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March 6, 2024 | 讻状讜 讘讗讚专 讗壮 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v鈥橸ehuda Tzvi.

    专讘讜转 讘谞讜转 注砖讜 讞讬诇 讜讗转 注诇讬转 注诇志讻诇谞讛

Bava Metzia 7

Today’s daf is sponsored by Eitan and Pnina Lipsker “in honor of all the women daf yomi learners, especially those who make an extra-human effort to join the Hebrew Zoom at 6:20 every morning. They add kedusha and Torah to Am Yisrael. May we be blessed to continue to learn Torah daily and l’hagdil Torah u’lehaadira.”

After deliberations on Bava Metzia 6 regarding a contested item that was sanctified by one of the parties, the Gemara brings a ruling that the sanctification is not effective unless the one who sanctified had proof of ownership that would hold up in court. However, this is limited to land, as the sanctification of moveable items is ineffective unless the item is physically in the domain of the one sanctifying it. Rav Tachlifa brings a braita that states if two people are holding on to part of the tallit, each one gets to keep the part they are holding on to and the remainder is divided evenly. Rabbi Avahu added that this is only if they take an oath. In light of this braita, Rav Papa explains that our Mishna must refer to a case where each was holding onto the edge of the garment. Comparisons are made to other cases like a kinyan sudar or a get, divorce document, where two people are holding onto the object. Are these cases similar or different to our case and why? How is the garment divided if there is gold running through it? A braita discusses the case of two people holding a document – the creditor claiming ownership, such that the debtor still owes the money, and the debtor claiming ownership as the loan was already paid back. Rebbi says the document is validated if the witnesses’ signatures can be confirmed. They explain this to mean that if it is validated, the document is split, but if not, since the debtor admits there was a loan, but claims it was paid, the debtor is believed as “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says they split it in either case. The principle of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted” is not relevant here as there is a document as well. If the document is found near the judge (meaning, the judge validated it), the rabbis and Rabbi Yosi disagree – is it never able to be collected or does it remain valid for collecting? Rabbi Yosi holds it can be collected as we are not concerned that the debtor already paid back the loan. However, this is difficult in light of a different braita relating to a ketuba that is found and contested by the husband and wife, Rabbi Yosi rules (against the rabbis) that if the woman is divorced or widowed, we assume it was paid. The rabbis suggest three possible ways to resolve the contradiction. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yochanan differentiate between a typical case where two people are holding a document and a case in which one is holding the main part (toref) and one is holding the tofes (the summary at the end which does not include the date. What exactly is this case and how would it be divided? How do we assess the difference between the value of the toref and the tofes?

讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讱 诇诪讬诪专 注砖讬专讬 讜讚讗讬 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讗 注砖讬专讬 住驻拽 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 注砖讬专讬 讜讚讗讬 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讗 注砖讬专讬 住驻拽


Rather, what have you to say to explain why one is not required to tithe his flock in a case where a counted animal jumped back into the pen? The Merciful One states: 鈥淎nd all the tithe of the herd or the flock, anyone that passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 27:32), from which it is derived that a certain tenth animal must be tithed, but not an uncertain tenth, i.e., an animal that is not certainly the tenth. Here too, the entire flock is exempt from tithe because the Merciful One states that a certain tenth animal must be designated as tithe and not an uncertain tenth, i.e., an animal that is not certainly subject to tithe. Therefore, there is proof from the baraita that if a priest seizes an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain, the court removes it from his possession.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 诪讚驻转讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 诪讗讬 住驻讬拽讜转 讗讬诇讬诪讗 住驻拽 讘讻讜专讜转 讬讛讬讛 拽讚砖 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讗 砖讻讘专 拽讚讜砖


Rav A岣 of Difti said to Ravina: What are these animals of uncertain status that that are subject to tithe according to the mishna? If we say that the reference is to animals whose status as firstborns is uncertain, the Merciful One states: 鈥淭he tenth shall be sacred to the Lord,鈥 indicating that the tithe animal becomes sacred only when it is designated as tithe, from which it is inferred: But not an animal that is already sacred for a different reason. Therefore, since an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain is already considered sacred due to the uncertainty, the sanctity of animal tithe would not apply to it.


讗诇讗 住驻拽 驻讚讬讜谉 驻讟专 讞诪讜专 讜讻讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讬砖专讗诇 砖讬砖 诇讜 注砖专讛 住驻拽 驻讟专讬 讞诪讜专 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讜 诪驻专讬砖 注诇讬讛谉 注砖专讛 砖讬讬谉 讜诪注砖专谉 讜讛谉 砖诇讜


Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case of an uncertain redemption of a firstborn donkey, i.e., a lamb used as redemption for a donkey whose status as firstborn is uncertain. And this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Na岣an, as Rav Na岣an says that Rabba bar Avuh says: An Israelite who has ten donkeys whose status as firstborn is uncertain in his home separates ten lambs to redeem them, and tithes the lambs, separating one as a tithe, and they all belong to him, as a priest cannot prove that he is entitled to any of the ten.


诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 讚诪住讜转讗 转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讛讜讛 注讜讘讚讗 讘讬 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 讘讬 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜驻砖讟讛 诪讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻诇 诪诪讜谉 砖讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讜爪讬讗讜 讘讚讬讬谞讬谉 讛拽讚讬砖讜 讗讬谞讜 拽讚讜砖


The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter of the bathhouse? Come and hear a conclusion, as Rabbi 岣yya bar Avin said: There was a similar incident that was brought before the school of Rav 岣sda, and Rav 岣sda brought the case before the school of Rav Huna, and Rav Huna resolved the issue based on that which Rav Na岣an says: With regard to any property that one cannot recover from the possession of another party by legal process, if he consecrated it while it was in the possession of the other party the consecration is not valid.


讛讗 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讜爪讬讗讜 讘讚讬讬谞讬谉 讛拽讚讬砖讜 拽讚讜砖 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讗驻拽讬讛 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讙讝诇 讜诇讗 谞转讬讬讗砖讜 讛讘注诇讬诐 砖谞讬讛诐 讗讬谞诐 讬讻讜诇讬谉 诇讛拽讚讬砖讜 讝讛 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谞讛 砖诇讜 讜讝讛 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谞讛 讘专砖讜转讜


The Gemara questions Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement: By inference, is it so that if one can recover the property from the other party by legal process, and he consecrated it, the consecration is valid, although he has not yet recovered it? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan say: In a case where one robbed another of an item and the owner did not despair of retrieving it, neither the owner nor the robber can consecrate it; this one, the robber, because it is not his, and that one, the owner, because it is not in his possession? The indication is that one cannot consecrate even his own item if it is not in his possession.


诪讬 住讘专转 讘诪住讜转讗 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 注住拽讬谞谉 讘诪住讜转讗 诪拽专拽注讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讻讬 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛 讘讚讬讬谞讬谉 讘专砖讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讗


The Gemara answers: Did you think that in the case of the bathhouse we are dealing with a movable bath? No, we are dealing with a bath that is excavated in the ground, in which case once its owner can recover it by legal process there is no need to take possession of it, as it already exists in his possession.


转谞讬 专讘 转讞诇讬驻讗 讘专 诪注专讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖谞讬诐 讗讚讜拽讬诐 讘讟诇讬转 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 注讚 诪拽讜诐 砖讬讚讜 诪讙注转 讜讝讛 谞讜讟诇 注讚 诪拽讜诐 砖讬讚讜 诪讙注转 讜讛砖讗专 讞讜诇拽讬谉 讘砖讜讛 诪讞讜讬 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讜讘砖讘讜注讛


Rav Ta岣lifa from the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, taught this baraita before Rabbi Abbahu: If two people are grasping a garment, this one takes up to where his hand reaches, and that one takes up to where his hand reaches, and they divide the remainder, the part of the garment that is in the grasp of neither, equally. Rabbi Abbahu indicated by means of a hand gesture that Rav Ta岣lifa should add: And this is with the proviso that they take an oath.


讗诇讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 讚驻诇讙讬 讘讛讚讚讬 讜诇讗 拽转谞讬 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 注讚 诪拽讜诐 砖讬讚讜 诪讙注转 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讚转驻讬住讬 讘讻专讻砖转讗


The Gemara asks: But then how can you find a case where the halakha in the mishna applies? As the mishna teaches that they divide the garment between them, and does not teach that this one takes up to where his hand reaches and that one does likewise. Rav Pappa said: The mishna is discussing a case where neither of them is grasping the garment itself, but rather they are holding onto the fringes [bekarkashta] of the garment. Therefore, each is required to take an oath and they divide the garment between them.


讗诪专 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讗讬 住讜讚专讗 讻讬讜谉 讚转驻讬住 讘讬讛 砖诇砖 注诇 砖诇砖 拽专讬谞谉 讘讬讛 讜谞转谉 诇专注讛讜


Rav Mesharshiyya said: Learn a halakha with regard to the symbolic transfer of a cloth as a formal act of acquisition from Rav Pappa鈥檚 statement: The entire cloth need not change hands. Rather, once the recipient of the cloth has grasped three by three fingerbreadths of the cloth, which is the minimum size of a cloth that can be considered a utensil, the transaction takes effect, as we consider such an action to be an implementation of the verse upon which acquisition by means of a cloth is based: 鈥淣ow this was the custom in former times in Israel鈥o confirm all things: A man drew off his shoe, and gave it to his neighbor; and this was the attestation in Israel鈥 (Ruth 4:7).


讚讻诪讗谉 讚驻住讬拽 讚诪讬 讜拽谞讬


This is because such an amount of the cloth is significant enough to be considered as though it were severed from the rest of the cloth, and therefore when the recipient grasps it, it effects the acquisition, even though the rest of the cloth is still in the hand of the other party.


讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讙讟 讘讬讚讛 讜诪砖讬讞讛 讘讬讚讜 讗诐 讬讻讜诇 诇谞转拽讜 讜诇讛讘讬讗讜 讗爪诇讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 诪讙讜专砖转


The Gemara asks: But in what way is this case different from the ruling of Rav 岣sda? As Rav 岣sda said: In a case where a husband placed a bill of divorce in his wife鈥檚 hand, and a string attached to the bill of divorce remained in his hand, if the husband can still pull the bill of divorce out of her hand and bring it to him, she is not divorced; and if he is not able to do so, e.g., if the string is too flimsy, then she is divorced. This indicates that as long as part of the bill of divorce remains in his hand, it is not considered as though he gave it to her.


讛转诐 讻专讬转讜转 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讬讻讗 讛讻讗 谞转讬谞讛 讘注讬谞谉 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗


The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, we require that it accomplish a complete severance between the husband and wife, and as long as the husband continues to have some hold on the bill of divorce there is no complete severance. By contrast, here, in the case of a transaction by means of a cloth, we require an act of giving, and there is a valid act of giving even if only part of the cloth was given.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 讛讬转讛 讟诇讬转 诪讜讝讛讘转 讞讜诇拽讬谉 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚拽讗讬 讚讛讘讗 讘讬 诪爪注讬


Rava says: Even if the garment was fashioned with gold thread, they divide it. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 this obvious? Why would a gold garment have a different halakha? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the gold is in the middle of the garment, neither in one鈥檚 hand nor in the other鈥檚.


讛讗 谞诪讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚诪讬拽专讘 诇讙讘讬 讚讞讚 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻诇讜讙 讛讻讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚驻诇讙转 讛讻讬 驻诇讜讙 讛讻讬


The Gemara challenges: This too is obvious; the halakha is that they divide the remainder. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the gold is closer to one of them, though it is not in his grasp. Lest you say that the one to whom the gold is closer can say to the other: Divide it in this manner, along the middle line of the garment between us, leaving most of the gold in my possession, Rava therefore teaches us that they divide the gold equally. The reason is that the other litigant can say to him in response: What did you see that led you to divide it in that manner, e.g., lengthwise? Divide it in this manner, e.g., widthwise, so that the gold will be divided equally between us.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讚讜拽讬谉 讘砖讟专 诪诇讜讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇讬 讛讜讗 讜谞驻诇 诪诪谞讬 讜诪爪讗转讬讜 讜诇讜讛 讗诪专 砖诇讱 讛讜讗 讜驻专注转讬讜 诇讱 讬转拽讬讬诐 讛砖讟专 讘讞讜转诪讬讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬


The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:8): In a case where two people, a creditor and a debtor, are grasping a promissory note, and the creditor says: The promissory note is mine, as the debt has not yet been repaid, and I merely dropped it and I subsequently found it, and the debtor says: The promissory note was once yours, i.e., you lent me the money, but I already repaid you, and you therefore gave me the note, in that case the promissory note must be ratified through its signatories for the creditor to collect the debt. In other words, the court must first ascertain the validity of the promissory note by verifying that the signatures of the witnesses are authentic. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.


专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜


Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The creditor and the debtor divide the debt attested to in the promissory note, i.e., the debtor is liable to pay half the amount, due to uncertainty as to who is telling the truth.


谞驻诇 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗讜 注讜诇诪讬转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讘讞讝拽转讜


If a promissory note fell into the possession of a judge and the two parties do not agree as to which of them it belongs, either to the creditor, and the debt has yet to have been repaid, or to the debtor, and the debt was repaid, it may never be removed from the judge鈥檚 possession to collect the debt until proof is provided. Rabbi Yosei says: The promissory note retains its presumptive status of validity and the litigants proceed in accordance with its contents.


讗诪专 诪专 讬转拽讬讬诐 讛砖讟专 讘讞讜转诪讬讜 讜讙讘讬 诇讬讛 诪诇讜讛 讻讜诇讬讛 讜诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讻讜壮


The Gemara discusses the baraita. The Master said that the promissory note must be ratified through its signatories. And does this indicate that once it is ratified, the creditor collects the entire debt? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold in accordance with the halakha taught in the mishna with regard to two people holding a garment, that they divide the garment? Here too, each party should be entitled half the promissory note, and the debtor should therefore be obligated to pay only half the debt.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘诪拽讜讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘砖讗讬谞讜 诪拽讜讬诐


Rava says that Rav Na岣an says: In a case where the promissory note was ratified by the court, everyone agrees that the litigants divide it, and the debtor repays only half of the debt. They disagree with regard to a case where it was not ratified.


专讘讬 住讘专 诪讜讚讛 讘砖讟专 砖讻转讘讜 爪专讬讱 诇拽讬讬诪讜 讜讗讬 诪拽讬讬诐 诇讬讛 驻诇讬讙 讜讗讬 诇讗 诪拽讬讬诐 诇讬讛 诇讗 驻诇讬讙


Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that even when a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor must ratify it in court in order for the creditor to collect the debt. And therefore, if he ratifies the promissory note in court he divides it with the debtor, and if he does not ratify it he does not divide it with the debtor. If he is unable to ratify the signatures of the witnesses, he receives nothing even if the debtor admits that he borrowed the money.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讞住驻讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 诪讗谉 拽讗 诪砖讜讬 诇讬讛 诇讛讗讬 砖讟专讗 诇讜讛 讛讗 拽讗诪专 讚驻专讬注


What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 opinion? He holds that an unratified promissory note is merely a shard. Who renders this document a valid promissory note? The debtor does. The validity of the note is solely dependent on the corroboration of the debtor, and doesn鈥檛 the debtor say that the debt mentioned in the promissory note was repaid? Therefore, the note is worthless unless it is ratified by the witnesses in court.


讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 住讘专 诪讜讚讛 讘砖讟专 砖讻转讘讜 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇拽讬讬诪讜 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 诪拽讬讬诐 诇讬讛 讬讞诇讜拽讜


And Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor is not required to ratify it in court in order for the creditor to collect the debt. And therefore, even if the creditor does not ratify it, the promissory note is valid, and they divide it.


谞驻诇 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗讜 注讜诇诪讬转


It is taught in the baraita that if a promissory note fell into the possession of a judge it may never be removed from his possession until proof is provided.


诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜讗讞专 砖诪爪讗 砖讟专 砖谞驻诇 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讚讻转讘 讘讬讛 讛谞驻拽 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗讜 注讜诇诪讬转


The Gemara asks: What is different about the case where the promissory note fell into the possession of a judge, such that the creditor cannot retrieve it to collect the debt? Rava said this is what the baraita is saying: But in the case of another individual, who is neither the debtor nor the creditor, who found a promissory note that had already fallen into the possession of a judge, it may never be removed from his possession until proof is provided. And what are the circumstances? What does it mean that the promissory note had fallen into the possession of a judge? It is a case where the court wrote in the promissory note a ratification certifying that it examined and ratified the note and it can be used to collect the debt.


讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讗 讻转讘 讘讬讛 讛谞驻拽 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讻转讘 诇诇讜转 讜诇讗 诇讜讛 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讻转讘 讘讬讛 讛谞驻拽 讚诪拽讜讬诐 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻讬专注讜谉


And the reason the baraita refers specifically to these circumstances is that it is not necessary to state that in a case where there is no ratification written in the promissory note that the creditor cannot use it to collect the debt; as it can be said that the debtor wrote the document because he intended to borrow the money, but he ultimately did not borrow it. Rather, the baraita states that even in a case where there is a ratification written in the promissory note, as it is now a ratified promissory note, the finder should not return it to the creditor, as we suspect that there was repayment, i.e., that the debtor may have repaid the debt, and he lost the promissory note.


讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讘讞讝拽转讜 讜诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻讬专注讜谉 讜诇讗 讞讬讬砖 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇驻讬专注讜谉


The Gemara discusses the continuation of the baraita: And Rabbi Yosei says: The promissory note retains its presumptive status. The Gemara explains: And we do not suspect that there was repayment; had the debt been repaid the debtor would have immediately destroyed the promissory note. The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yosei not suspect that there was repayment?


讜讛转谞讬讗 诪爪讗 砖讟专 讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讜拽 讘讝诪谉 砖讛讘注诇 诪讜讚讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 诪讜讚讛 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讛


But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: If one found a marriage contract in the marketplace, in a case when the husband admits that he has not yet paid the amount written in the contract to his wife, the finder must return the document to the wife. In a case when the husband does not admit this, but instead claims that he has already paid the amount written in the contract, the one who found it should not return it to this one, the husband, or to that one, the wife.


专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 注讜讚讛 转讞转 讘注诇讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讛


Rabbi Yosei says that there is a distinction between different situations: If the wife is still under the auspices of her husband, i.e., she is still married to him, the one who found the marriage contract must return it to the wife because presumably the husband did not pay her the amount specified in the marriage contract during their marriage. If the wife was widowed or divorced, he should not return it to this party, the husband or his heirs, or to that party, the wife, as perhaps she already received payment and the contract was later lost by her husband or his heirs. In this case, Rabbi Yosei suspects that there was payment.


讗讬驻讜讱 谞驻诇 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗讜 注讜诇诪讬转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讘讞讝拽转讜


The Gemara answers: Reverse the order of the tanna鈥檌m in the baraita and teach it as follows: If the promissory note fell into the possession of a judge, it may never be removed; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. And the Rabbis say: It retains its presumptive status.


讗讬 讛讻讬 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘谞谉 讗讚专讘谞谉


The Gemara asks: If so, the contradiction between the statement of the Rabbis in this baraita and the statement of the Rabbis with regard to the case of the marriage contract is difficult. Whereas according to the emended version of the baraita the Rabbis do not take into account the possibility that the debt was repaid, in the case of the marriage contract the Rabbis take this possibility into account.


砖讟专 讻转讜讘讛 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讞住讜专讬 诪讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 诪讜讚讛 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 砖谞转讙专砖讛 讗讘诇 注讜讚讛 转讞转 讘注诇讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 砖专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 注讜讚讛 转讞转 讘注诇讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 砖谞转讙专砖讛 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讛


The Gemara resolves the problem: The baraita that discusses the marriage contract is entirely in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; it contains no dispute. And the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: In a case where the husband does not admit that he did not pay the marriage contract, the one who found it should not return it to this party or to that party. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where the woman was widowed or divorced. But if she is still under the auspices of her husband, the finder must return it to the wife. As Rabbi Yosei says: If she is still under the auspices of her husband, the finder must return it to the wife. If she was widowed or divorced, he should not return it to this party or to that party.


专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 诇讗 转讬驻讜讱 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 讚专讘谞谉 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜


Rav Pappa said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions in the baraita, but instead resolve the contradiction differently: Rabbi Yosei was telling the Rabbis what the halakha should be in the case of a marriage contract according to their statement, i.e., according to their opinion that one who finds a promissory note needs to take into account that the debt may have been repaid already.


诇讚讬讚讬 讗驻讬诇讜 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻讬专注讜谉 诇讚讬讚讻讜 讗讜讚讜 诇讬 诪讬讛转 讘注讜讚讛 转讞转 讘注诇讛 讚讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 讚诇讗讜 讘转 驻讬专注讜谉 讛讬讗


His statement should be understood as follows: In my opinion, even if she was widowed or divorced we do not suspect that there was payment. But according to your opinion, concede to me, in any event, that while she is still under the auspices of her husband the finder should return the document to the wife, as the marriage contract is not yet subject to payment. Since the husband is not yet liable to pay, it is unlikely that he paid.


讜讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 讗讬诪讜专 爪专专讬 讗转驻住讛


And the Rabbis said to him in response: Even if they are still married, say that he gave her bundles of money, and in exchange she gave him back the marriage contract. If the finder then returns the marriage contract to the wife, that would enable her to collect the sum twice.


专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬驻讜讱 拽诪讬讬转讗 讜讟注诪讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讻讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇砖转讬 讻转讜讘讜转 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇砖转讬 讻转讜讘讜转 诇讗 讞讬讬砖


Ravina said: Actually, reverse the order of the tanna鈥檌m in the first baraita, which discusses one who finds a promissory note, and resolve the contradiction between the different statements of the Rabbis as follows: The reason for the opinion of the Rabbis here, that a marriage contract cannot be returned to the wife, is that we suspect that the husband wrote two marriage contracts; after the first marriage contract was lost, the husband had to write a second one in its stead. Returning to the wife the marriage contract that was found would enable her to collect twice. And Rabbi Yosei holds that it should be returned to the wife because he does not suspect that the husband wrote two marriage contracts; in his opinion, it is a rare occurrence.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘砖砖谞讬讛诐 讗讚讜拽讬诐 讘讟讜驻住 讜砖谞讬讛诐 讘转讜专祝 讗讘诇 讗讞讚 讗讚讜拽 讘讟讜驻住 讜讗讞讚 讗讚讜拽 讘转讜专祝 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 讟讜驻住 讜讝讛 谞讜讟诇 转讜专祝 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讞讜诇拽讬谉


Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in the case of a creditor and a debtor both grasping a promissory note, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that they divide the promissory note evenly, specifically in a case where both are grasping the standard part of the promissory note, i.e., the part that contains the standard formulation of the note, or both are grasping the essential part of the promissory note, where the names of the creditor and debtor are written, as well as the amount owed and the date. But if one of them is grasping the standard part and the other one is grasping the essential part, they divide the promissory note between them based on the section that each of them is holding; this one takes the standard part and that one takes the essential part. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Actually, they divide everything equally.


讜讗驻讬诇讜 讗讞讚 讗讚讜拽 讘讟讜驻住 讜讗讞讚 讘转讜专祝 讜讛转谞讬讗 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 注讚 诪拽讜诐 砖讬讚讜 诪讙注转 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚拽讗讬 转讜专祝 讘讬 诪爪注讬


The Gemara asks with regard to Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement: And does he hold that this is the halakha even in a case where one is grasping the standard part and one the essential part? But isn鈥檛 it taught in the baraita that was cited above with regard to a garment: This one takes up to where his hand reaches and that one takes up to where his hand reaches? Here as well, if one is grasping the standard part and the other is grasping the essential part, they should take the parts they are holding. The Gemara answers: No, this halakha that Rabbi Yo岣nan stated is necessary for a case where the essential part is located in the middle. He was not discussing the case where one was grasping the standard part and the other one was grasping the essential part. In that case, he would agree that each takes the part he was grasping.


讗讬 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚诪拽专讘 诇讙讘讬 讚讞讚 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻诇讜讙 讛讻讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚驻诇讙转 讛讻讬 驻诇讜讙 讛讻讬


The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating that they divide it equally? That is obvious. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where the essential part of the document is closer to one of them. Lest you say that the one to whom the essential part is closer can say to the other one: Divide it in this manner, leaving the essential part on my side, Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that the other one can say to him in response: What did you see that led you to divide it in that manner? Divide it in this manner, so that we will both share the essential part.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 诪讚驻转讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 讟讜驻住 讜讝讛 谞讜讟诇 转讜专祝 诇诪讛 诇讬讛 讜讻讬 诇爪讜专 注诇 驻讬 爪诇讜讞讬转讜 讛讜讗 爪专讬讱


Rav A岣 of Difti said to Ravina: According to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says this one takes the standard part and that one takes the essential part, why do either of them need it? Does he need half of the document to cover the opening of his flask? Having half a promissory note is of no legal consequence.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讚诪讬


Ravina said to him: The division in question is not division of the document itself, with each taking half of the paper. It is a division of its monetary value, as the value of each section of the promissory note is compared to the value of the other.


讚讗诪专 讛讻讬 砖讟专讗 讚讗讬转 讘讬讛 讝诪谉 讻诪讛 砖讜讬 讜讚诇讬转 讘讬讛 讝诪谉 讻诪讛 砖讜讬 讘砖讟专讗 讚讗讬转 讘讬讛 讝诪谉 讙讘讬 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讜讗讬讚讱 诇讗 讙讘讬 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讛讬讗讱 讚讘讬谞讬 讘讬谞讬


The one grasping the essential part of the promissory note, which contains the date, can say this: Consider a promissory note that has the date written on it; how much is it worth? And consider a promissory note that does not have the date written on it; how much is it worth? The significance of writing the date is that if a creditor is in possession of a promissory note that has the date written on it, he can collect his debt even from liened property that has been sold by the debtor to another individual after taking the loan. But if a creditor is in possession of the other kind of promissory note, i.e., one that does not have the date written on it, he cannot collect his debt from liened property. Therefore, the other party, who is grasping the standard part of the document, gives him the difference between the two values.


讜讬讞诇讜拽讜 谞诪讬 讚讗诪专谉 诇讚诪讬 讚讗讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 砖谞讬诐 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讘讟诇讬转 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚驻诇讙讬 讛讗 讗驻住讚讜讛 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗


And this is also true in general, with regard to cases where we said that the two litigants divide the disputed item: The reference is to the monetary value, and not division of the actual item. As, if you do not say so, but rather you hold that the item itself is divided, in the case of two people who come to court holding a garment, do they also divide the garment itself into two? But by doing so they would ruin it. The Gemara rejects this proof: This is not difficult, as it is possible to explain that they actually cut the garment in two.


  • Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v鈥橸ehuda Tzvi.

    专讘讜转 讘谞讜转 注砖讜 讞讬诇 讜讗转 注诇讬转 注诇志讻诇谞讛

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Bava Metzia 7

讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇讱 诇诪讬诪专 注砖讬专讬 讜讚讗讬 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讗 注砖讬专讬 住驻拽 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 注砖讬专讬 讜讚讗讬 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讗 注砖讬专讬 住驻拽


Rather, what have you to say to explain why one is not required to tithe his flock in a case where a counted animal jumped back into the pen? The Merciful One states: 鈥淎nd all the tithe of the herd or the flock, anyone that passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 27:32), from which it is derived that a certain tenth animal must be tithed, but not an uncertain tenth, i.e., an animal that is not certainly the tenth. Here too, the entire flock is exempt from tithe because the Merciful One states that a certain tenth animal must be designated as tithe and not an uncertain tenth, i.e., an animal that is not certainly subject to tithe. Therefore, there is proof from the baraita that if a priest seizes an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain, the court removes it from his possession.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 诪讚驻转讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 诪讗讬 住驻讬拽讜转 讗讬诇讬诪讗 住驻拽 讘讻讜专讜转 讬讛讬讛 拽讚砖 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜诇讗 砖讻讘专 拽讚讜砖


Rav A岣 of Difti said to Ravina: What are these animals of uncertain status that that are subject to tithe according to the mishna? If we say that the reference is to animals whose status as firstborns is uncertain, the Merciful One states: 鈥淭he tenth shall be sacred to the Lord,鈥 indicating that the tithe animal becomes sacred only when it is designated as tithe, from which it is inferred: But not an animal that is already sacred for a different reason. Therefore, since an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain is already considered sacred due to the uncertainty, the sanctity of animal tithe would not apply to it.


讗诇讗 住驻拽 驻讚讬讜谉 驻讟专 讞诪讜专 讜讻讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讬砖专讗诇 砖讬砖 诇讜 注砖专讛 住驻拽 驻讟专讬 讞诪讜专 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讜 诪驻专讬砖 注诇讬讛谉 注砖专讛 砖讬讬谉 讜诪注砖专谉 讜讛谉 砖诇讜


Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case of an uncertain redemption of a firstborn donkey, i.e., a lamb used as redemption for a donkey whose status as firstborn is uncertain. And this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Na岣an, as Rav Na岣an says that Rabba bar Avuh says: An Israelite who has ten donkeys whose status as firstborn is uncertain in his home separates ten lambs to redeem them, and tithes the lambs, separating one as a tithe, and they all belong to him, as a priest cannot prove that he is entitled to any of the ten.


诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 讚诪住讜转讗 转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讛讜讛 注讜讘讚讗 讘讬 专讘 讞住讚讗 讜专讘 讞住讚讗 讘讬 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜驻砖讟讛 诪讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻诇 诪诪讜谉 砖讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讜爪讬讗讜 讘讚讬讬谞讬谉 讛拽讚讬砖讜 讗讬谞讜 拽讚讜砖


The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter of the bathhouse? Come and hear a conclusion, as Rabbi 岣yya bar Avin said: There was a similar incident that was brought before the school of Rav 岣sda, and Rav 岣sda brought the case before the school of Rav Huna, and Rav Huna resolved the issue based on that which Rav Na岣an says: With regard to any property that one cannot recover from the possession of another party by legal process, if he consecrated it while it was in the possession of the other party the consecration is not valid.


讛讗 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讜爪讬讗讜 讘讚讬讬谞讬谉 讛拽讚讬砖讜 拽讚讜砖 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讗驻拽讬讛 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讙讝诇 讜诇讗 谞转讬讬讗砖讜 讛讘注诇讬诐 砖谞讬讛诐 讗讬谞诐 讬讻讜诇讬谉 诇讛拽讚讬砖讜 讝讛 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谞讛 砖诇讜 讜讝讛 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谞讛 讘专砖讜转讜


The Gemara questions Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement: By inference, is it so that if one can recover the property from the other party by legal process, and he consecrated it, the consecration is valid, although he has not yet recovered it? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan say: In a case where one robbed another of an item and the owner did not despair of retrieving it, neither the owner nor the robber can consecrate it; this one, the robber, because it is not his, and that one, the owner, because it is not in his possession? The indication is that one cannot consecrate even his own item if it is not in his possession.


诪讬 住讘专转 讘诪住讜转讗 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 注住拽讬谞谉 讘诪住讜转讗 诪拽专拽注讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讚讻讬 讬讻讜诇 诇讛讜爪讬讗讛 讘讚讬讬谞讬谉 讘专砖讜转讬讛 拽讬讬诪讗


The Gemara answers: Did you think that in the case of the bathhouse we are dealing with a movable bath? No, we are dealing with a bath that is excavated in the ground, in which case once its owner can recover it by legal process there is no need to take possession of it, as it already exists in his possession.


转谞讬 专讘 转讞诇讬驻讗 讘专 诪注专讘讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖谞讬诐 讗讚讜拽讬诐 讘讟诇讬转 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 注讚 诪拽讜诐 砖讬讚讜 诪讙注转 讜讝讛 谞讜讟诇 注讚 诪拽讜诐 砖讬讚讜 诪讙注转 讜讛砖讗专 讞讜诇拽讬谉 讘砖讜讛 诪讞讜讬 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讜讘砖讘讜注讛


Rav Ta岣lifa from the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, taught this baraita before Rabbi Abbahu: If two people are grasping a garment, this one takes up to where his hand reaches, and that one takes up to where his hand reaches, and they divide the remainder, the part of the garment that is in the grasp of neither, equally. Rabbi Abbahu indicated by means of a hand gesture that Rav Ta岣lifa should add: And this is with the proviso that they take an oath.


讗诇讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 讚驻诇讙讬 讘讛讚讚讬 讜诇讗 拽转谞讬 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 注讚 诪拽讜诐 砖讬讚讜 诪讙注转 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讚转驻讬住讬 讘讻专讻砖转讗


The Gemara asks: But then how can you find a case where the halakha in the mishna applies? As the mishna teaches that they divide the garment between them, and does not teach that this one takes up to where his hand reaches and that one does likewise. Rav Pappa said: The mishna is discussing a case where neither of them is grasping the garment itself, but rather they are holding onto the fringes [bekarkashta] of the garment. Therefore, each is required to take an oath and they divide the garment between them.


讗诪专 专讘 诪砖专砖讬讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讛讗讬 住讜讚专讗 讻讬讜谉 讚转驻讬住 讘讬讛 砖诇砖 注诇 砖诇砖 拽专讬谞谉 讘讬讛 讜谞转谉 诇专注讛讜


Rav Mesharshiyya said: Learn a halakha with regard to the symbolic transfer of a cloth as a formal act of acquisition from Rav Pappa鈥檚 statement: The entire cloth need not change hands. Rather, once the recipient of the cloth has grasped three by three fingerbreadths of the cloth, which is the minimum size of a cloth that can be considered a utensil, the transaction takes effect, as we consider such an action to be an implementation of the verse upon which acquisition by means of a cloth is based: 鈥淣ow this was the custom in former times in Israel鈥o confirm all things: A man drew off his shoe, and gave it to his neighbor; and this was the attestation in Israel鈥 (Ruth 4:7).


讚讻诪讗谉 讚驻住讬拽 讚诪讬 讜拽谞讬


This is because such an amount of the cloth is significant enough to be considered as though it were severed from the rest of the cloth, and therefore when the recipient grasps it, it effects the acquisition, even though the rest of the cloth is still in the hand of the other party.


讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讙讟 讘讬讚讛 讜诪砖讬讞讛 讘讬讚讜 讗诐 讬讻讜诇 诇谞转拽讜 讜诇讛讘讬讗讜 讗爪诇讜 讗讬谞讛 诪讙讜专砖转 讜讗诐 诇讗讜 诪讙讜专砖转


The Gemara asks: But in what way is this case different from the ruling of Rav 岣sda? As Rav 岣sda said: In a case where a husband placed a bill of divorce in his wife鈥檚 hand, and a string attached to the bill of divorce remained in his hand, if the husband can still pull the bill of divorce out of her hand and bring it to him, she is not divorced; and if he is not able to do so, e.g., if the string is too flimsy, then she is divorced. This indicates that as long as part of the bill of divorce remains in his hand, it is not considered as though he gave it to her.


讛转诐 讻专讬转讜转 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讬讻讗 讛讻讗 谞转讬谞讛 讘注讬谞谉 讜讛讗 讗讬讻讗


The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a bill of divorce, we require that it accomplish a complete severance between the husband and wife, and as long as the husband continues to have some hold on the bill of divorce there is no complete severance. By contrast, here, in the case of a transaction by means of a cloth, we require an act of giving, and there is a valid act of giving even if only part of the cloth was given.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 讛讬转讛 讟诇讬转 诪讜讝讛讘转 讞讜诇拽讬谉 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚拽讗讬 讚讛讘讗 讘讬 诪爪注讬


Rava says: Even if the garment was fashioned with gold thread, they divide it. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 this obvious? Why would a gold garment have a different halakha? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the gold is in the middle of the garment, neither in one鈥檚 hand nor in the other鈥檚.


讛讗 谞诪讬 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚诪讬拽专讘 诇讙讘讬 讚讞讚 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻诇讜讙 讛讻讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚驻诇讙转 讛讻讬 驻诇讜讙 讛讻讬


The Gemara challenges: This too is obvious; the halakha is that they divide the remainder. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the gold is closer to one of them, though it is not in his grasp. Lest you say that the one to whom the gold is closer can say to the other: Divide it in this manner, along the middle line of the garment between us, leaving most of the gold in my possession, Rava therefore teaches us that they divide the gold equally. The reason is that the other litigant can say to him in response: What did you see that led you to divide it in that manner, e.g., lengthwise? Divide it in this manner, e.g., widthwise, so that the gold will be divided equally between us.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讚讜拽讬谉 讘砖讟专 诪诇讜讛 讗讜诪专 砖诇讬 讛讜讗 讜谞驻诇 诪诪谞讬 讜诪爪讗转讬讜 讜诇讜讛 讗诪专 砖诇讱 讛讜讗 讜驻专注转讬讜 诇讱 讬转拽讬讬诐 讛砖讟专 讘讞讜转诪讬讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬


The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:8): In a case where two people, a creditor and a debtor, are grasping a promissory note, and the creditor says: The promissory note is mine, as the debt has not yet been repaid, and I merely dropped it and I subsequently found it, and the debtor says: The promissory note was once yours, i.e., you lent me the money, but I already repaid you, and you therefore gave me the note, in that case the promissory note must be ratified through its signatories for the creditor to collect the debt. In other words, the court must first ascertain the validity of the promissory note by verifying that the signatures of the witnesses are authentic. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.


专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讜拽讜


Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The creditor and the debtor divide the debt attested to in the promissory note, i.e., the debtor is liable to pay half the amount, due to uncertainty as to who is telling the truth.


谞驻诇 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗讜 注讜诇诪讬转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讘讞讝拽转讜


If a promissory note fell into the possession of a judge and the two parties do not agree as to which of them it belongs, either to the creditor, and the debt has yet to have been repaid, or to the debtor, and the debt was repaid, it may never be removed from the judge鈥檚 possession to collect the debt until proof is provided. Rabbi Yosei says: The promissory note retains its presumptive status of validity and the litigants proceed in accordance with its contents.


讗诪专 诪专 讬转拽讬讬诐 讛砖讟专 讘讞讜转诪讬讜 讜讙讘讬 诇讬讛 诪诇讜讛 讻讜诇讬讛 讜诇讬转 诇讬讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 砖谞讬诐 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讻讜壮


The Gemara discusses the baraita. The Master said that the promissory note must be ratified through its signatories. And does this indicate that once it is ratified, the creditor collects the entire debt? But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold in accordance with the halakha taught in the mishna with regard to two people holding a garment, that they divide the garment? Here too, each party should be entitled half the promissory note, and the debtor should therefore be obligated to pay only half the debt.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘诪拽讜讬诐 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讬讞诇讜拽讜 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘砖讗讬谞讜 诪拽讜讬诐


Rava says that Rav Na岣an says: In a case where the promissory note was ratified by the court, everyone agrees that the litigants divide it, and the debtor repays only half of the debt. They disagree with regard to a case where it was not ratified.


专讘讬 住讘专 诪讜讚讛 讘砖讟专 砖讻转讘讜 爪专讬讱 诇拽讬讬诪讜 讜讗讬 诪拽讬讬诐 诇讬讛 驻诇讬讙 讜讗讬 诇讗 诪拽讬讬诐 诇讬讛 诇讗 驻诇讬讙


Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that even when a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor must ratify it in court in order for the creditor to collect the debt. And therefore, if he ratifies the promissory note in court he divides it with the debtor, and if he does not ratify it he does not divide it with the debtor. If he is unable to ratify the signatures of the witnesses, he receives nothing even if the debtor admits that he borrowed the money.


诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讞住驻讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗 诪讗谉 拽讗 诪砖讜讬 诇讬讛 诇讛讗讬 砖讟专讗 诇讜讛 讛讗 拽讗诪专 讚驻专讬注


What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi鈥檚 opinion? He holds that an unratified promissory note is merely a shard. Who renders this document a valid promissory note? The debtor does. The validity of the note is solely dependent on the corroboration of the debtor, and doesn鈥檛 the debtor say that the debt mentioned in the promissory note was repaid? Therefore, the note is worthless unless it is ratified by the witnesses in court.


讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 住讘专 诪讜讚讛 讘砖讟专 砖讻转讘讜 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇拽讬讬诪讜 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 诪拽讬讬诐 诇讬讛 讬讞诇讜拽讜


And Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor is not required to ratify it in court in order for the creditor to collect the debt. And therefore, even if the creditor does not ratify it, the promissory note is valid, and they divide it.


谞驻诇 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗讜 注讜诇诪讬转


It is taught in the baraita that if a promissory note fell into the possession of a judge it may never be removed from his possession until proof is provided.


诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讜讗讞专 砖诪爪讗 砖讟专 砖谞驻诇 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 讜讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讚讻转讘 讘讬讛 讛谞驻拽 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗讜 注讜诇诪讬转


The Gemara asks: What is different about the case where the promissory note fell into the possession of a judge, such that the creditor cannot retrieve it to collect the debt? Rava said this is what the baraita is saying: But in the case of another individual, who is neither the debtor nor the creditor, who found a promissory note that had already fallen into the possession of a judge, it may never be removed from his possession until proof is provided. And what are the circumstances? What does it mean that the promissory note had fallen into the possession of a judge? It is a case where the court wrote in the promissory note a ratification certifying that it examined and ratified the note and it can be used to collect the debt.


讜诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讗 讻转讘 讘讬讛 讛谞驻拽 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讻转讘 诇诇讜转 讜诇讗 诇讜讛 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讻转讘 讘讬讛 讛谞驻拽 讚诪拽讜讬诐 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻讬专注讜谉


And the reason the baraita refers specifically to these circumstances is that it is not necessary to state that in a case where there is no ratification written in the promissory note that the creditor cannot use it to collect the debt; as it can be said that the debtor wrote the document because he intended to borrow the money, but he ultimately did not borrow it. Rather, the baraita states that even in a case where there is a ratification written in the promissory note, as it is now a ratified promissory note, the finder should not return it to the creditor, as we suspect that there was repayment, i.e., that the debtor may have repaid the debt, and he lost the promissory note.


讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讘讞讝拽转讜 讜诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻讬专注讜谉 讜诇讗 讞讬讬砖 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇驻讬专注讜谉


The Gemara discusses the continuation of the baraita: And Rabbi Yosei says: The promissory note retains its presumptive status. The Gemara explains: And we do not suspect that there was repayment; had the debt been repaid the debtor would have immediately destroyed the promissory note. The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yosei not suspect that there was repayment?


讜讛转谞讬讗 诪爪讗 砖讟专 讻转讜讘讛 讘砖讜拽 讘讝诪谉 砖讛讘注诇 诪讜讚讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 诪讜讚讛 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讛


But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: If one found a marriage contract in the marketplace, in a case when the husband admits that he has not yet paid the amount written in the contract to his wife, the finder must return the document to the wife. In a case when the husband does not admit this, but instead claims that he has already paid the amount written in the contract, the one who found it should not return it to this one, the husband, or to that one, the wife.


专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 注讜讚讛 转讞转 讘注诇讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讛


Rabbi Yosei says that there is a distinction between different situations: If the wife is still under the auspices of her husband, i.e., she is still married to him, the one who found the marriage contract must return it to the wife because presumably the husband did not pay her the amount specified in the marriage contract during their marriage. If the wife was widowed or divorced, he should not return it to this party, the husband or his heirs, or to that party, the wife, as perhaps she already received payment and the contract was later lost by her husband or his heirs. In this case, Rabbi Yosei suspects that there was payment.


讗讬驻讜讱 谞驻诇 诇讬讚 讚讬讬谉 诇讗 讬讜爪讬讗讜 注讜诇诪讬转 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讘讞讝拽转讜


The Gemara answers: Reverse the order of the tanna鈥檌m in the baraita and teach it as follows: If the promissory note fell into the possession of a judge, it may never be removed; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. And the Rabbis say: It retains its presumptive status.


讗讬 讛讻讬 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘谞谉 讗讚专讘谞谉


The Gemara asks: If so, the contradiction between the statement of the Rabbis in this baraita and the statement of the Rabbis with regard to the case of the marriage contract is difficult. Whereas according to the emended version of the baraita the Rabbis do not take into account the possibility that the debt was repaid, in the case of the marriage contract the Rabbis take this possibility into account.


砖讟专 讻转讜讘讛 讻讜诇讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讞住讜专讬 诪讞住专讗 讜讛讻讬 拽转谞讬 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 诪讜讚讛 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讛 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 砖谞转讙专砖讛 讗讘诇 注讜讚讛 转讞转 讘注诇讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 砖专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 注讜讚讛 转讞转 讘注诇讛 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 砖谞转讙专砖讛 诇讗 讬讞讝讬专 诇讗 诇讝讛 讜诇讗 诇讝讛


The Gemara resolves the problem: The baraita that discusses the marriage contract is entirely in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; it contains no dispute. And the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: In a case where the husband does not admit that he did not pay the marriage contract, the one who found it should not return it to this party or to that party. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where the woman was widowed or divorced. But if she is still under the auspices of her husband, the finder must return it to the wife. As Rabbi Yosei says: If she is still under the auspices of her husband, the finder must return it to the wife. If she was widowed or divorced, he should not return it to this party or to that party.


专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 诇讗 转讬驻讜讱 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 讚专讘谞谉 拽讗诪专 诇讛讜


Rav Pappa said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions in the baraita, but instead resolve the contradiction differently: Rabbi Yosei was telling the Rabbis what the halakha should be in the case of a marriage contract according to their statement, i.e., according to their opinion that one who finds a promissory note needs to take into account that the debt may have been repaid already.


诇讚讬讚讬 讗驻讬诇讜 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讗讜 谞转讙专砖讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇驻讬专注讜谉 诇讚讬讚讻讜 讗讜讚讜 诇讬 诪讬讛转 讘注讜讚讛 转讞转 讘注诇讛 讚讬讞讝讬专 诇讗砖讛 讚诇讗讜 讘转 驻讬专注讜谉 讛讬讗


His statement should be understood as follows: In my opinion, even if she was widowed or divorced we do not suspect that there was payment. But according to your opinion, concede to me, in any event, that while she is still under the auspices of her husband the finder should return the document to the wife, as the marriage contract is not yet subject to payment. Since the husband is not yet liable to pay, it is unlikely that he paid.


讜讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 讗讬诪讜专 爪专专讬 讗转驻住讛


And the Rabbis said to him in response: Even if they are still married, say that he gave her bundles of money, and in exchange she gave him back the marriage contract. If the finder then returns the marriage contract to the wife, that would enable her to collect the sum twice.


专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬驻讜讱 拽诪讬讬转讗 讜讟注诪讗 讚专讘谞谉 讛讻讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇砖转讬 讻转讜讘讜转 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇砖转讬 讻转讜讘讜转 诇讗 讞讬讬砖


Ravina said: Actually, reverse the order of the tanna鈥檌m in the first baraita, which discusses one who finds a promissory note, and resolve the contradiction between the different statements of the Rabbis as follows: The reason for the opinion of the Rabbis here, that a marriage contract cannot be returned to the wife, is that we suspect that the husband wrote two marriage contracts; after the first marriage contract was lost, the husband had to write a second one in its stead. Returning to the wife the marriage contract that was found would enable her to collect twice. And Rabbi Yosei holds that it should be returned to the wife because he does not suspect that the husband wrote two marriage contracts; in his opinion, it is a rare occurrence.


讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘砖砖谞讬讛诐 讗讚讜拽讬诐 讘讟讜驻住 讜砖谞讬讛诐 讘转讜专祝 讗讘诇 讗讞讚 讗讚讜拽 讘讟讜驻住 讜讗讞讚 讗讚讜拽 讘转讜专祝 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 讟讜驻住 讜讝讛 谞讜讟诇 转讜专祝 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讞讜诇拽讬谉


Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in the case of a creditor and a debtor both grasping a promissory note, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that they divide the promissory note evenly, specifically in a case where both are grasping the standard part of the promissory note, i.e., the part that contains the standard formulation of the note, or both are grasping the essential part of the promissory note, where the names of the creditor and debtor are written, as well as the amount owed and the date. But if one of them is grasping the standard part and the other one is grasping the essential part, they divide the promissory note between them based on the section that each of them is holding; this one takes the standard part and that one takes the essential part. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Actually, they divide everything equally.


讜讗驻讬诇讜 讗讞讚 讗讚讜拽 讘讟讜驻住 讜讗讞讚 讘转讜专祝 讜讛转谞讬讗 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 注讚 诪拽讜诐 砖讬讚讜 诪讙注转 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚拽讗讬 转讜专祝 讘讬 诪爪注讬


The Gemara asks with regard to Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 statement: And does he hold that this is the halakha even in a case where one is grasping the standard part and one the essential part? But isn鈥檛 it taught in the baraita that was cited above with regard to a garment: This one takes up to where his hand reaches and that one takes up to where his hand reaches? Here as well, if one is grasping the standard part and the other is grasping the essential part, they should take the parts they are holding. The Gemara answers: No, this halakha that Rabbi Yo岣nan stated is necessary for a case where the essential part is located in the middle. He was not discussing the case where one was grasping the standard part and the other one was grasping the essential part. In that case, he would agree that each takes the part he was grasping.


讗讬 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 诇诪讬诪专讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚诪拽专讘 诇讙讘讬 讚讞讚 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻诇讜讙 讛讻讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚驻诇讙转 讛讻讬 驻诇讜讙 讛讻讬


The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating that they divide it equally? That is obvious. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where the essential part of the document is closer to one of them. Lest you say that the one to whom the essential part is closer can say to the other one: Divide it in this manner, leaving the essential part on my side, Rabbi Yo岣nan teaches us that the other one can say to him in response: What did you see that led you to divide it in that manner? Divide it in this manner, so that we will both share the essential part.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 诪讚驻转讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 讝讛 谞讜讟诇 讟讜驻住 讜讝讛 谞讜讟诇 转讜专祝 诇诪讛 诇讬讛 讜讻讬 诇爪讜专 注诇 驻讬 爪诇讜讞讬转讜 讛讜讗 爪专讬讱


Rav A岣 of Difti said to Ravina: According to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says this one takes the standard part and that one takes the essential part, why do either of them need it? Does he need half of the document to cover the opening of his flask? Having half a promissory note is of no legal consequence.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讚诪讬


Ravina said to him: The division in question is not division of the document itself, with each taking half of the paper. It is a division of its monetary value, as the value of each section of the promissory note is compared to the value of the other.


讚讗诪专 讛讻讬 砖讟专讗 讚讗讬转 讘讬讛 讝诪谉 讻诪讛 砖讜讬 讜讚诇讬转 讘讬讛 讝诪谉 讻诪讛 砖讜讬 讘砖讟专讗 讚讗讬转 讘讬讛 讝诪谉 讙讘讬 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讜讗讬讚讱 诇讗 讙讘讬 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讛讬讗讱 讚讘讬谞讬 讘讬谞讬


The one grasping the essential part of the promissory note, which contains the date, can say this: Consider a promissory note that has the date written on it; how much is it worth? And consider a promissory note that does not have the date written on it; how much is it worth? The significance of writing the date is that if a creditor is in possession of a promissory note that has the date written on it, he can collect his debt even from liened property that has been sold by the debtor to another individual after taking the loan. But if a creditor is in possession of the other kind of promissory note, i.e., one that does not have the date written on it, he cannot collect his debt from liened property. Therefore, the other party, who is grasping the standard part of the document, gives him the difference between the two values.


讜讬讞诇讜拽讜 谞诪讬 讚讗诪专谉 诇讚诪讬 讚讗讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 砖谞讬诐 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讘讟诇讬转 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚驻诇讙讬 讛讗 讗驻住讚讜讛 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗


And this is also true in general, with regard to cases where we said that the two litigants divide the disputed item: The reference is to the monetary value, and not division of the actual item. As, if you do not say so, but rather you hold that the item itself is divided, in the case of two people who come to court holding a garment, do they also divide the garment itself into two? But by doing so they would ruin it. The Gemara rejects this proof: This is not difficult, as it is possible to explain that they actually cut the garment in two.


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