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Today's Daf Yomi

June 29, 2015 | 讬状讘 讘转诪讜讝 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Nedarim 36

诪转讬讘 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诐 讛讬讛 讻讛谉 讬讝专讜拽 注诇讬讜 讚诐 讞讟讗转讜 讜讚诐 讗砖诪讜

Rav Shimi bar Abba raised an objection from the Tosefta (2:7): If the one who vowed to prohibit another from benefiting from him was a priest, he may sprinkle the blood of his sin-offering and the blood of his guilt-offering on the other鈥檚 behalf. Apparently, the priest may perform all sacrificial rites for one prohibited from benefiting from him, even those that require knowledge of the one for whom the offering atones.

讚诐 讞讟讗转讜 砖诇 诪爪讜专注 讜讚诐 讗砖诪讜 砖诇 诪爪讜专注 讚讻转讬讘 讝讗转 转讛讬讛 转讜专转 讛诪爪专注 讘讬谉 讙讚讜诇 讜讘讬谉 拽讟谉

The Gemara answers. The reference is to blood of the sin-offering of a leper and blood of the guilt-offering of a leper. These are offerings brought by a leper who is lacking atonement, in order to complete his purification process, as it is written: 鈥淭his is the law of the leper鈥 (Leviticus 14:2). And the verse comes to teach that the halakhot of a leper apply to both an adult and a minor. This offering, too, does not require the knowledge of the one for whom the offering atones.

转谞谉 讛讻讛谞讬诐 砖驻讬讙诇讜 讘诪拽讚砖 诪讝讬讚讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讛讗 砖讜讙讙讬谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讗诇讗 砖驻讬讙讜诇谉 驻讬讙讜诇

The Gemara cites another proof to resolve the dilemma with regard to the nature of the agency of a priest. We learned in a mishna: In the case of priests who rendered an offering piggul in the Temple, i.e., they sacrificed an offering intending to consume it after its appointed time, if they did so intentionally, i.e., with full awareness of the period during which the offering may be consumed, they are obligated to pay. The Gemara infers: If they did so unwittingly, they are exempt from payment. However, in any event, when they rendered the offering piggul, it acquired the status of piggul and is disqualified.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 砖诇讜讞讬 讚砖诪讬讗 讛讜讜 讛讬讬谞讜 砖驻讬讙讜诇谉 驻讬讙讜诇 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 砖诇讜讞讬 讚讬讚谉 讛讜讜 讗诪讗讬 驻讬讙讜诇谉 驻讬讙讜诇 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 砖诇讬讞讗 砖讜讬转讬讱 诇转拽讜谞讬 讜诇讗 诇注讜讜转讬

The Gemara asks: Granted, if you say that the priests are agents of Heaven, this is why when their actions cause piggul it is piggul; their actions are independent of the one bringing the offering. However, if you say that the priests are our agents, why when their actions cause piggul is it piggul? Let the one bringing the offering say to the priest: I designated you an agent to perform the task properly but not to perform the task improperly.

讗诪专讬 砖讗谞讬 讙讘讬 驻讬讙讜诇 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讗 讬讞砖讘 诇讜 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The Sages say in response: It is different with regard to piggul, as in its regard the verse states and emphasizes: 鈥淗e who offered it, it will not be imputed to him鈥 (Leviticus 7:18). This implies that it is piggul in any case, e.g., even if one鈥檚 actions cause the offering to be piggul without the consent of the owner. Therefore, there is no proof with regard to the nature of the agency of the priest.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 爪专讬讻讬谉 讚注转 讞讜抓 诪诪讞讜住专 讻驻专讛 砖讛专讬 讗讚诐 诪讘讬讗 拽专讘谉 注诇 讘谞讬讜 讜注诇 讘谞讜转讬讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讬讘讬讗 讗讚诐 讞讟讗转 讞诇讘 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 砖讻谉 讗讚诐 诪讘讬讗 注诇 讗砖转讜 砖讜讟讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇诪讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛驻专讬砖 讞讟讗转 讞诇讘 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 诇讗 注砖讛 讻诇讜诐

搂 With regard to the matter itself, Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Everyone who brings an offering requires knowledge, except for those offerings brought by those lacking atonement; this can be proven from the fact that a person brings a purification offering for his minor sons and daughters. The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, let a person bring a sin-offering on behalf of another who unwittingly ate forbidden fat without his knowledge, just as a man brings an offering for his wife who is an imbecile, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Why then did Rabbi Elazar say: One who separated a sin-offering on behalf of another who unwittingly ate forbidden fat has done nothing?

讗砖转讜 砖讜讟讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗讻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 砖讜讟讛 诇讗讜 讘转 拽专讘谉 讛讬讗

The Gemara refutes the analogy between the cases. What are the circumstances of the case of his wife who is an imbecile? If she ate the forbidden fat when she was an imbecile, she is not subject to liability to bring an offering, as one lacking halakhic competence is exempt from punishment and needs no atonement.

讜讗讬 讚讗讻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 驻拽讞转 讜谞砖转讟讬转 讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讻诇 讞诇讘 讜讛驻专讬砖 拽专讘谉 讜谞砖转讟讛 讜讞讝专 讜谞砖转驻讛 驻住讜诇 讛讜讗讬诇 讜谞讚讞讛 讬讚讞讛

And if she ate the forbidden fat when she was halakhically competent and then became an imbecile, didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yirmeya say that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: If one ate forbidden fat unwittingly, and separated an offering, and became an imbecile, and became competent again, the offering is disqualified. Since it was disqualified when he was demented, it will be disqualified forever. It is clear, therefore, that the sin-offering that one brings for his wife who is an imbecile is not a sin-offering for eating forbidden fat, as that would require halakhic intelligence. It is merely for completion of the purification process, e.g., a woman after childbirth, for which halakhic competence is not required. Therefore, no proof may be cited from the case of one鈥檚 wife who is an imbecile to the case of bringing a sin-offering on behalf of another who ate fat.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讬讘讬讗 讗讚诐 驻住讞 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 砖讻谉 讗讚诐 诪讘讬讗 注诇 讘谞讬讜 讜注诇 讘谞讜转讬讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讗诇诪讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛驻专讬砖 驻住讞 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 诇讗 注砖讛 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, let a person bring a Paschal lamb on behalf of another without his knowledge, just as a person brings a Paschal lamb for his minor sons and daughters. Why then did Rabbi Elazar say: One who separated a Paschal lamb on behalf of another has done nothing?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 砖讛 诇讘讬转 讗讘转 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

Rabbi Zeira said: The verse states: 鈥淎 lamb for each father鈥檚 house, a lamb for the household鈥 (Exodus 12:3). From here it is derived that all members of a household, including minor sons and daughters, are registered to the group eating a Paschal lamb. However, this is a custom; it is not by Torah law.

讜诪诪讗讬 诪讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讘谞讬讜 讛专讬谞讬 砖讜讞讟 讗转 讛驻住讞 注诇 诪讬 砖讬注诇讛 诪讻诐 专讗砖讜谉 诇讬专讜砖诇讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖讛讻谞讬住 专讗砖讜谉 专讗砖讜 讜专讜讘讜 讝讻讛 讘讞诇拽讜 讜诪讝讻讛 讗转 讗讞讬讜 注诪讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 砖讛 诇讘讬转 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 注诇 讘讬砖专讗 拽讗讬 讜诪讝讻讬 诇讛讜

And from where is this halakha learned? It is from that which we learned in a mishna (Pesa岣m 89a): With regard to one who says to his minor sons: I am hereby slaughtering the Paschal lamb on behalf of the one of you who will ascend to Jerusalem first, and he will be privileged to eat from that lamb, then once the first of his children introduces his head and most of his body into Jerusalem, he acquires his portion and acquires portions on behalf of his brothers with him. And if you say that the halakha derived from the phrase 鈥渁 lamb for the household鈥 is by Torah law, and the minors are obligated to register for the Paschal lamb, although the son who reached Jerusalem first acquired his portion based on the stipulation of his father, how can he stand over the meat of the Paschal lamb after it was slaughtered and acquire it on behalf of his brothers? Apparently, minors are not required by Torah law to register as members of the group eating the Paschal lamb.

讗诇讗 诇诪讛 诇讛讜 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜谉 讗讘讜讛讜谉 讻讚讬 诇讝专讝谉 讘诪爪讜转 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 诪注砖讛 讛讬讛 讜拽讚诪讜 讘谞讜转 诇讘谞讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讘谞讜转 讝专讬讝讜转 讜讘谞讬诐 砖驻诇讬诐

The Gemara asks: However, why do they require that their father say to them: The one of you who will ascend to Jerusalem first will be privileged to eat from that lamb, when no actual acquisition takes place? It is in order to motivate them in the performance of mitzvot. This is also taught in a baraita: There was an incident that transpired where a father said to his sons and daughters that they should compete to see who reaches the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb first, and the daughters preceded the sons, and the daughters were found to be motivated and the sons to be lazy [shefalim]. Since the baraita did not say that the result was that daughters acquired their portion, apparently the father鈥檚 statement was merely motivational.

讜转讜专诐 讗转 转专讜诪转讜 讻讜壮

搂 We learned in the mishna that among the tasks that one may perform for someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him is: And he separates his teruma.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛转讜专诐 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 爪专讬讱 讚注转讜 讗讜 诇讗 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讝讻讜转 讛讜讗 诇讜 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讚注转 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪爪讜讛 讚讬诇讬讛 讛讬讗 讜谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇诪讬注讘讚讬讛

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of one who separates teruma from his own produce on behalf of the produce of another, does he require the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce or not? Do we say: Since it is a benefit for the other to have his produce tithed, it does not require his knowledge, as one may act in a person鈥檚 interest in his absence? Or, perhaps it is his mitzva, and it is preferable for him to perform the mitzva himself, and therefore, it does not benefit him to have the produce tithed on his behalf.

转讗 砖诪注 转讜专诐 讗转 转专讜诪讜转讬讜 讜讗转 诪注砖专讜转讬讜 诇讚注转讜 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪谉 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 注诇 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讜诇讚注转讜 讚诪讗谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇讚注转讜 讚讬诇讬讛 诪讗谉 砖讜讜讬讛 砖诇讬讞

Come and hear a proof from the mishna: For one for whom benefit from him is forbidden by vow, he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with his knowledge and consent. The Gemara analyzes this statement: With what are we dealing? If we say that he separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the same owner of the pile, the question is: And with the knowledge and consent of whom may he do so? If we say it is with the knowledge of the one tithing the produce, who designated him an agent to do so? One cannot tithe another鈥檚 produce unless he is designated as an agent.

讗诇讗 诇讚注转讜 讚讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讛讗 拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讚拽注讘讬讚 砖诇讬讞讜转讬讛 讗诇讗 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖诇 讛讻专讬 讜诇讚注转讜 讚诪讗谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇讚注转讜 讚讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讛讗 拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诇讚注转讬讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 讜诪砖诇讜 转讜专诐 注诇 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 爪专讬讱 讚注转 讛讗 拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 讚注转

Rather, it must be that he is tithing with the knowledge of the owner of the pile. However, in that case, by tithing the produce isn鈥檛 he benefiting the owner, as he is performing the action in fulfillment of the agency of the owner? Rather, it must be that he separates teruma from his own produce on behalf of the produce of the owner of the pile. The Gemara asks: And with the knowledge and consent of whom is he doing so? If we say it is with the knowledge of the owner of the pile, isn鈥檛 he benefiting the owner? He is performing the action in fulfillment of the agency of the owner. Rather, is it not that he is tithing on the basis of his own knowledge, and he is separating from his own produce on behalf of the produce of another? And if you say that in order to tithe from one鈥檚 produce on behalf of the produce of the owner, it requires the owner鈥檚 knowledge and consent, isn鈥檛 he benefiting the owner? Rather, is it not that one may conclude from here that in order to tithe from one鈥檚 produce on behalf of the produce of another, one does not require the knowledge and consent of the owner of the pile?

诇注讜诇诐 诪砖诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 注诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讻讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讘讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛专讜爪讛 诇转专讜诐 讬讘讗 讜讬转专讜诐 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘讗讜诪专 讜讻讜壮

The Gemara rejects that conclusion. Actually, it is a case where he separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the same owner of the pile. However, the circumstances here are parallel to those addressed by Rava in another context, as Rava said that there is a case where one says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma. Here too, this is a case where one says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma. In that case, one may tithe another鈥檚 produce without being designated as his agent.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讛转讜专诐 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 砖诇 诪讬 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗讬 诇讗讜 驻讬专讬 讚讛讗讬讱 诪讬 诪转拽谞讗 讻专讬讗 讚讛讛讜讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗讬 诇讗讜 讻专讬讗 讚讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讛讜讬讬谉 驻讬专讬 讚讛讚讬谉 转专讜诪讛

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: In a case where one separates teruma from his own produce for the produce of another, who is entitled to the discretionary benefit, i.e., the right to give the teruma to the priest of his choosing? Do we say: If not for the produce of this one separating the teruma, would the pile of that owner of the produce be properly tithed, and therefore the one separating the teruma is entitled to the discretionary benefit? Or, perhaps we say: If not for the pile of that owner of the pile, the produce of this one separating the teruma would not be teruma, and therefore the owner is entitled to the discretionary benefit.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 讗转 讻诇 转讘讜讗转 讝专注讱 讜谞转转

Rabbi Zeira said to him that as the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall tithe all the produce of your seed鈥nd you shall give鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:22, 26), this indicates that the discretion to give the teruma to the priest of his choosing is the prerogative of the one to whom the pile of the produce belongs.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 转讜专诐 讗转 转专讜诪讜转讬讜 讜讗转 诪注砖专讜转讬讜 诇讚注转讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讚讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讛讗 拽讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讚讬诇讬讛 讗诪专讬 诇讗 诪砖诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 注诇 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讜诇讚注转讜 讚讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讘讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛专讜爪讛 诇转专讜诐 讬讘讗 讜讬转专讜诐

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira from the mishna: For someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him, he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce. And if you say that the right to the discretionary benefit belongs to the owner of the pile, by separating teruma for his produce, isn鈥檛 he benefiting the owner? Rather, conclude from the mishna that the right to the discretionary benefit belongs to the one separating the teruma. The Sages say: No, actually this could even be a case where one separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the owner of the pile, and he does so with the knowledge of the owner of the pile, where he says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诪拽讚讬砖 诪讜住讬祝 讞讜诪砖 讜诪转讻驻专 注讜砖讛 转诪讜专讛 讜讛转讜专诐 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖讗讬谞讜 砖诇讜 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 砖诇讜

Come and hear a resolution of Rabbi Yirmeya鈥檚 dilemma, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: In a case where one consecrates an animal as an offering for another and it becomes blemished, only the one who consecrates the animal adds one-fifth to the cost of redeeming the animal, and the one seeking atonement through this offering does not. And since the body of the animal belongs to the one seeking atonement through the offering, only he renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for the sacred animal, consecrated as a substitute. And in the case of one who separates teruma from his own produce for produce that is not his, the discretionary benefit is his.

诪诇诪讚讜 诪讚专砖 讛诇讻讜转 讜讗讙讚讜转 讗讘诇 诇讗 讬诇诪讚谞讜 诪拽专讗 诪拽专讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 讬诇诪讚谞讜 诪砖讜诐 讚拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 诪讚专砖 谞诪讬 拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讜讟诇讬谉 砖讻专 注诇 讛诪拽专讗 讜讗讬谉 谞讜讟诇讬谉 砖讻专 注诇 讛诪讚专砖 诪讗讬 驻住拽讗

搂 We learned in the mishna that one teaches someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him midrash, halakhot, and aggadot, but he may not teach him Bible. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he may not teach him Bible? Is it due to the fact that the teacher benefits the one for whom benefit from him is forbidden by teaching him Bible? When he teaches him midrash he also benefits him. Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a place where one takes payment for teaching Bible and one does not take payment for teaching midrash. By teaching him Bible, the one for whom benefit is forbidden, benefits from the fact that he does not pay. The Gemara asks: Why was the halakha stated without qualification? There is no apparent fundamental difference between Bible and midrash. Why did the mishna refer specifically to a case where payment is taken for teaching Bible?

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Nedarim 36

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Nedarim 36

诪转讬讘 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诐 讛讬讛 讻讛谉 讬讝专讜拽 注诇讬讜 讚诐 讞讟讗转讜 讜讚诐 讗砖诪讜

Rav Shimi bar Abba raised an objection from the Tosefta (2:7): If the one who vowed to prohibit another from benefiting from him was a priest, he may sprinkle the blood of his sin-offering and the blood of his guilt-offering on the other鈥檚 behalf. Apparently, the priest may perform all sacrificial rites for one prohibited from benefiting from him, even those that require knowledge of the one for whom the offering atones.

讚诐 讞讟讗转讜 砖诇 诪爪讜专注 讜讚诐 讗砖诪讜 砖诇 诪爪讜专注 讚讻转讬讘 讝讗转 转讛讬讛 转讜专转 讛诪爪专注 讘讬谉 讙讚讜诇 讜讘讬谉 拽讟谉

The Gemara answers. The reference is to blood of the sin-offering of a leper and blood of the guilt-offering of a leper. These are offerings brought by a leper who is lacking atonement, in order to complete his purification process, as it is written: 鈥淭his is the law of the leper鈥 (Leviticus 14:2). And the verse comes to teach that the halakhot of a leper apply to both an adult and a minor. This offering, too, does not require the knowledge of the one for whom the offering atones.

转谞谉 讛讻讛谞讬诐 砖驻讬讙诇讜 讘诪拽讚砖 诪讝讬讚讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讛讗 砖讜讙讙讬谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讗诇讗 砖驻讬讙讜诇谉 驻讬讙讜诇

The Gemara cites another proof to resolve the dilemma with regard to the nature of the agency of a priest. We learned in a mishna: In the case of priests who rendered an offering piggul in the Temple, i.e., they sacrificed an offering intending to consume it after its appointed time, if they did so intentionally, i.e., with full awareness of the period during which the offering may be consumed, they are obligated to pay. The Gemara infers: If they did so unwittingly, they are exempt from payment. However, in any event, when they rendered the offering piggul, it acquired the status of piggul and is disqualified.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 砖诇讜讞讬 讚砖诪讬讗 讛讜讜 讛讬讬谞讜 砖驻讬讙讜诇谉 驻讬讙讜诇 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 砖诇讜讞讬 讚讬讚谉 讛讜讜 讗诪讗讬 驻讬讙讜诇谉 驻讬讙讜诇 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 砖诇讬讞讗 砖讜讬转讬讱 诇转拽讜谞讬 讜诇讗 诇注讜讜转讬

The Gemara asks: Granted, if you say that the priests are agents of Heaven, this is why when their actions cause piggul it is piggul; their actions are independent of the one bringing the offering. However, if you say that the priests are our agents, why when their actions cause piggul is it piggul? Let the one bringing the offering say to the priest: I designated you an agent to perform the task properly but not to perform the task improperly.

讗诪专讬 砖讗谞讬 讙讘讬 驻讬讙讜诇 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 诇讗 讬讞砖讘 诇讜 诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐

The Sages say in response: It is different with regard to piggul, as in its regard the verse states and emphasizes: 鈥淗e who offered it, it will not be imputed to him鈥 (Leviticus 7:18). This implies that it is piggul in any case, e.g., even if one鈥檚 actions cause the offering to be piggul without the consent of the owner. Therefore, there is no proof with regard to the nature of the agency of the priest.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 爪专讬讻讬谉 讚注转 讞讜抓 诪诪讞讜住专 讻驻专讛 砖讛专讬 讗讚诐 诪讘讬讗 拽专讘谉 注诇 讘谞讬讜 讜注诇 讘谞讜转讬讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讬讘讬讗 讗讚诐 讞讟讗转 讞诇讘 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 砖讻谉 讗讚诐 诪讘讬讗 注诇 讗砖转讜 砖讜讟讛 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇诪讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛驻专讬砖 讞讟讗转 讞诇讘 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 诇讗 注砖讛 讻诇讜诐

搂 With regard to the matter itself, Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Everyone who brings an offering requires knowledge, except for those offerings brought by those lacking atonement; this can be proven from the fact that a person brings a purification offering for his minor sons and daughters. The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, let a person bring a sin-offering on behalf of another who unwittingly ate forbidden fat without his knowledge, just as a man brings an offering for his wife who is an imbecile, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Why then did Rabbi Elazar say: One who separated a sin-offering on behalf of another who unwittingly ate forbidden fat has done nothing?

讗砖转讜 砖讜讟讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 讚讗讻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 砖讜讟讛 诇讗讜 讘转 拽专讘谉 讛讬讗

The Gemara refutes the analogy between the cases. What are the circumstances of the case of his wife who is an imbecile? If she ate the forbidden fat when she was an imbecile, she is not subject to liability to bring an offering, as one lacking halakhic competence is exempt from punishment and needs no atonement.

讜讗讬 讚讗讻诇讛 讻砖讛讬讗 驻拽讞转 讜谞砖转讟讬转 讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗讻诇 讞诇讘 讜讛驻专讬砖 拽专讘谉 讜谞砖转讟讛 讜讞讝专 讜谞砖转驻讛 驻住讜诇 讛讜讗讬诇 讜谞讚讞讛 讬讚讞讛

And if she ate the forbidden fat when she was halakhically competent and then became an imbecile, didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yirmeya say that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: If one ate forbidden fat unwittingly, and separated an offering, and became an imbecile, and became competent again, the offering is disqualified. Since it was disqualified when he was demented, it will be disqualified forever. It is clear, therefore, that the sin-offering that one brings for his wife who is an imbecile is not a sin-offering for eating forbidden fat, as that would require halakhic intelligence. It is merely for completion of the purification process, e.g., a woman after childbirth, for which halakhic competence is not required. Therefore, no proof may be cited from the case of one鈥檚 wife who is an imbecile to the case of bringing a sin-offering on behalf of another who ate fat.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛 讬讘讬讗 讗讚诐 驻住讞 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 砖讻谉 讗讚诐 诪讘讬讗 注诇 讘谞讬讜 讜注诇 讘谞讜转讬讜 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讗诇诪讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛驻专讬砖 驻住讞 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 诇讗 注砖讛 讻诇讜诐

The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, let a person bring a Paschal lamb on behalf of another without his knowledge, just as a person brings a Paschal lamb for his minor sons and daughters. Why then did Rabbi Elazar say: One who separated a Paschal lamb on behalf of another has done nothing?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 砖讛 诇讘讬转 讗讘转 诇讗讜 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗

Rabbi Zeira said: The verse states: 鈥淎 lamb for each father鈥檚 house, a lamb for the household鈥 (Exodus 12:3). From here it is derived that all members of a household, including minor sons and daughters, are registered to the group eating a Paschal lamb. However, this is a custom; it is not by Torah law.

讜诪诪讗讬 诪讚转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 诇讘谞讬讜 讛专讬谞讬 砖讜讞讟 讗转 讛驻住讞 注诇 诪讬 砖讬注诇讛 诪讻诐 专讗砖讜谉 诇讬专讜砖诇讬诐 讻讬讜谉 砖讛讻谞讬住 专讗砖讜谉 专讗砖讜 讜专讜讘讜 讝讻讛 讘讞诇拽讜 讜诪讝讻讛 讗转 讗讞讬讜 注诪讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 砖讛 诇讘讬转 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 注诇 讘讬砖专讗 拽讗讬 讜诪讝讻讬 诇讛讜

And from where is this halakha learned? It is from that which we learned in a mishna (Pesa岣m 89a): With regard to one who says to his minor sons: I am hereby slaughtering the Paschal lamb on behalf of the one of you who will ascend to Jerusalem first, and he will be privileged to eat from that lamb, then once the first of his children introduces his head and most of his body into Jerusalem, he acquires his portion and acquires portions on behalf of his brothers with him. And if you say that the halakha derived from the phrase 鈥渁 lamb for the household鈥 is by Torah law, and the minors are obligated to register for the Paschal lamb, although the son who reached Jerusalem first acquired his portion based on the stipulation of his father, how can he stand over the meat of the Paschal lamb after it was slaughtered and acquire it on behalf of his brothers? Apparently, minors are not required by Torah law to register as members of the group eating the Paschal lamb.

讗诇讗 诇诪讛 诇讛讜 讚讗诪专 诇讛讜谉 讗讘讜讛讜谉 讻讚讬 诇讝专讝谉 讘诪爪讜转 转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 诪注砖讛 讛讬讛 讜拽讚诪讜 讘谞讜转 诇讘谞讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 讘谞讜转 讝专讬讝讜转 讜讘谞讬诐 砖驻诇讬诐

The Gemara asks: However, why do they require that their father say to them: The one of you who will ascend to Jerusalem first will be privileged to eat from that lamb, when no actual acquisition takes place? It is in order to motivate them in the performance of mitzvot. This is also taught in a baraita: There was an incident that transpired where a father said to his sons and daughters that they should compete to see who reaches the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb first, and the daughters preceded the sons, and the daughters were found to be motivated and the sons to be lazy [shefalim]. Since the baraita did not say that the result was that daughters acquired their portion, apparently the father鈥檚 statement was merely motivational.

讜转讜专诐 讗转 转专讜诪转讜 讻讜壮

搂 We learned in the mishna that among the tasks that one may perform for someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him is: And he separates his teruma.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讛转讜专诐 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 爪专讬讱 讚注转讜 讗讜 诇讗 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讻讬讜谉 讚讝讻讜转 讛讜讗 诇讜 诇讗 爪专讬讱 讚注转 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诪爪讜讛 讚讬诇讬讛 讛讬讗 讜谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 诇诪讬注讘讚讬讛

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of one who separates teruma from his own produce on behalf of the produce of another, does he require the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce or not? Do we say: Since it is a benefit for the other to have his produce tithed, it does not require his knowledge, as one may act in a person鈥檚 interest in his absence? Or, perhaps it is his mitzva, and it is preferable for him to perform the mitzva himself, and therefore, it does not benefit him to have the produce tithed on his behalf.

转讗 砖诪注 转讜专诐 讗转 转专讜诪讜转讬讜 讜讗转 诪注砖专讜转讬讜 诇讚注转讜 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪谉 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 注诇 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讜诇讚注转讜 讚诪讗谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇讚注转讜 讚讬诇讬讛 诪讗谉 砖讜讜讬讛 砖诇讬讞

Come and hear a proof from the mishna: For one for whom benefit from him is forbidden by vow, he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with his knowledge and consent. The Gemara analyzes this statement: With what are we dealing? If we say that he separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the same owner of the pile, the question is: And with the knowledge and consent of whom may he do so? If we say it is with the knowledge of the one tithing the produce, who designated him an agent to do so? One cannot tithe another鈥檚 produce unless he is designated as an agent.

讗诇讗 诇讚注转讜 讚讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讛讗 拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讚拽注讘讬讚 砖诇讬讞讜转讬讛 讗诇讗 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖诇 讛讻专讬 讜诇讚注转讜 讚诪讗谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诇讚注转讜 讚讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讛讗 拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 诇讚注转讬讛 讚谞驻砖讬讛 讜诪砖诇讜 转讜专诐 注诇 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 爪专讬讱 讚注转 讛讗 拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 讚注转

Rather, it must be that he is tithing with the knowledge of the owner of the pile. However, in that case, by tithing the produce isn鈥檛 he benefiting the owner, as he is performing the action in fulfillment of the agency of the owner? Rather, it must be that he separates teruma from his own produce on behalf of the produce of the owner of the pile. The Gemara asks: And with the knowledge and consent of whom is he doing so? If we say it is with the knowledge of the owner of the pile, isn鈥檛 he benefiting the owner? He is performing the action in fulfillment of the agency of the owner. Rather, is it not that he is tithing on the basis of his own knowledge, and he is separating from his own produce on behalf of the produce of another? And if you say that in order to tithe from one鈥檚 produce on behalf of the produce of the owner, it requires the owner鈥檚 knowledge and consent, isn鈥檛 he benefiting the owner? Rather, is it not that one may conclude from here that in order to tithe from one鈥檚 produce on behalf of the produce of another, one does not require the knowledge and consent of the owner of the pile?

诇注讜诇诐 诪砖诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 注诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讻讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讘讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛专讜爪讛 诇转专讜诐 讬讘讗 讜讬转专讜诐 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘讗讜诪专 讜讻讜壮

The Gemara rejects that conclusion. Actually, it is a case where he separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the same owner of the pile. However, the circumstances here are parallel to those addressed by Rava in another context, as Rava said that there is a case where one says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma. Here too, this is a case where one says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma. In that case, one may tithe another鈥檚 produce without being designated as his agent.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪专讘讬 讝讬专讗 讛转讜专诐 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 砖诇 诪讬 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗讬 诇讗讜 驻讬专讬 讚讛讗讬讱 诪讬 诪转拽谞讗 讻专讬讗 讚讛讛讜讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讗讬 诇讗讜 讻专讬讗 讚讛讛讜讗 诇讗 讛讜讬讬谉 驻讬专讬 讚讛讚讬谉 转专讜诪讛

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: In a case where one separates teruma from his own produce for the produce of another, who is entitled to the discretionary benefit, i.e., the right to give the teruma to the priest of his choosing? Do we say: If not for the produce of this one separating the teruma, would the pile of that owner of the produce be properly tithed, and therefore the one separating the teruma is entitled to the discretionary benefit? Or, perhaps we say: If not for the pile of that owner of the pile, the produce of this one separating the teruma would not be teruma, and therefore the owner is entitled to the discretionary benefit.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诪专 拽专讗 讗转 讻诇 转讘讜讗转 讝专注讱 讜谞转转

Rabbi Zeira said to him that as the verse states: 鈥淵ou shall tithe all the produce of your seed鈥nd you shall give鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:22, 26), this indicates that the discretion to give the teruma to the priest of his choosing is the prerogative of the one to whom the pile of the produce belongs.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 转讜专诐 讗转 转专讜诪讜转讬讜 讜讗转 诪注砖专讜转讬讜 诇讚注转讜 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讚讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讛讗 拽讗 诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 讚讬诇讬讛 讗诪专讬 诇讗 诪砖诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 注诇 砖诇 讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讜诇讚注转讜 讚讘注诇 讛讻专讬 讘讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛专讜爪讛 诇转专讜诐 讬讘讗 讜讬转专讜诐

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira from the mishna: For someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him, he separates his teruma and his tithes, provided that it is with the knowledge and consent of the owner of the produce. And if you say that the right to the discretionary benefit belongs to the owner of the pile, by separating teruma for his produce, isn鈥檛 he benefiting the owner? Rather, conclude from the mishna that the right to the discretionary benefit belongs to the one separating the teruma. The Sages say: No, actually this could even be a case where one separates teruma from the produce of the owner of the pile for the produce of the owner of the pile, and he does so with the knowledge of the owner of the pile, where he says: Anyone who wishes to come and separate teruma may come and separate teruma.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诪拽讚讬砖 诪讜住讬祝 讞讜诪砖 讜诪转讻驻专 注讜砖讛 转诪讜专讛 讜讛转讜专诐 诪砖诇讜 注诇 砖讗讬谞讜 砖诇讜 讟讜讘转 讛谞讗讛 砖诇讜

Come and hear a resolution of Rabbi Yirmeya鈥檚 dilemma, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: In a case where one consecrates an animal as an offering for another and it becomes blemished, only the one who consecrates the animal adds one-fifth to the cost of redeeming the animal, and the one seeking atonement through this offering does not. And since the body of the animal belongs to the one seeking atonement through the offering, only he renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for the sacred animal, consecrated as a substitute. And in the case of one who separates teruma from his own produce for produce that is not his, the discretionary benefit is his.

诪诇诪讚讜 诪讚专砖 讛诇讻讜转 讜讗讙讚讜转 讗讘诇 诇讗 讬诇诪讚谞讜 诪拽专讗 诪拽专讗 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗 讬诇诪讚谞讜 诪砖讜诐 讚拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 诪讚专砖 谞诪讬 拽诪讛谞讬 诇讬讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讘诪拽讜诐 砖谞讜讟诇讬谉 砖讻专 注诇 讛诪拽专讗 讜讗讬谉 谞讜讟诇讬谉 砖讻专 注诇 讛诪讚专砖 诪讗讬 驻住拽讗

搂 We learned in the mishna that one teaches someone who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from him midrash, halakhot, and aggadot, but he may not teach him Bible. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he may not teach him Bible? Is it due to the fact that the teacher benefits the one for whom benefit from him is forbidden by teaching him Bible? When he teaches him midrash he also benefits him. Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a place where one takes payment for teaching Bible and one does not take payment for teaching midrash. By teaching him Bible, the one for whom benefit is forbidden, benefits from the fact that he does not pay. The Gemara asks: Why was the halakha stated without qualification? There is no apparent fundamental difference between Bible and midrash. Why did the mishna refer specifically to a case where payment is taken for teaching Bible?

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