Bava Metzia 22
וְכֵן יַרְדֵּן שֶׁנָּטַל מִזֶּה וְנָתַן לָזֶה, מַה שֶּׁנָּטַל – נָטַל, וּמַה שֶּׁנָּתַן – נָתַן.
and likewise, in the case of the Jordan River or another river that took an item from this person and gave it to that person, in all those cases, that which the person took, he took, and that which the person gave, he gave. Likewise, that which the river took, it took, and that which the river gave, it gave. The person who received the item need not return it.
בִּשְׁלָמָא גַּזְלָן וְיַרְדֵּן, דְּקָא חָזֵי לְהוּ וּמִיָּאַשׁ. אֶלָּא גַּנָּב, מִי קָא חָזֵי לֵיהּ דְּמִיָּאַשׁ? תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב פָּפָּא בְּלִסְטִים מְזוּיָּן. אִי הָכִי הַיְינוּ גַּזְלָן! תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי גַּזְלָן.
The Gemara asks: Granted in the cases of the robber and the Jordan River, one could say that the owner sees them take the item and despairs of its recovery; but in the case of the thief, who takes the item surreptitiously, does the owner see him take the item and would that lead him to despair? The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa interpreted the term thief in the baraita to be referring to armed bandits [listim]; therefore, the owner is aware that the item was taken and he despairs of its recovery. The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as a robber, why mention two identical cases? The Gemara answers: The baraita mentioned two types of robbers; in both cases the owner was aware that his item was taken.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שָׁטַף נָהָר קוֹרָיו, עֵצָיו, וַאֲבָנָיו, וּנְתָנוֹ בְּתוֹךְ שְׂדֵה חֲבֵירוֹ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנִּתְיָאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים. טַעְמָא דְּנִתְיָאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים, הָא סְתָמָא – לָא! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּשֶׁיָּכוֹל לְהַצִּיל.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If a river swept away one’s beams, one’s wood, or one’s stones and placed them into the field of another, these items belong to the owner of the field due to the fact that the respective owners despaired of their recovery. The Gemara infers from the baraita: The reason they belong to the finder is that the owners despaired; but in an unspecified case, where it is not definitively known that the owners despaired, they do not belong to the finder. Apparently, despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. The Gemara rejects the proof: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the beams, wood, or stones; therefore, their decision not to rescue them is a clear indication of despair.
אִי הָכִי אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אִם הָיוּ הַבְּעָלִים מְרַדְּפִין אַחֲרֵיהֶם – חַיָּיב לְהַחְזִיר. אִי בִּיכוֹלִין לְהַצִּיל, מַאי אִרְיָא מְרַדְּפִין? אֲפִילּוּ אֵין מְרַדְּפִין נָמֵי! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בִּיכוֹלִין לְהַצִּיל עַל יְדֵי הַדְּחָק. מְרַדְּפִין – לָא אִיָּיאוּשׁ, אֵין מְרַדְּפִין – אִיָּיאוֹשֵׁי מִיָּאַשׁ.
The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the same baraita: If the owners were pursuing the items, the finder is obligated to return them. If it is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the items, why did the baraita specifically cite a case where the owners were pursuing the items? Even if they were not pursuing the lost items, the items also remain in their ownership, as they did not despair of their recovery. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owners are capable of rescuing the items with difficulty. In that case, if the owners pursue the items, it indicates that they did not despair of their recovery, but if the owners do not pursue the items, it indicates that they despaired of their recovery.
תָּא שְׁמַע: כֵּיצַד אָמְרוּ הַתּוֹרֵם שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה – הֲרֵי שֶׁיָּרַד לְתוֹךְ שְׂדֵה חֲבֵירוֹ וְלִיקֵּט וְתָרַם שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת, אִם חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם גָּזֵל – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה, וְאִם לָאו – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 1:5): When did the Sages say that in the case where one separates teruma without the owner’s consent, his teruma is considered teruma? It is in a case where there was someone who entered another’s field and gathered produce from it and separated teruma without the owner’s permission. If the owner is concerned about his actions and views it as robbery, his teruma is not teruma, but if he is not concerned, his teruma is teruma.
וּמִנַּיִן הוּא יוֹדֵעַ אִם חוֹשֵׁשׁ מִשּׁוּם גָּזֵל וְאִם לָאו? הֲרֵי שֶׁבָּא בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וּמְצָאוֹ, וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל יָפוֹת״. אִם נִמְצְאוּ יָפוֹת מֵהֶן – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה, וְאִם לָאו – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. לִיקְּטוּ הַבְּעָלִים וְהוֹסִיפוּ עֲלֵיהֶן, בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
The baraita continues: And from where would he know whether the owner is concerned about his actions and views it as robbery or not? If the owner came and found him separating teruma and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that, then if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma, since the owner is assumed to have been sincere and pleased that the other has separated teruma from his produce. But if not, his teruma is not teruma, as it may be assumed that the owner was angry at him and was speaking sarcastically. The baraita adds: If the owners were gathering and adding to the teruma he had separated, indicating that they agree to his act of separation, either way, whether or not better-quality produce was found, his teruma is considered teruma.
וְכִי נִמְצְאוּ יָפוֹת מֵהֶן תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה, אַמַּאי? בְּעִידָּנָא דִּתְרַם הָא לָא הֲוָה יָדַע! תַּרְגְּמַהּ רָבָא אַלִּיבָּא דְּאַבָּיֵי: דְּשַׁוְּיֵהּ שָׁלִיחַ.
The Gemara questions the ruling of the baraita: But why is that the halakha, that if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found his teruma is teruma? At the time that he separated the teruma, he did not know that the owner would ultimately agree. The baraita states that the teruma is teruma from the moment he separated it, despite the fact that it was only later that he learned that the owner agreed. Apparently, in the case of despair as well, despair that is not conscious is considered despair, contrary to the opinion of Abaye. Rava interpreted the matter in accordance with the opinion of Abaye: This is a case where the owner designated him as an agent.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ דְּלָא שַׁוְּויֵהּ שָׁלִיחַ, מִי הָוְיָא תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה? וְהָא ״אַתֶּם״ ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא לְרַבּוֹת שְׁלוּחֲכֶם. מָה אַתֶּם לְדַעְתְּכֶם, אַף שְׁלוּחֲכֶם לְדַעְתְּכֶם.
So too, it is reasonable, as if it enters your mind that the owner did not designate him as an agent, would his teruma be teruma? But doesn’t the Merciful One state: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28)? Once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the term “you also” serves to include an agent. Therefore, an agent separating teruma has the same halakhot as an owner separating teruma. Just as when you, the owner, separate teruma, it is with your knowledge, so too when your agent separates teruma, it must be with your knowledge. Evidently, in any event, one needs to be appointed as an agent to be capable of separating teruma for another.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן דְּשַׁוְּיֵהּ שָׁלִיחַ, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״זִיל תְּרוֹם״, וְלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״תְּרוֹם מֵהָנֵי״. וּסְתָמֵיהּ דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת כִּי תָּרֵים מִבֵּינוֹנִית (הוּא) תָּרֵים, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ וּתְרַם מִיָּפוֹת, וּבָא בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וּמְצָאוֹ וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל יָפוֹת״, אִם נִמְצְאוּ יָפוֹת מֵהֶן – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה, וְאִם לָאו – אֵין תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
Rather, with what are we dealing here? It is a case where the owner designated him as an agent and said to him: Go and separate teruma, but he did not say to him: Separate teruma from these specific crops. And when the owner’s intent is unspecified, and it is unclear which of his crops are meant to be separated when the agent separates teruma, it is from the crops of intermediate quality that he separates teruma. And in this case, the agent went and separated teruma from higher-quality produce, and the owner of the field came and found him and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that. If produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma. But if not, his teruma is not teruma.
אַמֵּימָר וּמָר זוּטְרָא וְרַב אָשֵׁי אִקְּלַעוּ לְבוּסְתָּנָא דְּמָרִי בַּר אִיסַק, אַיְיתִי אֲרִיסֵיהּ תַּמְרֵי וְרִימּוֹנֵי וּשְׁדָא קַמַּיְיהוּ. אַמֵּימָר וְרַב אָשֵׁי אָכְלִי, מָר זוּטְרָא לָא אֲכַל. אַדְּהָכִי אֲתָא מָרִי בַּר אִיסַק, אַשְׁכְּחִינְהוּ, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ לַאֲרִיסֵיהּ: אַמַּאי לָא אַיְיתֵית לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן מֵהָנָךְ שַׁפִּירָתָא?
The Gemara digresses with a related incident: Ameimar, Mar Zutra, and Rav Ashi happened to come to the orchard [levustana] of Mari bar Isak. His sharecropper came and placed dates and pomegranates before them. Ameimar and Rav Ashi ate the fruit, but Mar Zutra did not eat the fruit due to the concern that the sharecropper had provided them with the fruit without the approval of the owner of the field. Meanwhile, Mari bar Isak came and found them eating his fruit and said to his sharecropper: Why didn’t you bring the Sages fruit from those higher-quality fruits?
אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ אַמֵּימָר וְרַב אָשֵׁי לְמָר זוּטְרָא: הַשְׁתָּא אַמַּאי לָא אָכֵיל מָר? וְהָתַנְיָא: אִם נִמְצְאוּ יָפוֹת מֵהֶן – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה! אֲמַר לְהוּ, הָכִי אָמַר רָבָא: לֹא אָמְרוּ כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל יָפוֹת אֶלָּא לְעִנְיַן תְּרוּמָה בִּלְבַד, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִצְוָה הוּא וְנִיחָא לֵיהּ, אֲבָל הָכָא – מִשּׁוּם כְּסִיפוּתָא הוּא דְּאָמַר הָכִי.
Ameimar and Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: Now why is the Master not eating the fruit? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: In a case where the owner of the field came and found him and said to him: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma from that; if produce of better quality than the produce he had separated is found, his teruma is considered teruma. Here too, it is clear that Mari bar Isak approved of the actions of his sharecropper. Mar Zutra said to them that this is what Rava said: The Sages said that the statement: You should have gone to take the produce of better quality and separate teruma, indicates consent of the owner only with regard to the matter of teruma, due to the fact that it is a mitzva and the owner is amenable to having the mitzva fulfilled. But here, in this incident, it is due to shame that he said this: Why did you not bring these Sages fruit from those higher-quality fruits? He did not really want to give them the fruit.
תָּא שְׁמַע: עוֹדֵהוּ הַטַּל עֲלֵיהֶן וְשָׂמַח – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּכִי יֻתַּן. נִגְּבוּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׂמַח –
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from a baraita with regard to despair that is not conscious. It is written: “And if any part of their carcass falls upon any sowing seed that is to be sown, it is ritually pure. But when water is placed upon the seed, and any part of their carcass falls thereon, it is ritually impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38). Produce becomes susceptible to contracting ritual impurity only after coming into contact with one of seven liquids: Wine, honey, oil, milk, dew, blood, and water. It is taught in the baraita: If the dew is still upon the produce and has not yet dried, and if the owner was glad that the dew moistened the produce and kept it fresh, that produce falls into the category of: “But when water is placed upon the seed,” and the produce is susceptible to contracting ritual impurity. If the produce had dried when the owner found it, then even though he was glad that the dew had moistened the produce,
אֵינָן בְּכִי יוּתַּן.
the produce is not in the category of: “But when water is placed [khi yuttan] upon the seed,” and the produce is not susceptible to contracting ritual impurity.
טַעְמָא מַאי? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אָמְרִינַן כֵּיוָן דְּאִיגַּלַּאי מִילְּתָא דְּהַשְׁתָּא נִיחָא לֵיהּ, מֵעִיקָּרָא נָמֵי נִיחָא לֵיהּ? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּכְתִיב ״כִּי יִתֵּן״. עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן.
What is the reason that if the produce dried, the fact that the owner is glad does not render it susceptible to ritual impurity? Is it not due to the fact that we do not say: Since the matter was revealed that he is amenable to the moisture now, he was also amenable from the outset? The same should be true with regard to despair that is not conscious. The fact that when he becomes aware of his loss he despairs of its recovery does not indicate that he despaired from the outset, contrary to the opinion of Rava. The Gemara rejects the proof: It is different there, as although the phrase is vocalized to mean: “When it is placed,” it is written: When one places [ki yitten], from which it is derived that the produce is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity only if the owner places the liquid on the produce.
אִי הָכִי, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי: הָתָם כִּדְרַב פָּפָּא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא רָמֵי, כְּתִיב ״כִּי יִתֵּן״, וְקָרֵינַן כִּי יוּתַּן! הָא כֵּיצַד?
The Gemara asks: If so, in the first clause of the baraita, too, the produce should not be rendered susceptible to contracting impurity, because the dew fell on the produce and was not placed there by the owner. The Gemara answers: There, the explanation is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa raised a contradiction: The verse states: “But when water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls thereon, it is ritually impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:38). The word “yuttan” is written in the defective form, as if it says “ki yitten.” Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet, we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, as if it is written “ki yuttan,” which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled?
בָּעֵינַן ״כִּי יוּתַּן״ דֻּומְיָא ״דְּכִי יִתֵּן״. מָה ״יִתֵּן״ לְדַעַת, אַף ״כִּי יוּתַּן״ נָמֵי לְדַעַת.
Rav Pappa explains that we require that the situation described by the words “when water is placed [ki yuttan]” be similar to the situation described by the words: When one places [dekhi yitten]: Just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is with the knowledge of the owner that the produce becomes wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term “is placed [yuttan]” means that it is with his knowledge that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. Therefore, no proof may be cited with regard to the matter of despair, where there is no Torah derivation requiring awareness from the outset.
תָּא שְׁמַע דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בֶּן יְהוֹצָדָק: מִנַּיִן לַאֲבֵידָה שֶׁשְּׁטָפָהּ נָהָר שֶׁהִיא מוּתֶּרֶת? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכֵן תַּעֲשֶׂה לַחֲמוֹרוֹ וְכֵן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְשִׂמְלָתוֹ וְכֵן תַּעֲשֶׂה לְכׇל אֲבֵידַת אָחִיךָ אֲשֶׁר תֹּאבַד מִמֶּנּוּ וּמְצָאתָהּ״. מִי שֶׁאֲבוּדָה הֵימֶנּוּ וּמְצוּיָה אֵצֶל כׇּל אָדָם, יָצָאתָה זוֹ שֶׁאֲבוּדָה מִמֶּנּוּ וְאֵינָהּ מְצוּיָה אֵצֶל כׇּל אָדָם.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Yehotzadak: From where is it derived with regard to a lost item that the river swept away that it is permitted for its finder to keep it? It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it” (Deuteronomy 22:3). The verse states that one must return that which is lost from him, the owner, but is available to be found by any person. Excluded from that obligation is that which is lost from him and is not available to be found by any person; it is ownerless property and anyone who finds it may keep it.
וְאִיסּוּרָא דּוּמְיָא דְּהֶיתֵּירָא, מָה הֶיתֵּירָא בֵּין דְּאִית בַּהּ סִימָן וּבֵין דְּלֵית בַּהּ סִימָן – שַׁרְיָא, אַף אִיסּוּרָא בֵּין דְּאִית בַּהּ סִימַן וּבֵין דְּלֵית בַּהּ סִימָן – אֲסִירָא. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרָבָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא!
And the prohibition written in the verse against keeping an item that is lost only to its owner is similar to the allowance to keep an item lost to all people that is inferred from the verse; just as in the case of the allowance, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is permitted for the finder to keep it, so too in the case of the prohibition, whether there is a distinguishing mark and whether there is no distinguishing mark, it is prohibited for the finder to keep it, until there is proof that the owner despaired of its recovery. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rava is indeed a conclusive refutation.
וְהִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי בְּיַעַל קַגַּם.
And although in disputes between Abaye and Rava, the halakha is typically ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rava, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye in the disputes represented by the mnemonic: Yod, ayin, lamed; kuf, gimmel, mem.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְכִי מֵאַחַר דְּאִיתּוֹתַב רָבָא – הָנֵי תַּמְרֵי דְזִיקָא הֵיכִי אָכְלִינַן לְהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא שְׁקָצִים וּרְמָשִׂים דְּקָא אָכְלִי לְהוּ, מֵעִיקָּרָא יָאוֹשֵׁי מְיָאַשׁ מִנַּיְיהוּ.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And now that the opinion of Rava was conclusively refuted, and the halakha is that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, if those dates are blown off the tree by the wind, how do we eat them? Perhaps their owner did not despair of their recovery. Rav Ashi said to him: Since there are repugnant creatures and creeping animals that eat the dates after they fall, the owner despairs of their recovery from the outset. Therefore, one who finds the dates may keep them.
יַתְמֵי דְּלָאו בְּנֵי מְחִילָה נִינְהוּ, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בָּאגָא בְּאַרְעָא דְיַתְמֵי לָא מַחְזְקִינַן.
Rav Aḥa asked: Perhaps the tree belonged to minor orphans who, because they are not capable of relinquishing property, cannot despair of recovering the dates from the outset. Accordingly, what is the justification for eating found dates? Rav Ashi said to him: We do not presume a valley to be land belonging to orphans, and therefore that is not a concern.
מוּחְזָק וְעוֹמֵד, מַאי? כְּרַכְתָּא, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲסִירָן.
Rav Aḥa asked: If the presumptive status of the trees was previously established as belonging to orphans, what is the halakha? If the trees are surrounded by fences that prevent repugnant creatures and creeping animals from gaining access, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi said to him: The dates are forbidden in those cases.
כְּרִיכוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ. אָמַר רַבָּה: וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ סִימָן. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רַבָּה: סִימָן הֶעָשׂוּי לִידָּרֵס לָא הָוֵי סִימָן. רָבָא אָמַר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ סִימָן, אֲבָל בְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ סִימָן חַיָּיב לְהַכְרִיז. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר רָבָא: סִימָן הֶעָשׂוּי לִידָּרֵס הָוֵי סִימָן.
§ The mishna teaches that if one found bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him. Rabba says with regard to this ruling: And this is the halakha even with regard to an item on which there is a distinguishing mark. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabba holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is not that of a distinguishing mark. Since the owner of the lost item knows that the mark is prone to be trampled, he does not rely on it and he despairs of recovering the item. Rava said: The Sages taught this halakha only with regard to an item on which there is no distinguishing mark, but with regard to an item on which there is a distinguishing mark, the one who finds it is obligated to proclaim his find. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rava holds that the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is that of a distinguishing mark.
וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא בְּאַנְפֵּי נַפְשַׁהּ: סִימָן הֶעָשׂוּי לִידָּרֵס, רַבָּה אָמַר: לָא הָוֵי סִימָן, וְרָבָא אָמַר: הָוֵי סִימָן.
And there are those who teach the dispute with regard to this halakha independent of the mishna. With regard to the legal status of a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled, Rabba says: It is not a distinguishing mark. And Rava says: It is a distinguishing mark.
תְּנַן: כְּרִיכוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד – נוֹטֵל וּמַכְרִיז. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּלֵית בְּהוּ סִימָן, בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד מַאי מַכְרֵיז? אֶלָּא לָאו דְּאִית בְּהוּ סִימָן, וְקָתָנֵי: בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ. אַלְמָא סִימָן הֶעָשׂוּי לִידָּרֵס לָא הָוֵי סִימָן, תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרָבָא!
The Gemara cites proof from that which we learned in a baraita: If one finds bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him; if he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes them and proclaims his find. What are the circumstances? If it is a case where there is no distinguishing mark on the bundles, when one finds them in a secluded area, what does he proclaim? Rather, is it not a case where there is a distinguishing mark on the bundles, and there is then a reason for him to proclaim his find. And yet, it is taught in the baraita that if he finds the bundles in a public area those bundles belong to him. Apparently, a distinguishing mark that is prone to be trampled is not a distinguishing mark. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava.
אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: לְעוֹלָם דְּלֵית בְּהוּ סִימָן, וּדְקָא אָמְרַתְּ בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד מַאי מַכְרֵיז? מַכְרֵיז מָקוֹם. וְרַבָּה אָמַר: מָקוֹם לָא הָוֵי סִימָן. דְּאִיתְּמַר: מָקוֹם, רַבָּה אָמַר: לָא הָוֵי סִימָן, וְרָבָא אָמַר: הָוֵי סִימָן.
Rava could have said to you: Actually, it is a case where there is no distinguishing mark on the bundles. And with regard to that which you said: When one finds them in a secluded area, what does he proclaim? He proclaims that the owner should provide the location where he lost the bundles and thereby recover his bundles. And Rabba said: The location, provided by the owner, is not a distinguishing mark that would enable the return of an item to its owner. As it was stated that the amora’im disputed this matter: With regard to location, Rabba says: It is not a distinguishing mark, and Rava says: It is a distinguishing mark.
תָּא שְׁמַע: כְּרִיכוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד – נוֹטֵל וּמַכְרִיז. וְהָאֲלוּמּוֹת, בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים בֵּין בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד – נוֹטֵל וּמַכְרִיז. רַבָּה הֵיכִי מְתָרֵץ לַהּ, וְרָבָא הֵיכִי מְתָרֵץ לַהּ? רַבָּה מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ, בְּסִימָן. וְרָבָא מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ, בְּמָקוֹם.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one finds bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him; if he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes them and proclaims his find. And with regard to the sheaves, i.e., large bundles, whether he finds them in a public area or whether he finds them in a secluded area, the finder takes them and proclaims his find. How does Rabba explain the baraita, and how does Rava explain the baraita? Rabba explains, according to his line of reasoning, that the baraita is referring to bundles with a distinguishing mark. And Rava explains, according to his line of reasoning, that the baraita is referring to bundles whose location is their distinguishing mark.
רַבָּה מְתָרֵץ לְטַעְמֵיהּ בְּסִימָן: כְּרִיכוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, מִשּׁוּם
The Gemara elaborates. Rabba explains, according to his line of reasoning, that the baraita is referring to bundles with a distinguishing mark: If one finds bundles of grain in a public area, these belong to him due to the fact
