Nedarim 27

והיו בה בנות שוח ואמר אילו הייתי יודע שבנות שוח בתוכה לא הייתי נודר הכלכלה אסורה בנות שוח מותרות עד שבא רבי עקיבא ולימד נדר שהותר מקצתו הותר כולו מאי לאו דאמר אילו הייתי יודע שבנות שוח בתוכה הייתי אומר תאנים שחורות ולבנות אסורות בנות שוח מותרות ורבי עקיבא היא ופליגי רבנן

and there were benot shuaḥ in it, and he said: Had I known that there were benot shuaḥ in it I would not have taken a vow, the basket and the remaining figs inside are forbidden, while the benot shuaḥ are permitted. This was the accepted ruling until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. Therefore, all of the produce is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where one said: Had I known that benot shuaḥ were inside it, I would have said that black and white figs are forbidden, and benot shuaḥ are permitted, and this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the Rabbis disagree with him? But according to Rava everyone agrees that all the produce is permitted in a case like this.

לא באומר אילו הייתי יודע שבנות שוח בתוכה הייתי אומר כל הכלכלה אסורה ובנות שוח מותרות

The Gemara responds: No, it is possible to say that it is speaking of a case where he says: Had I known that there were benot shuaḥ in it I would have said that the entire basket is forbidden and the benot shuaḥ are permitted, which is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva according to Rava.

מאן תנא להא דתנו רבנן נדר מחמשה בני אדם כאחד הותר לאחד מהם הותרו כולן חוץ מאחד מהן הוא מותר והן אסורין

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that which the Sages taught: With regard to one who took a vow, in one utterance, prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from five people, if the vow is dissolved for one of them, then the vow concerning all of them is dissolved; but if he retracted and said: I am prohibited to derive benefit from all of these individuals except for one of them, then he, i.e., that individual who was excluded, is permitted and they, the others, are forbidden?

אי לרבה רישא רבי עקיבא וסיפא דברי הכל אי לרבא סיפא רבנן ורישא דברי הכל:

The Gemara explains two possibilities: If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rabba, then the first clause is referring to a case where after having taken a vow prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from all five people, he retracted and said: Benefit from this one and from that one are forbidden but benefit from one is permitted, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that a vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. And the latter clause is where he adds to the initial vow by stating: Except for one of them, and everyone agrees that only that one is permitted. If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rava, the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and everyone agrees with the ruling of the first clause.

מתני׳ נדרי אונסין הדירו חבירו שיאכל אצלו וחלה הוא או שחלה בנו או שעכבו נהר הרי אלו נדרי אונסין:

MISHNA: What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. They are not binding and do not require dissolution.

גמ׳ ההוא גברא דאתפיס זכוותא בבי דינא ואמר אי לא אתינא עד תלתין יומין ליבטלון הני זכוותאי איתניס ולא אתא אמר רב הונא בטיל זכוותיה

GEMARA: The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who had a dispute in court with another individual and wanted to postpone the trial to a later time in order to search for more evidence. Meanwhile, he deposited his documents for a favorable verdict, i.e., that supported his claim, in court, and since the other litigant did not believe that he would return, the man said: If I do not come back within thirty days, these documents for a favorable verdict will be void. He was impeded by circumstances beyond his control and did not come back. Rav Huna said: His documents for a favorable verdict are void since he did not return by the specified time.

אמר ליה רבא אנוס הוא ואנוס רחמנא פטריה דכתיב ולנערה לא תעשה דבר

Rava said to him: He is a victim of circumstances beyond his control and the halakha is that the Merciful One exempted a victim of circumstances beyond his control from responsibility for his actions, as it is written concerning a young woman who was raped: “But unto the damsel you shall do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death” (Deuteronomy 22:26).

וכי תימא קטלא שאני והתנן נדרי אונסין הדירו חבירו שיאכל אצלו וחלה הוא או שחלה בנו או שעיכבו נהר הרי אלו נדרי אונסין

And if you would say that with regard to the penalty of death, which is extremely severe, the halakha is different, and she is treated leniently and not executed, but with regard to other transgressions one’s actions are treated as deliberate, but didn’t we learn in the mishna here: What are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control; they are not binding and do not require dissolution. This demonstrates that even here the exemption due to circumstances beyond one’s control should apply.

ולרבא מאי שנא מהא דתנן הרי זה גיטיך מעכשיו אם לא באתי מכאן עד שנים עשר חדש ומת בתוך שנים עשר חדש הרי זה גט אמאי והא מינס איתניס אמרי דלמא שאני התם

The Gemara asks: And according to Rava, in what way is it different from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b): If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not arrive from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, this document is a valid bill of divorce from the time of his declaration. Why? But he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as death is the ultimate example of this? The Gemara answers: Say that perhaps it is different there,

דאי הוה ידע דמית מן לאלתר הוה גמר ויהיב גיטא

for had he known that he would die within a year he would have immediately finalized his decision and given her the bill of divorce. Since he gave it to her initially so that she not require levirate marriage, it is assumed that his intent was to deliver it even in this case. By contrast, in the case where one stipulated about his rights, which he certainly did not intend to forfeit, it is assumed that he would not have wanted his statement to take effect in this situation.

מאי שנא מההוא דאמר להו אי לא אתינא מכאן עד תלתין יומין ליהוי גיטא אתא ופסקיה מעברא אמר להו חזו דאתאי חזו דאתאי ואמר שמואל לא שמיה מתייא אמאי והא מינס אניס

The Gemara continues to question Rava: In what way is it different from the following case: There was a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted a bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came on the thirtieth day but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not arrive within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived. And Shmuel said: It is not considered to be an arrival, and the condition is considered to have been fulfilled. The Gemara asks: Why is it not considered an arrival; but he was impeded by circumstances beyond his control?

דלמא אונסא דמיגליא שאני ומעברא מיגלי אונסיה

The Gemara responds: Perhaps the case of circumstances beyond one’s control that are apparent to everyone and could have been anticipated ahead of time is different, and a ferry is considered an apparent type of circumstance beyond one’s control, which he should have considered and stipulated explicitly. Since he did not do so, it is not considered a circumstance beyond one’s control.

ולרב הונא מכדי אסמכתא היא ואסמכתא לא קניא שאני הכא דמיתפסן זכותן

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Huna, who said that his documents for a favorable verdict are rendered void if he does not return by the set time, it is difficult to understand why the stipulation is valid. After all, it is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], since he certainly assumed that he would return and intended to actually give away his documents, and an asmakhta does not effect acquisition. Even if a person performs an act of acquisition to that effect, he does not have the intention to actually follow through. The Gemara responds: Here it is different because his documents for a favorable verdict are being held by the court, so he certainly did intend to give them up in the event that he not return on time.

והיכא דמיתפסין לאו אסמכתא היא והתנן מי שפרע מקצת חובו והשליש את שטרו ואמר אם אין אני נותן לו מכאן עד שלשים יום תן לו שטרו

The Gemara asks: And in a case where his rights are held by another party, is it not considered an asmakhta? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 168a): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, and deposited his loan document with a third party for purposes of security, and said: If I do not give him the remainder of the debt from now until thirty days, give him his loan document and he can collect the entire amount.

הגיע זמן ולא נתן רבי יוסי אומר יתן ורבי יהודה אומר לא יתן ואמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר רב אין הלכה כרבי יוסי דאמר אסמכתא קניא

If the time arrived and he did not give the remainder of the debt to the creditor, Rabbi Yosei says: The third party should give the document to the debtor. And Rabbi Yehuda says: He should not give it. And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that an asmakhta effects acquisition. The reason for this is that the one who deposited the document believes he will return in time and never intended to give over the document. It can be seen in the mishna that even in a case where the document was held by a third party, it is still considered an asmakhta and is not valid.

שאני הכא דאמר לבטלן זכותיה

The Gemara responds: It is different here because the one who deposited his documents with the court explicitly said that documents for a favorable verdict should be void, which demonstrates that he intended to uphold his stipulation.

והלכתא אסמכתא קניא והוא דלא אניס והוא דקנו מיניה בבית דין חשוב:

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha in these cases is as follows: An asmakhta effects acquisition even if it is dependent on a condition that may not be fulfilled, but this is true only if the one who had stated the obligation dependent upon the asmakhta was not impeded by circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, and instead deliberately chose not to fulfill the stipulation. In addition, this is the halakha only if he effected an acquisition from the other party for this asmakhta in an eminent court, but not for an agreement that takes place not in an eminent court.

מתני׳ נודרין להרגין ולחרמין ולמוכסין שהיא תרומה אף על פי שאינו תרומה שהן של בית המלך אף על פי שאינן של בית המלך בית שמאי אומרים בכל נודרין

MISHNA: One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ḥaramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people,