Search

Bekhorot 19

Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:

English
עברית
podcast placeholder

0:00
0:00




podcast placeholder

0:00
0:00




Summary

Is it considered a firstborn if it is only a firstborn from a particular aspect? One who purchases an animal from a non-Jew and doesn’t know if the animal has given birth yet, how does one treat its offspring? According to Rabbi Yishmael who says that past a certain age, it is treated as a firstborn out of doubt, wouldn’t we just follow the majority as most animals give birth within their first year of being able to conceive? In order to answer this question, the gemara discusses the differences between a majority that is actually there vs. a statistical majority.

Today’s daily daf tools:

Bekhorot 19

דְּהָךְ דְּלָא בִּיכְּרָה שְׁבִיחַ טְפֵי צְרִיכָא.

that this offspring born to the ewe that had not previously given birth is superior. The Gemara concludes: Consequently, it was necessary to teach each case.

מַתְנִי׳ יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן וְהַבָּא אַחֲרָיו, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶם יִרְעוּ עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֲבוּ, וְיֵאָכְלוּ בְּמוּמָן לַבְּעָלִים. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶן אֵינָן בְּכוֹר, הָרִאשׁוֹן — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״, וְהַשֵּׁנִי — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקְּדָמוֹ אַחֵר.

MISHNA: With regard to an animal born by caesarean section and the offspring that follows it, since there is uncertainty whether each is a firstborn, neither is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: Both of them must graze until they become unfit, and they may be eaten in their blemished state by their owner. Rabbi Akiva says: Neither of them is firstborn; the first because it is not the one that opens the womb (see Exodus 13:12), as this animal did not itself open the womb, and the second because the other one preceded it.

גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד, אִי הָוֵי בְּכוֹר אִי לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree? Rabbi Tarfon is uncertain with regard to an animal that is a firstborn in one aspect, e.g., first to be born or first to open the womb, whether it is considered a firstborn or whether it is not considered a firstborn. And conversely, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that an animal which is a firstborn in only one aspect is not considered a firstborn.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִכְּלָל הַצָּרִיךְ לִפְרָט וּמִפְּרָט הַצָּרִיךְ לִכְלָל, כֵּיצַד? ״קַדֶּשׁ לִי כׇל בְּכוֹר״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ נְקֵבָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זָכָר״.

With regard to the definition of a firstborn, the Sages taught in a baraita: This halakha can be derived by means of the form of exegesis known as: From a generalization that requires a detail, and from a detail that requires a generalization. How so? The verse states: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn, that which opens any womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of animal, it is Mine” (Exodus 13:2). Had the verse written only the generalization: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn,” one might have thought that even a female animal is included in the category of a firstborn. Therefore, the verse states the detail: “Every firstborn male…you shall sanctify to the Lord” (Deuteronomy 15:19).

אִי ״זָכָר״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יָצְתָה נְקֵבָה לְפָנָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״. אִי ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יָצָא אַחַר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּכוֹר״.

And had the verse stated only: “Every firstborn male,” one might have thought that the first male offspring of an animal has firstborn status, even in a case where a female emerged from the womb before it. Therefore, the verse states: “That which opens any womb,” to teach that only an animal that itself opens its mother’s womb can be a firstborn. And had the verse stated only: “That which opens any womb,” one might have thought that even an animal that emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section is considered firstborn. Therefore, the verse states: “All the firstborn,” to teach that only the first offspring can be considered a firstborn.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא לְאַבָּיֵי: רֵישָׁא לָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״בְּכוֹר״, אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר. סֵיפָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״בְּכוֹר״, אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר!

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. Rav Sherevya said to Abaye: In the first clause, the baraita does not cite proof from the word “firstborn” that a male born after a female is not considered a firstborn. Apparently, an animal that is a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn, otherwise the baraita would not have had to derive the exclusion of a male born after a female from the phrase “that which opens any womb”; it could have cited the word “firstborn.” And in the last clause, the baraita does cite proof from the word “firstborn” that an animal whose older sibling was born by caesarean section is not considered a firstborn, despite the fact that it is a firstborn in one aspect. Apparently, a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn. If so, the baraita is self-contradictory.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְעוֹלָם בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְרֵישָׁא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי זָכָר, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״.

Abaye said to Rav Sherevya: Actually, a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn, and this is what the first clause is saying: Had the verse stated only: “Every firstborn male,” one might have thought that even an animal born by caesarean section is itself considered a firstborn. Therefore, the verse states: “That which opens any womb,” to teach that an animal must itself open the womb to be considered a firstborn. The word “firstborn” cannot be cited as proof that an animal born by caesarean section is not a firstborn, as such an animal was in fact born first. Therefore, the tanna cites the phrase “that which opens any womb.” Once this phrase is cited, then a male born after a female is excluded as well, despite the fact that this halakha could have been derived from the word “firstborn.”

רָבִינָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְסֵיפָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יָצָא אַחֵר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן קָדוֹשׁ, ״בְּכוֹר״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא לְמָה לִי?

Ravina said that there is a different explanation: Actually, a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn, and the halakha is not derived from the meaning of the word “firstborn” itself, but from the fact that it is superfluous. And this is what the last clause is saying: If it enters your mind that an animal which emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section is sanctified, why do I need the word “firstborn” that the Merciful One wrote?

אִי לְמַעוֹטֵי הֵיכָא דְּיָצְתָה נְקֵבָה לְפָנָיו — מִ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״ נָפְקָא! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ ״בְּכוֹר״ לְמַעוֹטֵי הֵיכָא דְּיוֹצֵא אַחַר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן.

If it serves to exclude a case where a female emerged from the womb before it, that is derived from the phrase “that which opens any womb.” Rather, conclude from it that “firstborn” serves to exclude a case where an animal emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section. According to Ravina, the word “firstborn” is referring to an animal that is a firstborn even in only one aspect, but as it is extraneous it serves to exclude an animal whose older sibling was born by caesarean section.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, תִּינַח הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא זָכָר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן וְזָכָר דֶּרֶךְ רֶחֶם, דְּלָא קָדוֹשׁ, דְּאִימַּעוּט לֵידָה מִ״בְּכוֹר״, דִּבְכוֹר לִרְחָמִים אִיכָּא, בְּכוֹר לִזְכָרִים לֵיכָּא.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: If it enters your mind that a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn and the derivation is based on the fact that the term “firstborn” is superfluous, that works out well in a case where a male emerged by caesarean section and then another male emerged through the womb. It stands to reason that it is not sanctified, as this birth is excluded by the word “firstborn,” as it is the firstborn of the womb, but it is not the firstborn of the males.

אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּיָצְתָה נְקֵבָה דֶּרֶךְ דּוֹפֶן וְזָכָר דֶּרֶךְ רֶחֶם — לִיקְדַּשׁ, דְּהָא אִיכָּא בְּכוֹר לִזְכָרִים וּבְכוֹר לְרֶחֶם! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְאַבָּיֵי.

But in a case where a female emerged by caesarean section and afterward a male was born through the womb, let it be sanctified, as it is the firstborn of the males and the firstborn of the womb. One cannot derive the exclusions of both of these cases from the word “firstborn,” and yet the baraita indicates that even if a female was born first by caesarean section, the male born afterward is not considered the firstborn. The Gemara concludes: Rather, it is clear that the baraita must be interpreted in accordance with the explanation of Abaye, that a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַלּוֹקֵחַ עוּבַּר פָּרָתוֹ.

מַתְנִי׳ הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מִן הַגּוֹי, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִם בִּיכְּרָה אִם לֹא בִּיכְּרָה. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: עֵז בַּת שְׁנָתָהּ — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק. רָחֵל בַּת שְׁתַּיִם — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק. פָּרָה וַחֲמוֹר בְּנוֹת שָׁלֹשׁ — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק.

MISHNA: In the case of one who purchases a female animal from a gentile and does not know whether it had previously given birth or whether it had not previously given birth, and after the purchase the animal gave birth to a male, Rabbi Yishmael says: If the mother was a goat within its first year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest, as it definitely never gave birth previously. From that point forward, i.e., if the mother is older than that, its offspring’s status as a firstborn is uncertain. If it was a ewe within its second year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward an offspring’s status is uncertain. If it was a cow or a donkey within its third year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward the offspring’s status is uncertain.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אִילּוּ בְּוָולָד בִּלְבַד הַבְּהֵמָה נִפְטֶרֶת כִּדְבָרֶיךָ, אֶלָּא אָמְרוּ: סִימָן הַוָּולָד בִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה — טִינּוּף, וּבַגַּסָּה — שִׁילְיָא, וּבָאִשָּׁה — שָׁפִיר וְשִׁילְיָא.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Were an animal exempted only by giving birth to an offspring and in no other manner the halakha would be in accordance with your statement. But the Sages said: An indication of the offspring in a small animal is a murky discharge from the womb, which indicates the animal had been pregnant, and therefore exempts subsequent births from the mitzva of the firstborn. The indication in a large animal is the emergence of an afterbirth, and the indication in a woman is a fetal sac or an afterbirth. Since these can be produced even within a year, it cannot be assumed that an animal in its first year is definitely subject to the mitzva of the firstborn.

זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁיָּדוּעַ שֶׁבִּיכְּרָה — אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם, וְכֹל שֶׁלֹּא בִּיכְּרָה — הֲרֵי זֶה לַכֹּהֵן, וְאִם סָפֵק — יֵאָכֵל בְּמוּמוֹ לַבְּעָלִים.

Rabbi Akiva continues: Rather, this is the principle: In any case where it is known that the animal had previously given birth, the priest has nothing here. And in any case where it is known that the animal had not previously given birth, that is given to the priest. And if it is uncertain, it may be eaten in its blemished state by the owner.

גְּמָ׳ מִיכָּן וְאֵילָךְ, אַמַּאי סָפֵק? הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב בְּהֵמוֹת, וְרוֹב בְּהֵמוֹת מִתְעַבְּרוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנָתָן נִינְהוּ, וְהָא וַדַּאי מֵילָד אוֹלֵיד! לֵימָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא?

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Yishmael, the firstborn status of the offspring of a goat acquired from a gentile when it was more than one year old is uncertain. The Gemara asks: From that point forward, i.e., if it was bought after its first year, why is it in a state of uncertainty? One should follow the majority of animals, and as the majority of animals are impregnated and give birth within their first year, it can be assumed this animal certainly gave birth. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says one must be concerned for the minority, i.e., he must take the minority of cases into account?

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כִּי אָזְלִי בָּתַר רוּבָּא בְּרוּבָּא דְּאִיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, כְּגוֹן תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת וְסַנְהֶדְרִין, אֲבָל רוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן — לָא אָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא.

The Gemara responds: You may even say Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. When the Rabbis follow the majority, this is in a case of an evident majority, which is extant and can be examined. For example, in a situation where a piece of meat is found in front of nine stores selling kosher meat and one store selling non-kosher meat, and it is not known from which store it came, it may be assumed that it came from one of the stores that sells kosher meat. And similarly, the Sanhedrin reaches its decisions by a majority vote of its judges. But with regard to a non-evident majority, which is based solely upon statistical information such as the assertion that most animals become pregnant and give birth within their first year, even the Rabbis do not follow the majority.

וְהָא קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה, דְּרוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, וְקָאָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא, דִּתְנַן: קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה לֹא חוֹלְצִין וְלֹא מְיַיבְּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: יָפֶה אָמַרְתָּ שֶׁאֵין חוֹלְצִין, ״אִישׁ״ כָּתוּב בַּפָּרָשָׁה, וּמַקְּשִׁינַן אִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the case of levirate marriage of a male minor or a female minor is dependent upon a non-evident majority, and yet the Rabbis follow the majority in their ruling. As we learned in a baraita: A male minor or a female minor may not perform the ritual through which a yavam frees a yevama of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], nor enter into levirate marriage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: You have aptly stated that they may not perform ḥalitza, since “man,” indicating an adult male, is written in the section of the Torah addressing ḥalitza (see Deuteronomy 25:7). Although an adult female is not mentioned explicitly, we juxtapose the halakha of the woman to that of the man and require that the female involved in ḥalitza must be an adult as well.

מָה טַעַם אֵין מְיַיבְּמִין? אָמַר לָהֶם: קָטָן — שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא סָרִיס, קְטַנָּה — שֶׁמָּא תִּמָּצֵא אַיְילוֹנִית, וְנִמְצְאוּ פּוֹגְעִין בְּעֶרְוָה.

But what is the reason they may not enter into levirate marriage, with regard to which the Torah’s wording does not specifically indicate adults? Rabbi Meir said to them: In the case of a male minor I am concerned lest he is found to be a eunuch, i.e., one who is incapable of fathering children, when he grows up. Similarly, a female minor may not enter into levirate marriage lest when she grows up she is found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children. In either case the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply, and they would be found to have encountered a forbidden relative and entered into a forbidden relationship where no mitzva applies, as the entire purpose of levirate marriage is to have children for the brother who died childless.

וְרַבָּנַן, זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא קְטַנִּים, וְרוֹב קְטַנִּים לָאו סָרִיסִים נִינְהוּ; זִיל בָּתַר קְטַנּוֹת, וְרוֹב קְטַנּוֹת לָאו אַיְילוֹנִית נִינְהוּ!

And the Rabbis hold: Follow the majority of male minors, and most male minors are not eunuchs; and likewise, follow the majority of female minors, and most female minors are not sexually underdeveloped women. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir even with regard to a non-evident majority.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא:

Rather, Rava says:

Today’s daily daf tools:

Delve Deeper

Broaden your understanding of the topics on this daf with classes and podcasts from top women Talmud scholars.

For the Beyond the Daf shiurim offered in Hebrew, see here.

New to Talmud?

Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you. 

The Hadran Women’s Tapestry

Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories. 

I started learning daf in January, 2020, being inspired by watching the Siyyum Hashas in Binyanei Haumah. I wasn’t sure I would be able to keep up with the task. When I went to school, Gemara was not an option. Fast forward to March, 2022, and each day starts with the daf. The challenge is now learning the intricacies of delving into the actual learning. Hadran community, thank you!

Rochel Cheifetz
Rochel Cheifetz

Riverdale, NY, United States

I read Ilana Kurshan’s “If All the Seas Were Ink” which inspired me. Then the Women’s Siyum in Jerusalem in 2020 convinced me, I knew I had to join! I have loved it- it’s been a constant in my life daily, many of the sugiyot connect to our lives. My family and friends all are so supportive. It’s incredible being part of this community and love how diverse it is! I am so excited to learn more!

Shira Jacobowitz
Shira Jacobowitz

Jerusalem, Israel

My family recently made Aliyah, because we believe the next chapter in the story of the Jewish people is being written here, and we want to be a part of it. Daf Yomi, on the other hand, connects me BACK, to those who wrote earlier chapters thousands of years ago. So, I feel like I’m living in the middle of this epic story. I’m learning how it all began, and looking ahead to see where it goes!
Tina Lamm
Tina Lamm

Jerusalem, Israel

When the new cycle began, I thought, If not now, when? I’d just turned 72. I feel like a tourist on a tour bus passing astonishing scenery each day. Rabbanit Michelle is my beloved tour guide. When the cycle ends, I’ll be 80. I pray that I’ll have strength and mind to continue the journey to glimpse a little more. My grandchildren think having a daf-learning savta is cool!

Wendy Dickstein
Wendy Dickstein

Jerusalem, Israel

I started last year after completing the Pesach Sugiyot class. Masechet Yoma might seem like a difficult set of topics, but for me made Yom Kippur and the Beit HaMikdash come alive. Liturgy I’d always had trouble connecting with took on new meaning as I gained a sense of real people moving through specific spaces in particular ways. It was the perfect introduction; I am so grateful for Hadran!

Debbie Engelen-Eigles
Debbie Engelen-Eigles

Minnesota, United States

Hearing and reading about the siyumim at the completion of the 13 th cycle Daf Yomi asked our shul rabbi about starting the Daf – he directed me to another shiur in town he thought would allow a woman to join, and so I did! Love seeing the sources for the Divrei Torah I’ve been hearing for the past decades of living an observant life and raising 5 children .

Jill Felder
Jill Felder

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States

It happened without intent (so am I yotzei?!) – I watched the women’s siyum live and was so moved by it that the next morning, I tuned in to Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur, and here I am, still learning every day, over 2 years later. Some days it all goes over my head, but others I grasp onto an idea or a story, and I ‘get it’ and that’s the best feeling in the world. So proud to be a Hadran learner.

Jeanne Yael Klempner
Jeanne Yael Klempner

Zichron Yaakov, Israel

“I got my job through the NY Times” was an ad campaign when I was growing up. I can headline “I got my daily Daf shiur and Hadran through the NY Times”. I read the January 4, 2020 feature on Reb. Michelle Farber and Hadran and I have been participating ever since. Thanks NY Times & Hadran!
Deborah Aschheim
Deborah Aschheim

New York, United States

In early 2020, I began the process of a stem cell transplant. The required extreme isolation forced me to leave work and normal life but gave me time to delve into Jewish text study. I did not feel isolated. I began Daf Yomi at the start of this cycle, with family members joining me online from my hospital room. I’ve used my newly granted time to to engage, grow and connect through this learning.

Reena Slovin
Reena Slovin

Worcester, United States

I began daf yomi in January 2020 with Brachot. I had made aliya 6 months before, and one of my post-aliya goals was to complete a full cycle. As a life-long Tanach teacher, I wanted to swim from one side of the Yam shel Torah to the other. Daf yomi was also my sanity through COVID. It was the way to marking the progression of time, and feel that I could grow and accomplish while time stopped.

Leah Herzog
Leah Herzog

Givat Zev, Israel

Retirement and Covid converged to provide me with the opportunity to commit to daily Talmud study in October 2020. I dove into the middle of Eruvin and continued to navigate Seder Moed, with Rabannit Michelle as my guide. I have developed more confidence in my learning as I completed each masechet and look forward to completing the Daf Yomi cycle so that I can begin again!

Rhona Fink
Rhona Fink

San Diego, United States

I started learning Gemara at the Yeshivah of Flatbush. And I resumed ‘ברוך ה decades later with Rabbanit Michele at Hadran. I started from Brachot and have had an exciting, rewarding experience throughout seder Moed!

Anne Mirsky (1)
Anne Mirsky

Maale Adumim, Israel

The first month I learned Daf Yomi by myself in secret, because I wasn’t sure how my husband would react, but after the siyyum on Masechet Brachot I discovered Hadran and now sometimes my husband listens to the daf with me. He and I also learn mishnayot together and are constantly finding connections between the different masechtot.

Laura Warshawsky
Laura Warshawsky

Silver Spring, Maryland, United States

A few years back, after reading Ilana Kurshan’s book, “If All The Seas Were Ink,” I began pondering the crazy, outlandish idea of beginning the Daf Yomi cycle. Beginning in December, 2019, a month before the previous cycle ended, I “auditioned” 30 different podcasts in 30 days, and ultimately chose to take the plunge with Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle. Such joy!

Cindy Dolgin
Cindy Dolgin

HUNTINGTON, United States

I started to listen to Michelle’s podcasts four years ago. The minute I started I was hooked. I’m so excited to learn the entire Talmud, and think I will continue always. I chose the quote “while a woman is engaged in conversation she also holds the spindle”. (Megillah 14b). It reminds me of all of the amazing women I learn with every day who multi-task, think ahead and accomplish so much.

Julie Mendelsohn
Julie Mendelsohn

Zichron Yakov, Israel

After reading the book, “ If All The Seas Were Ink “ by Ileana Kurshan I started studying Talmud. I searched and studied with several teachers until I found Michelle Farber. I have been studying with her for two years. I look forward every day to learn from her.

Janine Rubens
Janine Rubens

Virginia, United States

My Daf journey began in August 2012 after participating in the Siyum Hashas where I was blessed as an “enabler” of others.  Galvanized into my own learning I recited the Hadran on Shas in January 2020 with Rabbanit Michelle. That Siyum was a highlight in my life.  Now, on round two, Daf has become my spiritual anchor to which I attribute manifold blessings.

Rina Goldberg
Rina Goldberg

Englewood NJ, United States

Ive been learning Gmara since 5th grade and always loved it. Have always wanted to do Daf Yomi and now with Michelle Farber’s online classes it made it much easier to do! Really enjoying the experience thank you!!

Lisa Lawrence
Lisa Lawrence

Neve Daniel, Israel

I went to day school in Toronto but really began to learn when I attended Brovenders back in the early 1980’s. Last year after talking to my sister who was learning Daf Yomi, inspired, I looked on the computer and the Hadran site came up. I have been listening to each days shiur in the morning as I work. I emphasis listening since I am not sitting with a Gamara. I listen while I work in my studio.

Rachel Rotenberg
Rachel Rotenberg

Tekoa, Israel

See video

Susan Fisher
Susan Fisher

Raanana, Israel

Bekhorot 19

דְּהָךְ דְּלָא בִּיכְּרָה שְׁבִיחַ טְפֵי צְרִיכָא.

that this offspring born to the ewe that had not previously given birth is superior. The Gemara concludes: Consequently, it was necessary to teach each case.

מַתְנִי׳ יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן וְהַבָּא אַחֲרָיו, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶם יִרְעוּ עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֲבוּ, וְיֵאָכְלוּ בְּמוּמָן לַבְּעָלִים. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵיהֶן אֵינָן בְּכוֹר, הָרִאשׁוֹן — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינוֹ ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״, וְהַשֵּׁנִי — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקְּדָמוֹ אַחֵר.

MISHNA: With regard to an animal born by caesarean section and the offspring that follows it, since there is uncertainty whether each is a firstborn, neither is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: Both of them must graze until they become unfit, and they may be eaten in their blemished state by their owner. Rabbi Akiva says: Neither of them is firstborn; the first because it is not the one that opens the womb (see Exodus 13:12), as this animal did not itself open the womb, and the second because the other one preceded it.

גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד, אִי הָוֵי בְּכוֹר אִי לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ: בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree? Rabbi Tarfon is uncertain with regard to an animal that is a firstborn in one aspect, e.g., first to be born or first to open the womb, whether it is considered a firstborn or whether it is not considered a firstborn. And conversely, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that an animal which is a firstborn in only one aspect is not considered a firstborn.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִכְּלָל הַצָּרִיךְ לִפְרָט וּמִפְּרָט הַצָּרִיךְ לִכְלָל, כֵּיצַד? ״קַדֶּשׁ לִי כׇל בְּכוֹר״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ נְקֵבָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זָכָר״.

With regard to the definition of a firstborn, the Sages taught in a baraita: This halakha can be derived by means of the form of exegesis known as: From a generalization that requires a detail, and from a detail that requires a generalization. How so? The verse states: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn, that which opens any womb among the children of Israel, both of man and of animal, it is Mine” (Exodus 13:2). Had the verse written only the generalization: “Sanctify to Me all the firstborn,” one might have thought that even a female animal is included in the category of a firstborn. Therefore, the verse states the detail: “Every firstborn male…you shall sanctify to the Lord” (Deuteronomy 15:19).

אִי ״זָכָר״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יָצְתָה נְקֵבָה לְפָנָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״. אִי ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יָצָא אַחַר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּכוֹר״.

And had the verse stated only: “Every firstborn male,” one might have thought that the first male offspring of an animal has firstborn status, even in a case where a female emerged from the womb before it. Therefore, the verse states: “That which opens any womb,” to teach that only an animal that itself opens its mother’s womb can be a firstborn. And had the verse stated only: “That which opens any womb,” one might have thought that even an animal that emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section is considered firstborn. Therefore, the verse states: “All the firstborn,” to teach that only the first offspring can be considered a firstborn.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁרֵבְיָא לְאַבָּיֵי: רֵישָׁא לָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״בְּכוֹר״, אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר. סֵיפָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ תַּלְמוּדָא ״בְּכוֹר״, אַלְמָא בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר!

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. Rav Sherevya said to Abaye: In the first clause, the baraita does not cite proof from the word “firstborn” that a male born after a female is not considered a firstborn. Apparently, an animal that is a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn, otherwise the baraita would not have had to derive the exclusion of a male born after a female from the phrase “that which opens any womb”; it could have cited the word “firstborn.” And in the last clause, the baraita does cite proof from the word “firstborn” that an animal whose older sibling was born by caesarean section is not considered a firstborn, despite the fact that it is a firstborn in one aspect. Apparently, a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn. If so, the baraita is self-contradictory.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְעוֹלָם בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד לָא הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְרֵישָׁא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי זָכָר, יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״.

Abaye said to Rav Sherevya: Actually, a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn, and this is what the first clause is saying: Had the verse stated only: “Every firstborn male,” one might have thought that even an animal born by caesarean section is itself considered a firstborn. Therefore, the verse states: “That which opens any womb,” to teach that an animal must itself open the womb to be considered a firstborn. The word “firstborn” cannot be cited as proof that an animal born by caesarean section is not a firstborn, as such an animal was in fact born first. Therefore, the tanna cites the phrase “that which opens any womb.” Once this phrase is cited, then a male born after a female is excluded as well, despite the fact that this halakha could have been derived from the word “firstborn.”

רָבִינָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, וְסֵיפָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יָצָא אַחֵר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן קָדוֹשׁ, ״בְּכוֹר״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא לְמָה לִי?

Ravina said that there is a different explanation: Actually, a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn, and the halakha is not derived from the meaning of the word “firstborn” itself, but from the fact that it is superfluous. And this is what the last clause is saying: If it enters your mind that an animal which emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section is sanctified, why do I need the word “firstborn” that the Merciful One wrote?

אִי לְמַעוֹטֵי הֵיכָא דְּיָצְתָה נְקֵבָה לְפָנָיו — מִ״פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם״ נָפְקָא! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ ״בְּכוֹר״ לְמַעוֹטֵי הֵיכָא דְּיוֹצֵא אַחַר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן.

If it serves to exclude a case where a female emerged from the womb before it, that is derived from the phrase “that which opens any womb.” Rather, conclude from it that “firstborn” serves to exclude a case where an animal emerged from the womb after its older sibling was born by caesarean section. According to Ravina, the word “firstborn” is referring to an animal that is a firstborn even in only one aspect, but as it is extraneous it serves to exclude an animal whose older sibling was born by caesarean section.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּכוֹר לְדָבָר אֶחָד הָוֵי בְּכוֹר, תִּינַח הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא זָכָר יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן וְזָכָר דֶּרֶךְ רֶחֶם, דְּלָא קָדוֹשׁ, דְּאִימַּעוּט לֵידָה מִ״בְּכוֹר״, דִּבְכוֹר לִרְחָמִים אִיכָּא, בְּכוֹר לִזְכָרִים לֵיכָּא.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: If it enters your mind that a firstborn in one aspect is called a firstborn and the derivation is based on the fact that the term “firstborn” is superfluous, that works out well in a case where a male emerged by caesarean section and then another male emerged through the womb. It stands to reason that it is not sanctified, as this birth is excluded by the word “firstborn,” as it is the firstborn of the womb, but it is not the firstborn of the males.

אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּיָצְתָה נְקֵבָה דֶּרֶךְ דּוֹפֶן וְזָכָר דֶּרֶךְ רֶחֶם — לִיקְדַּשׁ, דְּהָא אִיכָּא בְּכוֹר לִזְכָרִים וּבְכוֹר לְרֶחֶם! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְאַבָּיֵי.

But in a case where a female emerged by caesarean section and afterward a male was born through the womb, let it be sanctified, as it is the firstborn of the males and the firstborn of the womb. One cannot derive the exclusions of both of these cases from the word “firstborn,” and yet the baraita indicates that even if a female was born first by caesarean section, the male born afterward is not considered the firstborn. The Gemara concludes: Rather, it is clear that the baraita must be interpreted in accordance with the explanation of Abaye, that a firstborn in one aspect is not called a firstborn.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַלּוֹקֵחַ עוּבַּר פָּרָתוֹ.

מַתְנִי׳ הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מִן הַגּוֹי, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִם בִּיכְּרָה אִם לֹא בִּיכְּרָה. רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: עֵז בַּת שְׁנָתָהּ — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק. רָחֵל בַּת שְׁתַּיִם — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק. פָּרָה וַחֲמוֹר בְּנוֹת שָׁלֹשׁ — וַדַּאי לַכֹּהֵן, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — סָפֵק.

MISHNA: In the case of one who purchases a female animal from a gentile and does not know whether it had previously given birth or whether it had not previously given birth, and after the purchase the animal gave birth to a male, Rabbi Yishmael says: If the mother was a goat within its first year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest, as it definitely never gave birth previously. From that point forward, i.e., if the mother is older than that, its offspring’s status as a firstborn is uncertain. If it was a ewe within its second year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward an offspring’s status is uncertain. If it was a cow or a donkey within its third year the male offspring certainly is given to the priest; from that point forward the offspring’s status is uncertain.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אִילּוּ בְּוָולָד בִּלְבַד הַבְּהֵמָה נִפְטֶרֶת כִּדְבָרֶיךָ, אֶלָּא אָמְרוּ: סִימָן הַוָּולָד בִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה — טִינּוּף, וּבַגַּסָּה — שִׁילְיָא, וּבָאִשָּׁה — שָׁפִיר וְשִׁילְיָא.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Were an animal exempted only by giving birth to an offspring and in no other manner the halakha would be in accordance with your statement. But the Sages said: An indication of the offspring in a small animal is a murky discharge from the womb, which indicates the animal had been pregnant, and therefore exempts subsequent births from the mitzva of the firstborn. The indication in a large animal is the emergence of an afterbirth, and the indication in a woman is a fetal sac or an afterbirth. Since these can be produced even within a year, it cannot be assumed that an animal in its first year is definitely subject to the mitzva of the firstborn.

זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁיָּדוּעַ שֶׁבִּיכְּרָה — אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם, וְכֹל שֶׁלֹּא בִּיכְּרָה — הֲרֵי זֶה לַכֹּהֵן, וְאִם סָפֵק — יֵאָכֵל בְּמוּמוֹ לַבְּעָלִים.

Rabbi Akiva continues: Rather, this is the principle: In any case where it is known that the animal had previously given birth, the priest has nothing here. And in any case where it is known that the animal had not previously given birth, that is given to the priest. And if it is uncertain, it may be eaten in its blemished state by the owner.

גְּמָ׳ מִיכָּן וְאֵילָךְ, אַמַּאי סָפֵק? הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב בְּהֵמוֹת, וְרוֹב בְּהֵמוֹת מִתְעַבְּרוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנָתָן נִינְהוּ, וְהָא וַדַּאי מֵילָד אוֹלֵיד! לֵימָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא?

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Yishmael, the firstborn status of the offspring of a goat acquired from a gentile when it was more than one year old is uncertain. The Gemara asks: From that point forward, i.e., if it was bought after its first year, why is it in a state of uncertainty? One should follow the majority of animals, and as the majority of animals are impregnated and give birth within their first year, it can be assumed this animal certainly gave birth. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says one must be concerned for the minority, i.e., he must take the minority of cases into account?

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כִּי אָזְלִי בָּתַר רוּבָּא בְּרוּבָּא דְּאִיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, כְּגוֹן תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת וְסַנְהֶדְרִין, אֲבָל רוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן — לָא אָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא.

The Gemara responds: You may even say Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. When the Rabbis follow the majority, this is in a case of an evident majority, which is extant and can be examined. For example, in a situation where a piece of meat is found in front of nine stores selling kosher meat and one store selling non-kosher meat, and it is not known from which store it came, it may be assumed that it came from one of the stores that sells kosher meat. And similarly, the Sanhedrin reaches its decisions by a majority vote of its judges. But with regard to a non-evident majority, which is based solely upon statistical information such as the assertion that most animals become pregnant and give birth within their first year, even the Rabbis do not follow the majority.

וְהָא קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה, דְּרוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, וְקָאָזְלִי רַבָּנַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא, דִּתְנַן: קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה לֹא חוֹלְצִין וְלֹא מְיַיבְּמִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: יָפֶה אָמַרְתָּ שֶׁאֵין חוֹלְצִין, ״אִישׁ״ כָּתוּב בַּפָּרָשָׁה, וּמַקְּשִׁינַן אִשָּׁה לְאִישׁ.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the case of levirate marriage of a male minor or a female minor is dependent upon a non-evident majority, and yet the Rabbis follow the majority in their ruling. As we learned in a baraita: A male minor or a female minor may not perform the ritual through which a yavam frees a yevama of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], nor enter into levirate marriage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: You have aptly stated that they may not perform ḥalitza, since “man,” indicating an adult male, is written in the section of the Torah addressing ḥalitza (see Deuteronomy 25:7). Although an adult female is not mentioned explicitly, we juxtapose the halakha of the woman to that of the man and require that the female involved in ḥalitza must be an adult as well.

מָה טַעַם אֵין מְיַיבְּמִין? אָמַר לָהֶם: קָטָן — שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא סָרִיס, קְטַנָּה — שֶׁמָּא תִּמָּצֵא אַיְילוֹנִית, וְנִמְצְאוּ פּוֹגְעִין בְּעֶרְוָה.

But what is the reason they may not enter into levirate marriage, with regard to which the Torah’s wording does not specifically indicate adults? Rabbi Meir said to them: In the case of a male minor I am concerned lest he is found to be a eunuch, i.e., one who is incapable of fathering children, when he grows up. Similarly, a female minor may not enter into levirate marriage lest when she grows up she is found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children. In either case the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply, and they would be found to have encountered a forbidden relative and entered into a forbidden relationship where no mitzva applies, as the entire purpose of levirate marriage is to have children for the brother who died childless.

וְרַבָּנַן, זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא קְטַנִּים, וְרוֹב קְטַנִּים לָאו סָרִיסִים נִינְהוּ; זִיל בָּתַר קְטַנּוֹת, וְרוֹב קְטַנּוֹת לָאו אַיְילוֹנִית נִינְהוּ!

And the Rabbis hold: Follow the majority of male minors, and most male minors are not eunuchs; and likewise, follow the majority of female minors, and most female minors are not sexually underdeveloped women. This indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir even with regard to a non-evident majority.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא:

Rather, Rava says:

Want to follow content and continue where you left off?

Create an account today to track your progress, mark what you’ve learned, and follow the shiurim that speak to you.

Clear all items from this list?

This will remove ALL the items in this section. You will lose any progress or history connected to them. This is irreversible.

Cancel
Yes, clear all

Are you sure you want to delete this item?

You will lose any progress or history connected to this item.

Cancel
Yes, delete