Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

October 5, 2018 | 讻状讜 讘转砖专讬 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Menachot 56

In the verse regarding the leader’s聽goat sin offering, what does the word “it” come to exclude? Several suggestions are offered. Regarding leavening, one is obligated if one continued a part of the leavening process of a meal offering even if it had already leavened (for example, baking it after it was already leavened from kneading). Would the same things still apply in other cases? The act of leavening is also different from a regular act as the leavening happens on its own聽and yet one is obligated. This is聽compared to putting a piece of meat on the fire on Shabbat as the cooking happens by the fire and not by a person.


If the lesson doesn't play, click "Download"

诇专讘讜转 砖注讬专讬 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诇住诪讬讻讛

The term 鈥渙f the goat鈥 serves to include the goats brought as communal sin offerings for idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬谞讗 转讬谞讞 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

Ravina objects to this: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon was included in the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term 鈥渋t,鈥 since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 诪专讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 谞诪讬 诪讗讬 讚讗讬转专讘讬 讗讬转专讘讬 诪讗讬 讚诇讗 讗讬转专讘讬 诇讗 讗讬转专讘讬

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, why not say that for that which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included; and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included. Why would one think that the obligation to slaughter in the north applies to the offering of Nahshon merely because the requirement of placing hands applies to that offering?

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗讬 诇讗 诪注讟讬讛 拽专讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 转讬转讬 讘讘谞讬谉 讗讘 住诪讬讻讛 讙讜驻讛 诇讬砖转讜拽 拽专讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜转讬转讬 讘讘谞讬谉 讗讘 讗诇讗 砖注讛 诪讚讜专讜转 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 砖注讛 诪讚讜专讜转 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉

And if you would say that had the verse not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirements of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.

讗诇讗 讗讜转讜 讟注讜谉 爪驻讜谉 讜讗讬谉 讛砖讜讞讟 注讜诪讚 讘爪驻讜谉

Rather, the term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters. The offering would be valid even if he were to stand in the south of the courtyard and use a long knife to slaughter the animal that is positioned in the north.

诪讚专讘讬 讗讞讬讬讛 谞驻拽讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讞讬讬讛 讗讜诪专 讜砖讞讟 讗转讜 注诇 讬专讱 讛诪讝讘讞 爪驻讜谞讛 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专

The Gemara challenges this: The halakha of the one who slaughters has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi A岣yya, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi A岣yya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: 鈥淎nd he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before God鈥 (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term 鈥渋t鈥?

诇驻讬 砖诪爪讬谞讜 讘诪拽讘诇 砖注讜诪讚 讘爪驻讜谉 讜诪拽讘诇 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讗诐 注诪讚 讘讚专讜诐 讜拽讬讘诇 讘爪驻讜谉 驻住讜诇 讬讻讜诇 讗祝 讝讛 讻谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗转讜 讗讜转讜 讘爪驻讜谉 讜诇讗 讛砖讜讞讟 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注讜诪讚 讘爪驻讜谉

He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎nd he shall slaughter it,鈥 to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters does not have to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. The question returns: What is derived from the exclusionary term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?

讗诇讗 讗讜转讜 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讗讬谉 讘谉 注讜祝 讘爪驻讜谉 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讬转讬 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讘谉 爪讗谉 讜诪讛 讘谉 爪讗谉 砖诇讗 拽讘注 诇讜 讻讛谉 拽讘注 诇讜 爪驻讜谉 讘谉 注讜祝 砖拽讘注 诇讜 讻讛谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞拽讘注 诇讜 爪驻讜谉

The Gemara answers: Rather, the term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. It might enter your mind to say: Let it be derived that a bird must be killed in the north by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a sheep, as follows: Just as is the case for a sheep brought as a burnt offering, that the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, yet nevertheless it fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states 鈥渋t,鈥 to exclude a bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.

诪讛 诇讘谉 爪讗谉 砖讻谉 拽讘注 诇讜 讻诇讬

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a bird offering from the halakha of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. By contrast, a bird is killed by the priest pinching the nape of its neck with his fingernail, without a utensil. Therefore, the term 鈥渋t鈥 cannot serve to counter this derivation. If so, there is no reason to think that a bird should also have to be killed in the north, and the term 鈥渋t鈥 is not necessary to exclude this possibility.

讗诇讗 讗讜转讜 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讗讬谉 驻住讞 讘爪驻讜谉 驻住讞 诪讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 谞驻拽讗

The Gemara explains: Rather, the term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north. The Gemara raises a difficulty: The halakha that the Paschal offering need not be slaughtered in the north is not derived from the term: 鈥淚t,鈥 but rather it is derived as stated by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 讬讛讗 讛驻住讞 讟注讜谉 爪驻讜谉 讜讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 注讜诇讛 砖诇讗 拽讘注 诇讛 讝诪谉 讘砖讞讬讟转讛 拽讘注 诇讛 爪驻讜谉 驻住讞 砖拽讘注 诇讜 讝诪谉 诇砖讞讬讟转讜 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖拽讘注 诇讜 爪驻讜谉

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter yet fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, i.e., it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states 鈥渋t,鈥 to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.

诪讛 诇注讜诇讛 砖讻谉 讻诇讬诇

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a Paschal offering from the halakha of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

诪讞讟讗转 诪讛 诇讞讟讗转 砖讻谉 诪讻驻专转 注诇 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar yet is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it has the power to atone for those sins liable for punishment by excision from the World-to-Come [karet], which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

诪讗砖诐 诪讛 诇讗砖诐 砖讻谉 拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讻讜诇讛讜 谞诪讬 砖讻谉 拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, does not atone for those sins liable for punishment by karet, and is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it is an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings the halakha of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them either, since each of them is an offering of the most sacred order.

讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻讚拽讗诪专讬谞谉 诪注讬拽专讗 讗讜转讜 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讗讬谉 讛砖讜讞讟 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讚拽讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讱 诪讚专讘讬 讗讞讬讬讛 谞驻拽讗 讚专讘讬 讗讞讬讬讛 诇讗讜 诇诪注讜讟讬 砖讜讞讟 讘爪驻讜谉 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讗诇讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讬谉 讛砖讜讞讟 讘爪驻讜谉 讗讘诇 诪拽讘诇 讘爪驻讜谉

The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Rather, the term 鈥渋t鈥 teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this halakha from the statement of Rabbi A岣yya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation of Rabbi A岣yya from the term 鈥渋t鈥 does not come to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that is known already from the term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king. Rather, this is what Rabbi A岣yya is saying: The one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.

诪拽讘诇 诪诇拽讞 讜诇拽讞 谞驻拽讗 诇拽讞 讜诇拽讞 诇讗 诪砖诪注 诇讬讛

The Gemara questions this inference: The halakha that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: 鈥淎nd the priest shall take鈥 (Leviticus 4:34). The Gemara explains: This tanna does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: 鈥淎nd the priest shall take.鈥 Since he does not agree with this derivation, he must therefore derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.

讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 诇讬砖转讛 讜注诇 注专讬讻转讛 讜注诇 讗驻讬讬转讛 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗驻讗讛 诇讜拽讛 砖转讬诐 讗讞转 注诇 注专讬讻转讛 讜讗讞转 注诇 讗驻讬讬转讛 讜讛讗 讗诪专转 诪讛 讗驻讬讬讛 诪讬讜讞讚转 砖讛讬讗 诪注砖讛 讬讞讬讚讬 讜讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛

搂 The mishna teaches: And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven. Rav Pappa said: If one baked a meal offering as leaven he is flogged with two sets of lashes, one for shaping the dough and one for baking it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But you said in the baraita: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single action and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself; this indicates that one receives one set of lashes for baking a meal offering as leavened bread, not two.

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚注专讬讱 讛讜讗 讜讗驻讛 讛讜讗 讛讗 讚注专讬讱 讞讘专讬讛 讜讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讜讗驻讛

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement of the baraita, i.e., that one receives a single set of lashes for baking, is referring to a case where he shaped the dough and he, the same person, also baked it. Since he already incurred liability to receive lashes for shaping the dough before he baked it, he is not liable again for shaping when he bakes it. That statement of Rav Pappa, that one who bakes the dough is liable to receive two sets of lashes, is referring to a situation where another person shaped the dough and gave the shaped dough to him, and he baked it. Although the one who shaped it is liable to receive lashes for the act of shaping, nevertheless, the one who bakes it is liable to receive two sets of lashes, as his act of baking also completed the shaping of the dough.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘讻讜专 砖讗讞讝讜 讚诐 诪拽讬讝讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗转 讛讚诐 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 讘讜 诪讜诐 讜讗讬谉 诪拽讬讝讬谉 讗转 讛讚诐 讘诪拽讜诐 砖注讜砖讬谉 讘讜 诪讜诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

搂 The Gemara continues to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bekhorot 3:6): In the case of an unblemished firstborn kosher animal whose blood circulation is constricted, a condition that can be healed only through bloodletting, one may let the animal鈥檚 blood by cutting it in a place where the incision does not cause a permanent blemish. But one may not let the animal鈥檚 blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, as it is prohibited to intentionally cause a blemish in a firstborn animal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬拽讬讝 讗祝 讘诪拽讜诐 砖注讜砖讬谉 讘讜 诪讜诐 讜讘诇讘讚 砖诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 注诇 讗讜转讜 诪讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专

And the Rabbis say: One may even let the animal鈥檚 blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, provided that he does not slaughter the animal on the basis of that blemish, even though in general, a firstborn animal may be slaughtered once it develops a permanent blemish. The Rabbis maintain that in this case, since he caused the blemish himself, he may not slaughter it until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. Rabbi Shimon says:

讗祝 谞砖讞讟 注诇 讗讜转讜 诪讜诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪转 讗讬谉 诪拽讬讝讬谉 诇讜 讗转 讛讚诐

The animal may even be slaughtered on the basis of that blemish. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the firstborn would die if its blood is not let, one may not let its blood at all.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘诪讞诪抓 讗讞专 诪讞诪抓 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转注砖讛 讞诪抓 讜诇讗 转讗驻讛 讞诪抓

The Gemara discusses similar cases, including examples involving meal offerings. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: All of the Sages who disagree as to whether one may let the blood of a firstborn animal whose blood circulation is constricted concede that one who leavens a meal offering after another had already leavened it is liable to receive lashes for the additional leavening, as it is written: 鈥淣o meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven鈥 (Leviticus 2:11), and it is also stated: 鈥淚t shall not be baked with leaven鈥 (Leviticus 6:10). This indicates that one is liable for every act of leavening performed on a meal offering.

讘诪住专住 讗讞专 诪住专住 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讚讻转讬讘 讜诪注讜讱 讜讻转讜转 讜谞转讜拽 讜讻专讜转 讗诐 注诇 讻讜专转 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 注诇 谞讜转拽 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诇讗 诇讛讘讬讗 谞讜转拽 讗讞专 讻讜专转 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘

Similarly, everyone agrees that one who castrates an animal after one who castrates it is liable, as it is written: 鈥淭hose whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or detached, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land鈥 (Leviticus 22:24). If one is liable when the seminal vesicles are cut, then when the testicles are detached altogether is he not all the more so liable? Rather, this verse serves to include one who detaches the testicles after one who cuts the seminal vesicles, to indicate that he is liable. Apparently, one is liable for castrating an animal that is already sterilized.

诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讟讬诇 诪讜诐 讘讘注诇 诪讜诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讻诇 诪讜诐 诇讗 讬讛讬讛 讘讜 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 转诪讬诐 讬讛讬讛 诇专爪讜谉

These Sages disagree only with regard to one who inflicts a blemish on an already blemished animal, such as one whose blood circulation is constricted. Rabbi Meir maintains that as the verse states: 鈥淚t shall be perfect to be accepted; there shall be no blemish in it鈥 (Leviticus 22:21), this categorical statement includes even the infliction of a blemish on an offering that is already blemished. And the Rabbis maintain that the phrase 鈥渋t shall be perfect to be accepted鈥 indicates that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to an animal that is currently perfect, i.e., unblemished, and can therefore be accepted, meaning that it is suitable to be sacrificed upon the altar. If the animal is already blemished, there is no prohibition against inflicting an additional blemish upon it.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 转诪讬诐 讬讛讬讛 诇专爪讜谉 讛讛讜讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 讘注诇 诪讜诐 诪注讬拽专讗

The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who derives the halakha from the phrase 鈥渢here shall be no blemish in it,鈥 isn鈥檛 it written also: 鈥淚t shall be perfect to be accepted鈥? The Gemara answers: That verse serves to exclude only an animal that was blemished from the outset, i.e., an animal that was born with a blemish. In such a case, there is no prohibition to inflict an additional blemish on it. But if the animal was initially unblemished and later developed a blemish, it is prohibited to inflict another blemish upon it.

讘注诇 诪讜诐 诪注讬拽专讗 讚讬拽诇讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There is no need to exclude an animal that was blemished from the outset, as it is merely like a palm tree, i.e., it is an item that can never attain the status of an animal consecrated as an offering. Therefore, it is obvious that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to this animal.

讗诇讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 驻住讜诇讬 讛诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗讞专 驻讚讬讜谞诐 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗住讬专讬 讘讙讬讝讛 讜注讘讜讚讛 讘诪讜诪诐 谞诪讬 诇讬转住专讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rather, Rabbi Meir maintains that the phrase 鈥渋t shall be perfect to be accepted鈥 serves to exclude disqualified consecrated animals, to teach that after their redemption, when they become non-sacred, the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to them any longer. This exclusion is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is prohibited to shear disqualified consecrated animals or use them for labor even after they have been redeemed and are non-sacred, perhaps let it also be prohibited to inflict a blemish upon them. Consequently, this verse teaches us that there is no prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon these animals.

讜专讘谞谉 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 讻诇 诪讜诐 诇讗 讬讛讬讛 讘讜 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讜讻诇 诪讜诐 诇讗 讬讛讬讛 讘讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 讘讜 诪讜诐 诪谞讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讙专讜诐 诇讜 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专讬诐 砖诇讗 讬谞讬讞 讘爪拽 讗讜 讚讘讬诇讛 注诇 讙讘讬 讛讗讜讝谉 讻讚讬 砖讬讘讗 讛讻诇讘 讜讬讟诇谞讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻诇 诪讜诐 讗诪专 诪讜诐 讜讗诪专 讻诇 诪讜诐

The Gemara analyzes the opinion of the Rabbis. And according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, who base their opinion on the phrase: 鈥淚t shall be perfect to be accepted,鈥 isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淭here shall not be any blemish in it,鈥 which indicates an expansion of the prohibition against inflicting a blemish? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淭here shall not be any blemish in it鈥 (Leviticus 22:21). I have derived only that it may not have a blemish caused directly by human action. From where is it derived that one may not cause a blemish to be inflicted upon it indirectly by means of other agents, e.g., that one may not place dough or pressed figs on its ear so that a dog will come and take it, thereby biting off part of the animal鈥檚 ear and leaving it blemished? The verse states: 鈥淎ny blemish.鈥 It says: 鈥淏lemish,鈥 and it says 鈥淎ny blemish鈥; the word 鈥渘o鈥 serves to teach that one may not cause a blemish indirectly.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讛谞讬讞 砖讗讜专 注诇 讙讘讬 注讬住讛 讜讛诇讱 讜讬砖讘 诇讜 讜谞转讞诪爪讛 诪讗诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇讬讛 讻诪注砖讛 砖讘转 讜诪注砖讛 砖讘转 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 诪讬 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛

搂 The Gemara returns to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. Rabbi Ami says: If one placed leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, on top of the dough of a meal offering, and he went and sat himself down to wait, meaning that he performed no other action, and the dough then leavened of its own accord, he is liable to receive lashes for it. This is similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat. The Gemara questions this comparison: And is one liable for performing a prohibited action on Shabbat in a case like this? But doesn鈥檛 Rabba bar bar 岣na say

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Menachot 56

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Menachot 56

诇专讘讜转 砖注讬专讬 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诇住诪讬讻讛

The term 鈥渙f the goat鈥 serves to include the goats brought as communal sin offerings for idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬谞讗 转讬谞讞 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

Ravina objects to this: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon was included in the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term 鈥渋t,鈥 since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 诪专讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 谞诪讬 诪讗讬 讚讗讬转专讘讬 讗讬转专讘讬 诪讗讬 讚诇讗 讗讬转专讘讬 诇讗 讗讬转专讘讬

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, why not say that for that which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included; and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included. Why would one think that the obligation to slaughter in the north applies to the offering of Nahshon merely because the requirement of placing hands applies to that offering?

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗讬 诇讗 诪注讟讬讛 拽专讗 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 转讬转讬 讘讘谞讬谉 讗讘 住诪讬讻讛 讙讜驻讛 诇讬砖转讜拽 拽专讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜转讬转讬 讘讘谞讬谉 讗讘 讗诇讗 砖注讛 诪讚讜专讜转 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 砖注讛 诪讚讜专讜转 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉

And if you would say that had the verse not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirements of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.

讗诇讗 讗讜转讜 讟注讜谉 爪驻讜谉 讜讗讬谉 讛砖讜讞讟 注讜诪讚 讘爪驻讜谉

Rather, the term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters. The offering would be valid even if he were to stand in the south of the courtyard and use a long knife to slaughter the animal that is positioned in the north.

诪讚专讘讬 讗讞讬讬讛 谞驻拽讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讞讬讬讛 讗讜诪专 讜砖讞讟 讗转讜 注诇 讬专讱 讛诪讝讘讞 爪驻讜谞讛 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专

The Gemara challenges this: The halakha of the one who slaughters has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi A岣yya, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi A岣yya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: 鈥淎nd he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before God鈥 (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term 鈥渋t鈥?

诇驻讬 砖诪爪讬谞讜 讘诪拽讘诇 砖注讜诪讚 讘爪驻讜谉 讜诪拽讘诇 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讗诐 注诪讚 讘讚专讜诐 讜拽讬讘诇 讘爪驻讜谉 驻住讜诇 讬讻讜诇 讗祝 讝讛 讻谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗转讜 讗讜转讜 讘爪驻讜谉 讜诇讗 讛砖讜讞讟 爪专讬讱 诇讛讬讜转 注讜诪讚 讘爪驻讜谉

He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎nd he shall slaughter it,鈥 to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters does not have to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. The question returns: What is derived from the exclusionary term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?

讗诇讗 讗讜转讜 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讗讬谉 讘谉 注讜祝 讘爪驻讜谉 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讬转讬 讘拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 诪讘谉 爪讗谉 讜诪讛 讘谉 爪讗谉 砖诇讗 拽讘注 诇讜 讻讛谉 拽讘注 诇讜 爪驻讜谉 讘谉 注讜祝 砖拽讘注 诇讜 讻讛谉 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖谞拽讘注 诇讜 爪驻讜谉

The Gemara answers: Rather, the term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. It might enter your mind to say: Let it be derived that a bird must be killed in the north by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a sheep, as follows: Just as is the case for a sheep brought as a burnt offering, that the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, yet nevertheless it fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states 鈥渋t,鈥 to exclude a bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.

诪讛 诇讘谉 爪讗谉 砖讻谉 拽讘注 诇讜 讻诇讬

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a bird offering from the halakha of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. By contrast, a bird is killed by the priest pinching the nape of its neck with his fingernail, without a utensil. Therefore, the term 鈥渋t鈥 cannot serve to counter this derivation. If so, there is no reason to think that a bird should also have to be killed in the north, and the term 鈥渋t鈥 is not necessary to exclude this possibility.

讗诇讗 讗讜转讜 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讗讬谉 驻住讞 讘爪驻讜谉 驻住讞 诪讚专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 谞驻拽讗

The Gemara explains: Rather, the term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north. The Gemara raises a difficulty: The halakha that the Paschal offering need not be slaughtered in the north is not derived from the term: 鈥淚t,鈥 but rather it is derived as stated by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘谉 讬注拽讘 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 讬讛讗 讛驻住讞 讟注讜谉 爪驻讜谉 讜讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诪讛 注讜诇讛 砖诇讗 拽讘注 诇讛 讝诪谉 讘砖讞讬讟转讛 拽讘注 诇讛 爪驻讜谉 驻住讞 砖拽讘注 诇讜 讝诪谉 诇砖讞讬讟转讜 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖拽讘注 诇讜 爪驻讜谉

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter yet fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, i.e., it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states 鈥渋t,鈥 to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.

诪讛 诇注讜诇讛 砖讻谉 讻诇讬诇

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a Paschal offering from the halakha of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

诪讞讟讗转 诪讛 诇讞讟讗转 砖讻谉 诪讻驻专转 注诇 讞讬讬讘讬 讻专讬转讜转

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar yet is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it has the power to atone for those sins liable for punishment by excision from the World-to-Come [karet], which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

诪讗砖诐 诪讛 诇讗砖诐 砖讻谉 拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讻讜诇讛讜 谞诪讬 砖讻谉 拽讚砖讬 拽讚砖讬诐

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, does not atone for those sins liable for punishment by karet, and is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it is an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings the halakha of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them either, since each of them is an offering of the most sacred order.

讗诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讻讚拽讗诪专讬谞谉 诪注讬拽专讗 讗讜转讜 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讗讬谉 讛砖讜讞讟 讘爪驻讜谉 讜讚拽讗 拽砖讬讗 诇讱 诪讚专讘讬 讗讞讬讬讛 谞驻拽讗 讚专讘讬 讗讞讬讬讛 诇讗讜 诇诪注讜讟讬 砖讜讞讟 讘爪驻讜谉 讛讜讗 讚讗转讗 讗诇讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讬谉 讛砖讜讞讟 讘爪驻讜谉 讗讘诇 诪拽讘诇 讘爪驻讜谉

The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Rather, the term 鈥渋t鈥 teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this halakha from the statement of Rabbi A岣yya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation of Rabbi A岣yya from the term 鈥渋t鈥 does not come to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that is known already from the term 鈥渋t鈥 stated with regard to the sin offering of a king. Rather, this is what Rabbi A岣yya is saying: The one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.

诪拽讘诇 诪诇拽讞 讜诇拽讞 谞驻拽讗 诇拽讞 讜诇拽讞 诇讗 诪砖诪注 诇讬讛

The Gemara questions this inference: The halakha that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: 鈥淎nd the priest shall take鈥 (Leviticus 4:34). The Gemara explains: This tanna does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: 鈥淎nd the priest shall take.鈥 Since he does not agree with this derivation, he must therefore derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.

讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 诇讬砖转讛 讜注诇 注专讬讻转讛 讜注诇 讗驻讬讬转讛 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讗驻讗讛 诇讜拽讛 砖转讬诐 讗讞转 注诇 注专讬讻转讛 讜讗讞转 注诇 讗驻讬讬转讛 讜讛讗 讗诪专转 诪讛 讗驻讬讬讛 诪讬讜讞讚转 砖讛讬讗 诪注砖讛 讬讞讬讚讬 讜讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 讘驻谞讬 注爪诪讛

搂 The mishna teaches: And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven. Rav Pappa said: If one baked a meal offering as leaven he is flogged with two sets of lashes, one for shaping the dough and one for baking it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But you said in the baraita: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single action and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself; this indicates that one receives one set of lashes for baking a meal offering as leavened bread, not two.

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚注专讬讱 讛讜讗 讜讗驻讛 讛讜讗 讛讗 讚注专讬讱 讞讘专讬讛 讜讬讛讬讘 诇讬讛 讜讗驻讛

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement of the baraita, i.e., that one receives a single set of lashes for baking, is referring to a case where he shaped the dough and he, the same person, also baked it. Since he already incurred liability to receive lashes for shaping the dough before he baked it, he is not liable again for shaping when he bakes it. That statement of Rav Pappa, that one who bakes the dough is liable to receive two sets of lashes, is referring to a situation where another person shaped the dough and gave the shaped dough to him, and he baked it. Although the one who shaped it is liable to receive lashes for the act of shaping, nevertheless, the one who bakes it is liable to receive two sets of lashes, as his act of baking also completed the shaping of the dough.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘讻讜专 砖讗讞讝讜 讚诐 诪拽讬讝讬谉 讗讜转讜 讗转 讛讚诐 讘诪拽讜诐 砖讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 讘讜 诪讜诐 讜讗讬谉 诪拽讬讝讬谉 讗转 讛讚诐 讘诪拽讜诐 砖注讜砖讬谉 讘讜 诪讜诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

搂 The Gemara continues to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bekhorot 3:6): In the case of an unblemished firstborn kosher animal whose blood circulation is constricted, a condition that can be healed only through bloodletting, one may let the animal鈥檚 blood by cutting it in a place where the incision does not cause a permanent blemish. But one may not let the animal鈥檚 blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, as it is prohibited to intentionally cause a blemish in a firstborn animal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬拽讬讝 讗祝 讘诪拽讜诐 砖注讜砖讬谉 讘讜 诪讜诐 讜讘诇讘讚 砖诇讗 讬砖讞讜讟 注诇 讗讜转讜 诪讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专

And the Rabbis say: One may even let the animal鈥檚 blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, provided that he does not slaughter the animal on the basis of that blemish, even though in general, a firstborn animal may be slaughtered once it develops a permanent blemish. The Rabbis maintain that in this case, since he caused the blemish himself, he may not slaughter it until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. Rabbi Shimon says:

讗祝 谞砖讞讟 注诇 讗讜转讜 诪讜诐 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪转 讗讬谉 诪拽讬讝讬谉 诇讜 讗转 讛讚诐

The animal may even be slaughtered on the basis of that blemish. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the firstborn would die if its blood is not let, one may not let its blood at all.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 诪讜讚讬诐 讘诪讞诪抓 讗讞专 诪讞诪抓 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转注砖讛 讞诪抓 讜诇讗 转讗驻讛 讞诪抓

The Gemara discusses similar cases, including examples involving meal offerings. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: All of the Sages who disagree as to whether one may let the blood of a firstborn animal whose blood circulation is constricted concede that one who leavens a meal offering after another had already leavened it is liable to receive lashes for the additional leavening, as it is written: 鈥淣o meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven鈥 (Leviticus 2:11), and it is also stated: 鈥淚t shall not be baked with leaven鈥 (Leviticus 6:10). This indicates that one is liable for every act of leavening performed on a meal offering.

讘诪住专住 讗讞专 诪住专住 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讚讻转讬讘 讜诪注讜讱 讜讻转讜转 讜谞转讜拽 讜讻专讜转 讗诐 注诇 讻讜专转 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 注诇 谞讜转拽 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 讗诇讗 诇讛讘讬讗 谞讜转拽 讗讞专 讻讜专转 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘

Similarly, everyone agrees that one who castrates an animal after one who castrates it is liable, as it is written: 鈥淭hose whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or detached, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land鈥 (Leviticus 22:24). If one is liable when the seminal vesicles are cut, then when the testicles are detached altogether is he not all the more so liable? Rather, this verse serves to include one who detaches the testicles after one who cuts the seminal vesicles, to indicate that he is liable. Apparently, one is liable for castrating an animal that is already sterilized.

诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讗诇讗 讘诪讟讬诇 诪讜诐 讘讘注诇 诪讜诐 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讻诇 诪讜诐 诇讗 讬讛讬讛 讘讜 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 转诪讬诐 讬讛讬讛 诇专爪讜谉

These Sages disagree only with regard to one who inflicts a blemish on an already blemished animal, such as one whose blood circulation is constricted. Rabbi Meir maintains that as the verse states: 鈥淚t shall be perfect to be accepted; there shall be no blemish in it鈥 (Leviticus 22:21), this categorical statement includes even the infliction of a blemish on an offering that is already blemished. And the Rabbis maintain that the phrase 鈥渋t shall be perfect to be accepted鈥 indicates that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to an animal that is currently perfect, i.e., unblemished, and can therefore be accepted, meaning that it is suitable to be sacrificed upon the altar. If the animal is already blemished, there is no prohibition against inflicting an additional blemish upon it.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 转诪讬诐 讬讛讬讛 诇专爪讜谉 讛讛讜讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 讘注诇 诪讜诐 诪注讬拽专讗

The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who derives the halakha from the phrase 鈥渢here shall be no blemish in it,鈥 isn鈥檛 it written also: 鈥淚t shall be perfect to be accepted鈥? The Gemara answers: That verse serves to exclude only an animal that was blemished from the outset, i.e., an animal that was born with a blemish. In such a case, there is no prohibition to inflict an additional blemish on it. But if the animal was initially unblemished and later developed a blemish, it is prohibited to inflict another blemish upon it.

讘注诇 诪讜诐 诪注讬拽专讗 讚讬拽诇讗 讘注诇诪讗 讛讜讗

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There is no need to exclude an animal that was blemished from the outset, as it is merely like a palm tree, i.e., it is an item that can never attain the status of an animal consecrated as an offering. Therefore, it is obvious that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to this animal.

讗诇讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 驻住讜诇讬 讛诪讜拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗讞专 驻讚讬讜谞诐 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讗住讬专讬 讘讙讬讝讛 讜注讘讜讚讛 讘诪讜诪诐 谞诪讬 诇讬转住专讬 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rather, Rabbi Meir maintains that the phrase 鈥渋t shall be perfect to be accepted鈥 serves to exclude disqualified consecrated animals, to teach that after their redemption, when they become non-sacred, the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to them any longer. This exclusion is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is prohibited to shear disqualified consecrated animals or use them for labor even after they have been redeemed and are non-sacred, perhaps let it also be prohibited to inflict a blemish upon them. Consequently, this verse teaches us that there is no prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon these animals.

讜专讘谞谉 谞诪讬 讛讻转讬讘 讻诇 诪讜诐 诇讗 讬讛讬讛 讘讜 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬讗 讜讻诇 诪讜诐 诇讗 讬讛讬讛 讘讜 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 讘讜 诪讜诐 诪谞讬谉 砖诇讗 讬讙专讜诐 诇讜 注诇 讬讚讬 讗讞专讬诐 砖诇讗 讬谞讬讞 讘爪拽 讗讜 讚讘讬诇讛 注诇 讙讘讬 讛讗讜讝谉 讻讚讬 砖讬讘讗 讛讻诇讘 讜讬讟诇谞讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻诇 诪讜诐 讗诪专 诪讜诐 讜讗诪专 讻诇 诪讜诐

The Gemara analyzes the opinion of the Rabbis. And according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, who base their opinion on the phrase: 鈥淚t shall be perfect to be accepted,鈥 isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淭here shall not be any blemish in it,鈥 which indicates an expansion of the prohibition against inflicting a blemish? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淭here shall not be any blemish in it鈥 (Leviticus 22:21). I have derived only that it may not have a blemish caused directly by human action. From where is it derived that one may not cause a blemish to be inflicted upon it indirectly by means of other agents, e.g., that one may not place dough or pressed figs on its ear so that a dog will come and take it, thereby biting off part of the animal鈥檚 ear and leaving it blemished? The verse states: 鈥淎ny blemish.鈥 It says: 鈥淏lemish,鈥 and it says 鈥淎ny blemish鈥; the word 鈥渘o鈥 serves to teach that one may not cause a blemish indirectly.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讛谞讬讞 砖讗讜专 注诇 讙讘讬 注讬住讛 讜讛诇讱 讜讬砖讘 诇讜 讜谞转讞诪爪讛 诪讗诇讬讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇讬讛 讻诪注砖讛 砖讘转 讜诪注砖讛 砖讘转 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 诪讬 诪讬讞讬讬讘 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛

搂 The Gemara returns to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. Rabbi Ami says: If one placed leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, on top of the dough of a meal offering, and he went and sat himself down to wait, meaning that he performed no other action, and the dough then leavened of its own accord, he is liable to receive lashes for it. This is similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat. The Gemara questions this comparison: And is one liable for performing a prohibited action on Shabbat in a case like this? But doesn鈥檛 Rabba bar bar 岣na say

Scroll To Top