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June 3, 2024 | 讻状讜 讘讗讬讬专 转砖驻状讚

  • Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v鈥橸ehuda Tzvi.

    专讘讜转 讘谞讜转 注砖讜 讞讬诇 讜讗转 注诇讬转 注诇志讻诇谞讛

Bava Metzia 96

Abaye, Rava and Rav Ashi each bring a different derivation for the rule that shmira b’baalaim is a valid exemption only when the owner was working for the borrower at the moment of the act of borrowing. Rami bar Hama asks four questions regarding the borrower’s liablity for unexpected damages (oness). Then he asks three questions, and Ravina asks a fourth regarding the exemption of shmira b’baalim. Each of these eight questions relates to a unique case and asks whether the general halakha applies in these exceptional circumstances. The last two questions, regarding a husband/wife and an agent are answered: they depend on amoraic debates. Is there a difference if the agent is the owner’s slave? Rami bar Hama asks a question regarding a husband’s level of responsibility for his wife’s usufruct property and about who is responsible for meila for her property if it was sanctified. Rava answers both questions. A borrower is not liable for depreciation or for an animal dying from use as the borrower can claim: “I didn’t borrow it just to leave it on the windowsill!”

专讘讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讜诪转专抓 诇拽专讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讚转谞讬讗 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 诪砖诪注 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘转专讜讬讬讛讜 讜诪砖诪注 谞诪讬 讚讻讬 讗讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜诇讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 驻讟讜专


By contrast, Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, and he explains the verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, thereby arriving at the conclusion of the baraita, as it is taught in a baraita: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥 teaches about the case in which the owner was working for the borrower at both points in time, and it also teaches about the case in which he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one; in both cases the borrower is exempt.


讜讻转讬讘 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 诪砖诪注 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪砖诪注 谞诪讬 讚讻讬 讗讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜诇讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讞讬讬讘


The Gemara raises an objection: But it is also written: 鈥淚f its owner is not with him, he shall pay.鈥 The verse teaches about the case in which the owner was not working for the borrower at either point in time, and it also teaches about the case in which he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one; in both cases the borrower is liable.


诇讜诪专 诇讱 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗诇讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗诇讛


To reconcile the verses, one must say that the phrase 鈥渋f its owner is with him鈥 serves to tell you that if the owner was with the borrower, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, then he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption to apply.


讗讬驻讜讱 讗谞讗 诪住转讘专讗 砖讗诇讛 注讚讬驻讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诇专砖讜转讬讛


The Gemara raises a difficulty: I could reverse the conclusion and say that the borrower鈥檚 exemption from liability is dependent upon the time when the animal was injured or died. The Gemara explains: It is reasonable that the exemption from liability should be dependent on the time of the borrowing because the borrowing is of greater significance, as with it the borrower brings the animal into his domain.


讗讚专讘讛 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 注讚讬驻讗 砖讻谉 讞讬讬讘 讘讗讜谞住讬谉


The Gemara retorts: On the contrary, the time when the animal is injured or dies is of greater significance, because that point marks when the borrower is actually liable to pay for any accidents that occurred.


讗讬 诇讗 砖讗诇讛 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 讜讗讬 诇讗讜 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 砖讗诇讛 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 砖讗诇讛 注讚讬驻讗 砖讻谉 讞讬讬讘 讘诪讝讜谞讜转讬讛


The Gemara responds: No, the borrowing is more significant. Were it not for the initial borrowing, what liability could be caused by the fact that the animal is injured or dies? The Gemara argues: But by the same logic, were it not for the fact that the animal is injured or dies, what liability could be caused by the act of borrowing? The Gemara concludes: Even so, the borrowing is of greater significance, as with it the borrower is obligated to provide the animal鈥檚 sustenance as long as it is entrusted with him.


专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讻讬 讬砖讗诇 讗讬砖 诪注诐 专注讛讜 讜诇讗 专注讛讜 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 讛讗 专注讛讜 注诪讜 驻讟讜专


Rav Ashi said that the halakha that the borrower鈥檚 exemption from liability is dependent upon the time of the borrowing can be derived from the verse itself: The verse states: 鈥淎nd when a man borrows from another鈥he shall pay鈥 (Exodus 22:13). The precise formulation of the verse indicates that he borrowed an item from another, but that other person was not with him, i.e., working for him, at the time. It is only in such a case that that verse concludes: 鈥淗e shall pay.鈥 By inference, when the other person is working with him, the borrower is exempt. Accordingly, it is clear that the critical moment is the time of the borrowing.


讗讬 讛讻讬 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 讜讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗讬 诇讗讜 讛谞讱 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讗讬 讗讜专讞讬讛 讚拽专讗 讛讜讗


The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need the continuation of that verse: 鈥淚ts owner is not with him,鈥 and the next verse: 鈥淚f its owner is with him鈥? According to Rav Ashi, the circumstances of the borrower鈥檚 liability and exemption can be derived from the beginning of the first verse. The Gemara explains: If it were not for these additional clauses, I would say that this phrase 鈥渇rom another鈥 is simply the usual manner of the verse, and is not to be expounded to teach an exemption. Since the continuation of the verse and the next verse teach the actual exemption from liability, and the apparent contradiction between them raises the question of when the critical moment is, it is apparent that the beginning of the verse was written in order to be expounded, as Rav Ashi did.


讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 砖讗诇讛 诇专讘注讛 诪讛讜 讻讚砖讬讬诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讛讻讬 诇讗 砖讬讬诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛谞讗讛 讜讛讗讬 谞诪讬 讛讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讛谞讗讛


Rami bar 岣ma raises a dilemma: If one borrowed an animal in order to engage in bestiality with it, a severe transgression (see Leviticus 18:23), what is the halakha; is the borrower liable for mishaps? The crux of the dilemma is: In order for him to be liable, do we require that the borrowing be for a purpose similar to that for which people typically borrow animals, and since people do not typically borrow animals for this purpose, the borrower is exempt? Or perhaps, what is the reason that a borrower is liable? It is due to the benefit he derives from the animal, and as this borrower, too, has benefit from the animal, he is liable for mishaps.


砖讗诇讛 诇讬专讗讜转 讘讛 诪讛讜 诪诪讜谞讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讛讗讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪诪讜谞讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讛谞讗讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讬讻讗


A similar question: If one borrowed an item, not to use it but to be seen with it, so that people will assume that he is wealthy, what is the halakha? In order for him to be liable, do we require that he borrow an item of monetary worth, and that exists in this case? Or, perhaps we require that he borrow an item of monetary worth from which he also derives tangible benefit, and that does not exist in this case.


砖讗诇讛 诇注砖讜转 讘讛 驻讞讜转 诪驻专讜讟讛 诪讛讜 诪诪讜谞讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讗讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 驻讞讜转 诪驻专讜讟讛 诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讛讬讗


Another question: If one borrowed an item to perform work with it that is worth less than the value of one peruta, what is the halakha? Do we require only that he borrow an item of monetary worth, and that exists in this case? Or, perhaps any benefit derived that is worth less than one peruta is nothing, i.e., it is legally considered to be of no monetary worth, and he is therefore exempt.


砖讗诇 砖转讬 驻专讜转 诇注砖讜转 讘讛谉 驻专讜讟讛 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讝讬诇 讘转专 砖讜讗诇 讜诪砖讗讬诇 讜讗讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讝讬诇 讘转专 驻专讜转 讜讻诇 讞讚讗 讜讞讚讗 诇讬讻讗 诪诪讜谞讗


Another question: If one borrowed two cows to perform work with them that will be worth the value of one peruta in total, what is the halakha? When appraising the value of the benefit derived, to see if it has monetary worth of one peruta, do we say: Follow the borrower and lender, i.e., appraise how much benefit the borrower received from the lender, and in this case there is benefit of the value of one peruta. Or, perhaps we follow the cows, and in this case, each one of the cows does not provide the borrower with monetary worth of one peruta.


砖讗诇 诪砖讜转驻讬谉 讜谞砖讗诇 诇讜 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 诪讛讜 讻讜诇讜 讘注诇讬讜 讘注讬谞谉 讜讛讗 诇讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪讛讛讜讗 驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬讛 诪讬讛讗 诪讬驻讟专


Another question: If one borrowed an item from two partners, and the services of one of those partners were also borrowed by him, what is the halakha? Does the exemption of borrowing an item together with its owner apply in this case? For the exemption to apply, do we require all of the item鈥檚 owners to be working for the borrower, and that does not exist in this case? Or, perhaps there is no such condition, but in any event, the borrower should at least be exempt from liability for that half of the item owned by the partner who is working for him.


砖讜转驻讬谉 砖砖讗诇讜 讜谞砖讗诇 诇讗讞讚 诪讛谉 诪讛讜 讻讜诇讜 砖讜讗诇 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讘讛讛讬讗 驻诇讙讗 讚砖讬讬诇讬 诪讬讛转 诪讬驻讟专


Another question: In the case of partners who borrowed an item and its owner鈥檚 services were also borrowed by one of them, what is the halakha? For the exemption to apply, do we require that the owner be working for all the borrowers, and that does not exist in this case? Or, perhaps there is no such condition, but in any event, the partner who borrowed only the item should at least be exempt from liability for the half of the animal that the partner, whom the owner worked for, had borrowed.


砖讗诇 诪讛讗砖讛 讜谞砖讗诇 讘注诇讛 讗砖讛 砖砖讗诇讛 讜谞砖讗诇 诇讘注诇 诪讛讜 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讗讜 诇讗


Another question: If one borrowed an item from a woman, and the services of her husband were also borrowed by him, or where a woman borrowed an item and its owner鈥檚 services were also borrowed by her husband, what is the halakha? A husband has the right to use his wife鈥檚 property. These questions are dependent on whether ownership of the right to use an item and the profits it engenders is tantamount to ownership of the item itself or not.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 讜讛砖讗诇 诇讬 注诐 驻专转讬 诪讛讜 讘注诇讬讜 诪诪砖 讘注讬谞讗 讜诇讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讜讗讬讻讗


Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In the case of one who says to his agent: Go and lend your services to somebody on my behalf together with lending my cow to that person, what is the halakha? For the exemption to apply, do I require that the cow鈥檚 actual owner work for the borrower, and in this case that does not exist? Or perhaps, since the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself, it is sufficient if his agent works for the borrower, and accordingly, the necessary conditions exist.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讜讬讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讘注诇 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 砖诇讬讞 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讜专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛


Rav A岣, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: This question concerning a husband is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish. And the question concerning an agent is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshiya.


讘注诇 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗讬转诪专 讛诪讜讻专 砖讚讛讜 诇讞讘讬专讜 诇驻讬专讜转 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讜诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜拽讜专讗 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讜诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜讗讬谞讜 拽讜专讗


The Gemara clarifies: The question concerning a husband is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish pertaining to the requirement to bring the first fruits of one鈥檚 field to the Temple and recite the accompanying declaration (see Deuteronomy, chapter 26): As it was stated: With regard to one who sells his field to another, not outright but for its produce, Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The buyer brings the first fruits and recites the declaration, whereas Reish Lakish says: The buyer brings the first fruits but does not recite the declaration.


专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讜诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜拽讜专讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讜诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜讗讬谞讜 拽讜专讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬


The Gemara explains: They disagree about whether it is justifiable for the buyer to recite the declaration, since in that declaration he refers to the land as: 鈥淭he land which You, the Lord, have given me鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:10), i.e., he states that the land belongs to him. Rabbi Yo岣nan says that the buyer brings the first fruits and recites the declaration, because he holds that ownership of the right to use land and its produce is tantamount to ownership of the land itself. Accordingly, the buyer is considered to be the owner of the land and he may consequently recite the declaration. And Reish Lakish says that the buyer brings the first fruits but does not recite the declaration, because he holds that ownership of the right to use land and its produce is not tantamount to ownership of the land itself. Accordingly, the buyer is not considered to be the owner of the land and is consequently unable to recite the declaration.


砖诇讬讞 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讜专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖转讛讗 讗砖转讬 谞讜讚专转 诪讻讗谉 注讚 砖讗讘讗 诪诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讛驻专 诇讛 讜讛驻讬专 诇讛 讬讻讜诇 讬讛讜 诪讜驻专讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讗讜诪专 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜


The Gemara clarifies the second disagreement: The question concerning an agent is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshiya, as it is taught in a baraita: If there is one who says to a steward appointed to take care of his household: All vows that my wife will vow from now until I come back from such and such a place, you should nullify them for her in my stead, and the steward annulled them for her, one might have thought that they would be nullified. To dispel this notion, the verse states with regard to a vow taken by a wife: 鈥淗er husband sustains it and her husband nullifies it鈥 (Numbers 30:14), which indicates that only her husband is able to do so, and no one else; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says: We have found everywhere in halakha that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself. Since the steward was the agent of the husband, his nullification of the vows is effective.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 注讬诇讬砖 诇专讘讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇注讘讚讜 爪讗 讜讛砖讗诇 注诐 驻专转讬 诪讛讜 转讬讘注讬 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 转讬讘注讬 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讗讬谞讜 讻诪讜转讜


Another question: Rav Ilish said to Rava: In the case of one who says to his Canaanite slave: Go and lend your services to another together with lending my cow to that person, what is the halakha? Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself, and let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is not like that of himself.


转讬讘注讬 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 砖诇讬讞 讚讘专 诪爪讜讛 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 注讘讚 讚诇讗讜 讘专 诪爪讜讛 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 砖诇讬讞 讗讘诇 注讘讚 讬讚 注讘讚 讻讬讚 专讘讜 讚诪讬讗


The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself, as follows: Does this matter apply only to an agent, who is obligated in mitzvot, just like the one who appointed him; but for a slave, who is not fully obligated in mitzvot, the principle does not apply? Or perhaps, even according to the one who says that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is not like that of himself, maybe that matter applies to an agent, who is a free, independent person. But in the case of a slave, since he has no independence from his master, as the possession of a slave is like the possession of his master, i.e., anything that the slave acquires is automatically acquired by his master, perhaps if the slave鈥檚 services are borrowed it is the same as if the master himself had been borrowed.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪住转讘专讗 讬讚 注讘讚 讻讬讚 专讘讜 讚诪讬讗


Rava said to Rav Ilish: It stands to reason that since the possession of a slave is like the possession of his master, then one who borrows both another鈥檚 item and the services of his slave is exempt from liability.


讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讘注诇 讘谞讻住讬 讗砖转讜


Rami bar 岣ma raises a dilemma: What level of liability does a husband bear with regard to his wife鈥檚 usufruct property? This is property belonging to the wife that the husband has the right to use and to enjoy its profits while they are married, but that is returned to her upon termination of the marriage.


砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讗讜 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬


Is he like a borrower or is he like a renter?


讗诪专 专讘讗 诇驻讜诐 讞讜专驻讗 砖讘砖转讗 诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗讬 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 砖讗诇讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 讛讬讗 讗讬 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬 砖讻讬专讜转 讘讘注诇讬诐 讛讬讗


Rava said of Rami bar 岣ma: Commensurate to the sharpness of his mind is the extent of his error, as whichever way you look at it, he should be exempt: If he is like a borrower, this is a case of borrowing an item together with the services of the owner, as his wife is obligated to perform household services for him. Alternatively, if he is like a renter, this is a case of renting an item together with the services of the owner, for the same reason. Either way, he should be exempt.


讗诇讗 讻讬 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讚讗讙专 诪讬谞讛 驻专讛 讜讛讚专 谞住讘讛 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讗讜 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬


The Gemara reinterprets Rami bar 岣ma鈥檚 question: Rather, when Rami bar 岣ma raised the dilemma, it was with regard to a case in which one first rented a cow from a woman and subsequently married her. In that case, she was not working for him at the time he began renting the cow, and so the exemption of borrowing an item together with its owner does not apply. Rami bar 岣ma鈥檚 question was: What is the halakha once they get married? This is dependent on whether, from that point, he is like a borrower or he is like a renter.


砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讜讗转讬讗 砖讗诇讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 诪驻拽注讗 砖讻讬专讜转 砖诇讗 讘讘注诇讬诐 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬 讜砖讻讬专讜转 讻讚拽讬讬诪讗 拽讬讬诪讗


The Gemara elaborates: Since the husband initially rented the cow, if he is now like a borrower, then his status has changed, and so the new borrowing of the cow done together with borrowing the services of its owner comes and displaces the initial renting that was done without borrowing the services of the owner. Accordingly, the exemption will apply. Or perhaps even once he is married he is still like a renter, and since his status has not changed, the renting stands as it was, i.e., his current renting of the cow is considered a continuation of the initial renting that began before his wife was obligated to work for him. Consequently, the exemption would not apply.


讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚讗讬 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讚讗转讬 砖讗诇讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 诪驻拽注讗 砖讻讬专讜转 砖诇讗 讘讘注诇讬诐 讗讬 砖讜讻专 谞诪讬 讛讜讬 转讬转讬 砖讻讬专讜转 讘讘注诇讬诐 转讬驻讜拽 砖讻讬专讜转 砖诇讗 讘讘注诇讬诐


The Gemara questions this logic: But what is different about these possibilities, that you say that only if he is a borrower is it so that the new borrowing of the cow done together with borrowing the services of the owner comes and displaces the initial renting that was done without borrowing the services of the owner? Say the same also if he is now like a renter, and let the new renting of the cow done together with borrowing the services of the owner come and displace the initial renting that was done without borrowing the services of the owner.


讗诇讗 讻讬 拽讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗讙专讗 讗讬讛讬 驻专讛 诪注诇诪讗 讜讛讚专 谞住讘讛


The Gemara reinterprets his question: Rather, when Rami bar 岣ma raised the dilemma, it was with regard to a case where a woman rented a cow from someone in the world at large, and subsequently another man married her.


讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 砖讜讗诇 诪砖诇诐 诇砖讜讻专 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讚讜讚讗讬 砖讗讬诇讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 讛讬讗


The Gemara explains that the relevance of this dilemma is dependent upon a dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei concerning a case in which one rents a cow, and then another person borrows it from the renter, and then a mishap occurs to it (see 35a). And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the borrower pays the renter, do not raise the dilemma, as it is certainly a case of borrowing an item and borrowing or hiring its owner with it. Evidently, the Rabbis hold that for the duration of the rental period the renter is considered to be the owner of the cow. Accordingly, in this case, the woman is considered to be the owner of the cow. Therefore, when the man marries her, he is considered to be borrowing the cow from her at the same time at which she becomes obligated to work for him.


讻讬 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 转讞讝讬专 驻专讛 诇讘注诇讬诐 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 诪讗讬 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讗讜 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬


When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the value of the cow must be returned to its original owner. Rabbi Yosei holds that the renter is not considered to be the owner of the cow, and therefore this is not a case of borrowing an item together with borrowing or renting the services of its owner. Therefore, Rami bar 岣ma asks what level of liability the husband bears; is he like a borrower or is he like a renter?


讗诪专 专讘讗 讘注诇 诇讗 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讜诇讗 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬 讗诇讗 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讬 诪讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘讗讜砖讗 讛转拽讬谞讜 讛讗砖讛 砖诪讻专讛 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讞讬讬 讘注诇讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转


Rava said: A husband is not like a borrower nor is he like a renter. Rather, he is considered to be like a buyer of his wife鈥檚 property, as can be inferred from the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: In Usha the Sages instituted: In the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property during her husband鈥檚 lifetime and then died, the husband can appropriate the property from the buyers, provided he compensates them for their loss of the purchase. Evidently, the wife鈥檚 property is considered to be owned by the husband.


讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讘注诇 讘谞讻住讬 讗砖转讜 诪讬 诪注诇


Rami bar 岣ma raises a dilemma: When a husband acquires the rights to his wife鈥檚 usufruct property that includes consecrated property, acquiring property from the Temple in this way is considered misuse of consecrated property. In such a case, who is liable for having misused consecrated property?


讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讗谉 诇讬诪注讜诇 诇讬诪注讜诇 讘注诇 讚讛讬转专讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽谞讬 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽谞讬


Rava said: Who could be considered to have misused consecrated property? Should the husband be considered to have misused consecrated property? Certainly not, as while it is satisfactory for him to acquire non-sacred items of his wife鈥檚 property, which are permitted for him to use, it is not satisfactory for him to acquire consecrated property, which it is prohibited for him to use. Since he does not wish to acquire these items, he cannot be held liable for removing them from the possession of the Temple.


转讬诪注讜诇 讗讬讛讬 讚讛讬转专讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讛 讚诇讬拽谞讬


Should she be considered to have misused consecrated property? Certainly not, as also with regard to non-sacred items, which are permitted for use, it is not satisfactory to her that her husband acquire them. Nevertheless, by virtue of the rabbinic ordinance, he does. Evidently, her husband鈥檚 acquisition is not affected by her wishes, and therefore she cannot be held liable for it.


谞讬诪注诇讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讻讬 注讘讚讜 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗 讜讗诪专讜 讘注诇 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讬 诇讛讬转专讗 诇讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 注讘讬讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗


Should the court be considered to have misused consecrated property, as it is their ordinance that granted the husband ownership? Certainly not, because when the Sages instituted the ordinance, and they said that a husband is considered to be like a buyer of his wife鈥檚 property, that was only with regard to non-sacred items, which are permitted for him to use. But with regard to consecrated property, which it is prohibited for him to use, the Sages did not institute the ordinance.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讘注诇 诪注诇 诇讻砖讬讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗诪讜爪讬讗 诪注讜转 讛拽讚砖 诇讞讜诇讬谉


Rather, Rava said: The husband is liable for having misused consecrated property only when he actually takes and spends the money for himself, just as it is in the case of one who mistakenly spends consecrated coins for a non-sacred purpose.


讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讻讞砖 讘砖专 诪讞诪转 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讗讬


A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the flesh of a borrowed animal was weakened due to the labor it performed for the borrower, what is the halakha? Is the borrower liable to compensate the owner of the animal?


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪专讘谞谉 讜专讘 讞诇拽讬讛 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讜讬讗 砖诪讬讛 诪讻诇诇 讚讻讬 诪转讛 诪讞诪转 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讞讬讬讘 谞讬诪讗 诇讗讜 诇讗讜拽诪讗 讘讻讬诇转讗 砖讗讬诇转讛


One of the Sages, and Rav 岣lkiya, son of Rav Avya, is his name, said to the Sage who raised the dilemma: By inference from your question, it seems that when a borrowed animal died due to ordinary labor that it performed, the borrower is liable. Why should that be? Let the borrower say: It was understood by you that I did not borrow it just to stow it in a canopy but to use it; therefore, if it died while I was using it, I should not be liable.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讻讞砖 讘砖专 诪讞诪转 诪诇讗讻讛 讚驻讟讜专 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪转讛 诪讞诪转 诪诇讗讻讛 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗讜 诇讗讜拽诪讗 讘讻讬诇转讗 砖讗讬诇转讛


Rather, Rava said: It is not necessary to say that if its flesh was weakened due to ordinary labor that the borrower is exempt from liability. Rather, even if the animal died due to ordinary labor, he is also exempt, as the borrower can say to the owner: It is self-understood that I did not borrow it just to stow it in a canopy, but rather in order to use it.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚砖讗讬诇 谞专讙讗 诪讞讘专讬讛 讗讬转讘专 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讬诇 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚诇讗讜 砖谞讬转 讘讬讛 讜讗讬驻讟专


The Gemara relates: A certain man borrowed an ax from another and it broke. The borrower came before Rava for judgment, who said to him: Go, bring witnesses that you did not deviate from its regular use, and you will be exempt from liability, as this is comparable to a case of a borrowed animal that died due to ordinary labor.


讜讗讬 诇讬讻讗 住讛讚讬 诪讗讬 转讗 砖诪注 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚砖讗讬诇 谞专讙讗 诪讞讘专讬讛 讜讗讬转讘专 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讬诇 砖诇讬诐 诇讬讛 谞专讙讗 诪注诇讬讗


The Gemara asks: And if there are no witnesses, what is the halakha? The Gemara provides a precedent: Come and hear a similar case: There was an incident in which a certain man borrowed an ax from another and it broke. The borrower came before Rav for judgment, who said to him: Go and pay him the entire value of a proper ax.


讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜专讘 讗住讬 诇专讘


Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav:


  • Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v鈥橸ehuda Tzvi.

    专讘讜转 讘谞讜转 注砖讜 讞讬诇 讜讗转 注诇讬转 注诇志讻诇谞讛

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Bava Metzia 96

专讘讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讜诪转专抓 诇拽专讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讚转谞讬讗 讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诐 诪砖诪注 讚讗讬转讬讛 讘转专讜讬讬讛讜 讜诪砖诪注 谞诪讬 讚讻讬 讗讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜诇讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 驻讟讜专


By contrast, Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, and he explains the verses in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, thereby arriving at the conclusion of the baraita, as it is taught in a baraita: 鈥淚f its owner is with him, he does not pay鈥 teaches about the case in which the owner was working for the borrower at both points in time, and it also teaches about the case in which he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one; in both cases the borrower is exempt.


讜讻转讬讘 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 诪砖诪注 讚诇讬转讬讛 讘转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪砖诪注 谞诪讬 讚讻讬 讗讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜诇讬转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讞讬讬讘


The Gemara raises an objection: But it is also written: 鈥淚f its owner is not with him, he shall pay.鈥 The verse teaches about the case in which the owner was not working for the borrower at either point in time, and it also teaches about the case in which he was working for him at one of those times but not at the other one; in both cases the borrower is liable.


诇讜诪专 诇讱 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗诇讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 讛讬讛 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注诪讜 讘砖注转 砖讗诇讛


To reconcile the verses, one must say that the phrase 鈥渋f its owner is with him鈥 serves to tell you that if the owner was with the borrower, i.e., working for him, at the time of borrowing, then he does not need to be with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he was with him at the time when the animal is injured or dies, he does need to have been with him at the time of borrowing for the exemption to apply.


讗讬驻讜讱 讗谞讗 诪住转讘专讗 砖讗诇讛 注讚讬驻讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诇专砖讜转讬讛


The Gemara raises a difficulty: I could reverse the conclusion and say that the borrower鈥檚 exemption from liability is dependent upon the time when the animal was injured or died. The Gemara explains: It is reasonable that the exemption from liability should be dependent on the time of the borrowing because the borrowing is of greater significance, as with it the borrower brings the animal into his domain.


讗讚专讘讛 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 注讚讬驻讗 砖讻谉 讞讬讬讘 讘讗讜谞住讬谉


The Gemara retorts: On the contrary, the time when the animal is injured or dies is of greater significance, because that point marks when the borrower is actually liable to pay for any accidents that occurred.


讗讬 诇讗 砖讗诇讛 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 讜讗讬 诇讗讜 砖讘讜专讛 讜诪转讛 砖讗诇讛 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 砖讗诇讛 注讚讬驻讗 砖讻谉 讞讬讬讘 讘诪讝讜谞讜转讬讛


The Gemara responds: No, the borrowing is more significant. Were it not for the initial borrowing, what liability could be caused by the fact that the animal is injured or dies? The Gemara argues: But by the same logic, were it not for the fact that the animal is injured or dies, what liability could be caused by the act of borrowing? The Gemara concludes: Even so, the borrowing is of greater significance, as with it the borrower is obligated to provide the animal鈥檚 sustenance as long as it is entrusted with him.


专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讻讬 讬砖讗诇 讗讬砖 诪注诐 专注讛讜 讜诇讗 专注讛讜 注诪讜 砖诇诐 讬砖诇诐 讛讗 专注讛讜 注诪讜 驻讟讜专


Rav Ashi said that the halakha that the borrower鈥檚 exemption from liability is dependent upon the time of the borrowing can be derived from the verse itself: The verse states: 鈥淎nd when a man borrows from another鈥he shall pay鈥 (Exodus 22:13). The precise formulation of the verse indicates that he borrowed an item from another, but that other person was not with him, i.e., working for him, at the time. It is only in such a case that that verse concludes: 鈥淗e shall pay.鈥 By inference, when the other person is working with him, the borrower is exempt. Accordingly, it is clear that the critical moment is the time of the borrowing.


讗讬 讛讻讬 讘注诇讬讜 讗讬谉 注诪讜 讜讗诐 讘注诇讬讜 注诪讜 诇诪讛 诇讬 讗讬 诇讗讜 讛谞讱 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讗讬 讗讜专讞讬讛 讚拽专讗 讛讜讗


The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need the continuation of that verse: 鈥淚ts owner is not with him,鈥 and the next verse: 鈥淚f its owner is with him鈥? According to Rav Ashi, the circumstances of the borrower鈥檚 liability and exemption can be derived from the beginning of the first verse. The Gemara explains: If it were not for these additional clauses, I would say that this phrase 鈥渇rom another鈥 is simply the usual manner of the verse, and is not to be expounded to teach an exemption. Since the continuation of the verse and the next verse teach the actual exemption from liability, and the apparent contradiction between them raises the question of when the critical moment is, it is apparent that the beginning of the verse was written in order to be expounded, as Rav Ashi did.


讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 砖讗诇讛 诇专讘注讛 诪讛讜 讻讚砖讬讬诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讛讻讬 诇讗 砖讬讬诇讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 诪砖讜诐 讛谞讗讛 讜讛讗讬 谞诪讬 讛讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讛谞讗讛


Rami bar 岣ma raises a dilemma: If one borrowed an animal in order to engage in bestiality with it, a severe transgression (see Leviticus 18:23), what is the halakha; is the borrower liable for mishaps? The crux of the dilemma is: In order for him to be liable, do we require that the borrowing be for a purpose similar to that for which people typically borrow animals, and since people do not typically borrow animals for this purpose, the borrower is exempt? Or perhaps, what is the reason that a borrower is liable? It is due to the benefit he derives from the animal, and as this borrower, too, has benefit from the animal, he is liable for mishaps.


砖讗诇讛 诇讬专讗讜转 讘讛 诪讛讜 诪诪讜谞讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讛讗讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪诪讜谞讗 讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讛谞讗讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讬讻讗


A similar question: If one borrowed an item, not to use it but to be seen with it, so that people will assume that he is wealthy, what is the halakha? In order for him to be liable, do we require that he borrow an item of monetary worth, and that exists in this case? Or, perhaps we require that he borrow an item of monetary worth from which he also derives tangible benefit, and that does not exist in this case.


砖讗诇讛 诇注砖讜转 讘讛 驻讞讜转 诪驻专讜讟讛 诪讛讜 诪诪讜谞讗 讘注讬谞谉 讜讗讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻诇 驻讞讜转 诪驻专讜讟讛 诇讗 讻诇讜诐 讛讬讗


Another question: If one borrowed an item to perform work with it that is worth less than the value of one peruta, what is the halakha? Do we require only that he borrow an item of monetary worth, and that exists in this case? Or, perhaps any benefit derived that is worth less than one peruta is nothing, i.e., it is legally considered to be of no monetary worth, and he is therefore exempt.


砖讗诇 砖转讬 驻专讜转 诇注砖讜转 讘讛谉 驻专讜讟讛 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讝讬诇 讘转专 砖讜讗诇 讜诪砖讗讬诇 讜讗讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讝讬诇 讘转专 驻专讜转 讜讻诇 讞讚讗 讜讞讚讗 诇讬讻讗 诪诪讜谞讗


Another question: If one borrowed two cows to perform work with them that will be worth the value of one peruta in total, what is the halakha? When appraising the value of the benefit derived, to see if it has monetary worth of one peruta, do we say: Follow the borrower and lender, i.e., appraise how much benefit the borrower received from the lender, and in this case there is benefit of the value of one peruta. Or, perhaps we follow the cows, and in this case, each one of the cows does not provide the borrower with monetary worth of one peruta.


砖讗诇 诪砖讜转驻讬谉 讜谞砖讗诇 诇讜 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 诪讛讜 讻讜诇讜 讘注诇讬讜 讘注讬谞谉 讜讛讗 诇讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪讛讛讜讗 驻诇讙讗 讚讬讚讬讛 诪讬讛讗 诪讬驻讟专


Another question: If one borrowed an item from two partners, and the services of one of those partners were also borrowed by him, what is the halakha? Does the exemption of borrowing an item together with its owner apply in this case? For the exemption to apply, do we require all of the item鈥檚 owners to be working for the borrower, and that does not exist in this case? Or, perhaps there is no such condition, but in any event, the borrower should at least be exempt from liability for that half of the item owned by the partner who is working for him.


砖讜转驻讬谉 砖砖讗诇讜 讜谞砖讗诇 诇讗讞讚 诪讛谉 诪讛讜 讻讜诇讜 砖讜讗诇 讘注讬谞谉 讜诇讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讘讛讛讬讗 驻诇讙讗 讚砖讬讬诇讬 诪讬讛转 诪讬驻讟专


Another question: In the case of partners who borrowed an item and its owner鈥檚 services were also borrowed by one of them, what is the halakha? For the exemption to apply, do we require that the owner be working for all the borrowers, and that does not exist in this case? Or, perhaps there is no such condition, but in any event, the partner who borrowed only the item should at least be exempt from liability for the half of the animal that the partner, whom the owner worked for, had borrowed.


砖讗诇 诪讛讗砖讛 讜谞砖讗诇 讘注诇讛 讗砖讛 砖砖讗诇讛 讜谞砖讗诇 诇讘注诇 诪讛讜 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讗讜 诇讗


Another question: If one borrowed an item from a woman, and the services of her husband were also borrowed by him, or where a woman borrowed an item and its owner鈥檚 services were also borrowed by her husband, what is the halakha? A husband has the right to use his wife鈥檚 property. These questions are dependent on whether ownership of the right to use an item and the profits it engenders is tantamount to ownership of the item itself or not.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讛讗讜诪专 诇砖诇讜讞讜 爪讗 讜讛砖讗诇 诇讬 注诐 驻专转讬 诪讛讜 讘注诇讬讜 诪诪砖 讘注讬谞讗 讜诇讬讻讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讜讗讬讻讗


Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In the case of one who says to his agent: Go and lend your services to somebody on my behalf together with lending my cow to that person, what is the halakha? For the exemption to apply, do I require that the cow鈥檚 actual owner work for the borrower, and in this case that does not exist? Or perhaps, since the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself, it is sufficient if his agent works for the borrower, and accordingly, the necessary conditions exist.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讜讬讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讘注诇 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 砖诇讬讞 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讜专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛


Rav A岣, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: This question concerning a husband is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish. And the question concerning an agent is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshiya.


讘注诇 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗讬转诪专 讛诪讜讻专 砖讚讛讜 诇讞讘讬专讜 诇驻讬专讜转 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讜诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜拽讜专讗 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讜诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜讗讬谞讜 拽讜专讗


The Gemara clarifies: The question concerning a husband is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yo岣nan and Reish Lakish pertaining to the requirement to bring the first fruits of one鈥檚 field to the Temple and recite the accompanying declaration (see Deuteronomy, chapter 26): As it was stated: With regard to one who sells his field to another, not outright but for its produce, Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The buyer brings the first fruits and recites the declaration, whereas Reish Lakish says: The buyer brings the first fruits but does not recite the declaration.


专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讜诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜拽讜专讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗讜诪专 诪讘讬讗 讜讗讬谞讜 拽讜专讗 拽谞讬谉 驻讬专讜转 诇讗讜 讻拽谞讬谉 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬


The Gemara explains: They disagree about whether it is justifiable for the buyer to recite the declaration, since in that declaration he refers to the land as: 鈥淭he land which You, the Lord, have given me鈥 (Deuteronomy 26:10), i.e., he states that the land belongs to him. Rabbi Yo岣nan says that the buyer brings the first fruits and recites the declaration, because he holds that ownership of the right to use land and its produce is tantamount to ownership of the land itself. Accordingly, the buyer is considered to be the owner of the land and he may consequently recite the declaration. And Reish Lakish says that the buyer brings the first fruits but does not recite the declaration, because he holds that ownership of the right to use land and its produce is not tantamount to ownership of the land itself. Accordingly, the buyer is not considered to be the owner of the land and is consequently unable to recite the declaration.


砖诇讬讞 驻诇讜讙转讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讜专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖转讛讗 讗砖转讬 谞讜讚专转 诪讻讗谉 注讚 砖讗讘讗 诪诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讛驻专 诇讛 讜讛驻讬专 诇讛 讬讻讜诇 讬讛讜 诪讜驻专讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 讗讜诪专 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜


The Gemara clarifies the second disagreement: The question concerning an agent is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshiya, as it is taught in a baraita: If there is one who says to a steward appointed to take care of his household: All vows that my wife will vow from now until I come back from such and such a place, you should nullify them for her in my stead, and the steward annulled them for her, one might have thought that they would be nullified. To dispel this notion, the verse states with regard to a vow taken by a wife: 鈥淗er husband sustains it and her husband nullifies it鈥 (Numbers 30:14), which indicates that only her husband is able to do so, and no one else; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says: We have found everywhere in halakha that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself. Since the steward was the agent of the husband, his nullification of the vows is effective.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 注讬诇讬砖 诇专讘讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇注讘讚讜 爪讗 讜讛砖讗诇 注诐 驻专转讬 诪讛讜 转讬讘注讬 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 转讬讘注讬 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讗讬谞讜 讻诪讜转讜


Another question: Rav Ilish said to Rava: In the case of one who says to his Canaanite slave: Go and lend your services to another together with lending my cow to that person, what is the halakha? Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself, and let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is not like that of himself.


转讬讘注讬 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 砖诇讬讞 讚讘专 诪爪讜讛 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 注讘讚 讚诇讗讜 讘专 诪爪讜讛 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 砖诇讬讞 讗讘诇 注讘讚 讬讚 注讘讚 讻讬讚 专讘讜 讚诪讬讗


The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself, as follows: Does this matter apply only to an agent, who is obligated in mitzvot, just like the one who appointed him; but for a slave, who is not fully obligated in mitzvot, the principle does not apply? Or perhaps, even according to the one who says that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is not like that of himself, maybe that matter applies to an agent, who is a free, independent person. But in the case of a slave, since he has no independence from his master, as the possession of a slave is like the possession of his master, i.e., anything that the slave acquires is automatically acquired by his master, perhaps if the slave鈥檚 services are borrowed it is the same as if the master himself had been borrowed.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪住转讘专讗 讬讚 注讘讚 讻讬讚 专讘讜 讚诪讬讗


Rava said to Rav Ilish: It stands to reason that since the possession of a slave is like the possession of his master, then one who borrows both another鈥檚 item and the services of his slave is exempt from liability.


讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讘注诇 讘谞讻住讬 讗砖转讜


Rami bar 岣ma raises a dilemma: What level of liability does a husband bear with regard to his wife鈥檚 usufruct property? This is property belonging to the wife that the husband has the right to use and to enjoy its profits while they are married, but that is returned to her upon termination of the marriage.


砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讗讜 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬


Is he like a borrower or is he like a renter?


讗诪专 专讘讗 诇驻讜诐 讞讜专驻讗 砖讘砖转讗 诪讛 谞驻砖讱 讗讬 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 砖讗诇讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 讛讬讗 讗讬 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬 砖讻讬专讜转 讘讘注诇讬诐 讛讬讗


Rava said of Rami bar 岣ma: Commensurate to the sharpness of his mind is the extent of his error, as whichever way you look at it, he should be exempt: If he is like a borrower, this is a case of borrowing an item together with the services of the owner, as his wife is obligated to perform household services for him. Alternatively, if he is like a renter, this is a case of renting an item together with the services of the owner, for the same reason. Either way, he should be exempt.


讗诇讗 讻讬 拽诪讬讘注讬讗 诇讬讛 诇专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讚讗讙专 诪讬谞讛 驻专讛 讜讛讚专 谞住讘讛 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讗讜 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬


The Gemara reinterprets Rami bar 岣ma鈥檚 question: Rather, when Rami bar 岣ma raised the dilemma, it was with regard to a case in which one first rented a cow from a woman and subsequently married her. In that case, she was not working for him at the time he began renting the cow, and so the exemption of borrowing an item together with its owner does not apply. Rami bar 岣ma鈥檚 question was: What is the halakha once they get married? This is dependent on whether, from that point, he is like a borrower or he is like a renter.


砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讜讗转讬讗 砖讗诇讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 诪驻拽注讗 砖讻讬专讜转 砖诇讗 讘讘注诇讬诐 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬 讜砖讻讬专讜转 讻讚拽讬讬诪讗 拽讬讬诪讗


The Gemara elaborates: Since the husband initially rented the cow, if he is now like a borrower, then his status has changed, and so the new borrowing of the cow done together with borrowing the services of its owner comes and displaces the initial renting that was done without borrowing the services of the owner. Accordingly, the exemption will apply. Or perhaps even once he is married he is still like a renter, and since his status has not changed, the renting stands as it was, i.e., his current renting of the cow is considered a continuation of the initial renting that began before his wife was obligated to work for him. Consequently, the exemption would not apply.


讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚讗讬 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讚讗转讬 砖讗诇讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 诪驻拽注讗 砖讻讬专讜转 砖诇讗 讘讘注诇讬诐 讗讬 砖讜讻专 谞诪讬 讛讜讬 转讬转讬 砖讻讬专讜转 讘讘注诇讬诐 转讬驻讜拽 砖讻讬专讜转 砖诇讗 讘讘注诇讬诐


The Gemara questions this logic: But what is different about these possibilities, that you say that only if he is a borrower is it so that the new borrowing of the cow done together with borrowing the services of the owner comes and displaces the initial renting that was done without borrowing the services of the owner? Say the same also if he is now like a renter, and let the new renting of the cow done together with borrowing the services of the owner come and displace the initial renting that was done without borrowing the services of the owner.


讗诇讗 讻讬 拽讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讻讙讜谉 讚讗讙专讗 讗讬讛讬 驻专讛 诪注诇诪讗 讜讛讚专 谞住讘讛


The Gemara reinterprets his question: Rather, when Rami bar 岣ma raised the dilemma, it was with regard to a case where a woman rented a cow from someone in the world at large, and subsequently another man married her.


讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 砖讜讗诇 诪砖诇诐 诇砖讜讻专 诇讗 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讚讜讚讗讬 砖讗讬诇讛 讘讘注诇讬诐 讛讬讗


The Gemara explains that the relevance of this dilemma is dependent upon a dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei concerning a case in which one rents a cow, and then another person borrows it from the renter, and then a mishap occurs to it (see 35a). And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the borrower pays the renter, do not raise the dilemma, as it is certainly a case of borrowing an item and borrowing or hiring its owner with it. Evidently, the Rabbis hold that for the duration of the rental period the renter is considered to be the owner of the cow. Accordingly, in this case, the woman is considered to be the owner of the cow. Therefore, when the man marries her, he is considered to be borrowing the cow from her at the same time at which she becomes obligated to work for him.


讻讬 转讬讘注讬 诇讱 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 转讞讝讬专 驻专讛 诇讘注诇讬诐 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 诪讗讬 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讗讜 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬


When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the value of the cow must be returned to its original owner. Rabbi Yosei holds that the renter is not considered to be the owner of the cow, and therefore this is not a case of borrowing an item together with borrowing or renting the services of its owner. Therefore, Rami bar 岣ma asks what level of liability the husband bears; is he like a borrower or is he like a renter?


讗诪专 专讘讗 讘注诇 诇讗 砖讜讗诇 讛讜讬 讜诇讗 砖讜讻专 讛讜讬 讗诇讗 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讬 诪讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘讗讜砖讗 讛转拽讬谞讜 讛讗砖讛 砖诪讻专讛 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讞讬讬 讘注诇讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转


Rava said: A husband is not like a borrower nor is he like a renter. Rather, he is considered to be like a buyer of his wife鈥檚 property, as can be inferred from the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, as Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: In Usha the Sages instituted: In the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property during her husband鈥檚 lifetime and then died, the husband can appropriate the property from the buyers, provided he compensates them for their loss of the purchase. Evidently, the wife鈥檚 property is considered to be owned by the husband.


讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讘注诇 讘谞讻住讬 讗砖转讜 诪讬 诪注诇


Rami bar 岣ma raises a dilemma: When a husband acquires the rights to his wife鈥檚 usufruct property that includes consecrated property, acquiring property from the Temple in this way is considered misuse of consecrated property. In such a case, who is liable for having misused consecrated property?


讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讗谉 诇讬诪注讜诇 诇讬诪注讜诇 讘注诇 讚讛讬转专讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽谞讬 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讚诇讬拽谞讬


Rava said: Who could be considered to have misused consecrated property? Should the husband be considered to have misused consecrated property? Certainly not, as while it is satisfactory for him to acquire non-sacred items of his wife鈥檚 property, which are permitted for him to use, it is not satisfactory for him to acquire consecrated property, which it is prohibited for him to use. Since he does not wish to acquire these items, he cannot be held liable for removing them from the possession of the Temple.


转讬诪注讜诇 讗讬讛讬 讚讛讬转专讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讛 讚诇讬拽谞讬


Should she be considered to have misused consecrated property? Certainly not, as also with regard to non-sacred items, which are permitted for use, it is not satisfactory to her that her husband acquire them. Nevertheless, by virtue of the rabbinic ordinance, he does. Evidently, her husband鈥檚 acquisition is not affected by her wishes, and therefore she cannot be held liable for it.


谞讬诪注诇讜 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讻讬 注讘讚讜 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗 讜讗诪专讜 讘注诇 诇讜拽讞 讛讜讬 诇讛讬转专讗 诇讗讬住讜专讗 诇讗 注讘讬讚 专讘谞谉 转拽谞转讗


Should the court be considered to have misused consecrated property, as it is their ordinance that granted the husband ownership? Certainly not, because when the Sages instituted the ordinance, and they said that a husband is considered to be like a buyer of his wife鈥檚 property, that was only with regard to non-sacred items, which are permitted for him to use. But with regard to consecrated property, which it is prohibited for him to use, the Sages did not institute the ordinance.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讘注诇 诪注诇 诇讻砖讬讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗诪讜爪讬讗 诪注讜转 讛拽讚砖 诇讞讜诇讬谉


Rather, Rava said: The husband is liable for having misused consecrated property only when he actually takes and spends the money for himself, just as it is in the case of one who mistakenly spends consecrated coins for a non-sacred purpose.


讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讻讞砖 讘砖专 诪讞诪转 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讗讬


A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the flesh of a borrowed animal was weakened due to the labor it performed for the borrower, what is the halakha? Is the borrower liable to compensate the owner of the animal?


讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪专讘谞谉 讜专讘 讞诇拽讬讛 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讜讬讗 砖诪讬讛 诪讻诇诇 讚讻讬 诪转讛 诪讞诪转 诪诇讗讻讛 诪讞讬讬讘 谞讬诪讗 诇讗讜 诇讗讜拽诪讗 讘讻讬诇转讗 砖讗讬诇转讛


One of the Sages, and Rav 岣lkiya, son of Rav Avya, is his name, said to the Sage who raised the dilemma: By inference from your question, it seems that when a borrowed animal died due to ordinary labor that it performed, the borrower is liable. Why should that be? Let the borrower say: It was understood by you that I did not borrow it just to stow it in a canopy but to use it; therefore, if it died while I was using it, I should not be liable.


讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 讻讞砖 讘砖专 诪讞诪转 诪诇讗讻讛 讚驻讟讜专 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 诪转讛 诪讞诪转 诪诇讗讻讛 谞诪讬 驻讟讜专 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讗讜 诇讗讜拽诪讗 讘讻讬诇转讗 砖讗讬诇转讛


Rather, Rava said: It is not necessary to say that if its flesh was weakened due to ordinary labor that the borrower is exempt from liability. Rather, even if the animal died due to ordinary labor, he is also exempt, as the borrower can say to the owner: It is self-understood that I did not borrow it just to stow it in a canopy, but rather in order to use it.


讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚砖讗讬诇 谞专讙讗 诪讞讘专讬讛 讗讬转讘专 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讬诇 讗讬讬转讬 住讛讚讬 讚诇讗讜 砖谞讬转 讘讬讛 讜讗讬驻讟专


The Gemara relates: A certain man borrowed an ax from another and it broke. The borrower came before Rava for judgment, who said to him: Go, bring witnesses that you did not deviate from its regular use, and you will be exempt from liability, as this is comparable to a case of a borrowed animal that died due to ordinary labor.


讜讗讬 诇讬讻讗 住讛讚讬 诪讗讬 转讗 砖诪注 讚讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚砖讗讬诇 谞专讙讗 诪讞讘专讬讛 讜讗讬转讘专 讗转讗 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讝讬诇 砖诇讬诐 诇讬讛 谞专讙讗 诪注诇讬讗


The Gemara asks: And if there are no witnesses, what is the halakha? The Gemara provides a precedent: Come and hear a similar case: There was an incident in which a certain man borrowed an ax from another and it broke. The borrower came before Rav for judgment, who said to him: Go and pay him the entire value of a proper ax.


讗诪专讜 诇讬讛 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜专讘 讗住讬 诇专讘


Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav:


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