Nedarim 83

הרי זו סופגת את הארבעים הפר לה בעלה והיא לא ידעה שהפר לה והיתה שותה יין ומיטמאה למתים אינה סופגת את הארבעים

she incurs [sofeget] the forty lashes, the penalty for one who transgresses a Torah prohibition, as she violated the terms of her nazirite vow. If her husband nullified the vow for her, but she did not know that he nullified it for her, and she drank wine or became impure through contact with the dead, she does not incur the forty lashes. She did not commit a transgression, as her nazirite vow was nullified.

ואי אמרת מפר למתענה ואין מפר לשאין מתענה דלמא מן יין דאית לה צערא הפר לה מן חרצן ומן זג לא הפר לה דהא לא אית לה צערא ותספוג את הארבעים

And if you say that the husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself, the same reasoning should apply to a nazirite vow: Perhaps the husband nullified for her the vow that rendered wine forbidden to her, as she suffers pain when she refrains from drinking it. But as for her vow that rendered grape seeds and grape skins forbidden to her, he did not nullify it for her, as she suffers no pain when she abstains from them. And since even grape seeds and grape skins are forbidden to a nazirite, if the woman ate of them, she should receive the forty lashes, even if her husband nullified her vow.

אמר רב יוסף אין נזירות לחצאין

Rav Yosef said: Here it is different, as naziriteship cannot take effect partially. Since one cannot be a nazirite and accept only some of the prohibitions of naziriteship, the husband’s nullification cancels the entire vow. In the case of an ordinary vow, on the other hand, the husband can nullify only the part that causes his wife suffering.

אמר ליה אביי הא קרבן לחצי נזירות איכא אלא אמר אביי אין נזירות לחצאין ואין קרבן לחצאין

Abaye said to him: The wording of your statement suggests that naziriteship cannot take effect partially, but that an offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship. Rather, Abaye said that one should say as follows: Naziriteship cannot take effect partially, and no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship.

מיתיבי האשה שנדרה בנזיר והפרישה בהמתה ואחר כך הפר לה בעלה מביאה חטאת העוף ואינה מביאה עולת העוף ואי אמרת אין קרבן לחצי נזירות אמאי מביאה חטאת העוף

The Gemara raises an objection from the following statement: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and she designated her animal for her nazirite offering, and afterward her husband nullified her vow for her, she must bring a bird sin-offering but she does not bring a bird burnt-offering. And if you say that no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship, why must she bring a bird sin-offering?

ואלא מאי יש קרבן לחצי נזירות שלש בהמות בעי לאתויי חטאת עולה ושלמים אלא לעולם אין קרבן לחצי נזירות וחטאת העוף דמתיא משום דחטאת על הספק

The Gemara rejects this argument: But rather, what will you say? That an offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship? If so, she should be required to bring three animals as offerings, a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and a peace-offering, in accordance with the halakha governing a nazirite who has completed the period of his vow. Rather, say as follows: Actually, no offering is brought for partial observance of naziriteship, and as for the bird sin-offering that she must bring, this is because a bird sin-offering can be brought in a case of uncertainty. She must therefore bring a sin-offering for the partial naziriteship that she observed.

איתיביה האשה שנדרה בנזיר ונטמאת ואחר כך הפר לה בעלה מביאה חטאת העוף ואין מביאה עולת העוף ואי אמרת מפר למתענה ואין מפר לשאין מתענה

Rav Asi raised an objection against the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the following baraita: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and she became ritually impure through contact with the dead, and afterward her husband nullified her vow for her, she must bring a bird sin-offering but does not bring a bird burnt-offering. And if you say that the husband can nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would cause her to deprive herself, but he cannot nullify the vow with regard to the loaf that would not cause her to deprive herself, the same reasoning should apply here:

דלמא מיין דאית לה צערא הפר לה מטומאת מת דלית לה צערא לא הפר לה

Perhaps the husband nullified for her the vow that rendered wine forbidden to her, as she suffers pain when she refrains from drinking it. But as for her vow that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her, he did not nullify it for her, as she suffers no pain by not becoming impure through contact with the dead. Why, then, does she not bring the offerings that must be brought by a nazirite who became ritually impure through contact with the dead? This implies that since the husband can nullify a vow with regard to a matter that would cause her to deprive herself, he can also nullify a vow with regard to a matter that would not cause her to deprive herself.

אמרי מטומאת מת נמי אית לה צערא דכתיב והחי יתן אל לבו ותניא היה רבי מאיר אומר מאי דכתיב והחי יתן אל לבו דיספוד יספדון ליה דיבכון יבכון ליה דיקבר יקברוניה

The Gemara rejects this argument: The Sages say in response that a woman who vows that impurity imparted by the dead is forbidden to her also suffers pain as a result. How so? As it is written: “And the living shall lay it to his heart” (Ecclesiastes 7:2), and it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And the living shall lay it to his heart”? This means that one who eulogizes others when they die will in turn be eulogized when he himself dies; one who weeps for others will be wept for when he himself passes away; and one who buries others will himself be buried upon his passing. A woman who cannot participate in the funerals of others because she is barred from contracting impurity through contact with a corpse is distressed by the thought that she will receive similar treatment when she dies. Therefore, her vow involves affliction and can be nullified by her husband. The conclusion is that this case does not present a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan.

מתני׳ קונם שאני נהנה לבריות אינו יכול להפר ויכולה היא ליהנות בלקט שכחה ובפאה

MISHNA: If a woman vowed: The property of other people is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, her husband cannot nullify her vow, but nevertheless, if she is poor, she may benefit from the agricultural gifts that must be left for the poor: Gleanings, i.e., isolated stalks that fell during the harvest; forgotten sheaves; and produce of the corners [pe’a] of the field that the owner is obligated to leave for the poor. Enjoyment of these gifts is not considered as benefit derived from people, as these gifts are not given voluntarily out of the kindness of the donors, but in the performance of a mitzva.

קונם כהנים לוים נהנים לי יטלו על כרחו כהנים אלו ולוים אלו נהנים לי יטלו אחרים

If one said: I will not let priests and Levites benefit from me, as that is konam for me, they can take the priestly and Levitical gifts from him against his will. If, however, he said: I will not let these specific priests and these specific Levites benefit from me, as that is konam for me, they are taken by others.

גמ׳ אלמא אפשר דמתזנה מדיליה מכלל דבעל לאו בכלל בריות הוא אימא סיפא יכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה אבל מדבעל לא אכלה אלמא בעל בכלל בריות הוא

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a woman vowed not to derive benefit from people, her husband cannot nullify her vow. The Gemara infers from this halakha: Apparently, this is because the woman can be sustained from his, i.e., her husband’s, property, without having to take from others. This proves by inference that in this context a husband is not included in her reference to people, as, although she mentioned people in her vow, she did not mean to prohibit herself from deriving benefit from her husband. The Gemara asks: But say the latter clause of that same part of the mishna, which states: But she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a. This implies that she may derive benefit from the gifts given to the poor, but she may not eat from property belonging to her husband. Apparently, a husband is in fact included in her reference to people, and she may not benefit from him either.

אמר עולא לעולם לאו בכלל בריות הוא ועוד אין יכול להפר מפני שיכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה

Ulla said: Actually, a husband is not included in her reference to people, and there is no contradiction. Rather, the mishna provides two reasons why he cannot nullify his wife’s vow. The first reason, which is merely implied by the mishna, is that she can be sustained by her husband. And furthermore there is the stated reason, that he cannot nullify the vow because she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.

רבא אמר לעולם בעל בכלל בריות הוא ומה טעם קאמר מה טעם אין יכול להפר מפני שיכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה

Rava said the opposite: Actually, a husband is included in her reference to people, and therefore his wife may not benefit from him. And when the mishna states the halakha, it employs the style known as: What is the reason, and it should be understood as follows: What is the reason that the husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow? Because she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.

רב נחמן אמר לעולם בעל לאו בכלל בריות הוא והכי קתני נתגרשה יכולה ליהנות בלקט שכחה ופאה

Rav Naḥman said: Actually, a husband is not included in her reference to people, and her vow not to derive benefit from all people does not include him, which is why he cannot nullify it. And this is what the mishna is teaching: The husband cannot nullify his wife’s vow, because even if she becomes divorced and can no longer derive benefit from her husband, as he is now included in her reference to people, she may still benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and pe’a.