Ketubot 48

רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר שארה כסותה לפום שארה תן כסותה שלא יתן לה לא של ילדה לזקינה ולא של זקינה לילדה כסותה ועונתה לפום עונתה תן כסותה שלא יתן חדשים בימות החמה ולא שחקים בימות הגשמים:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says that she’era and kesuta should be interpreted as follows: In accordance with her flesh [she’era], i.e., her age, give her clothing [kesuta]. This means that he should not give the garments of a young girl to an elderly woman, nor those of an elderly woman to a young girl. Similarly, kesuta and onata are linked: In accordance with the time of year [onata], give her clothing [kesuta], meaning that he should not give new, heavy clothes in the summer, nor worn-out garments in the rainy season, i.e., the winter, when she requires heavier, warmer clothes. The entire phrase, therefore, refers only to a husband’s obligation to provide clothing for his wife.

תני רב יוסף שארה זו קרוב בשר שלא ינהג בה מנהג פרסיים שמשמשין מטותיהן בלבושיהן מסייע ליה לרב הונא דאמר רב הונא האומר אי אפשי אלא אני בבגדי והיא בבגדה יוציא ונותן כתובה:

Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: “She’era,” this is referring to closeness of flesh during intercourse, which teaches that he should not treat her in the manner of Persians, who have conjugal relations in their clothes. The Gemara comments: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to have intercourse with my wife unless I am in my clothes and she is in her clothes, he must divorce his wife and give her the payment for her marriage contract. This is in keeping with the opinion of the tanna of the baraita that the Torah mandates the intimacy of flesh during sexual relations.

רבי יהודה אומר אפילו עני שבישראל וכו׳: מכלל דתנא קמא סבר הני לא היכי דמי אי דאורחה מאי טעמא דתנא קמא דאמר לא ואי דלאו אורחה מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the poorest man of the Jewish people may not provide fewer than two flutes and a lamenting woman for his wife’s funeral. The Gemara infers: This proves by inference that the first, anonymous tanna cited in the mishna holds that these are not part of a husband’s obligations. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is the common custom in her family at funerals, what is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna who said that he does not have to do so? If he neglected to provide these items he would be treating her with disrespect. And if this is not the common custom in her family, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

לא צריכא כגון דאורחיה דידיה ולאו אורחה דידה תנא קמא סבר כי אמרינן עולה עמו ואינה יורדת עמו הני מילי מחיים אבל לאחר מיתה לא

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state their dispute in a case where it is the common custom for his family according to its social status, but it is not common for her family according to its social status. The first tanna holds: When we say that a woman who marries a man ascends with him, i.e., she must be treated as equal in status to her husband if his social status is higher than hers, and does not descend with him if he is from a lower social status, this applies only when they are alive, but after death the Sages did not enforce this rule.

ורבי יהודה סבר אפילו לאחר מיתה אמר רב חסדא אמר מר עוקבא הלכה כרבי יהודה

And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: Even after death she must be treated in accordance with his status, which means that if those in his family are mourned with flutes and lamenting women, he must provide the same for her funeral. Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

ואמר רב חסדא אמר מר עוקבא מי שנשתטה בית דין יורדין לנכסיו וזנין ומפרנסין את אשתו ובניו ובנותיו ודבר אחר אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי מאי שנא מהא דתניא מי שהלך למדינת הים ואשתו תובעת מזונות בית דין יורדין לנכסיו וזנין ומפרנסין את אשתו אבל לא בניו ובנותיו ולא דבר אחר

Apropos this ruling, the Gemara cites another statement that Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: With regard to one who became insane, the court enters his property and feeds and provides a livelihood for his wife, his sons, and his daughters, and it also gives something else, as will be explained. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this case different from that which is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife claims sustenance, the court descends to his property and feeds and provides a livelihood for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters and does not give something else. If a father is not obligated to sustain his children in his absence, what is different about a situation where he is mad?

אמר ליה ולא שאני לך בין יוצא לדעת ליוצא שלא לדעת

Rav Ashi said to Ravina: Is there no difference for you between a man who leaves his responsibilities knowingly and one who leaves them unknowingly? A father who lost his sanity did not do so by his own choice, and therefore it can be assumed that he would want to provide for his children from his possessions, despite the fact that he is not obligated to do so. By contrast, if he went overseas he freely decided to depart, and one would think that he would leave enough for his sons and daughters. If he failed to do so, he has demonstrated that he does not want to provide for them.

מאי דבר אחר רב חסדא אמר זה תכשיט רב יוסף אמר צדקה מאן דאמר תכשיט כל שכן צדקה מאן דאמר צדקה אבל תכשיט יהבינן לה דלא ניחא ליה דתינוול

The Gemara asks: What is this something else mentioned in the baraita? Rav Ḥisda said: This is a wife’s ornaments, to which she is entitled in addition to her sustenance. Rav Yosef said: It is money for charity. The Gemara comments: According to the one who says that the court does not pay for a woman’s ornaments from her husband’s property if he has gone overseas, all the more so he maintains that the husband’s property is not taken for charity. Conversely, the one who says that the court does not give money for charity holds that this applies only to charity, but it does give her ornaments, as it is assumed that it is not satisfactory for him that his wife be demeaned by a lack of jewelry.

אמר רב חייא בר אבין אמר רב הונא מי שהלך למדינת הים ומתה אשתו בית דין יורדין לנכסיו וקוברין אותה לפי כבודו לפי כבודו ולא לפי כבודה

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Huna said: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife died, the court enters his property and buries her in accordance with his dignity. The Gemara asks: Does the court act in accordance with his dignity and not in accordance with her dignity? What if she came from a more dignified family than her husband?

אימא אף לפי כבודו הא קא משמע לן עולה עמו ואינה יורדת עמו ואפילו לאחר מיתה

The Gemara answers: Say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin meant: Even in accordance with his dignity, i.e., if his family was more distinguished than hers, he must bury her in accordance with the dignity of his family. The Gemara adds: This comes to teach us that she ascends with him to his social status and does not descend with him, and this principle applies even after her death, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the mishna.

אמר רב מתנה האומר אם מתה לא תקברוה מנכסיו שומעין לו מאי שנא כי אמר דנפלי נכסי קמי יתמי כי לא אמר נמי נכסי קמי יתמי רמו

Rav Mattana said: In the case of one who says that if his wife dies, they should not bury her using funds from his property, the court listens to him. The Gemara asks: What is different about the case when he says this command that induces the court to comply with his wishes? It is due to the fact that the property has come before the orphans as an inheritance, while the obligation to bury her is not incumbent upon them but is a duty of the inheritors of her marriage contract. However, even if he did not state the above preference, the property is cast before the orphans and it belongs to them. What does it matter whether or not the husband issued a command to this effect?

אלא האומר אם מת הוא לא תקברוהו מנכסיו אין שומעין לו לאו כל הימנו שיעשיר את בניו ויפיל עצמו על הציבור:

Rather, the Gemara amends Rav Mattana’s statement: With regard to one who says that if he himself dies, they should not bury him using funds from his property, one does not listen to him, but the court spends his money without resorting to charity. The reason for this is that it is not in his power to enrich his sons by saving them this expense and to cast himself as a burden on the community.

מתני׳ לעולם היא ברשות האב עד שתכנס

MISHNA: Even after she is betrothed, a daughter is always under her father’s authority until she enters

לרשות הבעל לנשואין מסר האב לשלוחי הבעל הרי היא ברשות הבעל הלך האב עם שלוחי הבעל או שהלכו שלוחי האב עם שלוחי הבעל הרי היא ברשות האב מסרו שלוחי האב לשלוחי הבעל הרי היא ברשות הבעל:

her husband’s authority in marriage via the wedding canopy. If the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers to bring her to her husband and the wedding canopy, once she has been handed over she is under the husband’s authority. However, if the father went with the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers went with the husband’s messengers, she is still under the father’s authority, as he has not fully delivered her to the husband’s messengers. If her father sent her with his own messengers and the father’s messengers delivered the woman to the husband’s messengers, from that moment onwards she is under her husband’s authority.

גמ׳ מאי לעולם לאפוקי ממשנה ראשונה דתנן הגיע זמן ולא נישאו אוכלות משלו ואוכלות בתרומה קא משמע לן לעולם:

GEMARA: The mishna taught that a daughter always remains under her father’s authority until she has fully entered her husband’s jurisdiction. The Gemara asks: What is the significance of the term: Always, in the mishna? The Gemara explains: This comes to exclude the opinion stated in the initial version of the mishna. As we learned in a mishna (57a): If the time that the groom designated for the wedding arrived, and the wedding was postponed, and they were not married, the brides are entitled to eat from his food and, if he is a priest, eat teruma, like married women. The mishna here teaches us that the halakha is not in accordance with this earlier ruling cited in that mishna. Rather, they are always under their father’s authority until they actually enter the wedding canopy.

מסר האב לשלוחי הבעל הרי היא ברשות הבעל וכו׳: אמר רב מסירתה לכל חוץ מתרומה ורב אסי אמר אף לתרומה

§ The mishna taught that if the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers, she is under the husband’s authority, unless the father or his messengers accompanied them. Rav said: When her father delivers her she leaves his jurisdiction in all respects, apart from the issue of partaking of teruma. Even if her husband is a priest, if she is not from a family of priests, she may not partake of teruma until she is fully married. And Rav Asi said that once she has been delivered to the husband’s messengers she is under her husband’s authority even with regard to teruma.

איתיביה רב הונא לרב אסי ואמרי לה חייא בר רב לרב אסי לעולם היא ברשות האב עד שתכנס לחופה אמר להו רב לאו אמינא לכו לא תיזלו בתר איפכא יכול לשנויי לכו מסירתה זו היא כניסתה לחופה

Rav Huna raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Asi, and some say that it was Ḥiyya, son of Rav, who raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Asi: The mishna states that she is always under her father’s authority until she enters the wedding canopy. According to Rav Asi, however, as soon as her father delivers her to the husband’s messengers she is no longer under her father’s authority. Rav said to them: Didn’t I tell you not to follow, i.e., attempt to refute rulings, on the basis of sources that can be explained in opposing manners? Rav Asi can answer you that the mishna means that her delivery to the husband’s messengers is equivalent to her entrance to the wedding canopy, and the same halakhot apply in both cases.

ושמואל אמר לירושתה

And Shmuel said that once a woman’s father has delivered her to the messengers of her husband, she is under her husband’s authority only with regard to her inheritance, i.e., her husband inherits her property upon her death as though she had already entered the wedding canopy.

ריש לקיש אמר לכתובתה כתובתה מאי היא דאי מתה ירית לה היינו דשמואל אמר רבינא לומר כתובתה מאחר מנה

Reish Lakish said: Her delivery is also effective with regard to her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is Reish Lakish referring to when he says that she is under her husband’s authority with regard to her marriage contract? If you say it means that if she dies he inherits all her property, including the dowry specified in her marriage contract, that is the same as the statement of Shmuel, and Reish Lakish has added nothing to his ruling. Ravina said: Reish Lakish is coming to say that if the man dies before marrying her, and she then marries someone else, her marriage contract from the other man is one hundred dinars, as she is considered a widow from marriage rather than a widow from betrothal.

רבי יוחנן ורבי חנינא דאמרי תרוייהו מסירתה לכל אף לתרומה

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Ḥanina both say that a woman’s delivery to the messengers of her husband causes her to be under his authority for all matters, even including partaking of teruma.

מיתיבי הלך האב עם שלוחי הבעל או שהלכו שלוחי האב עם שלוחי הבעל או שהיתה לה חצר בדרך ונכנסה עמו ללין אף על פי שכתובתה בבית בעלה מתה אביה יורשה

The Gemara raises an objection from the Tosefta (Ketubot 4:4): If the father went with the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers went with the husband’s messengers, or if she owned a courtyard along the way and she entered with her groom to lodge, not for the purpose of marriage but merely to stay overnight until they arrive at his residence, then even if the dowry specified in her marriage contract is already in her husband’s house, if she dies, her father inherits from her, as she is not considered to have entered her husband’s domain.

מסר האב לשלוחי הבעל או שמסרו שלוחי האב לשלוחי הבעל או שהיתה לו חצר בדרך ונכנסה עמו לשום נישואין אף על פי שכתובתה בבית אביה מתה בעלה יורשה

Conversely, if the father delivered her to the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers delivered her to the husband’s messengers, or if the groom owned a courtyard along the way and she entered with him for the purpose of marriage, then even if the dowry specified in her marriage contract is still in her father’s house and has not yet been given to her husband, if she dies, her husband inherits from her.

במה דברים אמורים לירושתה אבל לתרומה אין אשה אוכלת בתרומה עד שתכנס לחופה תיובתא דכולהו תיובתא

The Tosefta concludes: In what case is this statement said? It is stated with regard to the husband’s right to inherit from her. However, with regard to teruma, the halakha is that a woman who marries a priest may not partake of teruma until she actually enters the wedding canopy. This baraita is apparently a refutation of all of them, i.e., all of the opinions cited previously that hold that once the woman is delivered to the husband’s messengers, if the husband is a priest, the woman may partake of teruma. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation.

הא גופא קשיא אמרת נכנסה עמו ללין טעמא דללין הא סתמא לשם נישואין אימא סיפא נכנסה עמו לשם נישואין הא סתמא ללין

The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult. You said in the Tosefta that if she entered with him to her courtyard to lodge for one night, and she dies, her father inherits her property. The reason is because it specified that they entered only to lodge there, from which it may be inferred that if they entered without specification it is as though she entered for the sake of marriage. Say the latter clause of the Tosefta: If she entered with him to his courtyard for the purpose of marriage, and she dies, her husband inherits her property. This indicates that if she entered without specification, i.e., without saying that they were doing so for marriage, it is considered as though they entered merely to lodge. The inferences from these two clauses of the Tosefta apparently contradict one another.

אמר רב אשי סתמי סתמי קתני סתם חצר דידה ללין סתם חצר דידיה לנשואין

Rav Ashi said: This is an incorrect interpretation, as the tanna taught the halakha of entering one type of courtyard without specification and the halakha of entering a different type of courtyard without specification, as follows: If they entered her courtyard without specification it is assumed that they entered merely to lodge, whereas if they entered his courtyard without specification, it is assumed that they did so for the sake of marriage, unless they expressly stated that they had another purpose in mind.

תנא מסר האב לשלוחי הבעל וזינתה הרי זו בחנק מנא הני מילי אמר רבי אמי בר חמא אמר קרא לזנות בית אביה פרט לשמסר האב לשלוחי הבעל

§ A Sage taught in a baraita: If the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers and she subsequently committed adultery, she is sentenced to strangulation, in accordance with the halakha of a married woman who committed adultery, rather than stoning, which is the punishment for a betrothed woman who commits adultery. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ami bar Ḥama said that the verse states, in the context of the command to stone a young woman who commits adultery during betrothal: “To play the whore in her father’s house” (Deuteronomy 22:21), which excludes a case when the father has delivered her to the husband’s messengers, when she is no longer in her father’s house.

ואימא פרט שנכנסה לחופה ולא נבעלה

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But one can say that the verse is excluding a case where she has entered the wedding canopy but she has not yet had intercourse, whereas if her father has merely delivered her to the husband’s messengers she is still considered to have sinned in his house and is punishable by stoning like any other betrothed woman.

אמר רבא אמר לי אמי חופה בהדיא כתיבא כי יהיה נערה בתולה מאורשה לאיש נערה ולא בוגרת בתולה ולא בעולה מאורשה ולא נשואה

In answer to this question, Rava said: The verse cannot be excluding that case, as Ami said to me that the case where she already entered the wedding canopy is not derived by inference from that verse; it is explicitly written in the following verse: “If there is a young woman who is a virgin betrothed to a man” (Deuteronomy 22:23). The terminology of the verse indicates that it applies to a “young woman” and not to a grown woman; to a “virgin” and not to a non-virgin; and to a “betrothed” woman and not to a married woman.

מאי נשואה אילימא נשואה ממש היינו בתולה ולא בעולה אלא לאו שנכנסה לחופה ולא נבעלה

The Gemara analyzes this statement: What is the meaning of the term: A married woman, in this context? If we say that she is actually married and has already engaged in intercourse with her husband, this ruling is the same as the previous one, that she must be a virgin and not a non-virgin. Rather, is it not the case that it is referring to a woman who has entered the wedding canopy but has not had intercourse, and yet if she committed adultery at this stage she is sentenced to strangulation, like one who had engaged in relations with her husband? Consequently, the other verse, cited by Rabbi Ami bar Ḥama, cannot be referring to this case.