Nedarim 90

ושרקיה טינא ואתייה לקמיה דרב חסדא אמר רבא מאן חכים למיעבד כי הא מילתא אי לאו דרב אחא בר רב הונא דגברא רבה הוא דקסבר דכי היכי דפליגי רבנן ורבי נתן בהפרה הכי נמי פליגי בשאלה

And Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna then smeared him with clay to protect him from the elements, as it was now prohibited for him to benefit from the world by wearing clothes. And he then brought him before Rav Ḥisda, to dissolve his vow. Rava said: Who is wise enough to act in this manner, if not Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna, who is a great man? As he holds that just as the Rabbis and Rabbi Natan disagree with regard to nullification, whether it is possible to nullify a vow that has yet to take effect, so too, they disagree with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, whether it is possible to request dissolution of such a vow. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna’s plan was to have the vow go into effect, so that the man could request that it be dissolved.

ורב פפי אמר מחלוקת בהפרה דרבי נתן סבר אין הבעל מיפר אלא אם כן חל נדר דכתיב וחפרה הלבנה ורבנן סברי בעל מיפר אף על פי שלא חל נדר דכתיב מפר מחשבות ערומים

And Rav Pappi said with regard to this issue: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, as it is written: “And the moon shall be confounded [ḥafera]” (Isaiah 24:23). He employs this phrase as an allusion, interpreting the word ḥafera as if it were hafara, nullification, and concludes from here that only a vow that already exists, like the moon, can be nullified. And the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, as it is written: “He nullifies the thoughts of the crafty” (Job 5:12), implying that nullification pertains even to thoughts, to prevent them from going into effect.

אבל בשאלה דברי הכל אין חכם מתיר כלום אלא אם כן חל נדר דכתיב לא יחל דברו

But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees that a halakhic authority cannot dissolve anything unless the vow has already taken effect, as it is written: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that the person himself who took the vow cannot profane his words and dissolve his vow, but a halakhic authority may do so. This, however, applies only if the vow has already gone into effect, as it says: “His word.”

לימא מסייע ליה קונם שאיני נהנה לפלוני ולמי שאשאל עליו נשאל על הראשון ואחר כך נשאל על השני ואי אמרת נשאל אף על פי שלא חל נדר אי בעי על האי ניתשיל ברישא אי בעי על האי ניתשיל ברישא

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Pappi’s opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, then, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must he request dissolution of his two vows in the above order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.

ומי ידע אי האי קמא אי האי בתרא

The Gemara refutes this argument: And does he know if this vow is first or if that vow is last? The baraita does not specify which vow is first and which is last. Perhaps first and last is referring not to the order in which the two vows were taken, but rather to the order in which they are dissolved, so that if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.

אלא לימא מסייע ליה קונם שאיני נהנה לפלוני הריני נזיר לכשאשאל עליו נשאל על נדרו ואחר כך נשאל על נזרו

Rather, let us say that a different baraita supports Rav Pappi’s opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from a particular person, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow.

ואי אמרת נשאל אף על פי שלא חל נדר אי בעי על נדרו איתשיל ברישא אי בעי על נזרו איתשיל ברישא רבי נתן היא

And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must the two vows be dissolved in that order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is no proof, as it is possible that the baraita is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who maintains that a vow can be nullified only after it has gone into effect. The Rabbis, however, dispute this view.

אמר רבינא אמר לי מרימר הכי אמר אבוך משמיה דרב פפי מחלוקת בהפרה אבל בשאלה דברי הכל מפר ואף על פי שלא חל נדר דכתיב לא יחל דברו

Ravina said: Mareimar said to me: This is what your father said in the name of Rav Pappi: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, whereas the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees, that he can dissolve the vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. As it is written: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which Ravina expounds as follows:

למימרא דלא הוה ביה מעשה

That is to say that there was not yet any action but only speech, and even so the halakhic authority can dissolve the vow.

מיתיבי קונם שאיני נהנה לפלוני ולמי שנשאל עליו נשאל על הראשון ואחר כך נשאל על השני אמאי אי בעי על האי ניתשיל ברישא ואי בעי על האי ניתשיל ברישא

The Gemara raises an objection against this version of the tannaitic dispute from the aforementioned baraita: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. But according to what was stated above, that all agree that a vow can be dissolved even before it has taken effect, why is this so? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.

מי יודע הי ראשון והי שני

The Gemara answers: Does he know which vow is first and which is the second? The wording of the baraita is not at all clear on this point. Perhaps, if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.

מתיבי קונם שאיני נהנה והריני נזיר לכשאשאל עליו נשאל על נדרו ואחר כך נשאל על נזרו ואמאי אי בעי על נדרו ניתשיל ברישא ואי בעי על נזרו ניתשיל ברישא תיובתא

The Gemara raises a further objection from the second baraita cited above: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow that rendered benefit from a particular person forbidden, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow. But why must he proceed in this manner? If he so wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The fact that the baraita does not say this indicates that a vow can be dissolved only once it has gone into effect. The Gemara concludes: Here is a conclusive refutation of this version of the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis.

מתני׳ בראשונה היו אומרים שלש נשים יוצאות ונוטלות כתובה האומרת טמאה אני לך שמים ביני לבינך ונטולה אני מן היהודים

MISHNA: Initially the Sages would say that three women are divorced even against their husbands’ will, and nevertheless they receive payment of what is due to them according to their marriage contract. The first is the wife of a priest who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she claims that she had been raped, so that she is now forbidden to her husband. The second is a woman who says to her husband: Heaven is between me and you, i.e., she declares that he is impotent, a claim she cannot prove, as the truth of it is known only to God. And the third is a woman who takes a vow, stating: I am removed from the Jews, i.e., benefit from sexual intercourse with any Jew, including my husband, is forbidden to me.

חזרו לומר שלא תהא אשה נותנת עיניה באחר ומקלקלת על בעלה האומרת טמאה אני לך תביא ראיה לדבריה השמים ביני לבינך יעשו דרך בקשה ונטולה אני מן היהודים יפר לחלקו ותהא משמשתו ותהא נטולה מן היהודים

They subsequently retracted their words and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and to that end ruin her relationship with her husband and still receive payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified as follows: A priest’s wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring proof for her words that she was raped. As for a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court must act and deal with the matter by way of a request, rather than force the husband to divorce his wife. And with regard to a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the aspect of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may engage in sexual intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her she is forbidden to all.

גמ׳ איבעיא להו אמרה לבעלה טמאה אני מהו שתאכל בתרומה רב ששת אמר אוכלת שלא תוציא לעז על בניה רבא אמר אינה אוכלת אפשר דאכלה חולין

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages, based on the second ruling of the mishna: If the wife of a priest said to her husband: I am defiled to you, what is the halakha with regard to whether she may partake of teruma? Is the halakha that just as she is not believed with regard to divorce, so she is not believed with regard to teruma, or is the halakha that with regard to teruma she is believed, and therefore it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, as is the halakha of a woman married to a priest who engages in sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband? Rav Sheshet said: She may partake of teruma, so that she not cast aspersions on her children. If she is barred from partaking of teruma, people will see this as supporting her claim that she had been raped, and rumors will circulate that her sons are unfit for the priesthood. Rava said: She may not partake of teruma, as she can partake of non-sacred food, and it is preferable that her claim that she is no longer permitted to eat teruma be taken into account.

אמר רבא ומודה רב ששת שאם נתארמלה שאינה אוכלת מידי הוא טעמא אלא משום תוציא לעז על בניה נתארמלה ונתגרשה אמרי השתא דאיתניסא

Rava said: And Rav Sheshet concedes that if this wife of the priest who claimed to have been raped was then widowed from him, she may not continue to partake of teruma. Why? Isn’t the reason that she is permitted to partake of teruma only that she should not cast aspersions on her children? This being the case, if she was widowed or divorced, people will say that only now it occurred that she was raped, i.e., the entire incident occurred after she was no longer married to her husband. Therefore, rumors will not circulate that the children that she bore him beforehand are unfit.

אמר רב פפא בדיק לן רבא אשת כהן שנאנסה יש לה כתובה או אין לה כתובה כיון דאונס לגבי כהן כרצון לגבי ישראל דמי אין לה כתובה או דילמא מצי אמרה ליה אנא הא חזינא

§ Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us with the following question: As for the wife of a priest who was raped in the presence of witnesses, is she entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract or is she not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is the halakha that since rape with regard to a woman married to a priest is like willing sexual intercourse with regard to a woman married to an Israelite, as the wife of a priest who was raped is obligated to leave her husband, just as the wife of an Israelite who willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with another man is obligated to leave her husband, she is therefore not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? Or perhaps she can say to him: I am fit to continue being married, as, if her husband were an Israelite she would not be forbidden to him after being raped.