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Today's Daf Yomi

September 3, 2022 | 讝壮 讘讗诇讜诇 转砖驻状讘

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 59

This is the daf for Shabbat. For Friday鈥檚 daf please click here.
Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica’s parents Sheira and Steve Schacter. “It is fitting that this milestone anniversary falls in the tractate of Ketubot, and the discussion of the marriage contract. Their marriage, which has been filled with love, respect, understanding, compassion, and of course lots of humor has been a blessing to watch and learn from. May they continue to enjoy many more years of a happy and healthy married life together until 120.
Rav and Shmuel disagree with Rav Ada bar Ahava regarding the case in which Rabbi Meir is referring to when he says that when a man sanctifies his wife’s earnings beyond her salary, it is effective. What is the root of the debate between them? Rabbi Yochanan the Sandlar says it is not effective. Shmuel holds like him. However, since Rabbi Yochanan’s position is based on the assumption that one cannot sanctify items that are not yet in this world, how could Shmuel hold like him if he says elsewhere that one can sanctify things that are not in this world, as proven from a Mishna. The Gemara brings three possible resolutions – the first two are rejected. What are a wife’s household responsibilities to her husband? The Mishna lists various things such as laundry, cooking, nursing their son, etc. If she brings in maidservants, what responsibilities can she be absolved of? Can she not work at all? Is it bad for her not to be working and sitting idly? Is it possible our Mishna disagrees with Beit Shamai who holds that a woman can vow to nurse her son?

诪讝讜谞讜转 转讞转 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诪注讛 讻住祝 转讞转 诪讜转专 讜讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 拽讗 讬讛讬讘 诇讛 诪注讛 讻住祝 诪讜转专 讚讬讚讛 讛讜讬 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 住讘专 转拽谞讜 诪讝讜谞讜转 转讞转 诪讜转专 讜诪注讛 讻住祝 转讞转 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗 讬讛讬讘 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讬 诪讜转专 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讜讬

sustenance in exchange for her earnings, and the silver ma鈥檃 coin that he must give her in exchange for the surplus that she continues to make beyond her quota. And since he does not give her a silver ma鈥檃 the surplus is hers, unless some of it is left after her death, in which case the husband inherits it. Rav Adda bar Ahava maintains that they established sustenance in exchange for the surplus, and a silver ma鈥檃 in exchange for her earnings. And since he provides her with sustenance, the surplus is his, and therefore the sanctity takes effect on it immediately when she produces the surplus.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 诪讬讚讬 讚砖讻讬讞 诪诪讬讚讬 讚砖讻讬讞 讜诪专 住讘专 诪讬讚讬 讚拽讬讬抓 诪诪讬讚讬 讚拽讬讬抓

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, i.e., Rav and Shmuel, holds that they established something common in exchange for something common. Consequently, they established sustenance, which is common, in exchange for earnings, which are also common. And one Sage, Rav Adda bar Ahava, holds that they established something with a fixed amount in exchange for something with a fixed amount. Consequently, since a silver ma鈥檃 is a fixed amount and the quota of a woman鈥檚 earnings is also fixed, they established one in exchange for the other.

诪讬转讬讘讬 转拽谞讜 诪讝讜谞讜转 转讞转 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讗讬诪讗 转讞转 诪讜转专 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Adda bar Ahava鈥檚 opinion from a baraita: They established sustenance in exchange for her earnings. Apparently, sustenance is not in exchange for the surplus. The Gemara answers by emending the text of the baraita: Say: They established sustenance in exchange for the surplus of her earnings.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 谞讜转谉 诇讛 诪注讛 讻住祝 诇爪讜专讻讬讛 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜转专 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛 讜讛讗 注诇讛 拽转谞讬 诪讛 讛讬讗 注讜砖讛 诇讜 诪砖拽诇 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 砖转讬 讘讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara attempts another proof from a mishna (64b): Come and hear: If he does not give her a silver ma鈥檃 for her needs, her earnings belong to her. This indicates that the earnings were established in exchange for the silver ma鈥檃, as Rav Adda bar Ahava contended. The Gemara rejects this by emending the text of the mishna: Say: The surplus of her earnings belongs to her. The Gemara challenges the emendation: But it is taught in the continuation of this mishna: What is the fixed amount that she must earn for him? She must spin the weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee. This clause implies that the mishna is not discussing the surplus but rather the quota of her required earnings.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讻诪讛 讛讜讬 讚诇讬讚注 诪讜转专 讚讬讚讛 讻诪讛 诪砖拽诇 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 砖转讬 讘讬讛讜讚讛 砖讛谉 注砖专 住诇注讬诐 讘讙诇讬诇

The Gemara answers: This is what it is saying: How much is the required amount of her earnings, so that one can know how much of what she produces constitutes the surplus, and to this the mishna replied: The weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee.

讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛住谞讚诇专

Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan the Cobbler. A husband may not consecrate his wife鈥檚 earnings at all, as they have not yet come into being.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讬 讜讛转谞谉 拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 注讜砖讛 诇驻讬讱 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛驻专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 转注讚讬祝 注诇讬讜 讬转专 诪谉 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讗诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 讬讙专砖谞讛 讜转讛讗 讗住讜专讛 诇讞讝讜专

The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If a woman said: What I make to feed you, i.e., what I earn for you, is forbidden like an offering [konam], the husband does not need to nullify this vow. She has a prior obligation to work for him, and therefore the konam cannot take effect on something that does not belong to her. Rabbi Akiva says: Even so, the husband should nullify the vow, lest she produce more earnings than is appropriate for him, and the konam will then take effect on the surplus amount. Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri said: He should nullify the vow for a different reason, lest he divorce her. Since she rendered her earnings forbidden to him, she will be prohibited from remarrying him after her divorce, as it would then be impossible for him to avoid benefiting from his wife鈥檚 earnings.

讜讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 诇讛注讚驻讛

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, who maintains that the wife can render her future earnings prohibited to her husband before these earnings have come into being, with the prohibition to go into effect after she divorces. This would imply that Shmuel holds that it is possible to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, contrary to what Rabbi Yo岣nan the Cobbler said. The Gemara answers: When Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, he was referring only to the surplus.

讜诇讬诪讗 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 诇讛注讚驻讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗讬 谞诪讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

The Gemara asks: If so, let him say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus, or alternatively, he should say that the halakha is not in accordance with the first tanna, or alternatively, he should simply say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who is concerned about the surplus amount.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 拽讜谞诪讜转 拽讗诪专转 砖讗谞讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 诪转讜讱 砖讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讗讚诐 诪拽讚讬砖 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐

Rather, explain it differently, as Rav Yosef said: Did you speak about konamot to prove your contention that one can consecrate objects that have not yet come into the world? Konamot are different, as they have a special status, since a person can prohibit another鈥檚 produce to himself. If one says to another: Your produce is konam to me, it is prohibited for him to eat that produce, although it does not belong to him and the prohibition will apply to it only when it reaches his domain. This indicates that a konam has unique power that enables a person to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, which according to Rabbi Yo岣nan the Cobbler is an exception to the principle. Consequently, Shmuel鈥檚 ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri with regard to konamot is not relevant to his opinion on the issue of a wife鈥檚 earnings.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讘砖诇诪讗 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 砖讻谉 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转讬讜 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 讬讗住专 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 砖讻谉 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇 讞讘讬专讜

Abaye said to him: This analogy cannot serve as a proof. Granted, a person can prohibit another鈥檚 produce to himself, but this is possible because a person can prohibit his own produce to another. In both cases there is at least one aspect of the prohibition that is in his domain, either when he forbids another鈥檚 produce to himself, or when he forbids produce in his own possession to others. However, one cannot prohibit an object that has not yet come into the world to another, since a person cannot prohibit another鈥檚 produce to another. Just as he cannot make a konam and render prohibited to another person produce that is not in his possession, he also cannot render prohibited to another person produce that has not yet come into the world. If so, how can a woman render her earnings prohibited to her husband by a konam if those earnings have not yet come into the world?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讘讗讜诪专转 讬拽讚砖讜 讬讚讬 诇注讜砖讬讛诐 讚讬讚讬诐 讗讬转谞讛讜 讘注讜诇诐

Rather, the Gemara rejects that explanation and instead explains as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The mishna does not refer to a case where she said: My earnings are konam to you, but rather to one when she says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them, and this konam can take effect because the hands do exist in the world.

讜讻讬 拽讗诪专讛 讛讻讬 诪讬 诪拽讚砖谉 讛讗 诪砖注讘讚讗 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专讛 诇讻讬 诪讬讙专砖讛

The Gemara asks: When she says this in such terms does it become consecrated? She is subjugated to her husband with regard to her earnings, so how can she consecrate that which is not hers? The Gemara answers: She says that the consecration will take effect when she will get divorced from her husband.

讜诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗讬诇讜 讛砖转讗 诇讗 拽讚讬砖 讜诇拽诪讬讛 拽讚讬砖 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讗讬 讗诇诪讛 诇讗 讗讬诇讜 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 诪诪讱 转讬拽讚砖 诪讬 诇讗 拽讚砖讛

The Gemara asks: Is there anything one would do that if done at present, the consecration could not take effect and in the future the consecration could take effect? Rabbi Elai said: Why not? If one told another: This field that I am selling to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you, doesn鈥檛 that field become consecrated when he buys it back? It appears that one can cause an item to become consecrated in the future although at present he cannot consecrate it.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讘讬讚讜 诇讛拽讚讬砖讛 讛讻讗 讗讬谉 讘讬讚讛 诇讙专砖 讗转 注爪诪讛 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪讻专转讬 诇讱 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 诪诪讱 转讬拽讚砖 讚诇讗 拽讚砖讛

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this: Are these cases comparable? There, with regard to a field, since the field that he is selling belongs to him at the time of the sale, it is in his power to consecrate it now. Therefore, he can effect sanctity on it at a later point as well. But here, it is not in her power to divorce herself. Consequently, the analogy is invalid. Rather, this is comparable only to a different case, when one says to another: This field that I already sold to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you. In that case the field is not consecrated, as, when he said this the field was not in his possession, and one cannot consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讙讜驻讗 讜驻讬专讜转 讘讬讚讗 讚诇讜拽讞 讛讻讗 讙讜驻讛 讘讬讚讛 讛讜讗 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜

Rav Pappa objects to this: Is Rav Yirmeya鈥檚 analogy comparable? There, the field itself and its produce are in the possession of the buyer, and therefore the seller cannot consecrate them. Here, her body is in her possession, as she owns her hands. Rather, this is comparable only to a case where one says to another:

砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪砖讻谞转讬 诇讱 诇讻砖讗驻讚谞讛 诪诪讱 转讬拽讚砖 讚拽讚砖讛

This field that I mortgaged to you and from whose produce you are benefiting will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated, since the field itself was not transferred to another鈥檚 ownership.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖讬砖讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬讚讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讛 讛讻讗 讗讬谉 讘讬讚讛 诇讙专砖 注爪诪讛 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪砖讻谞转讬 诇讱 诇注砖专 砖谞讬诐 诇讻砖讗驻讚谞讛 诪诪讱 转讬拽讚砖 讚拽讚砖讛

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: Is it comparable? There, in the case where he mortgaged the field, it is in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman who renders her earnings prohibited to her husband, it is not in her power to divorce herself from her husband. This is only comparable to one who says to another: This field that I have mortgaged to you for ten years will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated. Similarly, in this case, despite the fact that her earnings belong to her husband, when she will be divorced they will revert to her, and since her hands have always belonged to her, she can consecrate her earnings.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 诇注砖专 砖谞讬诐 诪讬讛讗 讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讛 讛讻讗 讗讬谉 讘讬讚讛 诇讙专砖 注爪诪讛 诇注讜诇诐

Rav Ashi objects to this: Is it comparable? There, after ten years in any case it will be in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman, it is never in her power to divorce herself from her husband. Consequently, there is no way for her to consecrate her future earnings.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 拽讗 讗诪专转 砖讗谞讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 讚拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛拽讚砖 讞诪抓 讜砖讞专讜专 诪驻拽讬注讬谉 诪讬讚讬 砖讬注讘讜讚

Rather, the contradiction between the two rulings of Shmuel must be resolved in a different manner. Rav Ashi said: Did you speak about konamot? Konamot are different, since they are a type of inherent sanctity, and therefore the konam can take effect on an item that is subjugated to another person, in accordance with the halakha articulated by Rava. As Rava said: Consecration, the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and the liberation of a slave can all abrogate a lien on property. If property was mortgaged to another person, and then the owner consecrated it, or if leavened bread was mortgaged and Passover arrived and it became prohibited to benefit from it, or if a slave was mortgaged and then liberated by his owner, the lien is abrogated. Since konam is a form of consecration, it can take effect on an item even when it is subjugated to another when the owner prohibited it, similar to the case of mortgaged property.

讜谞拽讚砖讜 诪讛砖转讗 讗诇诪讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇砖讬注讘讜讚讬讛 讚讘注诇 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 转讬拽讚砖 诪讛砖转讗

The Gemara asks: If it is so, that a konam can remove the lien on property, let her earnings become consecrated from now, even before her husband divorces her. The Gemara answers: The Sages reinforced the husband鈥檚 lien in order that it not become consecrated now. However, since in general a konam can take effect on mortgaged items, it can take effect on her earnings after she leaves her husband鈥檚 jurisdiction.

诪转谞讬壮 讜讗诇讜 诪诇讗讻讜转 砖讛讗砖讛 注讜砖讛 诇讘注诇讛 讟讜讞谞转 讜讗讜驻讛 讜诪讻讘住转 诪讘砖诇转 讜诪谞讬拽讛 讗转 讘谞讛 诪爪注转 诇讜 讛诪讟讛 讜注讜砖讛 讘爪诪专 讛讻谞讬住讛 诇讜 砖驻讞讛 讗讞转 诇讗 讟讜讞谞转 讜诇讗 讗讜驻讛 讜诇讗 诪讻讘住转 砖转讬诐 讗讬谉 诪讘砖诇转 讜讗讬谉 诪谞讬拽讛 讗转 讘谞讛 砖诇砖 讗讬谉 诪爪注转 诇讜 讛诪讟讛 讜讗讬谉 注讜砖讛 讘爪诪专 讗专讘注 讬讜砖讘转 讘拽转讚专讗

MISHNA: And these are tasks that a wife must perform for her husband: She grinds wheat into flour, and bakes, and washes clothes, cooks, and nurses her child, makes her husband鈥檚 bed, and makes thread from wool by spinning it. If she brought him one maidservant, i.e., brought the maidservant with her into the marriage, the maidservant will perform some of these tasks. Consequently, the wife does not need to grind, and does not need to bake, and does not need to wash clothes. If she brought him two maidservants, she does not need to cook and does not need to nurse her child if she does not want to, but instead may give the child to a wet nurse. If she brought him three maidservants, she does not need to make his bed and does not need to make thread from wool. If she brought him four maidservants, she may sit in a chair [katedra] like a queen and not do anything, as her maidservants do all of her work for her.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻谞讬住讛 诇讜 诪讗讛 砖驻讞讜转 讻讜驻讛 诇注砖讜转 讘爪诪专 砖讛讘讟诇讛 诪讘讬讗讛 诇讬讚讬 讝讬诪讛 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗祝 讛诪讚讬专 讗转 讗砖转讜 诪诇注砖讜转 诪诇讗讻讛 讬讜爪讬讗 讜讬转谉 讻转讜讘讛 砖讛讘讟诇讛 诪讘讬讗讛 诇讬讚讬 砖讬注诪讜诐

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he can compel her to make thread from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness. Consequently, it is better for a woman to be doing some kind of work. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows that his wife is prohibited from doing any work must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy.

讙诪壮 讟讜讞谞转 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讟讞谞转 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讘专讬讞讬讗 讚讬讚讗

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna鈥檚 choice of terminology the Gemara asks: Could it enter your mind that she grinds the wheat into flour? Ordinarily, grinding is performed in a mill using millstones that are rotated by water or by animals, so the woman herself does not actually grind the wheat. The Gemara answers: Rather, say that she supervises the grinding by bringing wheat to the mill and ensuring that it is ground properly. Alternatively, if you wish, say instead: She can grind the wheat herself with a hand mill.

诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讗讬谉 讗砖讛 讗诇讗 诇讬讜驻讬 讗讬谉 讗砖讛 讗诇讗 诇讘谞讬诐 讜转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讗讬谉 讗砖讛 讗诇讗 诇转讻砖讬讟讬 讗砖讛 讜转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讛专讜爪讛 砖讬注讚谉 讗转 讗砖转讜 讬诇讘讬砖谞讛 讻诇讬 驻砖转谉 讛专讜爪讛 砖讬诇讘讬谉 讗转 讘转讜 讬讗讻讬诇谞讛 讗驻专讜讞讬诐 讜讬砖拽谞讛 讞诇讘 住诪讜讱 诇驻讬专拽讛

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya, as Rabbi 岣yya teaches: A wife is only for beauty, and a wife is only for children, but not for household tasks. And Rabbi 岣yya teaches: A wife is only for wearing a woman鈥檚 finery. And Rabbi 岣yya similarly teaches: One who wishes to beautify his wife should clothe her in linen garments, and one who wishes to whiten his daughter so that she will have a fair complexion, should feed her young chickens, and should give her milk to drink toward the time of her maturity.

讜诪谞讬拽讛 讗转 讘谞讛 诇讬诪讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讚转谞讬讗 谞讚专讛 砖诇讗 诇讛谞讬拽 讗转 讘谞讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖讜诪讟转 讚讚 诪驻讬讜 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻讜驻讛 讜诪谞讬拽转讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讗讬谞讜 讻讜驻讛 讜讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讻讬专讛 谞讜转谉 诇讛 砖讻专讛 讜讻讜驻讛 讜诪谞讬拽转讜 诪驻谞讬 讛住讻谞讛

搂 The mishna mentions among a wife鈥檚 obligations that she nurses her child. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it is taught in a baraita: If a woman took a vow not to nurse her child, Beit Shammai say: Since she vowed, she must remove her nipple from his mouth and not nurse him. Beit Hillel say: Her husband can compel her, and she must nurse the child even against her will. However, if she was divorced and therefore had no further obligations to her husband, he cannot compel her. Nevertheless, if the baby recognized her, then even after the divorce, her husband may pay her a salary as a wet nurse and compel her to nurse due to the danger that the child will starve if he refuses to nurse from another woman. This baraita indicates that according to Beit Shammai a woman has no obligation to nurse her child. If she had a prior obligation to her husband to nurse the child, the vow would not take effect.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖谞讚专讛 讛讬讗 讜拽讬讬诐 诇讛 讛讜讗 讜拽住讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讜讗 谞讜转谉 讗爪讘注 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讬讛 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 住讘专讬 讛讬讗 谞转谞讛 讗爪讘注 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讬讛

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Even if you say that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, here we are dealing with a case where she made this vow and her husband ratified it for her by refraining from nullifying it. Beit Shammai maintain that in that case it is considered as if he had placed his finger between her teeth, i.e., he caused the vow to be in effect, meaning that in that case the responsibility lies with him. Since he declined the opportunity to nullify the vow, her obligation to nurse is canceled. Beit Hillel maintain that in that case she put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she caused the vow to remain in effect. Consequently, although he ratified her vow, the responsibility rests on her, and for this reason her obligation is not annulled.

讜谞驻诇讙讜 讘讻转讜讘讛 讘注诇诪讗 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪谞讬拽讛 讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讘讬转 砖诪讗讬

The Gemara asks: If so, that the dispute is about who is responsible when a woman vows and her husband ratifies the vow, and it is not specifically about her obligation to nurse her child, then let them dispute about a marriage contract in general, with regard to whether or not a woman is entitled to payment for her marriage contract if she vows to prohibit her husband from deriving benefit from her. And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai explicitly say with regard to all women, not specifically in the context of vows: She does not need to nurse if she does not want to. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讻讬专讛

The Gemara above quotes a baraita where it is taught that if the baby recognized her, her husband can compel her to continue nursing even after she is divorced, but he must pay her for nursing.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot 59

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 59

诪讝讜谞讜转 转讞转 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诪注讛 讻住祝 转讞转 诪讜转专 讜讻讬讜谉 讚诇讗 拽讗 讬讛讬讘 诇讛 诪注讛 讻住祝 诪讜转专 讚讬讚讛 讛讜讬 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 住讘专 转拽谞讜 诪讝讜谞讜转 转讞转 诪讜转专 讜诪注讛 讻住祝 转讞转 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜讻讬讜谉 讚拽讗 讬讛讬讘 诇讛 诪讝讜谞讬 诪讜转专 讚讬讚讬讛 讛讜讬

sustenance in exchange for her earnings, and the silver ma鈥檃 coin that he must give her in exchange for the surplus that she continues to make beyond her quota. And since he does not give her a silver ma鈥檃 the surplus is hers, unless some of it is left after her death, in which case the husband inherits it. Rav Adda bar Ahava maintains that they established sustenance in exchange for the surplus, and a silver ma鈥檃 in exchange for her earnings. And since he provides her with sustenance, the surplus is his, and therefore the sanctity takes effect on it immediately when she produces the surplus.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 诪讬讚讬 讚砖讻讬讞 诪诪讬讚讬 讚砖讻讬讞 讜诪专 住讘专 诪讬讚讬 讚拽讬讬抓 诪诪讬讚讬 讚拽讬讬抓

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, i.e., Rav and Shmuel, holds that they established something common in exchange for something common. Consequently, they established sustenance, which is common, in exchange for earnings, which are also common. And one Sage, Rav Adda bar Ahava, holds that they established something with a fixed amount in exchange for something with a fixed amount. Consequently, since a silver ma鈥檃 is a fixed amount and the quota of a woman鈥檚 earnings is also fixed, they established one in exchange for the other.

诪讬转讬讘讬 转拽谞讜 诪讝讜谞讜转 转讞转 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讗讬诪讗 转讞转 诪讜转专 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Adda bar Ahava鈥檚 opinion from a baraita: They established sustenance in exchange for her earnings. Apparently, sustenance is not in exchange for the surplus. The Gemara answers by emending the text of the baraita: Say: They established sustenance in exchange for the surplus of her earnings.

转讗 砖诪注 讗诐 讗讬谞讜 谞讜转谉 诇讛 诪注讛 讻住祝 诇爪讜专讻讬讛 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜转专 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 砖诇讛 讜讛讗 注诇讛 拽转谞讬 诪讛 讛讬讗 注讜砖讛 诇讜 诪砖拽诇 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 砖转讬 讘讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara attempts another proof from a mishna (64b): Come and hear: If he does not give her a silver ma鈥檃 for her needs, her earnings belong to her. This indicates that the earnings were established in exchange for the silver ma鈥檃, as Rav Adda bar Ahava contended. The Gemara rejects this by emending the text of the mishna: Say: The surplus of her earnings belongs to her. The Gemara challenges the emendation: But it is taught in the continuation of this mishna: What is the fixed amount that she must earn for him? She must spin the weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee. This clause implies that the mishna is not discussing the surplus but rather the quota of her required earnings.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讻诪讛 讛讜讬 讚诇讬讚注 诪讜转专 讚讬讚讛 讻诪讛 诪砖拽诇 讞诪砖 住诇注讬诐 砖转讬 讘讬讛讜讚讛 砖讛谉 注砖专 住诇注讬诐 讘讙诇讬诇

The Gemara answers: This is what it is saying: How much is the required amount of her earnings, so that one can know how much of what she produces constitutes the surplus, and to this the mishna replied: The weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee.

讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛住谞讚诇专

Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan the Cobbler. A husband may not consecrate his wife鈥檚 earnings at all, as they have not yet come into being.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讬 讜讛转谞谉 拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 注讜砖讛 诇驻讬讱 讗讬谞讜 爪专讬讱 诇讛驻专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 转注讚讬祝 注诇讬讜 讬转专 诪谉 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讗诪专 讬驻专 砖诪讗 讬讙专砖谞讛 讜转讛讗 讗住讜专讛 诇讞讝讜专

The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If a woman said: What I make to feed you, i.e., what I earn for you, is forbidden like an offering [konam], the husband does not need to nullify this vow. She has a prior obligation to work for him, and therefore the konam cannot take effect on something that does not belong to her. Rabbi Akiva says: Even so, the husband should nullify the vow, lest she produce more earnings than is appropriate for him, and the konam will then take effect on the surplus amount. Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri said: He should nullify the vow for a different reason, lest he divorce her. Since she rendered her earnings forbidden to him, she will be prohibited from remarrying him after her divorce, as it would then be impossible for him to avoid benefiting from his wife鈥檚 earnings.

讜讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 讻讬 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 诇讛注讚驻讛

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, who maintains that the wife can render her future earnings prohibited to her husband before these earnings have come into being, with the prohibition to go into effect after she divorces. This would imply that Shmuel holds that it is possible to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, contrary to what Rabbi Yo岣nan the Cobbler said. The Gemara answers: When Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, he was referring only to the surplus.

讜诇讬诪讗 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 谞讜专讬 诇讛注讚驻讛 讗讬 谞诪讬 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻转谞讗 拽诪讗 讗讬 谞诪讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗

The Gemara asks: If so, let him say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus, or alternatively, he should say that the halakha is not in accordance with the first tanna, or alternatively, he should simply say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who is concerned about the surplus amount.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 拽讜谞诪讜转 拽讗诪专转 砖讗谞讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 诪转讜讱 砖讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 讗讚诐 诪拽讚讬砖 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐

Rather, explain it differently, as Rav Yosef said: Did you speak about konamot to prove your contention that one can consecrate objects that have not yet come into the world? Konamot are different, as they have a special status, since a person can prohibit another鈥檚 produce to himself. If one says to another: Your produce is konam to me, it is prohibited for him to eat that produce, although it does not belong to him and the prohibition will apply to it only when it reaches his domain. This indicates that a konam has unique power that enables a person to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, which according to Rabbi Yo岣nan the Cobbler is an exception to the principle. Consequently, Shmuel鈥檚 ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri with regard to konamot is not relevant to his opinion on the issue of a wife鈥檚 earnings.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讘砖诇诪讗 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇讬讜 砖讻谉 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转讬讜 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 讬讗住专 讚讘专 砖诇讗 讘讗 诇注讜诇诐 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 砖讻谉 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 讗讜住专 驻讬专讜转 讞讘讬专讜 注诇 讞讘讬专讜

Abaye said to him: This analogy cannot serve as a proof. Granted, a person can prohibit another鈥檚 produce to himself, but this is possible because a person can prohibit his own produce to another. In both cases there is at least one aspect of the prohibition that is in his domain, either when he forbids another鈥檚 produce to himself, or when he forbids produce in his own possession to others. However, one cannot prohibit an object that has not yet come into the world to another, since a person cannot prohibit another鈥檚 produce to another. Just as he cannot make a konam and render prohibited to another person produce that is not in his possession, he also cannot render prohibited to another person produce that has not yet come into the world. If so, how can a woman render her earnings prohibited to her husband by a konam if those earnings have not yet come into the world?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讛讜砖注 讘讗讜诪专转 讬拽讚砖讜 讬讚讬 诇注讜砖讬讛诐 讚讬讚讬诐 讗讬转谞讛讜 讘注讜诇诐

Rather, the Gemara rejects that explanation and instead explains as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The mishna does not refer to a case where she said: My earnings are konam to you, but rather to one when she says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them, and this konam can take effect because the hands do exist in the world.

讜讻讬 拽讗诪专讛 讛讻讬 诪讬 诪拽讚砖谉 讛讗 诪砖注讘讚讗 诇讬讛 讚讗诪专讛 诇讻讬 诪讬讙专砖讛

The Gemara asks: When she says this in such terms does it become consecrated? She is subjugated to her husband with regard to her earnings, so how can she consecrate that which is not hers? The Gemara answers: She says that the consecration will take effect when she will get divorced from her husband.

讜诪讬 讗讬讻讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讗讬诇讜 讛砖转讗 诇讗 拽讚讬砖 讜诇拽诪讬讛 拽讚讬砖 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讗讬 讗诇诪讛 诇讗 讗讬诇讜 讛讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 诪诪讱 转讬拽讚砖 诪讬 诇讗 拽讚砖讛

The Gemara asks: Is there anything one would do that if done at present, the consecration could not take effect and in the future the consecration could take effect? Rabbi Elai said: Why not? If one told another: This field that I am selling to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you, doesn鈥檛 that field become consecrated when he buys it back? It appears that one can cause an item to become consecrated in the future although at present he cannot consecrate it.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讘讬讚讜 诇讛拽讚讬砖讛 讛讻讗 讗讬谉 讘讬讚讛 诇讙专砖 讗转 注爪诪讛 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪讻专转讬 诇讱 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 诪诪讱 转讬拽讚砖 讚诇讗 拽讚砖讛

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this: Are these cases comparable? There, with regard to a field, since the field that he is selling belongs to him at the time of the sale, it is in his power to consecrate it now. Therefore, he can effect sanctity on it at a later point as well. But here, it is not in her power to divorce herself. Consequently, the analogy is invalid. Rather, this is comparable only to a different case, when one says to another: This field that I already sold to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you. In that case the field is not consecrated, as, when he said this the field was not in his possession, and one cannot consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讙讜驻讗 讜驻讬专讜转 讘讬讚讗 讚诇讜拽讞 讛讻讗 讙讜驻讛 讘讬讚讛 讛讜讗 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜

Rav Pappa objects to this: Is Rav Yirmeya鈥檚 analogy comparable? There, the field itself and its produce are in the possession of the buyer, and therefore the seller cannot consecrate them. Here, her body is in her possession, as she owns her hands. Rather, this is comparable only to a case where one says to another:

砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪砖讻谞转讬 诇讱 诇讻砖讗驻讚谞讛 诪诪讱 转讬拽讚砖 讚拽讚砖讛

This field that I mortgaged to you and from whose produce you are benefiting will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated, since the field itself was not transferred to another鈥檚 ownership.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖讬砖讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬讚讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讛 讛讻讗 讗讬谉 讘讬讚讛 诇讙专砖 注爪诪讛 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪砖讻谞转讬 诇讱 诇注砖专 砖谞讬诐 诇讻砖讗驻讚谞讛 诪诪讱 转讬拽讚砖 讚拽讚砖讛

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: Is it comparable? There, in the case where he mortgaged the field, it is in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman who renders her earnings prohibited to her husband, it is not in her power to divorce herself from her husband. This is only comparable to one who says to another: This field that I have mortgaged to you for ten years will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated. Similarly, in this case, despite the fact that her earnings belong to her husband, when she will be divorced they will revert to her, and since her hands have always belonged to her, she can consecrate her earnings.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 诇注砖专 砖谞讬诐 诪讬讛讗 讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讛 讛讻讗 讗讬谉 讘讬讚讛 诇讙专砖 注爪诪讛 诇注讜诇诐

Rav Ashi objects to this: Is it comparable? There, after ten years in any case it will be in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman, it is never in her power to divorce herself from her husband. Consequently, there is no way for her to consecrate her future earnings.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 拽讗 讗诪专转 砖讗谞讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 讚拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讻讚专讘讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛拽讚砖 讞诪抓 讜砖讞专讜专 诪驻拽讬注讬谉 诪讬讚讬 砖讬注讘讜讚

Rather, the contradiction between the two rulings of Shmuel must be resolved in a different manner. Rav Ashi said: Did you speak about konamot? Konamot are different, since they are a type of inherent sanctity, and therefore the konam can take effect on an item that is subjugated to another person, in accordance with the halakha articulated by Rava. As Rava said: Consecration, the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and the liberation of a slave can all abrogate a lien on property. If property was mortgaged to another person, and then the owner consecrated it, or if leavened bread was mortgaged and Passover arrived and it became prohibited to benefit from it, or if a slave was mortgaged and then liberated by his owner, the lien is abrogated. Since konam is a form of consecration, it can take effect on an item even when it is subjugated to another when the owner prohibited it, similar to the case of mortgaged property.

讜谞拽讚砖讜 诪讛砖转讗 讗诇诪讜讛 专讘谞谉 诇砖讬注讘讜讚讬讛 讚讘注诇 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚诇讗 转讬拽讚砖 诪讛砖转讗

The Gemara asks: If it is so, that a konam can remove the lien on property, let her earnings become consecrated from now, even before her husband divorces her. The Gemara answers: The Sages reinforced the husband鈥檚 lien in order that it not become consecrated now. However, since in general a konam can take effect on mortgaged items, it can take effect on her earnings after she leaves her husband鈥檚 jurisdiction.

诪转谞讬壮 讜讗诇讜 诪诇讗讻讜转 砖讛讗砖讛 注讜砖讛 诇讘注诇讛 讟讜讞谞转 讜讗讜驻讛 讜诪讻讘住转 诪讘砖诇转 讜诪谞讬拽讛 讗转 讘谞讛 诪爪注转 诇讜 讛诪讟讛 讜注讜砖讛 讘爪诪专 讛讻谞讬住讛 诇讜 砖驻讞讛 讗讞转 诇讗 讟讜讞谞转 讜诇讗 讗讜驻讛 讜诇讗 诪讻讘住转 砖转讬诐 讗讬谉 诪讘砖诇转 讜讗讬谉 诪谞讬拽讛 讗转 讘谞讛 砖诇砖 讗讬谉 诪爪注转 诇讜 讛诪讟讛 讜讗讬谉 注讜砖讛 讘爪诪专 讗专讘注 讬讜砖讘转 讘拽转讚专讗

MISHNA: And these are tasks that a wife must perform for her husband: She grinds wheat into flour, and bakes, and washes clothes, cooks, and nurses her child, makes her husband鈥檚 bed, and makes thread from wool by spinning it. If she brought him one maidservant, i.e., brought the maidservant with her into the marriage, the maidservant will perform some of these tasks. Consequently, the wife does not need to grind, and does not need to bake, and does not need to wash clothes. If she brought him two maidservants, she does not need to cook and does not need to nurse her child if she does not want to, but instead may give the child to a wet nurse. If she brought him three maidservants, she does not need to make his bed and does not need to make thread from wool. If she brought him four maidservants, she may sit in a chair [katedra] like a queen and not do anything, as her maidservants do all of her work for her.

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻谞讬住讛 诇讜 诪讗讛 砖驻讞讜转 讻讜驻讛 诇注砖讜转 讘爪诪专 砖讛讘讟诇讛 诪讘讬讗讛 诇讬讚讬 讝讬诪讛 专讘谉 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗祝 讛诪讚讬专 讗转 讗砖转讜 诪诇注砖讜转 诪诇讗讻讛 讬讜爪讬讗 讜讬转谉 讻转讜讘讛 砖讛讘讟诇讛 诪讘讬讗讛 诇讬讚讬 砖讬注诪讜诐

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he can compel her to make thread from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness. Consequently, it is better for a woman to be doing some kind of work. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows that his wife is prohibited from doing any work must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy.

讙诪壮 讟讜讞谞转 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讟讞谞转 讜讗讬讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 讘专讬讞讬讗 讚讬讚讗

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna鈥檚 choice of terminology the Gemara asks: Could it enter your mind that she grinds the wheat into flour? Ordinarily, grinding is performed in a mill using millstones that are rotated by water or by animals, so the woman herself does not actually grind the wheat. The Gemara answers: Rather, say that she supervises the grinding by bringing wheat to the mill and ensuring that it is ground properly. Alternatively, if you wish, say instead: She can grind the wheat herself with a hand mill.

诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讚转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讗讬谉 讗砖讛 讗诇讗 诇讬讜驻讬 讗讬谉 讗砖讛 讗诇讗 诇讘谞讬诐 讜转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讗讬谉 讗砖讛 讗诇讗 诇转讻砖讬讟讬 讗砖讛 讜转谞讬 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讛专讜爪讛 砖讬注讚谉 讗转 讗砖转讜 讬诇讘讬砖谞讛 讻诇讬 驻砖转谉 讛专讜爪讛 砖讬诇讘讬谉 讗转 讘转讜 讬讗讻讬诇谞讛 讗驻专讜讞讬诐 讜讬砖拽谞讛 讞诇讘 住诪讜讱 诇驻讬专拽讛

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi 岣yya, as Rabbi 岣yya teaches: A wife is only for beauty, and a wife is only for children, but not for household tasks. And Rabbi 岣yya teaches: A wife is only for wearing a woman鈥檚 finery. And Rabbi 岣yya similarly teaches: One who wishes to beautify his wife should clothe her in linen garments, and one who wishes to whiten his daughter so that she will have a fair complexion, should feed her young chickens, and should give her milk to drink toward the time of her maturity.

讜诪谞讬拽讛 讗转 讘谞讛 诇讬诪讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讚转谞讬讗 谞讚专讛 砖诇讗 诇讛谞讬拽 讗转 讘谞讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖讜诪讟转 讚讚 诪驻讬讜 讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻讜驻讛 讜诪谞讬拽转讜 谞转讙专砖讛 讗讬谞讜 讻讜驻讛 讜讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讻讬专讛 谞讜转谉 诇讛 砖讻专讛 讜讻讜驻讛 讜诪谞讬拽转讜 诪驻谞讬 讛住讻谞讛

搂 The mishna mentions among a wife鈥檚 obligations that she nurses her child. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it is taught in a baraita: If a woman took a vow not to nurse her child, Beit Shammai say: Since she vowed, she must remove her nipple from his mouth and not nurse him. Beit Hillel say: Her husband can compel her, and she must nurse the child even against her will. However, if she was divorced and therefore had no further obligations to her husband, he cannot compel her. Nevertheless, if the baby recognized her, then even after the divorce, her husband may pay her a salary as a wet nurse and compel her to nurse due to the danger that the child will starve if he refuses to nurse from another woman. This baraita indicates that according to Beit Shammai a woman has no obligation to nurse her child. If she had a prior obligation to her husband to nurse the child, the vow would not take effect.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖谞讚专讛 讛讬讗 讜拽讬讬诐 诇讛 讛讜讗 讜拽住讘专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讜讗 谞讜转谉 讗爪讘注 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讬讛 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 住讘专讬 讛讬讗 谞转谞讛 讗爪讘注 讘讬谉 砖讬谞讬讛

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Even if you say that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, here we are dealing with a case where she made this vow and her husband ratified it for her by refraining from nullifying it. Beit Shammai maintain that in that case it is considered as if he had placed his finger between her teeth, i.e., he caused the vow to be in effect, meaning that in that case the responsibility lies with him. Since he declined the opportunity to nullify the vow, her obligation to nurse is canceled. Beit Hillel maintain that in that case she put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she caused the vow to remain in effect. Consequently, although he ratified her vow, the responsibility rests on her, and for this reason her obligation is not annulled.

讜谞驻诇讙讜 讘讻转讜讘讛 讘注诇诪讗 讜注讜讚 转谞讬讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪谞讬拽讛 讗诇讗 诪讞讜讜专转讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻讘讬转 砖诪讗讬

The Gemara asks: If so, that the dispute is about who is responsible when a woman vows and her husband ratifies the vow, and it is not specifically about her obligation to nurse her child, then let them dispute about a marriage contract in general, with regard to whether or not a woman is entitled to payment for her marriage contract if she vows to prohibit her husband from deriving benefit from her. And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai explicitly say with regard to all women, not specifically in the context of vows: She does not need to nurse if she does not want to. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讻讬专讛

The Gemara above quotes a baraita where it is taught that if the baby recognized her, her husband can compel her to continue nursing even after she is divorced, but he must pay her for nursing.

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