Bava Metzia 93

הניחא למאן דאמר אין הרב יכול לומר לעבד עשה עמי ואיני זנך שפיר אלא למאן דאמר יכול הרב לומר לעבד עשה עמי ואיני זנך מאי איכא למימר

This works out well according to the one who says that a master cannot say to a slave: Work for me and I will not feed you, i.e., he is obligated to provide the slave with a livelihood. For the purposes of the case at hand, this means that the master cannot stipulate that he is relinquishing his slaves’ right to eat while performing labor, and therefore it works out well. But according to the one who says that a master can say to a slave: Work for me and I will not feed you, what can be said? He should be able to stipulate to that effect with regard to his minor slave, as he is entitled to all profits that result from the slaves’ labor.

אלא אידי ואידי בשאין מעלה להן מזונות ובהא פליגי דמר סבר יכול ומר סבר אין יכול ורבי יוחנן דאמר יכול הרב שביק מתניתין ועביד כברייתא

Rather, according to this opinion one must accept a different explanation: Both this mishna and that baraita are referring to a case when he does not provide the slaves with food, and the two tannaitic sources disagree with regard to that very issue. As one Sage, the tanna of the baraita, holds that a master can say to a slave: Work for me and I will not feed you, and one Sage, the tanna of the mishna, holds that he cannot do so. The Gemara is puzzled by this response: If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that a master can say to his slave that he will not feed him, has left aside the mishna and acted and ruled in accordance with the baraita.

אלא דכולי עלמא משל שמים הוא אוכל ולא מצי קציץ ומאי קוצץ דאמר רבי הושעיא מזונות

Rather, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation in favor of another: Everyone agrees that a laborer eats from the property of Heaven, and even if a father or master provides his child or slave with food he cannot stipulate that the child or slave should not eat when performing labor, as the father or master has no rights over that which they consume. And what is the meaning of: Stipulates, that Rabbi Hoshaya says in the baraita? That does not mean, as in the mishna, that the master relinquishes the slaves’ right to food; rather, he stipulates that they should eat food before they work, so that they will be too full to eat at a later stage.

דכוותיה גבי בהמתו תבן נקוץ לה אלא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר משלו הוא אוכל ומר סבר משל שמים הוא אוכל

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, in the corresponding situation, with regard to his animal, there should likewise be no discussion at all because he can stipulate in this manner and distribute straw for it before it starts work, as everyone agrees that this is permitted. Rather, the Gemara retracts this interpretation and says that in fact they disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, the tanna of the mishna, holds that a laborer eats from his own property, and one Sage, the tanna of the baraita, holds that a laborer eats from the property of Heaven. This proves that this issue is in fact a dispute between tanna’im.

מתני׳ קוצץ אדם על ידי עצמו על ידי בנו ובתו הגדולים על ידי עבדו ושפחתו הגדולים על ידי אשתו מפני שיש בהן דעת אבל אינו קוצץ על ידי בנו ובתו הקטנים ולא על ידי עבדו ושפחתו הקטנים ולא על ידי בהמתו מפני שאין בהן דעת

MISHNA: A man can stipulate on his own behalf that he receive a certain increase in his wages instead of eating the produce with which he works, and similarly, he can stipulate this on behalf of his adult son or daughter, on behalf of his adult Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, or on behalf of his wife, with their agreement, because they have the basic level of mental competence, i.e., they are legally competent and can therefore waive their rights. But he cannot stipulate this on behalf of his minor son or daughter, nor on behalf of his minor Canaanite slave or Canaanite maidservant, nor on behalf of his animal, as they do not have the basic level of mental competence.

השוכר את הפועלים לעשות בנטע רבעי שלו הרי אלו לא יאכלו אם לא הודיען פודה ומאכילן נתפרסו עגוליו נתפתחו חביותיו הרי אלו לא יאכלו אם לא הודיען מעשר ומאכילן

In the case of one who hires a laborer to perform labor with his fourth-year fruit, such laborers may not eat the fruit. And if he did not inform them beforehand that they were working with fourth-year fruit, he must redeem the fruit and feed them. If his fig cakes broke apart and crumbled, so that they must be preserved again, or if his barrels of wine opened and he hired workers to reseal them, these laborers may not eat, as the work of the figs or wine had already been completed with regard to tithes, from which point a laborer may not eat them. And if he did not inform them, he must tithe the food and feed them.

שומרי פירות אוכלין מהלכות מדינה אבל לא מן התורה

The mishna adds: Watchmen of produce may eat the produce of the field or vineyard by local regulations, i.e., in accordance with the ordinances accepted by the residents of that place, but not by Torah law.

גמ׳ שומרי פירות אמר רב לא שנו אלא שומרי גנות ופרדסין אבל שומרי גיתות וערימות אוכלין מן התורה קסבר משמר כעושה מעשה דמי

GEMARA: The mishna mentions watchmen of produce. Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to watchmen of gardens and orchards, in which the produce is still attached to the ground, and therefore the watchman would have no legal right to it were it not for the local custom. But watchmen of winepresses and piles of detached produce may eat from them by Torah law, as the decisive factor is whether or not the produce is attached to the ground. Evidently, Rav maintains that one who safeguards is considered like one who performs labor, and therefore he has the status of a laborer.

ושמואל אמר לא שנו אלא שומרי גיתות וערימות אבל שומרי גנות ופרדסים אינן אוכלים לא מן התורה ולא מהלכות מדינה קא סבר משמר לאו כעושה מעשה דמי

And conversely, Shmuel says that the Sages taught the halakha of the mishna, that they may eat by local regulations, only with regard to watchmen of winepresses and piles of detached produce. But watchmen of gardens and orchards may not eat, neither by Torah law nor by local regulations. This shows that Shmuel holds that one who safeguards is not considered like one who performs labor, and therefore no watchman is entitled to eat by Torah law. In the particular case of detached produce, there is a local custom to allow a watchman of detached produce to eat from it.

מתיב רב אחא בר רב הונא המשמר את הפרה מטמא בגדים ואי אמרת משמר לאו כעושה מעשה דמי אמאי מטמא בגדים אמר רבה בר עולא גזירה שמא יזיז בה אבר

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna raises an objection to this reasoning from a baraita: One who safeguards the red heifer after it has been burned renders his garments impure, in accordance with halakha concerning all those who take part in the ritual of the red heifer. The Torah decrees that all those who take part in the ritual of the red heifer contract impurity (Numbers, chapter 19). It is therefore necessary to establish which people are considered to have taken part in this ritual. And if you say that one who safeguards is not considered like one who performs labor, why does he render his garments impure? He has not performed any labor. Rabba bar Ulla said: He does not render them impure due to his work as a watchman; rather, this is a rabbinic decree, lest he move a limb of the heifer.

מתיב רב כהנא המשמר ארבע וחמש מקשאות הרי זה לא ימלא כרסו מאחד מהן אלא מכל אחד ואחד אוכל לפי חשבון ואי אמרת משמר לאו כעושה מעשה דמי אמאי אוכל

Rav Kahana raises an objection: With regard to one who safeguards four or five cucumber fields, which contain various types of cucumbers and gourds belonging to different people, this one may not fill his stomach from any single one of them. Rather, he must eat from each and every one by a proportionate amount. But if you say that one who safeguards is not considered like one who performs labor, why is he allowed to eat at all?

אמר רב שימי בר אשי בעקורין שנו עקורין והלא נגמרה מלאכתן למעשר שלא ניטל פיקס שלהם

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: They taught this halakha with regard to uprooted cucumbers, concerning which even Shmuel agrees that a watchman may eat them by local regulations. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Uprooted? But at that stage hasn’t their work already been completed with regard to tithes, and therefore no laborer should be permitted to eat them? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case when their blossom had not yet been removed. Since the cucumbers still require work, they are not yet subject to tithes.

אמר רב אשי כוותיה דשמואל מסתברא דתנן ואלו אוכלין מן התורה העושה במחובר לקרקע בשעת גמר מלאכה ובתלוש כו׳ מכלל דאיכא דלא קא אכיל מן התורה אלא מהלכות מדינה

Rav Ashi said: It stands to reason that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as we learned in a mishna (87a): And these laborers may eat by Torah law: A laborer who performs labor with produce attached to the ground at the time of the completion of its work, e.g., harvesting produce; and a laborer who performs labor with produce detached from the ground before the completion of its work. The mishna’s phrase: By Torah law, proves by inference that with regard to detached produce there is one who does not eat by Torah law but by local regulations.

אימא סיפא ואלו שאינן אוכלין מאי אינן אוכלין אילימא שאין אוכלין מן התורה אלא מהלכות מדינה היינו רישא אלא לאו שאין אוכלין לא מן התורה ולא מהלכות מדינה ומאי ניהו עושה במחובר לקרקע בשעה שאין גמר מלאכה וכל שכן שומרי גנות ופרדסות

The Gemara continues its proof: Now, say the latter clause of that mishna: And these may not eat. What is the meaning of: May not eat? If we say this means that they may not eat by Torah law but by local regulations, this is the same as the first clause. Rather, is it not correct to say that it means they may not eat at all, neither by Torah law nor by local regulations? And who are the people included in this list? They are one who performs labor with produce attached to the ground at a time when it has not reached the completion of its work, and all the more so watchmen of gardens and orchards, who do not perform any significant action.

מתני׳ ארבעה שומרים הן שומר חנם והשואל נושא שכר והשוכר שומר חנם נשבע על הכל והשואל משלם את הכל

MISHNA: There are four types of bailees, to whom different halakhot apply. They are as follows: An unpaid bailee, who receives no compensation for safeguarding the item; and the borrower of an item for his own use; a paid bailee, who is provided with a salary for watching over an item; and a renter, i.e., a bailee who pays a fee for the use of a vessel or animal. If the item was stolen, lost, or broken, or if the animal died in any manner, their halakhot are as follows: An unpaid bailee takes an oath over every outcome; whether the item was lost, stolen, or broken, or if the animal died, the unpaid bailee must take an oath that it happened as he described, and he is then exempt from payment. The borrower does not take an oath, but pays for every outcome, even in a circumstance beyond his control.

ונושא שכר והשוכר נשבעים על השבורה ועל השבויה ועל המתה ומשלמין את האבידה ואת הגניבה

And the halakhot of a paid bailee and a renter are the same: They take an oath over an injured animal, over a captured animal, and over a dead animal, attesting that the mishaps were caused by circumstances beyond their control, and they are exempt, but they must pay for loss or theft.

גמ׳ מאן תנא ארבעה שומרים אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה רבי מאיר היא אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן מי איכא דלית ליה ארבעה שומרין אמר ליה הכי קאמינא לך מאן תנא שוכר כנושא שכר רבי מאיר היא

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this mishna about four types of bailees? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: It is Rabbi Meir. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Is there any Sage who does not accept the halakha concerning four types of bailees? All of the Sages agree that the Torah spoke of these four types of bailees. Rav Naḥman said to him: This is what I am saying to you, i.e., I mean as follows: Who is the tanna who maintains that the halakha of a renter is like that of a paid bailee? It is Rabbi Meir.

והא רבי מאיר איפכא שמעינן ליה דתניא שוכר כיצד משלם רבי מאיר אומר כשומר חנם רבי יהודה אומר כשומר שכר רבה בר אבוה איפכא קתני

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t we hear that Rabbi Meir said the opposite, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a renter, whose halakha is not stated in the Torah, how does he pay, i.e., in which cases is he liable to pay? Rabbi Meir says: He pays in the same cases as an unpaid bailee; Rabbi Yehuda says he pays in the same cases as a paid bailee. The Gemara explains: Rabba bar Avuh teaches this baraita in the opposite manner to the version here.

אי הכי ארבעה שלשה נינהו אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק ארבעה שומרין ודיניהם שלשה

The Gemara asks a question with regard to the accepted number of bailees: If so, that the same halakha applies to a renter and a paid bailee, why does the tanna say that there are four bailees? They are only three. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the mishna should be understood as follows: There are four types of bailees, whose halakhot are three.

ההוא רעיא דהוה קא רעי חיותא אגודא דנהר פפא שריג חדא מינייהו ונפלת למיא אתא לקמיה דרבה ופטריה אמר מאי הוה ליה למעבד

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain shepherd who was herding animals on the bank of the Pappa River, when one of them slipped and fell into the water and drowned. He came before Rabba, and Rabba exempted him from payment. Rabba stated the following reasoning in support of his ruling: What could he have done? A drowning of this kind is a circumstance beyond his control, and although a shepherd is a paid bailee he is exempt from liability in circumstances beyond his control.

הא נטר כדנטרי אינשי אמר ליה אביי אלא מעתה על למתא בעידנא דעיילי אינשי הכי נמי דפטור אמר ליה אין גנא פורתא בעידנא דגנו אינשי הכי נמי דפטור אמר ליה אין

He safeguarded them in the manner that people safeguard, and he is not required to do anything more. Abaye said to him: If that is so, in a case where he entered the city at a time when other people enter, as shepherds normally do, when their animals are grazing in a quiet and safe place, and a theft occurred at that hour, so too will you say that he is exempt? Rabba said to him: Yes. Abaye raised a further difficulty: If he slept a little at a time when people generally sleep, so too is he exempt? Rabba said to him: Yes.

איתיביה אלו הם אונסין ששומר שכר פטור עליהן כגון ותפל שבא ותקחם ואת הנערים הכו לפי חרב אמר ליה התם בחזני מתא

Abaye raised an objection to him from a baraita: These are the circumstances beyond one’s control for which a paid bailee is exempt: For example, as it is stated in the verse: “The oxen were plowing, and the donkeys feeding beside them. And the Sabeans made a raid and took them away, and they have slain the servants with the edge of the sword” (Job 1:15). This teaches that only a robbery by an army is considered a circumstance beyond his control, but nothing less. Rabba said to him: There it is referring to city watchmen, i.e., professionals hired to watch over city property, who are exempt due to an occurrence on that scale, i.e., a military incursion.

איתיביה עד מתי שומר שכר חייב לשמור עד כדי הייתי ביום אכלני חרב וקרח בלילה אמר ליה התם נמי בחזני מתא אמר ליה אטו יעקב אבינו חזן מתא הוה דאמר ליה ללבן נטרי לך נטירותא יתירתא כחזני מתא

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from another baraita: To what extent is a paid bailee obligated to safeguard? He is obligated to the extent that Jacob said to Laban: “Thus I was: In the day the drought consumed me, and the frost by night” (Genesis 31:40). Rava said to him: There too, the baraita is speaking of city watchmen, whose responsibility extends further. Abaye said to him: Is that to say that Jacob, our forefather, whose statement is the source of this halakha, was a city watchman? Rava replied: It means that Jacob said to Laban: I safeguarded for you an extra level of safeguarding, like that of city watchmen.

איתיביה רועה שהיה רועה והניח עדרו ובא לעיר בא זאב וטרף ובא ארי ודרס אין אומרים אילו היה שם היה מציל אלא אומדין אותו אם יכול להציל חייב אם לאו פטור

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from another baraita: With regard to a shepherd who was herding the animals of others, and he left his flock and came to the town, if in the meantime a wolf came and tore an animal to pieces, or a lion came and trampled one of his flock, we do not say definitively that had he been there he would have rescued them and therefore he is liable due to his absence. Rather, the court estimates with regard to him: If he could have rescued his animal by chasing a beast of this kind away, he is liable, as his departure from the scene was certainly a contributing factor to the damage. If not, he is exempt from liability.

מאי לאו דעל בעידנא דעיילי אינשי לא דעל בעידנא דלא עיילי אינשי אי הכי אמאי פטור תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב

Abaye continues: What, is this baraita not referring to a case when the shepherd enters the town at a time when other people usually enter? If so, it presents a difficulty to the opinion of Rabba. Rabba responds: No, it is speaking of one who enters at a time when other people do not usually enter. Abaye retorts: If so, why is he exempt even if he could not have rescued the animal? This is a mishap that came about initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, and in a case of this kind he is liable due to his negligence.

דשמע קל אריה ועל אי הכי אומדין אותו מאי הוה ליה למעבד היה לו לקדם ברועים ובמקלות

Rabba explains: It is referring to one who heard the sound of a lion roaring and entered the city to save himself. In such a case, his actions were not initially negligent, but rather, it was a circumstance beyond his control. Abaye questions this response: If so, what is the relevance of the statement: The court estimates with regard to him? What could he have done to prevent an attack by a lion? Rabba replies: He should have faced the lion with other shepherds and with sticks to chase it away.

אי הכי מאי איריא שומר שכר אפילו שומר חנם נמי דהא מר הוא דאמר שומר חנם שהיה לו לקדם ברועים ובמקלות ולא קידם חייב שומר חנם בחנם שומר שכר בשכר

Abaye asks: If so, why specifically state this halakha with regard to a paid bailee? The same would hold true even for an unpaid bailee, as wasn’t it you, Master, who said that an unpaid bailee who had the option of facing an animal with other shepherds and with sticks and did not face it in this manner is liable, as he is considered negligent in his duty? Rabba answers: An unpaid bailee is liable only if he could have gathered together other shepherds to help him defend his animals free of charge, whereas a paid bailee is obligated to do so even for payment.

ועד כמה עד כדי דמיהן והיכן מצינו בשומר שכר שחייב באונסין דהדר שקיל דמיהן מבעל הבית

The Gemara asks: And up to how much must a paid bailee pay for this extra protection? The Gemara answers: Up to the sum of the value of the animals he is responsible to safeguard. The Gemara further asks: But in that case, it seems that a paid bailee must pay from his own pocket to protect the animals from marauding beasts; where have we found with regard to a paid bailee that he is liable for circumstances beyond his control? Everyone agrees that this loss was caused by circumstances beyond the bailee’s control, and yet he must bear the expenses indirectly. The Gemara responds: The halakha is that he may return and take the money that he paid for these additional guards from the owner.

אמר ליה רב פפא לאביי אי הכי מאי אהני ליה מינה נפקא מינה לכושרא דחיותא אי נמי לטרחא יתירתא

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If so, what benefit does the owner of the animals receive from this? Any potential loss he avoided from the lion must be paid to the extra guards. Abaye replied: The practical difference concerns the fitness of and his familiarity with the animals. Although it makes no difference to him financially, if he had to purchase other animals he would lose those animals that he knows, and he would rather keep his own livestock. Alternatively, it matters with respect to the additional effort involved in the acquisition of new animals.

רב חסדא ורבה בר רב הונא לא סבירא להו הא דרבה דאמרי להכי יהבי לך אגרא לנטורי לי נטירותא יתירתא

As demonstrated in the above discussion, Rabba maintains that even a paid bailee is required to safeguard and take care of the animals only in the normal fashion. By contrast, Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna do not hold in accordance with this opinion of Rabba, as they say that the owner can tell the bailee: It was for this reason that I gave you a wage, so that you should safeguard for me with an additional level of safeguarding, not for you to go and eat and sleep like other people.

בר אדא סבולאה הוי קא מעבר חיותא אגמלא דנרש דחפה חדא לחברתה ושדיתה במיא אתא לקמיה דרב פפא חייביה אמר ליה מאי הוה לי למעבד אמר ליה אבעי לך לעבורי חדא חדא אמר ליה ידעת ביה בבר אחתיך דמצי למעבר חדא חדא אמר ליה כבר צווחו קמאי דקמך ולא איכא דאשגח בהו

The Gemara relates: Bar Adda the porter was transporting animals across the narrow bridge of Neresh when one animal pushed another and cast it into the water, and it drowned. The case came before Rav Pappa, who deemed him liable. Bar Adda said to him: What should I have done? Rav Pappa said to him: You should have transported them one by one. The porter said to him: Do you know of the son of your sister who can transport them one by one? In other words, are you aware of anyone who can do such a thing? It is virtually impossible. Rav Pappa said to him: The very earliest scholars before you already shouted and complained about this, but none paid attention to them. Since you are an expert and were hired for this purpose, the responsibility is yours.

איבו אפקיד כיתנא בי רוניא אזל שבו שמטיה מיניה לסוף הוכר הגנב אתא לקמיה דרב נחמן חייביה לימא פליגא דרב הונא בר אבין

The Gemara relates another incident: Aivu deposited flax with a bailee in the house of Ronya. A robber called Shabbu went and forcibly snatched the flax from him. Eventually the thief was identified and caught. The matter came before Rav Naḥman, who rendered the bailee liable. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that Rav Naḥman disagrees with the opinion of Rav Huna bar Avin?

דשלח רב הונא בר אבין נגנבה באונס ואחר כך הוכר הגנב אם שומר חנם הוא רצה נשבע רצה עושה עמו דין אם שומר שכר הוא עושה עמו דין ואינו נשבע

The Gemara explains: As Rav Huna bar Avin sent this ruling: In a case where an animal was stolen in a circumstance beyond his control, and the thief was subsequently identified and captured, if the bailee is an unpaid bailee, the following distinction applies: If he wishes, he takes an oath that he did not misappropriate the animal before it was stolen, and the owners must claim its value from the thief; if he wishes, he enters into judgment with the thief, by claiming the money directly from him. If he is a paid bailee, he enters into judgment with the thief and does not take an oath. Since the ruling of Rav Naḥman was in the case of an unpaid bailee, why did he have to deal with the thief?

אמר רבא התם גברי דפרמוסקא הוו קיימי דאי רמא קלא הוו אתו ומצלין ליה

Rava said: The cases are not the same, as there, in the ruling of Rav Naḥman, men from the government were standing there, which means that if he had raised his voice they would have come and rescued him. Since it was his own negligence that caused the robbery, he must find a way to collect the money from the robber.

מתני׳ זאב אחד אינו אונס שני זאבים אונס רבי יהודה אומר בשעת משלחת זאבים אף זאב אחד אונס

MISHNA: One wolf that approaches a flock and attacks is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as the shepherd can drive it away, but an attack by two wolves is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Rabbi Yehuda says: At a time of wolf attacks, when many wolves come out of hiding and pounce on animals at every corner, even an attack by one wolf is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control.

שני כלבים אינו אונס ידוע הבבלי אומר משום רבי מאיר מרוח אחת אינו אונס משתי רוחות אונס הלסטים הרי זה אונס הארי הדוב והנמר והברדלס והנחש הרי אלו אונס

An attack by two dogs is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Yadua the Babylonian says in the name of Rabbi Meir: If the two dogs came and attacked from one direction it is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, but if they attacked from two directions, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as the shepherd cannot protect his flock from both of them at once. If bandits came, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. Likewise, with regard to an attack by a lion, a bear, a leopard, a cheetah, and a snake, these are each considered a circumstance beyond one’s control.

אימתי בזמן שבאו מאליהן אבל הוליכן למקום גדודי חיה ולסטים אינו אונס

When is an attack by one of the above considered beyond his control, which means that a paid bailee is exempt? It is when the dangerous beasts or bandits came of their own accord to the usual grazing spot. But if the shepherd led his flock to a place of groups of beasts or bandits, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control, as he is at fault.

מתה כדרכה הרי זה אונס סגפה ומתה אינו אונס עלתה לראשי צוקין ונפלה הרי זה אונס העלה לראשי צוקין ונפלה ומתה אינו אונס

If the animal died in its normal manner, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control; if he afflicted it by overworking it or by negligent treatment and it died, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. If the animal ascended to the top of a cliff and fell down and died, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. If the shepherd himself brought it up to the top of a cliff and it fell down and died, this is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control.

גמ׳ והתניא זאב אחד אונס אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק ההיא בשעת משלחת זאבים ורבי יהודה היא

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that an attack by one wolf is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: That baraita is speaking of a time of wolf attacks, and it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna.

הלסטים הרי זה אונס אמאי לוקי גברא להדי גברא אמר רב בלסטים מזויין

The mishna teaches that if bandits came, this is considered a circumstance beyond one’s control. The Gemara asks: Why? Let one man stand against another man. The shepherd should defend his flock and fight the bandit, as that is what he was hired to do. Rav said: The mishna is referring to armed bandits, against whom the shepherd cannot reasonably defend the flock.

איבעיא להו לסטים מזויין ורועה מזויין מהו מי אמרינן אוקי גברא להדי גברא או דלמא האי מסר נפשיה והאי לא מסר נפשיה מסתברא דהאי מסר נפשיה והאי לא מסר נפשיה אמר ליה אביי לרבא אשכחיה רועה ואמר ליה גנבא סריא בדוכתא פלניא יתיבינן

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the case involved an armed bandit and an armed shepherd, what is the halakha? Do we say, let one man stand and fight against another man, or perhaps this bandit is willing to risk his life and that shepherd is not prepared to risk his life? The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that this one will risk his life and that one would not risk his life. Consequently, the shepherd is not held responsible if he refuses to fight the bandit. Abaye said to Rava: What is the halakha if the shepherd found a known thief and said to him: You dirty thief! In such and such a place we shepherds sit;