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Bekhorot 19

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Summary

Is it considered a firstborn if it is only a firstborn from a particular aspect? One who purchases an animal from a non-Jew and doesn’t know if the animal has given birth yet, how does one treat its offspring? According to Rabbi Yishmael who says that past a certain age, it is treated as a firstborn out of doubt, wouldn’t we just follow the majority as most animals give birth within their first year of being able to conceive? In order to answer this question, the gemara discusses the differences between a majority that is actually there vs. a statistical majority.

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Bekhorot 19

דְּהָךְ דְּלָא בִּיכְּרָה שְׁבִיחַ טְפֵי צְרִיכָא.

that this offspring born to the ewe that had not previously given birth is superior. The Gemara concludes: Consequently, it was necessary to teach each case.

מַתְנִי׳ יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן וְהַבָּא אַחֲרָיו, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶם יִרְעוּ עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֲבוּ, וְיֵאָכְלוּ בְּמוּמָן לַבְּעָלִים. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶן אֵינָן בְּכוֹר, הָרִאשׁוֹן — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״, וְהַשֵּׁנִי — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקְּדָמוֹ אַחֵר.

MISHNA: With regard to an animal born by caesarean section and the offspring that follows it, since there is uncertainty whether each is a firstborn, neither is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: Both of them must graze until they become unfit, and they may be eaten in their blemished state by their owner. Rabbi Akiva says: Neither of them is firstborn; the first because it is not the one that opens the womb (see Exodus 13:12), as this animal did not itself open the womb, and the second because the other one preceded it.

גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד, אִי הָוֵי בְּכוֹר אִי לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree? Rabbi Tarfon is uncertain with regard to an animal that is a firstborn in one aspect, e.g., first to be born or first to open the womb, whether it is considered a firstborn or whether it is not considered a firstborn. And conversely, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that an animal which is a firstborn in only one aspect is not considered a firstborn.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִכְּלָל הַצָּרִיךְ לִפְרָט וּמִפְּרָט הַצָּרִיךְ לִכְלָל, כֵּיצַד? ״קַדֶּשׁ לִי כׇל בְּכוֹר״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ נְקֵבָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זָכָר״.

With regard to the definition of a firstborn, the Sages taught in a baraita: This halakha can be derived by means of the form of exegesis known as: From a generalization that requires a detail, and from a detail that requires a generalization. How so? The verse states: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn, that which opens any womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of animal, it is Mine” (Exodus 13:2). Had the verse written only the generalization: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn,” one might have thought that even a female animal is included in the category of a firstborn. Therefore, the verse states the detail: “Every firstborn male…you shall sanctify to the Lord” (Deuteronomy 15:19).

אִי ״זָכָר״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יָצְתָה נְקֵבָה לְפָנָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״. אִי ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יָצָא אַחַר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּכוֹר״.

And had the verse stated only: “Every firstborn male,” one might have thought that the first male offspring of an animal has firstborn status, even in a case where a female emerged from the womb before it. Therefore, the verse states: “That which opens any womb,” to teach that only an animal that itself opens its mother’s womb can be a firstborn. And had the verse stated only: “That which opens any womb,” one might have thought that even an animal that emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section is considered firstborn. Therefore, the verse states: “All the firstborn,” to teach that only the first offspring can be considered a firstborn.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא לְאַבָּיֵי: רֵישָׁא לָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״בְּכוֹר״, אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר. סֵיפָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״בְּכוֹר״, אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר!

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. Rav Sherevya said to Abaye: In the first clause, the baraita does not cite proof from the word “firstborn” that a male born after a female is not considered a firstborn. Apparently, an animal that is a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn, otherwise the baraita would not have had to derive the exclusion of a male born after a female from the phrase “that which opens any womb”; it could have cited the word “firstborn.” And in the last clause, the baraita does cite proof from the word “firstborn” that an animal whose older sibling was born by caesarean section is not considered a firstborn, despite the fact that it is a firstborn in one aspect. Apparently, a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn. If so, the baraita is self-contradictory.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְעוֹלָם בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְרֵישָׁא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי זָכָר, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״.

Abaye said to Rav Sherevya: Actually, a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn, and this is what the first clause is saying: Had the verse stated only: “Every firstborn male,” one might have thought that even an animal born by caesarean section is itself considered a firstborn. Therefore, the verse states: “That which opens any womb,” to teach that an animal must itself open the womb to be considered a firstborn. The word “firstborn” cannot be cited as proof that an animal born by caesarean section is not a firstborn, as such an animal was in fact born first. Therefore, the tanna cites the phrase “that which opens any womb.” Once this phrase is cited, then a male born after a female is excluded as well, despite the fact that this halakha could have been derived from the word “firstborn.”

רָבִינָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְסֵיפָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יָצָא אַחֵר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן קָדוֹשׁ, ״בְּכוֹר״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא לְמָה לִי?

Ravina said that there is a different explanation: Actually, a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn, and the halakha is not derived from the meaning of the word “firstborn” itself, but from the fact that it is superfluous. And this is what the last clause is saying: If it enters your mind that an animal which emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section is sanctified, why do I need the word “firstborn” that the Merciful One wrote?

אִי לְמַעוֹטֵי הֵיכָא דְּיָצְתָה נְקֵבָה לְפָנָיו — מִ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״ נָפְקָא! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ ״בְּכוֹר״ לְמַעוֹטֵי הֵיכָא דְּיוֹצֵא אַחַר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן.

If it serves to exclude a case where a female emerged from the womb before it, that is derived from the phrase “that which opens any womb.” Rather, conclude from it that “firstborn” serves to exclude a case where an animal emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section. According to Ravina, the word “firstborn” is referring to an animal that is a firstborn even in only one aspect, but as it is extraneous it serves to exclude an animal whose older sibling was born by caesarean section.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, תִּינַח הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא זָכָר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן וְזָכָר דֶּרֶךְ רֶחֶם, דְּלָא קָדוֹשׁ, דְּאִימַּעוּט לֵידָה מִ״בְּכוֹר״, דִּבְכוֹר לִרְחָמִים אִיכָּא, בְּכוֹר לִזְכָרִים לֵיכָּא.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: If it enters your mind that a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn and the derivation is based on the fact that the term “firstborn” is superfluous, that works out well in a case where a male emerged by caesarean section and then another male emerged through the womb. It stands to reason that it is not sanctified, as this birth is excluded by the word “firstborn,” as it is the firstborn of the womb, but it is not the firstborn of the males.

אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּיָצְתָה נְקֵבָה דֶּרֶךְ דּוֹפֶן וְזָכָר דֶּרֶךְ רֶחֶם — לִיקְדַּשׁ, דְּהָא אִיכָּא בְּכוֹר לִזְכָרִים וּבְכוֹר לְרֶחֶם! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְאַבָּיֵי.

But in a case where a female emerged by caesarean section and afterward a male was born through the womb, let it be sanctified, as it is the firstborn of the males and the firstborn of the womb. One cannot derive the exclusions of both of these cases from the word “firstborn,” and yet the baraita indicates that even if a female was born first by caesarean section, the male born afterward is not considered the firstborn. The Gemara concludes: Rather, it is clear that the baraita must be interpreted in accordance with the explanation of Abaye, that a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַלּוֹקֵחַ עוּבַּר פָּרָתוֹ.

מַתְנִי׳ הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מִן הַגּוֹי, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִם בִּיכְּרָה אִם לֹא בִּיכְּרָה. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: עֵז בַּת שְׁנָתָהּ — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק. רָחֵל בַּת שְׁתַּיִם — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק. פָּרָה וַחֲמוֹר בְּנוֹת שָׁלֹשׁ — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק.

MISHNA: In the case of one who purchases a female animal from a gentile and does not know whether it had previously given birth or whether it had not previously given birth, and after the purchase the animal gave birth to a male, Rabbi Yishmael says: If the mother was a goat within its first year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest, as it definitely never gave birth previously. From that point forward, i.e., if the mother is older than that, its offspring’s status as a firstborn is uncertain. If it was a ewe within its second year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward an offspring’s status is uncertain. If it was a cow or a donkey within its third year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward the offspring’s status is uncertain.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אִילּוּ בְּוָולָד בִּלְבַד הַבְּהֵמָה נִפְטֶרֶת כִּדְבָרֶיךָ, אֶלָּא אָמְרוּ: סִימָן הַוָּולָד בִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה — טִינּוּף, וּבַגַּסָּה — שִׁילְיָא, וּבָאִשָּׁה — שָׁפִיר וְשִׁילְיָא.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Were an animal exempted only by giving birth to an offspring and in no other manner the halakha would be in accordance with your statement. But the Sages said: An indication of the offspring in a small animal is a murky discharge from the womb, which indicates the animal had been pregnant, and therefore exempts subsequent births from the mitzva of the firstborn. The indication in a large animal is the emergence of an afterbirth, and the indication in a woman is a fetal sac or an afterbirth. Since these can be produced even within a year, it cannot be assumed that an animal in its first year is definitely subject to the mitzva of the firstborn.

זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁיָּדוּעַ שֶׁבִּיכְּרָה — אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם, וְכֹל שֶׁלֹּא בִּיכְּרָה — הֲרֵי זֶה לַכֹּהֵן, וְאִם סָפֵק — יֵאָכֵל בְּמוּמוֹ לַבְּעָלִים.

Rabbi Akiva continues: Rather, this is the principle: In any case where it is known that the animal had previously given birth, the priest has nothing here. And in any case where it is known that the animal had not previously given birth, that is given to the priest. And if it is uncertain, it may be eaten in its blemished state by the owner.

גְּמָ׳ מִיכָּן וְאֵילָךְ, אַמַּאי סָפֵק? הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב בְּהֵמוֹת, וְרוֹב בְּהֵמוֹת מִתְעַבְּרוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנָתָן נִינְהוּ, וְהָא וַדַּאי מֵילָד אוֹלֵיד! לֵימָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא?

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Yishmael, the firstborn status of the offspring of a goat acquired from a gentile when it was more than one year old is uncertain. The Gemara asks: From that point forward, i.e., if it was bought after its first year, why is it in a state of uncertainty? One should follow the majority of animals, and as the majority of animals are impregnated and give birth within their first year, it can be assumed this animal certainly gave birth. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says one must be concerned for the minority, i.e., he must take the minority of cases into account?

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כִּי אָזְלִי בָּתַר רוּבָּא בְּרוּבָּא דְּאִיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, כְּגוֹן תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת וְסַנְהֶדְרִין, אֲבָל רוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן — לָא אָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא.

The Gemara responds: You may even say Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. When the Rabbis follow the majority, this is in a case of an evident majority, which is extant and can be examined. For example, in a situation where a piece of meat is found in front of nine stores selling kosher meat and one store selling non-kosher meat, and it is not known from which store it came, it may be assumed that it came from one of the stores that sells kosher meat. And similarly, the Sanhedrin reaches its decisions by a majority vote of its judges. But with regard to a non-evident majority, which is based solely upon statistical information such as the assertion that most animals become pregnant and give birth within their first year, even the Rabbis do not follow the majority.

וְהָא קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה, דְּרוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, וְקָאָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא, דִּתְנַן: קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה לֹא חוֹלְצִין וְלֹא מְיַיבְּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: יָפֶה אָמַרְתָּ שֶׁאֵין חוֹלְצִין, ״אִישׁ״ כָּתוּב בַּפָּרָשָׁה, וּמַקְּשִׁינַן אִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the case of levirate marriage of a male minor or a female minor is dependent upon a non-evident majority, and yet the Rabbis follow the majority in their ruling. As we learned in a baraita: A male minor or a female minor may not perform the ritual through which a yavam frees a yevama of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], nor enter into levirate marriage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: You have aptly stated that they may not perform ḥalitza, since “man,” indicating an adult male, is written in the section of the Torah addressing ḥalitza (see Deuteronomy 25:7). Although an adult female is not mentioned explicitly, we juxtapose the halakha of the woman to that of the man and require that the female involved in ḥalitza must be an adult as well.

מָה טַעַם אֵין מְיַיבְּמִין? אָמַר לָהֶם: קָטָן — שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא סָרִיס, קְטַנָּה — שֶׁמָּא תִּמָּצֵא אַיְילוֹנִית, וְנִמְצְאוּ פּוֹגְעִין בְּעֶרְוָה.

But what is the reason they may not enter into levirate marriage, with regard to which the Torah’s wording does not specifically indicate adults? Rabbi Meir said to them: In the case of a male minor I am concerned lest he is found to be a eunuch, i.e., one who is incapable of fathering children, when he grows up. Similarly, a female minor may not enter into levirate marriage lest when she grows up she is found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children. In either case the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply, and they would be found to have encountered a forbidden relative and entered into a forbidden relationship where no mitzva applies, as the entire purpose of levirate marriage is to have children for the brother who died childless.

וְרַבָּנַן, זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא קְטַנִּים, וְרוֹב קְטַנִּים לָאו סָרִיסִים נִינְהוּ; זִיל בָּתַר קְטַנּוֹת, וְרוֹב קְטַנּוֹת לָאו אַיְילוֹנִית נִינְהוּ!

And the Rabbis hold: Follow the majority of male minors, and most male minors are not eunuchs; and likewise, follow the majority of female minors, and most female minors are not sexually underdeveloped women. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir even with regard to a non-evident majority.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא:

Rather, Rava says:

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The Hadran Women’s Tapestry

Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories. 

I had never heard of Daf Yomi and after reading the book, The Weight of Ink, I explored more about it. I discovered that it was only 6 months before a whole new cycle started and I was determined to give it a try. I tried to get a friend to join me on the journey but after the first few weeks they all dropped it. I haven’t missed a day of reading and of listening to the podcast.

Anne Rubin
Anne Rubin

Elkins Park, United States

Margo
I started my Talmud journey in 7th grade at Akiba Jewish Day School in Chicago. I started my Daf Yomi journey after hearing Erica Brown speak at the Hadran Siyum about marking the passage of time through Daf Yomi.

Carolyn
I started my Talmud journey post-college in NY with a few classes. I started my Daf Yomi journey after the Hadran Siyum, which inspired both my son and myself.

Carolyn Hochstadter and Margo Kossoff Shizgal
Carolyn Hochstadter and Margo Kossoff Shizgal

Merion Station,  USA

Beit Shemesh, Israel

Geri Goldstein got me started learning daf yomi when I was in Israel 2 years ago. It’s been a challenge and I’ve learned a lot though I’m sure I miss a lot. I quilt as I listen and I want to share what I’ve been working on.

Rebecca Stulberg
Rebecca Stulberg

Ottawa, Canada

In early 2020, I began the process of a stem cell transplant. The required extreme isolation forced me to leave work and normal life but gave me time to delve into Jewish text study. I did not feel isolated. I began Daf Yomi at the start of this cycle, with family members joining me online from my hospital room. I’ve used my newly granted time to to engage, grow and connect through this learning.

Reena Slovin
Reena Slovin

Worcester, United States

Since I started in January of 2020, Daf Yomi has changed my life. It connects me to Jews all over the world, especially learned women. It makes cooking, gardening, and folding laundry into acts of Torah study. Daf Yomi enables me to participate in a conversation with and about our heritage that has been going on for more than 2000 years.

Shira Eliaser
Shira Eliaser

Skokie, IL, United States

When the new cycle began, I thought, If not now, when? I’d just turned 72. I feel like a tourist on a tour bus passing astonishing scenery each day. Rabbanit Michelle is my beloved tour guide. When the cycle ends, I’ll be 80. I pray that I’ll have strength and mind to continue the journey to glimpse a little more. My grandchildren think having a daf-learning savta is cool!

Wendy Dickstein
Wendy Dickstein

Jerusalem, Israel

It’s hard to believe it has been over two years. Daf yomi has changed my life in so many ways and has been sustaining during this global sea change. Each day means learning something new, digging a little deeper, adding another lens, seeing worlds with new eyes. Daf has also fostered new friendships and deepened childhood connections, as long time friends have unexpectedly become havruta.

Joanna Rom
Joanna Rom

Northwest Washington, United States

I learned Talmud as a student in Yeshivat Ramaz and felt at the time that Talmud wasn’t for me. After reading Ilana Kurshan’s book I was intrigued and after watching the great siyum in Yerushalayim it ignited the spark to begin this journey. It has been a transformative life experience for me as a wife, mother, Savta and member of Klal Yisrael.
Elana Storch
Elana Storch

Phoenix, Arizona, United States

I heard about the syium in January 2020 & I was excited to start learning then the pandemic started. Learning Daf became something to focus on but also something stressful. As the world changed around me & my family I had to adjust my expectations for myself & the world. Daf Yomi & the Hadran podcast has been something I look forward to every day. It gives me a moment of centering & Judaism daily.

Talia Haykin
Talia Haykin

Denver, United States

I started learning Jan 2020 when I heard the new cycle was starting. I had tried during the last cycle and didn’t make it past a few weeks. Learning online from old men didn’t speak to my soul and I knew Talmud had to be a soul journey for me. Enter Hadran! Talmud from Rabbanit Michelle Farber from a woman’s perspective, a mother’s perspective and a modern perspective. Motivated to continue!

Keren Carter
Keren Carter

Brentwood, California, United States

I started learning at the beginning of the cycle after a friend persuaded me that it would be right up my alley. I was lucky enough to learn at Rabbanit Michelle’s house before it started on zoom and it was quickly part of my daily routine. I find it so important to see for myself where halachot were derived, where stories were told and to get more insight into how the Rabbis interacted.

Deborah Dickson
Deborah Dickson

Ra’anana, Israel

I learned Talmud as a student in Yeshivat Ramaz and felt at the time that Talmud wasn’t for me. After reading Ilana Kurshan’s book I was intrigued and after watching the great siyum in Yerushalayim it ignited the spark to begin this journey. It has been a transformative life experience for me as a wife, mother, Savta and member of Klal Yisrael.
Elana Storch
Elana Storch

Phoenix, Arizona, United States

I start learning Daf Yomi in January 2020. The daily learning with Rabbanit Michelle has kept me grounded in this very uncertain time. Despite everything going on – the Pandemic, my personal life, climate change, war, etc… I know I can count on Hadran’s podcast to bring a smile to my face.
Deb Engel
Deb Engel

Los Angeles, United States

I started my Daf Yomi journey at the beginning of the COVID19 pandemic.

Karena Perry
Karena Perry

Los Angeles, United States

At almost 70 I am just beginning my journey with Talmud and Hadran. I began not late, but right when I was called to learn. It is never too late to begin! The understanding patience of staff and participants with more experience and knowledge has been fabulous. The joy of learning never stops and for me. It is a new life, a new light, a new depth of love of The Holy One, Blessed be He.
Deborah Hoffman-Wade
Deborah Hoffman-Wade

Richmond, CA, United States

When I began the previous cycle, I promised myself that if I stuck with it, I would reward myself with a trip to Israel. Little did I know that the trip would involve attending the first ever women’s siyum and being inspired by so many learners. I am now over 2 years into my second cycle and being part of this large, diverse, fascinating learning family has enhanced my learning exponentially.

Shira Krebs
Shira Krebs

Minnesota, United States

I’ve been studying Talmud since the ’90s, and decided to take on Daf Yomi two years ago. I wanted to attempt the challenge of a day-to-day, very Jewish activity. Some days are so interesting and some days are so boring. But I’m still here.
Wendy Rozov
Wendy Rozov

Phoenix, AZ, United States

I was exposed to Talmud in high school, but I was truly inspired after my daughter and I decided to attend the Women’s Siyum Shas in 2020. We knew that this was a historic moment. We were blown away, overcome with emotion at the euphoria of the revolution. Right then, I knew I would continue. My commitment deepened with the every-morning Virtual Beit Midrash on Zoom with R. Michelle.

Adina Hagege
Adina Hagege

Zichron Yaakov, Israel

Inspired by Hadran’s first Siyum ha Shas L’Nashim two years ago, I began daf yomi right after for the next cycle. As to this extraordinary journey together with Hadran..as TS Eliot wrote “We must not cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we began and to know the place for the first time.

Susan Handelman
Susan Handelman

Jerusalem, Israel

When I started studying Hebrew at Brown University’s Hillel, I had no idea that almost 38 years later, I’m doing Daf Yomi. My Shabbat haburah is led by Rabbanit Leah Sarna. The women are a hoot. I’m tracking the completion of each tractate by reading Ilana Kurshan’s memoir, If All the Seas Were Ink.

Hannah Lee
Hannah Lee

Pennsylvania, United States

Bekhorot 19

דְּהָךְ דְּלָא בִּיכְּרָה שְׁבִיחַ טְפֵי צְרִיכָא.

that this offspring born to the ewe that had not previously given birth is superior. The Gemara concludes: Consequently, it was necessary to teach each case.

מַתְנִי׳ יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן וְהַבָּא אַחֲרָיו, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶם יִרְעוּ עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֲבוּ, וְיֵאָכְלוּ בְּמוּמָן לַבְּעָלִים. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶן אֵינָן בְּכוֹר, הָרִאשׁוֹן — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״, וְהַשֵּׁנִי — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקְּדָמוֹ אַחֵר.

MISHNA: With regard to an animal born by caesarean section and the offspring that follows it, since there is uncertainty whether each is a firstborn, neither is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: Both of them must graze until they become unfit, and they may be eaten in their blemished state by their owner. Rabbi Akiva says: Neither of them is firstborn; the first because it is not the one that opens the womb (see Exodus 13:12), as this animal did not itself open the womb, and the second because the other one preceded it.

גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד, אִי הָוֵי בְּכוֹר אִי לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree? Rabbi Tarfon is uncertain with regard to an animal that is a firstborn in one aspect, e.g., first to be born or first to open the womb, whether it is considered a firstborn or whether it is not considered a firstborn. And conversely, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that an animal which is a firstborn in only one aspect is not considered a firstborn.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִכְּלָל הַצָּרִיךְ לִפְרָט וּמִפְּרָט הַצָּרִיךְ לִכְלָל, כֵּיצַד? ״קַדֶּשׁ לִי כׇל בְּכוֹר״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ נְקֵבָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זָכָר״.

With regard to the definition of a firstborn, the Sages taught in a baraita: This halakha can be derived by means of the form of exegesis known as: From a generalization that requires a detail, and from a detail that requires a generalization. How so? The verse states: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn, that which opens any womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of animal, it is Mine” (Exodus 13:2). Had the verse written only the generalization: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn,” one might have thought that even a female animal is included in the category of a firstborn. Therefore, the verse states the detail: “Every firstborn male…you shall sanctify to the Lord” (Deuteronomy 15:19).

אִי ״זָכָר״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יָצְתָה נְקֵבָה לְפָנָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״. אִי ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יָצָא אַחַר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּכוֹר״.

And had the verse stated only: “Every firstborn male,” one might have thought that the first male offspring of an animal has firstborn status, even in a case where a female emerged from the womb before it. Therefore, the verse states: “That which opens any womb,” to teach that only an animal that itself opens its mother’s womb can be a firstborn. And had the verse stated only: “That which opens any womb,” one might have thought that even an animal that emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section is considered firstborn. Therefore, the verse states: “All the firstborn,” to teach that only the first offspring can be considered a firstborn.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא לְאַבָּיֵי: רֵישָׁא לָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״בְּכוֹר״, אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר. סֵיפָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״בְּכוֹר״, אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר!

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. Rav Sherevya said to Abaye: In the first clause, the baraita does not cite proof from the word “firstborn” that a male born after a female is not considered a firstborn. Apparently, an animal that is a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn, otherwise the baraita would not have had to derive the exclusion of a male born after a female from the phrase “that which opens any womb”; it could have cited the word “firstborn.” And in the last clause, the baraita does cite proof from the word “firstborn” that an animal whose older sibling was born by caesarean section is not considered a firstborn, despite the fact that it is a firstborn in one aspect. Apparently, a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn. If so, the baraita is self-contradictory.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְעוֹלָם בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְרֵישָׁא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי זָכָר, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״.

Abaye said to Rav Sherevya: Actually, a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn, and this is what the first clause is saying: Had the verse stated only: “Every firstborn male,” one might have thought that even an animal born by caesarean section is itself considered a firstborn. Therefore, the verse states: “That which opens any womb,” to teach that an animal must itself open the womb to be considered a firstborn. The word “firstborn” cannot be cited as proof that an animal born by caesarean section is not a firstborn, as such an animal was in fact born first. Therefore, the tanna cites the phrase “that which opens any womb.” Once this phrase is cited, then a male born after a female is excluded as well, despite the fact that this halakha could have been derived from the word “firstborn.”

רָבִינָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְסֵיפָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יָצָא אַחֵר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן קָדוֹשׁ, ״בְּכוֹר״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא לְמָה לִי?

Ravina said that there is a different explanation: Actually, a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn, and the halakha is not derived from the meaning of the word “firstborn” itself, but from the fact that it is superfluous. And this is what the last clause is saying: If it enters your mind that an animal which emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section is sanctified, why do I need the word “firstborn” that the Merciful One wrote?

אִי לְמַעוֹטֵי הֵיכָא דְּיָצְתָה נְקֵבָה לְפָנָיו — מִ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״ נָפְקָא! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ ״בְּכוֹר״ לְמַעוֹטֵי הֵיכָא דְּיוֹצֵא אַחַר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן.

If it serves to exclude a case where a female emerged from the womb before it, that is derived from the phrase “that which opens any womb.” Rather, conclude from it that “firstborn” serves to exclude a case where an animal emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section. According to Ravina, the word “firstborn” is referring to an animal that is a firstborn even in only one aspect, but as it is extraneous it serves to exclude an animal whose older sibling was born by caesarean section.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, תִּינַח הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא זָכָר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן וְזָכָר דֶּרֶךְ רֶחֶם, דְּלָא קָדוֹשׁ, דְּאִימַּעוּט לֵידָה מִ״בְּכוֹר״, דִּבְכוֹר לִרְחָמִים אִיכָּא, בְּכוֹר לִזְכָרִים לֵיכָּא.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: If it enters your mind that a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn and the derivation is based on the fact that the term “firstborn” is superfluous, that works out well in a case where a male emerged by caesarean section and then another male emerged through the womb. It stands to reason that it is not sanctified, as this birth is excluded by the word “firstborn,” as it is the firstborn of the womb, but it is not the firstborn of the males.

אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּיָצְתָה נְקֵבָה דֶּרֶךְ דּוֹפֶן וְזָכָר דֶּרֶךְ רֶחֶם — לִיקְדַּשׁ, דְּהָא אִיכָּא בְּכוֹר לִזְכָרִים וּבְכוֹר לְרֶחֶם! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְאַבָּיֵי.

But in a case where a female emerged by caesarean section and afterward a male was born through the womb, let it be sanctified, as it is the firstborn of the males and the firstborn of the womb. One cannot derive the exclusions of both of these cases from the word “firstborn,” and yet the baraita indicates that even if a female was born first by caesarean section, the male born afterward is not considered the firstborn. The Gemara concludes: Rather, it is clear that the baraita must be interpreted in accordance with the explanation of Abaye, that a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַלּוֹקֵחַ עוּבַּר פָּרָתוֹ.

מַתְנִי׳ הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מִן הַגּוֹי, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִם בִּיכְּרָה אִם לֹא בִּיכְּרָה. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: עֵז בַּת שְׁנָתָהּ — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק. רָחֵל בַּת שְׁתַּיִם — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק. פָּרָה וַחֲמוֹר בְּנוֹת שָׁלֹשׁ — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק.

MISHNA: In the case of one who purchases a female animal from a gentile and does not know whether it had previously given birth or whether it had not previously given birth, and after the purchase the animal gave birth to a male, Rabbi Yishmael says: If the mother was a goat within its first year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest, as it definitely never gave birth previously. From that point forward, i.e., if the mother is older than that, its offspring’s status as a firstborn is uncertain. If it was a ewe within its second year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward an offspring’s status is uncertain. If it was a cow or a donkey within its third year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward the offspring’s status is uncertain.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אִילּוּ בְּוָולָד בִּלְבַד הַבְּהֵמָה נִפְטֶרֶת כִּדְבָרֶיךָ, אֶלָּא אָמְרוּ: סִימָן הַוָּולָד בִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה — טִינּוּף, וּבַגַּסָּה — שִׁילְיָא, וּבָאִשָּׁה — שָׁפִיר וְשִׁילְיָא.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Were an animal exempted only by giving birth to an offspring and in no other manner the halakha would be in accordance with your statement. But the Sages said: An indication of the offspring in a small animal is a murky discharge from the womb, which indicates the animal had been pregnant, and therefore exempts subsequent births from the mitzva of the firstborn. The indication in a large animal is the emergence of an afterbirth, and the indication in a woman is a fetal sac or an afterbirth. Since these can be produced even within a year, it cannot be assumed that an animal in its first year is definitely subject to the mitzva of the firstborn.

זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁיָּדוּעַ שֶׁבִּיכְּרָה — אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם, וְכֹל שֶׁלֹּא בִּיכְּרָה — הֲרֵי זֶה לַכֹּהֵן, וְאִם סָפֵק — יֵאָכֵל בְּמוּמוֹ לַבְּעָלִים.

Rabbi Akiva continues: Rather, this is the principle: In any case where it is known that the animal had previously given birth, the priest has nothing here. And in any case where it is known that the animal had not previously given birth, that is given to the priest. And if it is uncertain, it may be eaten in its blemished state by the owner.

גְּמָ׳ מִיכָּן וְאֵילָךְ, אַמַּאי סָפֵק? הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב בְּהֵמוֹת, וְרוֹב בְּהֵמוֹת מִתְעַבְּרוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנָתָן נִינְהוּ, וְהָא וַדַּאי מֵילָד אוֹלֵיד! לֵימָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא?

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Yishmael, the firstborn status of the offspring of a goat acquired from a gentile when it was more than one year old is uncertain. The Gemara asks: From that point forward, i.e., if it was bought after its first year, why is it in a state of uncertainty? One should follow the majority of animals, and as the majority of animals are impregnated and give birth within their first year, it can be assumed this animal certainly gave birth. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says one must be concerned for the minority, i.e., he must take the minority of cases into account?

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כִּי אָזְלִי בָּתַר רוּבָּא בְּרוּבָּא דְּאִיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, כְּגוֹן תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת וְסַנְהֶדְרִין, אֲבָל רוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן — לָא אָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא.

The Gemara responds: You may even say Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. When the Rabbis follow the majority, this is in a case of an evident majority, which is extant and can be examined. For example, in a situation where a piece of meat is found in front of nine stores selling kosher meat and one store selling non-kosher meat, and it is not known from which store it came, it may be assumed that it came from one of the stores that sells kosher meat. And similarly, the Sanhedrin reaches its decisions by a majority vote of its judges. But with regard to a non-evident majority, which is based solely upon statistical information such as the assertion that most animals become pregnant and give birth within their first year, even the Rabbis do not follow the majority.

וְהָא קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה, דְּרוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, וְקָאָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא, דִּתְנַן: קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה לֹא חוֹלְצִין וְלֹא מְיַיבְּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: יָפֶה אָמַרְתָּ שֶׁאֵין חוֹלְצִין, ״אִישׁ״ כָּתוּב בַּפָּרָשָׁה, וּמַקְּשִׁינַן אִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the case of levirate marriage of a male minor or a female minor is dependent upon a non-evident majority, and yet the Rabbis follow the majority in their ruling. As we learned in a baraita: A male minor or a female minor may not perform the ritual through which a yavam frees a yevama of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], nor enter into levirate marriage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: You have aptly stated that they may not perform ḥalitza, since “man,” indicating an adult male, is written in the section of the Torah addressing ḥalitza (see Deuteronomy 25:7). Although an adult female is not mentioned explicitly, we juxtapose the halakha of the woman to that of the man and require that the female involved in ḥalitza must be an adult as well.

מָה טַעַם אֵין מְיַיבְּמִין? אָמַר לָהֶם: קָטָן — שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא סָרִיס, קְטַנָּה — שֶׁמָּא תִּמָּצֵא אַיְילוֹנִית, וְנִמְצְאוּ פּוֹגְעִין בְּעֶרְוָה.

But what is the reason they may not enter into levirate marriage, with regard to which the Torah’s wording does not specifically indicate adults? Rabbi Meir said to them: In the case of a male minor I am concerned lest he is found to be a eunuch, i.e., one who is incapable of fathering children, when he grows up. Similarly, a female minor may not enter into levirate marriage lest when she grows up she is found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children. In either case the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply, and they would be found to have encountered a forbidden relative and entered into a forbidden relationship where no mitzva applies, as the entire purpose of levirate marriage is to have children for the brother who died childless.

וְרַבָּנַן, זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא קְטַנִּים, וְרוֹב קְטַנִּים לָאו סָרִיסִים נִינְהוּ; זִיל בָּתַר קְטַנּוֹת, וְרוֹב קְטַנּוֹת לָאו אַיְילוֹנִית נִינְהוּ!

And the Rabbis hold: Follow the majority of male minors, and most male minors are not eunuchs; and likewise, follow the majority of female minors, and most female minors are not sexually underdeveloped women. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir even with regard to a non-evident majority.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא:

Rather, Rava says:

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