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Today's Daf Yomi

October 28, 2016 | 讻状讜 讘转砖专讬 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Metzia 32

If one loses money from his work by taking a lost item, how do we determine what compensation he receives from the owner? 聽According to the mishna, if he wants to get his full salary, he needs stipulate that in front of three men. 聽A story is brought about a different case where there was a debate about whether it needed to be done before 3 men like the case in our mishna or two is sufficient. 聽If one finds an animal in a cowshed, it is not considered a lost item but in a public thoroughfare, it is. 聽More details of this are discussed in the gemara. 聽If one’s parent tells you to do something against what the Torah prescribes, one cannot listen to one’s parent. 聽The differences between loading and unloading are discussed. 聽Within the context of that conversation, Rava claims that the mitzva of tzaar baalei chayim is prescribed by the Torah. 聽Various proofs and contradictory sources are brought.

转专讬 诪讙讜 转诇转讗 讜讗讬 谞诪讬 转专讬 住讛讚讬 讚驻诇讙转 讘讗驻讬 讘讬 转诇转讗

two of the three of them to testify that you dissolved the partnership before them. Or alternatively, bring two witnesses to testify that you dissolved the partnership before a court of three.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪谞讗 诇讱 讛讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讚转谞谉 讗诐 讬砖 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪转谞讛 讘驻谞讬讛诐 讗讬谉 砖诐 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘驻谞讬 诪讬 讬转谞讛 砖诇讜 拽讜讚诐

Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: From where do you know this halakha, that dissolution of the partnership may be accomplished only before a court? Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: It is as we learned in the mishna: If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. But if there is no court there, before whom can he stipulate his condition? Rather, in that case, his financial interests take precedence, and he need not return the lost item. Apparently, one stipulates binding conditions with regard to another鈥檚 property only before a court.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讚诪驻讬拽 诪诪讜谞讗 诪讛讗讬 讜诪讜转讬讘 诇讛讗讬 讘注讬谞谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讬讚讬讛 砖拽诇讬 讙讬诇讜讬 诪讬诇转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讘转专讬 住讙讬 诇讬讛 转讚注 讚转谞谉 讗诇诪谞讛 诪讜讻专转 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉

Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: Is that case in the mishna comparable to this case? There, where he is removing property from the possession of this person and giving it to that person, we require a court. But here, referring to himself in the third person, he is merely taking his own property, and not the property of any other person. There is no transaction effected here. It is mere disclosure of the matter that he divided the joint property equitably, and two witnesses are sufficient for him to disclose that fact. Rav Safra cites proof. Know that this is so, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 97a) that a widow owed sustenance from her husband鈥檚 estate sells the property of the estate when not before a court. Apparently, one need not involve the court when reclaiming property that belongs to him.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜诇讗讜 诪讬 讗转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诇诪谞讛 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖诇 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讗讘诇 爪专讬讻讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖诇 讛讚讬讜讟讜转

Abaye said to him: But wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says: The court before which a widow sells the property of the estate need not be a court of experts, but is required to be at least a court of laymen. Therefore, as in the parallel case of the widow, even when disclosing that one took property belonging to him, two witnesses are not sufficient and a court is required.

诪转谞讬壮 诪爪讗讛 讘专驻转 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讘讛 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘讛 讜讗诐 讛讬转讛 讘讘讬转 讛拽讘专讜转 诇讗 讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讗诐 讗诪专 诇讜 讗讘讬讜 讛讬讟诪讗 讗讜 砖讗诪专 诇讜 讗诇 转讞讝讬专 诇讗 讬砖诪注 诇讜

MISHNA: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it to its owner. If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and a priest found it, he may not become impure to return it. If his father said to him: Become impure; or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father, as one may not violate Torah law to honor his father.

驻专拽 讜讟注谉 驻专拽 讜讟注谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪讬砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讗诪专 注讝讘 转注讝讘

If one unloaded a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight and then later loaded it onto the animal, and later unloaded and loaded it again, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to continue unloading and loading, as it is stated: 鈥淚f you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta鈥檃zov] with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times.

讛诇讱 讜讬砖讘 诇讜 讜讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜注诇讬讱 诪爪讜讛 讗诐 专爪讜谞讱 诇驻专讜拽 驻专讜拽 驻讟讜专 砖谞讗诪专 注诪讜 讗诐 讛讬讛 讝拽谉 讗讜 讞讜诇讛 讞讬讬讘

If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, if it is your wish to unload the burden, unload it, in such a case the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall release it with him,鈥 with the owner of the animal. If the failure of the owner to participate in unloading the burden was due to the fact he was old or infirm, the passerby is obligated to unload the burden alone.

诪爪讜讛 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 诇驻专讜拽 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗祝 诇讟注讜谉

There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. Rabbi Shimon says: There is even a mitzva to load the burden.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讛讬讛 注诇讬讜 讬转专 注诇 诪砖讗讜 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 转讞转 诪砖讗讜 诪砖讗讜讬 砖讬讻讜诇 诇注诪讜讚 讘讜

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: 鈥淯nder its burden,鈥 i.e., the obligation is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘讗 专驻转 砖讗诪专讜 讗讬谞讛 诪转注讛 讜讗讬谞讛 诪砖诪专转 讗讬谞讛 诪转注讛 诪讚拽转谞讬 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讘讛 讜讗讬谞讛 诪砖诪专转 诪讚讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讬转谞讬 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讘讛

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one found an animal in a stable, he need not return it to its owner. Rava said: The stable that the Sages mentioned in the mishna is one that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal so it will not flee. The Gemara explains Rava鈥檚 statement. That it does not encourage the animal to stray is learned from the fact that the tanna teaches: He is not obligated in its return. The fact that it does not secure the animal is learned from the fact that it was necessary for the tanna to teach: He is not obligated in its return.

讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诪砖诪专转 讛砖转讗 诪砖讻讞 诇讛 讗讘专讗讬 诪注讬讬诇 诇讛 诇讙讜讗讬 诪砖讻讞 诇讛 诪讙讜讗讬 诪讘注讬讗 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讗讬谞讛 诪砖诪专转 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara continues its explanation of Rava鈥檚 statement: As, if it enters your mind to say that it is a stable that secures the animal, that ruling would be extraneous. Now that in a case where one found the animal outside a stable he brings it inside a stable of that type and thereby returns the animal to its owner, in a case where he found the animal inside the stable is it necessary to teach that he is not obligated to return it to its owner? Rather, learn from it that the stable mentioned in the mishna does not secure the animal and therefore there is a possibility that one must return it. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it that it is a stable that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal.

诪爪讗讛 讘专驻转 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚转 转讜讱 诇转讞讜诐 诪讻诇诇 讚讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘转讜讱 讛转讞讜诐 谞诪讬 讞讬讬讘

搂 The mishna teaches: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitz岣k says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing within the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that if the animal was found in a public area he is obligated to return it, and even if it was within the city limits, he is also obligated to return it.

讗讬讻讗 讚诪转谞讬 诇讛 讗住讬驻讗 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚转 讞讜抓 诇转讞讜诐 诪讻诇诇 讚讘专驻转 讗驻讬诇讜 注讜诪讚转 讞讜抓 诇转讞讜诐 谞诪讬 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讘讛

There are those who teach this statement with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitz岣k says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing beyond the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that in a case where the animal was found in the stable, even if the animal is standing beyond the city limits, he is also not obligated in its return.

讘讘讬转 讛拽讘专讜转 诇讗 讬讟诪讗 诇讛 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诪谞讬谉 砖讗诐 讗诪专 诇讜 讗讘讬讜 讛讬讟诪讗 讗讜 砖讗诪专 诇讜 讗诇 转讞讝讬专 砖诇讗 讬砖诪注 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 讗讬砖 讗诪讜 讜讗讘讬讜 转讬专讗讜 讜讗转 砖讘转讜转讬 转砖诪专讜 讗谞讬 讛壮 讻讜诇讻诐 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘讻讘讜讚讬

搂 The mishna teaches: And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and was found by a priest, he may not become impure to return it. In a case where a priest鈥檚 father said to him: Become impure, or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: From where is it derived that if a priest鈥檚 father said to him: Become impure, or that if one鈥檚 father said to him: Do not return a lost item that you found; he should not listen to him? It is derived from the verse, as it is stated: 鈥淓very man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 19:3). From the fact that the verse concludes: 鈥淚 am the Lord,鈥 it is derived that: You are all, parent and child alike, obligated in My honor. Therefore, if a parent commands his child to refrain from observing a mitzva, he must not obey the command.

讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讗转 砖讘转讜转讬 转砖诪专讜 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 爪讬讬转讗 诇讬讛 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗讬 注砖讛 讜讛讗讬 诇讗 转注砖讛 讜注砖讛 讜诇讗 讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 讗转 诇讗 转注砖讛 讜注砖讛

The Gemara infers: The reason that a priest must not obey his father鈥檚 command to become impure is because the Merciful One writes: 鈥淵ou shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord鈥; but if it were not so, I would say that the child must obey him. The Gemara asks: But why? This obligation to obey a parent is a positive mitzva, as it is written: 鈥淗onor your father and your mother鈥 (Exodus 20:12), and that obligation of a priest to refrain from becoming impure is both a prohibition: 鈥淭o the dead among his people he shall not defile himself鈥 (Leviticus 21:1), and a positive mitzva: 鈥淵ou shall be holy鈥 (Leviticus 19:2); and the principle is that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition and a positive mitzva.

讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜拽砖 讻讬讘讜讚 讗讘 讜讗诐 诇讻讘讜讚讜 砖诇 诪拽讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讻讗谉 讻讘讚 讗转 讗讘讬讱 讜讗转 讗诪讱 讜谞讗诪专 诇讛诇谉 讻讘讚 讗转 讛壮 诪讛讜谞讱 讛诇讻讱 诇爪讬讬转 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诇讗 诇砖诪注 诇讬讛

The Gemara answers that the derivation from 鈥淵ou shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord鈥 was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since honoring one鈥檚 father and mother is equated to the honor of the Omnipresent, as it is stated here: 鈥淗onor your father and your mother鈥 (Exodus 20:12), and it is stated elsewhere: 鈥淗onor the Lord with your wealth鈥 (Proverbs 3:9), therefore, one might have thought that the priest must obey his father鈥檚 command to become impure. Therefore the Torah teaches us that the priest is commanded not to listen to him.

诪爪讜讛 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 诇驻专讜拽 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 诪讗讬 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 讻诇诇 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 驻专讬拽讛 讚讻转讬讘 注讝讘 转注讝讘 注诪讜 讟注讬谞讛 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 讛拽诐 转拽讬诐 注诪讜

搂 The mishna teaches: There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: But there is no mitzva to load it? If we say that it means: But there is no mitzva to load it at all; what is different about unloading, with regard to which it is written: 鈥淵ou shall release it with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5)? With regard to loading as well, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淵ou shall lift them with him鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:4)?

讗诇讗 诪爪讜讛 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 诇驻专讜拽 讘讞谞诐 讜诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 讘讞谞诐 讗诇讗 讘砖讻专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗祝 诇讟注讜谉 讘讞谞诐 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 驻专讬拽讛 讘讞谞诐 讟注讬谞讛 讘砖讻专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讝讜 讜讝讜 讘讞谞诐

The Gemara answers: Rather, there is a mitzva by Torah law to unload the burden for free, but there is no mitzva to load it for free; rather, the mitzva is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon says: There is also a mitzva to load it for free. The Gemara states: We learn by inference from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: Unloading is performed for free, and loading is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon said: Both this and that are performed for free.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讬讛讜 讚专讘谞谉 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讟注讬谞讛 讜诇讗 讘注讬 驻专讬拽讛 讜讗谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 讜诪讛 讟注讬谞讛 讚诇讬转 讘讛 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讜诇讬讻讗 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讞讬讬讘 驻专讬拽讛 讚讗讬转 讘讛 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讜讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诇讗 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讻转讘讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 驻专讬拽讛 讘讞谞诐 讟注讬谞讛 讘砖讻专

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis that there is a distinction between unloading and loading with regard to remuneration? The reason is that if it enters your mind that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let the Merciful One write only the mitzva of loading, and then He would need not write the mitzva of unloading, and I would say: Just as with regard to loading, where there is no potential suffering of animals and there is no potential monetary loss for the owner, one is obligated to load the burden, with regard to unloading, where there is potential suffering of animals and there is potential monetary loss for the owner, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden? Rather, with regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write the mitzva of unloading? It is to tell you: The mitzva of unloading the burden is performed for free, but the mitzva of loading is performed with remuneration.

讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that even loading is performed for free, what is the reason that the Torah writes the mitzva of unloading? The Gemara answers: It is because the verses are not clearly defined, and it is unclear which of the verses refers to loading and which refers to unloading. Had the Torah written one verse, it would have been interpreted with regard to unloading, and there would be no source that one needs to load an animal.

讜专讘谞谉 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬 讛讻讗 讻转讬讘 专讜讘抓 转讞转 诪砖讗讜 讛转诐 讻转讬讘 谞讜驻诇讬谉 讘讚专讱 讚专诪讜 讗讬谞讛讜 讜讟注讜谞讬讬讛讜 讘讗讜专讞讗 诪砖诪注 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 谞讜驻诇讬谉 讘讚专讱 讗讬谞讛讜 讜讟注讜谞讬讬讛讜 注诇讜讬讬讛讜 诪砖诪注

And the Rabbis could ask: Why does Rabbi Shimon say that the verses are not clearly defined? Here it is written: 鈥淐ollapsed under its burden鈥 (Exodus 23:5), clearly referring to the case of a burden that needs unloading, and there it is written: 鈥淔allen down by the way鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:4), indicating that both the animals and their burdens are lying on the way and are in need of loading. And Rabbi Shimon explains that the verses are not defined because the phrase 鈥渇allen down by the way鈥 could be understood as indicating that the animals are fallen with their burdens upon them, and referring to unloading.

讗诪专 专讘讗

Rava says:

诪讚讘专讬 砖谞讬讛诐 谞诇诪讚 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬 讗讘诇 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬 讚专砖讬谞谉 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚专砖讬谞谉

From the statements of both of these tanna鈥檌m it can be learned that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. As even Rabbi Shimon says that he disagreed with the opinion of the Rabbis only because the verses are not clearly defined; but had the verses been clearly defined, we would have learned the same a fortiori inference. Due to what factor can that inference be learned? What, is it not due to the matter of suffering of animals, which is a factor in unloading and not a factor in loading, that we would have learned the a fortiori inference?

讚诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜诪讛 讟注讬谞讛 讚诇讬转 讘讛 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讞讬讬讘 驻专讬拽讛 讚讗讬转 讘讛 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The Gemara rejects that proof. Perhaps the a fortiori inference is due to the fact that there is the factor of monetary loss in unloading but not in loading, and this is what the Rabbis are saying: If in the case of loading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is no potential monetary loss, one is obligated to help load the animal, in the case of unloading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is potential monetary loss, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden?

讜讟注讬谞讛 讗讬谉 讘讛 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讗讚讛讻讬 讜讛讻讬 讘讟讬诇 诪砖讜拽讬讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讗转讜 讙谞讘讬 讜砖拽诇讬 讻诇 诪讛 讚讗讬讻讗 讘讛讚讬讛

The Gemara asks: But is there no potential monetary loss in loading? Are we not also dealing with a case where in the meanwhile, while the owner waits for assistance, he will be prevented from bringing his merchandise to the marketplace in time to sell it; alternatively, thieves might come and take all the merchandise that is there with him? Therefore, no a fortiori inference can be learned on the basis of monetary loss, and the inference must be based on the matter of the suffering of animals.

转讚注 讚爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讛讬讛 注诇讬讜 讬转专 [注诇] 诪砖讗讜 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 转讞转 诪砖讗讜 诪砖讗讜讬 砖讬讻讜诇 诇注诪讜讚 讘讜 诇讗讜 诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讝拽讜拽 诇讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, as it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: 鈥淯nder its burden鈥 (Exodus 23:5). Rabbi Yosei holds that the obligation to unload an animal is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear; does this not indicate by inference that the first tanna holds that he must attend to it to unload a burden that is greater than its typical burden? What is the reason for this ruling; is it not due to the fact that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law?

讚诇诪讗 讘转讞转 诪砖讗讜 驻诇讬讙讬 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 住讘专 讚专砖讬谞谉 转讞转 诪砖讗讜 诪砖讗讜讬 砖讬讻讜诇 诇注诪讜讚 讘讜 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讚专砖讬谞谉 转讞转 诪砖讗讜

The Gemara rejects that proof: Perhaps it is with regard to the meaning of the phrase 鈥渦nder its burden鈥 that they disagree, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that we interpret the phrase 鈥渦nder its burden鈥 to mean: A burden that the animal can bear. And the Rabbis hold that we do not interpret the phrase 鈥渦nder its burden鈥 in this manner.

转讚注 讚爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 讛诇讱 讜讬砖讘 诇讜 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜注诇讬讱 诪爪讜讛 诇驻专讜拽 驻专讜拽 驻讟讜专 砖谞讗诪专 注诪讜 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讛 诇讬 讗讬转讬讛 诇诪专讬讛 讘讛讚讬讛 讜诪讛 诇讬 讻讬 诇讬转讬讛 诇诪专讬讛 讘讛讚讬讛

The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, as it is taught in the former clause of the mishna: If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, unload it, the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall release it with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5). And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if its owner is working with the passerby and what is it to me if its owner is not working with the passerby? The animal suffers in both cases.

诇注讜诇诐 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讬 住讘专转 驻讟讜专 驻讟讜专 诇讙诪专讬 讜讚诇诪讗 驻讟讜专 讘讞谞诐 讜讞讬讬讘 讘砖讻专 讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讻讬 讗讬转讬讛 诇诪专讬讛 讘讛讚讬讛 注讘讚 讙讘讬讛 讘讞谞诐 讜讻讬 诇讬转讬讛 诇诪专讬讛 讘讛讚讬讛 注讘讚 讙讘讬讛 讘砖讻专 讜诇注讜诇诐 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara rejects that proof: Actually, one could say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. And when the tanna exempts the passerby when the owner does not participate in unloading the burden, do you maintain that exempt means completely exempt? Perhaps it means that the passerby is exempt from unloading the burden for free, but is obligated to do so for remuneration; and this is what the Merciful One said: If its owner is working with the passerby, perform the unloading with him for free; and if its owner is not working with the passerby, perform the unloading for him for remuneration. And actually, the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law.

(住讬诪谉 讘讛诪转 讘讛诪转 讗讜讛讘 砖讜谞讗 专讘爪谉)

The Gemara presents a mnemonic for a series of proposed proofs cited by the Gemara: Animal of; animal of; friend; enemy; collapser.

诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 讘讛诪转 谞讻专讬 诪讟驻诇 讘讛 讻讘讛诪转 讬砖专讗诇 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 诪讟驻诇 讘讛 讻讘讛诪转 讬砖专讗诇 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诪讗讬 诪讟驻诇 讘讛 讻讘讛诪转 讬砖专讗诇 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 讗讬讘讛

Let us say that a baraita supports Rava鈥檚 opinion that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under its burden, he tends to it and unloads its burden, as he would the animal of a Jew. The Gemara reasons: Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he tends to it as he would the animal of a Jew. But if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, why does he tend to it as he would the animal of a Jew? The Gemara rejects the proof: There one tends to the animal due to enmity that would arise if gentiles see Jews assisting their own people and not gentiles. The obligation is not due to the requirement to prevent suffering of animals.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽转谞讬 讗诐 讛讬转讛 讟注讜谞讛 讬讬谉 谞住讱 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜诇讛讟注讬谞讛 讬讬谉 谞住讱 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讛

So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita in this manner, as it is taught in another baraita: If the animal of a gentile was loaded with wine used for a libation to idolatry, and the animal is collapsed under its burden, a Jew does not attend to it. Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering of animals is not by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he does not attend to it. But if you say that the obligation is by Torah law, why does he not attend to it; isn鈥檛 the animal suffering? The Gemara answers that this is what the tanna is saying: And to load the animal with wine used for a libation to idolatry, he does not attend to it. Loading an animal does not alleviate its suffering. Furthermore, the refusal of the Jew to handle the libation wine will not cause enmity, because he can explain that his religion precludes him from handling these materials.

转讗 砖诪注 讘讛诪转 谞讻专讬 讜诪砖讗讜讬 讬砖专讗诇 讜讞讚诇转 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诪讗讬 讜讞讚诇转 注讝讘 转注讝讘 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇注讜诇诐 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛转诐 讘讟注讬谞讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under the burden of a Jew, he may refuse to unload the burden, as it is written: 鈥淚f you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5). By employing the phrase 鈥測ou shall forgo,鈥 the verse indicates that there are circumstances in which one may forgo unloading the animal. The Gemara reasons: And if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, why is there the option of: 鈥淵ou shall forgo鈥? The Torah should have commanded only: 鈥淵ou shall release it with him.鈥 The Gemara answers: Actually, say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, and there the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讘讛诪转 讬砖专讗诇 讜诪砖讗讜讬 谞讻专讬 注讝讘 转注讝讘 讜讗讬 讘讟注讬谞讛 讗诪讗讬 注讝讘 转注讝讘 诪砖讜诐 爪注专讗 讚讬砖专讗诇

The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the baraita: With regard to a case involving the animal of a Jew collapsed under the burden of a gentile, it is written: 鈥淵ou shall release it.鈥 And if the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor, why does the baraita state: 鈥淵ou shall release it鈥? The Gemara answers: It is because in that case, there is suffering of the Jew, who is delayed while waiting for the animal to be loaded.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 专讬砖讗 讘讞诪专 谞讻专讬 住讬驻讗 讘讞诪专 讬砖专讗诇 诪讗讬 驻住拽转 住转诪讗 讚诪诇转讗 讗讬谞讬砖 讘转专 讞诪专讬讛 讗讝讬诇

The Gemara asks: If so, then the halakha should be the same even in the first clause. Why is there no requirement to prevent the suffering of the Jewish partner in that case? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the first clause is stated with regard to a gentile donkey driver, and the Jewish owner of the burden is absent. The ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a Jewish donkey driver and one is obligated to prevent his suffering. The Gemara asks: On what basis did you arrive at this definitive assertion that the animal of a Jew is driven by that Jew and the animal of a gentile is driven by that gentile? The Gemara answers: The typical state of matters is that a person follows his donkey. The first clause addressed the case of a gentile鈥檚 donkey, so presumably its driver is gentile. The latter clause addressed the case of a Jew鈥檚 donkey, so presumably its driver is a Jew.

讜讛讗 讜讞讚诇转 讜注讝讘 转注讝讘 讘驻专讬拽讛 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘讬

The Gemara questions the explanation that the baraita is referring to cases involving loading. But isn鈥檛 it with regard to unloading that the phrases cited in the baraita: 鈥淵ou shall forgo passing him by,鈥 and: 鈥淵ou shall release it,鈥 are written?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara answers that he said to him: Indeed, the fact that one need not unload the burden from the donkey in the first clause of the baraita indicates that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. That is the minority opinion, as the Rabbis disagree.

转讗 砖诪注 讗讜讛讘 诇驻专讜拽 讜砖讜谞讗 诇讟注讜谉 诪爪讜讛 讘砖讜谞讗 讻讚讬 诇讻讜祝 讗转 讬爪专讜 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讗 注讚讬祝 诇讬讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讻讚讬 诇讻讜祝 讗转 讬爪专讜 注讚讬祝

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters a friend whose animal collapsed and it is necessary to unload its burden, and one also encounters an enemy who needs assistance to load a burden onto his animal, the mitzva is to assist the enemy, in order to subjugate one鈥檚 evil inclination. The Gemara reasons: And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, that option, to unload his friend鈥檚 animal, is the preferable course of action for him. The Gemara answers: Even if the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, even so, loading his enemy鈥檚 animal in order to subjugate his evil inclination is preferable.

转讗 砖诪注 砖讜谞讗 砖讗诪专讜 砖讜谞讗 讬砖专讗诇 讜诇讗 砖讜谞讗 谞讻专讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讛 诇讬 砖讜谞讗 讬砖专讗诇 讜诪讛 诇讬 砖讜谞讗 谞讻专讬

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita. The enemy with regard to which they stated the halakha that one must assist with his animal is a Jewish enemy and not a gentile enemy. The Gemara asks: If you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if it is a Jewish enemy and what is it to me if it is a gentile enemy? In either case, failure to unload the burden will cause the animal suffering.

诪讬 住讘专转 讗砖讜谞讗 讚拽专讗 拽讗讬 讗砖讜谞讗 讚诪转谞讬转讬谉 拽讗讬

The Gemara answers: Do you maintain that the reference in the baraita to an enemy applies to the enemy mentioned in the verse: 鈥淚f you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden鈥ou shall release it with him鈥? It applies to the enemy mentioned in the baraita cited above, in which the tanna taught that loading a burden onto an enemy鈥檚 animal is preferable to unloading a burden from a friend鈥檚 animal.

转讗 砖诪注

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Bava Metzia 32

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 32

转专讬 诪讙讜 转诇转讗 讜讗讬 谞诪讬 转专讬 住讛讚讬 讚驻诇讙转 讘讗驻讬 讘讬 转诇转讗

two of the three of them to testify that you dissolved the partnership before them. Or alternatively, bring two witnesses to testify that you dissolved the partnership before a court of three.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪谞讗 诇讱 讛讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讚转谞谉 讗诐 讬砖 讘讬转 讚讬谉 诪转谞讛 讘驻谞讬讛诐 讗讬谉 砖诐 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讘驻谞讬 诪讬 讬转谞讛 砖诇讜 拽讜讚诐

Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: From where do you know this halakha, that dissolution of the partnership may be accomplished only before a court? Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: It is as we learned in the mishna: If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. But if there is no court there, before whom can he stipulate his condition? Rather, in that case, his financial interests take precedence, and he need not return the lost item. Apparently, one stipulates binding conditions with regard to another鈥檚 property only before a court.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讚诪驻讬拽 诪诪讜谞讗 诪讛讗讬 讜诪讜转讬讘 诇讛讗讬 讘注讬谞谉 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讬讚讬讛 砖拽诇讬 讙讬诇讜讬 诪讬诇转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 讘转专讬 住讙讬 诇讬讛 转讚注 讚转谞谉 讗诇诪谞讛 诪讜讻专转 砖诇讗 讘驻谞讬 讘讬转 讚讬谉

Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: Is that case in the mishna comparable to this case? There, where he is removing property from the possession of this person and giving it to that person, we require a court. But here, referring to himself in the third person, he is merely taking his own property, and not the property of any other person. There is no transaction effected here. It is mere disclosure of the matter that he divided the joint property equitably, and two witnesses are sufficient for him to disclose that fact. Rav Safra cites proof. Know that this is so, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 97a) that a widow owed sustenance from her husband鈥檚 estate sells the property of the estate when not before a court. Apparently, one need not involve the court when reclaiming property that belongs to him.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讜诇讗讜 诪讬 讗转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 诪谞讬讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诇诪谞讛 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖诇 诪讜诪讞讬谉 讗讘诇 爪专讬讻讛 讘讬转 讚讬谉 砖诇 讛讚讬讜讟讜转

Abaye said to him: But wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Na岣an says: The court before which a widow sells the property of the estate need not be a court of experts, but is required to be at least a court of laymen. Therefore, as in the parallel case of the widow, even when disclosing that one took property belonging to him, two witnesses are not sufficient and a court is required.

诪转谞讬壮 诪爪讗讛 讘专驻转 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讘讛 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘讛 讜讗诐 讛讬转讛 讘讘讬转 讛拽讘专讜转 诇讗 讬讟诪讗 诇讛 讗诐 讗诪专 诇讜 讗讘讬讜 讛讬讟诪讗 讗讜 砖讗诪专 诇讜 讗诇 转讞讝讬专 诇讗 讬砖诪注 诇讜

MISHNA: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it to its owner. If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and a priest found it, he may not become impure to return it. If his father said to him: Become impure; or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father, as one may not violate Torah law to honor his father.

驻专拽 讜讟注谉 驻专拽 讜讟注谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讗专讘注讛 讜讞诪讬砖讛 驻注诪讬诐 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讗诪专 注讝讘 转注讝讘

If one unloaded a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight and then later loaded it onto the animal, and later unloaded and loaded it again, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to continue unloading and loading, as it is stated: 鈥淚f you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta鈥檃zov] with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times.

讛诇讱 讜讬砖讘 诇讜 讜讗诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜注诇讬讱 诪爪讜讛 讗诐 专爪讜谞讱 诇驻专讜拽 驻专讜拽 驻讟讜专 砖谞讗诪专 注诪讜 讗诐 讛讬讛 讝拽谉 讗讜 讞讜诇讛 讞讬讬讘

If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, if it is your wish to unload the burden, unload it, in such a case the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall release it with him,鈥 with the owner of the animal. If the failure of the owner to participate in unloading the burden was due to the fact he was old or infirm, the passerby is obligated to unload the burden alone.

诪爪讜讛 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 诇驻专讜拽 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗祝 诇讟注讜谉

There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. Rabbi Shimon says: There is even a mitzva to load the burden.

专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讛讬讛 注诇讬讜 讬转专 注诇 诪砖讗讜 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 转讞转 诪砖讗讜 诪砖讗讜讬 砖讬讻讜诇 诇注诪讜讚 讘讜

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: 鈥淯nder its burden,鈥 i.e., the obligation is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘讗 专驻转 砖讗诪专讜 讗讬谞讛 诪转注讛 讜讗讬谞讛 诪砖诪专转 讗讬谞讛 诪转注讛 诪讚拽转谞讬 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讘讛 讜讗讬谞讛 诪砖诪专转 诪讚讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讬转谞讬 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讘讛

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one found an animal in a stable, he need not return it to its owner. Rava said: The stable that the Sages mentioned in the mishna is one that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal so it will not flee. The Gemara explains Rava鈥檚 statement. That it does not encourage the animal to stray is learned from the fact that the tanna teaches: He is not obligated in its return. The fact that it does not secure the animal is learned from the fact that it was necessary for the tanna to teach: He is not obligated in its return.

讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诪砖诪专转 讛砖转讗 诪砖讻讞 诇讛 讗讘专讗讬 诪注讬讬诇 诇讛 诇讙讜讗讬 诪砖讻讞 诇讛 诪讙讜讗讬 诪讘注讬讗 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讗讬谞讛 诪砖诪专转 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara continues its explanation of Rava鈥檚 statement: As, if it enters your mind to say that it is a stable that secures the animal, that ruling would be extraneous. Now that in a case where one found the animal outside a stable he brings it inside a stable of that type and thereby returns the animal to its owner, in a case where he found the animal inside the stable is it necessary to teach that he is not obligated to return it to its owner? Rather, learn from it that the stable mentioned in the mishna does not secure the animal and therefore there is a possibility that one must return it. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it that it is a stable that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal.

诪爪讗讛 讘专驻转 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚转 转讜讱 诇转讞讜诐 诪讻诇诇 讚讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讘转讜讱 讛转讞讜诐 谞诪讬 讞讬讬讘

搂 The mishna teaches: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitz岣k says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing within the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that if the animal was found in a public area he is obligated to return it, and even if it was within the city limits, he is also obligated to return it.

讗讬讻讗 讚诪转谞讬 诇讛 讗住讬驻讗 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讜讛讜讗 砖注讜诪讚转 讞讜抓 诇转讞讜诐 诪讻诇诇 讚讘专驻转 讗驻讬诇讜 注讜诪讚转 讞讜抓 诇转讞讜诐 谞诪讬 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讘讛

There are those who teach this statement with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitz岣k says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing beyond the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that in a case where the animal was found in the stable, even if the animal is standing beyond the city limits, he is also not obligated in its return.

讘讘讬转 讛拽讘专讜转 诇讗 讬讟诪讗 诇讛 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诪谞讬谉 砖讗诐 讗诪专 诇讜 讗讘讬讜 讛讬讟诪讗 讗讜 砖讗诪专 诇讜 讗诇 转讞讝讬专 砖诇讗 讬砖诪注 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 讗讬砖 讗诪讜 讜讗讘讬讜 转讬专讗讜 讜讗转 砖讘转讜转讬 转砖诪专讜 讗谞讬 讛壮 讻讜诇讻诐 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讘讻讘讜讚讬

搂 The mishna teaches: And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and was found by a priest, he may not become impure to return it. In a case where a priest鈥檚 father said to him: Become impure, or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: From where is it derived that if a priest鈥檚 father said to him: Become impure, or that if one鈥檚 father said to him: Do not return a lost item that you found; he should not listen to him? It is derived from the verse, as it is stated: 鈥淓very man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 19:3). From the fact that the verse concludes: 鈥淚 am the Lord,鈥 it is derived that: You are all, parent and child alike, obligated in My honor. Therefore, if a parent commands his child to refrain from observing a mitzva, he must not obey the command.

讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘 专讞诪谞讗 讗转 砖讘转讜转讬 转砖诪专讜 讛讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 爪讬讬转讗 诇讬讛 讜讗诪讗讬 讛讗讬 注砖讛 讜讛讗讬 诇讗 转注砖讛 讜注砖讛 讜诇讗 讗转讬 注砖讛 讜讚讞讬 讗转 诇讗 转注砖讛 讜注砖讛

The Gemara infers: The reason that a priest must not obey his father鈥檚 command to become impure is because the Merciful One writes: 鈥淵ou shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord鈥; but if it were not so, I would say that the child must obey him. The Gemara asks: But why? This obligation to obey a parent is a positive mitzva, as it is written: 鈥淗onor your father and your mother鈥 (Exodus 20:12), and that obligation of a priest to refrain from becoming impure is both a prohibition: 鈥淭o the dead among his people he shall not defile himself鈥 (Leviticus 21:1), and a positive mitzva: 鈥淵ou shall be holy鈥 (Leviticus 19:2); and the principle is that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition and a positive mitzva.

讗讬爪讟专讬讱 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜拽砖 讻讬讘讜讚 讗讘 讜讗诐 诇讻讘讜讚讜 砖诇 诪拽讜诐 砖谞讗诪专 讻讗谉 讻讘讚 讗转 讗讘讬讱 讜讗转 讗诪讱 讜谞讗诪专 诇讛诇谉 讻讘讚 讗转 讛壮 诪讛讜谞讱 讛诇讻讱 诇爪讬讬转 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诇讗 诇砖诪注 诇讬讛

The Gemara answers that the derivation from 鈥淵ou shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord鈥 was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since honoring one鈥檚 father and mother is equated to the honor of the Omnipresent, as it is stated here: 鈥淗onor your father and your mother鈥 (Exodus 20:12), and it is stated elsewhere: 鈥淗onor the Lord with your wealth鈥 (Proverbs 3:9), therefore, one might have thought that the priest must obey his father鈥檚 command to become impure. Therefore the Torah teaches us that the priest is commanded not to listen to him.

诪爪讜讛 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 诇驻专讜拽 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 诪讗讬 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讘诇 诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 讻诇诇 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 驻专讬拽讛 讚讻转讬讘 注讝讘 转注讝讘 注诪讜 讟注讬谞讛 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 讛拽诐 转拽讬诐 注诪讜

搂 The mishna teaches: There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: But there is no mitzva to load it? If we say that it means: But there is no mitzva to load it at all; what is different about unloading, with regard to which it is written: 鈥淵ou shall release it with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5)? With regard to loading as well, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淵ou shall lift them with him鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:4)?

讗诇讗 诪爪讜讛 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 诇驻专讜拽 讘讞谞诐 讜诇讗 诇讟注讜谉 讘讞谞诐 讗诇讗 讘砖讻专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗祝 诇讟注讜谉 讘讞谞诐 转谞讬谞讗 诇讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 驻专讬拽讛 讘讞谞诐 讟注讬谞讛 讘砖讻专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讝讜 讜讝讜 讘讞谞诐

The Gemara answers: Rather, there is a mitzva by Torah law to unload the burden for free, but there is no mitzva to load it for free; rather, the mitzva is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon says: There is also a mitzva to load it for free. The Gemara states: We learn by inference from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: Unloading is performed for free, and loading is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon said: Both this and that are performed for free.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讬讬讛讜 讚专讘谞谉 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讻转讜讘 专讞诪谞讗 讟注讬谞讛 讜诇讗 讘注讬 驻专讬拽讛 讜讗谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 讜诪讛 讟注讬谞讛 讚诇讬转 讘讛 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讜诇讬讻讗 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讞讬讬讘 驻专讬拽讛 讚讗讬转 讘讛 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讜讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诇讗 诇诪讗讬 讛诇讻转讗 讻转讘讬讛 专讞诪谞讗 诇讜诪专 诇讱 驻专讬拽讛 讘讞谞诐 讟注讬谞讛 讘砖讻专

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis that there is a distinction between unloading and loading with regard to remuneration? The reason is that if it enters your mind that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let the Merciful One write only the mitzva of loading, and then He would need not write the mitzva of unloading, and I would say: Just as with regard to loading, where there is no potential suffering of animals and there is no potential monetary loss for the owner, one is obligated to load the burden, with regard to unloading, where there is potential suffering of animals and there is potential monetary loss for the owner, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden? Rather, with regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write the mitzva of unloading? It is to tell you: The mitzva of unloading the burden is performed for free, but the mitzva of loading is performed with remuneration.

讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that even loading is performed for free, what is the reason that the Torah writes the mitzva of unloading? The Gemara answers: It is because the verses are not clearly defined, and it is unclear which of the verses refers to loading and which refers to unloading. Had the Torah written one verse, it would have been interpreted with regard to unloading, and there would be no source that one needs to load an animal.

讜专讘谞谉 讗诪讗讬 诇讗 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬 讛讻讗 讻转讬讘 专讜讘抓 转讞转 诪砖讗讜 讛转诐 讻转讬讘 谞讜驻诇讬谉 讘讚专讱 讚专诪讜 讗讬谞讛讜 讜讟注讜谞讬讬讛讜 讘讗讜专讞讗 诪砖诪注 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 谞讜驻诇讬谉 讘讚专讱 讗讬谞讛讜 讜讟注讜谞讬讬讛讜 注诇讜讬讬讛讜 诪砖诪注

And the Rabbis could ask: Why does Rabbi Shimon say that the verses are not clearly defined? Here it is written: 鈥淐ollapsed under its burden鈥 (Exodus 23:5), clearly referring to the case of a burden that needs unloading, and there it is written: 鈥淔allen down by the way鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:4), indicating that both the animals and their burdens are lying on the way and are in need of loading. And Rabbi Shimon explains that the verses are not defined because the phrase 鈥渇allen down by the way鈥 could be understood as indicating that the animals are fallen with their burdens upon them, and referring to unloading.

讗诪专 专讘讗

Rava says:

诪讚讘专讬 砖谞讬讛诐 谞诇诪讚 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬 讗讘诇 诪住讬讬诪讬 拽专讗讬 讚专砖讬谞谉 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚专砖讬谞谉

From the statements of both of these tanna鈥檌m it can be learned that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. As even Rabbi Shimon says that he disagreed with the opinion of the Rabbis only because the verses are not clearly defined; but had the verses been clearly defined, we would have learned the same a fortiori inference. Due to what factor can that inference be learned? What, is it not due to the matter of suffering of animals, which is a factor in unloading and not a factor in loading, that we would have learned the a fortiori inference?

讚诇诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬讻讗 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜诪讛 讟注讬谞讛 讚诇讬转 讘讛 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 讞讬讬讘 驻专讬拽讛 讚讗讬转 讘讛 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The Gemara rejects that proof. Perhaps the a fortiori inference is due to the fact that there is the factor of monetary loss in unloading but not in loading, and this is what the Rabbis are saying: If in the case of loading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is no potential monetary loss, one is obligated to help load the animal, in the case of unloading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is potential monetary loss, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden?

讜讟注讬谞讛 讗讬谉 讘讛 讞住专讜谉 讻讬住 诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讗讚讛讻讬 讜讛讻讬 讘讟讬诇 诪砖讜拽讬讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讗转讜 讙谞讘讬 讜砖拽诇讬 讻诇 诪讛 讚讗讬讻讗 讘讛讚讬讛

The Gemara asks: But is there no potential monetary loss in loading? Are we not also dealing with a case where in the meanwhile, while the owner waits for assistance, he will be prevented from bringing his merchandise to the marketplace in time to sell it; alternatively, thieves might come and take all the merchandise that is there with him? Therefore, no a fortiori inference can be learned on the basis of monetary loss, and the inference must be based on the matter of the suffering of animals.

转讚注 讚爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讛讬讛 注诇讬讜 讬转专 [注诇] 诪砖讗讜 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讜 砖谞讗诪专 转讞转 诪砖讗讜 诪砖讗讜讬 砖讬讻讜诇 诇注诪讜讚 讘讜 诇讗讜 诪讻诇诇 讚转谞讗 拽诪讗 住讘专 讝拽讜拽 诇讜 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, as it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: 鈥淯nder its burden鈥 (Exodus 23:5). Rabbi Yosei holds that the obligation to unload an animal is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear; does this not indicate by inference that the first tanna holds that he must attend to it to unload a burden that is greater than its typical burden? What is the reason for this ruling; is it not due to the fact that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law?

讚诇诪讗 讘转讞转 诪砖讗讜 驻诇讬讙讬 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 住讘专 讚专砖讬谞谉 转讞转 诪砖讗讜 诪砖讗讜讬 砖讬讻讜诇 诇注诪讜讚 讘讜 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 诇讗 讚专砖讬谞谉 转讞转 诪砖讗讜

The Gemara rejects that proof: Perhaps it is with regard to the meaning of the phrase 鈥渦nder its burden鈥 that they disagree, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that we interpret the phrase 鈥渦nder its burden鈥 to mean: A burden that the animal can bear. And the Rabbis hold that we do not interpret the phrase 鈥渦nder its burden鈥 in this manner.

转讚注 讚爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 讛诇讱 讜讬砖讘 诇讜 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜注诇讬讱 诪爪讜讛 诇驻专讜拽 驻专讜拽 驻讟讜专 砖谞讗诪专 注诪讜 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讛 诇讬 讗讬转讬讛 诇诪专讬讛 讘讛讚讬讛 讜诪讛 诇讬 讻讬 诇讬转讬讛 诇诪专讬讛 讘讛讚讬讛

The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, as it is taught in the former clause of the mishna: If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, unload it, the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall release it with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5). And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if its owner is working with the passerby and what is it to me if its owner is not working with the passerby? The animal suffers in both cases.

诇注讜诇诐 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讬 住讘专转 驻讟讜专 驻讟讜专 诇讙诪专讬 讜讚诇诪讗 驻讟讜专 讘讞谞诐 讜讞讬讬讘 讘砖讻专 讜讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讻讬 讗讬转讬讛 诇诪专讬讛 讘讛讚讬讛 注讘讚 讙讘讬讛 讘讞谞诐 讜讻讬 诇讬转讬讛 诇诪专讬讛 讘讛讚讬讛 注讘讚 讙讘讬讛 讘砖讻专 讜诇注讜诇诐 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara rejects that proof: Actually, one could say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. And when the tanna exempts the passerby when the owner does not participate in unloading the burden, do you maintain that exempt means completely exempt? Perhaps it means that the passerby is exempt from unloading the burden for free, but is obligated to do so for remuneration; and this is what the Merciful One said: If its owner is working with the passerby, perform the unloading with him for free; and if its owner is not working with the passerby, perform the unloading for him for remuneration. And actually, the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law.

(住讬诪谉 讘讛诪转 讘讛诪转 讗讜讛讘 砖讜谞讗 专讘爪谉)

The Gemara presents a mnemonic for a series of proposed proofs cited by the Gemara: Animal of; animal of; friend; enemy; collapser.

诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 讘讛诪转 谞讻专讬 诪讟驻诇 讘讛 讻讘讛诪转 讬砖专讗诇 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 诪讟驻诇 讘讛 讻讘讛诪转 讬砖专讗诇 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诪讗讬 诪讟驻诇 讘讛 讻讘讛诪转 讬砖专讗诇 讛转诐 诪砖讜诐 讗讬讘讛

Let us say that a baraita supports Rava鈥檚 opinion that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under its burden, he tends to it and unloads its burden, as he would the animal of a Jew. The Gemara reasons: Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he tends to it as he would the animal of a Jew. But if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, why does he tend to it as he would the animal of a Jew? The Gemara rejects the proof: There one tends to the animal due to enmity that would arise if gentiles see Jews assisting their own people and not gentiles. The obligation is not due to the requirement to prevent suffering of animals.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽转谞讬 讗诐 讛讬转讛 讟注讜谞讛 讬讬谉 谞住讱 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪砖讜诐 讛讻讬 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讛 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜诇讛讟注讬谞讛 讬讬谉 谞住讱 讗讬谉 讝拽讜拽 诇讛

So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita in this manner, as it is taught in another baraita: If the animal of a gentile was loaded with wine used for a libation to idolatry, and the animal is collapsed under its burden, a Jew does not attend to it. Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering of animals is not by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he does not attend to it. But if you say that the obligation is by Torah law, why does he not attend to it; isn鈥檛 the animal suffering? The Gemara answers that this is what the tanna is saying: And to load the animal with wine used for a libation to idolatry, he does not attend to it. Loading an animal does not alleviate its suffering. Furthermore, the refusal of the Jew to handle the libation wine will not cause enmity, because he can explain that his religion precludes him from handling these materials.

转讗 砖诪注 讘讛诪转 谞讻专讬 讜诪砖讗讜讬 讬砖专讗诇 讜讞讚诇转 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诪讗讬 讜讞讚诇转 注讝讘 转注讝讘 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇注讜诇诐 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛转诐 讘讟注讬谞讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under the burden of a Jew, he may refuse to unload the burden, as it is written: 鈥淚f you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it with him鈥 (Exodus 23:5). By employing the phrase 鈥測ou shall forgo,鈥 the verse indicates that there are circumstances in which one may forgo unloading the animal. The Gemara reasons: And if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, why is there the option of: 鈥淵ou shall forgo鈥? The Torah should have commanded only: 鈥淵ou shall release it with him.鈥 The Gemara answers: Actually, say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, and there the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讘讛诪转 讬砖专讗诇 讜诪砖讗讜讬 谞讻专讬 注讝讘 转注讝讘 讜讗讬 讘讟注讬谞讛 讗诪讗讬 注讝讘 转注讝讘 诪砖讜诐 爪注专讗 讚讬砖专讗诇

The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the baraita: With regard to a case involving the animal of a Jew collapsed under the burden of a gentile, it is written: 鈥淵ou shall release it.鈥 And if the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor, why does the baraita state: 鈥淵ou shall release it鈥? The Gemara answers: It is because in that case, there is suffering of the Jew, who is delayed while waiting for the animal to be loaded.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 专讬砖讗 谞诪讬 专讬砖讗 讘讞诪专 谞讻专讬 住讬驻讗 讘讞诪专 讬砖专讗诇 诪讗讬 驻住拽转 住转诪讗 讚诪诇转讗 讗讬谞讬砖 讘转专 讞诪专讬讛 讗讝讬诇

The Gemara asks: If so, then the halakha should be the same even in the first clause. Why is there no requirement to prevent the suffering of the Jewish partner in that case? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the first clause is stated with regard to a gentile donkey driver, and the Jewish owner of the burden is absent. The ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a Jewish donkey driver and one is obligated to prevent his suffering. The Gemara asks: On what basis did you arrive at this definitive assertion that the animal of a Jew is driven by that Jew and the animal of a gentile is driven by that gentile? The Gemara answers: The typical state of matters is that a person follows his donkey. The first clause addressed the case of a gentile鈥檚 donkey, so presumably its driver is gentile. The latter clause addressed the case of a Jew鈥檚 donkey, so presumably its driver is a Jew.

讜讛讗 讜讞讚诇转 讜注讝讘 转注讝讘 讘驻专讬拽讛 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘讬

The Gemara questions the explanation that the baraita is referring to cases involving loading. But isn鈥檛 it with regard to unloading that the phrases cited in the baraita: 鈥淵ou shall forgo passing him by,鈥 and: 鈥淵ou shall release it,鈥 are written?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讗 诪谞讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

The Gemara answers that he said to him: Indeed, the fact that one need not unload the burden from the donkey in the first clause of the baraita indicates that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. That is the minority opinion, as the Rabbis disagree.

转讗 砖诪注 讗讜讛讘 诇驻专讜拽 讜砖讜谞讗 诇讟注讜谉 诪爪讜讛 讘砖讜谞讗 讻讚讬 诇讻讜祝 讗转 讬爪专讜 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讗 注讚讬祝 诇讬讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讻讚讬 诇讻讜祝 讗转 讬爪专讜 注讚讬祝

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters a friend whose animal collapsed and it is necessary to unload its burden, and one also encounters an enemy who needs assistance to load a burden onto his animal, the mitzva is to assist the enemy, in order to subjugate one鈥檚 evil inclination. The Gemara reasons: And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, that option, to unload his friend鈥檚 animal, is the preferable course of action for him. The Gemara answers: Even if the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, even so, loading his enemy鈥檚 animal in order to subjugate his evil inclination is preferable.

转讗 砖诪注 砖讜谞讗 砖讗诪专讜 砖讜谞讗 讬砖专讗诇 讜诇讗 砖讜谞讗 谞讻专讬 讗讬 讗诪专转 爪注专 讘注诇讬 讞讬讬诐 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讛 诇讬 砖讜谞讗 讬砖专讗诇 讜诪讛 诇讬 砖讜谞讗 谞讻专讬

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita. The enemy with regard to which they stated the halakha that one must assist with his animal is a Jewish enemy and not a gentile enemy. The Gemara asks: If you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if it is a Jewish enemy and what is it to me if it is a gentile enemy? In either case, failure to unload the burden will cause the animal suffering.

诪讬 住讘专转 讗砖讜谞讗 讚拽专讗 拽讗讬 讗砖讜谞讗 讚诪转谞讬转讬谉 拽讗讬

The Gemara answers: Do you maintain that the reference in the baraita to an enemy applies to the enemy mentioned in the verse: 鈥淚f you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden鈥ou shall release it with him鈥? It applies to the enemy mentioned in the baraita cited above, in which the tanna taught that loading a burden onto an enemy鈥檚 animal is preferable to unloading a burden from a friend鈥檚 animal.

转讗 砖诪注

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita:

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