Nedarim 35

איתיביה אמר לו השאילני פרתך אמר לו קונם פרה שאני קנוי לך נכסי עליך אם יש לי פרה אלא זו השאילני קרדומך אמר לו קונם קרדום שיש לי שאני קנוי נכסי עלי אם יש לי קרדום אלא זה ונמצא שיש לו בחייו אסור מת או שנתנה לו במתנה הרי זה מותר

The Gemara raised an objection to Rava. If another person said to him: Lend me your cow, and the owner answered and said to him: Every cow that I purchased other than this one, which I need, is konam for you; or if he said: My property is forbidden to you if I have a cow other than this one, and in fact, he owns other cows; or if another said to him: Lend me your spade, and the owner of the spade said to him: Every spade that I have that I purchased is konam for you; or if he said: My property is forbidden to me if I have a spade other than this one, and it is discovered that he has another spade and the konam takes effect, then during the life of the one who vowed, the cow or the spade is forbidden to the subject of the vow. If the one who vowed died or if the cow or the spade was given to the subject of the vow as a gift, it is permitted. Apparently, the konam is in effect only as long as the property is in his possession.

אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא שניתנה לו על ידי אחר

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: It is referring to a case where it was given to the subject of the vow by another person. The one who vowed did not give him the gift directly. He sold or transferred the item to a third party, who gave it to the subject of the vow as a present. Since the property left the possession of its owner before it was given to the subject of the vow, the prohibition does not take effect upon it.

אמר רב אשי דיקא נמי דקתני שניתנה לו ולא קתני שנתנה לו

The Gemara states that Rav Ashi said: The language is also precise, as it teaches: That was given to him, and it is not taught: That he gave it to him. This indicates that this halakha applies specifically to a gift that was given to him by a third party, but not by the one who vowed.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן יש מעילה בקונמות או לא

§ Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: Is there liability for misuse of consecrated property in cases of konamot or not? Since the legal status of an item that was rendered a konam is like that of consecrated property in that it is forbidden to the one who one vowed, is it like consecrated property in every sense, including liability for misuse of consecrated property?

אמר ליה תניתוה מקום שנוטלין עליה שכר תיפול הנאה להקדש למימרא כי הקדש מה הקדש יש בו מעילה אף קונמות יש בהן מעילה

Rav Naḥman said to him: You learned this halakha from a mishna (33a): In a place where one takes payment for returning a lost item, that benefit that he receives for returning the item should fall into the category of consecrated Temple property. That is to say, an item forbidden by a konam is like consecrated property. Just as with regard to consecrated property there is liability for misuse, so too with regard to konamot there is liability for misuse.

כתנאי קונם ככר זו הקדש ואכלה בין הוא ובין חבירו מעל לפיכך יש לה פדיון ככר זו עלי להקדש ואכלה הוא מעל חבירו לא מעל לפיכך אין לה פדיון דברי רבי מאיר

The Gemara comments on this. This dilemma is like a dispute between tanna’im. If one said: This loaf is konam to all like consecrated property, and he ate it, then, whether he ate it or whether another ate it, the one who ate it misused consecrated property. Therefore, since its status is that of consecrated property, it has the possibility of desanctification through redemption. If one said: This loaf is konam for me like consecrated property and he eats it, he misused consecrated property. If another eats it, he did not misuse consecrated property, as he said: To me. Therefore, it does not have the possibility of desanctification through redemption, since its status is not that of full-fledged consecrated property. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וחכמים אומרים בין כך ובין כך לא מעל לפי שאין מעילה בקונמות

And the Rabbis say: In the case of both vows taken in this manner and vows taken in that manner, no one misused consecrated property because there is no liability for misuse of consecrated objects in cases of konamot. Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that there is liability for misuse in konamot.

אמר ליה רב אחא בריה דרב אויא לרב אשי ככרי עליך ונתנה לו במתנה מי מעל למעול נותן הא לא אסירא עליה למעול מקבל יכול דאמר היתירא בעיתי איסורא לא בעיתי אמר ליה מקבל מעל לכשיוציא שכל המוציא מעות הקדש לחולין כסבור של חולין הוא מועל אף זה מועל

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: If one said to another: My loaf is konam for you, and he then gave it to him as a gift, which of them misused consecrated property? If you say: Let the one who gives the loaf be liable for misuse, why would he be liable; the loaf is not forbidden to him? If you say: Let the one who receives the loaf be liable for misuse, he can say: I wanted to receive a permitted item; I did not want to receive a forbidden item. Since the loaf is forbidden, if I accepted it from you, it was not my intention to do so. Rav Ashi said to him: The one who receives the loaf is liable for misuse when he utilizes the loaf, as the principle with regard to misuse is that anyone who utilizes consecrated money for non-sacred purposes, when he is under the impression that it is non-sacred, misuses consecrated property. This person who received the loaf also misuses consecrated property.

מתני׳ ותורם את תרומתו ומעשרותיו לדעתו ומקריב עליו קיני זבין קיני זבות קיני יולדות חטאות ואשמות ומלמדו מדרש הלכות ואגדות אבל לא ילמדנו מקרא אבל מלמד הוא את בניו ואת בנותיו מקרא

MISHNA: The mishna proceeds to list other tasks that one may perform for someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him. And he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce. And he sacrifices for him the bird nests, i.e., pairs of birds, pigeons and turtledoves, of zavin (see Leviticus 15:13–15); the bird nests of zavot (see Leviticus 15:28–30); the bird nests of women after childbirth (see Leviticus 12:6–8); sin-offerings; and guilt-offerings. And he teaches him midrash, halakhot, and aggadot, but he may not teach him Bible. However, he may teach his sons and daughters Bible.

גמ׳ איבעיא להו הני כהני שלוחי דידן הוו או שלוחי דשמיא למאי נפקא מינה למודר הנאה אי אמרת דשלוחי דידן הוו הא מהני ליה ואסור ואי אמרת שלוחי דשמיא שרי מאי

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Are these priests our agents or agents of Heaven when they perform the Temple service? The Gemara elaborates: What is the practical difference whether they are our agents or God’s agents? The Gemara answers: The difference is with regard to one prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another. If you say that the priests are our agents, don’t the priests provide benefit for the one for whom benefit is forbidden by vow, and therefore, sacrificing that person’s offering is prohibited? And if you say that they are agents of Heaven, it is permitted. What is the status of priests?

תא שמע דתנן מקריב עליו קיני זבין כו׳ אי אמרת שלוחי דידן קא מהני ליה

Come and hear proof to resolve the dilemma, as we learned in the mishna: And he sacrifices for him the bird nests of zavin, etc. The Gemara infers: If you say that the priests are our agents, the priests would thereby provide benefit to one for whom benefit from them is forbidden. Based on the ruling in the mishna, apparently, priests are agents of Heaven.

וליטעמיך ליתני מקריב עליו קרבנות אלא מחוסרי כפרה שאני דאמר רבי יוחנן הכל צריכין דעת חוץ ממחוסרי כפרה שהרי אדם מביא קרבן על בניו ועל בנותיו הקטנים שנאמר זאת תורת הזב בין גדול בין קטן

The Gemara rejects the proof: And according to your reasoning, that the mishna holds that priests are agents of Heaven, let the mishna teach in general: He sacrifices for him offerings. Why did the mishna list these particular offerings? Rather, perforce, offerings brought by those lacking atonement are different from other offerings, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Everyone who brings an offering requires knowledge and intent in order to bring the offering, except for those lacking atonement, who bring the offering in order to complete their purification. This can be proven from the fact that a person brings a purification offering for his minor sons and daughters, although they lack halakhic intelligence, as it is stated: “This is the law of the zav” (Leviticus 15:32). This apparently superfluous verse comes to teach that the halakhot of the zav apply to both an adult and a minor.

אלא מעתה לרבי יוחנן זאת תורת הילדת וגו׳ בין קטנה ובין גדולה קטנה בת לידה היא והא תני רב ביבי קמיה דרב נחמן שלש נשים משמשות במוך קטנה ומעוברת ומניקה קטנה שמא תתעבר ותמות

The Gemara asks: However, if that is so according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, with regard to that which is written: “This is the law of a woman after childbirth” (Leviticus 12:7), would he interpret that the halakhot of a woman after childbirth apply to both an adult and a minor? Is a minor capable of giving birth? But didn’t Rav Beivai teach a baraita before Rav Naḥman: It is permitted for three women to engage in intercourse with a contraceptive resorbent: A minor, and a pregnant woman, and a nursing woman; a minor may do so lest she conceive and die. Apparently, a minor is incapable of giving birth, as she would die first.

ההיא זאת תורת הילדת בין פקחת בין שוטה שכן אדם מביא קרבן על אשתו שוטה

The Gemara explains: That verse: “This is the law of a woman after childbirth,” does not come to include a minor. Rather, it comes to teach that the halakhot of a woman after childbirth apply to both a halakhically competent woman and a woman who is an imbecile, as a man brings an offering for his wife who is an imbecile.

כדברי רבי יהודה דתניא רבי יהודה אומר אדם מביא קרבן עשיר על אשתו וכל קרבנות שחייבת

This halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: A man brings the offering of a wealthy person for his wife, as well as all offerings that she is obligated to bring. A wealthy woman after childbirth brings a lamb as a burnt-offering and a dove or turtledove as a sin-offering. A poor woman brings two turtledoves or two pigeons, one as a burnt-offering and one as a sin-offering. Even if the woman is poor, and based on her usufruct property, she would bring the offering of the poor; if her husband is wealthy, he brings the offering of a wealthy person on her behalf. And he must bring on her behalf all the offerings for which she is obligated.

שכך כותב לה ואחריות דאית ליך עלי מן קדמת דנא

The fact that he is obligated to bring a wealthy person’s offering on her behalf is due to the fact that this is what he writes in her marriage contract: And responsibility to pay any financial obligations that you have incurred before this moment is incumbent upon me. Offerings that she is obligated to bring are included in those obligations, irrespective of her degree of halakhic competence. The offering of a woman after childbirth is one of the offerings brought by those lacking atonement. Therefore, even if priests are our agents, they may sacrifice the offering on behalf of the woman; since they may do so without her knowledge and intent, no agency is required. Therefore, there is no proof from the mishna that priests are agents of Heaven.