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Today's Daf Yomi

August 31, 2022 | 讚壮 讘讗诇讜诇 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 56

Today’s daf is sponsored by Lisa Lowe Denker in honor of the engagement of Alissa Gold and Alexander Denker. “May the joy and love you have today always fill your life.”
What is the root of the debate between Rav and Rabbi Natan – whether or not they hold by Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria regarding the ketuba of a betrothed woman – does she receive only the 200/100 zuz, but not the additional amount? In later generations, they also grappled with the question of how to rule in this case. however, the Gemara concludes that we hold like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria. Ravin asked about a case where they had the wedding but didn’t yet have relations, would that be similar to the case of a betrothed woman or not? Rav Ashi asked what if she was a nidda at the time of the wedding and therefore couldn’t have relations, would that also be similar to the case of a betrothed woman? Rabbi Yehuda said that a woman can write that she received part of her ketuba money, even if she hadn’t. Two questions are raised against Rabbi Yehuda. Firstly, his opinion states that one can write a receipt. However, regarding a loan, Rabbi Yehuda doesn’t allow a receipt to be written if the loan was partially paid off, in case the borrower loses it and the creditor will demand the full amount. Rabbi Yirmia and Abaye each bring a different resolution. The second question is based on an inference from the words of Rabbi Yehuda. He states that the woman can write a document, which presumes that she could not state it orally. Presumably, this is because she would be making a stipulation against what it says in the Torah. However, Rabbi Yehuda himself holds that regarding monetary laws, one can make a stipulation against what it says in the Torah. This is resolved by saying that a ketuba is rabbinic and the rabbis needed to strengthen rabbinic law more than Torah law so that people would take it seriously – therefore he was stricter with rabbinic laws than with Torah laws. Questions are raised against this answer from other sources and in order to resolve them, the answer is limited to specific cases of rabbinic law. Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda and doesn’t allow one to give a woman a ketuba for less than the requisite amount in the way that Rabbi Yehuda permitted. From the language of Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, the Gemara infers that if he made a condition that was agreed to by the wife, the full ketuba can be collected as the condition is invalid, even though it is still considered a licentious relationship. This is because she thinks that she does not have a full marriage contract and is not protected from easy divorce and therefore views it as not a real marriage. A question is raised against Rabbi Meir who says that one cannot make a condition against what it says in the Torah, which would infer they can make a condition against rabbinic law? The answer is that Rabbi Meir holds that ketuba is a Torah law. A braita is brought which adds the opinion of Rabbi Yosi – that one can stipulate less in the ketuba. A contradiction is raised against him from another braita but a distinction is made between the cases.

讗诇讗 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗讝诇讬 讘转专 讗讜诪讚谞讗

In any case, it has been established that Rav also follows the principle of assessing one鈥檚 intention, which calls into question the conclusion that Rabbi Natan is the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rather, the Gemara concludes: Both Rav and Rabbi Natan follow the principle of assessing intention, and the debate can be explained in a different way.

诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 砖驻讬专 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗讜诪讚谉 讚注转讗 讛讜讗 诪砖讜诐 讗讬拽专讜讘讬 讚注转讗 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 讗讬拽专讘讗 诇讬讛 讚注转讗

According to the one who says the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, this works out well. According to the one who says the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, here too, this is an assessment of his intention. Why did he give her the additional sum of the marriage contract? It was due to a sense of intimacy between them, as they were betrothed and were planning to get married. Since he did demonstrate a sense of intimacy with her, the assessment is that he intended to give her the additional sum.

讬转讬讘 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讜拽讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻讜拽 拽专讬 拽专讗讱 诇讘专讗 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛

Rav 岣nina, who was known for teaching biblical verses, sat before Rabbi Yannai and said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Yannai said to him: Go out and read your verses outside. Your area of expertise is biblical verses, not halakha. What you said is incorrect and should not be said in the study hall, as the halakha is actually not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

讗诪专 专讘 讬爪讞拽 讘专 讗讘讚讬诪讬 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬谞讜 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛

Rav Yitz岣k bar Avdimi said in the name of our teacher, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rav Na岣an said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讬讚讬讛 讗诪专 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜谞讛专讚注讬 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讟 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讗诪专 讻诇 讚讬讬谞讗 讚讚讗讬谉 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讛讻讬 讜讛讻讬 转讬讛讜讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讛诇讻讛 诇诪注砖讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛

And Rav Na岣an also said his own statement: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And the Sages of Neharde鈥檃 say in the name of Rav Na岣an: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. The Gemara comments: And although Rav Na岣an cursed them and said: Any judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, such and such unspecified misfortune will happen to him, even so the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Since the Gemara presented a number of different opinions, it concludes: And the practical halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

讘注讬 专讘讬谉 谞讻谞住讛 诇讞讜驻讛 讜诇讗 谞讘注诇讛 诪讛讜 讞讬讘转 讞讜驻讛 拽讜谞讛 讗讜 讞讬讘转 讘讬讗讛 拽讜谞讛

搂 Since the practical halakha is that a woman who was divorced or widowed after betrothal receives the main sum of her marriage contract but not the additional sum, Ravin asks: What is the halakha with regard to a woman who entered the wedding canopy and is then widowed or divorced without having had sexual intercourse? Does the affection manifest in the wedding effect the marriage, and therefore she receives the additional sum as a married woman? Or, is it the affection manifest in the intercourse that effects the marriage, and consequently this woman is no different than a betrothed woman for the purpose of this halakha?

转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬 专讘 讬讜住祝 砖诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讗诇讗 注诇 讞讬讘转 诇讬诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讞讬讘转 讞讜驻讛 拽讜谞讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讚讗诪专 诇讬诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讞讬讘转 讘讬讗讛 拽讜谞讛 讘讬讗讛 讘诇讬诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 讗讬转讗 诪讻讗谉 讜讗讬诇讱 诇讬转讗

Come and hear that Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: He wrote the additional sum in the marriage contract for her only on account of the affection characteristic of the first night of the marriage. The Gemara asks: Granted, if you say that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, this is why it says the affection characteristic of the first night, as the wedding ceremony is performed on the first night only. But if you say that the affection manifest in the intercourse effects the marriage, is there intercourse only on the first night and then from this point forward there is none? Consequently, the baraita implies that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, and from that point on she is entitled to the additional sum of the marriage contract.

讜讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讞讜驻讛 讞讜驻讛 讘诇讬诇讛 讗讬转讗 讘讬诪诪讗 诇讬转讗 讜诇讟注诪讬讱 讘讬讗讛 讘诇讬诇讛 讗讬转讗 讘讬诪诪讗 诇讬转讗 讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 讛讬讛 讘讘讬转 讗驻诇 诪讜转专 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讗讜专讞 讗专注讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讘讬讗讛 讘诇讬诇讛

The Gemara rejects this proof: But rather, what is the advantage of interpreting the expression: Affection characteristic of the first night, as a reference to the wedding? Is there a wedding only at night and not during the day? The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, is there intercourse only at night and not during the day? Didn鈥檛 Rava say that although the Sages generally prohibited engaging in intercourse during the day, if it was in a dark house it is permitted? The Gemara rejects this question: This is not difficult. By employing this phrase, it teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior, i.e., that intercourse generally takes place at night.

讗诇讗 讞讜驻讛 拽砖讬讗 讞讜驻讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讬讜谉 讚住转诐 讞讜驻讛 诇讘讬讗讛 拽讬讬诪讗 讗讜专讞 讗专注讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讘诇讬诇讛

Rather, the opinion that the expression is a reference to the wedding is difficult, as a wedding does not have to take place at night. The Gemara responds: The wedding reference is also not difficult, since a reference to a wedding without specification means a wedding that takes place in order to lead directly to intercourse. By using this phrase, it similarly teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior, i.e., that intercourse generally takes place at night. Consequently, this baraita cannot be used as a proof for either possibility.

讘注讬 专讘 讗砖讬 谞讻谞住讛 诇讞讜驻讛 讜驻讬专住讛 谞讬讚讛 诪讛讜 讗诐 转讬诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讞讬讘转 讞讜驻讛 拽讜谞讛 讞讜驻讛 讚讞讝讬讗 诇讘讬讗讛 讗讘诇 讞讜驻讛 讚诇讗 讞讝讬讗 诇讘讬讗讛 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 砖谞讗 转讬拽讜

Rav Ashi asks a question similar to Ravin鈥檚: If the bride entered the wedding canopy and began menstruating, and the husband then died without ever engaging in intercourse with his wife, what is the halakha with regard to the additional sum of the marriage contract? If you say that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, does this refer specifically to a wedding in which the couple is fit to engage in intercourse, which involves greater affection, and a wedding in which the couple is not fit to engage in intercourse does not effect the marriage? Or, perhaps it is not different. The Sages could not answer this, so the question shall stand unresolved.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 专爪讛 讻讜转讘 诇讘转讜诇讛 讜讻讜壮 讜住讘专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讻讜转讘讬谉 砖讜讘专 讜讛转谞谉 诪讬 砖驻专注 诪拽爪转 讞讜讘讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讬祝 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讬讻转讜讘 诇讜 砖讜讘专

搂 The mishna states: Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes, he may write a marriage contract for a virgin for two hundred dinars, and she may then write a receipt as if he had paid part of that sum. They ask: And did Rabbi Yehuda hold that one writes a receipt for partial payment of a debt? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 170b): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, Rabbi Yehuda says: He should exchange the original promissory note for a new one that states the amount still owed, and Rabbi Yosei says: The lender should write him a receipt for the money he received? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a new note is preferable to a receipt because if the borrower loses the receipt, the lender is still in possession of a promissory note for the full amount and can collect a second time.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讻砖砖讜讘专转讛 诪转讜讻讛

Rabbi Yirmeya said: In the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda is referring to a case where the receipt is written within the marriage contract itself and not as a separate document. The husband is therefore not required to hold on to a receipt, and consequently Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 restriction against writing a receipt is not necessary.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讘砖讗讬谉 砖讜讘专转讛 诪转讜讻讛 讘砖诇诪讗 讛转诐 讜讚讗讬 驻专注讬讛 讚诇诪讗 诪讬专讻住 转讘专转讗 讜诪驻讬拽 诇讬讛 诇砖讟专讗 讜讛讚专 讙讘讬 讝讬诪谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛讻讗 讜讚讗讬 讬讛讘 诇讛 诪讬诇转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讛 诇讬讛 讗讬 谞讟专讬讛 谞讟专讬讛 讗讬 诇讗 谞讟专讬讛 讗讬讛讜 讛讜讗 讚讗驻住讬讚 讗谞驻砖讬讛

Abaye said: Even if you say that the mishna is referring to a case where the receipt is not written within it, it is logical that Rabbi Yehuda would make an exception in this case. Granted, there, in an ordinary case of a receipt, it is certain that the borrower repaid part of the loan, and consequently there is concern that perhaps he will lose the receipt and the lender will take out the promissory note and return and collect the entire payment again. But here, in the mishna, did the husband definitely give the wife part of the payment for the marriage contract? The receipt merely amounts to something she said to him in order to waive part of the payment, although she did not actually receive it. If he saved the receipt, he saved it; if he did not save it, it is he himself who will lose. Therefore, in this case, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that one writes a receipt.

讘砖诇诪讗 讗讘讬讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诇讗 拽转谞讬 砖讜讘专转讛 诪转讜讻讛 讗诇讗 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻讗讘讬讬 讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讘专 讚讛讻讗 讗讟讜 砖讜讘专 讚注诇诪讗

They ask: Granted, it is understandable why Abaye did not say his explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya, as the mishna does not teach explicitly that the receipt is written within the marriage contract. However, what is the reason that Rabbi Yirmeya did not say an explanation in accordance with the opinion of Abaye? Why does Rabbi Yirmeya limit the mishna to a case where the receipt was written within the marriage contract? The Gemara responds: Although this is an unusual case, as there is no concern that the receipt may be lost, there is nevertheless a rabbinic decree with regard to this receipt due to the typical case of receipts. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would not allow a receipt unless it was written into the marriage contract itself.

讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘讛 诇讬讛 讗讘诇 注诇 驻讛 诇讗 讗诪讗讬 讚讘专 砖讘诪诪讜谉 讛讜讗 讜砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讘诪诪讜谉 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐

With regard to the crux of the issue, the Gemara notes: The reason that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the wife can waive part of the main sum of her marriage contract is specifically because she wrote him a receipt. However, if she said it verbally, no, it is not effective, even according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: Why not? This is a monetary matter, and we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters in which someone makes a verbal stipulation, his stipulation stands.

讚转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 诇讬讱 注诇讬 砖讗专 讻住讜转 讜注讜谞讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘讚讘专 砖讘诪诪讜谉 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐

This is as it is taught in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): In the case of one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no ability to claim from me food, clothing, or conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his stipulation is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to monetary matters, such as food and clothing, his stipulation stands; therefore, if she verbally waives part of the marriage contract, and thereby makes a stipulation about a monetary matter, it should be effective.

拽住讘专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚专讘谞谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 注砖讜 讞讬讝讜拽 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 转讜专讛

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda holds: The marriage contract is a rabbinic law, and the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater force than Torah law. Therefore, if the wife waives part of the main sum of the marriage contract, Rabbi Yehuda holds that her declaration has no force unless it is written down. However, a Torah obligation, such as food and clothing, does not require this reinforcement, and consequently the wife may waive it with a verbal stipulation.

讛专讬 驻讬专讜转 讚专讘谞谉 讜诇讗 注讘讚讜 诇讛讜 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 注讚 砖讬讻转讜讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讜讘驻讬专讜转 驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 注讚 注讜诇诐

The Gemara challenges this answer: The husband鈥檚 entitlement to the produce of his wife鈥檚 property is a rabbinic decree, and nevertheless the Sages did not reinforce his rights to them, as we learned in a mishna (83a): Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the husband wrote that he waived his rights to the produce of his wife鈥檚 property, he may actually consume the produce of the produce of her property, meaning that he could invest the produce in additional property, which would also belong to his wife, but he would consume its produce. This applies unless he explicitly writes to her: I do not have any claim to your property, its produce, or the produce of its produce, forever.

讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 诪讗讬 讻讜转讘 讗讜诪专

And we maintain on this issue: What is the meaning of: Writes? It means: Says. In order to relinquish one鈥檚 claim to produce of the produce of his wife鈥檚 property, he does not necessarily need to write this in a document; it is sufficient to say it verbally in front of witnesses. It seems, therefore, that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a verbal stipulation is sufficient for a monetary matter of rabbinic law.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讻诇 讬砖 讻转讜讘讛 讜诇讗 诇讻诇 讬砖 驻讬专讜转 诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讻讬讞讗 注讘讚讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽 诪讬诇转讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 诇讗 注讘讚讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽

Abaye said: There is a distinction between the two cases. Every married woman has a marriage contract, but not all husbands have the right to produce, as not every woman brings property with her into the marriage. Therefore, in relation to a common matter, such as a marriage contract, the Sages reinforced their pronouncements about it by insisting that any stipulations to change the terms must be in writing. However, with regard to an uncommon matter, such as the produce of property, the Sages did not reinforce their pronouncements about it, and a verbal declaration is sufficient.

讛专讬 讞诪专讬诐 讚砖讻讬讞讬 讜诇讗 注讘讚讜 诇讛 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽

The Gemara challenges this answer: But with regard to the halakha of donkey drivers, which is a common matter, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that the Sages reinforced their pronouncements about it.

讚转谞谉 讛讞诪专讬谉 砖谞讻谞住讜 诇注讬专 讜讗诪专 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 砖诇讬 讞讚砖 讜砖诇 讞讘专讬 讬砖谉 砖诇讬 讗讬谞讜 诪转讜拽谉 讜砖诇 讞讘专讬 诪转讜拽谉 讗讬谉 谞讗诪谞讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 谞讗诪谞讬诐

This is as we learned in a mishna (Demai 4:7): In the case of donkey drivers who entered a city to sell their wares, and one of them said: My produce is from the new crop and is still moist and not as good, but my associate鈥檚 produce is from the old crop, or he said: Mine is not fit for use, i.e., tithes have not been separated, but my associate鈥檚 produce is fit for use, the drivers are not afforded credibility. There is a suspicion that they may be lying. They may have an arrangement between them where one will make this statement in one city and in the next city they will alternate, in order to appear credible, so that one will always be able to sell his wares. Rabbi Yehuda says: They are deemed credible. This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a verbal stipulation is sufficient even for a common monetary matter of rabbinic law.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讜讚讗讬 讚讚讘专讬讛诐 注讘讚讜 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽 住驻拽 讚讚讘专讬讛诐 诇讗 注讘讚讜 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽 专讘讗 讗诪专 讘讚诪讗讬 讛拽讬诇讜

Abaye said: There is a distinction between the cases. With regard to a certain matter involving a rabbinic decree, such as the main sum of the marriage contract, the Sages reinforced their pronouncements, but with regard to an uncertain matter involving a rabbinic decree, such as the case of the donkey drivers, the Sages did not reinforce their pronouncements. Rava said: The Sages did not reinforce their pronouncements in the case of the donkey drivers because, in general, they were lenient about questions concerning the prohibition of doubtfully tithed produce [demai], since the halakha of demai is itself a stringency, as most amei ha鈥檃retz separate tithes from their produce.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛驻讜讞转 讜讻讜壮 讻诇 讛驻讜讞转 讗驻讬诇讜 讘转谞讗讛 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讜讗讬转 诇讛 讜讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诇讬转 诇讬讱 讗诇讗 诪谞讛 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讛 讜讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讘注讬诇转讜 讘注讬诇转 讝谞讜转

搂 The mishna says: Rabbi Meir says: In the case of anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract to less than two hundred dinars for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a widow, this marriage amounts to licentious sexual intercourse. The Gemara makes an inference from the language of the mishna: The phrase: Anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract, means even if he made a stipulation and she agreed. Apparently, Rabbi Meir held that his stipulation in this case is void and she has the ability to collect the entire amount set by the Sages, but nevertheless since he said to her: You have only one hundred dinars, she does not rely on the marriage contract and does not see it as a true marriage, and therefore the intercourse becomes licentious sexual intercourse.

讜讛讗 砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 讻诇 讛诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讛讗 讘讚专讘谞谉 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐 拽住讘专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

But we have heard that Rabbi Meir said that anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void. This implies that if someone makes a stipulation on a rabbinic law his stipulation does stand, and therefore there is still a question as to why the stipulation about the marriage contract is void, as a marriage contract is a rabbinic ordinance. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Meir holds that a marriage contract is a requirement of Torah law. Consequently, if one made a stipulation to reduce the amount of the marriage contract, this is a stipulation counter to that which is written in the Torah, and it is void.

转谞讬讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛驻讜讞转 诇讘转讜诇讛 诪诪讗转讬诐 讜诇讗诇诪谞讛 诪诪谞讛 讛专讬 讝讜 讘注讬诇转 讝谞讜转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 专砖讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 专爪讛 讻讜转讘 诇讘转讜诇讛 砖讟专 砖诇 诪讗转讬诐 讜讛讬讗 讻讜转讘转 诇讜 讛转拽讘诇转讬 诪诪讱 诪谞讛 讜诇讗诇诪谞讛 诪谞讛 讜讛讬讗 讻讜转讘转 诇讜 讛转拽讘诇转讬 诪诪讱 讞诪砖讬诐 讝讜讝

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir says: In the case of anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract to lower than two hundred dinars for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a widow, this marriage amounts to licentious sexual intercourse. Rabbi Yosei says: One is permitted to reduce the amount by making a verbal stipulation, provided the wife agrees. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one wishes, he may write for a virgin a document for two hundred dinars, and she may write him a receipt stating: I received one hundred dinars from you. And similarly, for a widow one may write one hundred dinars and she may write for him: I received fifty dinars from you.

讜住讘专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 专砖讗讬 讜专诪讬谞讛讬 讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 讻转讜讘转 讗砖讛 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讻讬 诪讛 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 讬砖 讘讝讜 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谉 拽爪讜讘讬谉 讜驻讜讞转讬谉

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei actually hold that he is permitted to reduce the amount? The Gemara raises a contradiction based on a baraita: Collection of a woman鈥檚 marriage contract may not be made dependent upon movable property. This is a rabbinic decree enacted for the betterment of the world. Rabbi Yosei said: What betterment of the world is accomplished by this decree? The Gemara answers: The price of the movable property is not fixed, and therefore it might become devalued.

转谞讗 拽诪讗 谞诪讬 讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘砖诇讗 拽讘诇 注诇讬讜 讗讞专讬讜转 讗讘诇 拽讘诇 注诇讬讜 讗讞专讬讜转 注讜砖讬谉 讜讗转讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇诪讬诪专 讻讬 拽讬讘诇 注诇讬讜 讗讞专讬讜转 讗诪讗讬 注讜砖讬谉 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谉 拽爪讜讘讬谉 讜驻讜讞转讬谉

The Gemara analyzes the text of the baraita: The first tanna also said: A marriage contract may not be made dependent on movable property. What is Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 disagreement with him? Rather, is it not that this is what the first tanna said: In what case is this statement said? In a case where one did not provide a guarantee for the movable property. But if one did provide a guarantee, the marriage contract may be made dependent on it. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: Even if one provided a guarantee, why can the marriage contract be made dependent on it? The price is not fixed, and it may become devalued.

讛砖转讗 讜诪讛 讛转诐 讚讚诇诪讗 驻讞转讬 讞讬讬砖 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讻讗 讚讜讚讗讬 拽讗 驻讞转讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讛转诐 诇讗 讬讚注讛 讚转讞讬诇 讛讻讗 讬讚注讛 讜拽讗 诪讞诇讛

Now that the meaning of the baraita has been clarified, the Gemara asks: Just as there, in the case of movable property, where perhaps it will be devalued, Rabbi Yosei is concerned that the wife might not receive the full value of her marriage contract, here, where it will definitely be devalued, is it not all the more so clear that he would be concerned? The Gemara responds: How can these cases be compared? There, she does not know if her marriage contract will be devalued, and there is no reason to suppose that she will waive his obligation to her. But here, she knows and she waived it.

讗讞转讬讛 讚专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讛讜转 谞住讬讘讗 诇专讘 讗讜讬讗

The Gemara relates: The sister of Rami bar 岣ma was married to Rav Avya.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot 56

讗诇讗 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗讝诇讬 讘转专 讗讜诪讚谞讗

In any case, it has been established that Rav also follows the principle of assessing one鈥檚 intention, which calls into question the conclusion that Rabbi Natan is the one who said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rather, the Gemara concludes: Both Rav and Rabbi Natan follow the principle of assessing intention, and the debate can be explained in a different way.

诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 砖驻讬专 诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讗讜诪讚谉 讚注转讗 讛讜讗 诪砖讜诐 讗讬拽专讜讘讬 讚注转讗 讛讜讗 讜讛讗 讗讬拽专讘讗 诇讬讛 讚注转讗

According to the one who says the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, this works out well. According to the one who says the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, here too, this is an assessment of his intention. Why did he give her the additional sum of the marriage contract? It was due to a sense of intimacy between them, as they were betrothed and were planning to get married. Since he did demonstrate a sense of intimacy with her, the assessment is that he intended to give her the additional sum.

讬转讬讘 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 讜拽讗诪专 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻讜拽 拽专讬 拽专讗讱 诇讘专讗 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛

Rav 岣nina, who was known for teaching biblical verses, sat before Rabbi Yannai and said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Yannai said to him: Go out and read your verses outside. Your area of expertise is biblical verses, not halakha. What you said is incorrect and should not be said in the study hall, as the halakha is actually not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

讗诪专 专讘 讬爪讞拽 讘专 讗讘讚讬诪讬 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬谞讜 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛

Rav Yitz岣k bar Avdimi said in the name of our teacher, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rav Na岣an said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

讜专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讬讚讬讛 讗诪专 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜谞讛专讚注讬 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讟 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讜讗诪专 讻诇 讚讬讬谞讗 讚讚讗讬谉 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讛讻讬 讜讛讻讬 转讬讛讜讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛 讜讛诇讻讛 诇诪注砖讛 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘谉 注讝专讬讛

And Rav Na岣an also said his own statement: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And the Sages of Neharde鈥檃 say in the name of Rav Na岣an: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. The Gemara comments: And although Rav Na岣an cursed them and said: Any judge who rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, such and such unspecified misfortune will happen to him, even so the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Since the Gemara presented a number of different opinions, it concludes: And the practical halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.

讘注讬 专讘讬谉 谞讻谞住讛 诇讞讜驻讛 讜诇讗 谞讘注诇讛 诪讛讜 讞讬讘转 讞讜驻讛 拽讜谞讛 讗讜 讞讬讘转 讘讬讗讛 拽讜谞讛

搂 Since the practical halakha is that a woman who was divorced or widowed after betrothal receives the main sum of her marriage contract but not the additional sum, Ravin asks: What is the halakha with regard to a woman who entered the wedding canopy and is then widowed or divorced without having had sexual intercourse? Does the affection manifest in the wedding effect the marriage, and therefore she receives the additional sum as a married woman? Or, is it the affection manifest in the intercourse that effects the marriage, and consequently this woman is no different than a betrothed woman for the purpose of this halakha?

转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬 专讘 讬讜住祝 砖诇讗 讻转讘 诇讛 讗诇讗 注诇 讞讬讘转 诇讬诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讞讬讘转 讞讜驻讛 拽讜谞讛 讛讬讬谞讜 讚讗诪专 诇讬诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讞讬讘转 讘讬讗讛 拽讜谞讛 讘讬讗讛 讘诇讬诇讛 讛专讗砖讜谉 讗讬转讗 诪讻讗谉 讜讗讬诇讱 诇讬转讗

Come and hear that Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: He wrote the additional sum in the marriage contract for her only on account of the affection characteristic of the first night of the marriage. The Gemara asks: Granted, if you say that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, this is why it says the affection characteristic of the first night, as the wedding ceremony is performed on the first night only. But if you say that the affection manifest in the intercourse effects the marriage, is there intercourse only on the first night and then from this point forward there is none? Consequently, the baraita implies that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, and from that point on she is entitled to the additional sum of the marriage contract.

讜讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讞讜驻讛 讞讜驻讛 讘诇讬诇讛 讗讬转讗 讘讬诪诪讗 诇讬转讗 讜诇讟注诪讬讱 讘讬讗讛 讘诇讬诇讛 讗讬转讗 讘讬诪诪讗 诇讬转讗 讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诐 讛讬讛 讘讘讬转 讗驻诇 诪讜转专 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讗讜专讞 讗专注讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讘讬讗讛 讘诇讬诇讛

The Gemara rejects this proof: But rather, what is the advantage of interpreting the expression: Affection characteristic of the first night, as a reference to the wedding? Is there a wedding only at night and not during the day? The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, is there intercourse only at night and not during the day? Didn鈥檛 Rava say that although the Sages generally prohibited engaging in intercourse during the day, if it was in a dark house it is permitted? The Gemara rejects this question: This is not difficult. By employing this phrase, it teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior, i.e., that intercourse generally takes place at night.

讗诇讗 讞讜驻讛 拽砖讬讗 讞讜驻讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讬讜谉 讚住转诐 讞讜驻讛 诇讘讬讗讛 拽讬讬诪讗 讗讜专讞 讗专注讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讘诇讬诇讛

Rather, the opinion that the expression is a reference to the wedding is difficult, as a wedding does not have to take place at night. The Gemara responds: The wedding reference is also not difficult, since a reference to a wedding without specification means a wedding that takes place in order to lead directly to intercourse. By using this phrase, it similarly teaches us the ordinary mode of behavior, i.e., that intercourse generally takes place at night. Consequently, this baraita cannot be used as a proof for either possibility.

讘注讬 专讘 讗砖讬 谞讻谞住讛 诇讞讜驻讛 讜驻讬专住讛 谞讬讚讛 诪讛讜 讗诐 转讬诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讞讬讘转 讞讜驻讛 拽讜谞讛 讞讜驻讛 讚讞讝讬讗 诇讘讬讗讛 讗讘诇 讞讜驻讛 讚诇讗 讞讝讬讗 诇讘讬讗讛 诇讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 砖谞讗 转讬拽讜

Rav Ashi asks a question similar to Ravin鈥檚: If the bride entered the wedding canopy and began menstruating, and the husband then died without ever engaging in intercourse with his wife, what is the halakha with regard to the additional sum of the marriage contract? If you say that the affection manifest in the wedding effects the marriage, does this refer specifically to a wedding in which the couple is fit to engage in intercourse, which involves greater affection, and a wedding in which the couple is not fit to engage in intercourse does not effect the marriage? Or, perhaps it is not different. The Sages could not answer this, so the question shall stand unresolved.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 专爪讛 讻讜转讘 诇讘转讜诇讛 讜讻讜壮 讜住讘专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讻讜转讘讬谉 砖讜讘专 讜讛转谞谉 诪讬 砖驻专注 诪拽爪转 讞讜讘讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讬讞诇讬祝 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讬讻转讜讘 诇讜 砖讜讘专

搂 The mishna states: Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes, he may write a marriage contract for a virgin for two hundred dinars, and she may then write a receipt as if he had paid part of that sum. They ask: And did Rabbi Yehuda hold that one writes a receipt for partial payment of a debt? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 170b): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, Rabbi Yehuda says: He should exchange the original promissory note for a new one that states the amount still owed, and Rabbi Yosei says: The lender should write him a receipt for the money he received? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a new note is preferable to a receipt because if the borrower loses the receipt, the lender is still in possession of a promissory note for the full amount and can collect a second time.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讻砖砖讜讘专转讛 诪转讜讻讛

Rabbi Yirmeya said: In the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda is referring to a case where the receipt is written within the marriage contract itself and not as a separate document. The husband is therefore not required to hold on to a receipt, and consequently Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 restriction against writing a receipt is not necessary.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讘砖讗讬谉 砖讜讘专转讛 诪转讜讻讛 讘砖诇诪讗 讛转诐 讜讚讗讬 驻专注讬讛 讚诇诪讗 诪讬专讻住 转讘专转讗 讜诪驻讬拽 诇讬讛 诇砖讟专讗 讜讛讚专 讙讘讬 讝讬诪谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讛讻讗 讜讚讗讬 讬讛讘 诇讛 诪讬诇转讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讛 诇讬讛 讗讬 谞讟专讬讛 谞讟专讬讛 讗讬 诇讗 谞讟专讬讛 讗讬讛讜 讛讜讗 讚讗驻住讬讚 讗谞驻砖讬讛

Abaye said: Even if you say that the mishna is referring to a case where the receipt is not written within it, it is logical that Rabbi Yehuda would make an exception in this case. Granted, there, in an ordinary case of a receipt, it is certain that the borrower repaid part of the loan, and consequently there is concern that perhaps he will lose the receipt and the lender will take out the promissory note and return and collect the entire payment again. But here, in the mishna, did the husband definitely give the wife part of the payment for the marriage contract? The receipt merely amounts to something she said to him in order to waive part of the payment, although she did not actually receive it. If he saved the receipt, he saved it; if he did not save it, it is he himself who will lose. Therefore, in this case, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that one writes a receipt.

讘砖诇诪讗 讗讘讬讬 诇讗 讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诇讗 拽转谞讬 砖讜讘专转讛 诪转讜讻讛 讗诇讗 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讻讗讘讬讬 讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讘专 讚讛讻讗 讗讟讜 砖讜讘专 讚注诇诪讗

They ask: Granted, it is understandable why Abaye did not say his explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yirmeya, as the mishna does not teach explicitly that the receipt is written within the marriage contract. However, what is the reason that Rabbi Yirmeya did not say an explanation in accordance with the opinion of Abaye? Why does Rabbi Yirmeya limit the mishna to a case where the receipt was written within the marriage contract? The Gemara responds: Although this is an unusual case, as there is no concern that the receipt may be lost, there is nevertheless a rabbinic decree with regard to this receipt due to the typical case of receipts. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would not allow a receipt unless it was written into the marriage contract itself.

讟注诪讗 讚讻转讘讛 诇讬讛 讗讘诇 注诇 驻讛 诇讗 讗诪讗讬 讚讘专 砖讘诪诪讜谉 讛讜讗 讜砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 砖讘诪诪讜谉 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐

With regard to the crux of the issue, the Gemara notes: The reason that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the wife can waive part of the main sum of her marriage contract is specifically because she wrote him a receipt. However, if she said it verbally, no, it is not effective, even according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: Why not? This is a monetary matter, and we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters in which someone makes a verbal stipulation, his stipulation stands.

讚转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 讛专讬 讗转 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 诇讬讱 注诇讬 砖讗专 讻住讜转 讜注讜谞讛 讛专讬 讝讜 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘讚讘专 砖讘诪诪讜谉 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐

This is as it is taught in the Tosefta (Kiddushin 3:7): In the case of one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no ability to claim from me food, clothing, or conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his stipulation is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to monetary matters, such as food and clothing, his stipulation stands; therefore, if she verbally waives part of the marriage contract, and thereby makes a stipulation about a monetary matter, it should be effective.

拽住讘专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讻转讜讘讛 讚专讘谞谉 讜讞讻诪讬诐 注砖讜 讞讬讝讜拽 诇讚讘专讬讛诐 讬讜转专 诪砖诇 转讜专讛

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda holds: The marriage contract is a rabbinic law, and the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater force than Torah law. Therefore, if the wife waives part of the main sum of the marriage contract, Rabbi Yehuda holds that her declaration has no force unless it is written down. However, a Torah obligation, such as food and clothing, does not require this reinforcement, and consequently the wife may waive it with a verbal stipulation.

讛专讬 驻讬专讜转 讚专讘谞谉 讜诇讗 注讘讚讜 诇讛讜 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 讗讜讻诇 驻讬专讬 驻讬专讜转 注讚 砖讬讻转讜讘 诇讛 讚讬谉 讜讚讘专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讬 讘谞讻住讬讱 讜讘驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 讜讘驻讬专讜转 驻讬专讜转讬讛谉 注讚 注讜诇诐

The Gemara challenges this answer: The husband鈥檚 entitlement to the produce of his wife鈥檚 property is a rabbinic decree, and nevertheless the Sages did not reinforce his rights to them, as we learned in a mishna (83a): Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the husband wrote that he waived his rights to the produce of his wife鈥檚 property, he may actually consume the produce of the produce of her property, meaning that he could invest the produce in additional property, which would also belong to his wife, but he would consume its produce. This applies unless he explicitly writes to her: I do not have any claim to your property, its produce, or the produce of its produce, forever.

讜拽讬讬诪讗 诇谉 诪讗讬 讻讜转讘 讗讜诪专

And we maintain on this issue: What is the meaning of: Writes? It means: Says. In order to relinquish one鈥檚 claim to produce of the produce of his wife鈥檚 property, he does not necessarily need to write this in a document; it is sufficient to say it verbally in front of witnesses. It seems, therefore, that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a verbal stipulation is sufficient for a monetary matter of rabbinic law.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诇讻诇 讬砖 讻转讜讘讛 讜诇讗 诇讻诇 讬砖 驻讬专讜转 诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讻讬讞讗 注讘讚讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽 诪讬诇转讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讗 诇讗 注讘讚讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽

Abaye said: There is a distinction between the two cases. Every married woman has a marriage contract, but not all husbands have the right to produce, as not every woman brings property with her into the marriage. Therefore, in relation to a common matter, such as a marriage contract, the Sages reinforced their pronouncements about it by insisting that any stipulations to change the terms must be in writing. However, with regard to an uncommon matter, such as the produce of property, the Sages did not reinforce their pronouncements about it, and a verbal declaration is sufficient.

讛专讬 讞诪专讬诐 讚砖讻讬讞讬 讜诇讗 注讘讚讜 诇讛 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽

The Gemara challenges this answer: But with regard to the halakha of donkey drivers, which is a common matter, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that the Sages reinforced their pronouncements about it.

讚转谞谉 讛讞诪专讬谉 砖谞讻谞住讜 诇注讬专 讜讗诪专 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 砖诇讬 讞讚砖 讜砖诇 讞讘专讬 讬砖谉 砖诇讬 讗讬谞讜 诪转讜拽谉 讜砖诇 讞讘专讬 诪转讜拽谉 讗讬谉 谞讗诪谞讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 谞讗诪谞讬诐

This is as we learned in a mishna (Demai 4:7): In the case of donkey drivers who entered a city to sell their wares, and one of them said: My produce is from the new crop and is still moist and not as good, but my associate鈥檚 produce is from the old crop, or he said: Mine is not fit for use, i.e., tithes have not been separated, but my associate鈥檚 produce is fit for use, the drivers are not afforded credibility. There is a suspicion that they may be lying. They may have an arrangement between them where one will make this statement in one city and in the next city they will alternate, in order to appear credible, so that one will always be able to sell his wares. Rabbi Yehuda says: They are deemed credible. This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a verbal stipulation is sufficient even for a common monetary matter of rabbinic law.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讜讚讗讬 讚讚讘专讬讛诐 注讘讚讜 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽 住驻拽 讚讚讘专讬讛诐 诇讗 注讘讚讜 专讘谞谉 讞讬讝讜拽 专讘讗 讗诪专 讘讚诪讗讬 讛拽讬诇讜

Abaye said: There is a distinction between the cases. With regard to a certain matter involving a rabbinic decree, such as the main sum of the marriage contract, the Sages reinforced their pronouncements, but with regard to an uncertain matter involving a rabbinic decree, such as the case of the donkey drivers, the Sages did not reinforce their pronouncements. Rava said: The Sages did not reinforce their pronouncements in the case of the donkey drivers because, in general, they were lenient about questions concerning the prohibition of doubtfully tithed produce [demai], since the halakha of demai is itself a stringency, as most amei ha鈥檃retz separate tithes from their produce.

专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛驻讜讞转 讜讻讜壮 讻诇 讛驻讜讞转 讗驻讬诇讜 讘转谞讗讛 讗诇诪讗 拽住讘专 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讜讗讬转 诇讛 讜讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诇讬转 诇讬讱 讗诇讗 诪谞讛 诇讗 住诪讻讗 讚注转讛 讜讛讜讬讗 诇讛 讘注讬诇转讜 讘注讬诇转 讝谞讜转

搂 The mishna says: Rabbi Meir says: In the case of anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract to less than two hundred dinars for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a widow, this marriage amounts to licentious sexual intercourse. The Gemara makes an inference from the language of the mishna: The phrase: Anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract, means even if he made a stipulation and she agreed. Apparently, Rabbi Meir held that his stipulation in this case is void and she has the ability to collect the entire amount set by the Sages, but nevertheless since he said to her: You have only one hundred dinars, she does not rely on the marriage contract and does not see it as a true marriage, and therefore the intercourse becomes licentious sexual intercourse.

讜讛讗 砖诪注讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 讻诇 讛诪转谞讛 注诇 诪讛 砖讻转讜讘 讘转讜专讛 转谞讗讜 讘讟诇 讛讗 讘讚专讘谞谉 转谞讗讜 拽讬讬诐 拽住讘专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讻转讜讘讛 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

But we have heard that Rabbi Meir said that anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void. This implies that if someone makes a stipulation on a rabbinic law his stipulation does stand, and therefore there is still a question as to why the stipulation about the marriage contract is void, as a marriage contract is a rabbinic ordinance. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Meir holds that a marriage contract is a requirement of Torah law. Consequently, if one made a stipulation to reduce the amount of the marriage contract, this is a stipulation counter to that which is written in the Torah, and it is void.

转谞讬讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛驻讜讞转 诇讘转讜诇讛 诪诪讗转讬诐 讜诇讗诇诪谞讛 诪诪谞讛 讛专讬 讝讜 讘注讬诇转 讝谞讜转 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 专砖讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 专爪讛 讻讜转讘 诇讘转讜诇讛 砖讟专 砖诇 诪讗转讬诐 讜讛讬讗 讻讜转讘转 诇讜 讛转拽讘诇转讬 诪诪讱 诪谞讛 讜诇讗诇诪谞讛 诪谞讛 讜讛讬讗 讻讜转讘转 诇讜 讛转拽讘诇转讬 诪诪讱 讞诪砖讬诐 讝讜讝

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir says: In the case of anyone who reduces the amount of the marriage contract to lower than two hundred dinars for a virgin or one hundred dinars for a widow, this marriage amounts to licentious sexual intercourse. Rabbi Yosei says: One is permitted to reduce the amount by making a verbal stipulation, provided the wife agrees. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one wishes, he may write for a virgin a document for two hundred dinars, and she may write him a receipt stating: I received one hundred dinars from you. And similarly, for a widow one may write one hundred dinars and she may write for him: I received fifty dinars from you.

讜住讘专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 专砖讗讬 讜专诪讬谞讛讬 讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 讻转讜讘转 讗砖讛 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讻讬 诪讛 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 讬砖 讘讝讜 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谉 拽爪讜讘讬谉 讜驻讜讞转讬谉

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei actually hold that he is permitted to reduce the amount? The Gemara raises a contradiction based on a baraita: Collection of a woman鈥檚 marriage contract may not be made dependent upon movable property. This is a rabbinic decree enacted for the betterment of the world. Rabbi Yosei said: What betterment of the world is accomplished by this decree? The Gemara answers: The price of the movable property is not fixed, and therefore it might become devalued.

转谞讗 拽诪讗 谞诪讬 讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘砖诇讗 拽讘诇 注诇讬讜 讗讞专讬讜转 讗讘诇 拽讘诇 注诇讬讜 讗讞专讬讜转 注讜砖讬谉 讜讗转讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇诪讬诪专 讻讬 拽讬讘诇 注诇讬讜 讗讞专讬讜转 讗诪讗讬 注讜砖讬谉 讜讛诇讗 讗讬谉 拽爪讜讘讬谉 讜驻讜讞转讬谉

The Gemara analyzes the text of the baraita: The first tanna also said: A marriage contract may not be made dependent on movable property. What is Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 disagreement with him? Rather, is it not that this is what the first tanna said: In what case is this statement said? In a case where one did not provide a guarantee for the movable property. But if one did provide a guarantee, the marriage contract may be made dependent on it. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: Even if one provided a guarantee, why can the marriage contract be made dependent on it? The price is not fixed, and it may become devalued.

讛砖转讗 讜诪讛 讛转诐 讚讚诇诪讗 驻讞转讬 讞讬讬砖 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讻讗 讚讜讚讗讬 拽讗 驻讞转讛 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讻讬 讛砖转讗 讛转诐 诇讗 讬讚注讛 讚转讞讬诇 讛讻讗 讬讚注讛 讜拽讗 诪讞诇讛

Now that the meaning of the baraita has been clarified, the Gemara asks: Just as there, in the case of movable property, where perhaps it will be devalued, Rabbi Yosei is concerned that the wife might not receive the full value of her marriage contract, here, where it will definitely be devalued, is it not all the more so clear that he would be concerned? The Gemara responds: How can these cases be compared? There, she does not know if her marriage contract will be devalued, and there is no reason to suppose that she will waive his obligation to her. But here, she knows and she waived it.

讗讞转讬讛 讚专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讛讜转 谞住讬讘讗 诇专讘 讗讜讬讗

The Gemara relates: The sister of Rami bar 岣ma was married to Rav Avya.

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