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Today's Daf Yomi

January 5, 2023 | 讬状讘 讘讟讘转 转砖驻状讙

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

Nedarim 72

This month’s learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥澛

If a husband divorces his wife, is it considered that he ratified her vow at the divorce, or is it considered silence (hence, no ratification)? Three sources are quoted in order to answer this question but all are rejected. The Mishna says that Torah scholars would stand up on the wedding day of their daughter and their betrothed and declare that all vows she may have made before are nullified. Rami bar Hama asks: Can a husband (or a father) nullify her vow without having heard the vow? The Gemara tries to answer his question from both sections of our Mishna as they seem to be referring to the ability to nullify vows he had never heard. However, this is rejected as the statement they each make is meant to remind her to tell them about vows she may have made, and then, when they hear the vows, they will nullify them. Two other attempts are made to bring in other sources in order to get to an answer but those are rejected as well.

转讗 砖诪注 讗讬诪转讬 讗诪专讜 诪转 讛讘注诇 谞转专讜拽谞讛 专砖讜转 诇讗讘 讘讝诪谉 砖诇讗 砖诪注 讛讘注诇 讗讜 砖诪注 讜讛驻专 讗讜 砖诪注 讜砖转拽 讜诪转 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻砖转讬拽讛 讚诪讜 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 讗讜 砖诪注 讜讙讬专砖 诪讚诇讗 转谞讬 讛讻讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻讛拽诪讛 讚诪讜

Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from the following baraita: When did they say that if the husband died the authority to nullify a young woman鈥檚 vows reverts to the father? When the husband did not hear the vow; or he heard the vow and nullified it; or heard it, and was silent, and died on that day. And if you say that divorce is like silence, let the tanna of the baraita also teach with regard to the husband: Or he heard the vow and divorced her. From the fact that he did not teach this case, learn from the baraita that divorce is like ratification.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讗讘诇 讗诐 砖诪注 讜拽讬讬诐 讗讜 砖诪注 讜砖转拽 讜诪转 讘讬讜诐 砖诇 讗讞专讬讜 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻讛拽诪讛 讚诪讜 诇讬转谞讬 讜讗诐 砖诪注 讜讙讬专砖 讗诇讗 诪讚诇讗 拽转谞讬 讛讻讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻砖转讬拽讛 讚诪讜

The Gemara rejects the proof from the baraita: State the latter clause of the baraita: But if he heard it and ratified it; or he heard it, and was silent, and died on the following day, then the father cannot nullify the vow. But according to this clause, if you say that divorce is like ratification, let the tanna of the baraita also teach: And if he heard the vow and divorced her. Rather, from the fact that the baraita does not teach this, learn from the baraita that divorce is like silence.

讗诇讗 诪讛讗 诇讬讻讗 诇诪砖诪注 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬 专讬砖讗 讚讜拽讗 谞住讬讘 住讬驻讗 诪砖讜诐 专讬砖讗 讗讬 住讬驻讗 讚讜拽讗 谞住讬讘 专讬砖讗 诪砖讜诐 住讬驻讗

Rather, one cannot learn anything from this baraita about the effect of divorce on her vows. The Gemara explains that the discrepancy between the two clauses is stylistic and can be explained either way: If the cases in the first clause are chosen precisely, allowing for the inference that divorce is like ratification, then one must say that the tanna formulates the last clause of the baraita as he does because of the first clause, i.e., in the same style, although it does not add anything. If the cases in the last clause are chosen precisely, allowing for the inference that divorce is like silence, then one must say that the tanna formulates the first clause of the baraita as he does because of the last clause, i.e., in the same style, although it does not add anything.

转讗 砖诪注 谞讚专讛 讜讛讬讗 讗专讜住讛 讜谞转讙专砖讛 讜谞转讗专住讛 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗讛 讗讘讬讛 讜讘注诇讛 讛讗讞专讜谉 诪驻讬专讬谉 谞讚专讬讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻砖转讬拽讛 讚诪讜 讚讗讬 讻讛拽诪讛 讚诪讜 诪讬 诪爪讬 诪讬驻专 讗专讜住 讗讞专讜谉 谞讬讚专讬 讚讗讜拽讬诐 讗专讜住 专讗砖讜谉

Come and hear a mishna (71a): If she took a vow while she was betrothed, and was divorced, and was betrothed again on the same day, even to one hundred men, her father and her final husband nullify her vows. Learn from this mishna that divorce is like silence, because if it were like ratification, could the final betrothed nullify vows that the first betrothed had already ratified?

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖诇讗 砖诪注 讗专讜住 专讗砖讜谉 讗讬 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗讞专 诪讗讛 讬诪讬诐 谞诪讬

The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case in which the first betrothed man did not hear the vow, and for that reason his divorcing her does not constitute ratification. The Gemara then asks: If so, why mention specifically that the divorce occurred on that day? The same would hold true even after one hundred days as well. Since the first husband never heard the vow, the final husband can nullify it on whichever day he hears it.

讻砖诇讗 砖诪注 讗专讜住 讜砖诪注 讛讗讘 讚讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讛讜讗 讚诪爪讬 诪讬驻专 讗讘诇 诪讻讗谉 讜讗讬诇讱 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讬驻专

The Gemara answers: It is referring to a situation in which the betrothed man did not hear the vow but the father heard it. As in that case, it is only on the same day that he can nullify the vow, but he cannot nullify it from this point forward. Once her father has already heard the vow, her betrothed cannot nullify it on a different day. Therefore, one cannot infer from the mishna that divorce is like silence.

转讗 砖诪注 谞讚专讛 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讙讬专砖讛 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻讛拽诪讛 讚诪讜

Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a mishna (89a): If she took a vow on that day, and he divorced her and remarried her on the same day, he cannot nullify her vow. Learn from the mishna that divorce is like ratification.

讗诪专讬 讛讻讗 讘谞砖讜讗讛 注住拽讬谞谉 讜讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 诪讬驻专 讘拽讜讚诪讬谉

The Gemara rejects this proof: Say that here, i.e., in the mishna cited, we are dealing with a married woman, and that is the reason that he cannot nullify the vow. It is not because it has been ratified by divorce but because the husband cannot nullify his wife鈥檚 vows that precede their marriage. The dilemma remains unresolved.

诪转谞讬壮 讚专讱 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 注讚 砖诇讗 讛讬转讛 讘转讜 讬讜爪讗讛 诪讗爪诇讜 讗讜诪专 诇讛 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖谞讚专转 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讬 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 讜讻谉 讛讘注诇 注讚 砖诇讗 转讻谞住 诇专砖讜转讜 讗讜诪专 诇讛 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖谞讚专转 注讚 砖诇讗 转讻谞住讬 诇专砖讜转讬 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 砖诪砖转讻谞住 诇专砖讜转讜 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专

MISHNA: The practice of Torah scholars is to ensure that a woman about to be married should not be encumbered by any vows. A father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This was necessary because once she enters his jurisdiction he cannot nullify the vows she made before that.

讙诪壮 讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讘注诇 诪讛讜 砖讬驻专 讘诇讗 砖诪讬注讛 讜砖诪注 讗讬砖讛 讚讜拽讗 讛讜讗 讗讜 诇讗讜 讚讜拽讗 讛讜讗

gemara Rami bar 岣ma asks: Concerning a husband, what is the halakha with regard to his nullifying a vow without hearing it? In other words, can a husband state a general nullification of his wife鈥檚 vows without being aware of any particular vow? When the verse states: 鈥淎nd her husband hears it, on the day that he hears it, and holds his peace at her, then her vows shall be ratified鈥 (Numbers 30:8), is that referring specifically to a situation where he actually heard of a vow, and only then he can nullify it? Or is it not specifically referring to such a situation, and the mention of hearing is merely because the ordinary situation is that the husband nullifies a vow once he hears it?

讗诪专 专讘讗 转讗 砖诪注 讚专讱 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 注讚 砖诇讗 讬爪讗转 讘转讜 诪讗爪诇讜 讗讜诪专 诇讛 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖谞讚专转 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讬 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 讜讛讗 诇讗 砖诪注

Rava said: Come and hear the mishna: The practice of Torah scholars is that a father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. Rava points out: But the father did not hear her vows, so it must be that one can nullify vows without knowledge that they were actually made.

诇讻讬 砖诪注 讛讜讗 讚诪讬驻专 讗诐 讻谉 讻讬 诇讗 砖诪注 诇诪讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诪专 讛讗 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讗讜专讞讬讛 讚爪讜专讘讗 诪专讘谞谉 诇讛讚讜专讬

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: The mishna means that the father states a preemptive nullification that when he will hear a particular vow is when he nullifies it. The vow is not actually nullified until he hears it. The Gemara asks: If so, when he has not actually heard those vows yet, why is it necessary for him to state preemptively that the vows will be nullified; why not wait until he actually hears the vow? The Gemara answers: This teaches us that it is the practice of a Torah scholar to pursue such matters, in order to prompt his daughter or his betrothed to inform him of vows she took, which will then be nullified when he hears of them.

转讗 砖诪注 诪住讬驻讗 讜讻谉 讛讘注诇 注讚 砖诇讗 转讻谞住 诇专砖讜转讜 讗讜诪专 诇讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诇讻讬 砖诪注谞讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear from the latter clause of the mishna: And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This implies that he can nullify vows without hearing them. The Gemara responds: Here too, it means that he says to her: When I hear the particular vow, then it will be nullified.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖转讜 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖转讚讜专讬 注讚 砖讗讘讗 诪诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讛谉 拽讬讬诪讬谉 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪讜驻专 讜讛讗 诇讗 砖诪注

Come and hear another mishna to answer the question (Nedarim 75a): One who says to his wife: All vows that you vow until I arrive from such and such a place are hereby ratified, has not said anything, i.e., the vows are not ratified. If he says: All vows that you vow until then are hereby nullified, Rabbi Eliezer says: They are nullified. The Gemara comments: But he did not actually hear the particular vows, so one can infer from this that he need not hear her vows in order to nullify them.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚讗诪专 诇讻讬 砖诪注谞讗 讜诇诪讛 诇讬 诪谉 讛砖转讗 诇讻讬 砖诪注 诇讬驻专 诇讛 拽住讘专 讚诇诪讗 诪讟专讬讚谞讗 讛讛讬讗 砖注转讗

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Here too, one can understand the situation to be that he says: When I hear the particular vow, it will be nullified. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need, i.e., why must the husband state his nullification, from now; let him nullify them for her when he actually hears them. The Gemara answers: He reasons: Perhaps I will be preoccupied at that moment and will forget to nullify them. He therefore nullifies the vows beforehand, so that the nullification will take effect automatically when he hears them.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖谞讜讚专转 讗砖转讬 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖讗讘讗 诪诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讛驻专 讜讛驻专 诇讛 讬讻讜诇 讬讛讜 诪讜驻专讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛

Come and hear a baraita: In the case of one who says to a steward [apotropos] appointed to manage his affairs in his absence: All vows that my wife vows from now until I arrive from such and such a place you should nullify, and the steward nullified the vows for her, one might have thought that they would be nullified. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淗er husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14). The repetition of 鈥渉er husband鈥 teaches that it is the husband alone who may nullify his wife鈥檚 vows; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜

Rabbi Yonatan said to him: We have found everywhere in the Torah that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself. Therefore, a steward can nullify the vows on the husband鈥檚 behalf.

讜讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讙讝讬专转 讛讻转讜讘 讛讜讗 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讗讘诇 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讜讛讗 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬讛

The Gemara points out: And even Rabbi Yoshiya says that a steward cannot nullify the wife鈥檚 vows only because it is a Torah edict, based upon the words 鈥渉er husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14). But according to everyone, the principle that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself is generally valid. The only objection to the steward nullifying the vows is the Torah edict. The Gemara asks: But these vows were not heard by the steward? This indicates that not having heard the vows is not an obstacle to nullification.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

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Nedarim 72

转讗 砖诪注 讗讬诪转讬 讗诪专讜 诪转 讛讘注诇 谞转专讜拽谞讛 专砖讜转 诇讗讘 讘讝诪谉 砖诇讗 砖诪注 讛讘注诇 讗讜 砖诪注 讜讛驻专 讗讜 砖诪注 讜砖转拽 讜诪转 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻砖转讬拽讛 讚诪讜 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 讗讜 砖诪注 讜讙讬专砖 诪讚诇讗 转谞讬 讛讻讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻讛拽诪讛 讚诪讜

Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from the following baraita: When did they say that if the husband died the authority to nullify a young woman鈥檚 vows reverts to the father? When the husband did not hear the vow; or he heard the vow and nullified it; or heard it, and was silent, and died on that day. And if you say that divorce is like silence, let the tanna of the baraita also teach with regard to the husband: Or he heard the vow and divorced her. From the fact that he did not teach this case, learn from the baraita that divorce is like ratification.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讗讘诇 讗诐 砖诪注 讜拽讬讬诐 讗讜 砖诪注 讜砖转拽 讜诪转 讘讬讜诐 砖诇 讗讞专讬讜 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻讛拽诪讛 讚诪讜 诇讬转谞讬 讜讗诐 砖诪注 讜讙讬专砖 讗诇讗 诪讚诇讗 拽转谞讬 讛讻讬 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻砖转讬拽讛 讚诪讜

The Gemara rejects the proof from the baraita: State the latter clause of the baraita: But if he heard it and ratified it; or he heard it, and was silent, and died on the following day, then the father cannot nullify the vow. But according to this clause, if you say that divorce is like ratification, let the tanna of the baraita also teach: And if he heard the vow and divorced her. Rather, from the fact that the baraita does not teach this, learn from the baraita that divorce is like silence.

讗诇讗 诪讛讗 诇讬讻讗 诇诪砖诪注 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬 专讬砖讗 讚讜拽讗 谞住讬讘 住讬驻讗 诪砖讜诐 专讬砖讗 讗讬 住讬驻讗 讚讜拽讗 谞住讬讘 专讬砖讗 诪砖讜诐 住讬驻讗

Rather, one cannot learn anything from this baraita about the effect of divorce on her vows. The Gemara explains that the discrepancy between the two clauses is stylistic and can be explained either way: If the cases in the first clause are chosen precisely, allowing for the inference that divorce is like ratification, then one must say that the tanna formulates the last clause of the baraita as he does because of the first clause, i.e., in the same style, although it does not add anything. If the cases in the last clause are chosen precisely, allowing for the inference that divorce is like silence, then one must say that the tanna formulates the first clause of the baraita as he does because of the last clause, i.e., in the same style, although it does not add anything.

转讗 砖诪注 谞讚专讛 讜讛讬讗 讗专讜住讛 讜谞转讙专砖讛 讜谞转讗专住讛 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗讛 讗讘讬讛 讜讘注诇讛 讛讗讞专讜谉 诪驻讬专讬谉 谞讚专讬讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻砖转讬拽讛 讚诪讜 讚讗讬 讻讛拽诪讛 讚诪讜 诪讬 诪爪讬 诪讬驻专 讗专讜住 讗讞专讜谉 谞讬讚专讬 讚讗讜拽讬诐 讗专讜住 专讗砖讜谉

Come and hear a mishna (71a): If she took a vow while she was betrothed, and was divorced, and was betrothed again on the same day, even to one hundred men, her father and her final husband nullify her vows. Learn from this mishna that divorce is like silence, because if it were like ratification, could the final betrothed nullify vows that the first betrothed had already ratified?

讛讻讗 讘诪讗讬 注住拽讬谞谉 讘砖诇讗 砖诪注 讗专讜住 专讗砖讜谉 讗讬 讛讻讬 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗讞专 诪讗讛 讬诪讬诐 谞诪讬

The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case in which the first betrothed man did not hear the vow, and for that reason his divorcing her does not constitute ratification. The Gemara then asks: If so, why mention specifically that the divorce occurred on that day? The same would hold true even after one hundred days as well. Since the first husband never heard the vow, the final husband can nullify it on whichever day he hears it.

讻砖诇讗 砖诪注 讗专讜住 讜砖诪注 讛讗讘 讚讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讛讜讗 讚诪爪讬 诪讬驻专 讗讘诇 诪讻讗谉 讜讗讬诇讱 诇讗 诪爪讬 诪讬驻专

The Gemara answers: It is referring to a situation in which the betrothed man did not hear the vow but the father heard it. As in that case, it is only on the same day that he can nullify the vow, but he cannot nullify it from this point forward. Once her father has already heard the vow, her betrothed cannot nullify it on a different day. Therefore, one cannot infer from the mishna that divorce is like silence.

转讗 砖诪注 谞讚专讛 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讙讬专砖讛 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讻讛拽诪讛 讚诪讜

Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a mishna (89a): If she took a vow on that day, and he divorced her and remarried her on the same day, he cannot nullify her vow. Learn from the mishna that divorce is like ratification.

讗诪专讬 讛讻讗 讘谞砖讜讗讛 注住拽讬谞谉 讜讛讬讬谞讜 讟注诪讗 讚讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 诪讬驻专 讘拽讜讚诪讬谉

The Gemara rejects this proof: Say that here, i.e., in the mishna cited, we are dealing with a married woman, and that is the reason that he cannot nullify the vow. It is not because it has been ratified by divorce but because the husband cannot nullify his wife鈥檚 vows that precede their marriage. The dilemma remains unresolved.

诪转谞讬壮 讚专讱 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 注讚 砖诇讗 讛讬转讛 讘转讜 讬讜爪讗讛 诪讗爪诇讜 讗讜诪专 诇讛 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖谞讚专转 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讬 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 讜讻谉 讛讘注诇 注讚 砖诇讗 转讻谞住 诇专砖讜转讜 讗讜诪专 诇讛 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖谞讚专转 注讚 砖诇讗 转讻谞住讬 诇专砖讜转讬 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 砖诪砖转讻谞住 诇专砖讜转讜 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讛驻专

MISHNA: The practice of Torah scholars is to ensure that a woman about to be married should not be encumbered by any vows. A father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This was necessary because once she enters his jurisdiction he cannot nullify the vows she made before that.

讙诪壮 讘注讬 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 讘注诇 诪讛讜 砖讬驻专 讘诇讗 砖诪讬注讛 讜砖诪注 讗讬砖讛 讚讜拽讗 讛讜讗 讗讜 诇讗讜 讚讜拽讗 讛讜讗

gemara Rami bar 岣ma asks: Concerning a husband, what is the halakha with regard to his nullifying a vow without hearing it? In other words, can a husband state a general nullification of his wife鈥檚 vows without being aware of any particular vow? When the verse states: 鈥淎nd her husband hears it, on the day that he hears it, and holds his peace at her, then her vows shall be ratified鈥 (Numbers 30:8), is that referring specifically to a situation where he actually heard of a vow, and only then he can nullify it? Or is it not specifically referring to such a situation, and the mention of hearing is merely because the ordinary situation is that the husband nullifies a vow once he hears it?

讗诪专 专讘讗 转讗 砖诪注 讚专讱 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 注讚 砖诇讗 讬爪讗转 讘转讜 诪讗爪诇讜 讗讜诪专 诇讛 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖谞讚专转 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讬 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 讜讛讗 诇讗 砖诪注

Rava said: Come and hear the mishna: The practice of Torah scholars is that a father, before his daughter would leave him through marriage, would say to her: All vows that you vowed in my house are hereby nullified. Rava points out: But the father did not hear her vows, so it must be that one can nullify vows without knowledge that they were actually made.

诇讻讬 砖诪注 讛讜讗 讚诪讬驻专 讗诐 讻谉 讻讬 诇讗 砖诪注 诇诪讛 诇讬讛 诇诪讬诪专 讛讗 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讗讜专讞讬讛 讚爪讜专讘讗 诪专讘谞谉 诇讛讚讜专讬

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: The mishna means that the father states a preemptive nullification that when he will hear a particular vow is when he nullifies it. The vow is not actually nullified until he hears it. The Gemara asks: If so, when he has not actually heard those vows yet, why is it necessary for him to state preemptively that the vows will be nullified; why not wait until he actually hears the vow? The Gemara answers: This teaches us that it is the practice of a Torah scholar to pursue such matters, in order to prompt his daughter or his betrothed to inform him of vows she took, which will then be nullified when he hears of them.

转讗 砖诪注 诪住讬驻讗 讜讻谉 讛讘注诇 注讚 砖诇讗 转讻谞住 诇专砖讜转讜 讗讜诪专 诇讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚讗诪专 诇讛 诇讻讬 砖诪注谞讗

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear from the latter clause of the mishna: And similarly, the husband, before she would enter his jurisdiction, i.e., while they were still betrothed, would say to her: All vows that you vowed before you entered my jurisdiction are hereby nullified. This implies that he can nullify vows without hearing them. The Gemara responds: Here too, it means that he says to her: When I hear the particular vow, then it will be nullified.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖转讜 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖转讚讜专讬 注讚 砖讗讘讗 诪诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬 讛谉 拽讬讬诪讬谉 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐 讛专讬 讛谉 诪讜驻专讬谉 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪讜驻专 讜讛讗 诇讗 砖诪注

Come and hear another mishna to answer the question (Nedarim 75a): One who says to his wife: All vows that you vow until I arrive from such and such a place are hereby ratified, has not said anything, i.e., the vows are not ratified. If he says: All vows that you vow until then are hereby nullified, Rabbi Eliezer says: They are nullified. The Gemara comments: But he did not actually hear the particular vows, so one can infer from this that he need not hear her vows in order to nullify them.

讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讚讗诪专 诇讻讬 砖诪注谞讗 讜诇诪讛 诇讬 诪谉 讛砖转讗 诇讻讬 砖诪注 诇讬驻专 诇讛 拽住讘专 讚诇诪讗 诪讟专讬讚谞讗 讛讛讬讗 砖注转讗

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Here too, one can understand the situation to be that he says: When I hear the particular vow, it will be nullified. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need, i.e., why must the husband state his nullification, from now; let him nullify them for her when he actually hears them. The Gemara answers: He reasons: Perhaps I will be preoccupied at that moment and will forget to nullify them. He therefore nullifies the vows beforehand, so that the nullification will take effect automatically when he hears them.

转讗 砖诪注 讛讗讜诪专 诇讗驻讜讟专讜驻讜住 讻诇 谞讚专讬诐 砖谞讜讚专转 讗砖转讬 诪讻讗谉 讜注讚 砖讗讘讗 诪诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 讛驻专 讜讛驻专 诇讛 讬讻讜诇 讬讛讜 诪讜驻专讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛

Come and hear a baraita: In the case of one who says to a steward [apotropos] appointed to manage his affairs in his absence: All vows that my wife vows from now until I arrive from such and such a place you should nullify, and the steward nullified the vows for her, one might have thought that they would be nullified. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淗er husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14). The repetition of 鈥渉er husband鈥 teaches that it is the husband alone who may nullify his wife鈥檚 vows; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 讬讜谞转谉 诪爪讬谞讜 讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜

Rabbi Yonatan said to him: We have found everywhere in the Torah that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself. Therefore, a steward can nullify the vows on the husband鈥檚 behalf.

讜讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 讬讗砖讬讛 诇讗 拽讗诪专 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讙讝讬专转 讛讻转讜讘 讛讜讗 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讗讘诇 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 砖诇讜讞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讜 讜讛讗 诇讗 砖诪讬注 诇讬讛

The Gemara points out: And even Rabbi Yoshiya says that a steward cannot nullify the wife鈥檚 vows only because it is a Torah edict, based upon the words 鈥渉er husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14). But according to everyone, the principle that the legal status of a person鈥檚 agent is like that of himself is generally valid. The only objection to the steward nullifying the vows is the Torah edict. The Gemara asks: But these vows were not heard by the steward? This indicates that not having heard the vows is not an obstacle to nullification.

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