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Today's Daf Yomi

January 23, 2023 | 讗壮 讘砖讘讟 转砖驻状讙

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

Nedarim 90

This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky. 鈥淎 talmida chachama who studied gemara ahead of her time. Baby Chiyenna will be 4 1/2 when her mother finishes shas, be’ezrat Hashem!鈥
This week’s learning is sponsored by Stacey Goodstein Ashtamker in loving memory of Stacey鈥檚 beloved father Jack Goodstein, Yaakov ben Asur Halevi z”l whose 12 months of mourning ends on Rosh Chodesh and in memory of her father-in-law Eliyahu Ashtamker, Eliyahu ben David z”l, whose first yahrzeit is this Shabbat.聽 聽“May their memories be for a blessing.”
Today鈥檚 daf is dedicated in memory of HaRabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen zt”l, the wife of HaRav Shear Yashuv Hakohen zt”l. A woman ahead of her time who taught Gemara to women in Haifa. You are missed as a teacher, and as a special wise woman,聽we had the honor to study with.

Does the debate between Rabbi Natan and the rabbis regarding nullification of a vow that has not yet taken effect also apply to dissolving vows with a chacham? A story is brought of a man who took a vow of this kind and Rav Acha made sure the vow took effect so that it could be dissolved. Two explanations are brought up explaining why he needed the vow to take effect first. Sources are brought to support the second explanation but are each rejected. An alternate version of the second explanation is brought and the same sources are brought to raise a difficulty against it. One is resolved, and the other is not. Originally there were three different claims a woman could make and the rabbis would insist the husband divorce the wife and give her the ketuba money, but over time there were women who lied in order to get the husband to divorce her, and therefore the rabbis stopped believing them. What were these claims? After the rabbis changed their minds, what would they do if a woman made these claims? One of the claims is a woman married to a kohen claims that she was raped. The Gemara asks: if we no longer believe her to insist on divorce, can she continue to eat truma?

讜砖专拽讬讛 讟讬谞讗 讜讗转讬讬讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讗谉 讞讻讬诐 诇诪讬注讘讚 讻讬 讛讗 诪讬诇转讗 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讛讜讗 讚拽住讘专 讚讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 讜专讘讬 谞转谉 讘讛驻专讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘砖讗诇讛


And Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna then smeared him with clay to protect him from the elements, as it was now prohibited for him to benefit from the world by wearing clothes. And he then brought him before Rav 岣sda, to dissolve his vow. Rava said: Who is wise enough to act in this manner, if not Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna, who is a great man? As he holds that just as the Rabbis and Rabbi Natan disagree with regard to nullification, whether it is possible to nullify a vow that has yet to take effect, so too, they disagree with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, whether it is possible to request dissolution of such a vow. Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna鈥檚 plan was to have the vow go into effect, so that the man could request that it be dissolved.


讜专讘 驻驻讬 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讛驻专讛 讚专讘讬 谞转谉 住讘专 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 诪讬驻专 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讞诇 谞讚专 讚讻转讬讘 讜讞驻专讛 讛诇讘谞讛 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讘注诇 诪讬驻专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讞诇 谞讚专 讚讻转讬讘 诪驻专 诪讞砖讘讜转 注专讜诪讬诐


And Rav Pappi said with regard to this issue: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, as it is written: 鈥淎nd the moon shall be confounded [岣fera]鈥 (Isaiah 24:23). He employs this phrase as an allusion, interpreting the word 岣fera as if it were hafara, nullification, and concludes from here that only a vow that already exists, like the moon, can be nullified. And the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, as it is written: 鈥淗e nullifies the thoughts of the crafty鈥 (Job 5:12), implying that nullification pertains even to thoughts, to prevent them from going into effect.


讗讘诇 讘砖讗诇讛 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讞讻诐 诪转讬专 讻诇讜诐 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讞诇 谞讚专 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜


But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees that a halakhic authority cannot dissolve anything unless the vow has already taken effect, as it is written: 鈥淗e shall not profane his word鈥 (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that the person himself who took the vow cannot profane his words and dissolve his vow, but a halakhic authority may do so. This, however, applies only if the vow has already gone into effect, as it says: 鈥淗is word.鈥


诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜诇诪讬 砖讗砖讗诇 注诇讬讜 谞砖讗诇 注诇 讛专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗诇 注诇 讛砖谞讬 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 谞砖讗诇 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讞诇 谞讚专 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 讛讗讬 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 讛讗讬 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗


The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Pappi鈥檚 opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, then, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must he request dissolution of his two vows in the above order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.


讜诪讬 讬讚注 讗讬 讛讗讬 拽诪讗 讗讬 讛讗讬 讘转专讗


The Gemara refutes this argument: And does he know if this vow is first or if that vow is last? The baraita does not specify which vow is first and which is last. Perhaps first and last is referring not to the order in which the two vows were taken, but rather to the order in which they are dissolved, so that if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.


讗诇讗 诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬谞讬 谞讝讬专 诇讻砖讗砖讗诇 注诇讬讜 谞砖讗诇 注诇 谞讚专讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗诇 注诇 谞讝专讜


Rather, let us say that a different baraita supports Rav Pappi鈥檚 opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from a particular person, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow.


讜讗讬 讗诪专转 谞砖讗诇 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讞诇 谞讚专 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 谞讚专讜 讗讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 谞讝专讜 讗讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 专讘讬 谞转谉 讛讬讗


And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must the two vows be dissolved in that order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is no proof, as it is possible that the baraita is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who maintains that a vow can be nullified only after it has gone into effect. The Rabbis, however, dispute this view.


讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬 诪专讬诪专 讛讻讬 讗诪专 讗讘讜讱 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 驻驻讬 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讛驻专讛 讗讘诇 讘砖讗诇讛 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诪驻专 讜讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讞诇 谞讚专 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜


Ravina said: Mareimar said to me: This is what your father said in the name of Rav Pappi: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, whereas the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees, that he can dissolve the vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. As it is written: 鈥淗e shall not profane his word鈥 (Numbers 30:3), which Ravina expounds as follows:


诇诪讬诪专讗 讚诇讗 讛讜讛 讘讬讛 诪注砖讛


That is to say that there was not yet any action but only speech, and even so the halakhic authority can dissolve the vow.


诪讬转讬讘讬 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜诇诪讬 砖谞砖讗诇 注诇讬讜 谞砖讗诇 注诇 讛专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗诇 注诇 讛砖谞讬 讗诪讗讬 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 讛讗讬 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 讜讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 讛讗讬 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗


The Gemara raises an objection against this version of the tannaitic dispute from the aforementioned baraita: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. But according to what was stated above, that all agree that a vow can be dissolved even before it has taken effect, why is this so? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.


诪讬 讬讜讚注 讛讬 专讗砖讜谉 讜讛讬 砖谞讬


The Gemara answers: Does he know which vow is first and which is the second? The wording of the baraita is not at all clear on this point. Perhaps, if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.


诪转讬讘讬 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 讜讛专讬谞讬 谞讝讬专 诇讻砖讗砖讗诇 注诇讬讜 谞砖讗诇 注诇 谞讚专讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗诇 注诇 谞讝专讜 讜讗诪讗讬 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 谞讚专讜 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 讜讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 谞讝专讜 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 转讬讜讘转讗


The Gemara raises a further objection from the second baraita cited above: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow that rendered benefit from a particular person forbidden, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow. But why must he proceed in this manner? If he so wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The fact that the baraita does not say this indicates that a vow can be dissolved only once it has gone into effect. The Gemara concludes: Here is a conclusive refutation of this version of the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis.


诪转谞讬壮 讘专讗砖讜谞讛 讛讬讜 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖诇砖 谞砖讬诐 讬讜爪讗讜转 讜谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛 讛讗讜诪专转 讟诪讗讛 讗谞讬 诇讱 砖诪讬诐 讘讬谞讬 诇讘讬谞讱 讜谞讟讜诇讛 讗谞讬 诪谉 讛讬讛讜讚讬诐


MISHNA: Initially the Sages would say that three women are divorced even against their husbands鈥 will, and nevertheless they receive payment of what is due to them according to their marriage contract. The first is the wife of a priest who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she claims that she had been raped, so that she is now forbidden to her husband. The second is a woman who says to her husband: Heaven is between me and you, i.e., she declares that he is impotent, a claim she cannot prove, as the truth of it is known only to God. And the third is a woman who takes a vow, stating: I am removed from the Jews, i.e., benefit from sexual intercourse with any Jew, including my husband, is forbidden to me.


讞讝专讜 诇讜诪专 砖诇讗 转讛讗 讗砖讛 谞讜转谞转 注讬谞讬讛 讘讗讞专 讜诪拽诇拽诇转 注诇 讘注诇讛 讛讗讜诪专转 讟诪讗讛 讗谞讬 诇讱 转讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 诇讚讘专讬讛 讛砖诪讬诐 讘讬谞讬 诇讘讬谞讱 讬注砖讜 讚专讱 讘拽砖讛 讜谞讟讜诇讛 讗谞讬 诪谉 讛讬讛讜讚讬诐 讬驻专 诇讞诇拽讜 讜转讛讗 诪砖诪砖转讜 讜转讛讗 谞讟讜诇讛 诪谉 讛讬讛讜讚讬诐


They subsequently retracted their words and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and to that end ruin her relationship with her husband and still receive payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified as follows: A priest鈥檚 wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring proof for her words that she was raped. As for a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court must act and deal with the matter by way of a request, rather than force the husband to divorce his wife. And with regard to a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the aspect of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may engage in sexual intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her she is forbidden to all.


讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讗诪专讛 诇讘注诇讛 讟诪讗讛 讗谞讬 诪讛讜 砖转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讗讜讻诇转 砖诇讗 转讜爪讬讗 诇注讝 注诇 讘谞讬讛 专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讬谞讛 讗讜讻诇转 讗驻砖专 讚讗讻诇讛 讞讜诇讬谉


GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages, based on the second ruling of the mishna: If the wife of a priest said to her husband: I am defiled to you, what is the halakha with regard to whether she may partake of teruma? Is the halakha that just as she is not believed with regard to divorce, so she is not believed with regard to teruma, or is the halakha that with regard to teruma she is believed, and therefore it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, as is the halakha of a woman married to a priest who engages in sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband? Rav Sheshet said: She may partake of teruma, so that she not cast aspersions on her children. If she is barred from partaking of teruma, people will see this as supporting her claim that she had been raped, and rumors will circulate that her sons are unfit for the priesthood. Rava said: She may not partake of teruma, as she can partake of non-sacred food, and it is preferable that her claim that she is no longer permitted to eat teruma be taken into account.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诪讜讚讛 专讘 砖砖转 砖讗诐 谞转讗专诪诇讛 砖讗讬谞讛 讗讜讻诇转 诪讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讟注诪讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 转讜爪讬讗 诇注讝 注诇 讘谞讬讛 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讜谞转讙专砖讛 讗诪专讬 讛砖转讗 讚讗讬转谞讬住讗


Rava said: And Rav Sheshet concedes that if this wife of the priest who claimed to have been raped was then widowed from him, she may not continue to partake of teruma. Why? Isn鈥檛 the reason that she is permitted to partake of teruma only that she should not cast aspersions on her children? This being the case, if she was widowed or divorced, people will say that only now it occurred that she was raped, i.e., the entire incident occurred after she was no longer married to her husband. Therefore, rumors will not circulate that the children that she bore him beforehand are unfit.


讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讚讬拽 诇谉 专讘讗 讗砖转 讻讛谉 砖谞讗谞住讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讜谞住 诇讙讘讬 讻讛谉 讻专爪讜谉 诇讙讘讬 讬砖专讗诇 讚诪讬 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 诪爪讬 讗诪专讛 诇讬讛 讗谞讗 讛讗 讞讝讬谞讗


Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us with the following question: As for the wife of a priest who was raped in the presence of witnesses, is she entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract or is she not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is the halakha that since rape with regard to a woman married to a priest is like willing sexual intercourse with regard to a woman married to an Israelite, as the wife of a priest who was raped is obligated to leave her husband, just as the wife of an Israelite who willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with another man is obligated to leave her husband, she is therefore not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? Or perhaps she can say to him: I am fit to continue being married, as, if her husband were an Israelite she would not be forbidden to him after being raped.

  • This month's learning聽is sponsored by Leah Goldford in loving memory of聽her grandmothers, Tzipporah bat Yechezkiel, Rivka Yoda Bat聽Dovide Tzvi, Bracha Bayla bat Beryl, her father-in-law, Chaim Gershon ben Tzvi Aryeh, her mother, Devorah Rivkah bat Tuvia Hacohen, her cousins, Avrum Baer ben Mordechai, and Sharon bat Yaakov.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

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Nedarim 90

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Nedarim 90

讜砖专拽讬讛 讟讬谞讗 讜讗转讬讬讛 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讗谉 讞讻讬诐 诇诪讬注讘讚 讻讬 讛讗 诪讬诇转讗 讗讬 诇讗讜 讚专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讚讙讘专讗 专讘讛 讛讜讗 讚拽住讘专 讚讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 讜专讘讬 谞转谉 讘讛驻专讛 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘砖讗诇讛


And Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna then smeared him with clay to protect him from the elements, as it was now prohibited for him to benefit from the world by wearing clothes. And he then brought him before Rav 岣sda, to dissolve his vow. Rava said: Who is wise enough to act in this manner, if not Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna, who is a great man? As he holds that just as the Rabbis and Rabbi Natan disagree with regard to nullification, whether it is possible to nullify a vow that has yet to take effect, so too, they disagree with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, whether it is possible to request dissolution of such a vow. Rav A岣 bar Rav Huna鈥檚 plan was to have the vow go into effect, so that the man could request that it be dissolved.


讜专讘 驻驻讬 讗诪专 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讛驻专讛 讚专讘讬 谞转谉 住讘专 讗讬谉 讛讘注诇 诪讬驻专 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讞诇 谞讚专 讚讻转讬讘 讜讞驻专讛 讛诇讘谞讛 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讘注诇 诪讬驻专 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讞诇 谞讚专 讚讻转讬讘 诪驻专 诪讞砖讘讜转 注专讜诪讬诐


And Rav Pappi said with regard to this issue: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, as it is written: 鈥淎nd the moon shall be confounded [岣fera]鈥 (Isaiah 24:23). He employs this phrase as an allusion, interpreting the word 岣fera as if it were hafara, nullification, and concludes from here that only a vow that already exists, like the moon, can be nullified. And the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, as it is written: 鈥淗e nullifies the thoughts of the crafty鈥 (Job 5:12), implying that nullification pertains even to thoughts, to prevent them from going into effect.


讗讘诇 讘砖讗诇讛 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讞讻诐 诪转讬专 讻诇讜诐 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讞诇 谞讚专 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜


But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees that a halakhic authority cannot dissolve anything unless the vow has already taken effect, as it is written: 鈥淗e shall not profane his word鈥 (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that the person himself who took the vow cannot profane his words and dissolve his vow, but a halakhic authority may do so. This, however, applies only if the vow has already gone into effect, as it says: 鈥淗is word.鈥


诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜诇诪讬 砖讗砖讗诇 注诇讬讜 谞砖讗诇 注诇 讛专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗诇 注诇 讛砖谞讬 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 谞砖讗诇 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讞诇 谞讚专 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 讛讗讬 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 讛讗讬 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗


The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Pappi鈥檚 opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, then, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must he request dissolution of his two vows in the above order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.


讜诪讬 讬讚注 讗讬 讛讗讬 拽诪讗 讗讬 讛讗讬 讘转专讗


The Gemara refutes this argument: And does he know if this vow is first or if that vow is last? The baraita does not specify which vow is first and which is last. Perhaps first and last is referring not to the order in which the two vows were taken, but rather to the order in which they are dissolved, so that if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.


讗诇讗 诇讬诪讗 诪住讬讬注 诇讬讛 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讛专讬谞讬 谞讝讬专 诇讻砖讗砖讗诇 注诇讬讜 谞砖讗诇 注诇 谞讚专讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗诇 注诇 谞讝专讜


Rather, let us say that a different baraita supports Rav Pappi鈥檚 opinion: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from a particular person, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow.


讜讗讬 讗诪专转 谞砖讗诇 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讞诇 谞讚专 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 谞讚专讜 讗讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 谞讝专讜 讗讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 专讘讬 谞转谉 讛讬讗


And if you say that one can request dissolution of a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect, why must the two vows be dissolved in that order? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The Gemara rejects this argument: This is no proof, as it is possible that the baraita is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who maintains that a vow can be nullified only after it has gone into effect. The Rabbis, however, dispute this view.


讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬 诪专讬诪专 讛讻讬 讗诪专 讗讘讜讱 诪砖诪讬讛 讚专讘 驻驻讬 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讛驻专讛 讗讘诇 讘砖讗诇讛 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 诪驻专 讜讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 讞诇 谞讚专 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜


Ravina said: Mareimar said to me: This is what your father said in the name of Rav Pappi: The dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis is with regard to nullification only, as Rabbi Natan holds that a husband can nullify a vow only once the vow has taken effect, whereas the Rabbis hold that a husband can nullify a vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. But with regard to a request made to a halakhic authority to dissolve a vow, everyone, both Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis, agrees, that he can dissolve the vow even though the vow has not yet taken effect. As it is written: 鈥淗e shall not profane his word鈥 (Numbers 30:3), which Ravina expounds as follows:


诇诪讬诪专讗 讚诇讗 讛讜讛 讘讬讛 诪注砖讛


That is to say that there was not yet any action but only speech, and even so the halakhic authority can dissolve the vow.


诪讬转讬讘讬 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讜诇诪讬 砖谞砖讗诇 注诇讬讜 谞砖讗诇 注诇 讛专讗砖讜谉 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗诇 注诇 讛砖谞讬 讗诪讗讬 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 讛讗讬 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 讜讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 讛讗讬 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗


The Gemara raises an objection against this version of the tannaitic dispute from the aforementioned baraita: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and deriving benefit from he who I will request dissolution for the vow is also konam for me, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to the first vow, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to the second. But according to what was stated above, that all agree that a vow can be dissolved even before it has taken effect, why is this so? If he so wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to this vow, and if he wishes, he can first request dissolution with regard to that one.


诪讬 讬讜讚注 讛讬 专讗砖讜谉 讜讛讬 砖谞讬


The Gemara answers: Does he know which vow is first and which is the second? The wording of the baraita is not at all clear on this point. Perhaps, if he so wishes, he can first request dissolution of the vow not to derive benefit from the halakhic authority from whom he will request dissolution of his vow.


诪转讬讘讬 拽讜谞诐 砖讗讬谞讬 谞讛谞讛 讜讛专讬谞讬 谞讝讬专 诇讻砖讗砖讗诇 注诇讬讜 谞砖讗诇 注诇 谞讚专讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞砖讗诇 注诇 谞讝专讜 讜讗诪讗讬 讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 谞讚专讜 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 讜讗讬 讘注讬 注诇 谞讝专讜 谞讬转砖讬诇 讘专讬砖讗 转讬讜讘转讗


The Gemara raises a further objection from the second baraita cited above: If one says: The property of so-and-so is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, and I am hereby a nazirite for when I will request dissolution of this vow, if he desires to dissolve the vows he must first request dissolution with regard to his vow that rendered benefit from a particular person forbidden, and afterward he can request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship that he accepted upon himself should he request dissolution of his first vow. But why must he proceed in this manner? If he so wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow not to derive benefit from that other person, and if he wishes he can first request dissolution with regard to his vow of naziriteship. The fact that the baraita does not say this indicates that a vow can be dissolved only once it has gone into effect. The Gemara concludes: Here is a conclusive refutation of this version of the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis.


诪转谞讬壮 讘专讗砖讜谞讛 讛讬讜 讗讜诪专讬诐 砖诇砖 谞砖讬诐 讬讜爪讗讜转 讜谞讜讟诇讜转 讻转讜讘讛 讛讗讜诪专转 讟诪讗讛 讗谞讬 诇讱 砖诪讬诐 讘讬谞讬 诇讘讬谞讱 讜谞讟讜诇讛 讗谞讬 诪谉 讛讬讛讜讚讬诐


MISHNA: Initially the Sages would say that three women are divorced even against their husbands鈥 will, and nevertheless they receive payment of what is due to them according to their marriage contract. The first is the wife of a priest who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, i.e., she claims that she had been raped, so that she is now forbidden to her husband. The second is a woman who says to her husband: Heaven is between me and you, i.e., she declares that he is impotent, a claim she cannot prove, as the truth of it is known only to God. And the third is a woman who takes a vow, stating: I am removed from the Jews, i.e., benefit from sexual intercourse with any Jew, including my husband, is forbidden to me.


讞讝专讜 诇讜诪专 砖诇讗 转讛讗 讗砖讛 谞讜转谞转 注讬谞讬讛 讘讗讞专 讜诪拽诇拽诇转 注诇 讘注诇讛 讛讗讜诪专转 讟诪讗讛 讗谞讬 诇讱 转讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 诇讚讘专讬讛 讛砖诪讬诐 讘讬谞讬 诇讘讬谞讱 讬注砖讜 讚专讱 讘拽砖讛 讜谞讟讜诇讛 讗谞讬 诪谉 讛讬讛讜讚讬诐 讬驻专 诇讞诇拽讜 讜转讛讗 诪砖诪砖转讜 讜转讛讗 谞讟讜诇讛 诪谉 讛讬讛讜讚讬诐


They subsequently retracted their words and said that in order that a married woman should not cast her eyes on another man and to that end ruin her relationship with her husband and still receive payment of her marriage contract, these halakhot were modified as follows: A priest鈥檚 wife who says to her husband: I am defiled to you, must bring proof for her words that she was raped. As for a woman who says: Heaven is between me and you, the court must act and deal with the matter by way of a request, rather than force the husband to divorce his wife. And with regard to a woman who says: I am removed from the Jews, her husband must nullify his part, i.e., the aspect of the vow that concerns him, so that she should be permitted to him, and she may engage in sexual intercourse with him, but she is removed from all other Jews, so that if he divorces her she is forbidden to all.


讙诪壮 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讗诪专讛 诇讘注诇讛 讟诪讗讛 讗谞讬 诪讛讜 砖转讗讻诇 讘转专讜诪讛 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讗讜讻诇转 砖诇讗 转讜爪讬讗 诇注讝 注诇 讘谞讬讛 专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讬谞讛 讗讜讻诇转 讗驻砖专 讚讗讻诇讛 讞讜诇讬谉


GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages, based on the second ruling of the mishna: If the wife of a priest said to her husband: I am defiled to you, what is the halakha with regard to whether she may partake of teruma? Is the halakha that just as she is not believed with regard to divorce, so she is not believed with regard to teruma, or is the halakha that with regard to teruma she is believed, and therefore it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, as is the halakha of a woman married to a priest who engages in sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband? Rav Sheshet said: She may partake of teruma, so that she not cast aspersions on her children. If she is barred from partaking of teruma, people will see this as supporting her claim that she had been raped, and rumors will circulate that her sons are unfit for the priesthood. Rava said: She may not partake of teruma, as she can partake of non-sacred food, and it is preferable that her claim that she is no longer permitted to eat teruma be taken into account.


讗诪专 专讘讗 讜诪讜讚讛 专讘 砖砖转 砖讗诐 谞转讗专诪诇讛 砖讗讬谞讛 讗讜讻诇转 诪讬讚讬 讛讜讗 讟注诪讗 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 转讜爪讬讗 诇注讝 注诇 讘谞讬讛 谞转讗专诪诇讛 讜谞转讙专砖讛 讗诪专讬 讛砖转讗 讚讗讬转谞讬住讗


Rava said: And Rav Sheshet concedes that if this wife of the priest who claimed to have been raped was then widowed from him, she may not continue to partake of teruma. Why? Isn鈥檛 the reason that she is permitted to partake of teruma only that she should not cast aspersions on her children? This being the case, if she was widowed or divorced, people will say that only now it occurred that she was raped, i.e., the entire incident occurred after she was no longer married to her husband. Therefore, rumors will not circulate that the children that she bore him beforehand are unfit.


讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讚讬拽 诇谉 专讘讗 讗砖转 讻讛谉 砖谞讗谞住讛 讬砖 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗讜 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讜谞住 诇讙讘讬 讻讛谉 讻专爪讜谉 诇讙讘讬 讬砖专讗诇 讚诪讬 讗讬谉 诇讛 讻转讜讘讛 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 诪爪讬 讗诪专讛 诇讬讛 讗谞讗 讛讗 讞讝讬谞讗


Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us with the following question: As for the wife of a priest who was raped in the presence of witnesses, is she entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract or is she not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is the halakha that since rape with regard to a woman married to a priest is like willing sexual intercourse with regard to a woman married to an Israelite, as the wife of a priest who was raped is obligated to leave her husband, just as the wife of an Israelite who willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with another man is obligated to leave her husband, she is therefore not entitled to receive payment of her marriage contract? Or perhaps she can say to him: I am fit to continue being married, as, if her husband were an Israelite she would not be forbidden to him after being raped.

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