Bava Metzia 113
אֲבָל מְטָא זְמַן חִיּוּבֵיהּ – רָמֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ וּמִידְּכַר.
but when the time of his obligation to pay arrives, he applies himself and remembers all the details, so as not to violate the prohibition of delaying payment of the laborer’s wages.
וְכִי שָׂכִיר עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תִּגְזֹל״? הָתָם תְּרֵי חֲזָקֵי, הָכָא חֲדָא חֲזָקָה. גַּבֵּי בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אִיכָּא תְּרֵי חֲזָקֵי: חֲדָא דְּאֵין בַּעַל הַבַּיִת עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תָּלִין״, וַחֲדָא דְּאֵין שָׂכִיר מְשַׁהֶא שְׂכָרוֹ. וְהָכָא חֲדָא חֲזָקָה.
The Gemara asks: Why would one rely upon the presumption that the employer would not transgress? But is the hired laborer suspected of violating the prohibition of stealing? The Gemara replies: There, concerning the credibility of an employer, there are two presumptions, whereas here, concerning the credibility of a laborer, there is only one presumption. The Gemara explains: Concerning the credibility of an employer there are the following two presumptions: One is that the employer does not violate the prohibition of delaying payment of wages, and the other one is that a hired laborer does not delay the request for his wages. But here, concerning the credibility of the laborer, there is only one presumption, i.e., that the laborer does not violate the prohibition of stealing.
אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. וְהָא (קָתָבְעוֹ לְקַמַּן) [קָא תָבַע לֵיהּ קַמַּן]? אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי: שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ. וְדִלְמָא לְבָתַר הָכִי פְּרַע? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ כָּל זְמַנּוֹ.
The mishna teaches: If there are witnesses who testify that he claimed the money from him, he takes an oath and receives the money. The Gemara asks: But what need is there for witnesses that he lodged a claim, when he is claiming it from him in front of us? Rabbi Asi said: The tanna is referring to witnesses that testified that he claimed it from him at its proper time. The Gemara challenges: Even if the laborer claimed the money at the proper time, perhaps the employer paid him afterward. Abaye said: The witnesses testify that he claimed it from him the entire time, i.e., from the time he completed his labor until the end of that day.
וּלְעוֹלָם לָא פָּרַע לֵיהּ?! אָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר עוּקְבָא: כְּנֶגֶד אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם שֶׁל תְּבִיעָה.
The Gemara continues: And is it always assumed that the employer did not pay the laborer? Why does the fact that he claimed his money at the proper time mean that his claim against his employer is always accepted? Rav Ḥama bar Ukva said: The tanna means that he is given another day corresponding to that day of his claim during which the laborer can claim that he has not been paid.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ – לֹא יְמַשְׁכְּנֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין. וְלֹא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ לִיטּוֹל מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בַּחוּץ תַּעֲמֹד״. הָיוּ לוֹ שְׁנֵי כֵלִים – נוֹטֵל אֶחָד וּמַנִּיחַ אֶחָד.
MISHNA: With regard to one who lends money to another and the debtor fails to repay it at the end of the term of the loan, the creditor may take collateral from him to ensure payment only by means of an agent of the court, not of his own accord. And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral, as it is stated: “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral to you outside” (Deuteronomy 24:10–11). If the debtor had two utensils of the same kind, the creditor takes one and leaves the other one in the debtor’s possession.
וּמַחְזִיר אֶת הַכַּר בַּלַּיְלָה וְאֶת הַמַּחְרֵישָׁה בַּיּוֹם. וְאִם מֵת – אֵינוֹ מַחְזִיר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אַף לְעַצְמוֹ אֵינוֹ מַחְזִיר אֶלָּא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וּמִשְּׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וּלְהַלָּן מוֹכְרָן בְּבֵית דִּין.
And in addition, the creditor must return a pillow at night, as the debtor requires it for sleeping, and a plow, which is needed for his daytime work, by day. If the debtor died, he is not required to return it to the debtor’s heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even to the debtor himself he needs to return the collateral each day only until thirty days have passed, and from thirty days onward, the creditor can sell them in court, with the proceeds going toward payment of the debt.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין מְנַתַּח נַתּוֹחֵי – אִין, אֲבָל מַשְׁכּוֹנֵי – לָא. וְהָתְנַן: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ לֹא יְמַשְׁכְּנֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין, מִכְּלָל דִּבְבֵית דִּין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין!
GEMARA: Shmuel says: An agent of the court who was granted permission to appropriate items from a debtor up to the sum of the loan may seize these items from him in the marketplace, but is not permitted to enter the debtor’s house and take collateral. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that one who lends money to another may take collateral from him only by means of an agent of the court, which proves by inference that when it is taken by means of an agent of the court the agent of the court may enter the debtor’s house and take collateral?
אָמַר לָךְ שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵימָא, לֹא יְנַתְּחֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין. הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: לֹא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ לִיטּוֹל מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ. מַנִּי? אִילֵּימָא בַּעַל חוֹב – מֵרֵישָׁא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו, שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין!
The Gemara responds: Shmuel could have said to you: Say that the mishna meant as follows: He may seize it forcibly from him only by means of an agent of the court. The Gemara adds: So, too, it is reasonable that this is correct, as the latter clause of the mishna teaches: And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral. Who is the tanna referring to here? If we say it is referring to the creditor, this clause is not needed, as this halakha can be concluded from the first clause of the mishna, which states that a creditor has no right to take collateral himself. Rather, is it not referring to the court agent? Accordingly, this teaches that even an agent of the court may not enter the debtor’s house to take the collateral.
אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא – לָא אִירְיָא. הָכִי קָאָמַר: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ לֹא יְמַשְׁכְּנֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין, מִכְּלָל דִּבְבֵית דִּין מְמַשְׁכְּנִים, וּבַעַל חוֹב אֲפִילּוּ נַתּוֹחֵי נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁלֹּא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ לִיטּוֹל מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ.
The Gemara refutes the above claim: If the argument to understand the mishna in that manner is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument, as it is possible that this is what the mishna is saying: One who lends money to another may take collateral from him by entering the debtor’s house only by means of an agent of the court, which proves by inference that it is permitted to take collateral by entering the debtor’s house by means of an agent of the court. One can then infer: But as for the creditor himself, he may not even seize collateral outside the debtor’s house. This is a rabbinic decree so that he should not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral.
מֵתִיב רַב יוֹסֵף: ״לָא יַחֲבֹל רֵיחַיִם וָרָכֶב״, הָא דְּבָרִים אֲחֵרִים – חֲבֹל. ״לֹא תַחֲבֹל בֶּגֶד אַלְמָנָה״, הָא שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים – תַּחְבֹּל, מַאן? אִי נֵימָא בַּעַל חוֹב, הָא כְּתִיב: ״לֹא תָבֹא אֶל בֵּיתוֹ לַעֲבֹט עֲבֹטוֹ״, אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין!
Rav Yosef raises an objection to Shmuel’s statement from a baraita: The Torah states: “He may not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:6). But it may be inferred that other items may be taken as collateral. Similarly, it states: “You may not take a widow’s garment as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:17), but clothing that belongs to others you may take as collateral. The Gemara analyzes these statements: Who is permitted to do so? If we say that the creditor may take these items, that cannot be, as it is written: “You shall not go into his house to take his collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:10). Rather, is it not referring to the agent of the court, which indicates that the agent of the court may enter the debtor’s house and take collateral, although the Torah places limits on which item he can take?
תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב פָּפָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: לְעוֹלָם בְּבַעַל חוֹב, וְלַעֲבוֹר עָלָיו בִּשְׁנֵי לָאוִין.
Rav Pappa, son of Rav Naḥman, interpreted the baraita before Rav Yosef; and some say it was Rav Pappa, son of Rav Yosef, who interpreted the baraita before Rav Yosef: Actually, it is referring to a creditor, and the Torah’s additional prohibition against appropriating certain items is given so that he will violate two prohibitions for this action. For example, if he took the lower or upper millstone he violates both the command: “You shall not go into his house,” as well as the more specific prohibition.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״בַּחוּץ תַּעֲמֹד״ אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁ״הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר אַתָּה נוֹשֶׁה בוֹ יוֹצִיא״! אֶלָּא מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְהָאִישׁ״ – לְרַבּוֹת שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין. מַאי לָאו: שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין כְּלֹוֶה?
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different baraita that contradicts Shmuel: From the implication of that which is stated: “You shall stand outside,” do I not know that: “And the man to whom you lend shall bring forth outside” (Deuteronomy 24:11)? Rather, why must the verse state the inclusive phrase “And the man to whom you lend shall bring forth outside”? This serves to include the agent of the court. The Gemara comments: What, is it not that the agent of the court has the same status as the debtor himself, indicating that just as the debtor may enter his own house at any time, the court agent may act likewise?
לָא, שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין כְּמַלְוֶה.
The Gemara responds: No, the agent of the court is considered like the creditor, who must wait outside for the debtor to deliver his collateral.
תָּא שְׁמַע: ״אִם חָבֹל תַּחְבֹּל שַׂלְמַת רֵעֶךָ״ – בִּשְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בִּשְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְּבַעַל חוֹב? כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא תָבֹא אֶל בֵּיתוֹ לַעֲבֹט עֲבֹטוֹ״ – הֲרֵי בַּעַל חוֹב אָמוּר, הָא מָה אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים ״אִם חָבֹל תַּחְבֹּל שַׂלְמַת רֵעֶךָ״ – בִּשְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר!
The Gemara attempts a further proof. Come and hear that which the Sages taught: The verse states: “If you take as collateral your neighbor’s garment, you shall restore it to him until the sun goes down” (Exodus 22:25). The verse is speaking of an agent of the court. Do you say that the verse is speaking of an agent of the court, or perhaps it is referring only to a creditor? When it says: “You shall not go into his house to take his collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:10), the case of a creditor is thereby stated. How then do I realize the meaning of the verse: “If you take as collateral your neighbor’s garment”? The verse is speaking of an agent of the court. This indicates that an agent of the court has permission to take collateral.
תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁבָּא לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ – לֹא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ, אֶלָּא עוֹמֵד מִבַּחוּץ, וְהַלָּה מוֹצִיא לוֹ מַשְׁכּוֹן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״בַּחוּץ תַּעֲמֹד וְהָאִישׁ״.
The Gemara responds: This issue is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: An agent of the court who comes to take collateral from a debtor may not enter his house to take the collateral from him. Rather, the agent stands outside and the other, i.e., the debtor, brings out the collateral to him, as it is stated: “You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:11). According to this tanna, the agent of the court has the same status as the creditor.
וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: בַּעַל חוֹב שֶׁבָּא לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ – לֹא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ, אֶלָּא עוֹמֵד בַּחוּץ, וְהַלָּה נִכְנָס וּמוֹצִיא לוֹ מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בַּחוּץ תַּעֲמֹד״. וּשְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁבָּא לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִכְנָס לְבֵיתוֹ וּמְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ.
And it is taught in another baraita: A creditor who comes to take collateral from the debtor may not enter his house to take his collateral. Rather, he stands outside, and the other, i.e., the debtor, enters and brings out the collateral to him, as it is stated: “You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:11). But as for an agent of the court who comes to take collateral from the debtor, this agent may enter his house and take his collateral.
וְלֹא יְמַשְׁכְּנֶנּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁעוֹשִׂין בָּהֶן אוֹכֶל נֶפֶשׁ. וְנוֹתֵן מִטָּה וּמִטָּה וּמַצָּע – לְעָשִׁיר. מִטָּה וּמִטָּה וּמַפָּץ – לְעָנִי. לוֹ – אֲבָל לֹא לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, וְלֹא לְבָנָיו וְלִבְנוֹתָיו.
The baraita continues: The agent of the court may not take as collateral from the debtor items that people use in the preparation of food, as the debtor needs such items, and the Torah explicitly forbade their removal. And the agent gives, i.e., leaves behind, a bed, and a second bed, and blankets, for a wealthy person; and a bed, and a second bed, and a mat, for a poor person. These items are left for the debtor himself, but not for his wife, and not for his sons or for his daughters, as the Torah did not obligate the creditor to care for the debtor’s family.
כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁמְּסַדְּרִין לְבַעַל חוֹב – כָּךְ מְסַדְּרִין בַּעֲרָכִין. כְּלַפֵּי לְיָיא?! עִיקַּר סִידּוּר – בַּעֲרָכִין כְּתִיב! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁמְּסַדְּרִין בַּעֲרָכִין – כָּךְ מְסַדְּרִין בְּבַעַל חוֹב.
The tanna adds: In the manner that arrangements are made for a debtor to be left with certain necessary utensils, so arrangements are made for one obligated to give money to the Temple treasury resulting from a vow in the category of valuations. If one vowed to give a certain valuation to the Sanctuary as specified in the Torah (see Leviticus 27) but does not have sufficient money to pay that sum immediately, a similar arrangement is made for him. The Gemara is puzzled by this last clause: Isn’t it the opposite? The primary discussion of arrangements is stated in the Torah with regard to valuations, from which the halakha of other debts is derived. Rather, say that in the manner that arrangements are made for valuations as explained by the Torah, so arrangements are made for a debtor.
אָמַר מָר: נוֹתֵן מִטָּה וּמִטָּה וּמַצָּע לְעָשִׁיר, מִטָּה וּמִטָּה וּמַפָּץ לְעָנִי. לְמַאן? אִילֵימָא לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וּלְבָנָיו וְלִבְנוֹתָיו – הָא אָמְרַתְּ, לוֹ, אֲבָל לֹא לְאִשְׁתּוֹ וּלְבָנָיו וְלִבְנוֹתָיו! אֶלָּא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי לְדִידֵיהּ.
§ The Master said above: He gives a bed, and a second bed, and blankets, for a wealthy person; and a bed, and a second bed, and a mat, for a poor person. The Gemara asks: For whom is this extra bed? If we say it is for his wife, for his sons, or for his daughters, didn’t you expressly say that these items are left for him, but not for his wife, for his sons, or for his daughters? Rather, both this bed and that bed are for him.
תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי? חֲדָא דְּאָכֵיל עֲלַהּ וַחֲדָא דְּזָג עֲלַהּ, כְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל. דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כֹּל מִילֵּי יָדַעְנָא אָסוּתַיְיהוּ, לְבַר מֵהָנֵי תְּלָת: מַאן דְּאָכֵיל אֲהִינָא מְרִירָא אַלִּיבָּא רֵיקָנָא, מַאן דְּאָסַר מִיתְנָא דְּכִיתָּנָא רַטִּיבָא אַחַרְצֵיהּ, וּמַאן דְּאָכֵיל נַהֲמָא וְלָא מְסַגֵּי אַרְבְּעָה גַּרְמִידֵי.
The Gemara asks: Why does the debtor need two beds when one should suffice for all his needs? The Gemara answers: One is for him to eat on it and one is for him to sleep on it, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel, who was a doctor by profession, said: With regard to all items that cause illness, I know their cure, apart from these three: One who eats a bitter date [ahina] on an empty stomach, one who girds a wet linen belt around his loins, and one who eats bread and does not walk four cubits afterward. It is for this reason that one requires two beds, so that he should not eat and sleep on the same bed without having to walk a little distance between them after his meal.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁמְּסַדְּרִין בַּעֲרָכִין – כָּךְ מְסַדְּרִין בְּבַעַל חוֹב. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַשְׁתָּא זַבּוֹנֵי מְזַבְּנִינַן לֵיהּ, סַדּוֹרֵי מְסַדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ?! וּמִי מְזַבְּנִינַן לֵיהּ? וְהָתְנַן: מַחְזִיר אֶת הַכַּר בַּלַּיְלָה, וְאֶת הַמַּחְרֵישָׁה בַּיּוֹם!
§ A tanna taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman: In the manner in which arrangements are made for valuations, so arrangements are made for a debtor. Rav Naḥman said to him: Now that it states in the mishna that we sell his collateral, do we arrange for him to keep part of it? The Gemara asks: And do we sell it? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that he returns a pillow at night and a plow by day, which demonstrates that such items are not sold?
תַּנָּא כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: הַשְׁתָּא לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל זַבּוֹנֵי מְזַבְּנִינַן לֵיהּ, סַדּוֹרֵי מְסַדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ? דִּתְנַן, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אַף לְעַצְמוֹ אֵינוֹ מַחְזִיר אֶלָּא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ מוֹכְרָן בְּבֵית דִּין.
The Gemara answers: The tanna taught the baraita before him in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and this is what Rav Naḥman was saying to him: Now, since according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel we sell the collateral, do we make arrangements for him to keep it? As we learned in the mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even to the debtor himself he needs to return the collateral each day only until thirty days have passed, and from that point onward, the creditor can sell them in court, with the proceeds going toward payment of the debt.
וּמִמַּאי דְּכִי קָאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל זַבּוֹנֵי – לִגְמָרֵי קָאָמַר? דִּלְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם [מַ]הְדַּר לֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ מַיהְדַּר לֵיהּ לְמַאי דַּחֲזֵי לֵיהּ, וּמְזַבְּנִינַן מַאי דְּלָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ?
The Gemara asks: And from where is it known that when Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that he sells the collateral, he was saying that there may be a complete sale? Perhaps this is what he is saying: Until thirty days, the creditor returns it to the debtor as is; from that point onward, the creditor returns to him that which is fit for him, and we sell what is not fit for him.
אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הַאי סְבָרָא, לֵיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּלָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ. דְּאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – כּוּלְּהוּ סְבִירָא לְהוּ: כׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּנֵי מְלָכִים הֵן.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If it enters your mind that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains this reasoning, there is nothing that is unfit for him. As Abaye said: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva all hold that all Israel are the children of kings. In other words, a Jew is never deemed unfit to use a certain item, even if it is a luxury item.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דִּתְנַן: לֹא אֶת הַלּוּף וְלָא אֶת הַחַרְדָּל. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מַתִּיר בַּלּוּף, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מַאֲכָל לְעוֹרְבִין.
The Gemara cites the cases in which the tanna’im apply the above principle. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel applies this principle, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 126b): One may not move either raw arum or raw mustard on Shabbat, as these are unfit for consumption when they are raw, and are therefore set-aside [muktze]. In the case of arum, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits moving it because it is considered food for ravens, which wealthy Jews would breed for purposes of ornamentation and amusement. As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits all people to carry arum, not only the rich, it is evident that he maintains that all Jews are considered wealthy in this regard.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דִּתְנַן: בְּנֵי מְלָכִים סָכִין שֶׁמֶן וֶורֶד עַל גַּבֵּי מַכּוֹתֵיהֶן בְּשַׁבָּת, שֶׁכֵּן דַּרְכָּן לָסוּךְ בַּחוֹל. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּנֵי מְלָכִים הֵן.
Rabbi Shimon applies this principle as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 111a): Princes may smear rose oil on their wounds on Shabbat, even though most people use this oil for medicinal purposes, and healing oneself using oil is prohibited on Shabbat. The reason is that it is the usual manner of princes to smear rose oil on themselves for pleasure during the week. Rabbi Shimon says: All of the Jewish people are princes, and it is permitted for them to smear rose oil on themselves on Shabbat.
רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיוּ נוֹשִׁין בּוֹ אֶלֶף זוּז וְלָבוּשׁ אִיצְטְלָא בַּת מֵאָה מָנֶה – מַפְשִׁיטִין אוֹתָהּ מִמֶּנּוּ וּמַלְבִּישִׁים אוֹתוֹ אִיצְטְלָא הָרְאוּיָה לוֹ. וְתָנָא מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, וְתָנָא מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: כׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל רְאוּיִן לְאוֹתָהּ אִיצְטְלָא.
Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva also hold this opinion, as it is taught in a baraita: If creditors were claiming one thousand dinars from someone, and he was wearing a cloak [itztela] worth ten thousand dinars, the court strips it from him and sells it for his debt, and dresses him in a cloak appropriate for him, as one who is in debt does not have the right to withhold payment while possessing such an expensive garment. And it was taught in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, and it was similarly taught in the name of Rabbi Akiva: All of the Jewish people are fit for that cloak. One’s clothing is not sold to pay a debt, and since all Jews are worthy of wearing the finest garments, this halakha applies to an expensive cloak as well.
וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק אַדַּעְתִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא, דְּיָהֵיב לֵיהּ מַאי דַּחֲזֵי לֵיהּ, וּמְזַבְּנִינַן מַאי דְּלָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ? בִּשְׁלָמָא כַּר וָכֶסֶת חֲזֵי לֵיהּ דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי. אֶלָּא מַחְרֵישָׁה לְמַאי חַזְיָא? אָמַר רָבָא בַּר רַבָּה: מַחְרֵישָׁה דְּכַסְפָּא.
The Gemara returns to the issue at hand: And with regard to what entered our minds initially, that according to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the creditor returns to him that which is fit for him and we sell what is not fit for him, there is a difficulty, as the examples given in the mishna are bedding and a plow. Granted, this is understandable with regard to a pillow or cushion, as it can mean that the court sells these items only if the difference in cost between the ones he has and less expensive ones that are also fit for him suffices to repay the debt. But for what is a plow fit? In other words, how can there be a difference in price in this case? Rava bar Rabba said: This is referring to a silver plow, which is an ornament and not used for work.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב חַגָּא: וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ, לָאו עֲלַי קָרְמֵית? אָמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי:
Rav Ḥagga objects to this entire opinion concerning the arrangement made for a debtor: Let the creditor say to the debtor: Your needs are not cast upon me. In other words, why should I, who lent you money, make allowances for your livelihood? Abaye said to him:
