Bava Metzia 88

עד שיראה פני הבית שנאמר בערתי הקדש מן הבית

until it sees the front of the house through which people enter and exit, and it is brought into the house through that entrance, as it is stated in the formula of the declaration of the tithes: “I have removed the consecrated from the house” (Deuteronomy 26:13), which indicates that the obligation to tithe produce whose purpose has not yet been designated applies only when it is brought into the house.

ורבי יוחנן אמר אפילו חצר קובעת שנאמר ואכלו בשעריך ושבעו

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even bringing produce into the courtyard determines that the production process of the produce has been completed and that the produce is therefore subject to tithes, as it is stated in the confession of the tithes: “And I have given to the Levite, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, and they shall eat in your gates and be satisfied” (Deuteronomy 26:12).

ורבי יוחנן נמי הא כתיב מן הבית אמר לך חצר דומיא דבית מה בית המשתמר אף חצר המשתמרת

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan also, isn’t it written: “From the house”? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the term “house” is not to be taken literally. Rather, it indicates that bringing untithed produce into a courtyard is similar to bringing it into a house, in the following way: Just as a house is a secured area, so too, the courtyard must be secured. An area that is accessible to the public is not considered a courtyard for the purposes of this halakha.

ורבי ינאי נמי הכתיב בשעריך ההוא מיבעי ליה דמעייל ליה דרך שער לאפוקי דרך גגות וקרפיפות דלא

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yannai also, isn’t it written: “In your gates”? The Gemara answers: That term is necessary to teach that this halakha, that the production process is considered complete, applies only when one brings the produce into his house through the gate, i.e., the entranceway, to the exclusion of produce that was brought in through rooftops and enclosures, in which case the produce is not subject to tithes.

מתיב רב חנינא חוזאה כנפשך כך נפשו של פועל מה נפשך אוכל ופטור אף נפשו של פועל אוכל ופטור

Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a raises an objection from a statement of the baraita mentioned earlier (87b): The term “at your own pleasure [kenafshekha]” can also mean: As you are. Consequently, the term kenafshekha teaches that just as the halakha is concerning the owner of the vineyard himself, so is the halakha concerning the laborer himself: Just as the owner, alluded to by the term nafshekha, may eat from the produce before its labor is complete and is exempt from separating tithes, so too, the laborer himself may eat and is exempt from tithes.

הא לוקח חייב מאי לאו בשדה

The objection of Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a is as follows: This indicates that only an owner and a laborer may eat from produce without tithing it; but one who buys produce is obligated by Torah law to separate tithes before partaking of it. What, is it not correct to conclude that this is the halakha even when he purchased the produce while it was still in the field, i.e., he is obligated to tithe the produce even though it has not entered his house or courtyard?

אמר רב פפא הכא בתאנה העומדת בגינה ונופה נוטה לחצר עסקינן ולמאן דאמר לבית לבית

Rav Pappa said: Here, in the baraita, we are dealing with a fig tree that is standing in a garden outside a courtyard and its leaves are leaning into a courtyard, or, according to the one who says that the obligation to separate tithes applies when the produce is brought into the house, the branches are leaning into the house. Therefore, the produce entered the courtyard or house.

אי הכי בעל הבית נמי ניחייב בעל הבית עיניו בתאנתו ולוקח עיניו במקחו

The Gemara asks: If so, the homeowner himself, not only the buyer, should also be obligated to separate tithes, as the produce is in either the courtyard or the house. The Gemara answers: The homeowner’s eyes are on his fig tree, i.e., his primary concern is the tree, not its produce, and the main part of the tree is outside the courtyard. But the buyer’s eyes are on his purchase, i.e., his focus is on the produce itself, which is in the space of the courtyard or house.

ולוקח מדאורייתא מי מחייב והתניא מפני מה חרבו חנויות של בית הינו שלש שנים קודם ירושלים מפני שהעמידו דבריהם על דברי תורה שהיו אומרין

The Gemara asks: And is a buyer obligated by Torah law to tithe the produce he purchases? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: For what reason were the shops of Beit Hino, a town near Jerusalem, destroyed three years before the destruction of Jerusalem itself? It was because they based their practices strictly on matters of Torah, i.e., they did not adhere to the rabbinic safeguards. The baraita explains that they would say

עשר תעשר ואכלת ולא מוכר תבואת זרעך ולא לוקח אלא מדרבנן וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא

that a buyer need not tithe the produce he purchases, as derived from the verses: “You shall tithe all the produce of your planting, which is brought forth in the field year by year, and you shall eat before the Lord, your God” (Deuteronomy 14:22–23). They claimed that the phrases “you shall tithe…and you shall eat” indicate that only the one who eats the produce must tithe it, but not the one who sells it. Likewise, the phrase “the produce of your planting” teaches that the one who performs the planting must separate tithes, but not the one who buys it. Rather, the obligation of a buyer to separate tithes applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited as a mere support for this halakha. The residents of Beit Hino did not adhere to this rabbinic law and did not observe the halakha requiring the buyer to separate tithes.

אלא כנפשך למאי אתא לכדתניא כנפשך מה נפשך אם חסמת פטור אף פועל אם חסמת פטור

It was stated previously that a buyer is not required to tithe produce by Torah law. If so, the same certainly applies to a laborer. Consequently, the term kenafshekha cannot serve to teach that a laborer may eat without tithing, as claimed earlier. The Gemara asks: Rather, what does kenafshekha come to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes to teach that which is taught in another baraita: Kenafshekha can mean: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e., the owner, if you muzzled yourself and did not eat from your field’s produce, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of: “You shall not muzzle an ox when it is treading out the grain” (Deuteronomy 25:4), so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him, i.e., you did not allow him to eat, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

מתיב מר זוטרא איזהו גורנן למעשרות בקישואים ובדלועים משיפקסו ואמר רבי אסי משינטל פיקס שלהן מאי לאו משיפקסו אפילו בשדה

Mar Zutra raises an objection from a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:5): With regard to different types of produce, what is the equivalent of their granary, i.e., the point at which the processing of various types of produce is completed so that they become subject to the halakhot of tithes? With regard to cucumbers and gourds, they become obligated from when they lose their blossom; and Rabbi Asi said: This means from when their blossom [pikas] is removed. The Gemara clarifies the objection from the mishna: What, is it not correct to say that the mishna means from when they lose their blossom, even while the produce is still in the field? This would mean that the produce is subject to the halakhot of tithes before it enters the house or the courtyard, which is not in accordance with the opinions of either Rabbi Yannai or Rabbi Yoḥanan.

לא משיפקסו בבית אי הכי משיפקסו עד שיפקסו מיבעי ליה

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna means: From when they lose their blossom specifically in the house or courtyard, i.e., the house or courtyard renders the produce subject to tithes only when the produce loses its blossom. The Gemara asks: If so, the phrase: From when they lose their blossom, is inaccurate, as the mishna should have said: Until they lose their blossom. The expression: From when they lose their blossom, indicates that the obligation applies as soon as that happens, i.e., before the produce enters the courtyard or house. By contrast, the expression: Until they lose their blossom, indicates that the obligation does not come into effect until they lose their blossom, regardless of whatever else is done to them, i.e., only when they are in the house and they lose their blossom.

אי תנא עד שיפקסו הוה אמינא עד דגמר לפיקוסייהו קא משמע לן משיפקסו מכי אתחולי פיקוסייהו

The Gemara answers: Had the mishna taught: Until they lose their blossom, I would say erroneously that the produce is not subject to tithes until their loss of blossom is complete, i.e., until all of the produce loses its blossoms. The expression: From when they lose their blossom, teaches us that the obligation to separate tithes takes effect from when they begin to lose their blossom.

מתיב מר זוטרא בריה דרב נחמן גורנו למעשר לחייב עליו משום טבל משתגמר מלאכתן ואיזהו גמר מלאכתן מלאכת הכנסתן מאי לאו הכנסתן אפילו בשדה

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to produce, its granary for tithes, rendering one who eats it liable for violating the prohibition against untithed produce, is from when its work is completed. And what is meant by the completion of its work? This means the work of its being brought in. The Gemara discusses the meaning of being brought in. What, is it not correct to say that this is referring to its being brought into a pile, even while the produce is still in the field?

לא הכנסתן לבית זה הוא גמר מלאכתן ואיבעית אימא כי קאמר רבי ינאי בזיתים וענבים דלאו בני גורן נינהו אבל חטין ושעורין גורן בהדיא כתיב ביה

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it means that its being brought into the house is considered the completion of its work. And if you wish, say instead: When Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yoḥanan say that types of produce are subject to tithes when they are brought into the house or courtyard, they were referring only to olives or grapes, which are not of a granary, i.e., since these types of produce are not processed in a granary, which is the typical criterion for rendering produce subject to tithes, they become subject to tithes when they are brought into a house or courtyard. But in the case of wheat or barley, a granary is explicitly written with regard to them (see Numbers 18:27, 30). Therefore, they are subject to tithes in the granary, even before they are brought into a house or courtyard.

אשכחן אדם במחובר ושור בתלוש אדם בתלוש מנלן

§ The Gemara returns to its discussion with regard to the right of a laborer to eat while working: We found a source for the halakha that a person may eat from attached produce while working in the field; and likewise we found a source that an ox that is threshing must be allowed to eat from detached produce, as the verse states: “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4). From where do we derive that a person, while working, may eat from detached produce?

קל וחומר משור ומה שור שאינו אוכל במחובר אוכל בתלוש אדם שאוכל במחובר אינו דין שאוכל בתלוש מה לשור שכן אתה מצווה על חסימתו תאמר באדם שאי אתה מצווה על חסימתו

The Gemara answers: This is derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of an ox. And if an ox, which one need not allow to eat from attached produce, must be allowed to eat from detached produce, then with regard to a person, who may eat from attached produce, is it not right that he may also eat from detached produce? The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about an ox? It is notable in that you are commanded concerning its muzzling. Can you say that a similar halakha should apply to a person, as you are not commanded with regard to his muzzling?

ויהא אדם מצווה על חסימתו מקל וחומר משור ומה שור שאי אתה מצווה להחיותו אתה מצווה על חסימתו אדם שאתה מצווה להחיותו אינו דין שאתה מצווה על חסימתו

The Gemara asks: But let an employer be commanded concerning a person’s, i.e., his laborer’s, muzzling, from an a fortiori inference from an ox: And if with regard to an ox, which you are not commanded to sustain, as there is no mitzva to support ownerless oxen if they do not have food to eat, and yet you are commanded concerning its muzzling, with regard to a Jewish person, whom you are commanded to sustain if he is impoverished (see Leviticus 25:35–36), is it not right that you are commanded concerning his muzzling?

אמר קרא כנפשך כנפשו של פועל מה נפשו אם חסמתו פטור אף פועל אם חסמתו פטור

The Gemara answers: The halakha that one is not commanded concerning the muzzling of his laborer is derived from the fact that the verse states: “Kenafshekha,” which indicates that as you treat your own person, so is the halakha with regard to the person of the laborer. In other words, just as with regard to himself, the owner, if you muzzled yourself, you are exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of: “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing,” so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him you are exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

ואלא אדם בתלוש מנלן אמר קרא קמה קמה שתי פעמים אם אינו ענין לאדם במחובר תנהו ענין לאדם בתלוש

After refuting the a fortiori inference, the Gemara inquires: Rather, from where do we derive that a person may eat from detached produce? The Gemara answers: The verse states the term “standing,” “standing” twice: “When you come into your neighbor’s standing grain…but you shall not move a sickle on your neighbor’s standing grain” (Deuteronomy 23:26). If the second expression is not applied to the matter of the right of a person to eat from attached produce, as that halakha has been derived from the first mention of “standing,” apply it to the matter of the right of a person to eat from detached produce.

רבי אמי אמר אדם בתלוש לא צריך קרא כתיב כי תבא בכרם רעך מי לא עסקינן ששכרו לכתף ואמר רחמנא ליכול

Rabbi Ami stated an alternative answer: A verse is not required to teach the right of a person to eat from detached produce, as it is written: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard, then you may eat grapes” (Deuteronomy 23:25). Are we not dealing even with a case in which the employer hired the laborer to transport the grapes out of the vineyard, and yet the Merciful One states that he may eat?

שור במחובר מנלן קל וחמר מאדם ומה אדם שאינו אוכל בתלוש אוכל במחובר שור שאוכל בתלוש אינו דין שאוכל במחובר מה לאדם שכן אתה מצווה להחיותו תאמר בשור שאי אתה מצווה להחיותו

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara answers: This is derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of a person. And if a person, who may not eat from detached produce, i.e., there is no explicit verse that permits him to do so, nevertheless may eat from attached produce, then with regard to an ox, which must be allowed to eat from detached produce, is it not right that it must also be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about a person? He is notable in that you are commanded to sustain him. Can you say that a similar halakha should apply in a case of an ox, when you are not commanded to sustain it?

ויהא שור מצווה להחיותו מקל וחומר ומה אדם שאי אתה מצווה על חסימתו אתה מצווה להחיותו שור שאתה מצווה על חסימתו אינו דין שאתה מצווה להחיותו

The Gemara asks: But let one be commanded to sustain an ox, to prevent the suffering of living creatures, by an a fortiori inference from the case of a person: And if, with regard to a person, where you are not commanded concerning his muzzling, nevertheless you are commanded to sustain him, then in the case of an ox, where you are commanded concerning its muzzling, is it not right that you are commanded to sustain it?

אמר קרא וחי אחיך עמך אחיך ולא שור ואלא שור במחובר מנלן אמר קרא רעך רעך שתי פעמים אם אינו ענין לאדם במחובר תנהו ענין לשור במחובר

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This cannot be the case, as the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), which indicates that the mitzva to provide sustenance applies only to your brother, but not to an ox. After refuting the a fortiori inference, the Gemara inquires: Rather, from where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara answers: The verse states the term “your neighbor,” “your neighbor” twice (Deuteronomy 23:26). If the second expression is not applied to the matter of the right of a person to eat from attached produce, as that halakha has been derived from the first mention of “your neighbor,” apply it to the matter of an ox, that it must be allowed to eat from attached produce.

רבינא אמר לא אדם בתלוש ולא שור במחובר צריכי קראי דכתיב לא תחסם שור בדישו

Ravina said: Verses are not necessary either for the halakha that a person may eat from detached produce, or for the halakha that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce, as it is written: “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4).