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Today's Daf Yomi

May 4, 2016 | 讻状讜 讘谞讬住谉 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Kiddushin 54

Study Guide Kiddushin 54. Two interpretations of Rabbi Meir’s opinion about a sale/betrothal performed with money inadvertently – is it considered聽meila or not? 聽There opinions are analyzed and questions raised against them. 聽The gemara then determines the halacha for betrothal performed using maaser sheni聽and hekdesh – the former like Rabbi Meir and the latter聽like Rabbi Yehuda.


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讞讝专谞讜 注诇 讻诇 爪讚讚讬诐 砖诇 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜诇讗 诪爪讬谞讜 讛拽讚砖 讘砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪转讞诇诇 讘诪讝讬讚 诪转讞诇诇

We reviewed all angles of the opinion of Rabbi Meir, i.e., we have examined all of Rabbi Meir鈥檚 statements with regard to consecrated property, and we did not find that he holds that consecrated property is not desacralized if it is misused unwittingly but it is desacralized if misused intentionally.

讜诪砖谞转讬谞讜 讘讻转谞讜转 讻讛讜谞讛 砖诇讗 讘诇讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讛谞讜转 讘讛谉 诇驻讬 砖诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 转讜专讛 诇诪诇讗讻讬 讛砖专转

And as for our mishna, which indicates that this is Rabbi Meir鈥檚 opinion, it should not be understood as Rabbi Meir鈥檚 opinion with regard to consecrated property in general, but with regard to a case where a priest betrothed a woman using priestly tunics that have not worn out and that can still be worn during the Temple service. If a priest betrothed a woman with such garments, Rabbi Meir holds that if he did so unwittingly she is not betrothed, since clothes of this kind are not desacralized, and do not become hers. This is because they were initially given on the condition that the priests may benefit from them even when not performing the Temple service, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels. It is impossible for a priest to wear the garments only at the moment he is performing the service and at no other time. Therefore, these garments are desacralized only if he intended to desacralize them.

转讗 砖诪注 讻转谞讜转 讻讛讜谞讛 砖讘诇讜 诪讜注诇讬谉 讘讛诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讘诇讜 诇讗 讘诇讜 讚讜拽讗

The Gemara raises a difficulty with Rav鈥檚 statement. Come and hear: With regard to priestly tunics that have worn out, one misuses property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. What, is it not so that this halakha would apply even if they had not worn out, and the tanna wanted to teach the additional halakha that it is still a transgression even after they are no longer fit for use? The Gemara rejects this: No, this halakha applies specifically to garments that have worn out. Since these cannot be used by priests, the permission to use them for non-sacred purposes lapses, and they are like other consecrated property that is subject to the halakhot of misuse.

转讗 砖诪注 诪讜注诇讬诐 讘讞讚转讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪讜注诇讬诐 讘注转讬拽讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪讜注诇讬谉 讗祝 讘注转讬拽讬诐 砖讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪讜注诇讬谉 讘砖讬专讬 讛诇砖讻讛

The Gemara raises a difficulty with the explanation of Rabbi Meir鈥檚 statement. Come and hear: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using new shekels, i.e., those given this year, which are used to purchase animals for this year鈥檚 offerings, but one is not liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using old shekels, given by those who failed to give the previous year鈥檚 half-shekel, since these old shekels are used not to purchase offerings but for Temple maintenance; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple even by using old shekels, as Rabbi Meir would say: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple not only by using money designated to purchase offerings, but even with the remainder of the chamber, i.e., the money that remained in the chamber after money was taken to purchase the animals used in communal offerings.

讜讗诪讗讬 谞讬诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讛谞讜转 诇驻讬 砖诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 转讜专讛 诇诪诇讗讻讬 讛砖专转 讚讛讗 讞讜诪转 讛注讬专 讜诪讙讚诇讜转讬讛 诪砖讬专讬 讛诇砖讻讛 讗转讜 讚转谞谉 讞讜诪转 讛注讬专 讜诪讙讚诇讜转讬讛 讜讻诇 爪专讻讬 讛注讬专 讘讗讬谉 诪砖讬专讬 讛诇砖讻讛 诇讗 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara continues the question: But why should one be liable for using the old shekels? Let us say the same logic: One is not liable, because they were initially given on the condition that people may benefit from them, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels and people could not help but benefit from them. This is as the money to repair the wall of the city and its towers comes from the remainder of the chamber, as we learned in a mishna (Shekalim 4:2): The wall of the city, its towers, and all of the requirements of the city of Jerusalem come from the remainder of the chamber. It is not possible for passersby to avoid benefiting from the shade provided by the walls of the city. The Gemara answers: Do not say that the opinion that one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using money from the remainder of the chamber is that of Rabbi Meir. Rather, emend the mishna and say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讗讘谞讬 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 砖谞砖专讜 诪讜注诇讬诐 讘讛诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

Come and hear another proof: As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yitz岣k said: With regard to stones of the walls and towers of Jerusalem that fell, one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, the use of even such stones renders one liable, despite the fact that it is not possible for people to avoid benefiting from them. The Gemara again answers: Do not say that this baraita is recording the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rather, emend the baraita and say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诪讬 诪讬拽讚砖讗 讜讛转谞谉 讻讗讬诪专讗 讻讚讬专讬诐 讻注爪讬诐 讻讗讬砖讬诐 讻讛讬讻诇 讻诪讝讘讞 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, is Jerusalem consecrated at all? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 10b): If one says that an item shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, like the wood of the altar, like the fires on the altar, like the Sanctuary, like the altar, or like Jerusalem, it is a vow and he is prohibited to derive benefit from the item, as he has compared it to something consecrated. The essence of a vow creating a prohibition is the statement that a certain item shall be like a consecrated item. Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything, indicating that Rabbi Yehuda holds that Jerusalem is not consecrated.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 注讚 砖讬讚讜专 讘讚讘专 讛拽专讘 讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐

And if you would say that Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 reason is not that he holds that Jerusalem is not consecrated, but because the one stating the vow did not say: Like Jerusalem, but stated only that the item shall be considered Jerusalem, which is not a clear expression of a vow, but isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nedarim 1:6) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who says that an item shall be considered like Jerusalem has not said anything, until he vows by comparing the item to an item that is sacrificed in Jerusalem. This indicates that he holds that Jerusalem itself is not consecrated.

转专讬 转谞讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara answers: The baraita and the mishna in tractate Nedarim are two tanna鈥檌m and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning whether or not he holds that Jerusalem itself was sanctified.

讗诪专 注讜诇讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚讘专 驻讚讗 讗讜诪专 讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛拽讚砖 讘诪讝讬讚 诪转讞诇诇 讘砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪转讞诇诇 讜诇讗 讗诪专讜 讘砖讜讙讙 诪转讞诇诇 讗诇讗 诇注谞讬谉 拽专讘谉 讘诇讘讚 讜讻讬 诪讗讞专 讚讗讬谉 诪转讞诇诇 拽专讘谉 讘诪讗讬 诪讞讬讬讘

Ulla said a different opinion in the name of bar Padda: Rabbi Meir would say: Consecrated property is desacralized if misused intentionally; it is not desacralized if misused unwittingly. And they said that consecrated property that is misused unwittingly is desacralized only with regard to an offering, i.e., the one who misused it is liable to bring a guilt-offering for his action, but the property remains consecrated. The Gemara asks: But since it is not desacralized when misused unwittingly, for what reason is he rendered liable to bring an offering, as the action had no effect?

讗诇讗 讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 驻专讬砖 诪砖诪讬讛 讚讘专 驻讚讗 讗讜诪专 讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛拽讚砖 讘诪讝讬讚 诪转讞诇诇 讘砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪转讞诇诇 讜诇讗 讗诪专讜 讘砖讜讙讙 诪转讞诇诇 讗诇讗 诇注谞讬谉 讗讻讬诇讛 讘诇讘讚

Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he explained it this way in the name of bar Padda: Rabbi Meir would say: Consecrated property is desacralized if misused intentionally; it is not desacralized if misused unwittingly. And they said that consecrated property that is misused unwittingly is desacralized only with regard to eating. If one ate consecrated food, thereby consuming it completely, he is liable to bring an offering. If he merely misused consecrated money it retains its sanctity and is not desacralized, and he is not liable to bring an offering.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘诪注砖专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻讜转讬讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘讛拽讚砖 讛讜讗讬诇 讜住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻讜转讬讛

Rav Na岣an says that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir with regard to second tithe in that it is considered consecrated, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion. And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to consecrated property, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion.

讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘诪注砖专 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 讻专诐 专讘注讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讜诪砖 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 讘讬注讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬砖 诇讜

The Gemara clarifies this statement: What is the unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir with regard to second tithe? It is as we learned (Pe鈥檃 7:6): It is prohibited to eat or derive benefit from fruit during the first three years after the tree is planted. The fruit of the fourth year is to be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there. With regard to a vineyard in its fourth year, Beit Shammai say: It does not have the halakha of adding one-fifth, i.e., if the owner himself redeems the fruit to bring money to Jerusalem to spend on food there, as one may also do with second tithe, he does not add one-fifth to its value but redeems it for its true value. And it also does not have the halakha of disposal, i.e., there is no obligation to dispose of it on the eve of Passover of the fourth year of the Sabbatical cycle, when all tithes that have not yet been separated must be disposed of. And Beit Hillel say: It does have the halakha of adding one-fifth and the halakha of disposal.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬砖 诇讜 驻专讟 讜讬砖 诇讜 注讜诇诇讜转 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻讜诇讜 诇讙转

That mishna continues: Furthermore, Beit Shammai say: It has the mitzva requiring the owner of the vineyard to leave individual fallen grapes for the poor [peret], and it has the mitzva requiring the owner to leave incompletely formed clusters of grapes for the poor [olelot]. Since the vineyard is considered the owner鈥檚 property during this year, he must leave these gifts for the poor. And Beit Hillel say: All of it goes to the winepress to make wine. Since the grapes have sanctity, he is not obligated to leave these gifts for the poor.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讘讬转 讛诇诇 讙诪专讬 拽讚砖 拽讚砖 诪诪注砖专 诪讛 诪注砖专 讬砖 诇讜 讞讜诪砖 讜讬砖 诇讜 讘讬注讜专 讗祝 讻专诐 专讘注讬 讬砖 诇讜 讞讜诪砖 讜讬砖 诇讜 讘讬注讜专 讜讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讗 讙诪专讬 拽讚砖 拽讚砖 诪诪注砖专

The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of Beit Hillel? They derive a verbal analogy from the word 鈥渉oly鈥 stated with regard to a fourth-year vineyard, as the verse states: 鈥淗oly, for giving praise to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 19:24), from 鈥渉oly鈥 stated with regard to second tithe, as the verse states: 鈥淗oly to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 27:30). This verbal analogy teaches the following: Just as second tithe has the halakha of adding one-fifth and it has the halakha of disposal, so too, the fourth-year vineyard has the halakha of adding one-fifth and it has the halakha of disposal. And Beit Shammai do not derive the verbal analogy of 鈥渉oly鈥 with regard to a fourth-year vineyard and 鈥渉oly鈥 from second tithe.

讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诪注砖专 讻诪讗谉 住讘讬专讗 诇讛讜 讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪讗讬 讻讜诇讜 诇讙转 讛讗诪专 诪注砖专 诪诪讜谉 讛讚讬讜讟 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara proceeds to clarify the opinions of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai with regard to the obligation to leave peret and olelot from a fourth-year vineyard. And with regard to Beit Hillel, who say that the halakha of fourth-year produce is like the halakha of second tithe, in accordance with whose opinion do they hold with regard to second tithe? If they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why does all of it go to the winepress? Didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yehuda say that second tithe is itself common, i.e., non-sacred, property, and the owner must therefore leave peret and olelot? Rather, is it not the case that they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that second tithe is consecrated property? The mishna aligning the opinion of Beit Hillel with that of Rabbi Meir is tantamount to there being an unattributed mishna in accordance with Rabbi Meir鈥檚 opinion, as the halakha is generally in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘讛拽讚砖 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 砖讬诇讞 讘讬讚 驻讬拽讞 讜谞讝讻专 注讚 砖诇讗 讛讙讬注 讗爪诇 讞谞讜讜谞讬 讞谞讜讜谞讬 诪注诇 诇讻砖讬讜爪讬讗

The Gemara continues with the explanation of Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement: What is the unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to consecrated property? As we learned (Me鈥檌la 21a): In a case where one sent an agent to buy something on his behalf and unwittingly gave him consecrated money to use, if he sent it in the possession of a halakhically competent person and remembered that it was consecrated money before the agent reached the storekeeper, the storekeeper will have misused consecrated property when he will later spend the money. This indicates that one is liable for misuse of consecrated property even when one acts unwittingly, as the storekeeper did.

讜讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘诪注砖专 诪讬 诇讗 转谞谉 讜讛转谞谉 讛驻讜讚讛 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 砖诇讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇讬讜 讞诪讬砖讬转讜 讘讬谉 诪砖诇讜 讘讬谉 砖谞讬转谉 诇讜 讘诪转谞讛 诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 诪讬 诪爪讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讘诪转谞讛 讜讛讗诪专 诪注砖专 诪诪讜谉 讙讘讜讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 we learn an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to second tithe? But didn鈥檛 we learn (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 4:3): With regard to one who redeems his own second tithe, he adds to it its one-fifth, whether the tithe was from his crop or given to him as a gift. The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, can one give second tithe to another as a gift? But didn鈥檛 he say that second tithe is property belonging to the Most High, which means it is not one鈥檚 own to give to another as a gift? Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second tithe is common property, and consequently this unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to second tithe?

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 讚讬讛讬讘 谞讬讛诇讬讛 讘讟讬讘诇讬讛 讜拽住讘专 诪转谞讜转 砖诇讗 讛讜专诪讜 讻诪讬 砖诇讗 讛讜专诪讜 讚诪讬讬谉

The Gemara answers: No, actually it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and with what are we dealing here? It is not a situation where one gave second tithe itself as a gift, but where he gave him his entire crop in its state of being untithed produce. Consequently, the portion he gave him included tithes that had not yet been separated, and he holds that gifts that have not been separated are not considered as though they have been separated. One does not categorize the untithed produce as a mixture of regular produce and tithes, but as a non-sacred category in and of itself. Since the second tithe has not yet been separated, the produce has no sanctity, and he can give it as a gift.

转讗 砖诪注 讛驻讜讚讛 谞讟注 专讘注讬 砖诇讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇讬讜 讞诪讬砖讬转讜 讘讬谉 诪砖诇讜 讘讬谉 砖谞讬转谉 诇讜 讘诪转谞讛 诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讬 诪爪讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讜讛讗 讙诪专讬 拽讚砖 拽讚砖 诪诪注砖专 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara continues its line of inquiry: Come and hear another unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 4:6): With regard to one who redeems his own fourth-year produce, he adds to it its one-fifth, whether the produce was from his crop or was given to him as a gift. The Gemara inquires: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, can one give produce of the fourth year to another as a gift? But didn鈥檛 he derive that one must add one-fifth from the verbal analogy of 鈥渉oly鈥 for fourth-year fruit from 鈥渉oly鈥 from second tithe? This would mean that fourth-year fruit, like second tithe, is property of the Most High and cannot be given as a gift. Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 讚讬讛讬讘 讻砖讛讜讗 住诪讚专 讜讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 住诪讚专 讗住讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 驻专讬

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and with what are we dealing here? It is not a situation where one gave fully grown fourth-year fruit but where he gave him the fruit when it was a bud. And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: A bud of a fruit is forbidden as orla, because it is already considered a fruit. Rabbi Meir, by contrast, holds that a fruit bud is not considered fruit. Therefore, the halakhot of orla and fourth-year fruit apply only to fruit that has grown, whereas beforehand it can be given as a gift.

转讗 砖诪注 诪砖讱 讛讬诪谞讜 诪注砖专 讘住诇注 讜诇讗 讛住驻讬拽 诇驻讚讜转讜 注讚 砖注诪讚 讘砖转讬诐 谞讜转谉 住诇注 讜诪砖转讻专 讘住诇注 讜诪注砖专 砖谞讬 砖诇讜 诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诪讗讬 诪砖转讻专 讘住诇注 讜谞转谉 讗转 讛讻住祝 讜拽诐 诇讜 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara continues its line of inquiry: Come and hear another unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 4:6): If one was selling second-tithe produce, and the buyer pulled tithe worth a sela from him, thereby acquiring it, and did not manage to redeem it until its value stood at two sela, and he had not yet paid the seller, the buyer gives a sela to the seller, and he thereby gains a sela and the second tithe is his, since he acquired it when he pulled it and the price was fixed at that point. The Gemara inquires: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, why does the buyer gain a sela? The Merciful One states in the Torah with regard to the redemption of consecrated property: And he will give the money and it will be assured to him (see Leviticus 27:19), from which it is derived that one acquires consecrated property only after paying money. This means that the value of the second tithe increased before he acquired it. Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second tithe is common property, and it is acquired from the moment he pulled it?

诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讛讻讗 讞讚 住转诪讗 讜讛讻讗 转专讬 住转诪讬

The Gemara confirms: Actually, this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Nevertheless, Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement that the halakha with regard to second tithe is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir is still correct, as here there is one unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, while here there are two unattributed mishnayot that indicate that Beit Hillel鈥檚 opinion is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the one in tractate Ma鈥檃ser Sheni, and one in tractate Eduyyot (4:2).

讜讗讬 住转诪讗 讚讜拽讗 诪讛 诇讬 讞讚 住转诪讗 诪讛 诇讬 转专讬 住转诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜转谞谉 讘讘讞讬专转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛

The Gemara asks: But if an unattributed mishna is stated that way specifically to teach the halakha, what difference is there to me if it is one unattributed mishna or two unattributed mishnayot? The Gemara suggests an alternate reasoning. Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, since we learned in a mishna in the preferred tractate, Eduyyot, in accordance with his opinion. Since the halakha is ruled in accordance with all of the mishnayot in Eduyyot, the fact that the opinion of Beit Hillel in that tractate is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir means that the halakha should be decided accordingly.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Kiddushin 54

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Kiddushin 54

讞讝专谞讜 注诇 讻诇 爪讚讚讬诐 砖诇 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜诇讗 诪爪讬谞讜 讛拽讚砖 讘砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪转讞诇诇 讘诪讝讬讚 诪转讞诇诇

We reviewed all angles of the opinion of Rabbi Meir, i.e., we have examined all of Rabbi Meir鈥檚 statements with regard to consecrated property, and we did not find that he holds that consecrated property is not desacralized if it is misused unwittingly but it is desacralized if misused intentionally.

讜诪砖谞转讬谞讜 讘讻转谞讜转 讻讛讜谞讛 砖诇讗 讘诇讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讛谞讜转 讘讛谉 诇驻讬 砖诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 转讜专讛 诇诪诇讗讻讬 讛砖专转

And as for our mishna, which indicates that this is Rabbi Meir鈥檚 opinion, it should not be understood as Rabbi Meir鈥檚 opinion with regard to consecrated property in general, but with regard to a case where a priest betrothed a woman using priestly tunics that have not worn out and that can still be worn during the Temple service. If a priest betrothed a woman with such garments, Rabbi Meir holds that if he did so unwittingly she is not betrothed, since clothes of this kind are not desacralized, and do not become hers. This is because they were initially given on the condition that the priests may benefit from them even when not performing the Temple service, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels. It is impossible for a priest to wear the garments only at the moment he is performing the service and at no other time. Therefore, these garments are desacralized only if he intended to desacralize them.

转讗 砖诪注 讻转谞讜转 讻讛讜谞讛 砖讘诇讜 诪讜注诇讬谉 讘讛诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讘诇讜 诇讗 讘诇讜 讚讜拽讗

The Gemara raises a difficulty with Rav鈥檚 statement. Come and hear: With regard to priestly tunics that have worn out, one misuses property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. What, is it not so that this halakha would apply even if they had not worn out, and the tanna wanted to teach the additional halakha that it is still a transgression even after they are no longer fit for use? The Gemara rejects this: No, this halakha applies specifically to garments that have worn out. Since these cannot be used by priests, the permission to use them for non-sacred purposes lapses, and they are like other consecrated property that is subject to the halakhot of misuse.

转讗 砖诪注 诪讜注诇讬诐 讘讞讚转讬谉 讜讗讬谉 诪讜注诇讬诐 讘注转讬拽讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪讜注诇讬谉 讗祝 讘注转讬拽讬诐 砖讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪讜注诇讬谉 讘砖讬专讬 讛诇砖讻讛

The Gemara raises a difficulty with the explanation of Rabbi Meir鈥檚 statement. Come and hear: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using new shekels, i.e., those given this year, which are used to purchase animals for this year鈥檚 offerings, but one is not liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using old shekels, given by those who failed to give the previous year鈥檚 half-shekel, since these old shekels are used not to purchase offerings but for Temple maintenance; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple even by using old shekels, as Rabbi Meir would say: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple not only by using money designated to purchase offerings, but even with the remainder of the chamber, i.e., the money that remained in the chamber after money was taken to purchase the animals used in communal offerings.

讜讗诪讗讬 谞讬诪讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜谞讬转谞讜 诇讬讛谞讜转 诇驻讬 砖诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 转讜专讛 诇诪诇讗讻讬 讛砖专转 讚讛讗 讞讜诪转 讛注讬专 讜诪讙讚诇讜转讬讛 诪砖讬专讬 讛诇砖讻讛 讗转讜 讚转谞谉 讞讜诪转 讛注讬专 讜诪讙讚诇讜转讬讛 讜讻诇 爪专讻讬 讛注讬专 讘讗讬谉 诪砖讬专讬 讛诇砖讻讛 诇讗 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara continues the question: But why should one be liable for using the old shekels? Let us say the same logic: One is not liable, because they were initially given on the condition that people may benefit from them, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels and people could not help but benefit from them. This is as the money to repair the wall of the city and its towers comes from the remainder of the chamber, as we learned in a mishna (Shekalim 4:2): The wall of the city, its towers, and all of the requirements of the city of Jerusalem come from the remainder of the chamber. It is not possible for passersby to avoid benefiting from the shade provided by the walls of the city. The Gemara answers: Do not say that the opinion that one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using money from the remainder of the chamber is that of Rabbi Meir. Rather, emend the mishna and say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讗讘谞讬 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 砖谞砖专讜 诪讜注诇讬诐 讘讛诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诇讗 讗讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

Come and hear another proof: As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yitz岣k said: With regard to stones of the walls and towers of Jerusalem that fell, one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, the use of even such stones renders one liable, despite the fact that it is not possible for people to avoid benefiting from them. The Gemara again answers: Do not say that this baraita is recording the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rather, emend the baraita and say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

讗讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诪讬 诪讬拽讚砖讗 讜讛转谞谉 讻讗讬诪专讗 讻讚讬专讬诐 讻注爪讬诐 讻讗讬砖讬诐 讻讛讬讻诇 讻诪讝讘讞 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, is Jerusalem consecrated at all? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 10b): If one says that an item shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, like the wood of the altar, like the fires on the altar, like the Sanctuary, like the altar, or like Jerusalem, it is a vow and he is prohibited to derive benefit from the item, as he has compared it to something consecrated. The essence of a vow creating a prohibition is the statement that a certain item shall be like a consecrated item. Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything, indicating that Rabbi Yehuda holds that Jerusalem is not consecrated.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讗诪专 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 讜讛转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛讗讜诪专 讻讬专讜砖诇讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 注讚 砖讬讚讜专 讘讚讘专 讛拽专讘 讘讬专讜砖诇讬诐

And if you would say that Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 reason is not that he holds that Jerusalem is not consecrated, but because the one stating the vow did not say: Like Jerusalem, but stated only that the item shall be considered Jerusalem, which is not a clear expression of a vow, but isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nedarim 1:6) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who says that an item shall be considered like Jerusalem has not said anything, until he vows by comparing the item to an item that is sacrificed in Jerusalem. This indicates that he holds that Jerusalem itself is not consecrated.

转专讬 转谞讗讬 谞讬谞讛讜 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara answers: The baraita and the mishna in tractate Nedarim are two tanna鈥檌m and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning whether or not he holds that Jerusalem itself was sanctified.

讗诪专 注讜诇讗 诪砖诪讬讛 讚讘专 驻讚讗 讗讜诪专 讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛拽讚砖 讘诪讝讬讚 诪转讞诇诇 讘砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪转讞诇诇 讜诇讗 讗诪专讜 讘砖讜讙讙 诪转讞诇诇 讗诇讗 诇注谞讬谉 拽专讘谉 讘诇讘讚 讜讻讬 诪讗讞专 讚讗讬谉 诪转讞诇诇 拽专讘谉 讘诪讗讬 诪讞讬讬讘

Ulla said a different opinion in the name of bar Padda: Rabbi Meir would say: Consecrated property is desacralized if misused intentionally; it is not desacralized if misused unwittingly. And they said that consecrated property that is misused unwittingly is desacralized only with regard to an offering, i.e., the one who misused it is liable to bring a guilt-offering for his action, but the property remains consecrated. The Gemara asks: But since it is not desacralized when misused unwittingly, for what reason is he rendered liable to bring an offering, as the action had no effect?

讗诇讗 讻讬 讗转讗 专讘讬谉 驻专讬砖 诪砖诪讬讛 讚讘专 驻讚讗 讗讜诪专 讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛拽讚砖 讘诪讝讬讚 诪转讞诇诇 讘砖讜讙讙 讗讬谉 诪转讞诇诇 讜诇讗 讗诪专讜 讘砖讜讙讙 诪转讞诇诇 讗诇讗 诇注谞讬谉 讗讻讬诇讛 讘诇讘讚

Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he explained it this way in the name of bar Padda: Rabbi Meir would say: Consecrated property is desacralized if misused intentionally; it is not desacralized if misused unwittingly. And they said that consecrated property that is misused unwittingly is desacralized only with regard to eating. If one ate consecrated food, thereby consuming it completely, he is liable to bring an offering. If he merely misused consecrated money it retains its sanctity and is not desacralized, and he is not liable to bring an offering.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘诪注砖专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻讜转讬讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘讛拽讚砖 讛讜讗讬诇 讜住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻讜转讬讛

Rav Na岣an says that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir with regard to second tithe in that it is considered consecrated, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion. And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to consecrated property, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion.

讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘诪注砖专 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 讻专诐 专讘注讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讜 讞讜诪砖 讜讗讬谉 诇讜 讘讬注讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬砖 诇讜

The Gemara clarifies this statement: What is the unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir with regard to second tithe? It is as we learned (Pe鈥檃 7:6): It is prohibited to eat or derive benefit from fruit during the first three years after the tree is planted. The fruit of the fourth year is to be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there. With regard to a vineyard in its fourth year, Beit Shammai say: It does not have the halakha of adding one-fifth, i.e., if the owner himself redeems the fruit to bring money to Jerusalem to spend on food there, as one may also do with second tithe, he does not add one-fifth to its value but redeems it for its true value. And it also does not have the halakha of disposal, i.e., there is no obligation to dispose of it on the eve of Passover of the fourth year of the Sabbatical cycle, when all tithes that have not yet been separated must be disposed of. And Beit Hillel say: It does have the halakha of adding one-fifth and the halakha of disposal.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬砖 诇讜 驻专讟 讜讬砖 诇讜 注讜诇诇讜转 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻讜诇讜 诇讙转

That mishna continues: Furthermore, Beit Shammai say: It has the mitzva requiring the owner of the vineyard to leave individual fallen grapes for the poor [peret], and it has the mitzva requiring the owner to leave incompletely formed clusters of grapes for the poor [olelot]. Since the vineyard is considered the owner鈥檚 property during this year, he must leave these gifts for the poor. And Beit Hillel say: All of it goes to the winepress to make wine. Since the grapes have sanctity, he is not obligated to leave these gifts for the poor.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讘讬转 讛诇诇 讙诪专讬 拽讚砖 拽讚砖 诪诪注砖专 诪讛 诪注砖专 讬砖 诇讜 讞讜诪砖 讜讬砖 诇讜 讘讬注讜专 讗祝 讻专诐 专讘注讬 讬砖 诇讜 讞讜诪砖 讜讬砖 诇讜 讘讬注讜专 讜讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 诇讗 讙诪专讬 拽讚砖 拽讚砖 诪诪注砖专

The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of Beit Hillel? They derive a verbal analogy from the word 鈥渉oly鈥 stated with regard to a fourth-year vineyard, as the verse states: 鈥淗oly, for giving praise to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 19:24), from 鈥渉oly鈥 stated with regard to second tithe, as the verse states: 鈥淗oly to the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 27:30). This verbal analogy teaches the following: Just as second tithe has the halakha of adding one-fifth and it has the halakha of disposal, so too, the fourth-year vineyard has the halakha of adding one-fifth and it has the halakha of disposal. And Beit Shammai do not derive the verbal analogy of 鈥渉oly鈥 with regard to a fourth-year vineyard and 鈥渉oly鈥 from second tithe.

讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讻诪注砖专 讻诪讗谉 住讘讬专讗 诇讛讜 讗讬 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪讗讬 讻讜诇讜 诇讙转 讛讗诪专 诪注砖专 诪诪讜谉 讛讚讬讜讟 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara proceeds to clarify the opinions of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai with regard to the obligation to leave peret and olelot from a fourth-year vineyard. And with regard to Beit Hillel, who say that the halakha of fourth-year produce is like the halakha of second tithe, in accordance with whose opinion do they hold with regard to second tithe? If they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why does all of it go to the winepress? Didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yehuda say that second tithe is itself common, i.e., non-sacred, property, and the owner must therefore leave peret and olelot? Rather, is it not the case that they hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that second tithe is consecrated property? The mishna aligning the opinion of Beit Hillel with that of Rabbi Meir is tantamount to there being an unattributed mishna in accordance with Rabbi Meir鈥檚 opinion, as the halakha is generally in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.

讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘讛拽讚砖 诪讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞谉 砖讬诇讞 讘讬讚 驻讬拽讞 讜谞讝讻专 注讚 砖诇讗 讛讙讬注 讗爪诇 讞谞讜讜谞讬 讞谞讜讜谞讬 诪注诇 诇讻砖讬讜爪讬讗

The Gemara continues with the explanation of Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement: What is the unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to consecrated property? As we learned (Me鈥檌la 21a): In a case where one sent an agent to buy something on his behalf and unwittingly gave him consecrated money to use, if he sent it in the possession of a halakhically competent person and remembered that it was consecrated money before the agent reached the storekeeper, the storekeeper will have misused consecrated property when he will later spend the money. This indicates that one is liable for misuse of consecrated property even when one acts unwittingly, as the storekeeper did.

讜讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘诪注砖专 诪讬 诇讗 转谞谉 讜讛转谞谉 讛驻讜讚讛 诪注砖专 砖谞讬 砖诇讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇讬讜 讞诪讬砖讬转讜 讘讬谉 诪砖诇讜 讘讬谉 砖谞讬转谉 诇讜 讘诪转谞讛 诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗 诪讬 诪爪讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讘诪转谞讛 讜讛讗诪专 诪注砖专 诪诪讜谉 讙讘讜讛 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 we learn an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to second tithe? But didn鈥檛 we learn (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 4:3): With regard to one who redeems his own second tithe, he adds to it its one-fifth, whether the tithe was from his crop or given to him as a gift. The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, can one give second tithe to another as a gift? But didn鈥檛 he say that second tithe is property belonging to the Most High, which means it is not one鈥檚 own to give to another as a gift? Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second tithe is common property, and consequently this unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to second tithe?

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 讚讬讛讬讘 谞讬讛诇讬讛 讘讟讬讘诇讬讛 讜拽住讘专 诪转谞讜转 砖诇讗 讛讜专诪讜 讻诪讬 砖诇讗 讛讜专诪讜 讚诪讬讬谉

The Gemara answers: No, actually it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and with what are we dealing here? It is not a situation where one gave second tithe itself as a gift, but where he gave him his entire crop in its state of being untithed produce. Consequently, the portion he gave him included tithes that had not yet been separated, and he holds that gifts that have not been separated are not considered as though they have been separated. One does not categorize the untithed produce as a mixture of regular produce and tithes, but as a non-sacred category in and of itself. Since the second tithe has not yet been separated, the produce has no sanctity, and he can give it as a gift.

转讗 砖诪注 讛驻讜讚讛 谞讟注 专讘注讬 砖诇讜 诪讜住讬祝 注诇讬讜 讞诪讬砖讬转讜 讘讬谉 诪砖诇讜 讘讬谉 砖谞讬转谉 诇讜 讘诪转谞讛 诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讬 诪爪讬 讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讜讛讗 讙诪专讬 拽讚砖 拽讚砖 诪诪注砖专 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara continues its line of inquiry: Come and hear another unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 4:6): With regard to one who redeems his own fourth-year produce, he adds to it its one-fifth, whether the produce was from his crop or was given to him as a gift. The Gemara inquires: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, can one give produce of the fourth year to another as a gift? But didn鈥檛 he derive that one must add one-fifth from the verbal analogy of 鈥渉oly鈥 for fourth-year fruit from 鈥渉oly鈥 from second tithe? This would mean that fourth-year fruit, like second tithe, is property of the Most High and cannot be given as a gift. Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讻讙讜谉 讚讬讛讬讘 讻砖讛讜讗 住诪讚专 讜讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 住诪讚专 讗住讜专 诪驻谞讬 砖讛讜讗 驻专讬

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and with what are we dealing here? It is not a situation where one gave fully grown fourth-year fruit but where he gave him the fruit when it was a bud. And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: A bud of a fruit is forbidden as orla, because it is already considered a fruit. Rabbi Meir, by contrast, holds that a fruit bud is not considered fruit. Therefore, the halakhot of orla and fourth-year fruit apply only to fruit that has grown, whereas beforehand it can be given as a gift.

转讗 砖诪注 诪砖讱 讛讬诪谞讜 诪注砖专 讘住诇注 讜诇讗 讛住驻讬拽 诇驻讚讜转讜 注讚 砖注诪讚 讘砖转讬诐 谞讜转谉 住诇注 讜诪砖转讻专 讘住诇注 讜诪注砖专 砖谞讬 砖诇讜 诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗诪讗讬 诪砖转讻专 讘住诇注 讜谞转谉 讗转 讛讻住祝 讜拽诐 诇讜 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The Gemara continues its line of inquiry: Come and hear another unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda (Ma鈥檃ser Sheni 4:6): If one was selling second-tithe produce, and the buyer pulled tithe worth a sela from him, thereby acquiring it, and did not manage to redeem it until its value stood at two sela, and he had not yet paid the seller, the buyer gives a sela to the seller, and he thereby gains a sela and the second tithe is his, since he acquired it when he pulled it and the price was fixed at that point. The Gemara inquires: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, why does the buyer gain a sela? The Merciful One states in the Torah with regard to the redemption of consecrated property: And he will give the money and it will be assured to him (see Leviticus 27:19), from which it is derived that one acquires consecrated property only after paying money. This means that the value of the second tithe increased before he acquired it. Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second tithe is common property, and it is acquired from the moment he pulled it?

诇注讜诇诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讛讻讗 讞讚 住转诪讗 讜讛讻讗 转专讬 住转诪讬

The Gemara confirms: Actually, this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Nevertheless, Rav Na岣an鈥檚 statement that the halakha with regard to second tithe is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir is still correct, as here there is one unattributed mishna that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, while here there are two unattributed mishnayot that indicate that Beit Hillel鈥檚 opinion is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the one in tractate Ma鈥檃ser Sheni, and one in tractate Eduyyot (4:2).

讜讗讬 住转诪讗 讚讜拽讗 诪讛 诇讬 讞讚 住转诪讗 诪讛 诇讬 转专讬 住转诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讜讗讬诇 讜转谞谉 讘讘讞讬专转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛

The Gemara asks: But if an unattributed mishna is stated that way specifically to teach the halakha, what difference is there to me if it is one unattributed mishna or two unattributed mishnayot? The Gemara suggests an alternate reasoning. Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, since we learned in a mishna in the preferred tractate, Eduyyot, in accordance with his opinion. Since the halakha is ruled in accordance with all of the mishnayot in Eduyyot, the fact that the opinion of Beit Hillel in that tractate is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir means that the halakha should be decided accordingly.

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