Nedarim 79

שהשתיקה מקיימת ואין שתיקה מבטלת קיים בלבו קיים הפר בלבו אינו מופר קיים אין יכול להפר הפר אין יכול לקיים קתני שהשתיקה מקיימת מאי לאו בשותק על מנת למיקט

that silence ratifies a vow, but silence does not cancel, i.e., nullify, a vow. If the husband ratified a vow in his heart, it is ratified, but if he nullified it in his heart, it is not nullified. The baraita adds: If he ratified a vow he can no longer nullify it; and similarly, if he nullified a vow he can no longer ratify it. In any case, the baraita teaches that silence ratifies a vow. What, is it not referring even to one who is silent in order to annoy his wife?

לא בשותק על מנת לקיים היינו קיים בלבו קיים אלא בשותק סתם

The Gemara rejects this interpretation: No, it is referring to one who is silent in order to sustain the vow. The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as: If the husband ratified a vow in his heart, it is ratified. Rather, the phrase in the baraita: Silence ratifies a vow, is referring to a case where the husband is silent without specifying his intent.

אשכחן חומר בהקם מבהפר בהפר מבהקם מנא לן אמר רבי יוחנן נשאלין על ההקם ואין נשאלין על ההפר

Relating to the baraita, the Gemara asks: We found how the halakha is more stringent in ratification of vows than in nullification of vows, but where do we find a case in which the halakha is more stringent in nullification than in ratification? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One can request from a halakhic authority dissolution of the ratification of a vow his wife took, but one cannot request dissolution of the nullification of a vow.

מתיב רב כהנא ואם החרש יחריש לה אישה וגו׳ בשותק על מנת למיקט הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בשותק על מנת למיקט או אינו אלא בשותק על מנת לקיים

Rav Kahana raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina that a husband who is silent about his wife’s vow in order to annoy her can nullify it even several days later. A baraita teaches: “But if her husband altogether hold his peace at her from day to day, then he causes all her vows to be ratified” (Numbers 30:15). The verse is speaking of one who is silent in order to annoy his wife. Do you say that the verse is referring to one who is silent in order to annoy her, or it is referring only to one who is silent in order to ratify the vow?

כשהוא אומר כי החרש לה הרי בשותק על מנת לקיים הכתוב מדבר הא מה אני מקיים אם החרש יחריש לה אישה בשותק על מנת למיקט הכתוב מדבר תיובתא

The baraita continues: When it says, in the continuation of the same verse: “He has ratified them, because he held his peace at her on the day that he heard them” (Numbers 30:15), the verse is speaking of one who is silent in order to ratify the vow. How do I realize the meaning of: “If her husband altogether holds his peace at her”? It must be that the verse is speaking of one who is silent in order to annoy his wife, and that this is also considered an act of ratification. This baraita is a conclusive refutation [teyuveta] of Rabbi Ḥanina’s opinion.

ולוקים הא בשותק על מנת לקיים הא בשותק סתם קראי יתירי כתיבי

The Gemara asks about this baraita: And let the tanna interpret this part of the verse as referring to one who is silent in order to ratify the vow, and that part of the same verse as referring to one who was silent without specifying his intent, as the Gemara suggests above in explanation of the baraita? The Gemara answers: Superfluous verses are written about silence, leading to the conclusion that whatever the reason for the husband’s silence, the vow is ratified.

מתיב רבא נדרה עם חשכה מפר לה עד שלא חשכה שאם לא הפר וחשכה אינו יכול להפר אמאי להוי כשותק על מנת למיקט תיובתא

Rava raised a further objection to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, from a mishna (76b): If she took a vow on Friday with nightfall approaching, her father or husband can nullify the vow only until nightfall, since, if it became dark and he had not yet nullified her vow, he cannot nullify it anymore. Why should this be so? Let the fact that the husband refrained from nullifying the vow out of respect for Shabbat be regarded like one who is silent in order to annoy his wife, who, according to Rav Huna, can still nullify the vow later. The fact that this is not the case is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina.

מתיב רב אשי יודע אני שיש נדרים אבל איני יודע שיש מפירין יפר יודע אני שיש מפירין אבל איני יודע שזה נדר רבי מאיר אומר לא יפר וחכמים אומרים יפר

Rav Ashi also raised an objection to Rabbi Ḥanina’s opinion, from another mishna (87b): If a husband or father said, after failing to nullify a vow on the day he heard it: I know that there are vows, but I do not know that there are those who can nullify vows, i.e., he was unaware that he can nullify a vow, he can nullify it even after the day he heard it. However, if he said: I know there are those who nullify, but I refrained from nullifying the vow because I do not know that this is considered a vow that I could nullify, Rabbi Meir says: He cannot nullify at this point, but the Rabbis say: Even in this case he can nullify the vow when he discovers his error.

ואמאי ליהוי כשותק על מנת למיקט תיובתא

Rav Ashi asks rhetorically: But why may he not nullify according to Rabbi Meir’s opinion? Let his silence by mistake be like that of one who is silent in order to annoy, who, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, can nullify the vow at a later stage. This is a conclusive refutation of Rabbi Ḥanina’s opinion.

הדרן עלך נערה המאורסה

ואלו נדרים שהוא מפר דברים שיש בהן ענוי נפש אם ארחץ ואם לא ארחץ אם אתקשט ואם לא אתקשט

MISHNA: And these are the vows that he, the husband or father, can nullify: The first category consists of matters that involve affliction for the woman who took the vow. For example, if a woman vowed: If I bathe, or: If I do not bathe; if she vowed: If I adorn myself [etkashet], or: If I do not adorn myself.

אמר רבי יוסי אין אלו נדרי ענוי נפש ואלו הן נדרי ענוי נפש אמרה קונם פירות העולם עלי הרי זה יכול להפר פירות מדינה זו עלי יביא לה ממדינה אחרת פירות חנווני זה עלי אינו יכול להפר ואם לא היתה פרנסתו אלא ממנו הרי זה יפר דברי רבי יוסי

Rabbi Yosei said: These are not vows of affliction. Rather, these are vows of affliction: For example, if she said: The produce of the entire world is konam for me as if it were an offering, he can nullify the vow, as it certainly involves affliction. If, however, she said: The produce of this country is konam for me, he cannot nullify the vow, as it does not involve affliction, since he may still bring her produce from another country. Similarly, if she said: The produce of this storekeeper is konam for me, he cannot nullify her vow, as he may still bring her produce from another storekeeper. But if he can obtain his sustenance only from him, that particular storekeeper, he can nullify the vow. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

גמ׳ נדרי ענוי נפש הוא דמפר שאין בהן ענוי נפש אינו מפר והא תניא בין איש לאשתו בין אב לבתו מלמד שהבעל מפר נדרים שבינו לבינה

GEMARA: The Gemara raises a question with regard to the ruling of the mishna: Is it only vows of affliction that he can nullify, whereas vows that do not involve affliction he cannot nullify? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse “These are the statutes that the Lord commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter” (Numbers 30:17) teaches that a husband can nullify any of his wife’s vows that adversely affect the relationship between him and her, even if they do not involve affliction?

אמרי הלין והלין מפר מיהו ענוי נפש מפר לעולם אבל אין בהן ענוי נפש כדאיתה תחותיה הויא הפרה מכי מגרש לה חייל עלה נדרה בדברים שבינו לבינה שאין בהן ענוי נפש אבל יש בהן ענוי נפש לא חייל עליה נדרה

The Sages say in response: In fact, he can nullify both these and those. There is, however, a difference between them. When he nullifies vows of affliction, he nullifies them forever, i.e., the vows remain nullified even if they subsequently divorce. But when he nullifies vows that do not involve affliction but merely impact upon their relationship, then, while they are married and she is under his authority it is an effective nullification, but when he divorces her, her vow takes effect upon her, i.e., his nullification is no longer effective. As stated, this is referring to vows concerning matters that adversely affect the relationship between him and her, that do not involve affliction. However, if he nullifies a vow that affects their relationship and also involves affliction, her vow does not take effect upon her even after she leaves her husband’s authority.

ודברים שאין בהן ענוי נפש כי מגרש לה חיילא עלה והא תנן רבי יוחנן בן נורי אומר יפר שמא יגרשנה ותהא אסורה לו אלמא כי מגרש לה ומפר לה מעיקרא הויא הפרה

The Gemara asks: And as for vows concerning matters that do not involve affliction, when a man divorces his wife, do they really take effect upon her? But didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to a woman who prohibited her handiwork to her husband by way of a vow (85a) that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: Even though the vow is presently invalid, as a woman cannot render forbidden to her husband that to which he is already entitled, he should nevertheless nullify the vow? This is because perhaps he will one day divorce her, at which point the vow will take effect and she will then be forbidden to him, since he will be unable to remarry her lest he come to benefit from her handiwork. Apparently, however, if he divorces her after having nullified her vow from the outset, before their divorce, it is a permanent nullification, and although the vow does not involve affliction it remains nullified after their divorce.

אמרי הלין והלין הויא הפרה אלא נדרי ענוי נפש מפר בין לעצמו ובין לאחרים אין בהן ענוי נפש לעצמו מפר לאחרים אינו מפר והכי קתני אלו נדרים שהוא מפר בין לעצמו ובין לאחרים נדרים שיש בהן ענוי נפש

Consequently, the Sages say a different answer: With regard to both these and those, vows of affliction and vows adversely affecting the relationship between them, when the husband nullifies the vow, it is a permanent nullification. Rather, the difference between them is as follows: Vows of affliction he can fully nullify, both with respect to himself and with respect to others, i.e., the vow remains nullified even if he divorces her and she marries another man. Whereas vows that do not involve affliction but still adversely affect the relationship between him and her he can permanently nullify with respect to himself, but he cannot nullify with respect to others; if she marries another man, the vow takes effect. And according to this explanation, this is what the mishna is teaching: These are the vows that he can nullify both for himself and for others: Vows that involve affliction.

אם ארחץ היכי קאמר אילימא דאמרה קונם פירות עולם עלי אם ארחץ למה לה הפרה לא תרחץ ולא ליתסרן פירות עולם אלו עלה

§ The mishna teaches that, according to the first tanna, a woman’s vow: If I bathe, falls into the category of vows of affliction, whereas Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says that this is not a vow of affliction. The Gemara asks: As the phrase: If I bathe, is not the main substance of the vow, but rather the woman wishes to prohibit herself from deriving a certain benefit depending on whether or not she bathes, with regard to what case is the mishna speaking? If we say that she said: The produce of the world is konam for me if I bathe, why, according to the first tanna, does she need nullification at all to prevent her affliction? Let her not bathe and this produce of the world will not be forbidden to her.

ועוד בהא לימא רבי יוסי אין אלו נדרי ענוי נפש דלמא רחצה ואיתסרו פירות עולם עלה

And furthermore, this explanation is problematic for a different reason: With regard to a vow of this type, would Rabbi Yosei say that these are not vows of affliction? There is certainly room for concern that perhaps she will bathe and the produce of the world will be forbidden to her, a situation that certainly entails deprivation.