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Daf Yomi

March 3, 2024 | 讻状讙 讘讗讚专 讗壮 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v鈥橸ehuda Tzvi.

    专讘讜转 讘谞讜转 注砖讜 讞讬诇 讜讗转 注诇讬转 注诇志讻诇谞讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg and Rephael Wenger in loving memory of Zvi ben Yisrael Yitzhak Tyberg on his yahrzeit, and in honor of their daughter Ayelet's upcoming marriage to Ori Kinberg.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Hayim Herring with pride and love, in honor of his spouse, Terri Krivosha, who received this year's Sidney Barrows Lifetime Commitment Award from the Mpls. And St. Paul Federations in recognition of her distinguished contribution to the Twin Cities Legal and Jewish Communities.聽

Bava Metzia 4

Bava Metzia bookmark

This week’s learning is sponsored by Rachel Savin in loving memory of her father, Shalom ben Shmuel z”l.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Miriam Tannenbaum in honor of Rina Yahalom and in memory of Rebecca Baruch. “Rina, a dear 鈥榝ormer student鈥 & “bat bayit”, and her close friend, Rebecca Baruch 讛讬”讚 had planned to be chevrutot as they started their daf yomi journey together. Honoring Rina as she begins her daf journey with Bava Metzia, in Rebecca鈥檚 memory. May Rina鈥檚 learning be a source of strength for her and a zechut for all of Am Yisrael.”聽

The Gemara concludes that the kal va’chomer from which Rabbi Chiya derived that two witnesses who testify to half a claim can obligate the defendant to take an oath about the rest was learned out jointly from both one who admits to part of a claim, modeh bemiktzat, and from one witness, who both obligate an oath. Rabbi Chiya had also proven this halakha our Mishna. However, after raising a difficulty on this, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Chiya brought our Mishna as proof for a different halakha – one where one admits to half a claim and then says ‘heilach‘. Rabbi Chiya holds that even in that case one is still obligated to take an oath and that halakha can be proven from our Mishna. Rav Sheshet disagrees with Rabbi Chiya and does not require one to take an oath in that case. A braita is brought to first raise a difficulty against Rabbi Chiya, but is resolved. Then a different version of that difficulty is brought, using the dissenting opinion in that same braita to raise a difficulty against Rav Sheshet, but is resolved. Another difficulty is brought from a Mishna in Shevuot 38b against Rav Sheshet’s opinion but is also resolved.

转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖注诇 诪讛 砖讻驻专 讛讜讗 谞砖讘注


Would you say the same with regard to two witnesses, in which case the defendant takes an oath with regard to the claim that he denies, and not with regard to the debt about which they testify?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗转讬 诪讙诇讙讜诇 砖讘讜注讛 讚注讚 讗讞讚


Rather, Rav Pappa said: Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 a fortiori inference is derived from the extension of an oath that the testimony of one witness obligates him to take. Once a defendant is obligated to take an oath, the plaintiff can demand that he take an oath with regard to other claims that he has against him as well.


诪讛 诇讙诇讙讜诇 砖讘讜注讛 讚注讚 讗讞讚 砖讻谉 砖讘讜注讛 讙讜专专转 砖讘讜注讛 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 讚诪诪讜谉 拽讗 诪讞讬讬讘讬


The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about the extension of an oath that is obligated by the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that one oath leads to another oath. The obligation to take the second oath is not caused directly by the witness. Would you say the same in the case of witnesses, whose testimony renders the defendant liable to pay money? Incurring liability to pay one part of the claim does not extend further and incur liability to pay the rest.


驻讬讜 讬讜讻讬讞 诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 讗讬谞讜 讘讛讻讞砖讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讬讜讻讬讞 砖讬砖谞讜 讘讛讻讞砖讛 讜诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛


The Gemara responds: The admission of one鈥檚 mouth can prove that an element other than an oath can cause the defendant to be obligated to take an oath with regard to the rest of the claim. Although the a fortiori inference from admission alone was already rejected, due to the claim of: What is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth, it is notable in that it is not subject to contradiction; the testimony of one witness can prove that even testimony that is subject to contradiction renders one liable to take an oath.


诪讛 诇注讚 讗讞讚 砖讻谉 注诇 诪讛 砖诪注讬讚 讛讜讗 谞砖讘注 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖注诇 诪讛 砖讻驻专 讛讜讗 谞砖讘注 驻讬讜 讬讜讻讬讞


The a fortiori inference from the testimony of one witness was also rejected, as what is notable about the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that the defendant takes an oath with regard to the matter concerning that which he testifies. Would you say the same with regard to two witnesses, in which case the defendant takes an oath with regard to the claim that he denies? Admission to part of a claim by one鈥檚 mouth can prove this difference irrelevant, as a defendant can be required to take an oath even with regard to a claim that he denies.


讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讜诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖注诇 讬讚讬 讟注谞讛 讜讻驻讬专讛 讛谉 讘讗讬谉 讜谞砖讘注 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 注讚讬诐 砖注诇 讬讚讬 讟注谞讛 讜讻驻讬专讛 讛诐 讘讗讬谉 讜谞砖讘注


And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. At this point, the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, admission, is not like the aspect of that case, the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common denominator is that these cases come before the court with a claim and its denial, and the defendant is obligated to take an oath. I will also include in the obligation to take an oath the case of Rabbi 岣yya, where there is testimony of two witnesses about part of the debt, which comes before the court with a claim and its denial. And therefore the defendant is obligated to take an oath. This is the inference to which Rabbi 岣yya was referring.


诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖讻谉 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉


The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about their common denominator, i.e., the common denominator shared by admission to part of a claim by the defendant and the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that the defendant does not assume the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts. He has not been proven to be lying, so he is trusted to take an oath. Would you say the same with regard to the case of two witnesses who contradict the defendant鈥檚 denial of the plaintiff鈥檚 claim, where the defendant assumes the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts? In this case, he is no longer deemed trustworthy and his oath may not be credible.


讜讘注讚讬诐 诪讬 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉 讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诇讜讛 讻砖专 诇注讚讜转 讘驻讬拽讚讜谉 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara asks: But in a case where his denial is contradicted by two witnesses, does he assume the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts? But doesn鈥檛 Rav Idi bar Avin say that Rav 岣sda says: One who denies a claim that he received a loan and is contradicted by witnesses is fit to bear witness in a different case. He does not assume the status of a confirmed liar, as perhaps he intended to return the money afterward and denied the claim only in order to buy time until he acquired the necessary funds to repay the loan. By contrast, if one denies receiving a deposit and witnesses testify that he is lying, he is disqualified from bearing witness in other cases, as in that case he has no reason to buy time and is clearly a robber. Therefore, Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 a fortiori inference stands.


讗诇讗 驻专讬讱 讛讻讬 诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讻谉 讗讬谞谉 讘转讜专转 讛讝诪讛 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖讬砖谞谉 讘转讜专转 讛讝诪讛


Rather, refute the inference like this: What is notable about their common denominator, i.e., the common denominator shared by admission to part of a claim by the defendant and the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that these cases are not subject to the halakhot of conspiring witnesses. Even if witnesses testify that the single witness lied, he is not required to pay the defendant the sum that he sought to require him to pay, which is the punishment exacted upon conspiring witnesses. Would you say the same halakhot with regard to two witnesses, who are subject to the halakhot of conspiring witnesses?


讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 转讜专转 讛讝诪讛 诇讗 驻专讬讱


The Gemara rejects this: This is not difficult, as Rabbi 岣yya does not refute this inference based on the punishment accompanying the halakhot of conspiring witnesses. In other words, Rabbi 岣yya does not accept this refutation, as while this halakha does not apply at all to the admission of a defendant, it does apply to the testimony of a single witness in that if two witnesses testify that the single witness is a conspiring witness, his testimony is rendered void.


讗诇讗 讚拽讗诪专 讜转谞讗 转讜谞讗 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 诇诪诇讜讛 讗讬转 诇讬讛 住讛讚讬 诇诇讜讛 诇讬转 诇讬讛 住讛讚讬 讚诇讗 诪住讬拽 诇讬讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗讬 讛讜讜 诇讬讛 住讛讚讬 诇诇讜讛 讚诇讗 诪住讬拽 诇讬讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 诇讗 讘注讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诇讗砖转讘讜注讬 讛讻讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讘讛讗讬 讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讘讛讗讬 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 诪砖转讘注讬


The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which was stated (3a): And the tanna of the mishna also taught a similar halakha to that of Rabbi 岣yya, there is a difficulty. Is the case of the mishna comparable to the halakha of Rabbi 岣yya? There, in the case of witnesses to a loan, the creditor has witnesses to support his claim that there was a loan while the debtor does not have witnesses to support his claim that he does not owe the creditor anything. As, if the debtor had witnesses to support his claim that he does not owe the creditor anything, Rabbi 岣yya would not require him to take an oath. By contrast, here, in the case of the mishna, just as it is clear to us that this claimant has a right to the garment, as he is holding it, so too, is it clear to us that that other claimant has a right to the garment, as he is also holding it. Yet nevertheless, in the mishna each party is required to take an oath.


讗诇讗 讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讜转谞讗 转讜谞讗 讗讗讬讚讱 讚专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讗讬转诪专 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讗诇讗 讞诪讬砖讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘


Rather, when the phrase was stated: And the tanna of the mishna also taught a similar halakha, it was stated with regard to another statement of Rabbi 岣yya. As Rabbi 岣yya says: If one says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other says in response: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, and here you are, handing him the money, he is obligated to take an oath that he does not owe the remainder.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讬诇讱 谞诪讬 讻诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讚诪讬


What is the reason? One who says: Here you are, while immediately giving the money, is also considered like one who admits to part of the claim. It cannot be reasoned that by immediately handing over the amount to which he admits, the defendant thereby reduces the claim by the fifty dinars that he denies owing, and he is consequently exempt from taking an oath like any defendant who denies the claim entirely.


讜转谞讗 转讜谞讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讘讟诇讬转


Concerning this ruling of Rabbi 岣yya, the Gemara comments: And the tanna of the mishna taught a similar halakha, citing the mishna beginning: If two people came to court holding a garment.


讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚转驻讬住 讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讚诪讗讬 讚转驻讬住 讛讬诇讱 讛讜讗 讜拽转谞讬 讬砖讘注


The Gemara explains the comparison: And here, in the mishna, since each one grasps half the garment, it is clear to us that what one grasps is in his possession, just as if the other one had said to him: Here you are, I am giving it to you. And the mishna teaches that he takes an oath. Evidently, in a case where one denies part of a claim that is brought against him, and with regard to the rest of the claim he says to the claimant: Here you are, he is obligated to take an oath.


讜专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讛讬诇讱 驻讟讜专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬诇讱 讛谞讬 讝讜讝讬 讚拽讗 诪讜讚讬 讘讙讜讬讬讛讜 讻诪讗谉 讚谞拽讬讟 诇讛讜 诪诇讜讛 讚诪讬 讘讗讬谞讱 讞诪砖讬诐 讛讗 诇讗 诪讜讚讬 讛诇讻讱 诇讬讻讗 讛讜讚讗转 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛


And Rav Sheshet says: One who says about part of the claim: Here you are, and denies the rest of the claim, is exempt from taking an oath about the rest. What is the reason? Since he said to him: Here you are, those dinars that he admitted to owing are considered as if the creditor has them in his possession already, and with regard to the other fifty dinars, the defendant did not admit to owing them. Therefore, there is no admission to part of the claim.


讜诇专讘 砖砖转 拽砖讬讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 砖砖转 诪转谞讬转讬谉 转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讗


The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rav Sheshet, the mishna is difficult, as it seems to be a comparable case and yet an oath is required. The Gemara answers: Rav Sheshet could have said to you: The oath mentioned in the mishna is a rabbinic ordinance, which pertains specifically to that case. In general, a debtor who immediately hands over the money that he admits to owing is exempt from taking an oath.


讜讗讬讚讱 讗讬谉 转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讗 讜诪讬讛讜 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘 诪转拽谞讬 专讘谞谉 砖讘讜注讛 讻注讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讬诇讱 驻讟讜专 诪转拽谞讬 专讘谞谉 砖讘讜注讛 讚诇讬转讗 讚讻讜讜转讛 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


And how would the other amora, Rabbi 岣yya, respond to this assertion? Indeed, he would agree that it is a rabbinic ordinance. However, granted, if you say that by Torah law one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath, that explains why the Sages instituted the oath mentioned in the mishna, as it is similar to an oath administered by Torah law. But if you say that by Torah law one who says: Here you are, is exempt from taking an oath, would the Sages institute an oath that has no corresponding oath in Torah law? Clearly, there is a basis for the oath instituted by the Sages in Torah law, and that basis is the case where the defendant says: Here you are.


诪讬转讬讘讬


The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya from a baraita:


住诇注讬诐 讚讬谞专讬谉 诪诇讜讛 讗讜诪专 讞诪砖 讜诇讜讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇砖 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讜驻讟讜专


If it is written in a promissory note that one borrowed an unspecified amount of sela鈥檌m, or that one borrowed an unspecified amount of dinars, and the creditor says: I lent you five sela, and the debtor says: You lent me only three, in this case Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since the debtor admitted to part of the claim, he takes an oath. Rabbi Akiva says: Since the wording of the note indicates only that he owes two dinars, the minimum plural amount, by admitting that he owes three he is merely the equivalent of one returning a lost item, and he is exempt from taking an oath.


拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 砖诇砖 讛讗 砖转讬诐 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗讬 砖讟专 讚拽诪讜讚讬 讘讬讛 讛讬诇讱 讛讜讗 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讬诇讱 驻讟讜专


In any event, the baraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since the debtor admitted to part of the claim, he takes an oath. This indicates that the reason that he is obligated to take an oath is specifically because he said that he owes three dinars, but had he admitted to owing only two, he would have been exempt from taking an oath. And concerning the minimal obligation recorded in this promissory note, to which he admits, which is two dinars, it is as though he said: Here you are. An obligation recorded in a promissory note is tantamount to an obligation concerning which the defendant says: Here you are. And therefore, conclude from it that one who says: Here you are, is exempt from taking an oath with regard to the part of the claim he denies.


诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 砖转讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗讬 讚拽转谞讬 砖诇砖 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讬 讜驻讟讜专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讛讜讬 讜讞讬讬讘


The Gemara rejects this: No, actually I will say to you that even if he admitted that he owes two dinars he is obligated to take an oath, and the reason that the baraita teaches the dispute specifically with regard to the case of three dinars is not to exclude a case where he admits that he owes only two, but rather it is to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that he is the equivalent of one returning a lost item, and he is therefore exempt. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar teaches us that he is considered like one who admits to part of the claim, and he is obligated to take an oath.


讗讬 讛讻讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 讗祝 讝讛 讬砖讘注 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛


The Gemara asks: If so, the baraita should have been phrased differently. If the defendant is obligated to take an oath even in a case where he admits that he owes two dinars, rather than stating that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since the debtor admitted to part of the claim, he takes an oath, the baraita should have stated: Even this one, who admits to owing three dinars, takes an oath, in addition to one who admits to owing two dinars.


讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 砖转讬诐 驻讟讜专 讜讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讚拽讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 砖讟专讗


Rather, that explanation should be rejected. Actually, if he admits that he owes two dinars, he is exempt from taking an oath, but nevertheless, one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath. And the reason for this distinction is that here, the case is different, as the note supports him, i.e., it indicates that he owes two dinars. Therefore, he is exempt from taking an oath with regard to the rest.


讗讬 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 砖讟专 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转 讜讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 注诇 讻驻讬专转 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转


Alternatively, if he admits to owing two dinars he is exempt for a different reason: Because a promissory note creates a lien on the debtor鈥檚 land, and there is a principle that one does not take an oath with regard to a debtor鈥檚 denial of a debt that is secured with a lien on land. Oaths are administered only when one denies owing money or movable property.


讗讬讻讗 讚诪讜转讬讘 诪住讬驻讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讜驻讟讜专 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 砖诇砖 讛讗 砖转讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗 砖讟专 讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗 诪讜讚讬 讘讬讛 讻讛讬诇讱 讚诪讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘


There are those who raise an objection to Rav Sheshet鈥檚 opinion from the latter clause of this baraita, which teaches that Rabbi Akiva says: He is merely the equivalent of one returning a lost item and is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that he said that he owes three dinars. But had he admitted to owing only two, he would have been obligated to take an oath. And concerning the minimal obligation recorded in this promissory note, to which he admits, which is two dinars, it is as though he said: Here you are. Learn from it that one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath.


诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 砖转讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗讬 讚拽转谞讬 砖诇砖 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讛讜讬 讜讞讬讬讘 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讬 讜驻讟讜专


The Gemara rejects this: No, actually I will say to you that if he admits that he owes two dinars he is also exempt from taking an oath, and the reason that the baraita teaches the dispute specifically with regard to the case of three dinars is to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who says that he is considered one who admits to part of the claim and he is obligated to take an oath. Rabbi Akiva, therefore, teaches us that in his opinion, the defendant is the equivalent of one returning a lost item, and he is exempt from taking an oath.


讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 砖转讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘砖诇砖 讛讬讻讬 驻讟专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讗讬 讗注专讜诪讬 拽讗 诪注专讬诐 住讘专 讗讬 讗诪讬谞讗 砖转讬诐 讘注讬谞讗 讗砖转讘讜注讬 讗讬诪讗 砖诇砖 讚讗讛讜讬 讻诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讗讬驻讟专 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 砖转讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专


The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita as just explained, as, if it enters your mind that one who admits that he owes two dinars is obligated to take an oath, how does Rabbi Akiva deem him exempt in a case where he admits that he owes three dinars? Perhaps this debtor is employing artifice, thinking: If I say that I owe two, I will be required to take an oath. Therefore, I will say that I owe three so that I will be considered equivalent to one returning a lost item and will be exempt from taking an oath. Rather, learn from it that even if he admits that he owes only two dinars, he is also exempt from taking an oath.


讗诇讗 拽砖讬讗 诇专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚拽讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 砖讟专讗 讗讬 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 砖讟专 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转 讜讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 注诇 讻驻讬专转 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转


The Gemara asks: But this explanation poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya, that a defendant is obligated to take an oath in a case where he says: Here you are. In other words, Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 opinion is negated by the case of one who admits that he owes only two dinars, where he is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara answers: The case there is different, as the note supports him. Therefore, he is not required to take an oath. Alternatively, he is exempt because a promissory note creates a lien on the debtor鈥檚 land, and there is a principle that one does not take an oath with regard to a debtor鈥檚 denial of a debt that is secured with a lien on land.


诪转讬讘 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讟注谞讜 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讛讜讚讛 讘讻诇讬诐 讜讻驻专 讘拽专拽注讜转 讛讜讚讛 讘拽专拽注讜转 讜讻驻专 讘讻诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讛讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 拽专拽注讜转 驻讟讜专 诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘


Mar Zutra, son of Rav Na岣an, raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Sheshet from a mishna (Shevuot 38b): If one claimed that another owed him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied that he owes him land, or conversely, if he admitted to owing him land but denied that he owes him vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath with regard to what he denies. If he admitted that he owes him part of the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to owing some of the vessels, he is obligated to take an oath with regard to the remainder.


讟注诪讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讚拽专拽注 诇讗讜 讘转 砖讘讜注讛 讛讬讗 讛讗 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讞讬讬讘 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬诇讱 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘


The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is because the claim is for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath. But if the claim is for vessels and vessels, i.e., two sets of vessels, in a manner similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land, he is obligated to take an oath. What are the circumstances of such a case? Is it not a case where he said to him: Here you are? And learn from the mishna that one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath.


诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗 讚拽转谞讬 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注诇 讛拽专拽注讜转


The Gemara answers: No, actually I will say to you that if the claim is for vessels and vessels he is also exempt. And the fact that the mishna teaches the case of vessels and land teaches us this different halakha: If he admitted that he owes some of the vessels, and is therefore obligated to take an oath, he is also obligated to take an oath with regard to the land that he denied owing his creditor, although in and of itself one does not take an oath with regard to land.


诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讝讜拽拽讬谉 转谞讬谞讗 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 讗转 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 诇讬砖讘注 注诇讬讛诐


The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Is this teaching the halakha of binding? According to this halakha, one who is obligated to take an oath in response to a claim can be required to take an oath with regard to an additional claim of land. This cannot be, as we already learned this halakha in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): When there is a claim brought against a person for movable property and land, and he is obligated to take an oath with regard to the property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., the movable property, it binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that he is forced to take an oath with regard to it too. Why is this halakha repeated in tractate Shevuot?


讛讻讗 注讬拽专 讛转诐 讗讙讘 讙专专讗 谞住讘讛


The Gemara answers: The mishna here, in Shevuot, is the main reference to this halakha, as it discusses the halakhot of oaths, whereas the mishna there, in tractate Kiddushin, cites it incidentally, in the context of a broader survey of the difference between these two types of property.


  • Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v鈥橸ehuda Tzvi.

    专讘讜转 讘谞讜转 注砖讜 讞讬诇 讜讗转 注诇讬转 注诇志讻诇谞讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg and Rephael Wenger in loving memory of Zvi ben Yisrael Yitzhak Tyberg on his yahrzeit, and in honor of their daughter Ayelet's upcoming marriage to Ori Kinberg.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Hayim Herring with pride and love, in honor of his spouse, Terri Krivosha, who received this year's Sidney Barrows Lifetime Commitment Award from the Mpls. And St. Paul Federations in recognition of her distinguished contribution to the Twin Cities Legal and Jewish Communities.聽

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Bava Metzia 4

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 4

转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖注诇 诪讛 砖讻驻专 讛讜讗 谞砖讘注


Would you say the same with regard to two witnesses, in which case the defendant takes an oath with regard to the claim that he denies, and not with regard to the debt about which they testify?


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗转讬 诪讙诇讙讜诇 砖讘讜注讛 讚注讚 讗讞讚


Rather, Rav Pappa said: Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 a fortiori inference is derived from the extension of an oath that the testimony of one witness obligates him to take. Once a defendant is obligated to take an oath, the plaintiff can demand that he take an oath with regard to other claims that he has against him as well.


诪讛 诇讙诇讙讜诇 砖讘讜注讛 讚注讚 讗讞讚 砖讻谉 砖讘讜注讛 讙讜专专转 砖讘讜注讛 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 讚诪诪讜谉 拽讗 诪讞讬讬讘讬


The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about the extension of an oath that is obligated by the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that one oath leads to another oath. The obligation to take the second oath is not caused directly by the witness. Would you say the same in the case of witnesses, whose testimony renders the defendant liable to pay money? Incurring liability to pay one part of the claim does not extend further and incur liability to pay the rest.


驻讬讜 讬讜讻讬讞 诪讛 诇驻讬讜 砖讻谉 讗讬谞讜 讘讛讻讞砖讛 注讚 讗讞讚 讬讜讻讬讞 砖讬砖谞讜 讘讛讻讞砖讛 讜诪讞讬讬讘讜 砖讘讜注讛


The Gemara responds: The admission of one鈥檚 mouth can prove that an element other than an oath can cause the defendant to be obligated to take an oath with regard to the rest of the claim. Although the a fortiori inference from admission alone was already rejected, due to the claim of: What is notable about the admission of one鈥檚 mouth, it is notable in that it is not subject to contradiction; the testimony of one witness can prove that even testimony that is subject to contradiction renders one liable to take an oath.


诪讛 诇注讚 讗讞讚 砖讻谉 注诇 诪讛 砖诪注讬讚 讛讜讗 谞砖讘注 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖注诇 诪讛 砖讻驻专 讛讜讗 谞砖讘注 驻讬讜 讬讜讻讬讞


The a fortiori inference from the testimony of one witness was also rejected, as what is notable about the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that the defendant takes an oath with regard to the matter concerning that which he testifies. Would you say the same with regard to two witnesses, in which case the defendant takes an oath with regard to the claim that he denies? Admission to part of a claim by one鈥檚 mouth can prove this difference irrelevant, as a defendant can be required to take an oath even with regard to a claim that he denies.


讜讞讝专 讛讚讬谉 诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讜诇讗 专讗讬 讝讛 讻专讗讬 讝讛 讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖注诇 讬讚讬 讟注谞讛 讜讻驻讬专讛 讛谉 讘讗讬谉 讜谞砖讘注 讗祝 讗谞讬 讗讘讬讗 注讚讬诐 砖注诇 讬讚讬 讟注谞讛 讜讻驻讬专讛 讛诐 讘讗讬谉 讜谞砖讘注


And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. At this point, the halakha is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, admission, is not like the aspect of that case, the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common denominator is that these cases come before the court with a claim and its denial, and the defendant is obligated to take an oath. I will also include in the obligation to take an oath the case of Rabbi 岣yya, where there is testimony of two witnesses about part of the debt, which comes before the court with a claim and its denial. And therefore the defendant is obligated to take an oath. This is the inference to which Rabbi 岣yya was referring.


诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讻谉 诇讗 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖讻谉 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉


The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about their common denominator, i.e., the common denominator shared by admission to part of a claim by the defendant and the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that the defendant does not assume the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts. He has not been proven to be lying, so he is trusted to take an oath. Would you say the same with regard to the case of two witnesses who contradict the defendant鈥檚 denial of the plaintiff鈥檚 claim, where the defendant assumes the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts? In this case, he is no longer deemed trustworthy and his oath may not be credible.


讜讘注讚讬诐 诪讬 讛讜讞讝拽 讻驻专谉 讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讗讬讚讬 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讛讻讜驻专 讘诪诇讜讛 讻砖专 诇注讚讜转 讘驻讬拽讚讜谉 驻住讜诇 诇注讚讜转


The Gemara asks: But in a case where his denial is contradicted by two witnesses, does he assume the presumptive status of one who falsely denies his debts? But doesn鈥檛 Rav Idi bar Avin say that Rav 岣sda says: One who denies a claim that he received a loan and is contradicted by witnesses is fit to bear witness in a different case. He does not assume the status of a confirmed liar, as perhaps he intended to return the money afterward and denied the claim only in order to buy time until he acquired the necessary funds to repay the loan. By contrast, if one denies receiving a deposit and witnesses testify that he is lying, he is disqualified from bearing witness in other cases, as in that case he has no reason to buy time and is clearly a robber. Therefore, Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 a fortiori inference stands.


讗诇讗 驻专讬讱 讛讻讬 诪讛 诇讛爪讚 讛砖讜讛 砖讘讛谉 砖讻谉 讗讬谞谉 讘转讜专转 讛讝诪讛 转讗诪专 讘注讚讬诐 砖讬砖谞谉 讘转讜专转 讛讝诪讛


Rather, refute the inference like this: What is notable about their common denominator, i.e., the common denominator shared by admission to part of a claim by the defendant and the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable in that these cases are not subject to the halakhot of conspiring witnesses. Even if witnesses testify that the single witness lied, he is not required to pay the defendant the sum that he sought to require him to pay, which is the punishment exacted upon conspiring witnesses. Would you say the same halakhot with regard to two witnesses, who are subject to the halakhot of conspiring witnesses?


讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 转讜专转 讛讝诪讛 诇讗 驻专讬讱


The Gemara rejects this: This is not difficult, as Rabbi 岣yya does not refute this inference based on the punishment accompanying the halakhot of conspiring witnesses. In other words, Rabbi 岣yya does not accept this refutation, as while this halakha does not apply at all to the admission of a defendant, it does apply to the testimony of a single witness in that if two witnesses testify that the single witness is a conspiring witness, his testimony is rendered void.


讗诇讗 讚拽讗诪专 讜转谞讗 转讜谞讗 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 诇诪诇讜讛 讗讬转 诇讬讛 住讛讚讬 诇诇讜讛 诇讬转 诇讬讛 住讛讚讬 讚诇讗 诪住讬拽 诇讬讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗讬 讛讜讜 诇讬讛 住讛讚讬 诇诇讜讛 讚诇讗 诪住讬拽 诇讬讛 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 诇讗 讘注讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诇讗砖转讘讜注讬 讛讻讗 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讘讛讗讬 讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讘讛讗讬 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 诪砖转讘注讬


The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which was stated (3a): And the tanna of the mishna also taught a similar halakha to that of Rabbi 岣yya, there is a difficulty. Is the case of the mishna comparable to the halakha of Rabbi 岣yya? There, in the case of witnesses to a loan, the creditor has witnesses to support his claim that there was a loan while the debtor does not have witnesses to support his claim that he does not owe the creditor anything. As, if the debtor had witnesses to support his claim that he does not owe the creditor anything, Rabbi 岣yya would not require him to take an oath. By contrast, here, in the case of the mishna, just as it is clear to us that this claimant has a right to the garment, as he is holding it, so too, is it clear to us that that other claimant has a right to the garment, as he is also holding it. Yet nevertheless, in the mishna each party is required to take an oath.


讗诇讗 讻讬 讗讬转诪专 讜转谞讗 转讜谞讗 讗讗讬讚讱 讚专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讗讬转诪专 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 诪谞讛 诇讬 讘讬讚讱 讜讛诇讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讬讚讬 讗诇讗 讞诪讬砖讬诐 讝讜讝 讜讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘


Rather, when the phrase was stated: And the tanna of the mishna also taught a similar halakha, it was stated with regard to another statement of Rabbi 岣yya. As Rabbi 岣yya says: If one says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other says in response: You have only fifty dinars in my possession, and here you are, handing him the money, he is obligated to take an oath that he does not owe the remainder.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讬诇讱 谞诪讬 讻诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讚诪讬


What is the reason? One who says: Here you are, while immediately giving the money, is also considered like one who admits to part of the claim. It cannot be reasoned that by immediately handing over the amount to which he admits, the defendant thereby reduces the claim by the fifty dinars that he denies owing, and he is consequently exempt from taking an oath like any defendant who denies the claim entirely.


讜转谞讗 转讜谞讗 砖谞讬诐 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讘讟诇讬转


Concerning this ruling of Rabbi 岣yya, the Gemara comments: And the tanna of the mishna taught a similar halakha, citing the mishna beginning: If two people came to court holding a garment.


讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讻讬讜谉 讚转驻讬住 讗谞谉 住讛讚讬 讚诪讗讬 讚转驻讬住 讛讬诇讱 讛讜讗 讜拽转谞讬 讬砖讘注


The Gemara explains the comparison: And here, in the mishna, since each one grasps half the garment, it is clear to us that what one grasps is in his possession, just as if the other one had said to him: Here you are, I am giving it to you. And the mishna teaches that he takes an oath. Evidently, in a case where one denies part of a claim that is brought against him, and with regard to the rest of the claim he says to the claimant: Here you are, he is obligated to take an oath.


讜专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讛讬诇讱 驻讟讜专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬诇讱 讛谞讬 讝讜讝讬 讚拽讗 诪讜讚讬 讘讙讜讬讬讛讜 讻诪讗谉 讚谞拽讬讟 诇讛讜 诪诇讜讛 讚诪讬 讘讗讬谞讱 讞诪砖讬诐 讛讗 诇讗 诪讜讚讬 讛诇讻讱 诇讬讻讗 讛讜讚讗转 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛


And Rav Sheshet says: One who says about part of the claim: Here you are, and denies the rest of the claim, is exempt from taking an oath about the rest. What is the reason? Since he said to him: Here you are, those dinars that he admitted to owing are considered as if the creditor has them in his possession already, and with regard to the other fifty dinars, the defendant did not admit to owing them. Therefore, there is no admission to part of the claim.


讜诇专讘 砖砖转 拽砖讬讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 砖砖转 诪转谞讬转讬谉 转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讗


The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rav Sheshet, the mishna is difficult, as it seems to be a comparable case and yet an oath is required. The Gemara answers: Rav Sheshet could have said to you: The oath mentioned in the mishna is a rabbinic ordinance, which pertains specifically to that case. In general, a debtor who immediately hands over the money that he admits to owing is exempt from taking an oath.


讜讗讬讚讱 讗讬谉 转拽谞转 讞讻诪讬诐 讛讬讗 讜诪讬讛讜 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘 诪转拽谞讬 专讘谞谉 砖讘讜注讛 讻注讬谉 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讬诇讱 驻讟讜专 诪转拽谞讬 专讘谞谉 砖讘讜注讛 讚诇讬转讗 讚讻讜讜转讛 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗


And how would the other amora, Rabbi 岣yya, respond to this assertion? Indeed, he would agree that it is a rabbinic ordinance. However, granted, if you say that by Torah law one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath, that explains why the Sages instituted the oath mentioned in the mishna, as it is similar to an oath administered by Torah law. But if you say that by Torah law one who says: Here you are, is exempt from taking an oath, would the Sages institute an oath that has no corresponding oath in Torah law? Clearly, there is a basis for the oath instituted by the Sages in Torah law, and that basis is the case where the defendant says: Here you are.


诪讬转讬讘讬


The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya from a baraita:


住诇注讬诐 讚讬谞专讬谉 诪诇讜讛 讗讜诪专 讞诪砖 讜诇讜讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇砖 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讜驻讟讜专


If it is written in a promissory note that one borrowed an unspecified amount of sela鈥檌m, or that one borrowed an unspecified amount of dinars, and the creditor says: I lent you five sela, and the debtor says: You lent me only three, in this case Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since the debtor admitted to part of the claim, he takes an oath. Rabbi Akiva says: Since the wording of the note indicates only that he owes two dinars, the minimum plural amount, by admitting that he owes three he is merely the equivalent of one returning a lost item, and he is exempt from taking an oath.


拽转谞讬 诪讬讛转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 砖诇砖 讛讗 砖转讬诐 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗讬 砖讟专 讚拽诪讜讚讬 讘讬讛 讛讬诇讱 讛讜讗 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讬诇讱 驻讟讜专


In any event, the baraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since the debtor admitted to part of the claim, he takes an oath. This indicates that the reason that he is obligated to take an oath is specifically because he said that he owes three dinars, but had he admitted to owing only two, he would have been exempt from taking an oath. And concerning the minimal obligation recorded in this promissory note, to which he admits, which is two dinars, it is as though he said: Here you are. An obligation recorded in a promissory note is tantamount to an obligation concerning which the defendant says: Here you are. And therefore, conclude from it that one who says: Here you are, is exempt from taking an oath with regard to the part of the claim he denies.


诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 砖转讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗讬 讚拽转谞讬 砖诇砖 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讗诪专 诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讬 讜驻讟讜专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讛讜讬 讜讞讬讬讘


The Gemara rejects this: No, actually I will say to you that even if he admitted that he owes two dinars he is obligated to take an oath, and the reason that the baraita teaches the dispute specifically with regard to the case of three dinars is not to exclude a case where he admits that he owes only two, but rather it is to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that he is the equivalent of one returning a lost item, and he is therefore exempt. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar teaches us that he is considered like one who admits to part of the claim, and he is obligated to take an oath.


讗讬 讛讻讬 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讗讜诪专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讛讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讬砖讘注 讗祝 讝讛 讬砖讘注 诪讘注讬 诇讬讛


The Gemara asks: If so, the baraita should have been phrased differently. If the defendant is obligated to take an oath even in a case where he admits that he owes two dinars, rather than stating that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since the debtor admitted to part of the claim, he takes an oath, the baraita should have stated: Even this one, who admits to owing three dinars, takes an oath, in addition to one who admits to owing two dinars.


讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 砖转讬诐 驻讟讜专 讜讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘 讜砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讚拽讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 砖讟专讗


Rather, that explanation should be rejected. Actually, if he admits that he owes two dinars, he is exempt from taking an oath, but nevertheless, one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath. And the reason for this distinction is that here, the case is different, as the note supports him, i.e., it indicates that he owes two dinars. Therefore, he is exempt from taking an oath with regard to the rest.


讗讬 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 砖讟专 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转 讜讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 注诇 讻驻讬专转 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转


Alternatively, if he admits to owing two dinars he is exempt for a different reason: Because a promissory note creates a lien on the debtor鈥檚 land, and there is a principle that one does not take an oath with regard to a debtor鈥檚 denial of a debt that is secured with a lien on land. Oaths are administered only when one denies owing money or movable property.


讗讬讻讗 讚诪讜转讬讘 诪住讬驻讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讜驻讟讜专 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 砖诇砖 讛讗 砖转讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗 砖讟专 讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗 诪讜讚讬 讘讬讛 讻讛讬诇讱 讚诪讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘


There are those who raise an objection to Rav Sheshet鈥檚 opinion from the latter clause of this baraita, which teaches that Rabbi Akiva says: He is merely the equivalent of one returning a lost item and is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt is that he said that he owes three dinars. But had he admitted to owing only two, he would have been obligated to take an oath. And concerning the minimal obligation recorded in this promissory note, to which he admits, which is two dinars, it is as though he said: Here you are. Learn from it that one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath.


诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 砖转讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗讬 讚拽转谞讬 砖诇砖 诇讗驻讜拽讬 诪讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 诪讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 讛讟注谞讛 讛讜讬 讜讞讬讬讘 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讛讜讬 讜驻讟讜专


The Gemara rejects this: No, actually I will say to you that if he admits that he owes two dinars he is also exempt from taking an oath, and the reason that the baraita teaches the dispute specifically with regard to the case of three dinars is to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who says that he is considered one who admits to part of the claim and he is obligated to take an oath. Rabbi Akiva, therefore, teaches us that in his opinion, the defendant is the equivalent of one returning a lost item, and he is exempt from taking an oath.


讛讻讬 谞诪讬 诪住转讘专讗 讚讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 砖转讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讘砖诇砖 讛讬讻讬 驻讟专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讗讬 讗注专讜诪讬 拽讗 诪注专讬诐 住讘专 讗讬 讗诪讬谞讗 砖转讬诐 讘注讬谞讗 讗砖转讘讜注讬 讗讬诪讗 砖诇砖 讚讗讛讜讬 讻诪砖讬讘 讗讘讬讚讛 讜讗讬驻讟专 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 砖转讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专


The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita as just explained, as, if it enters your mind that one who admits that he owes two dinars is obligated to take an oath, how does Rabbi Akiva deem him exempt in a case where he admits that he owes three dinars? Perhaps this debtor is employing artifice, thinking: If I say that I owe two, I will be required to take an oath. Therefore, I will say that I owe three so that I will be considered equivalent to one returning a lost item and will be exempt from taking an oath. Rather, learn from it that even if he admits that he owes only two dinars, he is also exempt from taking an oath.


讗诇讗 拽砖讬讗 诇专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚拽讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 砖讟专讗 讗讬 谞诪讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 砖讟专 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转 讜讗讬谉 谞砖讘注讬谉 注诇 讻驻讬专转 砖注讘讜讚 拽专拽注讜转


The Gemara asks: But this explanation poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya, that a defendant is obligated to take an oath in a case where he says: Here you are. In other words, Rabbi 岣yya鈥檚 opinion is negated by the case of one who admits that he owes only two dinars, where he is exempt from taking an oath. The Gemara answers: The case there is different, as the note supports him. Therefore, he is not required to take an oath. Alternatively, he is exempt because a promissory note creates a lien on the debtor鈥檚 land, and there is a principle that one does not take an oath with regard to a debtor鈥檚 denial of a debt that is secured with a lien on land.


诪转讬讘 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讟注谞讜 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讛讜讚讛 讘讻诇讬诐 讜讻驻专 讘拽专拽注讜转 讛讜讚讛 讘拽专拽注讜转 讜讻驻专 讘讻诇讬诐 驻讟讜专 讛讜讚讛 诪拽爪转 拽专拽注讜转 驻讟讜专 诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘


Mar Zutra, son of Rav Na岣an, raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Sheshet from a mishna (Shevuot 38b): If one claimed that another owed him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to owing him vessels but denied that he owes him land, or conversely, if he admitted to owing him land but denied that he owes him vessels, he is exempt from taking an oath with regard to what he denies. If he admitted that he owes him part of the land, he is exempt. If he admitted to owing some of the vessels, he is obligated to take an oath with regard to the remainder.


讟注诪讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讚拽专拽注 诇讗讜 讘转 砖讘讜注讛 讛讬讗 讛讗 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讞讬讬讘 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬诇讱 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讬诇讱 讞讬讬讘


The Gemara infers: The reason he is exempt in the first cases is because the claim is for vessels and land, as a claim with regard to land is not subject to an oath. But if the claim is for vessels and vessels, i.e., two sets of vessels, in a manner similar to the case of a claim for vessels and land, he is obligated to take an oath. What are the circumstances of such a case? Is it not a case where he said to him: Here you are? And learn from the mishna that one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath.


诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 讻诇讬诐 讜讻诇讬诐 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讜讛讗 讚拽转谞讬 讻诇讬诐 讜拽专拽注讜转 讛讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讛讜讚讛 讘诪拽爪转 讻诇讬诐 讞讬讬讘 讗祝 注诇 讛拽专拽注讜转


The Gemara answers: No, actually I will say to you that if the claim is for vessels and vessels he is also exempt. And the fact that the mishna teaches the case of vessels and land teaches us this different halakha: If he admitted that he owes some of the vessels, and is therefore obligated to take an oath, he is also obligated to take an oath with regard to the land that he denied owing his creditor, although in and of itself one does not take an oath with regard to land.


诪讗讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讝讜拽拽讬谉 转谞讬谞讗 讝讜拽拽讬谉 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 讗转 讛谞讻住讬诐 砖讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讞专讬讜转 诇讬砖讘注 注诇讬讛诐


The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us? Is this teaching the halakha of binding? According to this halakha, one who is obligated to take an oath in response to a claim can be required to take an oath with regard to an additional claim of land. This cannot be, as we already learned this halakha in a mishna in tractate Kiddushin (26a): When there is a claim brought against a person for movable property and land, and he is obligated to take an oath with regard to the property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., the movable property, it binds the property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., the land, so that he is forced to take an oath with regard to it too. Why is this halakha repeated in tractate Shevuot?


讛讻讗 注讬拽专 讛转诐 讗讙讘 讙专专讗 谞住讘讛


The Gemara answers: The mishna here, in Shevuot, is the main reference to this halakha, as it discusses the halakhot of oaths, whereas the mishna there, in tractate Kiddushin, cites it incidentally, in the context of a broader survey of the difference between these two types of property.


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