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Today's Daf Yomi

January 19, 2023 | 讻状讜 讘讟讘转 转砖驻状讙

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

Nedarim 86

Today鈥檚 daf is sponsored by Sharon Mink in honor of the 40th anniversary of their Aliya.

Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua answered the contradiction in Shmuel’s rulings by explaining that Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri’s position is not a case where the woman is forbidding something that is not yet in the world as her vow refers to her hands and what they can create, and her hands are in this world. However, the Gemara points out that she is still referring to what her hands will create at a potential future point if and when she gets divorced and therefore it still should be considered something that is not yet in this world. In order to answer this question, several different rabbis suggest making comparisons to other cases. Each rejects the comparison of the previous one and suggests an alternative. In the end, all the comparisons are rejected as a woman getting divorced is not something that is clear will happen and not something in the woman’s control. Rav Ashi suggests a different answer. Although the woman does not own her produce fully, she has the right to forbid it as Rava said that three things can remove a lien that is on one’s possessions: sanctifying it (which is similar to forbidding something by a vow), chametz on Pesach and freeing a slave. Even if one were to say the rabbi’s strengthened the husband’s rights to be more like a buyer’s still the vow will take effect if and when he divorces her. If a man nullified his wife’s/daughter’s vow but was under a misimpression such as, he thought it was his wife who vowed, but it was in fact his daughter, or he thought she vowed to be a nazir but she vowed something else or he thought she vowed not to eat a certain type of food, but it was a different type, when he realizes his mistake, he needs to nullify the vow again.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讬诇讗 讜诪讛 讗讬诇讜 讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 诪诪讱 转拽讚讬砖 诪讬 诇讗 拽讚砖讛

Rabbi Ila said: And what is the halakha if one person says to another before selling him a field: This field that I am selling to you now, when I will buy it back from you, let it be consecrated? Is the field not consecrated when it is repurchased? In similar fashion, a woman can consecrate her future handiwork, even though the sanctity cannot presently take effect.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讬 讚诪讬 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 讛砖转讗 讘讬讚讬讛 讛讬讗 讗砖讛 讘讬讚讛 诇讛拽讚讬砖 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪讻专转讬 诇讱 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 诪诪讱 转拽讚讬砖 诪讬 拽讚砖讛

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this comparison: Are the two cases comparable? When a person says: Let this field that I am selling to you now be consecrated when I buy it back from you, now at least the field is still in his possession, and he can therefore consecrate it now, stipulating that the consecration should take effect only when it returns to his ownership. As for the woman, however, is it currently in her power to consecrate her handiwork? At present it does not belong to her. This case is comparable only to that of one who said to another: With regard to this field that I sold to you in the past, when I will buy it back from you, let it be consecrated. In such a case, is the field consecrated when it is repurchased?

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诪讬 讚诪讬 讙讘讬 讝讘讬谞讗 驻住讬拽讗 诪讬诇转讬讬讛讜 讙讘讬 讗砖讛 诪讬 驻住讬拽讗 诪讬诇转讗 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪砖讻谞转讬 诇讱 诇讻砖讗驻讚谞讛 诪诪讱 转拽讚讬砖 诪讬 诇讗 拽讚砖讛

Rav Pappa objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? In the case of the sale of a field, the matter is clear-cut, i.e., it is evident that the field belongs absolutely to its new owner, the buyer. In contrast, in the case of a woman, is the matter clear-cut? Even though the husband has rights to his wife鈥檚 handiwork, he does not own her body. Therefore, this case of a woman is comparable only to that of one person who said to another: With regard to this field that I pledged to you, when I will redeem it back from you, let it be consecrated. Here, the owner retains possession of the field itself, but another person enjoys the right to its fruit. In this case, is the field not consecrated when it is redeemed? Here too, a woman retains ownership of her body and she can consecrate her handiwork, stipulating that the consecration should take effect only after she is divorced.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖讬砖讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬讚讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 砖讚讛 讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讜 讗砖讛 讘讬讚讛 诇讛转讙专砖 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪砖讻谞转讬 诇讱 诇注砖专 砖谞讬诐 诇讻砖讗驻讚谞讛 诪诪讱 转拽讚讬砖 诪讬 诇讗 拽讚砖讛

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? In the case of a field, it is in the owner鈥檚 power to redeem it immediately by repaying his debt. But as for a woman, is it in her power to be divorced whenever she chooses? Therefore, this case is comparable only to that of one who said to another: With regard to this field that I pledged to you for ten years, when I will redeem it from you, let it be consecrated. In such a case, even though the owner cannot redeem the field for ten years, is it not consecrated once it is redeemed?

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 拽讬抓 讗砖讛 诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 拽讬爪讜转讗

Rav Ashi objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? There, in the case of a field, there is a fixed time frame of ten years. But in the case of a woman, is there a fixed time limit, so that she can know in advance when she will be divorced and released from her husband鈥檚 jurisdiction?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 砖讗谞讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 讚讻讬 拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜讻讚专讘讗

Rather, Rav Ashi said that this is the reason Shmuel ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri: Although a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, konamot are different. They are stringent and take effect in all cases, as their prohibited status is considered akin to inherent sanctity. When one person prohibits another from deriving benefit from a particular item by means of a konam, the forbidden item is treated as if it has inherent sanctity. It cannot be redeemed and can never become permitted. Because of its severity, a woman can forbid her handiwork to her husband by means of a konam, even though she is obligated to hand over the fruits of her labor to him. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rava.

讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛拽讚砖 讞诪抓 讜砖讞专讜专 诪驻拽讬注讬谉 诪讬讚讬 砖注讘讜讚

As Rava said: Consecration of an item to the Temple, becoming subject to the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and the emancipation of a slave abrogate any lien that exists upon them. The lien on that property does not prevent the consecration, the prohibition of leavened bread, or the emancipation of the slave from taking effect. In all three cases, the debtor loses his ownership of the liened property. The same halakha applies to a konam, whose prohibition has the severity of inherent sanctity. Even though the husband has a right to his wife鈥檚 handiwork, which could be described as a lien on her hands, that lien is abrogated when she renders her handiwork forbidden to him by means of a konam, and therefore the vow must be nullified.

讗讬 讛讻讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖诪讗 讬讙专砖谞讛 转谞讬 讜注讜讚 砖诪讗 讬讙专砖谞讛

The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri鈥檚 stated reason: Perhaps he will one day divorce her? If the woman鈥檚 konam abrogates the husband鈥檚 lien, the prohibition should take effect immediately. The Gemara answers: Teach that the vow takes effect right away, which is why the husband must nullify it. And furthermore, adds Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, even if you maintain that the Sages strengthened a husband鈥檚 lien so that the vow does not take effect immediately, there is another reason to nullify the vow, as perhaps he will one day divorce her.

诪转谞讬壮 谞讚专讛 讗砖转讜 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 讘转讜 谞讚专讛 讘转讜 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 讗砖转讜 谞讚专讛 讘谞讝讬专 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 讘拽专讘谉 谞讚专讛 讘拽专讘谉 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 讘谞讝讬专 谞讚专讛 诪转讗谞讬诐 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 诪谉 讛注谞讘讬诐 谞讚专讛 诪谉 讛注谞讘讬诐 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 诪谉 讛转讗谞讬诐 讛专讬 讝讛 讬讞讝讜专 讜讬驻专

MISHNA: If a man鈥檚 wife took a vow and he thought that it was his daughter who had taken a vow, or if his daughter took a vow and he thought that it was his wife who had taken a vow, or if his wife vowed to be a nazirite and he thought that she had vowed to bring an offering, or if she vowed to bring an offering and he thought that she had vowed to be a nazirite, or if she took a vow that figs are forbidden to her and he thought that she had taken a vow that grapes are forbidden to her, or if she took a vow that grapes are forbidden to her and he thought that she had taken a vow that figs are forbidden to her, and he nullified any of these vows, in each case, when he realizes his error with regard to the vow, he must repeat the action and nullify the vow a second time.

讙诪壮 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讬谞讬讗 讗讜转讛 讚讜拽讗 讛讜讗

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna鈥檚 ruling that if a man鈥檚 wife took a vow, but he thought that it was his daughter who had taken the vow and he nullified the vow, he must nullify the vow a second time, the Gemara asks: Is this to say that the phrase 鈥淏ut if her husband disallowed her [otah]鈥 (Numbers 30:9) is precise? In other words, does the use of the word her, otah, indicate that a man can nullify a vow only for the specific woman who took it?

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

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Nedarim 86: Who Owns a Wife’s Body?

In memory and tribute of our teacher Rabbi Moshe Kahn z"l || More on the question of a vow about...

Nedarim 86

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Nedarim 86

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讬诇讗 讜诪讛 讗讬诇讜 讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 诪诪讱 转拽讚讬砖 诪讬 诇讗 拽讚砖讛

Rabbi Ila said: And what is the halakha if one person says to another before selling him a field: This field that I am selling to you now, when I will buy it back from you, let it be consecrated? Is the field not consecrated when it is repurchased? In similar fashion, a woman can consecrate her future handiwork, even though the sanctity cannot presently take effect.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讬 讚诪讬 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖讗谞讬 诪讜讻专 诇讱 讛砖转讗 讘讬讚讬讛 讛讬讗 讗砖讛 讘讬讚讛 诇讛拽讚讬砖 诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪讻专转讬 诇讱 诇讻砖讗拽讞谞讛 诪诪讱 转拽讚讬砖 诪讬 拽讚砖讛

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this comparison: Are the two cases comparable? When a person says: Let this field that I am selling to you now be consecrated when I buy it back from you, now at least the field is still in his possession, and he can therefore consecrate it now, stipulating that the consecration should take effect only when it returns to his ownership. As for the woman, however, is it currently in her power to consecrate her handiwork? At present it does not belong to her. This case is comparable only to that of one who said to another: With regard to this field that I sold to you in the past, when I will buy it back from you, let it be consecrated. In such a case, is the field consecrated when it is repurchased?

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 诪讬 讚诪讬 讙讘讬 讝讘讬谞讗 驻住讬拽讗 诪讬诇转讬讬讛讜 讙讘讬 讗砖讛 诪讬 驻住讬拽讗 诪讬诇转讗 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪砖讻谞转讬 诇讱 诇讻砖讗驻讚谞讛 诪诪讱 转拽讚讬砖 诪讬 诇讗 拽讚砖讛

Rav Pappa objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? In the case of the sale of a field, the matter is clear-cut, i.e., it is evident that the field belongs absolutely to its new owner, the buyer. In contrast, in the case of a woman, is the matter clear-cut? Even though the husband has rights to his wife鈥檚 handiwork, he does not own her body. Therefore, this case of a woman is comparable only to that of one person who said to another: With regard to this field that I pledged to you, when I will redeem it back from you, let it be consecrated. Here, the owner retains possession of the field itself, but another person enjoys the right to its fruit. In this case, is the field not consecrated when it is redeemed? Here too, a woman retains ownership of her body and she can consecrate her handiwork, stipulating that the consecration should take effect only after she is divorced.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 砖讬砖讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬讚讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 砖讚讛 讘讬讚讜 诇驻讚讜转讜 讗砖讛 讘讬讚讛 诇讛转讙专砖 讛讗 诇讗 讚诪讬讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜诪专 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讚讛 讝讜 砖诪砖讻谞转讬 诇讱 诇注砖专 砖谞讬诐 诇讻砖讗驻讚谞讛 诪诪讱 转拽讚讬砖 诪讬 诇讗 拽讚砖讛

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? In the case of a field, it is in the owner鈥檚 power to redeem it immediately by repaying his debt. But as for a woman, is it in her power to be divorced whenever she chooses? Therefore, this case is comparable only to that of one who said to another: With regard to this field that I pledged to you for ten years, when I will redeem it from you, let it be consecrated. In such a case, even though the owner cannot redeem the field for ten years, is it not consecrated once it is redeemed?

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗砖讬 诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 拽讬抓 讗砖讛 诪讬 讗讬转 诇讛 拽讬爪讜转讗

Rav Ashi objects to this comparison: Are the cases comparable? There, in the case of a field, there is a fixed time frame of ten years. But in the case of a woman, is there a fixed time limit, so that she can know in advance when she will be divorced and released from her husband鈥檚 jurisdiction?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 砖讗谞讬 拽讜谞诪讜转 讚讻讬 拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝 讚诪讬 讜讻讚专讘讗

Rather, Rav Ashi said that this is the reason Shmuel ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri: Although a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, konamot are different. They are stringent and take effect in all cases, as their prohibited status is considered akin to inherent sanctity. When one person prohibits another from deriving benefit from a particular item by means of a konam, the forbidden item is treated as if it has inherent sanctity. It cannot be redeemed and can never become permitted. Because of its severity, a woman can forbid her handiwork to her husband by means of a konam, even though she is obligated to hand over the fruits of her labor to him. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rava.

讚讗诪专 专讘讗 讛拽讚砖 讞诪抓 讜砖讞专讜专 诪驻拽讬注讬谉 诪讬讚讬 砖注讘讜讚

As Rava said: Consecration of an item to the Temple, becoming subject to the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and the emancipation of a slave abrogate any lien that exists upon them. The lien on that property does not prevent the consecration, the prohibition of leavened bread, or the emancipation of the slave from taking effect. In all three cases, the debtor loses his ownership of the liened property. The same halakha applies to a konam, whose prohibition has the severity of inherent sanctity. Even though the husband has a right to his wife鈥檚 handiwork, which could be described as a lien on her hands, that lien is abrogated when she renders her handiwork forbidden to him by means of a konam, and therefore the vow must be nullified.

讗讬 讛讻讬 诇诪讛 诇讬 砖诪讗 讬讙专砖谞讛 转谞讬 讜注讜讚 砖诪讗 讬讙专砖谞讛

The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri鈥檚 stated reason: Perhaps he will one day divorce her? If the woman鈥檚 konam abrogates the husband鈥檚 lien, the prohibition should take effect immediately. The Gemara answers: Teach that the vow takes effect right away, which is why the husband must nullify it. And furthermore, adds Rabbi Yo岣nan ben Nuri, even if you maintain that the Sages strengthened a husband鈥檚 lien so that the vow does not take effect immediately, there is another reason to nullify the vow, as perhaps he will one day divorce her.

诪转谞讬壮 谞讚专讛 讗砖转讜 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 讘转讜 谞讚专讛 讘转讜 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 讗砖转讜 谞讚专讛 讘谞讝讬专 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 讘拽专讘谉 谞讚专讛 讘拽专讘谉 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 讘谞讝讬专 谞讚专讛 诪转讗谞讬诐 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 诪谉 讛注谞讘讬诐 谞讚专讛 诪谉 讛注谞讘讬诐 讜住讘讜专 砖谞讚专讛 诪谉 讛转讗谞讬诐 讛专讬 讝讛 讬讞讝讜专 讜讬驻专

MISHNA: If a man鈥檚 wife took a vow and he thought that it was his daughter who had taken a vow, or if his daughter took a vow and he thought that it was his wife who had taken a vow, or if his wife vowed to be a nazirite and he thought that she had vowed to bring an offering, or if she vowed to bring an offering and he thought that she had vowed to be a nazirite, or if she took a vow that figs are forbidden to her and he thought that she had taken a vow that grapes are forbidden to her, or if she took a vow that grapes are forbidden to her and he thought that she had taken a vow that figs are forbidden to her, and he nullified any of these vows, in each case, when he realizes his error with regard to the vow, he must repeat the action and nullify the vow a second time.

讙诪壮 诇诪讬诪专讗 讚讬谞讬讗 讗讜转讛 讚讜拽讗 讛讜讗

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna鈥檚 ruling that if a man鈥檚 wife took a vow, but he thought that it was his daughter who had taken the vow and he nullified the vow, he must nullify the vow a second time, the Gemara asks: Is this to say that the phrase 鈥淏ut if her husband disallowed her [otah]鈥 (Numbers 30:9) is precise? In other words, does the use of the word her, otah, indicate that a man can nullify a vow only for the specific woman who took it?

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