Bava Metzia 9
בְּמִדָּה זֹאת קָנוּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם לֹא קָנָה עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא מְשִׁיכָה בְּגָמָל וְהַנְהָגָה בַּחֲמוֹר.
they have both acquired the animal in that manner. Rabbi Yehuda says: Actually, one acquires an animal only through pulling in the case of a camel or driving in the case of a donkey, as that is the manner in which they are normally directed.
קָתָנֵי מִיהַת: אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מוֹשֵׁךְ וְאֶחָד מַנְהִיג, מוֹשֵׁךְ וּמַנְהִיג – אִין. אֲבָל רָכוּב לָא!
In any event, it is taught in the baraita: Or one who was pulling and one who was driving, which indicates that pulling and driving are indeed effective modes of acquisition, but sitting in a riding position on an animal is not.
הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ רָכוּב, וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי מוֹשֵׁךְ וּמַנְהִיג – לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא מְשִׁיכָה בְּגָמָל וְהַנְהָגָה בַּחֲמוֹר, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן דַּאֲפִילּוּ אִיפְּכָא נָמֵי קָנֵי.
The Gemara rejects this inference: The same is true with regard to even sitting in a riding position on an animal; it is an effective mode of acquisition. And the reason that the baraita teaches specifically the modes of pulling and driving is only to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that one acquires an animal only through pulling in the case of a camel or driving in the case of a donkey. Therefore, the first tanna teaches us that even in the opposite manner, i.e., pulling a donkey or driving a camel, one acquires the animal.
אִי הָכִי, לִיעָרְבִינְהוּ וְלִתְנִינְהוּ: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהָיוּ מוֹשְׁכִין וּמַנְהִיגִין בֵּין בְּגָמָל בֵּין בַּחֲמוֹר!
The Gemara asks: If that is so, then let the first tanna combine the cases and teach them as follows: With regard to two people who were pulling or driving either a camel or a donkey, they each acquire the respective animal. The fact that this wording is not used indicates that the first tanna does not entirely disagree with Rabbi Yehuda.
אִיכָּא חַד צַד דְּלָא קָנֵי: אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי מְשִׁיכָה בַּחֲמוֹר, וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי הַנְהָגָה בְּגָמָל.
The Gemara modifies its response: There is one manner of acquisition by which the first tanna concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that one does not acquire the animal if one employs it, and it is unclear what manner that is. Some say that by pulling a donkey one does not acquire it, as donkeys tend to not move at all when being pulled, and some say that by driving a camel one does not acquire it, as that is not the common way to move it.
וְאִית דְּמוֹתֵיב מִסֵּיפָא: בְּמִדָּה זוֹ קָנָה. ״בְּמִדָּה זוֹ״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי רָכוּב?! לָא, לְמַעוֹטֵי אִיפְּכָא.
And according to an alternative version of this discussion, there are those who raise an objection to the opinion that one can acquire an animal by sitting on it in a riding position from the latter clause of the statement of the first tanna in the baraita: They acquire the animal in that manner. The phrase in that manner is stated to exclude what? Is it not to exclude one who sits in a riding position on the animal? The Gemara answers: No, it is stated to exclude the opposite cases: One who drives a camel or pulls a donkey does not acquire the animal.
אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה! אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ צַד אֶחָד דְּלֹא קָנָה: אִית דְּאָמְרִי מְשִׁיכָה בַּחֲמוֹר, וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי הַנְהָגָה בְּגָמָל.
The Gemara asks: If so, that is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to one manner of acquisition in which one does not acquire the animal. Some say that according to the first tanna, by pulling a donkey one does not acquire it, and some say that by driving a camel one does not acquire it.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אֶחָד רָכוּב חֲמוֹר וְאֶחָד תָּפוּס בְּמוֹסֵירָה – זֶה קָנָה חֲמוֹר, וְזֶה קָנָה מוֹסֵירָה. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: רָכוּב קָנֵי!
Come and hear proof from a baraita that one can acquire an animal by sitting on it in a riding position: If one person is sitting in a riding position on a donkey and one other person is holding the reins, this one, the one sitting on the donkey, acquires the donkey, and that one, who is holding the reins, acquires the reins. Learn from it that one who sits in a riding position on an animal acquires it.
הָכָא נָמֵי בְּמַנְהִיג בְּרַגְלָיו. אִי הָכִי, נִקְנֵי נָמֵי רָכוּב בְּמוֹסֵירָה! אֵימָא: זֶה קָנָה חֲמוֹר וַחֲצִי מוֹסֵירָה, וְזֶה קָנָה חֲצִי מוֹסֵירָה.
The Gemara rejects this: Here too, the reference is to one who is not only sitting on the donkey but who is also driving it with his feet by squeezing or kicking it. The Gemara asks: If so, the one who is sitting should acquire part of the reins too. The fact that he does not acquire the reins indicates that his acquisition of the donkey is imperfect, which would not be the case if he were driving it. The Gemara answers: Emend the text and say: This one acquires the donkey and half of the reins, and that one acquires half of the reins.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רָכוּב קָנֵי, דְּקָמַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ בֶּן דַּעַת. אֶלָּא תָּפוּס בְּמוֹסֵירָה בְּמַאי קָנֵי?
The Gemara asks: Granted, the one sitting on the donkey acquires half of the reins because a mentally competent person, the one holding the reins, has lifted it for him, but in what manner does the one holding the reins acquire half the reins? The other end of the reins is attached to the donkey, and because he does not acquire the donkey he cannot acquire the reins.
אֵימָא: זֶה קָנָה חֲמוֹר וְכוּלֵּיהּ מוֹסֵירָה, וְזֶה קָנָה מַה שֶּׁתָּפוּס בְּיָדוֹ.
The Gemara answers: Emend the text and say: This one, the one sitting on the donkey, acquires the donkey and almost the entire reins, and that one, who is holding the reins, acquires only the part of the reins that is actually held in his hand.
הַאי מַאי?! אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּקָא מַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא דְּחַבְרֵיהּ. הַאי אַדַּעְתָּא דִּידֵיהּ קָא מַגְבַּהּ לֵיהּ: אִיהוּ לָא קָנֵי, לְאַחֲרִינֵי מַקְנֵי?!
The Gemara asks: What is the basis for this understanding? Even if you say that in a case of one who performs an act of acquisition by lifting a found item on behalf of another, the other person, i.e., the latter, acquires ownership of the item, that statement applies only in a case where one lifts an item with the intention that another person will acquire it. In the case here, this person who is holding the reins is lifting them with the intention of acquiring them for himself. Since he himself does not acquire them, how can he acquire them for others?
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: זֶה קָנָה חֲמוֹר וּבֵית פַּגֶּיהָ, וְזֶה קָנָה מַה שֶׁתָּפוּס בְּיָדוֹ – וְהַשְּׁאָר לֹא קָנָה, לֹא זֶה וְלֹא זֶה.
Rav Ashi said: Emend the baraita and say: This one, who is sitting on the donkey and driving it, acquires the donkey and its halter, which is attached to its head; and that one, who is holding the reins, acquires only the part that is held in his hand. And with regard to the rest, the part of the reins that is neither attached to the donkey’s head nor held in the person’s hand, neither this one nor that one has acquired it.
רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם כִּדְקָתָנֵי – הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לְנַתְּקָהּ וְלַהֲבִיאָהּ אֶצְלוֹ.
Rabbi Abbahu said: Actually, do not emend the baraita; leave it as it is taught. The one holding the reins acquires them because he can detach them from the donkey and bring them toward himself. Since he is able to pull the reins into his possession, they are considered his even though he does not lift them.
וְהָא דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ בְּרוּתָא הִיא, דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי: טַלִּית שֶׁהִיא מוּנַּחַת חֶצְיָהּ עַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע וְחֶצְיָהּ עַל גַּבֵּי עַמּוּד, וּבָא אֶחָד וְהִגְבִּיהַּ חֶצְיָהּ מֵעַל גַּבֵּי קַרְקַע וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִגְבִּיהַּ חֶצְיָהּ מֵעַל גַּבֵּי עַמּוּד, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּקַמָּא קָנֵי וּבָתְרָא לָא קָנֵי, הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לְנַתְּקָ[הּ] וְלַהֲבִיאָ[הּ] אֶצְלוֹ?! אֶלָּא הָא דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ בְּרוּתָא הִיא.
The Gemara comments: And this statement of Rabbi Abbahu is an error. As, if you do not say so, but instead accept Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion, that would result in an incorrect halakhic ruling in the case of a garment, half of which was lying on the ground and half of which was lying on a pillar, and one came and lifted the half of it that was on the ground off the ground, and another person came and lifted the other half of it off the pillar. In that case, should one also rule that the first one acquires the garment and the latter one does not acquire it, since the first one was able to detach it from the pillar and bring the entire garment toward him? That is certainly not the halakha. Rather, clearly this statement of Rabbi Abbahu is an error. In any event, the question of whether one can acquire an animal by sitting on it in a riding position remains unresolved.
תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: רָכוּב בַּשָּׂדֶה וּמַנְהִיג בָּעִיר – קָנָה! הָכָא נָמֵי מַנְהִיג בְּרַגְלָיו. אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ מַנְהִיג! תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי מַנְהִיג.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an additional proof from a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: If one sits on an animal in the field or leads an animal in the city, he acquires it. This proves that one can acquire an animal by sitting on it. The Gemara rejects this proof: Here too, the reference is to one who leads, i.e., drives, the animal with his feet. The Gemara asks: If so, that is the same as leading the animal. Why would the baraita mention the same case twice? The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing two types of leading.
אִי הָכִי, רָכוּב בָּעִיר מַאי טַעְמָא לָא קָנֵי? אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: לְפִי שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכָּן שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם לִרְכּוֹב בָּעִיר.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, what is the reason that one who sits on an animal in the city does not acquire it? Rav Kahana said: It is because people do not normally ride in the city, as it is crowded.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הִגְבִּיהַּ אַרְנָקִי בְּשַׁבָּת, שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכָּן שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם לְהַגְבִּיהַּ אַרְנָקִי בְּשַׁבָּת, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא קָנֵי? אֶלָּא מַאי דַּעֲבַד – עֲבַד, וְקָנֵי, הָכָא נָמֵי מַאי דַּעֲבַד – עֲבַד, וּקְנִי.
Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: If that is so, that by means of an unusual action one cannot effect an acquisition, then if one lifted a purse that he found on Shabbat, has he also not acquired it, since people do not normally lift a purse on Shabbat due to the prohibition of set-aside [muktze]? That is clearly not the halakha. Rather, how should one rule in that case? What he did, he did, and he acquires the purse. Here too, if one sat on an animal in the city, what he did, he did, and he acquires the animal.
אֶלָּא בְּמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר עָסְקִינַן, דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: קְנֵי כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁבְּנֵי אָדָם קוֹנִין.
Rather, the baraita is not referring to the case of a found animal, which one can acquire even by sitting on it in the city. In fact, we are dealing with a case of buying and selling an animal, where the seller said to the buyer: Acquire the animal the way that people normally acquire an animal. Therefore, the buyer cannot acquire it in the city by sitting on it.
וְאִי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים הוּא – קָנֵי, וְאִי אָדָם חָשׁוּב הוּא – קָנֵי, וְאִי אִשָּׁה הִיא – קָנְיָא, וְאִי אִינִישׁ זִילָא הוּא – קָנֵי.
And if he rides it in the public domain, he acquires it, as people commonly ride animals in the city’s public domain. And if he is an important person, who always rides his animal rather than leading it, he acquires it even in an alleyway. And if the buyer is a woman, she acquires the animal, as women do not normally lead animals. And if the buyer is a detestable person, who rides even where other people do not, he too acquires the animal.
בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״מְשׁוֹךְ בְּהֵמָה זוֹ לִקְנוֹת כֵּלִים שֶׁעָלֶיהָ״, מַהוּ?
§ Rabbi Elazar raises a dilemma: With regard to one who says to another, to whom he wishes to sell vessels: Pull this animal in order to acquire the vessels that are upon it, what is the halakha? Can the buyer acquire the vessels by pulling the animal?
לִקְנוֹת: מִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ קְנֵי! אֶלָּא: ״מְשׁוֹךְ בְּהֵמָה זוֹ וּקְנֵי כֵּלִים שֶׁעָלֶיהָ״, מַהוּ? מִי מַהְנְיָא מְשִׁיכָה דִּבְהֵמָה לְאַקְנוֹיֵי כֵּלִים, אוֹ לָא?
Before discussing the dilemma, the Gemara clarifies the issue. If the vendor merely says: In order that you will acquire the vessels, how can the buyer acquire them? Did he say to him in the imperative: Acquire the vessels? Without the seller’s explicitly instructing the buyer to acquire the vessels, the buyer cannot acquire them. Rather, Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma is with regard to a case where the seller says to the buyer: Pull this animal and thereby acquire the vessels that are upon it. What is the halakha? Is pulling the animal effective in order to acquire the vessels upon it, or not?
אָמַר רָבָא: אִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ קְנֵי בְּהֵמָה וּקְנֵי כֵּלִים – מִי קָנֵי כֵּלִים? חָצֵר מְהַלֶּכֶת הִיא, וְחָצֵר מְהַלֶּכֶת לֹא קָנָה.
Rava said: It is clearly not effective, as even if he said to him: Acquire the animal and acquire the vessels, does the buyer acquire the vessels? Although one can acquire an item by having it placed in his courtyard, and one’s animal is the equivalent of his courtyard, it is considered a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not effect acquisition of items that are placed in it.
וְכִי תֵּימָא כְּשֶׁעָמְדָה, וְהָא כֹּל שֶׁאִילּוּ מְהַלֵּךְ לֹא קָנָה – עוֹמֵד וְיוֹשֵׁב לֹא קָנָה!
And if you would say that the animal can function as a courtyard when it is standing still, not walking, while being pulled, isn’t there a principle which states that anything that does not effect acquisition when moving also does not effect acquisition when it is standing or sitting?
וְהִלְכְתָא בִּכְפוּתָהּ.
The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that the buyer can acquire vessels by having them placed on the animal’s back only when the animal is bound. In that circumstance, when the buyer acquires the animal it assumes the legal status of his courtyard, and he also acquires the items that are placed upon the animal.
אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְרָבָא: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הָיָה מְהַלֵּךְ בִּסְפִינָה, וְקָפְצוּ דָּגִים וְנָפְלוּ לְתוֹךְ הַסְּפִינָה, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּחָצֵר מְהַלֶּכֶת הִיא וְלָא קָנֵי?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סְפִינָה מֵינָח נָיְיחָא, וּמַיָּא הוּא דְּקָא מַמְטוּ לַהּ.
Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: If that is so, in a case where one was sailing on a boat and fish jumped and fell into the boat, is the boat also considered a mobile courtyard, and therefore he does not acquire the fish? Rava said to them: A boat is not considered a mobile courtyard, as the boat itself sits idle, and it is the water that moves it.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה הָיְתָה מְהַלֶּכֶת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְזָרַק לָהּ גֵּט לְתוֹךְ חֵיקָהּ אוֹ לְתוֹךְ קַלְתָּהּ, הָכָא נָמֵי דְּלָא מִגָּרְשָׁה?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: קַלְתָּהּ מֵינָח נָיְיחָא, וְאִיהִי דְּקָא מְסַגְּיָא מִתּוּתַהּ.
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If that is so, that one does not acquire items that are placed in his mobile courtyard, then if a woman was walking in the public domain and her husband threw a bill of divorce into her lap, i.e., onto her person, or into her basket that she was carrying on her head, here too, is she not divorced because the basket was moving? Rav Ashi said to him: Her basket is not considered a mobile courtyard, as it sits idle, and it is she who walks beneath it.
מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה רוֹכֵב עַל גַּבֵּי בְּהֵמָה וְרָאָה אֶת הַמְּצִיאָה וְאָמַר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״תְּנָהּ לִי״. נְטָלָהּ וְאָמַר: ״אֲנִי זָכִיתִי בָּהּ״ – זָכָה בָּהּ. אִם מִשֶּׁנְּתָנָהּ לוֹ, אָמַר: ״אֲנִי זָכִיתִי בָּהּ תְּחִלָּה״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.
MISHNA: If one was riding on an animal and saw a found item, and said to another person who was walking beside him: Give it to me, if the pedestrian took it and said: I have acquired it for myself, he has acquired it by means of lifting it, even though he did not see it first. But if, after giving it to the one riding the animal, he said: I acquired it for myself at the outset, he has said nothing and the rider keeps the item.
גְּמָ׳ תְּנַן הָתָם: מִי שֶׁלִּיקֵּט אֶת הַפֵּאָה, וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵי זוֹ לִפְלוֹנִי עָנִי״, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: זָכָה לוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יִתְּנֶנָּה לֶעָנִי הַנִּמְצָא רִאשׁוֹן.
GEMARA: We learned in a mishna there (Pe’a 4:9): With regard to one who gleaned the produce in the corner of the field, which is given to the poor [pe’a], and said: This produce is for so-and-so, a poor person, Rabbi Eliezer says: He thereby acquired it on the poor person’s behalf. And the Rabbis say: He did not acquire it for the poor person; rather, he should give it to the first poor person that he encounters.
אָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: מַחְלוֹקֶת מֵעָשִׁיר לְעָנִי,
Ulla said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: This dispute is in a case where the pe’a was gleaned by a rich person, who is not entitled to take the pe’a for himself, on behalf of a poor person.
דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: מִגּוֹ דְּאִי בָּעֵי מַפְקַר נִכְסֵיהּ וְהָוֵי עָנִי וַחֲזֵי לֵיהּ – הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי חֲזֵי לֵיהּ. וּמִגּוֹ דְּזָכֵי לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ, זָכֵי נָמֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי חַד מִגּוֹ אָמְרִינַן, תְּרֵי מִגּוֹ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
As Rabbi Eliezer holds that since [miggo], if he so desires, he can renounce ownership of his property and he would then be poor, and the pe’a would then be suitable for him, now too, it is considered potentially suitable for him even though he is wealthy. And since [miggo] he can acquire it for himself, he can acquire it on behalf of another poor person as well. And the Rabbis hold that we say miggo once, but we do not say miggo twice. Therefore, a wealthy person cannot acquire pe’a for a poor person.
אֲבָל מֵעָנִי לְעָנִי, דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל זָכָה לוֹ – דְּמִגּוֹ דְּזָכֵי לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ זָכֵי נָמֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ.
But in a case where the pe’a was gleaned by a poor person on behalf of another poor person, everyone agrees that he acquires it on behalf of the other person, as since [miggo] he can acquire it for himself, he can acquire it on behalf of another person as well.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן לְעוּלָּא: וְלֵימָא מָר, מֵעָנִי לְעָנִי מַחְלוֹקֶת, דְּהָא מְצִיאָה הַכֹּל עֲנִיִּים אֶצְלָהּ, וּתְנַן: הָיָה רוֹכֵב עַל גַּבֵּי בְּהֵמָה וְרָאָה אֶת הַמְּצִיאָה וְאָמַר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״תְּנָהּ לִי״, נְטָלָהּ וְאָמַר ״אֲנִי זָכִיתִי בָּהּ״ – זָכָה בָּהּ.
Rav Naḥman said to Ulla: But shouldn’t the Master say that the dispute is even in a case where the pe’a was gleaned by a poor person on behalf of another poor person? This can be proven from the mishna, as everyone is considered like poor people with regard to a found item, i.e., everyone has the right to acquire a found item just as a poor person is entitled to glean pe’a, and we learned in the mishna: If one was riding on an animal and saw a found item, and said to another person: Give it to me, if the pedestrian took it and said: I have acquired it for myself, he has acquired it.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא: מֵעָנִי לְעָנִי מַחְלוֹקֶת,
Granted, if you say the dispute pertains to a case where the pe’a was gleaned by a poor person on behalf of a poor person,
