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Today's Daf Yomi

August 3, 2017 | 讬状讗 讘讗讘 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Sanhedrin 24

Study Guide Sanhedrin 24. Various drashot are brought (mainly from verses of Zecharia) which show the difference between the scholars in Israel and those in Babylonia. 聽It seems to be a self-critique of the Babylonians of what goes on in their batei midrash. 聽If one accepts one witness to testify or a relative of the other side to be a witness or judge or for the other to swear in a lesser type of swearing than the one required by the court, can that person changed his/her mind? 聽Does this apply in all cases or only in some types? 聽Is this relevant before the court rules or even after? 聽Who is disqualified from being a witness? 聽Why is someone who gambled not allowed to testify – is it because of asmachta聽or because he doesn’t have a real job which makes him suspect he will take money to testify falsely.

讘注讚讬诐 驻住讜诇讬谉 讜讚讬讬谞讬谉 讻砖专讬谉 诪讬讙讜 讚驻住诇讬 注讚讬诐 驻住诇讬 谞诪讬 讚讬讬谞讬 住讬驻讗 讘讚讬讬谞讬谉 驻住讜诇讬谉 讜注讚讬诐 讻砖专讬谉 讚诪讬讙讜 讚驻住诇讬 讚讬讬谞讬谉 驻住诇讬 谞诪讬 注讚讬诐

is stated with regard to a case of disqualified witnesses and fit judges, i.e., the litigant claims that both the witnesses and the judges are disqualified and proves his claim only with regard to the witnesses. Rabbi Meir holds that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as the litigant鈥檚 entire claim is deemed credible. The latter clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify witnesses, is stated with regard to a case of disqualified judges and fit witnesses, i.e., the litigant proves his claim only with regard to the judges. Since the judges are disqualified the witnesses were also disqualified.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 讘砖诇诪讗 诪讬讙讜 讚驻住诇讬 注讚讬诐 驻住诇讬 谞诪讬 讚讬讬谞讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗诇讗 诪讬讙讜 讚驻住诇讬 讚讬讬谞讬 驻住诇讬 谞诪讬 注讚讬诐 讜讛讗 注讚讬诐 转讜 诇讬讻讗

Rava objects to this interpretation: Granted, in the former clause, it is reasonable that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as, since there is the option of going to another court, disqualifying these specific judges has no irreversible effect on the outcome of the case. But in the latter case, how can Rabbi Meir hold that since the judges are disqualified, the witnesses are also disqualified without proof? This disqualification nullifies the entire case, as there are no more witnesses.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讻转 讗讞专转

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is not referring to a case where there are no other witnesses. The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is necessary only in a case where there is another set of witnesses, which the litigant did not disqualify. Since disqualifying this set will not predetermine the outcome, the litigant鈥檚 claim that these witnesses are disqualified is accepted.

讛讗 诇讬讻讗 讻转 讗讞专转 诪讗讬 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 诪爪讬 驻住诇讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讚专讘 讚讬诪讬

The Gemara asks: But if there is no other set of witnesses, what is the halakha? Is it indeed true that the litigant cannot disqualify them? If so, this is identical to Rav Dimi鈥檚 interpretation that the mishna is referring to a case where there are two sets of witnesses.

讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讬讙讜 讚诪专 住讘专 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬讙讜 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬讙讜

The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the principle that since [miggo] one of the litigant鈥檚 claims is found to be correct, it can be assumed that other claims of his are correct as well. As one Sage, Ravin, holds that according to Rabbi Meir, we say miggo, i.e., this principle should be followed, and one Sage, Rav Dimi, holds that we do not say miggo, but rather the litigant is required to prove every claim he makes.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 壮驻讛 拽讚讜砖 讬讗诪专 讚讘专 讝讛壮 转谞讬 注讚讜

搂 The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.

讗讬谞讬 讜讛讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛专讜讗讛 讗转 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘讘讬转 讛诪讚专砖 讻讗讬诇讜 注讜拽专 讛专讬诐 讜讟讜讞谞谉 讝讛 讘讝讛

The Gemara asks: Is that so? Was it in character for Reish Lakish to speak of Rabbi Meir with such reverence when disagreeing with his ruling? But doesn鈥檛 Ulla say: When one sees Reish Lakish studying Torah in the study hall it is as though he is uprooting mountains and grinding them into each other? Reish Lakish was evidently very sharp in his analyses.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讜讛诇讗 讻诇 讛专讜讗讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讘讬转 讛诪讚专砖 讻讗讬诇讜 注讜拽专 讛专讬 讛专讬诐 讜讟讜讞谞谉 讝讛 讘讝讛

Ravina said in response: What is the difficulty? But is it not so that when anyone sees Rabbi Meir studying Torah in the study hall, it is as though he is uprooting the highest of mountains and grinding them into each other? Rabbi Meir was a greater scholar than Reish Lakish, so it was fitting for Reish Lakish to speak of him with reverence.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讘讗 讜专讗讛 讻诪讛 诪讞讘讘讬谉 讝讛 讗转 讝讛

The Gemara answers: The question: Is that so, was not stated to raise a difficulty; rather, this is what he is saying, i.e., this is what the Gemara was noting: Come and see how much the Sages love each other. Although Reish Lakish was himself very sharp and a great Torah scholar, he spoke of Rabbi Meir with reverence.

讻讬 讛讗 讚讬转讬讘 专讘讬 讜拽讗诪专 讗住讜专 诇讛讟诪讬谉 讗转 讛爪讜谞谉 讗诪专 诇驻谞讬讜 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讘讗 讛转讬专 诇讛讟诪讬谉 讗转 讛爪讜谞谉 讗诪专 诇讛诐 讻讘专 讛讜专讛 讝拽谉

The Gemara cites another example of Torah scholars who spoke of each other with reverence. It is like that incident where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold, as this may lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat to keep it hot. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before him: My father ruled that it is permitted to insulate cold food on Shabbat. There is no concern that this will lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi subsequently said to those who asked him about this issue: I retract my previous statement; the elder, Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling on this topic, and I defer to his ruling.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讗 讜专讗讛 讻诪讛 诪讞讘讘讬谉 讝讛 讗转 讝讛 讚讗讬诇讜 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 拽讬讬诐 讛讬讛 讻驻讜祝 讜讬讜砖讘 诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讚讛讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪诪诇讗 诪拽讜诐 讗讘讜转讬讜 讛讜讛 讜讛讬讛 讻驻讜祝 讜讬讜砖讘 诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讜拽讗 讗诪专 讻讘专 讛讜专讛 讝拽谉

Rav Pappa says: Come and see how much they loved each other. As, had Rabbi Yosei still been alive, he would have been subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student, as Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was his fathers鈥 replacement, i.e., he was as great a Torah scholar as his forebears, and he was subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student. And, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The elder has already issued a ruling on this topic, and he deferred to Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 ruling.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 诪讗讬 讚讻转讬讘 讜讗拽讞 诇讬 讗转 砖谞讬 诪拽诇讜转 诇讗讞讚 拽专讗转讬 谞讜注诐 讜诇讗讞讚 拽专讗转讬 讞讜讘诇讬诐 谞讜注诐 讗诇讜 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 砖讘讗专抓 讬砖专讗诇 砖诪谞注讬诪讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讛诇讻讛 讞讜讘诇讬诐 讗诇讜 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 砖讘讘讘诇 砖诪讞讘诇讬诐 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讛诇讻讛

This demonstrates what Rabbi Oshaya says: What is the meaning of that which is written: 鈥淎nd I took for myself two staves; the one I called Graciousness, and the other I called Binders鈥 (Zechariah 11:7)? 鈥淕raciousness鈥; these are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are gracious to one another in discussions of halakha. They treat each other with honor and love, as demonstrated in the statements of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. 鈥淏inders [岣velim]鈥; these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who injure [sheme岣bbelim] each other in discussions of halakha, i.e., they speak harshly to each other when they disagree.

讜讬讗诪专 讗诇讬 讗诇讛 [砖谞讬] 讘谞讬 讛讬爪讛专 讛注诪讚讬诐 讜讙讜壮 讜砖谞讬诐 讝讬转讬诐 注诇讬讛 讬爪讛专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讗诇讜 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 砖讘讗专抓 讬砖专讗诇 砖谞讜讞讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讛诇讻讛 讻砖诪谉 讝讬转 讜砖谞讬诐 讝讬转讬诐 注诇讬讛 讗诇讜 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 砖讘讘讘诇 砖诪专讜专讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讛诇讻讛 讻讝讬转

Similarly, it is stated: 鈥淭hen he said to me: These are the two anointed ones, that stand by the Lord of the whole earth鈥 (Zechariah 4:14), and it is stated: 鈥淎nd two olive trees by it, one upon the right side of the bowl, and the other upon its left side鈥 (Zechariah 4:3). With regard to the expression 鈥渁nointed ones,鈥 Rabbi Yitz岣k says: These are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are pleasant to each other in discussions of halakha like olive oil, which is not bitter. The verse 鈥渁nd two olive trees by it鈥 should be interpreted as follows: These are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who are bitter to each other in discussions of halakha like an olive.

讜讗砖讗 注讬谞讬 讜讗专讗 讜讛谞讛 砖转讬诐 谞砖讬诐 讬讜爪讗讜转 讜专讜讞 讘讻谞驻讬讛诐 讜诇讛谞讛 讻谞驻讬诐 讻讻谞驻讬 讛讞住讬讚讛 讜转砖讗谞讛 讛讗讬驻讛 讘讬谉 讛砖诪讬诐 讜讘讬谉 讛讗专抓 讜讗诪专 讗诇 讛诪诇讗讱 讛讚讘专 讘讬 讗谞讛 讛诪讛 诪讜诇讻讜转 讗转 讛讗讬驻讛 讜讬讗诪专 讗诇讬 诇讘谞讜转 诇讛 讘讬转 讘讗专抓 砖谞注专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讗讬 讝讜 讞谞讜驻讛 讜讙住讜转 讛专讜讞 砖讬专讚讜 诇讘讘诇

The Gemara interprets another verse in Zechariah: 鈥淭hen I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then I said to the angel that spoke with me: To where do they take the measure? And he said to me: To build her a house in the land of Shinar鈥 (Zechariah 5:9鈥11). Rabbi Yo岣nan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i: This measure refers to flattery and arrogance that descended to Babylonia, i.e., Shinar.

讜讙住讜转 讛专讜讞 诇讘讘诇 谞讞讬转 讜讛讗诪专 诪专 注砖专讛 拽讘讬谉 讙住讜转 讬专讚讜 诇注讜诇诐 转砖注讛 谞讟诇讛 注讬诇诐 讜讗讞转 讻诇 讛注讜诇诐 讻讜诇讜

The Gemara asks: And did arrogance descend to Babylonia? But doesn鈥檛 the Master say: Ten kav of arrogance descended to the world; Eilam took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one?

讗讬谉 诇讘讘诇 谞讞讬转 讜讗讬砖转专讘讜讘讬 讚讗讬砖转专讘讘 诇注讬诇诐 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚讻转讬讘 诇讘谞讜转 诇讛 讘讬转 讘讗专抓 砖谞注专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara answers: Yes, it descended to Babylonia, and it made its way to Eilam. The language of the verse is also precise, as it is written: 鈥淭o build her a house in the land of Shinar,鈥 which indicates that the original intention was to build a house in Babylonia, but it was not built there. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that arrogance did not remain in Babylonia.

讜讛讗诪专 诪专 住讬诪谉 诇讙住讜转 讛专讜讞 注谞讬讜转 讜注谞讬讜转 诇讘讘诇 谞讞讬转 诪讗讬 注谞讬讜转 注谞讬讜转 转讜专讛 讚讻转讬讘 讗讞讜转 诇谞讜 拽讟谞讛 讜砖讚讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讝讜 注讬诇诐 砖讝讻转讛 诇诇诪讜讚 讜诇讗 讝讻转讛 诇诇诪讚

The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 the Master say: A sign of arrogance is poverty? And poverty descended to Babylonia, not to Eilam. The Gemara answers: To what kind of poverty is this referring? It is poverty with regard to Torah, which was characteristic of Eilam. As it is written: 鈥淲e have a little sister, and she has no breasts鈥 (Song of Songs 8:8), and Rabbi Yo岣nan says: This refers to Eilam, whose inhabitants merited to learn Torah but did not merit to teach it. They did not produce Torah scholars capable of imparting their wisdom to others.

诪讗讬 讘讘诇 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘诇讜诇讛 讘诪拽专讗 讘诇讜诇讛 讘诪砖谞讛 讘诇讜诇讛 讘转诇诪讜讚 讘诪讞砖讻讬诐 讛讜砖讬讘谞讬 讻诪转讬 注讜诇诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讝讛 转诇诪讜讚讛 砖诇 讘讘诇

The Gemara asks: What is the homiletic interpretation of the word Babylonia? Rabbi Yo岣nan says, as a tribute to the Jewish community of Babylonia and its Torah scholars: It means mixed with Bible, mixed with Mishna, and mixed with Talmud. Other Sages had a different opinion of the Torah in Babylonia: With regard to the verse: 鈥淗e has made me dwell in dark places, as those that have been long dead鈥 (Lamentations 3:6), Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is the Talmud of Babylonia, which is not as clear as the Talmud of Eretz Yisrael.

诪转谞讬壮 讗诪专 诇讜 谞讗诪谉 注诇讬 讗讘讗 谞讗诪谉 注诇讬 讗讘讬讱 谞讗诪谞讬诐 注诇讬 砖诇砖讛 专讜注讬 讘拽专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

MISHNA: If one litigant says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract it, but must accept their verdict.

讛讬讛 讞讬讬讘 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讘讜注讛 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讚讜专 诇讬 讘讞讬讬 专讗砖讱 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

Similarly, one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, which is done while grasping a sacred object, and the latter said to him: Instead of taking an oath, merely vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and demand that the other litigant take an oath, as he is obligated to do by Torah law. And the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer. Once he has agreed to accept a vow, which is of less severity than an oath, he cannot retract his agreement.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讚讬诪讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讙讜谉 讚拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚

GEMARA: Rav Dimi, son of Rav Na岣an, son of Rav Yosef, says: The case of a litigant who accepts his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge is referring to where the litigant accepted this relative upon himself as one of the judges in a court of three, where the other two judges are fit. It is not referring to where he accepted him as the sole judge.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 讗讘诇 讘讗转谉 诇讱 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the claimant had said to the defendant: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you if my father or your father rules as judge to that effect, and the claimant subsequently wishes to retract his offer. But in a case where it is the defendant who said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge, everyone agrees that he can retract his offer. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 讜讘讬谉 讘讝讜 诪讞诇讜拽转

A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan: Is the dispute only with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer? Or perhaps Rabbi Yo岣nan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case?

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讗转谉 诇讱 讗讘诇 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from that which Rava says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 讜讘讬谉 讘讝讜 诪讞诇讜拽转 专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻诪讗谉

Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yo岣nan too, the dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer; this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yo岣nan the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha? His statement is in accordance with neither Shmuel鈥檚 opinion nor Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion.

专讘讗 讟注诪讗 讚谞驻砖讬讛 拽讗诪专

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps Rava is stating his own explanation of the dispute.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 转讞诇讬驻讗 诇专讘讗 讛讬讛 讞讬讬讘 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讘讜注讛 讜讗诪专 诇讜 壮讚讜专 诇讬 讘讞讬讬 专讗砖讱壮 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

Rav A岣 bar Ta岣ifa raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from the latter clause in the mishna: With regard to one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, and the latter said to him: Vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讗讜转谉 讛谞砖讘注讬谉 讜诇讗 诪砖诇诪讬谉 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻诪讞讜诇 诇讱

What, is it not referring to those who take an oath and do not pay, i.e., cases where the defendant is obligated to take an oath that the claim against him is false, and he is thereby exempt from paying? Accordingly, it is the claimant who suggests that the defendant take a vow instead, which is the same as saying: If you take a vow, the money I claim you owe is forgiven you.

诇讗 讘讗讜转谉 讛谞砖讘注讬谉 讜谞讜讟诇讬谉 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻讗转谉 诇讱

The Gemara rejects this objection: No, it is referring to those who take an oath and collect a debt. There are cases where it is the claimant who is obligated to take an oath, and he then collects the money that he claims. In a case where the defendant suggests that the claimant take a vow instead, it is the same as saying: If you take a vow I will give you what you claim.

讜讛讗 转谞讗 诇讬讛 专讬砖讗

The Gemara challenges: But according to Rava鈥檚 interpretation, the mishna already taught the halakha in a case where the defendant says: I will give you, in the first clause, where the defendant accepts unfit judges.

转谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讜转谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜

The Gemara answers: The mishna taught in the former clause a case where the defendant makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, namely, his father or the father of the claimant; and the mishna taught in the latter clause a case where he makes the outcome dependent on the claimant鈥檚 own decision.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 转谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚诪爪讬 讛讚专 讘讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 讚讗诪专 诪讬 讬讬诪专 讚诪讝讻讬 诇讬讛 讗讘诇 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讛讜 诇专讘谞谉

And it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases, since if the mishna taught only the case where he makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, one might reason that specifically in this case Rabbi Meir says that he can retract his acceptance of the unfit judges. This is because he presumably did not resolve to transfer the money if these judges deem him liable, as he must have said to himself: Who will say that the judges will rule in favor of the claimant? But in a case where he makes the outcome dependent on the claimant鈥檚 own decision by suggesting that he take a vow, say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that the defendant cannot retract his commitment to pay.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讗讘诇 讘讛讛讬讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if the mishna would teach us only this latter case, where the defendant suggests that the claimant take a vow, one might reason that specifically in this case the Rabbis say that he cannot retract his offer; but in that former case, where he makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that he can retract his acceptance of the unfit judges. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases.

讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讗讘诇 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转

Reish Lakish says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerns whether or not one can retract his acceptance of unfit judges before the verdict is issued. But after the verdict is issued, everyone agrees that one cannot retract his acceptance, as he has already been deemed liable. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The dispute concerns whether or not one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 讜讘讬谉 讘讝讜 诪讞诇讜拽转

A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan: Is the dispute over whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, but before the verdict is issued, everyone agrees that he can retract his acceptance? Or perhaps Rabbi Yo岣nan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 拽讬讘诇 注诇讬讜 拽专讜讘 讗讜 驻住讜诇 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma, as Rava says: If one accepted a relative upon himself as a judge or witness, or if he accepted one who is disqualified for another reason from serving as a judge or a witness, he can retract his acceptance before the verdict is issued. He cannot retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 诪讞诇讜拽转 专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻诪讗谉

Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yo岣nan too, the dispute concerns whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, but before the verdict is issued everyone agrees that one can retract his acceptance; then this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, and according to the opinion of the Rabbis. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yo岣nan, the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha? His statement is in accordance with the opinion of neither Reish Lakish nor Rabbi Yo岣nan.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rather, must we not conclude from Rava鈥檚 statement that the dispute is over whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from Rava鈥檚 statement that this is so.

砖诇讞 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬注拽讘 讬诇诪讚谞讜 专讘讬谞讜 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讜 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讛诇讻讛 讻讚讘专讬 诪讬 砖诇讞 诇讬讛 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讛诇讻讛 讻讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐

Rav Na岣an, son of Rav 岣sda, sent the following question to Rav Na岣an bar Ya鈥檃kov: Our teacher, instruct us: Does the dispute concern whether or not one can retract his acceptance before the verdict is issued, or does the dispute concern whether or not one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued? And furthermore, in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? Rav Na岣an bar Ya鈥檃kov sent to him in response: The dispute concerns whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, and the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讻讬 砖诇讞 诇讬讛 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讜 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讛诇讻讛 讻讚讘专讬 诪讬 砖诇讞 诇讬讛 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讛诇讻讛 讻讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐

Rav Ashi says a different version of the question and answer: This is the question that Rav Na岣an, son of Rav 岣sda, sent to Rav Na岣an bar Ya鈥檃kov: Is the dispute with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, or is the dispute with regard to a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you? And furthermore, in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? Rav Na岣an bar Ya鈥檃kov sent this response to him: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, and the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

讘住讜专讗 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 讘驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 讘专 砖诇诪讬讛 砖诇讞讜 诇讬讛 诪讘讬 专讘 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讬诇诪讚谞讜 专讘讬谞讜 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讜拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 诪讗讬 砖诇讞 诇讛讜 讗讬谉 诇讗讞专 拽谞讬讬谉 讻诇讜诐

In Sura they teach that previous version of the question and the answer. In Pumbedita they teach this following version: Rav 岣nina bar Shelemya says that they sent the following question from Rav鈥檚 study hall to Shmuel: Our teacher, instruct us: In a case where one litigant wishes to retract his acceptance of the judges before the verdict is issued, and the other litigant had performed a formal act of acquisition with him giving legal power to the acceptance, what is the halakha? Shmuel sent them in response: Nothing can be retracted after an act of acquisition was performed.

诪转谞讬壮 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 讛驻住讜诇讬谉 讛诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 讜讛诪诇讜讛 讘专讬讘讬转 讜诪驻专讬讞讬 讬讜谞讬诐 讜住讜讞专讬 砖讘讬注讬转

MISHNA: And these on the following list are the ones who are disqualified by the Sages from bearing witness due to their unseemly behavior, as they are considered wicked individuals guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice [bekubbiyya] for money, and one who lends money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, which may be eaten but may not be sold as an object of commerce.

讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘转讞讬诇讛 讛讬讜 拽讜专讬谉 讗讜转谉 讗讜住驻讬 砖讘讬注讬转 诪砖专讘讜 讛讗谞住讬谉 讞讝专讜 诇拽专讜转谉 住讜讞专讬 砖讘讬注讬转

Rabbi Shimon said: Initially, people would call them: Gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year. Once the tax collectors grew abundant they would then call them: Merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, as the Gemara will explain.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讗讜诪谞讜转 讗诇讗 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讜诪谞讜转 砖诇讗 讛讜讗 讻砖专讬谉

Rabbi Yehuda said: When are the people listed above disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one, although they also make money by these inappropriate means, they are fit to bear witness.

讙诪壮 诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 诪讗讬 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讗诪专 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 讗住诪讻转讗 讜讗住诪讻转讗 诇讗 拽谞讬讗

GEMARA: With regard to one who plays with dice for money, what is he doing that disqualifies him from bearing witness? Rami bar 岣ma says: He is disqualified because gambling is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], as one who gambles does not have conclusive consent to pay when he loses since he plays under the assumption that he will win. And as an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, the one who wins takes money that is not legally his, and is considered a robber.

专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讻诇 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 诇讗讜 讗住诪讻转讗 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 注住讜拽讬谉 讘讬讬砖讜讘讜 砖诇 注讜诇诐

Rav Sheshet says: Any case like this is not an asmakhta. In a game of dice both sides realize that they might lose, and consent at the outset to pay if that happens. Rather, those who play dice are disqualified because they are not involved in settling the world, i.e., in productive occupations that demand hard work. Since they do not realize the effort required of most people to earn a living they might not be scrupulous about other people鈥檚 money, and their testimony cannot be relied upon.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讙诪专 讗讜诪谞讜转讗 讗讞专讬转讬

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the explanations of Rami bar 岣ma and Rav Sheshet? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where the dice player learns another occupation, and is involved in that occupation as well. According to Rav Sheshet, since he has a productive occupation he is fit to bear witness. According to Rami bar 岣ma, since he is considered a robber, as the money he gains from gambling is not legally his, he is disqualified.

讜转谞谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讗讜诪谞讜转 讗诇讗 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讜诪谞讜转 砖诇讗 讛讜讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讻砖专讬诐 讗诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讬讬砖讜讘讜 砖诇 注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 拽砖讬讗 诇专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗

The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion of Rami bar 岣ma: But we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: When are they disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one they are fit to bear witness. Apparently, the reason that the mishna disqualifies these individuals from bearing witness is that they are not involved in settling the world, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rami bar 岣ma.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

And if you would say this is not difficult, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, this would be a problem as well. But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: Any place where Rabbi Yehuda says in the corpus of the Mishna:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Sanhedrin 24

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 24

讘注讚讬诐 驻住讜诇讬谉 讜讚讬讬谞讬谉 讻砖专讬谉 诪讬讙讜 讚驻住诇讬 注讚讬诐 驻住诇讬 谞诪讬 讚讬讬谞讬 住讬驻讗 讘讚讬讬谞讬谉 驻住讜诇讬谉 讜注讚讬诐 讻砖专讬谉 讚诪讬讙讜 讚驻住诇讬 讚讬讬谞讬谉 驻住诇讬 谞诪讬 注讚讬诐

is stated with regard to a case of disqualified witnesses and fit judges, i.e., the litigant claims that both the witnesses and the judges are disqualified and proves his claim only with regard to the witnesses. Rabbi Meir holds that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as the litigant鈥檚 entire claim is deemed credible. The latter clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify witnesses, is stated with regard to a case of disqualified judges and fit witnesses, i.e., the litigant proves his claim only with regard to the judges. Since the judges are disqualified the witnesses were also disqualified.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘讗 讘砖诇诪讗 诪讬讙讜 讚驻住诇讬 注讚讬诐 驻住诇讬 谞诪讬 讚讬讬谞讬 讗讬讻讗 讘讬 讚讬谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗诇讗 诪讬讙讜 讚驻住诇讬 讚讬讬谞讬 驻住诇讬 谞诪讬 注讚讬诐 讜讛讗 注讚讬诐 转讜 诇讬讻讗

Rava objects to this interpretation: Granted, in the former clause, it is reasonable that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as, since there is the option of going to another court, disqualifying these specific judges has no irreversible effect on the outcome of the case. But in the latter case, how can Rabbi Meir hold that since the judges are disqualified, the witnesses are also disqualified without proof? This disqualification nullifies the entire case, as there are no more witnesses.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讻转 讗讞专转

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is not referring to a case where there are no other witnesses. The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is necessary only in a case where there is another set of witnesses, which the litigant did not disqualify. Since disqualifying this set will not predetermine the outcome, the litigant鈥檚 claim that these witnesses are disqualified is accepted.

讛讗 诇讬讻讗 讻转 讗讞专转 诪讗讬 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 诪爪讬 驻住诇讬 讛讬讬谞讜 讚专讘 讚讬诪讬

The Gemara asks: But if there is no other set of witnesses, what is the halakha? Is it indeed true that the litigant cannot disqualify them? If so, this is identical to Rav Dimi鈥檚 interpretation that the mishna is referring to a case where there are two sets of witnesses.

讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讬讙讜 讚诪专 住讘专 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬讙讜 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪讬讙讜

The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the principle that since [miggo] one of the litigant鈥檚 claims is found to be correct, it can be assumed that other claims of his are correct as well. As one Sage, Ravin, holds that according to Rabbi Meir, we say miggo, i.e., this principle should be followed, and one Sage, Rav Dimi, holds that we do not say miggo, but rather the litigant is required to prove every claim he makes.

讙讜驻讗 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 壮驻讛 拽讚讜砖 讬讗诪专 讚讘专 讝讛壮 转谞讬 注讚讜

搂 The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.

讗讬谞讬 讜讛讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛专讜讗讛 讗转 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘讘讬转 讛诪讚专砖 讻讗讬诇讜 注讜拽专 讛专讬诐 讜讟讜讞谞谉 讝讛 讘讝讛

The Gemara asks: Is that so? Was it in character for Reish Lakish to speak of Rabbi Meir with such reverence when disagreeing with his ruling? But doesn鈥檛 Ulla say: When one sees Reish Lakish studying Torah in the study hall it is as though he is uprooting mountains and grinding them into each other? Reish Lakish was evidently very sharp in his analyses.

讗诪专 专讘讬谞讗 讜讛诇讗 讻诇 讛专讜讗讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讘讬转 讛诪讚专砖 讻讗讬诇讜 注讜拽专 讛专讬 讛专讬诐 讜讟讜讞谞谉 讝讛 讘讝讛

Ravina said in response: What is the difficulty? But is it not so that when anyone sees Rabbi Meir studying Torah in the study hall, it is as though he is uprooting the highest of mountains and grinding them into each other? Rabbi Meir was a greater scholar than Reish Lakish, so it was fitting for Reish Lakish to speak of him with reverence.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讘讗 讜专讗讛 讻诪讛 诪讞讘讘讬谉 讝讛 讗转 讝讛

The Gemara answers: The question: Is that so, was not stated to raise a difficulty; rather, this is what he is saying, i.e., this is what the Gemara was noting: Come and see how much the Sages love each other. Although Reish Lakish was himself very sharp and a great Torah scholar, he spoke of Rabbi Meir with reverence.

讻讬 讛讗 讚讬转讬讘 专讘讬 讜拽讗诪专 讗住讜专 诇讛讟诪讬谉 讗转 讛爪讜谞谉 讗诪专 诇驻谞讬讜 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讘讗 讛转讬专 诇讛讟诪讬谉 讗转 讛爪讜谞谉 讗诪专 诇讛诐 讻讘专 讛讜专讛 讝拽谉

The Gemara cites another example of Torah scholars who spoke of each other with reverence. It is like that incident where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold, as this may lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat to keep it hot. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before him: My father ruled that it is permitted to insulate cold food on Shabbat. There is no concern that this will lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi subsequently said to those who asked him about this issue: I retract my previous statement; the elder, Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling on this topic, and I defer to his ruling.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讗 讜专讗讛 讻诪讛 诪讞讘讘讬谉 讝讛 讗转 讝讛 讚讗讬诇讜 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 拽讬讬诐 讛讬讛 讻驻讜祝 讜讬讜砖讘 诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讚讛讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讘专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诪诪诇讗 诪拽讜诐 讗讘讜转讬讜 讛讜讛 讜讛讬讛 讻驻讜祝 讜讬讜砖讘 诇驻谞讬 专讘讬 讜拽讗 讗诪专 讻讘专 讛讜专讛 讝拽谉

Rav Pappa says: Come and see how much they loved each other. As, had Rabbi Yosei still been alive, he would have been subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student, as Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was his fathers鈥 replacement, i.e., he was as great a Torah scholar as his forebears, and he was subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student. And, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The elder has already issued a ruling on this topic, and he deferred to Rabbi Yosei鈥檚 ruling.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 诪讗讬 讚讻转讬讘 讜讗拽讞 诇讬 讗转 砖谞讬 诪拽诇讜转 诇讗讞讚 拽专讗转讬 谞讜注诐 讜诇讗讞讚 拽专讗转讬 讞讜讘诇讬诐 谞讜注诐 讗诇讜 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 砖讘讗专抓 讬砖专讗诇 砖诪谞注讬诪讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讛诇讻讛 讞讜讘诇讬诐 讗诇讜 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 砖讘讘讘诇 砖诪讞讘诇讬诐 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讛诇讻讛

This demonstrates what Rabbi Oshaya says: What is the meaning of that which is written: 鈥淎nd I took for myself two staves; the one I called Graciousness, and the other I called Binders鈥 (Zechariah 11:7)? 鈥淕raciousness鈥; these are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are gracious to one another in discussions of halakha. They treat each other with honor and love, as demonstrated in the statements of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. 鈥淏inders [岣velim]鈥; these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who injure [sheme岣bbelim] each other in discussions of halakha, i.e., they speak harshly to each other when they disagree.

讜讬讗诪专 讗诇讬 讗诇讛 [砖谞讬] 讘谞讬 讛讬爪讛专 讛注诪讚讬诐 讜讙讜壮 讜砖谞讬诐 讝讬转讬诐 注诇讬讛 讬爪讛专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讗诇讜 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 砖讘讗专抓 讬砖专讗诇 砖谞讜讞讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讛诇讻讛 讻砖诪谉 讝讬转 讜砖谞讬诐 讝讬转讬诐 注诇讬讛 讗诇讜 转诇诪讬讚讬 讞讻诪讬诐 砖讘讘讘诇 砖诪专讜专讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讛诇讻讛 讻讝讬转

Similarly, it is stated: 鈥淭hen he said to me: These are the two anointed ones, that stand by the Lord of the whole earth鈥 (Zechariah 4:14), and it is stated: 鈥淎nd two olive trees by it, one upon the right side of the bowl, and the other upon its left side鈥 (Zechariah 4:3). With regard to the expression 鈥渁nointed ones,鈥 Rabbi Yitz岣k says: These are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are pleasant to each other in discussions of halakha like olive oil, which is not bitter. The verse 鈥渁nd two olive trees by it鈥 should be interpreted as follows: These are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who are bitter to each other in discussions of halakha like an olive.

讜讗砖讗 注讬谞讬 讜讗专讗 讜讛谞讛 砖转讬诐 谞砖讬诐 讬讜爪讗讜转 讜专讜讞 讘讻谞驻讬讛诐 讜诇讛谞讛 讻谞驻讬诐 讻讻谞驻讬 讛讞住讬讚讛 讜转砖讗谞讛 讛讗讬驻讛 讘讬谉 讛砖诪讬诐 讜讘讬谉 讛讗专抓 讜讗诪专 讗诇 讛诪诇讗讱 讛讚讘专 讘讬 讗谞讛 讛诪讛 诪讜诇讻讜转 讗转 讛讗讬驻讛 讜讬讗诪专 讗诇讬 诇讘谞讜转 诇讛 讘讬转 讘讗专抓 砖谞注专 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讗讬 讝讜 讞谞讜驻讛 讜讙住讜转 讛专讜讞 砖讬专讚讜 诇讘讘诇

The Gemara interprets another verse in Zechariah: 鈥淭hen I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then I said to the angel that spoke with me: To where do they take the measure? And he said to me: To build her a house in the land of Shinar鈥 (Zechariah 5:9鈥11). Rabbi Yo岣nan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i: This measure refers to flattery and arrogance that descended to Babylonia, i.e., Shinar.

讜讙住讜转 讛专讜讞 诇讘讘诇 谞讞讬转 讜讛讗诪专 诪专 注砖专讛 拽讘讬谉 讙住讜转 讬专讚讜 诇注讜诇诐 转砖注讛 谞讟诇讛 注讬诇诐 讜讗讞转 讻诇 讛注讜诇诐 讻讜诇讜

The Gemara asks: And did arrogance descend to Babylonia? But doesn鈥檛 the Master say: Ten kav of arrogance descended to the world; Eilam took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one?

讗讬谉 诇讘讘诇 谞讞讬转 讜讗讬砖转专讘讜讘讬 讚讗讬砖转专讘讘 诇注讬诇诐 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚讻转讬讘 诇讘谞讜转 诇讛 讘讬转 讘讗专抓 砖谞注专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara answers: Yes, it descended to Babylonia, and it made its way to Eilam. The language of the verse is also precise, as it is written: 鈥淭o build her a house in the land of Shinar,鈥 which indicates that the original intention was to build a house in Babylonia, but it was not built there. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that arrogance did not remain in Babylonia.

讜讛讗诪专 诪专 住讬诪谉 诇讙住讜转 讛专讜讞 注谞讬讜转 讜注谞讬讜转 诇讘讘诇 谞讞讬转 诪讗讬 注谞讬讜转 注谞讬讜转 转讜专讛 讚讻转讬讘 讗讞讜转 诇谞讜 拽讟谞讛 讜砖讚讬诐 讗讬谉 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讝讜 注讬诇诐 砖讝讻转讛 诇诇诪讜讚 讜诇讗 讝讻转讛 诇诇诪讚

The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 the Master say: A sign of arrogance is poverty? And poverty descended to Babylonia, not to Eilam. The Gemara answers: To what kind of poverty is this referring? It is poverty with regard to Torah, which was characteristic of Eilam. As it is written: 鈥淲e have a little sister, and she has no breasts鈥 (Song of Songs 8:8), and Rabbi Yo岣nan says: This refers to Eilam, whose inhabitants merited to learn Torah but did not merit to teach it. They did not produce Torah scholars capable of imparting their wisdom to others.

诪讗讬 讘讘诇 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘诇讜诇讛 讘诪拽专讗 讘诇讜诇讛 讘诪砖谞讛 讘诇讜诇讛 讘转诇诪讜讚 讘诪讞砖讻讬诐 讛讜砖讬讘谞讬 讻诪转讬 注讜诇诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 讝讛 转诇诪讜讚讛 砖诇 讘讘诇

The Gemara asks: What is the homiletic interpretation of the word Babylonia? Rabbi Yo岣nan says, as a tribute to the Jewish community of Babylonia and its Torah scholars: It means mixed with Bible, mixed with Mishna, and mixed with Talmud. Other Sages had a different opinion of the Torah in Babylonia: With regard to the verse: 鈥淗e has made me dwell in dark places, as those that have been long dead鈥 (Lamentations 3:6), Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is the Talmud of Babylonia, which is not as clear as the Talmud of Eretz Yisrael.

诪转谞讬壮 讗诪专 诇讜 谞讗诪谉 注诇讬 讗讘讗 谞讗诪谉 注诇讬 讗讘讬讱 谞讗诪谞讬诐 注诇讬 砖诇砖讛 专讜注讬 讘拽专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

MISHNA: If one litigant says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract it, but must accept their verdict.

讛讬讛 讞讬讬讘 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讘讜注讛 讜讗诪专 诇讜 讚讜专 诇讬 讘讞讬讬 专讗砖讱 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

Similarly, one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, which is done while grasping a sacred object, and the latter said to him: Instead of taking an oath, merely vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and demand that the other litigant take an oath, as he is obligated to do by Torah law. And the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer. Once he has agreed to accept a vow, which is of less severity than an oath, he cannot retract his agreement.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讚讬诪讬 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讬讜住祝 讻讙讜谉 讚拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚

GEMARA: Rav Dimi, son of Rav Na岣an, son of Rav Yosef, says: The case of a litigant who accepts his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge is referring to where the litigant accepted this relative upon himself as one of the judges in a court of three, where the other two judges are fit. It is not referring to where he accepted him as the sole judge.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 讗讘诇 讘讗转谉 诇讱 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the claimant had said to the defendant: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you if my father or your father rules as judge to that effect, and the claimant subsequently wishes to retract his offer. But in a case where it is the defendant who said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge, everyone agrees that he can retract his offer. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 讜讘讬谉 讘讝讜 诪讞诇讜拽转

A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan: Is the dispute only with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer? Or perhaps Rabbi Yo岣nan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case?

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讗转谉 诇讱 讗讘诇 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from that which Rava says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 讜讘讬谉 讘讝讜 诪讞诇讜拽转 专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻诪讗谉

Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yo岣nan too, the dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer; this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yo岣nan the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha? His statement is in accordance with neither Shmuel鈥檚 opinion nor Rabbi Yo岣nan鈥檚 opinion.

专讘讗 讟注诪讗 讚谞驻砖讬讛 拽讗诪专

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps Rava is stating his own explanation of the dispute.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专 转讞诇讬驻讗 诇专讘讗 讛讬讛 讞讬讬讘 诇讞讘讬专讜 砖讘讜注讛 讜讗诪专 诇讜 壮讚讜专 诇讬 讘讞讬讬 专讗砖讱壮 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

Rav A岣 bar Ta岣ifa raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from the latter clause in the mishna: With regard to one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, and the latter said to him: Vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讗讜转谉 讛谞砖讘注讬谉 讜诇讗 诪砖诇诪讬谉 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻诪讞讜诇 诇讱

What, is it not referring to those who take an oath and do not pay, i.e., cases where the defendant is obligated to take an oath that the claim against him is false, and he is thereby exempt from paying? Accordingly, it is the claimant who suggests that the defendant take a vow instead, which is the same as saying: If you take a vow, the money I claim you owe is forgiven you.

诇讗 讘讗讜转谉 讛谞砖讘注讬谉 讜谞讜讟诇讬谉 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 讻讗转谉 诇讱

The Gemara rejects this objection: No, it is referring to those who take an oath and collect a debt. There are cases where it is the claimant who is obligated to take an oath, and he then collects the money that he claims. In a case where the defendant suggests that the claimant take a vow instead, it is the same as saying: If you take a vow I will give you what you claim.

讜讛讗 转谞讗 诇讬讛 专讬砖讗

The Gemara challenges: But according to Rava鈥檚 interpretation, the mishna already taught the halakha in a case where the defendant says: I will give you, in the first clause, where the defendant accepts unfit judges.

转谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讜转谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜

The Gemara answers: The mishna taught in the former clause a case where the defendant makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, namely, his father or the father of the claimant; and the mishna taught in the latter clause a case where he makes the outcome dependent on the claimant鈥檚 own decision.

讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 转谞讗 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 讗讞专讬诐 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚诪爪讬 讛讚专 讘讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 讙诪专 讜诪拽谞讬 讚讗诪专 诪讬 讬讬诪专 讚诪讝讻讬 诇讬讛 讗讘诇 转讜诇讛 讘讚注转 注爪诪讜 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讛讜 诇专讘谞谉

And it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases, since if the mishna taught only the case where he makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, one might reason that specifically in this case Rabbi Meir says that he can retract his acceptance of the unfit judges. This is because he presumably did not resolve to transfer the money if these judges deem him liable, as he must have said to himself: Who will say that the judges will rule in favor of the claimant? But in a case where he makes the outcome dependent on the claimant鈥檚 own decision by suggesting that he take a vow, say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that the defendant cannot retract his commitment to pay.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专讬 专讘谞谉 讗讘诇 讘讛讛讬讗 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讜 诇讬讛 专讘谞谉 诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if the mishna would teach us only this latter case, where the defendant suggests that the claimant take a vow, one might reason that specifically in this case the Rabbis say that he cannot retract his offer; but in that former case, where he makes the outcome dependent on the decision of others, say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that he can retract his acceptance of the unfit judges. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases.

讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪讞诇讜拽转 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讗讘诇 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转

Reish Lakish says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerns whether or not one can retract his acceptance of unfit judges before the verdict is issued. But after the verdict is issued, everyone agrees that one cannot retract his acceptance, as he has already been deemed liable. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The dispute concerns whether or not one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 讗讜 讚讬诇诪讗 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 讜讘讬谉 讘讝讜 诪讞诇讜拽转

A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan: Is the dispute over whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, but before the verdict is issued, everyone agrees that he can retract his acceptance? Or perhaps Rabbi Yo岣nan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 拽讬讘诇 注诇讬讜 拽专讜讘 讗讜 驻住讜诇 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma, as Rava says: If one accepted a relative upon himself as a judge or witness, or if he accepted one who is disqualified for another reason from serving as a judge or a witness, he can retract his acceptance before the verdict is issued. He cannot retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讘诇 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讘讜 专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谞谉 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 讘讬谉 讘讝讜 诪讞诇讜拽转 专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻诪讗谉

Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yo岣nan too, the dispute concerns whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, but before the verdict is issued everyone agrees that one can retract his acceptance; then this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, and according to the opinion of the Rabbis. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yo岣nan, the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha? His statement is in accordance with the opinion of neither Reish Lakish nor Rabbi Yo岣nan.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

Rather, must we not conclude from Rava鈥檚 statement that the dispute is over whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from Rava鈥檚 statement that this is so.

砖诇讞 诇讬讛 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬注拽讘 讬诇诪讚谞讜 专讘讬谞讜 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讜 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讛诇讻讛 讻讚讘专讬 诪讬 砖诇讞 诇讬讛 诇讗讞专 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讛诇讻讛 讻讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐

Rav Na岣an, son of Rav 岣sda, sent the following question to Rav Na岣an bar Ya鈥檃kov: Our teacher, instruct us: Does the dispute concern whether or not one can retract his acceptance before the verdict is issued, or does the dispute concern whether or not one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued? And furthermore, in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? Rav Na岣an bar Ya鈥檃kov sent to him in response: The dispute concerns whether one can retract his acceptance after the verdict is issued, and the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讻讬 砖诇讞 诇讬讛 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讗讜 讘诪讞讜诇 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讛诇讻讛 讻讚讘专讬 诪讬 砖诇讞 诇讬讛 讘讗转谉 诇讱 诪讞诇讜拽转 讜讛诇讻讛 讻讚讘专讬 讞讻诪讬诐

Rav Ashi says a different version of the question and answer: This is the question that Rav Na岣an, son of Rav 岣sda, sent to Rav Na岣an bar Ya鈥檃kov: Is the dispute with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, or is the dispute with regard to a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you? And furthermore, in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? Rav Na岣an bar Ya鈥檃kov sent this response to him: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, and the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis.

讘住讜专讗 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 讘驻讜诪讘讚讬转讗 诪转谞讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 讘专 砖诇诪讬讛 砖诇讞讜 诇讬讛 诪讘讬 专讘 诇砖诪讜讗诇 讬诇诪讚谞讜 专讘讬谞讜 诇驻谞讬 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讜拽谞讜 诪讬讚讜 诪讗讬 砖诇讞 诇讛讜 讗讬谉 诇讗讞专 拽谞讬讬谉 讻诇讜诐

In Sura they teach that previous version of the question and the answer. In Pumbedita they teach this following version: Rav 岣nina bar Shelemya says that they sent the following question from Rav鈥檚 study hall to Shmuel: Our teacher, instruct us: In a case where one litigant wishes to retract his acceptance of the judges before the verdict is issued, and the other litigant had performed a formal act of acquisition with him giving legal power to the acceptance, what is the halakha? Shmuel sent them in response: Nothing can be retracted after an act of acquisition was performed.

诪转谞讬壮 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 讛驻住讜诇讬谉 讛诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 讜讛诪诇讜讛 讘专讬讘讬转 讜诪驻专讬讞讬 讬讜谞讬诐 讜住讜讞专讬 砖讘讬注讬转

MISHNA: And these on the following list are the ones who are disqualified by the Sages from bearing witness due to their unseemly behavior, as they are considered wicked individuals guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice [bekubbiyya] for money, and one who lends money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, which may be eaten but may not be sold as an object of commerce.

讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘转讞讬诇讛 讛讬讜 拽讜专讬谉 讗讜转谉 讗讜住驻讬 砖讘讬注讬转 诪砖专讘讜 讛讗谞住讬谉 讞讝专讜 诇拽专讜转谉 住讜讞专讬 砖讘讬注讬转

Rabbi Shimon said: Initially, people would call them: Gatherers of the produce of the Sabbatical Year. Once the tax collectors grew abundant they would then call them: Merchants who trade in the produce of the Sabbatical Year, as the Gemara will explain.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讗讜诪谞讜转 讗诇讗 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讜诪谞讜转 砖诇讗 讛讜讗 讻砖专讬谉

Rabbi Yehuda said: When are the people listed above disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one, although they also make money by these inappropriate means, they are fit to bear witness.

讙诪壮 诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 诪讗讬 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讗诪专 专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讛 讗住诪讻转讗 讜讗住诪讻转讗 诇讗 拽谞讬讗

GEMARA: With regard to one who plays with dice for money, what is he doing that disqualifies him from bearing witness? Rami bar 岣ma says: He is disqualified because gambling is a transaction with inconclusive consent [asmakhta], as one who gambles does not have conclusive consent to pay when he loses since he plays under the assumption that he will win. And as an asmakhta does not effect acquisition, the one who wins takes money that is not legally his, and is considered a robber.

专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讻诇 讻讬 讛讗讬 讙讜讜谞讗 诇讗讜 讗住诪讻转讗 讛讬讗 讗诇讗 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 注住讜拽讬谉 讘讬讬砖讜讘讜 砖诇 注讜诇诐

Rav Sheshet says: Any case like this is not an asmakhta. In a game of dice both sides realize that they might lose, and consent at the outset to pay if that happens. Rather, those who play dice are disqualified because they are not involved in settling the world, i.e., in productive occupations that demand hard work. Since they do not realize the effort required of most people to earn a living they might not be scrupulous about other people鈥檚 money, and their testimony cannot be relied upon.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讙诪专 讗讜诪谞讜转讗 讗讞专讬转讬

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the explanations of Rami bar 岣ma and Rav Sheshet? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where the dice player learns another occupation, and is involved in that occupation as well. According to Rav Sheshet, since he has a productive occupation he is fit to bear witness. According to Rami bar 岣ma, since he is considered a robber, as the money he gains from gambling is not legally his, he is disqualified.

讜转谞谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讬诪转讬 讘讝诪谉 砖讗讬谉 诇讛谉 讗讜诪谞讜转 讗诇讗 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讬砖 诇讛谉 讗讜诪谞讜转 砖诇讗 讛讜讗 讛专讬 讝讛 讻砖专讬诐 讗诇诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚诪转谞讬转讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讬讬砖讜讘讜 砖诇 注讜诇诐 讛讜讗 拽砖讬讗 诇专诪讬 讘专 讞诪讗

The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion of Rami bar 岣ma: But we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: When are they disqualified from bearing witness? It is when they have no occupation but this one. But if they have an occupation other than this one they are fit to bear witness. Apparently, the reason that the mishna disqualifies these individuals from bearing witness is that they are not involved in settling the world, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rami bar 岣ma.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 讻诇 诪拽讜诐 砖讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

And if you would say this is not difficult, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, this would be a problem as well. But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: Any place where Rabbi Yehuda says in the corpus of the Mishna:

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