Nedarim 43
גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא לֹא יַלְוֶנּוּ — דְּקָא מַהֲנֵי לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא לָא יִלְוֶה הֵימֶנּוּ, מַאי קָא מַהֲנֵי לֵיהּ? וּבִשְׁלָמָא לֹא יִלְוֶה הֵימֶנּוּ וְלֹא יִקַּח הֵימֶנּוּ — דְּקָמִיתְהֲנֵי מִינֵּיהּ, אֶלָּא לֹא יִשְׁאַל הֵימֶנּוּ, מַאי קָא מִיתְהֲנֵי מִינֵּיהּ!
GEMARA: Granted that the person from whom benefit is forbidden may not lend money to the person for whom benefit is forbidden, as he thereby benefits him. However, with regard to the fact that the former may not borrow money from the latter, in what way does he benefit him by borrowing his money? And it could even be said, granted that he may neither borrow money from him nor purchase an item from him, as one benefits in lending money by preserving the value of that money in case the coins deteriorate, and in selling by ridding oneself an item that is difficult to sell. However, with regard to the fact that the person from whom benefit is forbidden may not borrow an item from the person for whom benefit is forbidden, in what way does the lender benefit from him? The borrower returns the same item to the lender.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּדְרוּ הֲנָאָה זֶה מִזֶּה. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: גְּזֵירָה לִשְׁאוֹל מִשּׁוּם לְהַשְׁאִיל, וְכֵן בְּכוּלְּהוּ גְּזֵירָה.
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: The mishna is referring to a case where they both vowed that benefit from each other is forbidden. Clearly, then, neither of them may lend to the other or borrow from him. Abaye said: It is possible to explain the mishna as it is written, as referring to a case where only one vowed that benefit from the other is forbidden. However, the Sages issued a decree that it is also prohibited for one to borrow from a person for whom benefit from him is forbidden, due to the concern that he might come to lend to him, as reciprocity is common in these matters. And likewise, that is the explanation in all the cases in the mishna; it is prohibited to borrow money, borrow items, and to purchase items from him due to a rabbinic decree, lest he come to benefit him.
מַתְנִי׳ אָמַר לוֹ: ״הַשְׁאִילֵנִי פָּרָתְךָ״. אָמַר לוֹ: אֵינָהּ פְּנוּיָה. אָמַר: ״קֻוֽנָּם שָׂדִי שֶׁאֲנִי חוֹרֵשׁ בָּהּ לְעוֹלָם״. אִם הָיָה דַּרְכּוֹ לַחְרוֹשׁ — הוּא אָסוּר, וְכׇל אָדָם מוּתָּרִים. וְאִם אֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לַחְרוֹשׁ — הוּא וְכׇל אָדָם אֲסוּרִין.
MISHNA: One said to another: Lend me your cow. The other person said to him: My cow is not available. The one seeking to borrow the cow responded angrily: Plowing my field with this cow is konam forever. If it was his typical manner to plow the field himself, then it is prohibited for him to plow his field with that cow but it is permitted for every other person. If it is not his typical manner to plow the field himself, and he has others plow for him, it is prohibited for him and for every other person to plow his field with that cow, because his intent was to render benefit from plowing with this cow forbidden.
הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל, הוֹלֵךְ אֵצֶל הַחֶנְוָנִי וְאוֹמֵר: אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי נוֹדֵר מִמֶּנִּי הֲנָאָה וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מַה אֶעֱשֶׂה. וְהוּא נוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּבָא וְנוֹטֵל מִזֶּה.
In the case of one for whom benefit from another is forbidden by vow and who does not have anything to eat, the one from whom benefit is forbidden goes to the shopkeeper and says to him: So-and-so vowed that benefit from me is forbidden for him and I do not know what I will do. After grasping his intent, the shopkeeper gives food to the one for whom benefit is forbidden, and then the shopkeeper comes and takes payment for the food from that one who spoke to him.
הָיָה בֵּיתוֹ לִבְנוֹת, גְּדֵרוֹ לִגְדּוֹר, שָׂדֵהוּ לִקְצוֹר, הוֹלֵךְ אֵצֶל הַפּוֹעֲלִים וְאוֹמֵר: אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מוּדָּר מִמֶּנִּי הֲנָאָה וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מַה אֶעֱשֶׂה. וְהֵן עוֹשִׂין עִמּוֹ, וּבָאִין וְנוֹטְלִין שָׂכָר מִזֶּה.
Similarly, if the house of one for whom benefit is forbidden by a vow was to be built, his fence to be erected, or his field to be harvested, and laborers were required but he had no money to hire them, the one from whom benefit is forbidden goes to the laborers and says to them: Benefit from me is forbidden by vow to so-and-so and I do not know what I will do. And the laborers perform those tasks with him, and come and take payment for their labor from that person who approached them.
הָיוּ מְהַלְּכִין בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל, נוֹתֵן לְאֶחָד לְשׁוּם מַתָּנָה, וְהַלָּה מוּתָּר בָּהּ. אִם אֵין עִמָּהֶם אַחֵר — מַנִּיחַ עַל הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל הַגָּדֵר וְאוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפְקָרִים לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיַּחְפּוֹץ, וְהַלָּה נוֹטֵל וְאוֹכֵל. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹסֵר.
If the one who vowed to render benefit from him forbidden and the one for whom benefit is forbidden were traveling together along the road and the one for whom benefit is forbidden does not have anything to eat, the one who from whom benefit is forbidden gives food to one other person as a gift, and it is permitted for that person for whom benefit is forbidden to eat the food because it no longer belongs to the one from whom benefit is forbidden. If there is no other person with them, the one who vowed places the food on the nearest rock or on the nearest fence and says: These food items are hereby rendered ownerless and are available to anyone who wants them. Then that person for whom benefit is forbidden takes and eats the food. Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי? קָסָבַר: הֶפְקֵר כְּמַתָּנָה. מָה מַתָּנָה — עַד דְּאָתְיָא מֵרְשׁוּת נוֹתֵן לִרְשׁוּת מְקַבֵּל, אַף הֶפְקֵר — עַד דְּאָתְיָא לִרְשׁוּת זוֹכֶה.
GEMARA: With regard to the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei whether one from whom benefit is forbidden to another can give the other person food by declaring the food ownerless, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? He holds that the legal status of the process of rendering property ownerless is like that of the acquisition of a gift. Just as acquisition of a gift is not complete until the item comes from the possession of the one who gives the gift into the possession of the one who receives the gift, so too, the process of rendering property ownerless is not complete until the item comes into the possession of the one who acquires it. According to Rabbi Yosei, it is prohibited for the one for whom benefit is forbidden to take the food that was declared ownerless. Since it still belongs to the one from whom benefit is forbidden, by taking the food he derives forbidden benefit from him.
מֵתִיב רַבִּי אַבָּא: וְהַלָּה נוֹטֵל וְאוֹכֵל, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹסֵר. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אֵימָתַי — בִּזְמַן שֶׁנִּדְרוֹ קוֹדֵם לְהֶפְקֵירוֹ.
Rabbi Abba raises an objection from a baraita: And then that person takes and eats the food; and Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Rabbi Yosei said: When is it prohibited to do so? When his vow predates his declaration that the food is ownerless. In that case, the vow took effect on all his possessions, including those that he later declared ownerless.
אֲבָל אִם הָיָה הֶפְקֵירוֹ קוֹדֵם לְנִדְרוֹ — הֲרֵי זֶה מוּתָּר. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ עַד דְּאָתֵי לִרְשׁוּת זוֹכֶה, מָה לִי נִדְרוֹ קוֹדֵם לְהֶפְקֵירוֹ, מָה לִי הֶפְקֵירוֹ קוֹדֵם לְנִדְרוֹ?
However, if his declaration that the food is ownerless predates his vow, it is permitted for the other person to eat the food. And if you say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei is because the food remains in the possession of the owner until it comes into the possession of the one who acquires it, what is different for me if his vow predates his declaration that the food is ownerless, and what is different for me if his declaration that the food is ownerless predates his vow? In any event, the item remains in the possession of its owner and the one for whom benefit is forbidden benefits from it.
הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְשַׁנֵּי לַהּ: כׇּל הַנּוֹדֵר אֵין דַּעְתּוֹ עַל מַה שֶּׁהִפְקִיר.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abba raised the objection and he answered that objection. The difference between the cases does not relate to the halakhot of ownerless property; rather, it relates to the nature of vows. The intent of anyone who vows is that the vow not apply to an item that he rendered ownerless. Therefore, when he declares the food ownerless and then vows, he does not intend to include the ownerless food in his vow, and the prohibition does not take effect upon it.
מֵתִיב רָבָא: מִקְצָתָן לָרִאשׁוֹן וְכוּלָּן לַשֵּׁנִי — רִאשׁוֹן קָנָה,
Rava raised an objection: With regard to a person on his deathbed who ordered his executor to distribute all his property, if he recovers, he may retract the gift. However, if he ordered him to distribute only a portion of his property and kept the rest, he cannot retract the gift. If he ordered him to distribute his property to two people and said: A portion of the property is given to the first person and all of the remaining property is given to the second person, then if he recovered, the first person acquired the property that was given him, as it was a partial gift.
שֵׁנִי לֹא קָנָה!
And the second person did not acquire the property that was given him, as it was a gift of all his remaining property, which can be retracted. Although the first person did not yet acquire the property, as the person on his deathbed did not die, the property is no longer considered to be in the possession of the one who owned it. This is clear from the fact that if it were still in his possession, the gift to the second person would not be a gift of all his remaining property. This contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said in explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: Acquisition of a gift is not complete until the item comes from the possession of the one who gives the gift into the possession of the one who receives the gift.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: גְּזֵירָה מִשּׁוּם מַתְּנַת בֵּית חוֹרוֹן.
Rather, Rava said that this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: It is prohibited by rabbinic decree for the one for whom benefit is forbidden to take food that was declared ownerless, due to the gift of Beit Ḥoron. An incident occurred in Beit Ḥoron involving a person who employed artifice and gave a gift to another to circumvent a vow. The Sages ruled that artifice of that sort is forbidden. Here too, when he renounced ownership he merely employed artifice to circumvent the vow.
תַּנְיָא: הַמַּפְקִיר אֶת שָׂדֵהוּ, כׇּל שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים — יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — אֵין יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ.
It is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who declares his field ownerless, for the entire three days after that declaration he is able to retract it. From this point forward, he is unable to retract the declaration.
