Kiddushin 54

חזרנו על כל צדדים של רבי מאיר ולא מצינו הקדש בשוגג אין מתחלל במזיד מתחלל

We reviewed all angles of the opinion of Rabbi Meir, i.e., we have examined all of Rabbi Meir’s statements with regard to consecrated property, and we did not find that he holds that consecrated property is not desacralized if it is misused unwittingly but it is desacralized if misused intentionally.

ומשנתינו בכתנות כהונה שלא בלו הואיל וניתנו ליהנות בהן לפי שלא ניתנה תורה למלאכי השרת

And as for our mishna, which indicates that this is Rabbi Meir’s opinion, it should not be understood as Rabbi Meir’s opinion with regard to consecrated property in general, but with regard to a case where a priest betrothed a woman using priestly tunics that have not worn out and that can still be worn during the Temple service. If a priest betrothed a woman with such garments, Rabbi Meir holds that if he did so unwittingly she is not betrothed, since clothes of this kind are not desacralized, and do not become hers. This is because they were initially given on the condition that the priests may benefit from them even when not performing the Temple service, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels. It is impossible for a priest to wear the garments only at the moment he is performing the service and at no other time. Therefore, these garments are desacralized only if he intended to desacralize them.

תא שמע כתנות כהונה שבלו מועלין בהם דברי רבי מאיר מאי לאו אפילו לא בלו לא בלו דוקא

The Gemara raises a difficulty with Rav’s statement. Come and hear: With regard to priestly tunics that have worn out, one misuses property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. What, is it not so that this halakha would apply even if they had not worn out, and the tanna wanted to teach the additional halakha that it is still a transgression even after they are no longer fit for use? The Gemara rejects this: No, this halakha applies specifically to garments that have worn out. Since these cannot be used by priests, the permission to use them for non-sacred purposes lapses, and they are like other consecrated property that is subject to the halakhot of misuse.

תא שמע מועלים בחדתין ואין מועלים בעתיקים דברי רבי יהודה רבי מאיר אומר מועלין אף בעתיקים שהיה רבי מאיר אומר מועלין בשירי הלשכה

The Gemara raises a difficulty with the explanation of Rabbi Meir’s statement. Come and hear: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using new shekels, i.e., those given this year, which are used to purchase animals for this year’s offerings, but one is not liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using old shekels, given by those who failed to give the previous year’s half-shekel, since these old shekels are used not to purchase offerings but for Temple maintenance; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple even by using old shekels, as Rabbi Meir would say: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple not only by using money designated to purchase offerings, but even with the remainder of the chamber, i.e., the money that remained in the chamber after money was taken to purchase the animals used in communal offerings.

ואמאי נימא הואיל וניתנו ליהנות לפי שלא ניתנה תורה למלאכי השרת דהא חומת העיר ומגדלותיה משירי הלשכה אתו דתנן חומת העיר ומגדלותיה וכל צרכי העיר באין משירי הלשכה לא תימא רבי מאיר אלא אימא רבי יהודה

The Gemara continues the question: But why should one be liable for using the old shekels? Let us say the same logic: One is not liable, because they were initially given on the condition that people may benefit from them, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels and people could not help but benefit from them. This is as the money to repair the wall of the city and its towers comes from the remainder of the chamber, as we learned in a mishna (Shekalim 4:2): The wall of the city, its towers, and all of the requirements of the city of Jerusalem come from the remainder of the chamber. It is not possible for passersby to avoid benefiting from the shade provided by the walls of the city. The Gemara answers: Do not say that the opinion that one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using money from the remainder of the chamber is that of Rabbi Meir. Rather, emend the mishna and say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

תא שמע דתניא אמר רבי ישמעאל בר רבי יצחק אבני ירושלים שנשרו מועלים בהם דברי רבי מאיר לא תימא רבי מאיר אלא אימא רבי יהודה

Come and hear another proof: As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yitzḥak said: With regard to stones of the walls and towers of Jerusalem that fell, one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, the use of even such stones renders one liable, despite the fact that it is not possible for people to avoid benefiting from them. The Gemara again answers: Do not say that this baraita is recording the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rather, emend the baraita and say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

אי רבי יהודה ירושלים מי מיקדשא והתנן כאימרא כדירים כעצים כאישים כהיכל כמזבח כירושלים רבי יהודה אומר כל האומר ירושלים לא אמר כלום

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, is Jerusalem consecrated at all? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 10b): If one says that an item shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, like the wood of the altar, like the fires on the altar, like the Sanctuary, like the altar, or like Jerusalem, it is a vow and he is prohibited to derive benefit from the item, as he has compared it to something consecrated. The essence of a vow creating a prohibition is the statement that a certain item shall be like a consecrated item. Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything, indicating that Rabbi Yehuda holds that Jerusalem is not consecrated.

וכי תימא משום דלא אמר כירושלים והתניא רבי יהודה אומר כל האומר כירושלים לא אמר כלום עד שידור בדבר הקרב בירושלים

And if you would say that Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is not that he holds that Jerusalem is not consecrated, but because the one stating the vow did not say: Like Jerusalem, but stated only that the item shall be considered Jerusalem, which is not a clear expression of a vow, but isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nedarim 1:6) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who says that an item shall be considered like Jerusalem has not said anything, until he vows by comparing the item to an item that is sacrificed in Jerusalem. This indicates that he holds that Jerusalem itself is not consecrated.

תרי תנאי נינהו ואליבא דרבי יהודה

The Gemara answers: The baraita and the mishna in tractate Nedarim are two tanna’im and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning whether or not he holds that Jerusalem itself was sanctified.

אמר עולא משמיה דבר פדא אומר היה רבי מאיר הקדש במזיד מתחלל בשוגג אין מתחלל ולא אמרו בשוגג מתחלל אלא לענין קרבן בלבד וכי מאחר דאין מתחלל קרבן במאי מחייב

Ulla said a different opinion in the name of bar Padda: Rabbi Meir would say: Consecrated property is desacralized if misused intentionally; it is not desacralized if misused unwittingly. And they said that consecrated property that is misused unwittingly is desacralized only with regard to an offering, i.e., the one who misused it is liable to bring a guilt-offering for his action, but the property remains consecrated. The Gemara asks: But since it is not desacralized when misused unwittingly, for what reason is he rendered liable to bring an offering, as the action had no effect?

אלא כי אתא רבין פריש משמיה דבר פדא אומר היה רבי מאיר הקדש במזיד מתחלל בשוגג אין מתחלל ולא אמרו בשוגג מתחלל אלא לענין אכילה בלבד

Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he explained it this way in the name of bar Padda: Rabbi Meir would say: Consecrated property is desacralized if misused intentionally; it is not desacralized if misused unwittingly. And they said that consecrated property that is misused unwittingly is desacralized only with regard to eating. If one ate consecrated food, thereby consuming it completely, he is liable to bring an offering. If he merely misused consecrated money it retains its sanctity and is not desacralized, and he is not liable to bring an offering.

אמר רב נחמן אמר רב אדא בר אהבה הלכה כרבי מאיר במעשר הואיל וסתם לן תנא כותיה והלכה כרבי יהודה בהקדש הואיל וסתם לן תנא כותיה

§ Rav Naḥman says that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir with regard to second tithe in that it is considered consecrated, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion. And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to consecrated property, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion.

כרבי מאיר במעשר מאי היא דתנן כרם רבעי בית שמאי אומרים אין לו חומש ואין לו ביעור ובית הלל אומרים יש לו

The Gemara clarifies this statement: What is the unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir with regard to second tithe? It is as we learned (Pe’a 7:6): It is prohibited to eat or derive benefit from fruit during the first three years after the tree is planted. The fruit of the fourth year is to be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there. With regard to a vineyard in its fourth year, Beit Shammai say: It does not have the halakha of adding one-fifth, i.e., if the owner himself redeems the fruit to bring money to Jerusalem to spend on food there, as one may also do with second tithe, he does not add one-fifth to its value but redeems it for its true value. And it also does not have the halakha of disposal, i.e., there is no obligation to dispose of it on the eve of Passover of the fourth year of the Sabbatical cycle, when all tithes that have not yet been separated must be disposed of. And Beit Hillel say: It does have the halakha of adding one-fifth and the halakha of disposal.

בית שמאי אומרים יש לו פרט ויש לו עוללות ובית הלל אומרים כולו לגת

That mishna continues: Furthermore, Beit Shammai say: It has the mitzva requiring the owner of the vineyard to leave individual fallen grapes for the poor [peret], and it has the mitzva requiring the owner to leave incompletely formed clusters of grapes for the poor [olelot]. Since the vineyard is considered the owner’s property during this year, he must leave these gifts for the poor. And Beit Hillel say: All of it goes to the winepress to make wine. Since the grapes have sanctity, he is not obligated to leave these gifts for the poor.

מאי טעמא דבית הלל גמרי קדש קדש ממעשר מה מעשר יש לו חומש ויש לו ביעור אף כרם רבעי יש לו חומש ויש לו ביעור ובית שמאי לא גמרי קדש קדש ממעשר

The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of Beit Hillel? They derive a verbal analogy from the word “holy” stated with regard to a fourth-year vineyard, as the verse states: “Holy, for giving praise to the Lord” (Leviticus 19:24), from “holy” stated with regard to second tithe, as the verse states: “Holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:30). This verbal analogy teaches the following: Just as second tithe has the halakha of adding one-fifth and it has the halakha of disposal, so too, the fourth-year vineyard has the halakha of adding one-fifth and it has the halakha of disposal. And Beit Shammai do not derive the verbal analogy of “holy” with regard to a fourth-year vineyard and “holy” from second tithe.

ובית הלל אומרים כמעשר כמאן סבירא להו אי כרבי יהודה אמאי כולו לגת האמר מעשר ממון הדיוט הוא אלא לאו כרבי מאיר

The Gemara proceeds to clarify the opinions of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai with regard to the obligation to leave peret and olelot from a fourth-year vineyard. And with regard to Beit Hillel, who say that the halakha of fourth-year produce is like the halakha of second tithe, in accordance with whose opinion do they hold with regard to second tithe? If they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why does all of it go to the winepress? Didn’t Rabbi Yehuda say that second tithe is itself common, i.e., non-sacred, property, and the owner must therefore leave peret and olelot? Rather, is it not the case that they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that second tithe is consecrated property? The mishna aligning the opinion of Beit Hillel with that of Rabbi Meir is tantamount to there being an unattributed mishna in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s opinion, as the halakha is generally in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

כרבי יהודה בהקדש מאי היא דתנן שילח ביד פיקח ונזכר עד שלא הגיע אצל חנווני חנווני מעל לכשיוציא

The Gemara continues with the explanation of Rav Naḥman’s statement: What is the unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to consecrated property? As we learned (Me’ila 21a): In a case where one sent an agent to buy something on his behalf and unwittingly gave him consecrated money to use, if he sent it in the possession of a halakhically competent person and remembered that it was consecrated money before the agent reached the storekeeper, the storekeeper will have misused consecrated property when he will later spend the money. This indicates that one is liable for misuse of consecrated property even when one acts unwittingly, as the storekeeper did.

וכרבי יהודה במעשר מי לא תנן והתנן הפודה מעשר שני שלו מוסיף עליו חמישיתו בין משלו בין שניתן לו במתנה מני אילימא רבי מאיר היא מי מצי יהיב ליה במתנה והאמר מעשר ממון גבוה הוא אלא לאו רבי יהודה

The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to second tithe? But didn’t we learn (Ma’aser Sheni 4:3): With regard to one who redeems his own second tithe, he adds to it its one-fifth, whether the tithe was from his crop or given to him as a gift. The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, can one give second tithe to another as a gift? But didn’t he say that second tithe is property belonging to the Most High, which means it is not one’s own to give to another as a gift? Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second tithe is common property, and consequently this unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to second tithe?

לא לעולם רבי מאיר והכא במאי עסקינן כגון דיהיב ניהליה בטיבליה וקסבר מתנות שלא הורמו כמי שלא הורמו דמיין

The Gemara answers: No, actually it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and with what are we dealing here? It is not a situation where one gave second tithe itself as a gift, but where he gave him his entire crop in its state of being untithed produce. Consequently, the portion he gave him included tithes that had not yet been separated, and he holds that gifts that have not been separated are not considered as though they have been separated. One does not categorize the untithed produce as a mixture of regular produce and tithes, but as a non-sacred category in and of itself. Since the second tithe has not yet been separated, the produce has no sanctity, and he can give it as a gift.

תא שמע הפודה נטע רבעי שלו מוסיף עליו חמישיתו בין משלו בין שניתן לו במתנה מני אילימא רבי מאיר מי מצי יהיב ליה והא גמרי קדש קדש ממעשר אלא לאו רבי יהודה

The Gemara continues its line of inquiry: Come and hear another unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (Ma’aser Sheni 4:6): With regard to one who redeems his own fourth-year produce, he adds to it its one-fifth, whether the produce was from his crop or was given to him as a gift. The Gemara inquires: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, can one give produce of the fourth year to another as a gift? But didn’t he derive that one must add one-fifth from the verbal analogy of “holy” for fourth-year fruit from “holy” from second tithe? This would mean that fourth-year fruit, like second tithe, is property of the Most High and cannot be given as a gift. Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

לעולם רבי מאיר והכא במאי עסקינן כגון דיהיב כשהוא סמדר ודלא כרבי יוסי דאמר סמדר אסור מפני שהוא פרי

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and with what are we dealing here? It is not a situation where one gave fully grown fourth-year fruit but where he gave him the fruit when it was a bud. And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: A bud of a fruit is forbidden as orla, because it is already considered a fruit. Rabbi Meir, by contrast, holds that a fruit bud is not considered fruit. Therefore, the halakhot of orla and fourth-year fruit apply only to fruit that has grown, whereas beforehand it can be given as a gift.

תא שמע משך הימנו מעשר בסלע ולא הספיק לפדותו עד שעמד בשתים נותן סלע ומשתכר בסלע ומעשר שני שלו מני אילימא רבי מאיר אמאי משתכר בסלע ונתן את הכסף וקם לו אמר רחמנא אלא לאו רבי יהודה

The Gemara continues its line of inquiry: Come and hear another unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (Ma’aser Sheni 4:6): If one was selling second-tithe produce, and the buyer pulled tithe worth a sela from him, thereby acquiring it, and did not manage to redeem it until its value stood at two sela, and he had not yet paid the seller, the buyer gives a sela to the seller, and he thereby gains a sela and the second tithe is his, since he acquired it when he pulled it and the price was fixed at that point. The Gemara inquires: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, why does the buyer gain a sela? The Merciful One states in the Torah with regard to the redemption of consecrated property: And he will give the money and it will be assured to him (see Leviticus 27:19), from which it is derived that one acquires consecrated property only after paying money. This means that the value of the second tithe increased before he acquired it. Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second tithe is common property, and it is acquired from the moment he pulled it?

לעולם רבי יהודה והכא חד סתמא והכא תרי סתמי

The Gemara confirms: Actually, this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Nevertheless, Rav Naḥman’s statement that the halakha with regard to second tithe is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir is still correct, as here there is one unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, while here there are two unattributed mishnayot that indicate that Beit Hillel’s opinion is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the one in tractate Ma’aser Sheni, and one in tractate Eduyyot (4:2).

ואי סתמא דוקא מה לי חד סתמא מה לי תרי סתמי אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק הלכה כרבי מאיר הואיל ותנן בבחירתא כוותיה

The Gemara asks: But if an unattributed mishna is stated that way specifically to teach the halakha, what difference is there to me if it is one unattributed mishna or two unattributed mishnayot? The Gemara suggests an alternate reasoning. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, since we learned in a mishna in the preferred tractate, Eduyyot, in accordance with his opinion. Since the halakha is ruled in accordance with all of the mishnayot in Eduyyot, the fact that the opinion of Beit Hillel in that tractate is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir means that the halakha should be decided accordingly.