Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

November 21, 2022 | 讻状讝 讘诪专讞砖讜讜谉 转砖驻状讙

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Nedarim 27

A final difficulty is raised against Rava’s explanation of the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shamai about the case where one cancels part of a vow. This difficulty is resolved as well. A braita is brought that is explained both according to Raba and according to Rava. The Mishna describes what is a vow of onasim, a vow that can’t be fulfilled because of circumstances beyond one’s control Rav Huna ruled in a case of one who was involved in a dispute with someone and when he went to search for more evidence in his favor, he handed in documents to the court that supported his claim and declared: If I don’t come back in thirty days, these documents will be void. In the end, he didn’t return due to circumstances beyond his control. Rav Huna ruled that the documents were void. Why is this case different from our Mishna – where circumstances beyond one’s control are enough to dissolve the vow? Rava held that circumstances beyond one’s control exempt one from responsibility. Why in a case of a get, though, is this not the case (when one says – this will be a get if I don’t return and he died)? Or why is it different from a case when the man gives a get if he doesn’t return within thirty days and on the thirtieth day he tries to get there but there is no ferry with which to cross the river? In both those cases, the get is valid. Returning to Rav Huna’s ruling, the Gemara asks why is it not considered asmachta, a transaction where one does not fully consent to the arrangement as the outcome is unclear, which is considered not to be a valid acquisition. Is it different as the court is already in possession of the documents? Is that a relevant factor? Or is it different because he explicitly said that the documents should be canceled? The Gemara concludes that regarding asmachta, we rule that it is a valid acquisition as long as there was no oness, unexpected circumstance, and an act of acquisition was performed in an important court. There are certain circumstances where one can make a vow that one never intends to keep, such as, to a tax collector or to a murderer.

讜讛讬讜 讘讛 讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 讜讗诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 讘转讜讻讛 诇讗 讛讬讬转讬 谞讜讚专 讛讻诇讻诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 诪讜转专讜转 注讚 砖讘讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜诇讬诪讚 谞讚专 砖讛讜转专 诪拽爪转讜 讛讜转专 讻讜诇讜 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 讘转讜讻讛 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 转讗谞讬诐 砖讞讜专讜转 讜诇讘谞讜转 讗住讜专讜转 讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 诪讜转专讜转 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讜驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉

and there were benot shua岣 in it, and he said: Had I known that there were benot shua岣 in it I would not have taken a vow, the basket and the remaining figs inside are forbidden, while the benot shua岣 are permitted. This was the accepted ruling until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. Therefore, all of the produce is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where one said: Had I known that benot shua岣 were inside it, I would have said that black and white figs are forbidden, and benot shua岣 are permitted, and this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the Rabbis disagree with him? But according to Rava everyone agrees that all the produce is permitted in a case like this.

诇讗 讘讗讜诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 讘转讜讻讛 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛讻诇讻诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讜讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 诪讜转专讜转

The Gemara responds: No, it is possible to say that it is speaking of a case where he says: Had I known that there were benot shua岣 in it I would have said that the entire basket is forbidden and the benot shua岣 are permitted, which is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva according to Rava.

诪讗谉 转谞讗 诇讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 谞讚专 诪讞诪砖讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讻讗讞讚 讛讜转专 诇讗讞讚 诪讛诐 讛讜转专讜 讻讜诇谉 讞讜抓 诪讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讛讜讗 诪讜转专 讜讛谉 讗住讜专讬谉

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that which the Sages taught: With regard to one who took a vow, in one utterance, prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from five people, if the vow is dissolved for one of them, then the vow concerning all of them is dissolved; but if he retracted and said: I am prohibited to derive benefit from all of these individuals except for one of them, then he, i.e., that individual who was excluded, is permitted and they, the others, are forbidden?

讗讬 诇专讘讛 专讬砖讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜住讬驻讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬 诇专讘讗 住讬驻讗 专讘谞谉 讜专讬砖讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

The Gemara explains two possibilities: If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rabba, then the first clause is referring to a case where after having taken a vow prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from all five people, he retracted and said: Benefit from this one and from that one are forbidden but benefit from one is permitted, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that a vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. And the latter clause is where he adds to the initial vow by stating: Except for one of them, and everyone agrees that only that one is permitted. If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rava, the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and everyone agrees with the ruling of the first clause.

诪转谞讬壮 谞讚专讬 讗讜谞住讬谉 讛讚讬专讜 讞讘讬专讜 砖讬讗讻诇 讗爪诇讜 讜讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讗讜 砖讞诇讛 讘谞讜 讗讜 砖注讻讘讜 谞讛专 讛专讬 讗诇讜 谞讚专讬 讗讜谞住讬谉

MISHNA: What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control? If one鈥檚 friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control. They are not binding and do not require dissolution.

讙诪壮 讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讗转驻讬住 讝讻讜讜转讗 讘讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讜讗诪专 讗讬 诇讗 讗转讬谞讗 注讚 转诇转讬谉 讬讜诪讬谉 诇讬讘讟诇讜谉 讛谞讬 讝讻讜讜转讗讬 讗讬转谞讬住 讜诇讗 讗转讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘讟讬诇 讝讻讜讜转讬讛

GEMARA: The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who had a dispute in court with another individual and wanted to postpone the trial to a later time in order to search for more evidence. Meanwhile, he deposited his documents for a favorable verdict, i.e., that supported his claim, in court, and since the other litigant did not believe that he would return, the man said: If I do not come back within thirty days, these documents for a favorable verdict will be void. He was impeded by circumstances beyond his control and did not come back. Rav Huna said: His documents for a favorable verdict are void since he did not return by the specified time.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗谞讜住 讛讜讗 讜讗谞讜住 专讞诪谞讗 驻讟专讬讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜诇谞注专讛 诇讗 转注砖讛 讚讘专

Rava said to him: He is a victim of circumstances beyond his control and the halakha is that the Merciful One exempted a victim of circumstances beyond his control from responsibility for his actions, as it is written concerning a young woman who was raped: 鈥淏ut unto the damsel you shall do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:26).

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 拽讟诇讗 砖讗谞讬 讜讛转谞谉 谞讚专讬 讗讜谞住讬谉 讛讚讬专讜 讞讘讬专讜 砖讬讗讻诇 讗爪诇讜 讜讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讗讜 砖讞诇讛 讘谞讜 讗讜 砖注讬讻讘讜 谞讛专 讛专讬 讗诇讜 谞讚专讬 讗讜谞住讬谉

And if you would say that with regard to the penalty of death, which is extremely severe, the halakha is different, and she is treated leniently and not executed, but with regard to other transgressions one鈥檚 actions are treated as deliberate, but didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna here: What are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control? If one鈥檚 friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control; they are not binding and do not require dissolution. This demonstrates that even here the exemption due to circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control should apply.

讜诇专讘讗 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诪注讻砖讬讜 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 诪讻讗谉 注讚 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讜诪转 讘转讜讱 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讗诪讗讬 讜讛讗 诪讬谞住 讗讬转谞讬住 讗诪专讬 讚诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐

The Gemara asks: And according to Rava, in what way is it different from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b): If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not arrive from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, this document is a valid bill of divorce from the time of his declaration. Why? But he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as death is the ultimate example of this? The Gemara answers: Say that perhaps it is different there,

讚讗讬 讛讜讛 讬讚注 讚诪讬转 诪谉 诇讗诇转专 讛讜讛 讙诪专 讜讬讛讬讘 讙讬讟讗

for had he known that he would die within a year he would have immediately finalized his decision and given her the bill of divorce. Since he gave it to her initially so that she not require levirate marriage, it is assumed that his intent was to deliver it even in this case. By contrast, in the case where one stipulated about his rights, which he certainly did not intend to forfeit, it is assumed that he would not have wanted his statement to take effect in this situation.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讬 诇讗 讗转讬谞讗 诪讻讗谉 注讚 转诇转讬谉 讬讜诪讬谉 诇讬讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗 讗转讗 讜驻住拽讬讛 诪注讘专讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讞讝讜 讚讗转讗讬 讞讝讜 讚讗转讗讬 讜讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 诪转讬讬讗 讗诪讗讬 讜讛讗 诪讬谞住 讗谞讬住

The Gemara continues to question Rava: In what way is it different from the following case: There was a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted a bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came on the thirtieth day but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not arrive within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived. And Shmuel said: It is not considered to be an arrival, and the condition is considered to have been fulfilled. The Gemara asks: Why is it not considered an arrival; but he was impeded by circumstances beyond his control?

讚诇诪讗 讗讜谞住讗 讚诪讬讙诇讬讗 砖讗谞讬 讜诪注讘专讗 诪讬讙诇讬 讗讜谞住讬讛

The Gemara responds: Perhaps the case of circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control that are apparent to everyone and could have been anticipated ahead of time is different, and a ferry is considered an apparent type of circumstance beyond one鈥檚 control, which he should have considered and stipulated explicitly. Since he did not do so, it is not considered a circumstance beyond one鈥檚 control.

讜诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪讻讚讬 讗住诪讻转讗 讛讬讗 讜讗住诪讻转讗 诇讗 拽谞讬讗 砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讚诪讬转驻住谉 讝讻讜转谉

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Huna, who said that his documents for a favorable verdict are rendered void if he does not return by the set time, it is difficult to understand why the stipulation is valid. After all, it is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], since he certainly assumed that he would return and intended to actually give away his documents, and an asmakhta does not effect acquisition. Even if a person performs an act of acquisition to that effect, he does not have the intention to actually follow through. The Gemara responds: Here it is different because his documents for a favorable verdict are being held by the court, so he certainly did intend to give them up in the event that he not return on time.

讜讛讬讻讗 讚诪讬转驻住讬谉 诇讗讜 讗住诪讻转讗 讛讬讗 讜讛转谞谉 诪讬 砖驻专注 诪拽爪转 讞讜讘讜 讜讛砖诇讬砖 讗转 砖讟专讜 讜讗诪专 讗诐 讗讬谉 讗谞讬 谞讜转谉 诇讜 诪讻讗谉 注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 转谉 诇讜 砖讟专讜

The Gemara asks: And in a case where his rights are held by another party, is it not considered an asmakhta? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 168a): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, and deposited his loan document with a third party for purposes of security, and said: If I do not give him the remainder of the debt from now until thirty days, give him his loan document and he can collect the entire amount.

讛讙讬注 讝诪谉 讜诇讗 谞转谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讬转谉 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬转谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讗住诪讻转讗 拽谞讬讗

If the time arrived and he did not give the remainder of the debt to the creditor, Rabbi Yosei says: The third party should give the document to the debtor. And Rabbi Yehuda says: He should not give it. And Rav Na岣an said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that an asmakhta effects acquisition. The reason for this is that the one who deposited the document believes he will return in time and never intended to give over the document. It can be seen in the mishna that even in a case where the document was held by a third party, it is still considered an asmakhta and is not valid.

砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讘讟诇谉 讝讻讜转讬讛

The Gemara responds: It is different here because the one who deposited his documents with the court explicitly said that documents for a favorable verdict should be void, which demonstrates that he intended to uphold his stipulation.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讗住诪讻转讗 拽谞讬讗 讜讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讗谞讬住 讜讛讜讗 讚拽谞讜 诪讬谞讬讛 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞砖讜讘

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha in these cases is as follows: An asmakhta effects acquisition even if it is dependent on a condition that may not be fulfilled, but this is true only if the one who had stated the obligation dependent upon the asmakhta was not impeded by circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, and instead deliberately chose not to fulfill the stipulation. In addition, this is the halakha only if he effected an acquisition from the other party for this asmakhta in an eminent court, but not for an agreement that takes place not in an eminent court.

诪转谞讬壮 谞讜讚专讬谉 诇讛专讙讬谉 讜诇讞专诪讬谉 讜诇诪讜讻住讬谉 砖讛讬讗 转专讜诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 转专讜诪讛 砖讛谉 砖诇 讘讬转 讛诪诇讱 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞谉 砖诇 讘讬转 讛诪诇讱 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘讻诇 谞讜讚专讬谉

MISHNA: One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [岣ramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people,

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

learn daf yomi one week at a time with tamara spitz

Nedarim: 21-28 – Daf Yomi One Week at a Time

This week we will focus on four types of vows that are automatically void. These include vows meant to motivate...
talking talmud_square

Nedarim 27: How to Really Mean What You Say

[Announcement on Donation Opportunities] Vows that are not fulfilled because of circumstances beyond one's control. With the example of a...
tax collectors office pieter brueghel the younger

Taxman

As Benjamin Franklin famously said, in this world nothing is certain except death and taxes. And, one might add, hatred...

Nedarim 27

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Nedarim 27

讜讛讬讜 讘讛 讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 讜讗诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 讘转讜讻讛 诇讗 讛讬讬转讬 谞讜讚专 讛讻诇讻诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 诪讜转专讜转 注讚 砖讘讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜诇讬诪讚 谞讚专 砖讛讜转专 诪拽爪转讜 讛讜转专 讻讜诇讜 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 讘转讜讻讛 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 转讗谞讬诐 砖讞讜专讜转 讜诇讘谞讜转 讗住讜专讜转 讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 诪讜转专讜转 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讜驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉

and there were benot shua岣 in it, and he said: Had I known that there were benot shua岣 in it I would not have taken a vow, the basket and the remaining figs inside are forbidden, while the benot shua岣 are permitted. This was the accepted ruling until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. Therefore, all of the produce is permitted. What, is it not referring to a case where one said: Had I known that benot shua岣 were inside it, I would have said that black and white figs are forbidden, and benot shua岣 are permitted, and this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the Rabbis disagree with him? But according to Rava everyone agrees that all the produce is permitted in a case like this.

诇讗 讘讗讜诪专 讗讬诇讜 讛讬讬转讬 讬讜讚注 砖讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 讘转讜讻讛 讛讬讬转讬 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛讻诇讻诇讛 讗住讜专讛 讜讘谞讜转 砖讜讞 诪讜转专讜转

The Gemara responds: No, it is possible to say that it is speaking of a case where he says: Had I known that there were benot shua岣 in it I would have said that the entire basket is forbidden and the benot shua岣 are permitted, which is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva according to Rava.

诪讗谉 转谞讗 诇讛讗 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 谞讚专 诪讞诪砖讛 讘谞讬 讗讚诐 讻讗讞讚 讛讜转专 诇讗讞讚 诪讛诐 讛讜转专讜 讻讜诇谉 讞讜抓 诪讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讛讜讗 诪讜转专 讜讛谉 讗住讜专讬谉

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that which the Sages taught: With regard to one who took a vow, in one utterance, prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from five people, if the vow is dissolved for one of them, then the vow concerning all of them is dissolved; but if he retracted and said: I am prohibited to derive benefit from all of these individuals except for one of them, then he, i.e., that individual who was excluded, is permitted and they, the others, are forbidden?

讗讬 诇专讘讛 专讬砖讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讜住讬驻讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬 诇专讘讗 住讬驻讗 专讘谞谉 讜专讬砖讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

The Gemara explains two possibilities: If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rabba, then the first clause is referring to a case where after having taken a vow prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from all five people, he retracted and said: Benefit from this one and from that one are forbidden but benefit from one is permitted, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that a vow which is dissolved partially is dissolved completely. And the latter clause is where he adds to the initial vow by stating: Except for one of them, and everyone agrees that only that one is permitted. If one says that it is in accordance with the explanation of Rava, the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and everyone agrees with the ruling of the first clause.

诪转谞讬壮 谞讚专讬 讗讜谞住讬谉 讛讚讬专讜 讞讘讬专讜 砖讬讗讻诇 讗爪诇讜 讜讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讗讜 砖讞诇讛 讘谞讜 讗讜 砖注讻讘讜 谞讛专 讛专讬 讗诇讜 谞讚专讬 讗讜谞住讬谉

MISHNA: What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control? If one鈥檚 friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control. They are not binding and do not require dissolution.

讙诪壮 讛讛讜讗 讙讘专讗 讚讗转驻讬住 讝讻讜讜转讗 讘讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讜讗诪专 讗讬 诇讗 讗转讬谞讗 注讚 转诇转讬谉 讬讜诪讬谉 诇讬讘讟诇讜谉 讛谞讬 讝讻讜讜转讗讬 讗讬转谞讬住 讜诇讗 讗转讗 讗诪专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讘讟讬诇 讝讻讜讜转讬讛

GEMARA: The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who had a dispute in court with another individual and wanted to postpone the trial to a later time in order to search for more evidence. Meanwhile, he deposited his documents for a favorable verdict, i.e., that supported his claim, in court, and since the other litigant did not believe that he would return, the man said: If I do not come back within thirty days, these documents for a favorable verdict will be void. He was impeded by circumstances beyond his control and did not come back. Rav Huna said: His documents for a favorable verdict are void since he did not return by the specified time.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讗谞讜住 讛讜讗 讜讗谞讜住 专讞诪谞讗 驻讟专讬讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜诇谞注专讛 诇讗 转注砖讛 讚讘专

Rava said to him: He is a victim of circumstances beyond his control and the halakha is that the Merciful One exempted a victim of circumstances beyond his control from responsibility for his actions, as it is written concerning a young woman who was raped: 鈥淏ut unto the damsel you shall do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death鈥 (Deuteronomy 22:26).

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 拽讟诇讗 砖讗谞讬 讜讛转谞谉 谞讚专讬 讗讜谞住讬谉 讛讚讬专讜 讞讘讬专讜 砖讬讗讻诇 讗爪诇讜 讜讞诇讛 讛讜讗 讗讜 砖讞诇讛 讘谞讜 讗讜 砖注讬讻讘讜 谞讛专 讛专讬 讗诇讜 谞讚专讬 讗讜谞住讬谉

And if you would say that with regard to the penalty of death, which is extremely severe, the halakha is different, and she is treated leniently and not executed, but with regard to other transgressions one鈥檚 actions are treated as deliberate, but didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna here: What are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control? If one鈥檚 friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control; they are not binding and do not require dissolution. This demonstrates that even here the exemption due to circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control should apply.

讜诇专讘讗 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讬讟讬讱 诪注讻砖讬讜 讗诐 诇讗 讘讗转讬 诪讻讗谉 注讚 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讜诪转 讘转讜讱 砖谞讬诐 注砖专 讞讚砖 讛专讬 讝讛 讙讟 讗诪讗讬 讜讛讗 诪讬谞住 讗讬转谞讬住 讗诪专讬 讚诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐

The Gemara asks: And according to Rava, in what way is it different from that which we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b): If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not arrive from now until the conclusion of twelve months, and he died within those twelve months, this document is a valid bill of divorce from the time of his declaration. Why? But he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control, as death is the ultimate example of this? The Gemara answers: Say that perhaps it is different there,

讚讗讬 讛讜讛 讬讚注 讚诪讬转 诪谉 诇讗诇转专 讛讜讛 讙诪专 讜讬讛讬讘 讙讬讟讗

for had he known that he would die within a year he would have immediately finalized his decision and given her the bill of divorce. Since he gave it to her initially so that she not require levirate marriage, it is assumed that his intent was to deliver it even in this case. By contrast, in the case where one stipulated about his rights, which he certainly did not intend to forfeit, it is assumed that he would not have wanted his statement to take effect in this situation.

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讛讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗讬 诇讗 讗转讬谞讗 诪讻讗谉 注讚 转诇转讬谉 讬讜诪讬谉 诇讬讛讜讬 讙讬讟讗 讗转讗 讜驻住拽讬讛 诪注讘专讗 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讞讝讜 讚讗转讗讬 讞讝讜 讚讗转讗讬 讜讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 诪转讬讬讗 讗诪讗讬 讜讛讗 诪讬谞住 讗谞讬住

The Gemara continues to question Rava: In what way is it different from the following case: There was a certain man who said to the agents with whom he entrusted a bill of divorce: If I do not return from now until thirty days have passed, let this be a bill of divorce. He came on the thirtieth day but was prevented from crossing the river by the ferry that was located on the other side of the river, so he did not arrive within the designated time. He said to the people across the river: See that I have arrived, see that I have arrived. And Shmuel said: It is not considered to be an arrival, and the condition is considered to have been fulfilled. The Gemara asks: Why is it not considered an arrival; but he was impeded by circumstances beyond his control?

讚诇诪讗 讗讜谞住讗 讚诪讬讙诇讬讗 砖讗谞讬 讜诪注讘专讗 诪讬讙诇讬 讗讜谞住讬讛

The Gemara responds: Perhaps the case of circumstances beyond one鈥檚 control that are apparent to everyone and could have been anticipated ahead of time is different, and a ferry is considered an apparent type of circumstance beyond one鈥檚 control, which he should have considered and stipulated explicitly. Since he did not do so, it is not considered a circumstance beyond one鈥檚 control.

讜诇专讘 讛讜谞讗 诪讻讚讬 讗住诪讻转讗 讛讬讗 讜讗住诪讻转讗 诇讗 拽谞讬讗 砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讚诪讬转驻住谉 讝讻讜转谉

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Huna, who said that his documents for a favorable verdict are rendered void if he does not return by the set time, it is difficult to understand why the stipulation is valid. After all, it is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], since he certainly assumed that he would return and intended to actually give away his documents, and an asmakhta does not effect acquisition. Even if a person performs an act of acquisition to that effect, he does not have the intention to actually follow through. The Gemara responds: Here it is different because his documents for a favorable verdict are being held by the court, so he certainly did intend to give them up in the event that he not return on time.

讜讛讬讻讗 讚诪讬转驻住讬谉 诇讗讜 讗住诪讻转讗 讛讬讗 讜讛转谞谉 诪讬 砖驻专注 诪拽爪转 讞讜讘讜 讜讛砖诇讬砖 讗转 砖讟专讜 讜讗诪专 讗诐 讗讬谉 讗谞讬 谞讜转谉 诇讜 诪讻讗谉 注讚 砖诇砖讬诐 讬讜诐 转谉 诇讜 砖讟专讜

The Gemara asks: And in a case where his rights are held by another party, is it not considered an asmakhta? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 168a): In the case of one who repaid part of his debt, and deposited his loan document with a third party for purposes of security, and said: If I do not give him the remainder of the debt from now until thirty days, give him his loan document and he can collect the entire amount.

讛讙讬注 讝诪谉 讜诇讗 谞转谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讬转谉 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬转谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讗讘讜讛 讗诪专 专讘 讗讬谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 讗住诪讻转讗 拽谞讬讗

If the time arrived and he did not give the remainder of the debt to the creditor, Rabbi Yosei says: The third party should give the document to the debtor. And Rabbi Yehuda says: He should not give it. And Rav Na岣an said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that an asmakhta effects acquisition. The reason for this is that the one who deposited the document believes he will return in time and never intended to give over the document. It can be seen in the mishna that even in a case where the document was held by a third party, it is still considered an asmakhta and is not valid.

砖讗谞讬 讛讻讗 讚讗诪专 诇讘讟诇谉 讝讻讜转讬讛

The Gemara responds: It is different here because the one who deposited his documents with the court explicitly said that documents for a favorable verdict should be void, which demonstrates that he intended to uphold his stipulation.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讗住诪讻转讗 拽谞讬讗 讜讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讗谞讬住 讜讛讜讗 讚拽谞讜 诪讬谞讬讛 讘讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞砖讜讘

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha in these cases is as follows: An asmakhta effects acquisition even if it is dependent on a condition that may not be fulfilled, but this is true only if the one who had stated the obligation dependent upon the asmakhta was not impeded by circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from doing so, and instead deliberately chose not to fulfill the stipulation. In addition, this is the halakha only if he effected an acquisition from the other party for this asmakhta in an eminent court, but not for an agreement that takes place not in an eminent court.

诪转谞讬壮 谞讜讚专讬谉 诇讛专讙讬谉 讜诇讞专诪讬谉 讜诇诪讜讻住讬谉 砖讛讬讗 转专讜诪讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞讜 转专讜诪讛 砖讛谉 砖诇 讘讬转 讛诪诇讱 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谞谉 砖诇 讘讬转 讛诪诇讱 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘讻诇 谞讜讚专讬谉

MISHNA: One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [岣ramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people,

Scroll To Top