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Today's Daf Yomi

August 30, 2022 | 讙壮 讘讗诇讜诇 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 55

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Sue Talansky in loving memory of her mother Ruth Stromer, Shifra Raizel bat Tzvi v’Sarah. 鈥淪he was a Holocaust survivor whose first task upon arriving in America was to ensure that her daughters got a yeshiva education. It is my mom who began my journey into learning.”
The additional amount the husband can add to the ketuba has the same status as the ketuba itself. This has relevance for a woman who sells, forgoes, or receives part of or demands her ketuba, and various other situations. There are four issues upon which the rabbis of Pumbedita and Mata Mechasia disagreed. One, do the male children collect their mother’s ketuba from their father’s inheritance as an inheritance, which cannot be collected from liened property, or as buyers, which can be collected from liened property. Two, if the husband set aside moveable property for collection of the ketuba and they are no longer in existence or able to be found, can she collect her ketuba without needing to swear that she didn’t receive any part of it yet? Three, if the husband delineated property from which the wife can collect her ketuba, but only identified one of the borders, does she need to swear that she didn’t receive any part of her ketuba before collecting the full amount from the land? Four, if someone said to write and sign a deed of a gift and give the gift to a particular person but there was no kinyan (a formal act of acquiring), does the messenger need to check again with the giver that they actually intend to give the gift? There was a debate in the Mishna and Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria held that a woman who is betrothed and received a ketuba and then got divorced or widowed, she can only collect the 200 or 100 zuz, but not the additional amount. Rav and Rabbi Natan debated whether we hold that may or not. The Gemara derives that Rabbi natan must have held like him as in a different halacha it is clear he holds by umdena, making an assessment about what we believe the person’s intentions must have been, which is exactly what Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria holds – we assess that the husband only promised her extra for the benefit of being married to her. That would mean that Rav doesn’t hold by umdena. However, the Gemara brings a debate between Rav and Shmuel where Rav does seem to hold by umdena, making an assessment.

诇砖讘讞 诇砖讘讜注讛 讜诇砖讘讬注讬转

It is also relevant to an increase in value, as she does not collect the main or additional sums from the increased value of the property in a case where the husband鈥檚 estate was not sufficient at the time of his death to pay the entire cost of her marriage contract but the heirs later increased the value of the property; to an oath, because if the wife is required to take an oath in order to receive her marriage contract, the additional sum is also included in that oath; and to the Sabbatical Year, as the marriage contract is not annulled with other debts in the Sabbatical Year, and this includes the additional sum as well.

讜诇讻讜转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讬讜 诇讙讘讜转 诪谉 讛拽专拽注 讜诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转 讜讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讛讬讗 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讜诇讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉

And with regard to one who writes a document transferring all of his property to his sons and leaves his wife a specific plot of land for her marriage contract, this teaches that she receives both the main and the additional sums of her contract only from that land. The aforementioned halakha also teaches that she collects the payment only from land, and specifically from land of inferior quality; and that a widow loses her ability to collect the main and additional sums as long as she is in her father鈥檚 home for more than twenty-five years after her husband鈥檚 death; and the principle also applies to the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit their mother鈥檚 dowry when her husband passes away in addition to the inheritance they receive together with their other brothers. These halakhot apply equally to the additional sum of the marriage contract.

讗讬转诪专 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讗诪专讬 诇讗 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讬专转讜谉 转谞谉

It was stated that there was a debate among the Sages with regard to the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit the sum stipulated in their mother鈥檚 marriage contract. The Sages of Pumbedita say: It is not seized from liened property that has been sold by the father. This is because we learned in a mishna (52b) that the text of the stipulation is: They will inherit the money set aside for their mother鈥檚 marriage contract. From this phrase it is clear that the stipulation follows the halakhot of inheritance, and therefore their inheritance can be taken only from property in the father鈥檚 possession at the time of his death, but not from property that he had sold.

讘谞讬 诪转讗 诪讞住讬讗 讗诪专讬 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讬住讘讜谉 转谞谉 讜讛诇讻转讗 诇讗 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讬专转讜谉 转谞谉

The residents of Mata Me岣sya say: It is seized from liened property that has been sold. Their tradition is that the mishna states that the text of the stipulation is: They will take the money set aside for their mother鈥檚 marriage contract. It is as if the husband transferred this property to the sons, and as their acquisition precedes those of the other buyers, they may seize the sold property from the buyers. The Gemara concludes that the halakha is that it is not seized from liened property that has been sold, as the mishna states: They will inherit.

诪讟诇讟诇讬 讜讗讬转谞讛讜 讘注讬谞讬讬讛讜 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛

There is another dispute between the Sages of Pumbedita and the residents of Mata Me岣sya, with regard to one who set aside payment for his wife鈥檚 marriage contract from movable property, and these objects are in their pure, unadulterated state at the time of the execution of the marriage contract after the husband鈥檚 death. In this case, all agree that the widow may take them without an oath that confirms that her husband did not leave her any other money for the payment of her marriage contract, as it is clear that he set aside these objects for that purpose.

诇讬转谞讛讜 讘注讬谞讬讬讛讜 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讗诪专讬 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讘谞讬 诪转讗 诪讞住讬讗 讗诪专讬 讘砖讘讜注讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛

However, if the movable objects are not in their pure, unadulterated state, e.g., they were lost, the Sages of Pumbedita say that she takes the payment for her marriage contract from other property, as all of the husband鈥檚 property is liened to the marriage contract without an oath. The residents of Mata Me岣sya say she takes her payment only with an oath, because of a concern that she may have already received other property as payment for her marriage contract. And the halakha is that she may take it without an oath, in accordance with the opinion of the Sages of Pumbedita.

讬讬讞讚 诇讛 讗专注讗 讘讗专讘注讛 诪爪专谞讛讗 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讘讞讚 诪爪专讗 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讗诪专讬 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讘谞讬 诪转讗 诪讞住讬讗 讗诪专讬 讘砖讘讜注讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛

If he set aside land for her, which he demarcated on all four of its borders, she seizes the land without an oath. If he demarcated it on only one border, which is not as clear an indication, the Sages of Pumbedita say she takes it without an oath, and the residents of Mata Me岣sya say she takes it with an oath. And the halakha is that she takes it without an oath.

讗诪专 诇注讚讬诐 讻转讘讜 讜讞转诪讜 讜讛讘讜 诇讬讛 拽谞讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讗讬诪诇讜讻讬 讘讬讛 诇讗 拽谞讜 诪讬谞讬讛 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讗诪专讬 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讗讬诪诇讜讻讬 讘讬讛 讘谞讬 诪转讗 诪讞住讬讗 讗诪专讬 爪专讬讱 讗讬诪诇讜讻讬 讘讬讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 爪专讬讱 讗讬诪诇讜讻讬 讘讬讛

Furthermore, they had a dispute in a case where someone told witnesses: Write and sign a deed of gift and give it to the intended recipient of the gift. In such a case, if the witnesses acquired it from him on behalf of the recipient by performing a formal act of acquisition, they do not need to consult with him again, as there can be no retraction after a formal acquisition. But if they did not acquire it from him, the Sages of Pumbedita say they do not need to consult with him again, and the residents of Mata Me岣sya say they must consult with him. And the halakha is that they must consult with him again.

专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讻讜壮 讗讬转诪专 专讘 讜专讘讬 谞转谉 讞讚 讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讞讚 讗诪专 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛

搂 The mishna states that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says that a woman who collects the payment for her marriage contract after marriage receives the main and additional sums, while one who collects it after betrothal receives only the main sum. It was stated: Rav and Rabbi Natan differed with regard to this issue. One said the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And one said the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

转住转讬讬诐 讚专讘讬 谞转谉 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讚砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 谞转谉 讚讗讝讬诇 讘转专 讗讜诪讚谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 谞转谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 讘诪住讜讻谉

It may be concluded that Rabbi Natan is the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, as we have heard that Rabbi Natan follows the principle of assessing intention. Even if one did not make an explicit statement, the court assesses what his intention must have been and decides the halakha based on that assessment. It is clear that he follows this principle, as Rabbi Natan said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in the case of an ill person in danger. If this person says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, that is understood as: Write it and give it to her, as his intention is to absolve her from the requirement of levirate marriage by means of the bill of divorce. Although he did not explicitly state this, Rabbi Natan holds that in such a situation the court assesses that this was the husband鈥檚 intent and follows it.

讜讘转专讜诪转 诪注砖专 砖诇 讚诪讗讬

And the halakha is also in accordance with his opinion with regard to the teruma of the tithe from doubtfully tithed produce [demai]. Produce purchased from a common, uneducated person [am ha鈥檃retz] is considered demai and by rabbinic law it is regarded as uncertain whether the seller separated tithes and teruma of the tithe from it. Rabbi Natan rules in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri鈥檚 opinion in a case where, after one bought demai and separated teruma of the tithe, this teruma becomes mingled with the produce from which it was separated. If all of the produce were treated as actual teruma, the only solution would be to sell all of the produce to a priest at low cost, as he is the only one who may use it. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, however, rules that in the case of demai, the owner may ask the fruit seller if he properly separated the tithes. If the seller responds that he did, the owner may rely on that, despite the fact that the seller is an am ha鈥檃retz, as the Sages do not apply their decree in a case where it would cause significant financial loss.

讜专讘 诇讗 讗讝讬诇 讘转专 讗讜诪讚谞讗 讜讛讗 讗讬转诪专 诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讻转讜讘 讘讛 拽谞讬谉 讘讘讬 专讘 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专讬 讗专讻讘讬讛 讗转专讬 专讻砖讬 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讗 讬讚注谞讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讚讜谉 讘讛

Having established that Rabbi Natan follows the principle of assessment, the Gemara asks: And does Rav not follow this principle of assessing intention? But it was stated that Rav and Shmuel disagreed about a specific case with regard to the gift of a person on his deathbed, in which it was also written that the gift was given with an act of acquisition. There is a rabbinic ordinance that one on his deathbed can effect the transfer of property without the ordinarily required act of acquisition, but in this case such an act was performed anyway. In the school of Rav, they say in the name of Rav: He had him ride on two horses, meaning that he gave him a gift with a document strengthened in two different ways. And Shmuel said: I do not know what to decide about it.

讘讘讬 专讘 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专讬 讗专讻讘讬讛 讗转专讬 专讻砖讬 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻诪转谞转 讘专讬讗 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注

The Gemara explains the two opinions: In the school of Rav, they say in the name of Rav: He had him ride on two horses, meaning that he performed the transfer in a manner that took advantage of two separate halakhot to strengthen its validity. In one aspect, it is similar to the gift of a healthy person, and in a different way it is similar to the gift of a person on his deathbed. Both of these aspects act to strengthen the transfer.

讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻诪转谞转 讘专讬讗 讚讗诐 注诪讚 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讗诐 讗诪专 讛诇讜讗转讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讛诇讜讗转讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬

On the one hand, it is similar to the gift of a healthy person in that if he arose from the bed and recovered he cannot retract it, since he performed a proper act of acquisition. On the other hand, it is like the gift of a person on his deathbed in that if he said: My loan, i.e., money owed to me, is transferred to so-and-so as a gift, his loan is in fact transferred to so-and-so. Although ordinarily ownership of a debt cannot be transferred without a formal transference of the promissory note, the verbal statement is sufficient to effect the transfer since this is a gift of a person on his deathbed.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讗 讬讚注谞讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讚讜谉 讘讛 砖诪讗 诇讗 讙诪专 诇讛拽谞讜转讜 讗诇讗 讘砖讟专 讜讗讬谉 砖讟专 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

And Shmuel said: I do not know what to decide about it. Perhaps his performance of an act of acquisition indicates that he resolved to transfer it to him only with a bill of sale. And since his intention is that the sale not take effect until he also gives a bill of sale, the transfer does not take effect, as a bill of sale is not effective after the death of the owner.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot 55

诇砖讘讞 诇砖讘讜注讛 讜诇砖讘讬注讬转

It is also relevant to an increase in value, as she does not collect the main or additional sums from the increased value of the property in a case where the husband鈥檚 estate was not sufficient at the time of his death to pay the entire cost of her marriage contract but the heirs later increased the value of the property; to an oath, because if the wife is required to take an oath in order to receive her marriage contract, the additional sum is also included in that oath; and to the Sabbatical Year, as the marriage contract is not annulled with other debts in the Sabbatical Year, and this includes the additional sum as well.

讜诇讻讜转讘 讻诇 谞讻住讬讜 诇讘谞讬讜 诇讙讘讜转 诪谉 讛拽专拽注 讜诪谉 讛讝讬讘讜专讬转 讜讻诇 讝诪谉 砖讛讬讗 讘讘讬转 讗讘讬讛 讜诇讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉

And with regard to one who writes a document transferring all of his property to his sons and leaves his wife a specific plot of land for her marriage contract, this teaches that she receives both the main and the additional sums of her contract only from that land. The aforementioned halakha also teaches that she collects the payment only from land, and specifically from land of inferior quality; and that a widow loses her ability to collect the main and additional sums as long as she is in her father鈥檚 home for more than twenty-five years after her husband鈥檚 death; and the principle also applies to the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit their mother鈥檚 dowry when her husband passes away in addition to the inheritance they receive together with their other brothers. These halakhot apply equally to the additional sum of the marriage contract.

讗讬转诪专 讻转讜讘转 讘谞讬谉 讚讻专讬谉 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讗诪专讬 诇讗 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讬专转讜谉 转谞谉

It was stated that there was a debate among the Sages with regard to the stipulation in the marriage contract that the male offspring inherit the sum stipulated in their mother鈥檚 marriage contract. The Sages of Pumbedita say: It is not seized from liened property that has been sold by the father. This is because we learned in a mishna (52b) that the text of the stipulation is: They will inherit the money set aside for their mother鈥檚 marriage contract. From this phrase it is clear that the stipulation follows the halakhot of inheritance, and therefore their inheritance can be taken only from property in the father鈥檚 possession at the time of his death, but not from property that he had sold.

讘谞讬 诪转讗 诪讞住讬讗 讗诪专讬 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讬住讘讜谉 转谞谉 讜讛诇讻转讗 诇讗 讟专驻讗 诪诪砖注讘讚讬 讬专转讜谉 转谞谉

The residents of Mata Me岣sya say: It is seized from liened property that has been sold. Their tradition is that the mishna states that the text of the stipulation is: They will take the money set aside for their mother鈥檚 marriage contract. It is as if the husband transferred this property to the sons, and as their acquisition precedes those of the other buyers, they may seize the sold property from the buyers. The Gemara concludes that the halakha is that it is not seized from liened property that has been sold, as the mishna states: They will inherit.

诪讟诇讟诇讬 讜讗讬转谞讛讜 讘注讬谞讬讬讛讜 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛

There is another dispute between the Sages of Pumbedita and the residents of Mata Me岣sya, with regard to one who set aside payment for his wife鈥檚 marriage contract from movable property, and these objects are in their pure, unadulterated state at the time of the execution of the marriage contract after the husband鈥檚 death. In this case, all agree that the widow may take them without an oath that confirms that her husband did not leave her any other money for the payment of her marriage contract, as it is clear that he set aside these objects for that purpose.

诇讬转谞讛讜 讘注讬谞讬讬讛讜 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讗诪专讬 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讘谞讬 诪转讗 诪讞住讬讗 讗诪专讬 讘砖讘讜注讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛

However, if the movable objects are not in their pure, unadulterated state, e.g., they were lost, the Sages of Pumbedita say that she takes the payment for her marriage contract from other property, as all of the husband鈥檚 property is liened to the marriage contract without an oath. The residents of Mata Me岣sya say she takes her payment only with an oath, because of a concern that she may have already received other property as payment for her marriage contract. And the halakha is that she may take it without an oath, in accordance with the opinion of the Sages of Pumbedita.

讬讬讞讚 诇讛 讗专注讗 讘讗专讘注讛 诪爪专谞讛讗 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讘讞讚 诪爪专讗 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讗诪专讬 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讘谞讬 诪转讗 诪讞住讬讗 讗诪专讬 讘砖讘讜注讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛

If he set aside land for her, which he demarcated on all four of its borders, she seizes the land without an oath. If he demarcated it on only one border, which is not as clear an indication, the Sages of Pumbedita say she takes it without an oath, and the residents of Mata Me岣sya say she takes it with an oath. And the halakha is that she takes it without an oath.

讗诪专 诇注讚讬诐 讻转讘讜 讜讞转诪讜 讜讛讘讜 诇讬讛 拽谞讜 诪讬谞讬讛 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讗讬诪诇讜讻讬 讘讬讛 诇讗 拽谞讜 诪讬谞讬讛 驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 讗诪专讬 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讗讬诪诇讜讻讬 讘讬讛 讘谞讬 诪转讗 诪讞住讬讗 讗诪专讬 爪专讬讱 讗讬诪诇讜讻讬 讘讬讛 讜讛诇讻转讗 爪专讬讱 讗讬诪诇讜讻讬 讘讬讛

Furthermore, they had a dispute in a case where someone told witnesses: Write and sign a deed of gift and give it to the intended recipient of the gift. In such a case, if the witnesses acquired it from him on behalf of the recipient by performing a formal act of acquisition, they do not need to consult with him again, as there can be no retraction after a formal acquisition. But if they did not acquire it from him, the Sages of Pumbedita say they do not need to consult with him again, and the residents of Mata Me岣sya say they must consult with him. And the halakha is that they must consult with him again.

专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讻讜壮 讗讬转诪专 专讘 讜专讘讬 谞转谉 讞讚 讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讞讚 讗诪专 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛

搂 The mishna states that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says that a woman who collects the payment for her marriage contract after marriage receives the main and additional sums, while one who collects it after betrothal receives only the main sum. It was stated: Rav and Rabbi Natan differed with regard to this issue. One said the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And one said the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

转住转讬讬诐 讚专讘讬 谞转谉 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讚砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 谞转谉 讚讗讝讬诇 讘转专 讗讜诪讚谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 谞转谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 砖讝讜专讬 讘诪住讜讻谉

It may be concluded that Rabbi Natan is the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, as we have heard that Rabbi Natan follows the principle of assessing intention. Even if one did not make an explicit statement, the court assesses what his intention must have been and decides the halakha based on that assessment. It is clear that he follows this principle, as Rabbi Natan said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in the case of an ill person in danger. If this person says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, that is understood as: Write it and give it to her, as his intention is to absolve her from the requirement of levirate marriage by means of the bill of divorce. Although he did not explicitly state this, Rabbi Natan holds that in such a situation the court assesses that this was the husband鈥檚 intent and follows it.

讜讘转专讜诪转 诪注砖专 砖诇 讚诪讗讬

And the halakha is also in accordance with his opinion with regard to the teruma of the tithe from doubtfully tithed produce [demai]. Produce purchased from a common, uneducated person [am ha鈥檃retz] is considered demai and by rabbinic law it is regarded as uncertain whether the seller separated tithes and teruma of the tithe from it. Rabbi Natan rules in accordance with Rabbi Shimon Shezuri鈥檚 opinion in a case where, after one bought demai and separated teruma of the tithe, this teruma becomes mingled with the produce from which it was separated. If all of the produce were treated as actual teruma, the only solution would be to sell all of the produce to a priest at low cost, as he is the only one who may use it. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, however, rules that in the case of demai, the owner may ask the fruit seller if he properly separated the tithes. If the seller responds that he did, the owner may rely on that, despite the fact that the seller is an am ha鈥檃retz, as the Sages do not apply their decree in a case where it would cause significant financial loss.

讜专讘 诇讗 讗讝讬诇 讘转专 讗讜诪讚谞讗 讜讛讗 讗讬转诪专 诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讻转讜讘 讘讛 拽谞讬谉 讘讘讬 专讘 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专讬 讗专讻讘讬讛 讗转专讬 专讻砖讬 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讗 讬讚注谞讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讚讜谉 讘讛

Having established that Rabbi Natan follows the principle of assessment, the Gemara asks: And does Rav not follow this principle of assessing intention? But it was stated that Rav and Shmuel disagreed about a specific case with regard to the gift of a person on his deathbed, in which it was also written that the gift was given with an act of acquisition. There is a rabbinic ordinance that one on his deathbed can effect the transfer of property without the ordinarily required act of acquisition, but in this case such an act was performed anyway. In the school of Rav, they say in the name of Rav: He had him ride on two horses, meaning that he gave him a gift with a document strengthened in two different ways. And Shmuel said: I do not know what to decide about it.

讘讘讬 专讘 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专讬 讗专讻讘讬讛 讗转专讬 专讻砖讬 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻诪转谞转 讘专讬讗 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注

The Gemara explains the two opinions: In the school of Rav, they say in the name of Rav: He had him ride on two horses, meaning that he performed the transfer in a manner that took advantage of two separate halakhot to strengthen its validity. In one aspect, it is similar to the gift of a healthy person, and in a different way it is similar to the gift of a person on his deathbed. Both of these aspects act to strengthen the transfer.

讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻诪转谞转 讘专讬讗 讚讗诐 注诪讚 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻诪转谞转 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 砖讗诐 讗诪专 讛诇讜讗转讬 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讛诇讜讗转讜 诇驻诇讜谞讬

On the one hand, it is similar to the gift of a healthy person in that if he arose from the bed and recovered he cannot retract it, since he performed a proper act of acquisition. On the other hand, it is like the gift of a person on his deathbed in that if he said: My loan, i.e., money owed to me, is transferred to so-and-so as a gift, his loan is in fact transferred to so-and-so. Although ordinarily ownership of a debt cannot be transferred without a formal transference of the promissory note, the verbal statement is sufficient to effect the transfer since this is a gift of a person on his deathbed.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讗 讬讚注谞讗 诪讗讬 讗讬讚讜谉 讘讛 砖诪讗 诇讗 讙诪专 诇讛拽谞讜转讜 讗诇讗 讘砖讟专 讜讗讬谉 砖讟专 诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛

And Shmuel said: I do not know what to decide about it. Perhaps his performance of an act of acquisition indicates that he resolved to transfer it to him only with a bill of sale. And since his intention is that the sale not take effect until he also gives a bill of sale, the transfer does not take effect, as a bill of sale is not effective after the death of the owner.

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