Today's Daf Yomi
October 28, 2016 | כ״ו בתשרי תשע״ז
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This month is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross z'l, on his 1st yahrzeit
Bava Metzia 32
If one loses money from his work by taking a lost item, how do we determine what compensation he receives from the owner? According to the mishna, if he wants to get his full salary, he needs stipulate that in front of three men. A story is brought about a different case where there was a debate about whether it needed to be done before 3 men like the case in our mishna or two is sufficient. If one finds an animal in a cowshed, it is not considered a lost item but in a public thoroughfare, it is. More details of this are discussed in the gemara. If one’s parent tells you to do something against what the Torah prescribes, one cannot listen to one’s parent. The differences between loading and unloading are discussed. Within the context of that conversation, Rava claims that the mitzva of tzaar baalei chayim is prescribed by the Torah. Various proofs and contradictory sources are brought.
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תרי מגו תלתא ואי נמי תרי סהדי דפלגת באפי בי תלתא
two of the three of them to testify that you dissolved the partnership before them. Or alternatively, bring two witnesses to testify that you dissolved the partnership before a court of three.
אמר ליה מנא לך הא אמר ליה דתנן אם יש בית דין מתנה בפניהם אין שם בית דין בפני מי יתנה שלו קודם
Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: From where do you know this halakha, that dissolution of the partnership may be accomplished only before a court? Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: It is as we learned in the mishna: If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. But if there is no court there, before whom can he stipulate his condition? Rather, in that case, his financial interests take precedence, and he need not return the lost item. Apparently, one stipulates binding conditions with regard to another’s property only before a court.
אמר ליה מי דמי התם דמפיק ממונא מהאי ומותיב להאי בעינן בית דין אבל הכא דידיה שקלי גילוי מילתא בעלמא הוא בתרי סגי ליה תדע דתנן אלמנה מוכרת שלא בפני בית דין
Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: Is that case in the mishna comparable to this case? There, where he is removing property from the possession of this person and giving it to that person, we require a court. But here, referring to himself in the third person, he is merely taking his own property, and not the property of any other person. There is no transaction effected here. It is mere disclosure of the matter that he divided the joint property equitably, and two witnesses are sufficient for him to disclose that fact. Rav Safra cites proof. Know that this is so, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 97a) that a widow owed sustenance from her husband’s estate sells the property of the estate when not before a court. Apparently, one need not involve the court when reclaiming property that belongs to him.
אמר ליה אביי ולאו מי אתמר עלה אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן אלמנה אינה צריכה בית דין של מומחין אבל צריכה בית דין של הדיוטות
Abaye said to him: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: The court before which a widow sells the property of the estate need not be a court of experts, but is required to be at least a court of laymen. Therefore, as in the parallel case of the widow, even when disclosing that one took property belonging to him, two witnesses are not sufficient and a court is required.
מתני׳ מצאה ברפת אין חייב בה ברשות הרבים חייב בה ואם היתה בבית הקברות לא יטמא לה אם אמר לו אביו היטמא או שאמר לו אל תחזיר לא ישמע לו
MISHNA: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it to its owner. If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and a priest found it, he may not become impure to return it. If his father said to him: Become impure; or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father, as one may not violate Torah law to honor his father.
פרק וטען פרק וטען אפילו ארבעה וחמישה פעמים חייב שנאמר עזב תעזב
If one unloaded a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight and then later loaded it onto the animal, and later unloaded and loaded it again, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to continue unloading and loading, as it is stated: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta’azov] with him” (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times.
הלך וישב לו ואמר הואיל ועליך מצוה אם רצונך לפרוק פרוק פטור שנאמר עמו אם היה זקן או חולה חייב
If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, if it is your wish to unload the burden, unload it, in such a case the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: “You shall release it with him,” with the owner of the animal. If the failure of the owner to participate in unloading the burden was due to the fact he was old or infirm, the passerby is obligated to unload the burden alone.
מצוה מן התורה לפרוק אבל לא לטעון רבי שמעון אומר אף לטעון
There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. Rabbi Shimon says: There is even a mitzva to load the burden.
רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אם היה עליו יתר על משאו אין זקוק לו שנאמר תחת משאו משאוי שיכול לעמוד בו
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden,” i.e., the obligation is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear.
גמ׳ אמר רבא רפת שאמרו אינה מתעה ואינה משמרת אינה מתעה מדקתני אינו חייב בה ואינה משמרת מדאיצטריך למיתני אינו חייב בה
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one found an animal in a stable, he need not return it to its owner. Rava said: The stable that the Sages mentioned in the mishna is one that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal so it will not flee. The Gemara explains Rava’s statement. That it does not encourage the animal to stray is learned from the fact that the tanna teaches: He is not obligated in its return. The fact that it does not secure the animal is learned from the fact that it was necessary for the tanna to teach: He is not obligated in its return.
דאי סלקא דעתך משמרת השתא משכח לה אבראי מעייל לה לגואי משכח לה מגואי מבעיא אלא שמע מינה אינה משמרת שמע מינה
The Gemara continues its explanation of Rava’s statement: As, if it enters your mind to say that it is a stable that secures the animal, that ruling would be extraneous. Now that in a case where one found the animal outside a stable he brings it inside a stable of that type and thereby returns the animal to its owner, in a case where he found the animal inside the stable is it necessary to teach that he is not obligated to return it to its owner? Rather, learn from it that the stable mentioned in the mishna does not secure the animal and therefore there is a possibility that one must return it. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it that it is a stable that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal.
מצאה ברפת אינו חייב אמר רבי יצחק והוא שעומדת תוך לתחום מכלל דברשות הרבים ואפילו בתוך התחום נמי חייב
§ The mishna teaches: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing within the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that if the animal was found in a public area he is obligated to return it, and even if it was within the city limits, he is also obligated to return it.
איכא דמתני לה אסיפא ברשות הרבים חייב בה אמר רבי יצחק והוא שעומדת חוץ לתחום מכלל דברפת אפילו עומדת חוץ לתחום נמי אינו חייב בה
There are those who teach this statement with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing beyond the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that in a case where the animal was found in the stable, even if the animal is standing beyond the city limits, he is also not obligated in its return.
בבית הקברות לא יטמא לה תנו רבנן מנין שאם אמר לו אביו היטמא או שאמר לו אל תחזיר שלא ישמע לו שנאמר איש אמו ואביו תיראו ואת שבתותי תשמרו אני ה׳ כולכם חייבין בכבודי
§ The mishna teaches: And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and was found by a priest, he may not become impure to return it. In a case where a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: From where is it derived that if a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or that if one’s father said to him: Do not return a lost item that you found; he should not listen to him? It is derived from the verse, as it is stated: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:3). From the fact that the verse concludes: “I am the Lord,” it is derived that: You are all, parent and child alike, obligated in My honor. Therefore, if a parent commands his child to refrain from observing a mitzva, he must not obey the command.
טעמא דכתב רחמנא את שבתותי תשמרו הא לאו הכי הוה אמינא צייתא ליה ואמאי האי עשה והאי לא תעשה ועשה ולא אתי עשה ודחי את לא תעשה ועשה
The Gemara infers: The reason that a priest must not obey his father’s command to become impure is because the Merciful One writes: “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord”; but if it were not so, I would say that the child must obey him. The Gemara asks: But why? This obligation to obey a parent is a positive mitzva, as it is written: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and that obligation of a priest to refrain from becoming impure is both a prohibition: “To the dead among his people he shall not defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), and a positive mitzva: “You shall be holy” (Leviticus 19:2); and the principle is that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition and a positive mitzva.
איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל והוקש כיבוד אב ואם לכבודו של מקום שנאמר כאן כבד את אביך ואת אמך ונאמר להלן כבד את ה׳ מהונך הלכך לציית ליה קא משמע לן דלא לשמע ליה
The Gemara answers that the derivation from “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since honoring one’s father and mother is equated to the honor of the Omnipresent, as it is stated here: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and it is stated elsewhere: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), therefore, one might have thought that the priest must obey his father’s command to become impure. Therefore the Torah teaches us that the priest is commanded not to listen to him.
מצוה מן התורה לפרוק אבל לא לטעון מאי אבל לא לטעון אילימא אבל לא לטעון כלל מאי שנא פריקה דכתיב עזב תעזב עמו טעינה נמי הכתיב הקם תקים עמו
§ The mishna teaches: There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: But there is no mitzva to load it? If we say that it means: But there is no mitzva to load it at all; what is different about unloading, with regard to which it is written: “You shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5)? With regard to loading as well, isn’t it written: “You shall lift them with him” (Deuteronomy 22:4)?
אלא מצוה מן התורה לפרוק בחנם ולא לטעון בחנם אלא בשכר רבי שמעון אומר אף לטעון בחנם תנינא להא דתנו רבנן פריקה בחנם טעינה בשכר רבי שמעון אומר זו וזו בחנם
The Gemara answers: Rather, there is a mitzva by Torah law to unload the burden for free, but there is no mitzva to load it for free; rather, the mitzva is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon says: There is also a mitzva to load it for free. The Gemara states: We learn by inference from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: Unloading is performed for free, and loading is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon said: Both this and that are performed for free.
מאי טעמייהו דרבנן דאי סלקא דעתך כרבי שמעון לכתוב רחמנא טעינה ולא בעי פריקה ואנא אמינא ומה טעינה דלית בה צער בעלי חיים וליכא חסרון כיס חייב פריקה דאית בה צער בעלי חיים וחסרון כיס לא כל שכן אלא למאי הלכתא כתביה רחמנא לומר לך פריקה בחנם טעינה בשכר
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis that there is a distinction between unloading and loading with regard to remuneration? The reason is that if it enters your mind that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let the Merciful One write only the mitzva of loading, and then He would need not write the mitzva of unloading, and I would say: Just as with regard to loading, where there is no potential suffering of animals and there is no potential monetary loss for the owner, one is obligated to load the burden, with regard to unloading, where there is potential suffering of animals and there is potential monetary loss for the owner, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden? Rather, with regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write the mitzva of unloading? It is to tell you: The mitzva of unloading the burden is performed for free, but the mitzva of loading is performed with remuneration.
ורבי שמעון מאי טעמא משום דלא מסיימי קראי
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that even loading is performed for free, what is the reason that the Torah writes the mitzva of unloading? The Gemara answers: It is because the verses are not clearly defined, and it is unclear which of the verses refers to loading and which refers to unloading. Had the Torah written one verse, it would have been interpreted with regard to unloading, and there would be no source that one needs to load an animal.
ורבנן אמאי לא מסיימי קראי הכא כתיב רובץ תחת משאו התם כתיב נופלין בדרך דרמו אינהו וטעונייהו באורחא משמע ורבי שמעון נופלין בדרך אינהו וטעונייהו עלוייהו משמע
And the Rabbis could ask: Why does Rabbi Shimon say that the verses are not clearly defined? Here it is written: “Collapsed under its burden” (Exodus 23:5), clearly referring to the case of a burden that needs unloading, and there it is written: “Fallen down by the way” (Deuteronomy 22:4), indicating that both the animals and their burdens are lying on the way and are in need of loading. And Rabbi Shimon explains that the verses are not defined because the phrase “fallen down by the way” could be understood as indicating that the animals are fallen with their burdens upon them, and referring to unloading.
אמר רבא
Rava says:
מדברי שניהם נלמד צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא ואפילו רבי שמעון לא קאמר אלא משום דלא מסיימי קראי אבל מסיימי קראי דרשינן קל וחומר משום מאי לאו משום צער בעלי חיים דרשינן
From the statements of both of these tanna’im it can be learned that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. As even Rabbi Shimon says that he disagreed with the opinion of the Rabbis only because the verses are not clearly defined; but had the verses been clearly defined, we would have learned the same a fortiori inference. Due to what factor can that inference be learned? What, is it not due to the matter of suffering of animals, which is a factor in unloading and not a factor in loading, that we would have learned the a fortiori inference?
דלמא משום דאיכא חסרון כיס והכי קאמר ומה טעינה דלית בה חסרון כיס חייב פריקה דאית בה חסרון כיס לא כל שכן
The Gemara rejects that proof. Perhaps the a fortiori inference is due to the fact that there is the factor of monetary loss in unloading but not in loading, and this is what the Rabbis are saying: If in the case of loading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is no potential monetary loss, one is obligated to help load the animal, in the case of unloading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is potential monetary loss, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden?
וטעינה אין בה חסרון כיס מי לא עסקינן דאדהכי והכי בטיל משוקיה אי נמי אתו גנבי ושקלי כל מה דאיכא בהדיה
The Gemara asks: But is there no potential monetary loss in loading? Are we not also dealing with a case where in the meanwhile, while the owner waits for assistance, he will be prevented from bringing his merchandise to the marketplace in time to sell it; alternatively, thieves might come and take all the merchandise that is there with him? Therefore, no a fortiori inference can be learned on the basis of monetary loss, and the inference must be based on the matter of the suffering of animals.
תדע דצער בעלי חיים דאורייתא דקתני סיפא רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אם היה עליו יתר [על] משאו אין זקוק לו שנאמר תחת משאו משאוי שיכול לעמוד בו לאו מכלל דתנא קמא סבר זקוק לו מאי טעמא לאו משום דצער בעלי חיים דאורייתא
The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, as it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden” (Exodus 23:5). Rabbi Yosei holds that the obligation to unload an animal is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear; does this not indicate by inference that the first tanna holds that he must attend to it to unload a burden that is greater than its typical burden? What is the reason for this ruling; is it not due to the fact that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law?
דלמא בתחת משאו פליגי דרבי יוסי סבר דרשינן תחת משאו משאוי שיכול לעמוד בו ורבנן סברי לא דרשינן תחת משאו
The Gemara rejects that proof: Perhaps it is with regard to the meaning of the phrase “under its burden” that they disagree, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that we interpret the phrase “under its burden” to mean: A burden that the animal can bear. And the Rabbis hold that we do not interpret the phrase “under its burden” in this manner.
תדע דצער בעלי חיים לאו דאורייתא דקתני רישא הלך וישב לו ואמר לו הואיל ועליך מצוה לפרוק פרוק פטור שנאמר עמו ואי סלקא דעתך צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא מה לי איתיה למריה בהדיה ומה לי כי ליתיה למריה בהדיה
The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, as it is taught in the former clause of the mishna: If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, unload it, the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: “You shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if its owner is working with the passerby and what is it to me if its owner is not working with the passerby? The animal suffers in both cases.
לעולם צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא מי סברת פטור פטור לגמרי ודלמא פטור בחנם וחייב בשכר והכי קאמר רחמנא כי איתיה למריה בהדיה עבד גביה בחנם וכי ליתיה למריה בהדיה עבד גביה בשכר ולעולם צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא
The Gemara rejects that proof: Actually, one could say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. And when the tanna exempts the passerby when the owner does not participate in unloading the burden, do you maintain that exempt means completely exempt? Perhaps it means that the passerby is exempt from unloading the burden for free, but is obligated to do so for remuneration; and this is what the Merciful One said: If its owner is working with the passerby, perform the unloading with him for free; and if its owner is not working with the passerby, perform the unloading for him for remuneration. And actually, the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law.
(סימן בהמת בהמת אוהב שונא רבצן)
The Gemara presents a mnemonic for a series of proposed proofs cited by the Gemara: Animal of; animal of; friend; enemy; collapser.
לימא מסייע ליה בהמת נכרי מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל אי אמרת בשלמא צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא משום הכי מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל אלא אי אמרת צער בעלי חיים לאו דאורייתא אמאי מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל התם משום איבה
Let us say that a baraita supports Rava’s opinion that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under its burden, he tends to it and unloads its burden, as he would the animal of a Jew. The Gemara reasons: Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he tends to it as he would the animal of a Jew. But if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, why does he tend to it as he would the animal of a Jew? The Gemara rejects the proof: There one tends to the animal due to enmity that would arise if gentiles see Jews assisting their own people and not gentiles. The obligation is not due to the requirement to prevent suffering of animals.
הכי נמי מסתברא דקתני אם היתה טעונה יין נסך אין זקוק לה אי אמרת בשלמא לאו דאורייתא משום הכי אין זקוק לה אלא אי אמרת דאורייתא אמאי אין זקוק לה הכי קאמר ולהטעינה יין נסך אין זקוק לה
So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita in this manner, as it is taught in another baraita: If the animal of a gentile was loaded with wine used for a libation to idolatry, and the animal is collapsed under its burden, a Jew does not attend to it. Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering of animals is not by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he does not attend to it. But if you say that the obligation is by Torah law, why does he not attend to it; isn’t the animal suffering? The Gemara answers that this is what the tanna is saying: And to load the animal with wine used for a libation to idolatry, he does not attend to it. Loading an animal does not alleviate its suffering. Furthermore, the refusal of the Jew to handle the libation wine will not cause enmity, because he can explain that his religion precludes him from handling these materials.
תא שמע בהמת נכרי ומשאוי ישראל וחדלת ואי אמרת צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא אמאי וחדלת עזב תעזב מבעי ליה לעולם צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא התם בטעינה
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under the burden of a Jew, he may refuse to unload the burden, as it is written: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). By employing the phrase “you shall forgo,” the verse indicates that there are circumstances in which one may forgo unloading the animal. The Gemara reasons: And if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, why is there the option of: “You shall forgo”? The Torah should have commanded only: “You shall release it with him.” The Gemara answers: Actually, say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, and there the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor.
אי הכי אימא סיפא בהמת ישראל ומשאוי נכרי עזב תעזב ואי בטעינה אמאי עזב תעזב משום צערא דישראל
The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the baraita: With regard to a case involving the animal of a Jew collapsed under the burden of a gentile, it is written: “You shall release it.” And if the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor, why does the baraita state: “You shall release it”? The Gemara answers: It is because in that case, there is suffering of the Jew, who is delayed while waiting for the animal to be loaded.
אי הכי אפילו רישא נמי רישא בחמר נכרי סיפא בחמר ישראל מאי פסקת סתמא דמלתא איניש בתר חמריה אזיל
The Gemara asks: If so, then the halakha should be the same even in the first clause. Why is there no requirement to prevent the suffering of the Jewish partner in that case? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the first clause is stated with regard to a gentile donkey driver, and the Jewish owner of the burden is absent. The ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a Jewish donkey driver and one is obligated to prevent his suffering. The Gemara asks: On what basis did you arrive at this definitive assertion that the animal of a Jew is driven by that Jew and the animal of a gentile is driven by that gentile? The Gemara answers: The typical state of matters is that a person follows his donkey. The first clause addressed the case of a gentile’s donkey, so presumably its driver is gentile. The latter clause addressed the case of a Jew’s donkey, so presumably its driver is a Jew.
והא וחדלת ועזב תעזב בפריקה הוא דכתיבי
The Gemara questions the explanation that the baraita is referring to cases involving loading. But isn’t it with regard to unloading that the phrases cited in the baraita: “You shall forgo passing him by,” and: “You shall release it,” are written?
אמר ליה הא מני רבי יוסי הגלילי היא דאמר צער בעלי חיים לאו דאורייתא
The Gemara answers that he said to him: Indeed, the fact that one need not unload the burden from the donkey in the first clause of the baraita indicates that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. That is the minority opinion, as the Rabbis disagree.
תא שמע אוהב לפרוק ושונא לטעון מצוה בשונא כדי לכוף את יצרו ואי סלקא דעתך צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא הא עדיף ליה אפילו הכי כדי לכוף את יצרו עדיף
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters a friend whose animal collapsed and it is necessary to unload its burden, and one also encounters an enemy who needs assistance to load a burden onto his animal, the mitzva is to assist the enemy, in order to subjugate one’s evil inclination. The Gemara reasons: And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, that option, to unload his friend’s animal, is the preferable course of action for him. The Gemara answers: Even if the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, even so, loading his enemy’s animal in order to subjugate his evil inclination is preferable.
תא שמע שונא שאמרו שונא ישראל ולא שונא נכרי אי אמרת צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא מה לי שונא ישראל ומה לי שונא נכרי
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita. The enemy with regard to which they stated the halakha that one must assist with his animal is a Jewish enemy and not a gentile enemy. The Gemara asks: If you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if it is a Jewish enemy and what is it to me if it is a gentile enemy? In either case, failure to unload the burden will cause the animal suffering.
מי סברת אשונא דקרא קאי אשונא דמתניתין קאי
The Gemara answers: Do you maintain that the reference in the baraita to an enemy applies to the enemy mentioned in the verse: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden…you shall release it with him”? It applies to the enemy mentioned in the baraita cited above, in which the tanna taught that loading a burden onto an enemy’s animal is preferable to unloading a burden from a friend’s animal.
תא שמע
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita:
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Bava Metzia 32
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
תרי מגו תלתא ואי נמי תרי סהדי דפלגת באפי בי תלתא
two of the three of them to testify that you dissolved the partnership before them. Or alternatively, bring two witnesses to testify that you dissolved the partnership before a court of three.
אמר ליה מנא לך הא אמר ליה דתנן אם יש בית דין מתנה בפניהם אין שם בית דין בפני מי יתנה שלו קודם
Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: From where do you know this halakha, that dissolution of the partnership may be accomplished only before a court? Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: It is as we learned in the mishna: If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. But if there is no court there, before whom can he stipulate his condition? Rather, in that case, his financial interests take precedence, and he need not return the lost item. Apparently, one stipulates binding conditions with regard to another’s property only before a court.
אמר ליה מי דמי התם דמפיק ממונא מהאי ומותיב להאי בעינן בית דין אבל הכא דידיה שקלי גילוי מילתא בעלמא הוא בתרי סגי ליה תדע דתנן אלמנה מוכרת שלא בפני בית דין
Rav Safra said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: Is that case in the mishna comparable to this case? There, where he is removing property from the possession of this person and giving it to that person, we require a court. But here, referring to himself in the third person, he is merely taking his own property, and not the property of any other person. There is no transaction effected here. It is mere disclosure of the matter that he divided the joint property equitably, and two witnesses are sufficient for him to disclose that fact. Rav Safra cites proof. Know that this is so, as we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 97a) that a widow owed sustenance from her husband’s estate sells the property of the estate when not before a court. Apparently, one need not involve the court when reclaiming property that belongs to him.
אמר ליה אביי ולאו מי אתמר עלה אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן אלמנה אינה צריכה בית דין של מומחין אבל צריכה בית דין של הדיוטות
Abaye said to him: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: The court before which a widow sells the property of the estate need not be a court of experts, but is required to be at least a court of laymen. Therefore, as in the parallel case of the widow, even when disclosing that one took property belonging to him, two witnesses are not sufficient and a court is required.
מתני׳ מצאה ברפת אין חייב בה ברשות הרבים חייב בה ואם היתה בבית הקברות לא יטמא לה אם אמר לו אביו היטמא או שאמר לו אל תחזיר לא ישמע לו
MISHNA: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it to its owner. If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and a priest found it, he may not become impure to return it. If his father said to him: Become impure; or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father, as one may not violate Torah law to honor his father.
פרק וטען פרק וטען אפילו ארבעה וחמישה פעמים חייב שנאמר עזב תעזב
If one unloaded a burden from an animal collapsing under its weight and then later loaded it onto the animal, and later unloaded and loaded it again, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to continue unloading and loading, as it is stated: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it [azov ta’azov] with him” (Exodus 23:5). It is derived from the verse that one is obligated to perform the action as needed, even several times.
הלך וישב לו ואמר הואיל ועליך מצוה אם רצונך לפרוק פרוק פטור שנאמר עמו אם היה זקן או חולה חייב
If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, if it is your wish to unload the burden, unload it, in such a case the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: “You shall release it with him,” with the owner of the animal. If the failure of the owner to participate in unloading the burden was due to the fact he was old or infirm, the passerby is obligated to unload the burden alone.
מצוה מן התורה לפרוק אבל לא לטעון רבי שמעון אומר אף לטעון
There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. Rabbi Shimon says: There is even a mitzva to load the burden.
רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אם היה עליו יתר על משאו אין זקוק לו שנאמר תחת משאו משאוי שיכול לעמוד בו
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden,” i.e., the obligation is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear.
גמ׳ אמר רבא רפת שאמרו אינה מתעה ואינה משמרת אינה מתעה מדקתני אינו חייב בה ואינה משמרת מדאיצטריך למיתני אינו חייב בה
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one found an animal in a stable, he need not return it to its owner. Rava said: The stable that the Sages mentioned in the mishna is one that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal so it will not flee. The Gemara explains Rava’s statement. That it does not encourage the animal to stray is learned from the fact that the tanna teaches: He is not obligated in its return. The fact that it does not secure the animal is learned from the fact that it was necessary for the tanna to teach: He is not obligated in its return.
דאי סלקא דעתך משמרת השתא משכח לה אבראי מעייל לה לגואי משכח לה מגואי מבעיא אלא שמע מינה אינה משמרת שמע מינה
The Gemara continues its explanation of Rava’s statement: As, if it enters your mind to say that it is a stable that secures the animal, that ruling would be extraneous. Now that in a case where one found the animal outside a stable he brings it inside a stable of that type and thereby returns the animal to its owner, in a case where he found the animal inside the stable is it necessary to teach that he is not obligated to return it to its owner? Rather, learn from it that the stable mentioned in the mishna does not secure the animal and therefore there is a possibility that one must return it. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it that it is a stable that neither encourages the animal to stray nor secures the animal.
מצאה ברפת אינו חייב אמר רבי יצחק והוא שעומדת תוך לתחום מכלל דברשות הרבים ואפילו בתוך התחום נמי חייב
§ The mishna teaches: If one found an animal in a stable belonging to its owner, he is not obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing within the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that if the animal was found in a public area he is obligated to return it, and even if it was within the city limits, he is also obligated to return it.
איכא דמתני לה אסיפא ברשות הרבים חייב בה אמר רבי יצחק והוא שעומדת חוץ לתחום מכלל דברפת אפילו עומדת חוץ לתחום נמי אינו חייב בה
There are those who teach this statement with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: If he found it in a public area, he is obligated to return it. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: And that is the halakha only in a case where the animal is standing beyond the city limits. The Gemara concludes by inference that in a case where the animal was found in the stable, even if the animal is standing beyond the city limits, he is also not obligated in its return.
בבית הקברות לא יטמא לה תנו רבנן מנין שאם אמר לו אביו היטמא או שאמר לו אל תחזיר שלא ישמע לו שנאמר איש אמו ואביו תיראו ואת שבתותי תשמרו אני ה׳ כולכם חייבין בכבודי
§ The mishna teaches: And if the animal was lost in a graveyard and was found by a priest, he may not become impure to return it. In a case where a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or in a case where one was obligated to return the animal and his father said to him: Do not return it, he may not listen to his father. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: From where is it derived that if a priest’s father said to him: Become impure, or that if one’s father said to him: Do not return a lost item that you found; he should not listen to him? It is derived from the verse, as it is stated: “Every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:3). From the fact that the verse concludes: “I am the Lord,” it is derived that: You are all, parent and child alike, obligated in My honor. Therefore, if a parent commands his child to refrain from observing a mitzva, he must not obey the command.
טעמא דכתב רחמנא את שבתותי תשמרו הא לאו הכי הוה אמינא צייתא ליה ואמאי האי עשה והאי לא תעשה ועשה ולא אתי עשה ודחי את לא תעשה ועשה
The Gemara infers: The reason that a priest must not obey his father’s command to become impure is because the Merciful One writes: “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord”; but if it were not so, I would say that the child must obey him. The Gemara asks: But why? This obligation to obey a parent is a positive mitzva, as it is written: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and that obligation of a priest to refrain from becoming impure is both a prohibition: “To the dead among his people he shall not defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), and a positive mitzva: “You shall be holy” (Leviticus 19:2); and the principle is that a positive mitzva does not come and override a prohibition and a positive mitzva.
איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא הואיל והוקש כיבוד אב ואם לכבודו של מקום שנאמר כאן כבד את אביך ואת אמך ונאמר להלן כבד את ה׳ מהונך הלכך לציית ליה קא משמע לן דלא לשמע ליה
The Gemara answers that the derivation from “You shall observe My Shabbatot; I am the Lord” was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since honoring one’s father and mother is equated to the honor of the Omnipresent, as it is stated here: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12), and it is stated elsewhere: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), therefore, one might have thought that the priest must obey his father’s command to become impure. Therefore the Torah teaches us that the priest is commanded not to listen to him.
מצוה מן התורה לפרוק אבל לא לטעון מאי אבל לא לטעון אילימא אבל לא לטעון כלל מאי שנא פריקה דכתיב עזב תעזב עמו טעינה נמי הכתיב הקם תקים עמו
§ The mishna teaches: There is a mitzva by Torah law to unload a burden, but there is no mitzva to load it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: But there is no mitzva to load it? If we say that it means: But there is no mitzva to load it at all; what is different about unloading, with regard to which it is written: “You shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5)? With regard to loading as well, isn’t it written: “You shall lift them with him” (Deuteronomy 22:4)?
אלא מצוה מן התורה לפרוק בחנם ולא לטעון בחנם אלא בשכר רבי שמעון אומר אף לטעון בחנם תנינא להא דתנו רבנן פריקה בחנם טעינה בשכר רבי שמעון אומר זו וזו בחנם
The Gemara answers: Rather, there is a mitzva by Torah law to unload the burden for free, but there is no mitzva to load it for free; rather, the mitzva is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon says: There is also a mitzva to load it for free. The Gemara states: We learn by inference from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: Unloading is performed for free, and loading is performed with remuneration. Rabbi Shimon said: Both this and that are performed for free.
מאי טעמייהו דרבנן דאי סלקא דעתך כרבי שמעון לכתוב רחמנא טעינה ולא בעי פריקה ואנא אמינא ומה טעינה דלית בה צער בעלי חיים וליכא חסרון כיס חייב פריקה דאית בה צער בעלי חיים וחסרון כיס לא כל שכן אלא למאי הלכתא כתביה רחמנא לומר לך פריקה בחנם טעינה בשכר
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis that there is a distinction between unloading and loading with regard to remuneration? The reason is that if it enters your mind that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let the Merciful One write only the mitzva of loading, and then He would need not write the mitzva of unloading, and I would say: Just as with regard to loading, where there is no potential suffering of animals and there is no potential monetary loss for the owner, one is obligated to load the burden, with regard to unloading, where there is potential suffering of animals and there is potential monetary loss for the owner, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden? Rather, with regard to what halakha did the Merciful One write the mitzva of unloading? It is to tell you: The mitzva of unloading the burden is performed for free, but the mitzva of loading is performed with remuneration.
ורבי שמעון מאי טעמא משום דלא מסיימי קראי
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that even loading is performed for free, what is the reason that the Torah writes the mitzva of unloading? The Gemara answers: It is because the verses are not clearly defined, and it is unclear which of the verses refers to loading and which refers to unloading. Had the Torah written one verse, it would have been interpreted with regard to unloading, and there would be no source that one needs to load an animal.
ורבנן אמאי לא מסיימי קראי הכא כתיב רובץ תחת משאו התם כתיב נופלין בדרך דרמו אינהו וטעונייהו באורחא משמע ורבי שמעון נופלין בדרך אינהו וטעונייהו עלוייהו משמע
And the Rabbis could ask: Why does Rabbi Shimon say that the verses are not clearly defined? Here it is written: “Collapsed under its burden” (Exodus 23:5), clearly referring to the case of a burden that needs unloading, and there it is written: “Fallen down by the way” (Deuteronomy 22:4), indicating that both the animals and their burdens are lying on the way and are in need of loading. And Rabbi Shimon explains that the verses are not defined because the phrase “fallen down by the way” could be understood as indicating that the animals are fallen with their burdens upon them, and referring to unloading.
אמר רבא
Rava says:
מדברי שניהם נלמד צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא ואפילו רבי שמעון לא קאמר אלא משום דלא מסיימי קראי אבל מסיימי קראי דרשינן קל וחומר משום מאי לאו משום צער בעלי חיים דרשינן
From the statements of both of these tanna’im it can be learned that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. As even Rabbi Shimon says that he disagreed with the opinion of the Rabbis only because the verses are not clearly defined; but had the verses been clearly defined, we would have learned the same a fortiori inference. Due to what factor can that inference be learned? What, is it not due to the matter of suffering of animals, which is a factor in unloading and not a factor in loading, that we would have learned the a fortiori inference?
דלמא משום דאיכא חסרון כיס והכי קאמר ומה טעינה דלית בה חסרון כיס חייב פריקה דאית בה חסרון כיס לא כל שכן
The Gemara rejects that proof. Perhaps the a fortiori inference is due to the fact that there is the factor of monetary loss in unloading but not in loading, and this is what the Rabbis are saying: If in the case of loading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is no potential monetary loss, one is obligated to help load the animal, in the case of unloading, where if one fails to assist the owner there is potential monetary loss, is it not all the more so clear that one is required to unload the burden?
וטעינה אין בה חסרון כיס מי לא עסקינן דאדהכי והכי בטיל משוקיה אי נמי אתו גנבי ושקלי כל מה דאיכא בהדיה
The Gemara asks: But is there no potential monetary loss in loading? Are we not also dealing with a case where in the meanwhile, while the owner waits for assistance, he will be prevented from bringing his merchandise to the marketplace in time to sell it; alternatively, thieves might come and take all the merchandise that is there with him? Therefore, no a fortiori inference can be learned on the basis of monetary loss, and the inference must be based on the matter of the suffering of animals.
תדע דצער בעלי חיים דאורייתא דקתני סיפא רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אם היה עליו יתר [על] משאו אין זקוק לו שנאמר תחת משאו משאוי שיכול לעמוד בו לאו מכלל דתנא קמא סבר זקוק לו מאי טעמא לאו משום דצער בעלי חיים דאורייתא
The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, as it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was a burden upon the animal greater than its typical burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden” (Exodus 23:5). Rabbi Yosei holds that the obligation to unload an animal is with regard to a burden that the animal can bear; does this not indicate by inference that the first tanna holds that he must attend to it to unload a burden that is greater than its typical burden? What is the reason for this ruling; is it not due to the fact that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law?
דלמא בתחת משאו פליגי דרבי יוסי סבר דרשינן תחת משאו משאוי שיכול לעמוד בו ורבנן סברי לא דרשינן תחת משאו
The Gemara rejects that proof: Perhaps it is with regard to the meaning of the phrase “under its burden” that they disagree, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that we interpret the phrase “under its burden” to mean: A burden that the animal can bear. And the Rabbis hold that we do not interpret the phrase “under its burden” in this manner.
תדע דצער בעלי חיים לאו דאורייתא דקתני רישא הלך וישב לו ואמר לו הואיל ועליך מצוה לפרוק פרוק פטור שנאמר עמו ואי סלקא דעתך צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא מה לי איתיה למריה בהדיה ומה לי כי ליתיה למריה בהדיה
The Gemara cites an additional proof: Know that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, as it is taught in the former clause of the mishna: If the owner went, and sat, and said to a passerby: Since there is a mitzva incumbent upon you to unload the burden, unload it, the passerby is exempt, as it is stated: “You shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if its owner is working with the passerby and what is it to me if its owner is not working with the passerby? The animal suffers in both cases.
לעולם צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא מי סברת פטור פטור לגמרי ודלמא פטור בחנם וחייב בשכר והכי קאמר רחמנא כי איתיה למריה בהדיה עבד גביה בחנם וכי ליתיה למריה בהדיה עבד גביה בשכר ולעולם צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא
The Gemara rejects that proof: Actually, one could say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law. And when the tanna exempts the passerby when the owner does not participate in unloading the burden, do you maintain that exempt means completely exempt? Perhaps it means that the passerby is exempt from unloading the burden for free, but is obligated to do so for remuneration; and this is what the Merciful One said: If its owner is working with the passerby, perform the unloading with him for free; and if its owner is not working with the passerby, perform the unloading for him for remuneration. And actually, the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law.
(סימן בהמת בהמת אוהב שונא רבצן)
The Gemara presents a mnemonic for a series of proposed proofs cited by the Gemara: Animal of; animal of; friend; enemy; collapser.
לימא מסייע ליה בהמת נכרי מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל אי אמרת בשלמא צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא משום הכי מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל אלא אי אמרת צער בעלי חיים לאו דאורייתא אמאי מטפל בה כבהמת ישראל התם משום איבה
Let us say that a baraita supports Rava’s opinion that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under its burden, he tends to it and unloads its burden, as he would the animal of a Jew. The Gemara reasons: Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he tends to it as he would the animal of a Jew. But if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law, why does he tend to it as he would the animal of a Jew? The Gemara rejects the proof: There one tends to the animal due to enmity that would arise if gentiles see Jews assisting their own people and not gentiles. The obligation is not due to the requirement to prevent suffering of animals.
הכי נמי מסתברא דקתני אם היתה טעונה יין נסך אין זקוק לה אי אמרת בשלמא לאו דאורייתא משום הכי אין זקוק לה אלא אי אמרת דאורייתא אמאי אין זקוק לה הכי קאמר ולהטעינה יין נסך אין זקוק לה
So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita in this manner, as it is taught in another baraita: If the animal of a gentile was loaded with wine used for a libation to idolatry, and the animal is collapsed under its burden, a Jew does not attend to it. Granted, if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering of animals is not by Torah law, it is due to that reason that he does not attend to it. But if you say that the obligation is by Torah law, why does he not attend to it; isn’t the animal suffering? The Gemara answers that this is what the tanna is saying: And to load the animal with wine used for a libation to idolatry, he does not attend to it. Loading an animal does not alleviate its suffering. Furthermore, the refusal of the Jew to handle the libation wine will not cause enmity, because he can explain that his religion precludes him from handling these materials.
תא שמע בהמת נכרי ומשאוי ישראל וחדלת ואי אמרת צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא אמאי וחדלת עזב תעזב מבעי ליה לעולם צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא התם בטעינה
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters the animal of a gentile collapsed under the burden of a Jew, he may refuse to unload the burden, as it is written: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). By employing the phrase “you shall forgo,” the verse indicates that there are circumstances in which one may forgo unloading the animal. The Gemara reasons: And if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, why is there the option of: “You shall forgo”? The Torah should have commanded only: “You shall release it with him.” The Gemara answers: Actually, say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, and there the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor.
אי הכי אימא סיפא בהמת ישראל ומשאוי נכרי עזב תעזב ואי בטעינה אמאי עזב תעזב משום צערא דישראל
The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the baraita: With regard to a case involving the animal of a Jew collapsed under the burden of a gentile, it is written: “You shall release it.” And if the baraita is referring to a case of loading, where suffering of animals is not a factor, why does the baraita state: “You shall release it”? The Gemara answers: It is because in that case, there is suffering of the Jew, who is delayed while waiting for the animal to be loaded.
אי הכי אפילו רישא נמי רישא בחמר נכרי סיפא בחמר ישראל מאי פסקת סתמא דמלתא איניש בתר חמריה אזיל
The Gemara asks: If so, then the halakha should be the same even in the first clause. Why is there no requirement to prevent the suffering of the Jewish partner in that case? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the first clause is stated with regard to a gentile donkey driver, and the Jewish owner of the burden is absent. The ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a Jewish donkey driver and one is obligated to prevent his suffering. The Gemara asks: On what basis did you arrive at this definitive assertion that the animal of a Jew is driven by that Jew and the animal of a gentile is driven by that gentile? The Gemara answers: The typical state of matters is that a person follows his donkey. The first clause addressed the case of a gentile’s donkey, so presumably its driver is gentile. The latter clause addressed the case of a Jew’s donkey, so presumably its driver is a Jew.
והא וחדלת ועזב תעזב בפריקה הוא דכתיבי
The Gemara questions the explanation that the baraita is referring to cases involving loading. But isn’t it with regard to unloading that the phrases cited in the baraita: “You shall forgo passing him by,” and: “You shall release it,” are written?
אמר ליה הא מני רבי יוסי הגלילי היא דאמר צער בעלי חיים לאו דאורייתא
The Gemara answers that he said to him: Indeed, the fact that one need not unload the burden from the donkey in the first clause of the baraita indicates that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. That is the minority opinion, as the Rabbis disagree.
תא שמע אוהב לפרוק ושונא לטעון מצוה בשונא כדי לכוף את יצרו ואי סלקא דעתך צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא הא עדיף ליה אפילו הכי כדי לכוף את יצרו עדיף
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: If one encounters a friend whose animal collapsed and it is necessary to unload its burden, and one also encounters an enemy who needs assistance to load a burden onto his animal, the mitzva is to assist the enemy, in order to subjugate one’s evil inclination. The Gemara reasons: And if it enters your mind that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, that option, to unload his friend’s animal, is the preferable course of action for him. The Gemara answers: Even if the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, even so, loading his enemy’s animal in order to subjugate his evil inclination is preferable.
תא שמע שונא שאמרו שונא ישראל ולא שונא נכרי אי אמרת צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא מה לי שונא ישראל ומה לי שונא נכרי
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita. The enemy with regard to which they stated the halakha that one must assist with his animal is a Jewish enemy and not a gentile enemy. The Gemara asks: If you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if it is a Jewish enemy and what is it to me if it is a gentile enemy? In either case, failure to unload the burden will cause the animal suffering.
מי סברת אשונא דקרא קאי אשונא דמתניתין קאי
The Gemara answers: Do you maintain that the reference in the baraita to an enemy applies to the enemy mentioned in the verse: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden…you shall release it with him”? It applies to the enemy mentioned in the baraita cited above, in which the tanna taught that loading a burden onto an enemy’s animal is preferable to unloading a burden from a friend’s animal.
תא שמע
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita:
