Ketubot 59

מזונות תחת מעשה ידיה ומעה כסף תחת מותר וכיון דלא קא יהיב לה מעה כסף מותר דידה הוי רב אדא בר אהבה סבר תקנו מזונות תחת מותר ומעה כסף תחת מעשה ידיה וכיון דקא יהיב לה מזוני מותר דידיה הוי

sustenance in exchange for her earnings, and the silver ma’a coin that he must give her in exchange for the surplus that she continues to make beyond her quota. And since he does not give her a silver ma’a the surplus is hers, unless some of it is left after her death, in which case the husband inherits it. Rav Adda bar Ahava maintains that they established sustenance in exchange for the surplus, and a silver ma’a in exchange for her earnings. And since he provides her with sustenance, the surplus is his, and therefore the sanctity takes effect on it immediately when she produces the surplus.

במאי קמיפלגי מר סבר מידי דשכיח ממידי דשכיח ומר סבר מידי דקייץ ממידי דקייץ

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, i.e., Rav and Shmuel, holds that they established something common in exchange for something common. Consequently, they established sustenance, which is common, in exchange for earnings, which are also common. And one Sage, Rav Adda bar Ahava, holds that they established something with a fixed amount in exchange for something with a fixed amount. Consequently, since a silver ma’a is a fixed amount and the quota of a woman’s earnings is also fixed, they established one in exchange for the other.

מיתיבי תקנו מזונות תחת מעשה ידיה אימא תחת מותר מעשה ידיה

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s opinion from a baraita: They established sustenance in exchange for her earnings. Apparently, sustenance is not in exchange for the surplus. The Gemara answers by emending the text of the baraita: Say: They established sustenance in exchange for the surplus of her earnings.

תא שמע אם אינו נותן לה מעה כסף לצורכיה מעשה ידיה שלה אימא מותר מעשה ידיה שלה והא עלה קתני מה היא עושה לו משקל חמש סלעים שתי ביהודה

The Gemara attempts another proof from a mishna (64b): Come and hear: If he does not give her a silver ma’a for her needs, her earnings belong to her. This indicates that the earnings were established in exchange for the silver ma’a, as Rav Adda bar Ahava contended. The Gemara rejects this by emending the text of the mishna: Say: The surplus of her earnings belongs to her. The Gemara challenges the emendation: But it is taught in the continuation of this mishna: What is the fixed amount that she must earn for him? She must spin the weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee. This clause implies that the mishna is not discussing the surplus but rather the quota of her required earnings.

הכי קאמר מעשה ידיה כמה הוי דלידע מותר דידה כמה משקל חמש סלעים שתי ביהודה שהן עשר סלעים בגליל

The Gemara answers: This is what it is saying: How much is the required amount of her earnings, so that one can know how much of what she produces constitutes the surplus, and to this the mishna replied: The weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee.

אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוחנן הסנדלר

§ Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler. A husband may not consecrate his wife’s earnings at all, as they have not yet come into being.

ומי אמר שמואל הכי והתנן קונם שאני עושה לפיך אינו צריך להפר רבי עקיבא אומר יפר שמא תעדיף עליו יתר מן הראוי לו רבי יוחנן בן נורי אמר יפר שמא יגרשנה ותהא אסורה לחזור

The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If a woman said: What I make to feed you, i.e., what I earn for you, is forbidden like an offering [konam], the husband does not need to nullify this vow. She has a prior obligation to work for him, and therefore the konam cannot take effect on something that does not belong to her. Rabbi Akiva says: Even so, the husband should nullify the vow, lest she produce more earnings than is appropriate for him, and the konam will then take effect on the surplus amount. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: He should nullify the vow for a different reason, lest he divorce her. Since she rendered her earnings forbidden to him, she will be prohibited from remarrying him after her divorce, as it would then be impossible for him to avoid benefiting from his wife’s earnings.

ואמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן נורי כי אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן נורי להעדפה

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who maintains that the wife can render her future earnings prohibited to her husband before these earnings have come into being, with the prohibition to go into effect after she divorces. This would imply that Shmuel holds that it is possible to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, contrary to what Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler said. The Gemara answers: When Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, he was referring only to the surplus.

ולימא הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן נורי להעדפה אי נמי אין הלכה כתנא קמא אי נמי הלכה כרבי עקיבא

The Gemara asks: If so, let him say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus, or alternatively, he should say that the halakha is not in accordance with the first tanna, or alternatively, he should simply say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who is concerned about the surplus amount.

אלא אמר רב יוסף קונמות קאמרת שאני קונמות מתוך שאדם אוסר פירות חבירו עליו אדם מקדיש דבר שלא בא לעולם

Rather, explain it differently, as Rav Yosef said: Did you speak about konamot to prove your contention that one can consecrate objects that have not yet come into the world? Konamot are different, as they have a special status, since a person can prohibit another’s produce to himself. If one says to another: Your produce is konam to me, it is prohibited for him to eat that produce, although it does not belong to him and the prohibition will apply to it only when it reaches his domain. This indicates that a konam has unique power that enables a person to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, which according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler is an exception to the principle. Consequently, Shmuel’s ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri with regard to konamot is not relevant to his opinion on the issue of a wife’s earnings.

אמר ליה אביי בשלמא אדם אוסר פירות חבירו עליו שכן אדם אוסר פירותיו על חבירו יאסר דבר שלא בא לעולם על חבירו שכן אין אדם אוסר פירות חבירו על חבירו

Abaye said to him: This analogy cannot serve as a proof. Granted, a person can prohibit another’s produce to himself, but this is possible because a person can prohibit his own produce to another. In both cases there is at least one aspect of the prohibition that is in his domain, either when he forbids another’s produce to himself, or when he forbids produce in his own possession to others. However, one cannot prohibit an object that has not yet come into the world to another, since a person cannot prohibit another’s produce to another. Just as he cannot make a konam and render prohibited to another person produce that is not in his possession, he also cannot render prohibited to another person produce that has not yet come into the world. If so, how can a woman render her earnings prohibited to her husband by a konam if those earnings have not yet come into the world?

אלא אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע באומרת יקדשו ידי לעושיהם דידים איתנהו בעולם

Rather, the Gemara rejects that explanation and instead explains as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The mishna does not refer to a case where she said: My earnings are konam to you, but rather to one when she says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them, and this konam can take effect because the hands do exist in the world.

וכי קאמרה הכי מי מקדשן הא משעבדא ליה דאמרה לכי מיגרשה

The Gemara asks: When she says this in such terms does it become consecrated? She is subjugated to her husband with regard to her earnings, so how can she consecrate that which is not hers? The Gemara answers: She says that the consecration will take effect when she will get divorced from her husband.

ומי איכא מידי דאילו השתא לא קדיש ולקמיה קדיש אמר רבי אלעאי אלמה לא אילו האומר לחבירו שדה זו שאני מוכר לך לכשאקחנה ממך תיקדש מי לא קדשה

The Gemara asks: Is there anything one would do that if done at present, the consecration could not take effect and in the future the consecration could take effect? Rabbi Elai said: Why not? If one told another: This field that I am selling to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you, doesn’t that field become consecrated when he buys it back? It appears that one can cause an item to become consecrated in the future although at present he cannot consecrate it.

מתקיף לה רבי ירמיה מי דמי התם בידו להקדישה הכא אין בידה לגרש את עצמה הא לא דמיא אלא לאומר לחבירו שדה זו שמכרתי לך לכשאקחנה ממך תיקדש דלא קדשה

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this: Are these cases comparable? There, with regard to a field, since the field that he is selling belongs to him at the time of the sale, it is in his power to consecrate it now. Therefore, he can effect sanctity on it at a later point as well. But here, it is not in her power to divorce herself. Consequently, the analogy is invalid. Rather, this is comparable only to a different case, when one says to another: This field that I already sold to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you. In that case the field is not consecrated, as, when he said this the field was not in his possession, and one cannot consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world.

מתקיף לה רב פפא מי דמי התם גופא ופירות בידא דלוקח הכא גופה בידה הוא הא לא דמיא אלא לאומר לחבירו

Rav Pappa objects to this: Is Rav Yirmeya’s analogy comparable? There, the field itself and its produce are in the possession of the buyer, and therefore the seller cannot consecrate them. Here, her body is in her possession, as she owns her hands. Rather, this is comparable only to a case where one says to another:

שדה זו שמשכנתי לך לכשאפדנה ממך תיקדש דקדשה

This field that I mortgaged to you and from whose produce you are benefiting will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated, since the field itself was not transferred to another’s ownership.

מתקיף לה רב שישא בריה דרב אידי מי דמי התם בידו לפדותה הכא אין בידה לגרש עצמה הא לא דמיא אלא לאומר לחבירו שדה זו שמשכנתי לך לעשר שנים לכשאפדנה ממך תיקדש דקדשה

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: Is it comparable? There, in the case where he mortgaged the field, it is in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman who renders her earnings prohibited to her husband, it is not in her power to divorce herself from her husband. This is only comparable to one who says to another: This field that I have mortgaged to you for ten years will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated. Similarly, in this case, despite the fact that her earnings belong to her husband, when she will be divorced they will revert to her, and since her hands have always belonged to her, she can consecrate her earnings.

מתקיף לה רב אשי מי דמי התם לעשר שנים מיהא בידו לפדותה הכא אין בידה לגרש עצמה לעולם

Rav Ashi objects to this: Is it comparable? There, after ten years in any case it will be in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman, it is never in her power to divorce herself from her husband. Consequently, there is no way for her to consecrate her future earnings.

אלא אמר רב אשי קונמות קא אמרת שאני קונמות דקדושת הגוף נינהו וכדרבא דאמר רבא הקדש חמץ ושחרור מפקיעין מידי שיעבוד

Rather, the contradiction between the two rulings of Shmuel must be resolved in a different manner. Rav Ashi said: Did you speak about konamot? Konamot are different, since they are a type of inherent sanctity, and therefore the konam can take effect on an item that is subjugated to another person, in accordance with the halakha articulated by Rava. As Rava said: Consecration, the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and the liberation of a slave can all abrogate a lien on property. If property was mortgaged to another person, and then the owner consecrated it, or if leavened bread was mortgaged and Passover arrived and it became prohibited to benefit from it, or if a slave was mortgaged and then liberated by his owner, the lien is abrogated. Since konam is a form of consecration, it can take effect on an item even when it is subjugated to another when the owner prohibited it, similar to the case of mortgaged property.

ונקדשו מהשתא אלמוה רבנן לשיעבודיה דבעל כי היכי דלא תיקדש מהשתא

The Gemara asks: If it is so, that a konam can remove the lien on property, let her earnings become consecrated from now, even before her husband divorces her. The Gemara answers: The Sages reinforced the husband’s lien in order that it not become consecrated now. However, since in general a konam can take effect on mortgaged items, it can take effect on her earnings after she leaves her husband’s jurisdiction.

מתני׳ ואלו מלאכות שהאשה עושה לבעלה טוחנת ואופה ומכבסת מבשלת ומניקה את בנה מצעת לו המטה ועושה בצמר הכניסה לו שפחה אחת לא טוחנת ולא אופה ולא מכבסת שתים אין מבשלת ואין מניקה את בנה שלש אין מצעת לו המטה ואין עושה בצמר ארבע יושבת בקתדרא

MISHNA: And these are tasks that a wife must perform for her husband: She grinds wheat into flour, and bakes, and washes clothes, cooks, and nurses her child, makes her husband’s bed, and makes thread from wool by spinning it. If she brought him one maidservant, i.e., brought the maidservant with her into the marriage, the maidservant will perform some of these tasks. Consequently, the wife does not need to grind, and does not need to bake, and does not need to wash clothes. If she brought him two maidservants, she does not need to cook and does not need to nurse her child if she does not want to, but instead may give the child to a wet nurse. If she brought him three maidservants, she does not need to make his bed and does not need to make thread from wool. If she brought him four maidservants, she may sit in a chair [katedra] like a queen and not do anything, as her maidservants do all of her work for her.

רבי אליעזר אומר אפילו הכניסה לו מאה שפחות כופה לעשות בצמר שהבטלה מביאה לידי זימה רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר אף המדיר את אשתו מלעשות מלאכה יוציא ויתן כתובה שהבטלה מביאה לידי שיעמום

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he can compel her to make thread from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness. Consequently, it is better for a woman to be doing some kind of work. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows that his wife is prohibited from doing any work must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy.

גמ׳ טוחנת סלקא דעתך אלא אימא מטחנת ואיבעית אימא בריחיא דידא

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s choice of terminology the Gemara asks: Could it enter your mind that she grinds the wheat into flour? Ordinarily, grinding is performed in a mill using millstones that are rotated by water or by animals, so the woman herself does not actually grind the wheat. The Gemara answers: Rather, say that she supervises the grinding by bringing wheat to the mill and ensuring that it is ground properly. Alternatively, if you wish, say instead: She can grind the wheat herself with a hand mill.

מתניתין דלא כרבי חייא דתני רבי חייא אין אשה אלא ליופי אין אשה אלא לבנים ותני רבי חייא אין אשה אלא לתכשיטי אשה ותני רבי חייא הרוצה שיעדן את אשתו ילבישנה כלי פשתן הרוצה שילבין את בתו יאכילנה אפרוחים וישקנה חלב סמוך לפירקה

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: A wife is only for beauty, and a wife is only for children, but not for household tasks. And Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: A wife is only for wearing a woman’s finery. And Rabbi Ḥiyya similarly teaches: One who wishes to beautify his wife should clothe her in linen garments, and one who wishes to whiten his daughter so that she will have a fair complexion, should feed her young chickens, and should give her milk to drink toward the time of her maturity.

ומניקה את בנה לימא מתניתין דלא כבית שמאי דתניא נדרה שלא להניק את בנה בית שמאי אומרים שומטת דד מפיו בית הלל אומרים כופה ומניקתו נתגרשה אינו כופה ואם היה מכירה נותן לה שכרה וכופה ומניקתו מפני הסכנה

§ The mishna mentions among a wife’s obligations that she nurses her child. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it is taught in a baraita: If a woman took a vow not to nurse her child, Beit Shammai say: Since she vowed, she must remove her nipple from his mouth and not nurse him. Beit Hillel say: Her husband can compel her, and she must nurse the child even against her will. However, if she was divorced and therefore had no further obligations to her husband, he cannot compel her. Nevertheless, if the baby recognized her, then even after the divorce, her husband may pay her a salary as a wet nurse and compel her to nurse due to the danger that the child will starve if he refuses to nurse from another woman. This baraita indicates that according to Beit Shammai a woman has no obligation to nurse her child. If she had a prior obligation to her husband to nurse the child, the vow would not take effect.

אפילו תימא בית שמאי הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שנדרה היא וקיים לה הוא וקסברי בית שמאי הוא נותן אצבע בין שיניה ובית הלל סברי היא נתנה אצבע בין שיניה

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Even if you say that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, here we are dealing with a case where she made this vow and her husband ratified it for her by refraining from nullifying it. Beit Shammai maintain that in that case it is considered as if he had placed his finger between her teeth, i.e., he caused the vow to be in effect, meaning that in that case the responsibility lies with him. Since he declined the opportunity to nullify the vow, her obligation to nurse is canceled. Beit Hillel maintain that in that case she put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she caused the vow to remain in effect. Consequently, although he ratified her vow, the responsibility rests on her, and for this reason her obligation is not annulled.

ונפלגו בכתובה בעלמא ועוד תניא בית שמאי אומרים אינה מניקה אלא מחוורתא מתניתין דלא כבית שמאי

The Gemara asks: If so, that the dispute is about who is responsible when a woman vows and her husband ratifies the vow, and it is not specifically about her obligation to nurse her child, then let them dispute about a marriage contract in general, with regard to whether or not a woman is entitled to payment for her marriage contract if she vows to prohibit her husband from deriving benefit from her. And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai explicitly say with regard to all women, not specifically in the context of vows: She does not need to nurse if she does not want to. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

אם היה מכירה

The Gemara above quotes a baraita where it is taught that if the baby recognized her, her husband can compel her to continue nursing even after she is divorced, but he must pay her for nursing.