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Today's Daf Yomi

December 23, 2016 | 讻状讙 讘讻住诇讜 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Bava Metzia 88

Various halachot relating to how a worker can eat in the field he is working in are derived from the verse about picking in the vineyard. 聽One of those is that he is not obligated in tithes. 聽The gemara then brings in two opinions about when one is obligated in tithes – when the food goes into the courtyard or into the house. 聽The gemara then questions why is the drasha from the Torah necessary if the worker was in the fields – wouldn’t he be exempt anyway on a Torah level if he was a buyer who purchased the produce while it was in the field? 聽Various other questions are also raised against the two opinions and answered up. 聽Then the gemara proves how we can derive that an animal can’t be muzzled to prevent him from eating – both produce that is detached and attached to the ground. 聽And likewise, from where we can derive that a wroker is allowed to eat produce that is attached to the ground as well as produce that is not attached to the ground.

注讚 砖讬专讗讛 驻谞讬 讛讘讬转 砖谞讗诪专 讘注专转讬 讛拽讚砖 诪谉 讛讘讬转

until it sees the front of the house through which people enter and exit, and it is brought into the house through that entrance, as it is stated in the formula of the declaration of the tithes: 鈥淚 have removed the consecrated from the house鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:13), which indicates that the obligation to tithe produce whose purpose has not yet been designated applies only when it is brought into the house.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讞爪专 拽讜讘注转 砖谞讗诪专 讜讗讻诇讜 讘砖注专讬讱 讜砖讘注讜

And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even bringing produce into the courtyard determines that the production process of the produce has been completed and that the produce is therefore subject to tithes, as it is stated in the confession of the tithes: 鈥淎nd I have given to the Levite, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, and they shall eat in your gates and be satisfied鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:12).

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 谞诪讬 讛讗 讻转讬讘 诪谉 讛讘讬转 讗诪专 诇讱 讞爪专 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讘讬转 诪讛 讘讬转 讛诪砖转诪专 讗祝 讞爪专 讛诪砖转诪专转

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yo岣nan also, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淔rom the house鈥? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the term 鈥渉ouse鈥 is not to be taken literally. Rather, it indicates that bringing untithed produce into a courtyard is similar to bringing it into a house, in the following way: Just as a house is a secured area, so too, the courtyard must be secured. An area that is accessible to the public is not considered a courtyard for the purposes of this halakha.

讜专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 讘砖注专讬讱 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讚诪注讬讬诇 诇讬讛 讚专讱 砖注专 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讚专讱 讙讙讜转 讜拽专驻讬驻讜转 讚诇讗

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yannai also, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淚n your gates鈥? The Gemara answers: That term is necessary to teach that this halakha, that the production process is considered complete, applies only when one brings the produce into his house through the gate, i.e., the entranceway, to the exclusion of produce that was brought in through rooftops and enclosures, in which case the produce is not subject to tithes.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 讞讜讝讗讛 讻谞驻砖讱 讻讱 谞驻砖讜 砖诇 驻讜注诇 诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗讜讻诇 讜驻讟讜专 讗祝 谞驻砖讜 砖诇 驻讜注诇 讗讜讻诇 讜驻讟讜专

Rav 岣nina 岣za鈥檃 raises an objection from a statement of the baraita mentioned earlier (87b): The term 鈥渁t your own pleasure [kenafshekha]鈥 can also mean: As you are. Consequently, the term kenafshekha teaches that just as the halakha is concerning the owner of the vineyard himself, so is the halakha concerning the laborer himself: Just as the owner, alluded to by the term nafshekha, may eat from the produce before its labor is complete and is exempt from separating tithes, so too, the laborer himself may eat and is exempt from tithes.

讛讗 诇讜拽讞 讞讬讬讘 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘砖讚讛

The objection of Rav 岣nina 岣za鈥檃 is as follows: This indicates that only an owner and a laborer may eat from produce without tithing it; but one who buys produce is obligated by Torah law to separate tithes before partaking of it. What, is it not correct to conclude that this is the halakha even when he purchased the produce while it was still in the field, i.e., he is obligated to tithe the produce even though it has not entered his house or courtyard?

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讛讻讗 讘转讗谞讛 讛注讜诪讚转 讘讙讬谞讛 讜谞讜驻讛 谞讜讟讛 诇讞爪专 注住拽讬谞谉 讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讘讬转 诇讘讬转

Rav Pappa said: Here, in the baraita, we are dealing with a fig tree that is standing in a garden outside a courtyard and its leaves are leaning into a courtyard, or, according to the one who says that the obligation to separate tithes applies when the produce is brought into the house, the branches are leaning into the house. Therefore, the produce entered the courtyard or house.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 谞诪讬 谞讬讞讬讬讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 注讬谞讬讜 讘转讗谞转讜 讜诇讜拽讞 注讬谞讬讜 讘诪拽讞讜

The Gemara asks: If so, the homeowner himself, not only the buyer, should also be obligated to separate tithes, as the produce is in either the courtyard or the house. The Gemara answers: The homeowner鈥檚 eyes are on his fig tree, i.e., his primary concern is the tree, not its produce, and the main part of the tree is outside the courtyard. But the buyer鈥檚 eyes are on his purchase, i.e., his focus is on the produce itself, which is in the space of the courtyard or house.

讜诇讜拽讞 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讛转谞讬讗 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讞专讘讜 讞谞讜讬讜转 砖诇 讘讬转 讛讬谞讜 砖诇砖 砖谞讬诐 拽讜讚诐 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛注诪讬讚讜 讚讘专讬讛诐 注诇 讚讘专讬 转讜专讛 砖讛讬讜 讗讜诪专讬谉

The Gemara asks: And is a buyer obligated by Torah law to tithe the produce he purchases? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: For what reason were the shops of Beit Hino, a town near Jerusalem, destroyed three years before the destruction of Jerusalem itself? It was because they based their practices strictly on matters of Torah, i.e., they did not adhere to the rabbinic safeguards. The baraita explains that they would say

注砖专 转注砖专 讜讗讻诇转 讜诇讗 诪讜讻专 转讘讜讗转 讝专注讱 讜诇讗 诇讜拽讞 讗诇讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 讜拽专讗 讗住诪讻转讗 讘注诇诪讗

that a buyer need not tithe the produce he purchases, as derived from the verses: 鈥淵ou shall tithe all the produce of your planting, which is brought forth in the field year by year, and you shall eat before the Lord, your God鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:22鈥23). They claimed that the phrases 鈥測ou shall tithe鈥nd you shall eat鈥 indicate that only the one who eats the produce must tithe it, but not the one who sells it. Likewise, the phrase 鈥渢he produce of your planting鈥 teaches that the one who performs the planting must separate tithes, but not the one who buys it. Rather, the obligation of a buyer to separate tithes applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited as a mere support for this halakha. The residents of Beit Hino did not adhere to this rabbinic law and did not observe the halakha requiring the buyer to separate tithes.

讗诇讗 讻谞驻砖讱 诇诪讗讬 讗转讗 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讻谞驻砖讱 诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗诐 讞住诪转 驻讟讜专 讗祝 驻讜注诇 讗诐 讞住诪转 驻讟讜专

It was stated previously that a buyer is not required to tithe produce by Torah law. If so, the same certainly applies to a laborer. Consequently, the term kenafshekha cannot serve to teach that a laborer may eat without tithing, as claimed earlier. The Gemara asks: Rather, what does kenafshekha come to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes to teach that which is taught in another baraita: Kenafshekha can mean: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e., the owner, if you muzzled yourself and did not eat from your field鈥檚 produce, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of: 鈥淵ou shall not muzzle an ox when it is treading out the grain鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:4), so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him, i.e., you did not allow him to eat, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

诪转讬讘 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讗讬讝讛讜 讙讜专谞谉 诇诪注砖专讜转 讘拽讬砖讜讗讬诐 讜讘讚诇讜注讬诐 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讗住讬 诪砖讬谞讟诇 驻讬拽住 砖诇讛谉 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讘砖讚讛

Mar Zutra raises an objection from a mishna (Ma鈥檃srot 1:5): With regard to different types of produce, what is the equivalent of their granary, i.e., the point at which the processing of various types of produce is completed so that they become subject to the halakhot of tithes? With regard to cucumbers and gourds, they become obligated from when they lose their blossom; and Rabbi Asi said: This means from when their blossom [pikas] is removed. The Gemara clarifies the objection from the mishna: What, is it not correct to say that the mishna means from when they lose their blossom, even while the produce is still in the field? This would mean that the produce is subject to the halakhot of tithes before it enters the house or the courtyard, which is not in accordance with the opinions of either Rabbi Yannai or Rabbi Yo岣nan.

诇讗 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 讘讘讬转 讗讬 讛讻讬 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 注讚 砖讬驻拽住讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna means: From when they lose their blossom specifically in the house or courtyard, i.e., the house or courtyard renders the produce subject to tithes only when the produce loses its blossom. The Gemara asks: If so, the phrase: From when they lose their blossom, is inaccurate, as the mishna should have said: Until they lose their blossom. The expression: From when they lose their blossom, indicates that the obligation applies as soon as that happens, i.e., before the produce enters the courtyard or house. By contrast, the expression: Until they lose their blossom, indicates that the obligation does not come into effect until they lose their blossom, regardless of whatever else is done to them, i.e., only when they are in the house and they lose their blossom.

讗讬 转谞讗 注讚 砖讬驻拽住讜 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 注讚 讚讙诪专 诇驻讬拽讜住讬讬讛讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 诪讻讬 讗转讞讜诇讬 驻讬拽讜住讬讬讛讜

The Gemara answers: Had the mishna taught: Until they lose their blossom, I would say erroneously that the produce is not subject to tithes until their loss of blossom is complete, i.e., until all of the produce loses its blossoms. The expression: From when they lose their blossom, teaches us that the obligation to separate tithes takes effect from when they begin to lose their blossom.

诪转讬讘 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讙讜专谞讜 诇诪注砖专 诇讞讬讬讘 注诇讬讜 诪砖讜诐 讟讘诇 诪砖转讙诪专 诪诇讗讻转谉 讜讗讬讝讛讜 讙诪专 诪诇讗讻转谉 诪诇讗讻转 讛讻谞住转谉 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讛讻谞住转谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讘砖讚讛

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Na岣an, raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to produce, its granary for tithes, rendering one who eats it liable for violating the prohibition against untithed produce, is from when its work is completed. And what is meant by the completion of its work? This means the work of its being brought in. The Gemara discusses the meaning of being brought in. What, is it not correct to say that this is referring to its being brought into a pile, even while the produce is still in the field?

诇讗 讛讻谞住转谉 诇讘讬转 讝讛 讛讜讗 讙诪专 诪诇讗讻转谉 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讘讝讬转讬诐 讜注谞讘讬诐 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 讙讜专谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讗讘诇 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讙讜专谉 讘讛讚讬讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it means that its being brought into the house is considered the completion of its work. And if you wish, say instead: When Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yo岣nan say that types of produce are subject to tithes when they are brought into the house or courtyard, they were referring only to olives or grapes, which are not of a granary, i.e., since these types of produce are not processed in a granary, which is the typical criterion for rendering produce subject to tithes, they become subject to tithes when they are brought into a house or courtyard. But in the case of wheat or barley, a granary is explicitly written with regard to them (see Numbers 18:27, 30). Therefore, they are subject to tithes in the granary, even before they are brought into a house or courtyard.

讗砖讻讞谉 讗讚诐 讘诪讞讜讘专 讜砖讜专 讘转诇讜砖 讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖 诪谞诇谉

搂 The Gemara returns to its discussion with regard to the right of a laborer to eat while working: We found a source for the halakha that a person may eat from attached produce while working in the field; and likewise we found a source that an ox that is threshing must be allowed to eat from detached produce, as the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:4). From where do we derive that a person, while working, may eat from detached produce?

拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪砖讜专 讜诪讛 砖讜专 砖讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 讘诪讞讜讘专 讗讜讻诇 讘转诇讜砖 讗讚诐 砖讗讜讻诇 讘诪讞讜讘专 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗讜讻诇 讘转诇讜砖 诪讛 诇砖讜专 砖讻谉 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 转讗诪专 讘讗讚诐 砖讗讬 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜

The Gemara answers: This is derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of an ox. And if an ox, which one need not allow to eat from attached produce, must be allowed to eat from detached produce, then with regard to a person, who may eat from attached produce, is it not right that he may also eat from detached produce? The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about an ox? It is notable in that you are commanded concerning its muzzling. Can you say that a similar halakha should apply to a person, as you are not commanded with regard to his muzzling?

讜讬讛讗 讗讚诐 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪砖讜专 讜诪讛 砖讜专 砖讗讬 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 讗讚诐 砖讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜

The Gemara asks: But let an employer be commanded concerning a person鈥檚, i.e., his laborer鈥檚, muzzling, from an a fortiori inference from an ox: And if with regard to an ox, which you are not commanded to sustain, as there is no mitzva to support ownerless oxen if they do not have food to eat, and yet you are commanded concerning its muzzling, with regard to a Jewish person, whom you are commanded to sustain if he is impoverished (see Leviticus 25:35鈥36), is it not right that you are commanded concerning his muzzling?

讗诪专 拽专讗 讻谞驻砖讱 讻谞驻砖讜 砖诇 驻讜注诇 诪讛 谞驻砖讜 讗诐 讞住诪转讜 驻讟讜专 讗祝 驻讜注诇 讗诐 讞住诪转讜 驻讟讜专

The Gemara answers: The halakha that one is not commanded concerning the muzzling of his laborer is derived from the fact that the verse states: 鈥Kenafshekha,鈥 which indicates that as you treat your own person, so is the halakha with regard to the person of the laborer. In other words, just as with regard to himself, the owner, if you muzzled yourself, you are exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of: 鈥淵ou shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing,鈥 so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him you are exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

讜讗诇讗 讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 拽诪讛 拽诪讛 砖转讬 驻注诪讬诐 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇讗讚诐 讘诪讞讜讘专 转谞讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖

After refuting the a fortiori inference, the Gemara inquires: Rather, from where do we derive that a person may eat from detached produce? The Gemara answers: The verse states the term 鈥渟tanding,鈥 鈥渟tanding鈥 twice: 鈥淲hen you come into your neighbor鈥檚 standing grain鈥ut you shall not move a sickle on your neighbor鈥檚 standing grain鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:26). If the second expression is not applied to the matter of the right of a person to eat from attached produce, as that halakha has been derived from the first mention of 鈥渟tanding,鈥 apply it to the matter of the right of a person to eat from detached produce.

专讘讬 讗诪讬 讗诪专 讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖 诇讗 爪专讬讱 拽专讗 讻转讬讘 讻讬 转讘讗 讘讻专诐 专注讱 诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 砖砖讻专讜 诇讻转祝 讜讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 诇讬讻讜诇

Rabbi Ami stated an alternative answer: A verse is not required to teach the right of a person to eat from detached produce, as it is written: 鈥淲hen you come into your neighbor鈥檚 vineyard, then you may eat grapes鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:25). Are we not dealing even with a case in which the employer hired the laborer to transport the grapes out of the vineyard, and yet the Merciful One states that he may eat?

砖讜专 讘诪讞讜讘专 诪谞诇谉 拽诇 讜讞诪专 诪讗讚诐 讜诪讛 讗讚诐 砖讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 讘转诇讜砖 讗讜讻诇 讘诪讞讜讘专 砖讜专 砖讗讜讻诇 讘转诇讜砖 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗讜讻诇 讘诪讞讜讘专 诪讛 诇讗讚诐 砖讻谉 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 转讗诪专 讘砖讜专 砖讗讬 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara answers: This is derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of a person. And if a person, who may not eat from detached produce, i.e., there is no explicit verse that permits him to do so, nevertheless may eat from attached produce, then with regard to an ox, which must be allowed to eat from detached produce, is it not right that it must also be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about a person? He is notable in that you are commanded to sustain him. Can you say that a similar halakha should apply in a case of an ox, when you are not commanded to sustain it?

讜讬讛讗 砖讜专 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讗讚诐 砖讗讬 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 砖讜专 砖讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜

The Gemara asks: But let one be commanded to sustain an ox, to prevent the suffering of living creatures, by an a fortiori inference from the case of a person: And if, with regard to a person, where you are not commanded concerning his muzzling, nevertheless you are commanded to sustain him, then in the case of an ox, where you are commanded concerning its muzzling, is it not right that you are commanded to sustain it?

讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讞讬 讗讞讬讱 注诪讱 讗讞讬讱 讜诇讗 砖讜专 讜讗诇讗 砖讜专 讘诪讞讜讘专 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 专注讱 专注讱 砖转讬 驻注诪讬诐 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇讗讚诐 讘诪讞讜讘专 转谞讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖讜专 讘诪讞讜讘专

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This cannot be the case, as the verse states: 鈥淎nd your brother shall live with you鈥 (Leviticus 25:36), which indicates that the mitzva to provide sustenance applies only to your brother, but not to an ox. After refuting the a fortiori inference, the Gemara inquires: Rather, from where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara answers: The verse states the term 鈥測our neighbor,鈥 鈥測our neighbor鈥 twice (Deuteronomy 23:26). If the second expression is not applied to the matter of the right of a person to eat from attached produce, as that halakha has been derived from the first mention of 鈥測our neighbor,鈥 apply it to the matter of an ox, that it must be allowed to eat from attached produce.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讗 讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖 讜诇讗 砖讜专 讘诪讞讜讘专 爪专讬讻讬 拽专讗讬 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讞住诐 砖讜专 讘讚讬砖讜

Ravina said: Verses are not necessary either for the halakha that a person may eat from detached produce, or for the halakha that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce, as it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:4).

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Bava Metzia 88

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Bava Metzia 88

注讚 砖讬专讗讛 驻谞讬 讛讘讬转 砖谞讗诪专 讘注专转讬 讛拽讚砖 诪谉 讛讘讬转

until it sees the front of the house through which people enter and exit, and it is brought into the house through that entrance, as it is stated in the formula of the declaration of the tithes: 鈥淚 have removed the consecrated from the house鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:13), which indicates that the obligation to tithe produce whose purpose has not yet been designated applies only when it is brought into the house.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讞爪专 拽讜讘注转 砖谞讗诪专 讜讗讻诇讜 讘砖注专讬讱 讜砖讘注讜

And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Even bringing produce into the courtyard determines that the production process of the produce has been completed and that the produce is therefore subject to tithes, as it is stated in the confession of the tithes: 鈥淎nd I have given to the Levite, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, and they shall eat in your gates and be satisfied鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:12).

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 谞诪讬 讛讗 讻转讬讘 诪谉 讛讘讬转 讗诪专 诇讱 讞爪专 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讘讬转 诪讛 讘讬转 讛诪砖转诪专 讗祝 讞爪专 讛诪砖转诪专转

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yo岣nan also, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淔rom the house鈥? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the term 鈥渉ouse鈥 is not to be taken literally. Rather, it indicates that bringing untithed produce into a courtyard is similar to bringing it into a house, in the following way: Just as a house is a secured area, so too, the courtyard must be secured. An area that is accessible to the public is not considered a courtyard for the purposes of this halakha.

讜专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 讘砖注专讬讱 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 讚诪注讬讬诇 诇讬讛 讚专讱 砖注专 诇讗驻讜拽讬 讚专讱 讙讙讜转 讜拽专驻讬驻讜转 讚诇讗

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yannai also, isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淚n your gates鈥? The Gemara answers: That term is necessary to teach that this halakha, that the production process is considered complete, applies only when one brings the produce into his house through the gate, i.e., the entranceway, to the exclusion of produce that was brought in through rooftops and enclosures, in which case the produce is not subject to tithes.

诪转讬讘 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 讞讜讝讗讛 讻谞驻砖讱 讻讱 谞驻砖讜 砖诇 驻讜注诇 诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗讜讻诇 讜驻讟讜专 讗祝 谞驻砖讜 砖诇 驻讜注诇 讗讜讻诇 讜驻讟讜专

Rav 岣nina 岣za鈥檃 raises an objection from a statement of the baraita mentioned earlier (87b): The term 鈥渁t your own pleasure [kenafshekha]鈥 can also mean: As you are. Consequently, the term kenafshekha teaches that just as the halakha is concerning the owner of the vineyard himself, so is the halakha concerning the laborer himself: Just as the owner, alluded to by the term nafshekha, may eat from the produce before its labor is complete and is exempt from separating tithes, so too, the laborer himself may eat and is exempt from tithes.

讛讗 诇讜拽讞 讞讬讬讘 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘砖讚讛

The objection of Rav 岣nina 岣za鈥檃 is as follows: This indicates that only an owner and a laborer may eat from produce without tithing it; but one who buys produce is obligated by Torah law to separate tithes before partaking of it. What, is it not correct to conclude that this is the halakha even when he purchased the produce while it was still in the field, i.e., he is obligated to tithe the produce even though it has not entered his house or courtyard?

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讛讻讗 讘转讗谞讛 讛注讜诪讚转 讘讙讬谞讛 讜谞讜驻讛 谞讜讟讛 诇讞爪专 注住拽讬谞谉 讜诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诇讘讬转 诇讘讬转

Rav Pappa said: Here, in the baraita, we are dealing with a fig tree that is standing in a garden outside a courtyard and its leaves are leaning into a courtyard, or, according to the one who says that the obligation to separate tithes applies when the produce is brought into the house, the branches are leaning into the house. Therefore, the produce entered the courtyard or house.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 谞诪讬 谞讬讞讬讬讘 讘注诇 讛讘讬转 注讬谞讬讜 讘转讗谞转讜 讜诇讜拽讞 注讬谞讬讜 讘诪拽讞讜

The Gemara asks: If so, the homeowner himself, not only the buyer, should also be obligated to separate tithes, as the produce is in either the courtyard or the house. The Gemara answers: The homeowner鈥檚 eyes are on his fig tree, i.e., his primary concern is the tree, not its produce, and the main part of the tree is outside the courtyard. But the buyer鈥檚 eyes are on his purchase, i.e., his focus is on the produce itself, which is in the space of the courtyard or house.

讜诇讜拽讞 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讛转谞讬讗 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讞专讘讜 讞谞讜讬讜转 砖诇 讘讬转 讛讬谞讜 砖诇砖 砖谞讬诐 拽讜讚诐 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讛注诪讬讚讜 讚讘专讬讛诐 注诇 讚讘专讬 转讜专讛 砖讛讬讜 讗讜诪专讬谉

The Gemara asks: And is a buyer obligated by Torah law to tithe the produce he purchases? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: For what reason were the shops of Beit Hino, a town near Jerusalem, destroyed three years before the destruction of Jerusalem itself? It was because they based their practices strictly on matters of Torah, i.e., they did not adhere to the rabbinic safeguards. The baraita explains that they would say

注砖专 转注砖专 讜讗讻诇转 讜诇讗 诪讜讻专 转讘讜讗转 讝专注讱 讜诇讗 诇讜拽讞 讗诇讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 讜拽专讗 讗住诪讻转讗 讘注诇诪讗

that a buyer need not tithe the produce he purchases, as derived from the verses: 鈥淵ou shall tithe all the produce of your planting, which is brought forth in the field year by year, and you shall eat before the Lord, your God鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:22鈥23). They claimed that the phrases 鈥測ou shall tithe鈥nd you shall eat鈥 indicate that only the one who eats the produce must tithe it, but not the one who sells it. Likewise, the phrase 鈥渢he produce of your planting鈥 teaches that the one who performs the planting must separate tithes, but not the one who buys it. Rather, the obligation of a buyer to separate tithes applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited as a mere support for this halakha. The residents of Beit Hino did not adhere to this rabbinic law and did not observe the halakha requiring the buyer to separate tithes.

讗诇讗 讻谞驻砖讱 诇诪讗讬 讗转讗 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讻谞驻砖讱 诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗诐 讞住诪转 驻讟讜专 讗祝 驻讜注诇 讗诐 讞住诪转 驻讟讜专

It was stated previously that a buyer is not required to tithe produce by Torah law. If so, the same certainly applies to a laborer. Consequently, the term kenafshekha cannot serve to teach that a laborer may eat without tithing, as claimed earlier. The Gemara asks: Rather, what does kenafshekha come to teach? The Gemara answers: It comes to teach that which is taught in another baraita: Kenafshekha can mean: Like your own person. Just as with regard to your own person, i.e., the owner, if you muzzled yourself and did not eat from your field鈥檚 produce, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of: 鈥淵ou shall not muzzle an ox when it is treading out the grain鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:4), so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him, i.e., you did not allow him to eat, you are exempt from liability for the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

诪转讬讘 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讗讬讝讛讜 讙讜专谞谉 诇诪注砖专讜转 讘拽讬砖讜讗讬诐 讜讘讚诇讜注讬诐 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讗住讬 诪砖讬谞讟诇 驻讬拽住 砖诇讛谉 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讘砖讚讛

Mar Zutra raises an objection from a mishna (Ma鈥檃srot 1:5): With regard to different types of produce, what is the equivalent of their granary, i.e., the point at which the processing of various types of produce is completed so that they become subject to the halakhot of tithes? With regard to cucumbers and gourds, they become obligated from when they lose their blossom; and Rabbi Asi said: This means from when their blossom [pikas] is removed. The Gemara clarifies the objection from the mishna: What, is it not correct to say that the mishna means from when they lose their blossom, even while the produce is still in the field? This would mean that the produce is subject to the halakhot of tithes before it enters the house or the courtyard, which is not in accordance with the opinions of either Rabbi Yannai or Rabbi Yo岣nan.

诇讗 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 讘讘讬转 讗讬 讛讻讬 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 注讚 砖讬驻拽住讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna means: From when they lose their blossom specifically in the house or courtyard, i.e., the house or courtyard renders the produce subject to tithes only when the produce loses its blossom. The Gemara asks: If so, the phrase: From when they lose their blossom, is inaccurate, as the mishna should have said: Until they lose their blossom. The expression: From when they lose their blossom, indicates that the obligation applies as soon as that happens, i.e., before the produce enters the courtyard or house. By contrast, the expression: Until they lose their blossom, indicates that the obligation does not come into effect until they lose their blossom, regardless of whatever else is done to them, i.e., only when they are in the house and they lose their blossom.

讗讬 转谞讗 注讚 砖讬驻拽住讜 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 注讚 讚讙诪专 诇驻讬拽讜住讬讬讛讜 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 诪砖讬驻拽住讜 诪讻讬 讗转讞讜诇讬 驻讬拽讜住讬讬讛讜

The Gemara answers: Had the mishna taught: Until they lose their blossom, I would say erroneously that the produce is not subject to tithes until their loss of blossom is complete, i.e., until all of the produce loses its blossoms. The expression: From when they lose their blossom, teaches us that the obligation to separate tithes takes effect from when they begin to lose their blossom.

诪转讬讘 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讙讜专谞讜 诇诪注砖专 诇讞讬讬讘 注诇讬讜 诪砖讜诐 讟讘诇 诪砖转讙诪专 诪诇讗讻转谉 讜讗讬讝讛讜 讙诪专 诪诇讗讻转谉 诪诇讗讻转 讛讻谞住转谉 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讛讻谞住转谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讘砖讚讛

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Na岣an, raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to produce, its granary for tithes, rendering one who eats it liable for violating the prohibition against untithed produce, is from when its work is completed. And what is meant by the completion of its work? This means the work of its being brought in. The Gemara discusses the meaning of being brought in. What, is it not correct to say that this is referring to its being brought into a pile, even while the produce is still in the field?

诇讗 讛讻谞住转谉 诇讘讬转 讝讛 讛讜讗 讙诪专 诪诇讗讻转谉 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讻讬 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讘讝讬转讬诐 讜注谞讘讬诐 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 讙讜专谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讗讘诇 讞讟讬谉 讜砖注讜专讬谉 讙讜专谉 讘讛讚讬讗 讻转讬讘 讘讬讛

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it means that its being brought into the house is considered the completion of its work. And if you wish, say instead: When Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yo岣nan say that types of produce are subject to tithes when they are brought into the house or courtyard, they were referring only to olives or grapes, which are not of a granary, i.e., since these types of produce are not processed in a granary, which is the typical criterion for rendering produce subject to tithes, they become subject to tithes when they are brought into a house or courtyard. But in the case of wheat or barley, a granary is explicitly written with regard to them (see Numbers 18:27, 30). Therefore, they are subject to tithes in the granary, even before they are brought into a house or courtyard.

讗砖讻讞谉 讗讚诐 讘诪讞讜讘专 讜砖讜专 讘转诇讜砖 讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖 诪谞诇谉

搂 The Gemara returns to its discussion with regard to the right of a laborer to eat while working: We found a source for the halakha that a person may eat from attached produce while working in the field; and likewise we found a source that an ox that is threshing must be allowed to eat from detached produce, as the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:4). From where do we derive that a person, while working, may eat from detached produce?

拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪砖讜专 讜诪讛 砖讜专 砖讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 讘诪讞讜讘专 讗讜讻诇 讘转诇讜砖 讗讚诐 砖讗讜讻诇 讘诪讞讜讘专 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗讜讻诇 讘转诇讜砖 诪讛 诇砖讜专 砖讻谉 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 转讗诪专 讘讗讚诐 砖讗讬 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜

The Gemara answers: This is derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of an ox. And if an ox, which one need not allow to eat from attached produce, must be allowed to eat from detached produce, then with regard to a person, who may eat from attached produce, is it not right that he may also eat from detached produce? The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about an ox? It is notable in that you are commanded concerning its muzzling. Can you say that a similar halakha should apply to a person, as you are not commanded with regard to his muzzling?

讜讬讛讗 讗讚诐 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪砖讜专 讜诪讛 砖讜专 砖讗讬 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 讗讚诐 砖讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜

The Gemara asks: But let an employer be commanded concerning a person鈥檚, i.e., his laborer鈥檚, muzzling, from an a fortiori inference from an ox: And if with regard to an ox, which you are not commanded to sustain, as there is no mitzva to support ownerless oxen if they do not have food to eat, and yet you are commanded concerning its muzzling, with regard to a Jewish person, whom you are commanded to sustain if he is impoverished (see Leviticus 25:35鈥36), is it not right that you are commanded concerning his muzzling?

讗诪专 拽专讗 讻谞驻砖讱 讻谞驻砖讜 砖诇 驻讜注诇 诪讛 谞驻砖讜 讗诐 讞住诪转讜 驻讟讜专 讗祝 驻讜注诇 讗诐 讞住诪转讜 驻讟讜专

The Gemara answers: The halakha that one is not commanded concerning the muzzling of his laborer is derived from the fact that the verse states: 鈥Kenafshekha,鈥 which indicates that as you treat your own person, so is the halakha with regard to the person of the laborer. In other words, just as with regard to himself, the owner, if you muzzled yourself, you are exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of: 鈥淵ou shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing,鈥 so too with regard to a laborer, if you muzzled him you are exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of muzzling an ox while it is working.

讜讗诇讗 讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 拽诪讛 拽诪讛 砖转讬 驻注诪讬诐 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇讗讚诐 讘诪讞讜讘专 转谞讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖

After refuting the a fortiori inference, the Gemara inquires: Rather, from where do we derive that a person may eat from detached produce? The Gemara answers: The verse states the term 鈥渟tanding,鈥 鈥渟tanding鈥 twice: 鈥淲hen you come into your neighbor鈥檚 standing grain鈥ut you shall not move a sickle on your neighbor鈥檚 standing grain鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:26). If the second expression is not applied to the matter of the right of a person to eat from attached produce, as that halakha has been derived from the first mention of 鈥渟tanding,鈥 apply it to the matter of the right of a person to eat from detached produce.

专讘讬 讗诪讬 讗诪专 讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖 诇讗 爪专讬讱 拽专讗 讻转讬讘 讻讬 转讘讗 讘讻专诐 专注讱 诪讬 诇讗 注住拽讬谞谉 砖砖讻专讜 诇讻转祝 讜讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 诇讬讻讜诇

Rabbi Ami stated an alternative answer: A verse is not required to teach the right of a person to eat from detached produce, as it is written: 鈥淲hen you come into your neighbor鈥檚 vineyard, then you may eat grapes鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:25). Are we not dealing even with a case in which the employer hired the laborer to transport the grapes out of the vineyard, and yet the Merciful One states that he may eat?

砖讜专 讘诪讞讜讘专 诪谞诇谉 拽诇 讜讞诪专 诪讗讚诐 讜诪讛 讗讚诐 砖讗讬谞讜 讗讜讻诇 讘转诇讜砖 讗讜讻诇 讘诪讞讜讘专 砖讜专 砖讗讜讻诇 讘转诇讜砖 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗讜讻诇 讘诪讞讜讘专 诪讛 诇讗讚诐 砖讻谉 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 转讗诪专 讘砖讜专 砖讗讬 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara answers: This is derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of a person. And if a person, who may not eat from detached produce, i.e., there is no explicit verse that permits him to do so, nevertheless may eat from attached produce, then with regard to an ox, which must be allowed to eat from detached produce, is it not right that it must also be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about a person? He is notable in that you are commanded to sustain him. Can you say that a similar halakha should apply in a case of an ox, when you are not commanded to sustain it?

讜讬讛讗 砖讜专 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 讗讚诐 砖讗讬 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜 砖讜专 砖讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 注诇 讞住讬诪转讜 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讗转讛 诪爪讜讜讛 诇讛讞讬讜转讜

The Gemara asks: But let one be commanded to sustain an ox, to prevent the suffering of living creatures, by an a fortiori inference from the case of a person: And if, with regard to a person, where you are not commanded concerning his muzzling, nevertheless you are commanded to sustain him, then in the case of an ox, where you are commanded concerning its muzzling, is it not right that you are commanded to sustain it?

讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讞讬 讗讞讬讱 注诪讱 讗讞讬讱 讜诇讗 砖讜专 讜讗诇讗 砖讜专 讘诪讞讜讘专 诪谞诇谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 专注讱 专注讱 砖转讬 驻注诪讬诐 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇讗讚诐 讘诪讞讜讘专 转谞讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖讜专 讘诪讞讜讘专

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This cannot be the case, as the verse states: 鈥淎nd your brother shall live with you鈥 (Leviticus 25:36), which indicates that the mitzva to provide sustenance applies only to your brother, but not to an ox. After refuting the a fortiori inference, the Gemara inquires: Rather, from where do we derive that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce? The Gemara answers: The verse states the term 鈥測our neighbor,鈥 鈥測our neighbor鈥 twice (Deuteronomy 23:26). If the second expression is not applied to the matter of the right of a person to eat from attached produce, as that halakha has been derived from the first mention of 鈥測our neighbor,鈥 apply it to the matter of an ox, that it must be allowed to eat from attached produce.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讗 讗讚诐 讘转诇讜砖 讜诇讗 砖讜专 讘诪讞讜讘专 爪专讬讻讬 拽专讗讬 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讞住诐 砖讜专 讘讚讬砖讜

Ravina said: Verses are not necessary either for the halakha that a person may eat from detached produce, or for the halakha that an ox must be allowed to eat from attached produce, as it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing鈥 (Deuteronomy 25:4).

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