Menachot 17

חריפי דפומבדיתא הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה ואפילו לרבנן דאמרי אין מפגלין בחצי מתיר הני מילי היכא דחישב ביה בשירים ולבונה במילתא קיימא אבל הכא דחישב לה בלבונה כמה דחישב ביה בכוליה מתיר דמי

the sharp people in the city of Pumbedita: Burning renders burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day renders the meal offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the Rabbis, who say that one does not render an offering piggul with intent occurring during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful alone with intent of piggul. The reason is that this statement applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, and the frankincense stands intact, i.e., he had no intent with regard to it. But here, when he had intent with regard to the frankincense while burning the handful, it is considered as though he had intent with regard to the entire permitting factor.

אמר רבא אף אנן נמי תנינא זה הכלל כל הקומץ ונותן בכלי והמוליך והמקטיר לאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול ולהקטיר דבר שדרכו להקטיר חוץ למקומו פסול ואין בו כרת חוץ לזמנו פגול וחייבין עליו כרת

Rava said: We learn this halakha in a mishna, as well (12a): This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for karet. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet on account of it.

מאי לאו הקטרה דומיא דהנך מה הנך בין לאכול בין להקטיר אף הקטרה בין לאכול בין להקטיר

Rava explains: What, is it not correct to say that the halakha with regard to burning is similar to these, i.e., the removal of the handful, its placement in a vessel, and the conveying? Accordingly, just as with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day or to burn the frankincense the next day, the halakha is that the offering is piggul, so too with regard to burning, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is piggul.

לא הנך בין לאכול בין להקטיר הקטרה לאכול אין להקטיר לא

The Gemara rejects this comparison: No, with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is in fact piggul. But with regard to burning, if one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day, yes, it is piggul, but if one’s intent was to burn the frankincense the next day, it is not piggul.

יתיב רב מנשיא בר גדא קמיה דאביי ויתיב וקא אמר משמיה דרב חסדא אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה ואפילו לרבי מאיר דאמר מפגלין בחצי מתיר

The Gemara relates that Rav Menashya bar Gadda sat before Abaye, and while he was sitting he said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Burning does not render burning piggul, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day does not render the offering piggul. And this is the halakha even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says in the mishna that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful but not the frankincense with intent of piggul.

הני מילי היכא דחישב בהו בשירים דקומץ מתיר דידהו אבל הכא דקומץ לאו מתיר דלבונה הוא לא מצי מפגל ביה

Rav Menashya bar Gadda explains that the reason is that this statement of Rabbi Meir applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, as the handful is their permitting factor. But here, as the handful is not a permitting factor of the frankincense, the offering cannot be rendered piggul through it.

אמר ליה אביי עני מרי משמיה דרב אמר ליה אין איתמר נמי אמר רב חסדא אמר רב אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה

Abaye said to Rav Menashya: Answer me, my Master, did Rav Ḥisda state this halakha in the name of Rav? Rav Menashya said to Abaye: Yes. The Gemara notes that it was also stated explicitly that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says: Burning does not render burning piggul.

אמר רב יעקב בר אידי משמיה דאביי אף אנן נמי תנינא שחט אחד מן הכבשים לאכול ממנו למחר הוא פיגול וחבירו כשר לאכול מחבירו למחר שניהם כשרין מאי טעמא לאו משום דכיון דלאו מתיר דידיה הוא לא מצי מפגל ביה

Rav Ya’akov bar Idi said in the name of Abaye: We learn in the mishna as well that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav: If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is piggul and the other lamb is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that since the first lamb is not a permitting factor of the second lamb, it cannot render the second lamb piggul? The same reasoning should apply to the case of the handful and frankincense.

לא התם הוא דלא איקבע בחד מנא אבל הכא דאיקבע בחד מנא כי חד דמו

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; there is a difference between these cases. It is only there, in the mishna, that one lamb cannot render the other piggul, as it was not fixed in one vessel with the other lamb, and therefore each animal stands independent of the other. But here, as the handful and frankincense were fixed in one vessel for the purpose of offering them, they are considered like one item and one of them therefore renders the other piggul.

אמר רב המנונא הא מילתא אבלע לי רבי חנינא ותקילא לי ככוליה תלמודאי הקטיר קומץ להקטיר לבונה ולבונה לאכול שירים למחר פגול

§ Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Ḥanina helped me internalize this following matter, and to me it is equivalent to all the rest of my learning, as it contains a significant novelty: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, and burned the frankincense with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the meal offering is piggul.

מאי קא משמע לן אי הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה קא משמע לן לימא הקטיר קומץ להקטיר לבונה אי מפגלין בחצי מתיר קא משמע לן לימא הקטיר קומץ לאכול שירים למחר אי תרוייהו אתא קא משמע לן לימא הקטיר קומץ להקטיר לבונה ולאכול שירים למחר

The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Ḥanina teaching us? If he is teaching us that burning renders burning piggul, then let him simply say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense, the offering is piggul. If he is teaching us that one renders an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, then let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul. If he is coming to teach us both of these halakhot, let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense or to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is piggul.

אמר רב אדא בר אהבה לעולם קסבר אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה ואין מפגלין בחצי מתיר ושאני הכא דפשטא ליה מחשבה בכולה מנחה

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Actually, Rabbi Ḥanina holds that burning does not render burning piggul, and therefore if one burned only the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is not piggul. And he also holds that one does not render an offering piggul through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, and consequently if one burned only the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is not piggul either. But it is different here, as intent of piggul has extended over the entire meal offering, as he had intent of piggul during the burning of the handful with regard to the frankincense and during the burning of the frankincense with regard to the remainder.

תני תנא קמיה דרב יצחק בר אבא הקטיר קומץ לאכול שירים לדברי הכל פגול והא מיפלג פליגי אלא אימא לדברי הכל פסול

The Gemara relates that a tanna taught a baraita before Rav Yitzḥak bar Abba: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, everyone agrees that the meal offering is piggul. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna with regard to this very case? Rather, say that the baraita states: Everyone agrees that the offering is disqualified, as although the Rabbis hold that such intent does not render an offering piggul, they concede that it disqualifies the offering.

ולימא הרי זה פגול ורבי מאיר היא תנא דברי הכל אתניוה פיגול בפסול מיחלף ליה הרי זה בדברי הכל לא מיחלף ליה

The Gemara challenges: But if one must emend the baraita, let him say that the baraita states: It is piggul, and that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara responds: It is reasonable that the tanna taught that everyone agrees, and that he accidentally exchanged the word piggul for disqualified. But he would not confuse the phrase: This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, with the phrase: Everyone agrees.

הדרן עלך הקומץ את המנחה

מתני׳ הקומץ את המנחה לאכול דבר שאין דרכו לאכול ולהקטיר דבר שאין דרכו להקטיר כשר רבי אליעזר פוסל

MISHNA: In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, the meal offering is fit. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, although it is not piggul, and consuming it is therefore not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet].

לאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול ולהקטיר דבר שדרכו להקטיר פחות מכזית כשר לאכול כחצי זית ולהקטיר כחצי זית כשר שאין אכילה והקטרה מצטרפין

In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does consume it, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to consume or burn improperly less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was both to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, the meal offering is nevertheless fit, because eating and burning do not join together.

גמ׳ אמר רבי אסי אמר רבי יוחנן מאי טעמא דרבי אליעזר אמר קרא ואם האכל יאכל מבשר זבח שלמיו בשתי אכילות הכתוב מדבר אחד אכילת אדם ואחד אכילת מזבח לומר לך כשם שמחשבין באכילת אדם כך מחשבין באכילת מזבח

GEMARA: Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer that the intention to consume, beyond its designated time, an item that is not usually consumed renders the meal offering unfit? The verse states with regard to consuming an offering after its designated time: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all consumed [he’akhol ye’akhel]” (Leviticus 7:18), repeating for emphasis the term for consumption. He derives from the repeated term that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is the consumption of the offering by a person, e.g., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is the consumption of the sacrificial portions by their being burned on the altar. This serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of a person renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of the altar renders the offering unfit.

וכשם שמחשבין מאכילת אדם לאכילת אדם ומאכילת מזבח לאכילת מזבח כך מחשבין מאכילת אדם למזבח ומאכילת מזבח לאדם

And furthermore, this serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by the altar renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the altar renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit.

מאי טעמא מדאפקינהו רחמנא להקטרה בלשון אכילה

What is the reason for this derivation? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption.

ורבנן האי דאפקינהו רחמנא בלשון אכילה

And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, maintain the following: This fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption

דלא שנא כי מחשב בלשון אכילה למזבח ולא שנא כי מחשב בלשון הקטרה למזבח

demonstrates that there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Consumption on the altar, and there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Burning on the altar. Therefore, if the priest removed the handful from the meal offering while expressing the intention that it should be burned on the altar on the following day, whether this intention was phrased as: Consumed on the altar, or: Burned on the altar, the offering is piggul.

אי נמי מה אכילה בכזית אף הקטרה בכזית ולעולם אכילה דאורחא משמע

Alternatively, the doubled expression serves to teach that just as one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the consumption of an olive-bulk, as this is the minimal measure for an act to be considered eating, so too, one renders the offering piggul only when one’s intention involves the burning of an olive-bulk. But actually, the expression for consumption found in the verse indicates consuming it in the usual manner, and therefore an offering is rendered unfit only if one’s improper intention involved consuming an item that is usually consumed, or burning an item that is usually burned.

ורבי אליעזר אם כן לכתוב רחמנא אם האכל האכל אי נמי אם יאכל יאכל מאי האכל יאכל שמעת מינה תרתי

And what would Rabbi Eliezer respond? He would say that if that were so, that the verse intends to teach only that halakha, let the Merciful One write either: If he’akhol he’akhol, or: If ye’akhel ye’akhel, repeating the same form of the word twice. What is the reason that the verse states “he’akhol ye’akhel,” employing both repetition and variation? Learn from this formulation two halakhot. One, as the Rabbis explain, is that the offering is rendered unfit whether one uses an expression of consumption or an expression of burning, provided that one’s intention is with regard to at least an olive-bulk. The second is that the offering is rendered unfit if one intends to burn on the altar an item that is usually consumed by a person, or to consume an item that is usually burned on the altar.

אמר ליה רבי זירא לרב אסי ואי טעמא דרבי אליעזר משום הכי הוא כרת נמי ליחייב וכי תימא הכי נמי והא את הוא דאמרת משמיה דרבי יוחנן מודה רבי אליעזר שאין ענוש כרת

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But if the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is due to that derivation, and he understands that the verse equates the improper intent to consume an item that is usually consumed with the improper intent to consume an item that is usually burned, then let one also be liable to receive karet for consuming an offering brought with intention to consume, after its designated time, the part of the offering that is burned, or for intention to burn, after its designated time, an item that is usually consumed. Why does Rabbi Eliezer state only that the offering is rendered unfit? And if you would say that indeed, Rabbi Eliezer does hold that one who consumes such an offering is liable to receive karet, that is difficult: But aren’t you the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that doing so is not punishable by karet?

אמר ליה תנאי היא אליבא דרבי אליעזר איכא למאן דאמר פסולה דאורייתא ואיכא למאן דאמר פסולה דרבנן

Rav Asi said to him: It is a dispute between tanna’im as to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by Torah law and one is liable to receive karet. It was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan cited the proof from the verse. And there is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by rabbinic law, and it was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no punishment of karet for this transgression.

דתניא השוחט את הזבח לשתות מדמו למחר להקטיר מבשרו למחר לאכול מאימוריו למחר כשר ורבי אליעזר פוסל להניח מדמו למחר רבי יהודה פוסל אמר רבי אלעזר אף בזו רבי אליעזר פוסל וחכמים מכשירין

As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intention to drink some of its blood, which is designated to be presented on the altar, on the next day, or to burn some of its meat, which is meant to be eaten, on the next day, or to eat some of its sacrificial portions, which are designated to be burned on the altar, on the next day, the offering is fit, as his intention is either to eat an item that is usually sacrificed on the altar, or to burn on the altar an item that is usually eaten. But Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit. If one slaughters the offering with the intention to leave some of its blood for the next day, but not to present it or consume it, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit. Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit.

רבי יהודה אליבא דמאן אילימא אליבא דרבנן השתא ומה התם דקא מחשב בלשון אכילה מכשרי רבנן הכא לא כל שכן

The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda that the offering is unfit even if he intends only to leave the blood for the next day, but not present it or consume it? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now consider: And if there, where the priest expresses his intention using the language of consumption, the Rabbis nevertheless deem the offering fit, despite the fact that if he had used this expression with regard to the portion burned on the altar, the offering would be piggul, is it not all the more so the case that here, when he intends only to leave the blood until the next day, the offering should be fit?

אלא אליבא דרבי אליעזר ואמר רבי אלעזר אף בזו רבי אליעזר פוסל וחכמים מכשירין רבי אלעזר היינו רבי יהודה

Rather, it must be that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And yet the baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. If Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, then the explanation of Rabbi Elazar of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is identical to that of Rabbi Yehuda, and there does not appear to be any disagreement between the two.

אלא לאו כרת איכא בינייהו דרבי יהודה (דתנא קמא) סבר להניח פסולא בעלמא בהנך כרת נמי מיחייב ואתא רבי אלעזר למימר אידי ואידי פסול ואין בו כרת

Rather, is it not so that the difference between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to liability for karet? The difference lies in that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one’s intention is to leave the blood for the next day, then according to Rabbi Eliezer the offering is only rendered unfit, whereas in those cases listed in the mishna, such as where one’s intention is to eat the sacrificial portions on the next day, he would be liable to receive karet as well. And Rabbi Elazar comes to say that according to Rabbi Eliezer, both in this case and in that case, the offering is unfit but there is no liability to receive karet for it.

לא דכולי עלמא כרת ליכא והכא שלש מחלוקת בדבר תנא קמא סבר בהנך פליגי להניח דברי הכל כשר

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it may be that everyone agrees that according to Rabbi Eliezer in a case where one’s intention is to eat, after its designated time, an item that is usually burned, or to burn an item that is usually eaten, there is no liability to receive karet. And here there are three disputes with regard to the matter. The first tanna holds that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only in those cases, with regard to whether the offering is rendered unfit due to the intention to eat an item that is usually burned or to burn an item that is usually eaten. But with regard to leaving of its blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is fit.