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Today's Daf Yomi

August 11, 2017 | 讬状讟 讘讗讘 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Sanhedrin 27

Family tree. If someone is convicted as a false witness (ed zomem), is any testimony of his from the time he testified falsely, inadmissible or is it only from the time he is convicted? 聽If one eats non kosher meat to express insolence but not for financial reasons or because he desires it, is one disqualified from being a witness? 聽Both these cases are debates between Rava and Abaye. 聽Which relatives are disqualified from being witnesses? 聽Where are the laws of relatives derived from?

注讚 讝讜诪诐 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诇诪驻专注 讛讜讗 谞驻住诇 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诪讬讻谉 讜诇讛讘讗 讛讜讗 谞驻住诇

concerning a conspiring witness: Abaye says: He is disqualified retroactively, from when he provided his testimony. Any testimony he may have provided after that point in time is retroactively nullified. And Rava says: He is disqualified only from that point forward, i.e., from when he was established to be a conspiring witness, but not retroactively from when he provided his testimony.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诇诪驻专注 讛讜讗 谞驻住诇 诪注讬讚谞讗 讚讗住讛讬讚 专砖注 讛讜讗 讜讛转讜专讛 讗诪专讛 讗诇 转砖转 讬讚讱 注诐 专砖注 讗诇 转砖转 专砖注 注讚

The Gemara explains the reasons for the two opinions: Abaye says he is disqualified retroactively because it is from that time when he testified that he is considered a wicked man. And the Torah stated: 鈥淒o not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness鈥 (Exodus 23:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not allow a wicked man to serve as a witness.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诪讬讻谉 讜诇讛讘讗 讛讜讗 谞驻住诇 注讚 讝讜诪诐 讞讬讚讜砖 讛讜讗 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚住诪讻转 讗讛谞讬 住诪讜讱 讗讛谞讬 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讜 讗诇讗 诪砖注转 讞讬讚讜砖讜 讜讗讬诇讱

Rava says that he is disqualified only from that point forward because the disqualification of a conspiring witness is a novelty, i.e., it is not based on logic. The reason is that this is a case of two witnesses against two other witnesses, in which case the testimony of neither should be accepted. What did you see that causes you to rely on the second set of witnesses, who testify that the first set were not at the scene of the purported event? You could instead rely upon the first set of witnesses, who testify to the event, and consequently disbelieve the second set. Yet the Torah teaches that the second set of witnesses is always deemed credible and the first set is subjected to punishment as conspiring witnesses. Therefore, as the disqualification of a conspiring witness is an anomaly, you have the right to disqualify him only from the time of its novelty and onward; this counterintuitive disqualification is not applied retroactively.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 专讘讗 谞诪讬 讻讗讘讬讬 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讜诪讗讬 讟注诐 拽讗诪专 诪讻讗谉 讜诇讛讘讗 诪砖讜诐 驻住讬讚讗 讚诇拽讜讞讜转

There are those who say that Rava also holds like Abaye, who says that by rights a conspiring witness should be disqualified retroactively from when he provided his testimony. And what is the reason Rava says that the witness is disqualified only from that point forward? It is due to the potential monetary loss for purchasers, whose acquisitions had been validated by these witnesses between the time of the witnesses鈥 first testimony and when they were rendered conspiring witnesses. If the disqualification of the witnesses were applied retroactively, as by right it should, all these transactions would be nullified, which would cause a loss to these purchasers.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬 转专讬 讘讞讚 讗讬 谞诪讬 讚驻住诇讬谞讛讜 讘讙讝诇谞讜转讗

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two explanations of Rava鈥檚 opinion? After all, according to both explanations Rava did not apply the disqualification of conspiring witnesses retroactively. The Gemara explains that there is a difference between them in a case where two witnesses testify about one of the witnesses that he was not at the scene of the supposed event, and two other witnesses testify about the other witness in a similar manner. Alternatively, there is a practical difference between the two explanations in a case where two witnesses disqualified the first set of witnesses by testifying that the first set had once committed robbery and are therefore unfit to give testimony. If the reason Rava does not disqualify conspiring witnesses retroactively is that it is a novel ruling, it is limited to that case. But if it is to protect purchasers, that would apply to the disqualifications of all witnesses, not only conspiring witnesses.

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讚讬驻转讬 注讘讚 专讘 驻驻讬 注讜讘讚讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚讗讘讬讬

And Rav Yirmeya of Difti related: Rav Pappi once performed an action, i.e., issued a practical ruling, in accordance with the opinion of Rava. Mar bar Rav Ashi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚讗讘讬讬 讘讬注诇 拽讙诐

The Gemara comments: And in disputes between Abaye and Rava the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, except for six cases in which the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye. They are: In the cases represented by the mnemonic yod, ayin, lamed, kuf, gimmel, mem: Unknown despair [ye鈥檜sh]; conspiring witnesses [eidim] who are disqualified retroactively; a side post [le岣] standing alone; betrothal [kiddushin] that is not given to consummation; revealing intent with a bill of divorce [get]; and an apostate [mumar] who sins rebelliously.

诪讜诪专 讗讜讻诇 谞讘讬诇讜转 诇转讬讗讘讜谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇

搂 The Gemara cites another dispute between Abaye and Rava with regard to disqualification of a witness. Concerning a transgressor who eats carcasses, i.e., non-kosher meat, due to appetite, i.e., because he desires this type of meat, or because it is less expensive or otherwise more accessible, everyone agrees that he is disqualified from bearing witness; it is suspected that just as he transgresses the halakhot of the Torah to satisfy his appetite, so too, he is willing to testify falsely for personal benefit.

诇讛讻注讬住 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 驻住讜诇 专讘讗 讗诪专 讻砖专

With regard to one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence, Abaye says that he is disqualified from bearing witness and Rava says that he is fit.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 驻住讜诇 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 专砖注 讜专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 讗诇 转砖转 专砖注 注讚 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 讻砖专 专砖注 讚讞诪住 讘注讬谞谉

Abaye says he is disqualified because he is wicked, and the Merciful One states: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness. And Rava says that he is fit because for one to be disqualified from bearing witness we require him to be a wicked person guilty of specifically a monetary transgression [de岣mas], e.g., robbery. This is because the verse: 鈥淒o not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous [岣mas] witness鈥 (Exodus 23:1) alludes to such a transgression.

诪讬转讬讘讬 壮讗诇 转砖转 专砖注 注讚壮 壮讗诇 转砖转 讞诪住 注讚壮 讗诇讜 讙讝诇谞讬谉 讜诪讜注诇讬谉 讘砖讘讜注讜转 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讞讚 砖讘讜注转 砖讜讗 讜讗讞讚 砖讘讜注转 诪诪讜谉

The Gemara raises an objection to Rava鈥檚 opinion from a baraita: The verse: 鈥淒o not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous [岣mas] witness,鈥 is interpreted in the following manner: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness; do not put one who is guilty of a monetary transgression in a position to serve as a witness. These are robbers and those who betray oaths, who are disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara explains the objection: What, doesn鈥檛 the category of those who betray oaths refer to both one who takes an oath in vain, without any monetary application, and one who falsely takes an oath concerning monetary matters? Apparently, any transgressor is disqualified, even if he did so to express insolence and not for monetary gain.

诇讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 砖讘讜注转 诪诪讜谉 讜诪讗讬 砖讘讜注讜转 砖讘讜注讜转 讚注诇诪讗

The Gemara answers: No, both this and that oath included in the phrase in the baraita: Those who betray oaths, are oaths concerning monetary matters. And accordingly, what is the reason the baraita uses the word oaths, in the plural? The baraita is referring to oaths in general, not to multiple categories of oaths.

诪讬转讬讘讬 壮讗诇 转砖转 专砖注 注讚壮 壮讗诇 转砖转 讞诪住 注讚壮 讗诇讜 讙讝诇谞讬谉 讜诪诇讜讬 专讘讬讜转 转讬讜讘转讗 讚讗讘讬讬 转讬讜讘转讗

The Gemara raises an objection to Abaye鈥檚 opinion from a baraita: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness; do not put one who is guilty of a monetary transgression in a position to serve as a witness. These are robbers and those who lend money with interest. The fact that only monetary transgressions are mentioned does not accord with the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Abaye is indeed a conclusive refutation.

谞讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 注讚 讝讜诪诐 驻住讜诇 诇讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讛讜讝诐 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讗讘诇 讛讜讝诐 讘讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讻砖专 诇讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m: A conspiring witness is disqualified from bearing witness about any matter in the entire Torah. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: In what situation is this statement said? Where he was rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a case of capital law; since he is assumed to have testified falsely with regard to a matter of life and death, he would certainly treat less serious testimonies lightly. Therefore, he is disqualified from bearing witness about any matter. But if he was rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a case of monetary law, he is fit to testify about cases of capital law, as there is no indication that he treats this matter lightly.

谞讬诪讗 讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪拽讜诇讗 诇讞讜诪专讗 讜专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 诪讞讜诪专讗 诇拽讜诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪拽讜诇讗 诇讞讜诪专讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉

The Gemara concludes its suggestion: Let us say that the opinion of Abaye is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the opinion of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara clarifies: The opinion of Abaye is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that we say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a minor issue one is disqualified from bearing witness even with regard to a major issue. And the opinion of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that we say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a relatively major issue one is disqualified with regard to a relatively minor issue; but we do not say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a relatively minor issue one is disqualified even with regard to a relatively major issue.

诇讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No. Everyone agrees that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei one who is rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a minor issue is not suspected of lying about a major issue. When Abaye and Rava disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, i.e., they disagree concerning what Rabbi Meir holds.

讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讙讘讬 注讚 讝讜诪诐 讚诪诪讜谉 讚专注 诇砖诪讬诐 讜专注 诇讘专讬讜转 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚专注 诇砖诪讬诐 讜讗讬谉 专注 诇讘专讬讜转 诇讗

Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and derives from his opinion that one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence is disqualified from bearing witness. And Rava holds that only there, with regard to a conspiring witness in a monetary case, does Rabbi Meir state his ruling that one who is rendered a conspiring witness about a minor issue is suspected of lying with regard to major issues as well. Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that he is both bad toward Heaven, having transgressed the prohibition against bearing false witness, and bad toward people, having caused another to lose money unrightfully. He is therefore suspected of testifying falsely with regard to any matter. But here, with regard to one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence, a person who is bad toward Heaven but is not proven to be bad toward people, he is not disqualified.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚讗讘讬讬 讜讛讗 讗讬转讜转讘 讛讛讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara asks: But wasn鈥檛 his opinion conclusively refuted? The Gemara answers: That baraita from which Abaye鈥檚 opinion was refuted is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and Abaye does not accept his opinion.

讜转讬讛讜讬 谞诪讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The Gemara asks: And let it even be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. According to the principles of halakhic ruling, in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. How can his opinion be rejected?

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讛讬讻讗 住转诐 诇谉

The Gemara answers: There it is different, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it is a general principle that the halakha is in accordance with rulings found in unattributed mishnayot. The Gemara asks: And where did the tanna teach us such an unattributed mishna?

讻讬 讛讗 讚讘专 讞诪讗 拽讟诇 谞驻砖讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇专讘 讗讘讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 驻讜拽 注讬讬谉 讘讛 讗讬 讜讚讗讬 拽讟诇 诇讬讻讛讬讜讛讜 诇注讬谞讬讛 讗转讜 转专讬 住讛讚讬 讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讚讜讚讗讬 拽讟诇 讗讝诇 讗讬讛讜 讗讬讬转讬 转专讬 住讛讚讬 讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讘讞讚 诪讛谞讱 讞讚 讗诪专 拽诪讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讙谞讘 拽讘讗 讚讞讜砖诇讗 讜讞讚 讗诪专 拽诪讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讙谞讘

The Gemara answers that this was established through a certain incident, as that incident occurred in which a man named bar 岣ma killed a person. The Exilarch said to Rav Abba bar Ya鈥檃kov: Go investigate this case, and if he certainly killed him, let them put his eyes out. Subsequently two witnesses came and testified that he certainly killed him. Bar 岣ma then went and brought two other witnesses, who testified about one of those first witnesses. One said: He stole, in my presence, a kav of barley; and one said: He stole, in my presence,

拽转讗 讚讘讜专讟讬讗

the handle of a spear [devortiya].

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讚注转讬讱 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讗诪专 讛讜讝诐 讘讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讻砖专 诇讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转

Rav Abba bar Ya鈥檃kov said to bar 岣ma: Why did you bring these witnesses? What do you hold? Do you hold like Rabbi Meir, that one who is guilty of a monetary transgression is disqualified from bearing witness in capital cases too? But in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yosei say that if one was rendered a conspiring witness in a case of monetary law he is fit to testify in cases of capital law?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 驻驻讬 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讻讗 住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专

Rav Pappi immediately said to him: This statement applies only where the tanna did not teach us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Here, the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

诪诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 讻诇 讛专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讛讗 讗讬讻讗 注讚 讝讜诪诐 讚诪诪讜谉 讚讻砖专 诇讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讜驻住讜诇 诇讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗

The Gemara asks: From what mishna is it seen that the tanna taught an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If we say it is from that which we learned in a mishna (Nidda 49b): Anyone who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law, that is inconclusive. Even though one can compare the halakhot of disqualifying judges to the halakhot of disqualifying witnesses, one cannot cite this as an example of a mishna taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Whose opinion is recorded in this mishna? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, isn鈥檛 there the counterexample of a conspiring witness in monetary matters, who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law but is disqualified from adjudicating cases of monetary law? Rather, is the ruling of the mishna not the opinion of Rabbi Meir?

诪诪讗讬 讚讬诇诪讗 讘驻住讜诇讬 讬讜讞住讬谉 拽讗讬

The Gemara explains why this cannot be the source: If this is the unattributed mishna Rav Pappi was referring to, from where is it derived that it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Perhaps the mishna is referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage, e.g., converts and mamzerim, not those who are disqualified due to sin.

讚讗讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 住讬驻讗 讚拽转谞讬 讬砖 专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 讚讗讬转讝诐 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讛讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讘驻住讜诇 讬讜讞住讬谉 拽讗讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘驻住讜诇 讬讜讞住讬谉 拽讗讬

As, if you do not say so, then with regard to the latter clause of that mishna, which teaches: There is one who is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law but is unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law, to whom could this be referring? Why would one be unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law? If it is referring to one who was rendered a conspiring witness in a case of capital law, is he fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law? But doesn鈥檛 everyone agree that he is disqualified? Rather, the mishna is clearly referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage. Here too, in the first clause, the mishna is referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage.

讗诇讗 讛讻讗 拽讗 住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讚转谞谉 讗诇讜 讛谉 讛驻住讜诇讬诐 讛诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 讜诪诇讜讬 讘专讘讬转 讜诪驻专讬讞讬 讬讜谞讬诐 讜住讜讞专讬 砖讘讬注讬转 讜讛注讘讚讬诐 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇 注讚讜转 砖讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 讻砖讬专讛 诇讛 讗祝 讛谉 讗讬谉 讻砖讬专讬谉 诇讛

Rather, the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna here, as we learned in a mishna (Rosh HaShana 22a): These people are disqualified from bearing witness, as they are considered wicked and guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice, and those who lend money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in produce of the Sabbatical Year. And Canaanite slaves are also disqualified. This is the principle: For any testimony for which a woman is not fit, these too are not fit. Although in certain cases a woman鈥檚 testimony is accepted, e.g., testimony concerning the death of someone鈥檚 husband, in most cases her testimony is not valid.

诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讛讗讬讻讗 注讚讜转 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 砖讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 讻砖专讛 诇讛 讜讛谉 讻砖专讬谉 诇讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗

In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that is difficult: But isn鈥檛 there testimony in cases of capital law, for which a woman is not fit but for which those considered wicked due to having committed monetary transgressions are fit? Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains these people are disqualified from testifying in cases of capital law as well? Apparently, this unspecified mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Therefore, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion.

拽诐 讘专 讞诪讗 谞砖拽讬讛 讗讻专注讬讛 讜拽讘诇讬讛 诇讻专讙讬讛 讚讻讜诇讬 砖谞讬讛

Based on this conclusion, one of the witnesses who testified against bar 岣ma with regard to the murder was disqualified, and bar 岣ma was acquitted. Bar 岣ma then arose and kissed Rabbi Pappi on his feet and accepted upon himself to pay his tax [karga] for all of his years.

诪转谞讬壮 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 讛拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讞讬讜 讜讗讞讬 讗讘讬讜 讜讗讞讬 讗诪讜 讜讘注诇 讗讞讜转讜 讜讘注诇 讗讞讜转 讗讘讬讜 讜讘注诇 讗讞讜转 讗诪讜 讜讘注诇 讗诪讜 讜讞诪讬讜 讜讙讬住讜 讛谉 讜讘谞讬讛谉 讜讞转谞讬讛谉 讜讞讜专讙讜 诇讘讚讜

MISHNA: And these are the ones disqualified from bearing witness or from serving as judges due to their status as relatives of one of the litigants or of each other: One鈥檚 brother, and his paternal uncle, and his maternal uncle, and his sister鈥檚 husband, and the husband of his paternal aunt, and the husband of his maternal aunt, and his mother鈥檚 husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, i.e., the husband of his wife鈥檚 sister. They themselves, all of these people, and also their sons, and their sons-in-law are considered relatives. And his stepson alone is disqualified, but not his stepson鈥檚 sons or sons-in-law.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讝讜 诪砖谞转 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讘诇 诪砖谞讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 讚讜讚讜 讜讘谉 讚讜讚讜 讜讻诇 讛专讗讜讬 诇讬讜专砖讜 讜讻诇 讛拽专讜讘 诇讜 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛

Rabbi Yosei says: This aforementioned halakha is Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 version of the mishna. But the initial version of the mishna reads as follows: His uncle and the son of his uncle, and anyone who is fit to inherit from him. Only paternal relatives, who are fit to inherit from him, are disqualified; maternal relatives, who do not inherit from him, are not disqualified from bearing witness about him or from adjudicating his case. And the halakha disqualifying a relative from bearing witness or serving as a judge is referring to anyone who is related to him at the time of the trial.

讛讬讛 拽专讜讘 讜谞转专讞拽 讛专讬 讝讛 讻砖专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪转讛 讘转讜 讜讬砖 诇讜 讘谞讬诐 诪诪谞讛 讛专讬 讝讛 拽专讜讘

If one was once a relative and became unrelated by the time of the trial, e.g., he married the daughter of one of the litigants, but she died or they were divorced, in this case he is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if his daughter died but her husband, the former son-in-law, has children from her, he is still considered a relative; the children cause them to remain related.

讛讗讜讛讘 讜讛砖讜谞讗 讗讜讛讘 讝讛 砖讜砖讘讬谞讜 砖讜谞讗 讻诇 砖诇讗 讚讘专 注诪讜 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讘讗讬讘讛 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇讗 谞讞砖讚讜 讬砖专讗诇 注诇 讻讱

One who loves or one who hates one of the litigants is also disqualified. With regard to one who loves one of the litigants, this is referring to his groomsman. One who hates is referring to anyone who, out of enmity, did not speak with the litigant for three days. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The Jewish people are not suspected of bearing false witness due to love or hate.

讙诪壮 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 诇诇诪讚 砖诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 讘注讜谉 讘谞讬诐 讜讘谞讬诐 讘注讜谉 讗讘讜转 讛专讬 讻讘专 谞讗诪专 讗讬砖 讘讞讟讗讜 讬讜诪转讜

GEMARA: From where is this matter, that relatives are disqualified from bearing witness, derived? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: 鈥淭he fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:16). Why must the verse state this first clause? If it is to teach that the fathers shall not be put to death for the sin of the children, nor shall the children be put to death for the sin of the fathers, this is unnecessary, as it is in any event stated: 鈥淓very man shall be put to death for his own sin.鈥

讗诇讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 讘注讚讜转 讘谞讬诐 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转 讘注讚讜转 讗讘讜转

Rather, the statement 鈥淭he fathers shall not be put to death for the children鈥 should be interpreted to mean that they shall not be put to death by the testimony of the children, and the statement 鈥淣either shall the children be put to death for the fathers鈥 should be interpreted to mean that they shall not be put to death by the testimony of the fathers.

讜讘谞讬诐 讘注讜谉 讗讘讜转 诇讗 讜讛讻转讬讘 驻拽讚 注讜谉 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: And are children not put to death for the sin of the fathers? But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淰isiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children鈥檚 children, unto the third and unto the fourth generation鈥 (Exodus 34:7)?

讛转诐 讻砖讗讜讞讝讬谉 诪注砖讛 讗讘讜转讬讛谉 讘讬讚讬讛谉

The Gemara answers: There, the verse is referring to a situation where the children adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own. If they do not behave like their ancestors they are not punished for their ancestors鈥 sins.

讻讚转谞讬讗 讜讗祝 讘注讜谞转 讗讘转诐 讗转诐 讬诪拽讜 讻砖讗讜讞讝讬谉 诪注砖讛 讗讘讜转讬讛诐 讘讬讚讬讛诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讻砖讗讜讞讝讬谉 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻砖讗讬谉 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讻砖讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬砖 讘讞讟讗讜 讬讜诪转讜 讛专讬 讻砖讗讜讞讝讬谉 诪注砖讛 讗讘讜转讬讛谉 讘讬讚讬讛谉

This is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse: 鈥淎nd also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them鈥 (Leviticus 26:39), is referring to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own. Do you say that it is referring specifically to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors, or perhaps it applies even where they do not adopt their ancestors鈥 actions? When the verse states: 鈥淓very man shall be put to death for his own sin,鈥 the Torah explicates that one is not put to death if he did not sin. Therefore, the verse in Leviticus is clearly referring to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own.

讜诇讗 讜讛讻转讬讘 讜讻砖诇讜 讗讬砖 讘讗讞讬讜 讗讬砖 讘注讜谉 讗讞讬讜 诪诇诪讚 砖讻讜诇谉 注专讘讬诐 讝讛 讘讝讛

The Gemara asks: And are descendants not punished for the sins of their ancestors unless they adopt their behavior? But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淎nd they shall stumble one upon another鈥 (Leviticus 26:37)? This verse is homiletically interpreted to mean that the Jewish people shall stumble, one due to the iniquity of another, i.e., they are punished for each other鈥檚 sins, which teaches that all Jews are considered guarantors, i.e., responsible, for one another.

讛转诐 砖讛讬讛 讘讬讚诐 诇诪讞讜转 讜诇讗 诪讬讞讜

The Gemara answers: There, in the verse in Leviticus, the reference is to a case where others had the ability to protest the sin but they did not protest. Consequently, they are punished for not protesting, regardless of any familial relationship they may have with the sinner.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Sanhedrin 27

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 27

注讚 讝讜诪诐 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诇诪驻专注 讛讜讗 谞驻住诇 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诪讬讻谉 讜诇讛讘讗 讛讜讗 谞驻住诇

concerning a conspiring witness: Abaye says: He is disqualified retroactively, from when he provided his testimony. Any testimony he may have provided after that point in time is retroactively nullified. And Rava says: He is disqualified only from that point forward, i.e., from when he was established to be a conspiring witness, but not retroactively from when he provided his testimony.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 诇诪驻专注 讛讜讗 谞驻住诇 诪注讬讚谞讗 讚讗住讛讬讚 专砖注 讛讜讗 讜讛转讜专讛 讗诪专讛 讗诇 转砖转 讬讚讱 注诐 专砖注 讗诇 转砖转 专砖注 注讚

The Gemara explains the reasons for the two opinions: Abaye says he is disqualified retroactively because it is from that time when he testified that he is considered a wicked man. And the Torah stated: 鈥淒o not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness鈥 (Exodus 23:1), which is interpreted to mean: Do not allow a wicked man to serve as a witness.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诪讬讻谉 讜诇讛讘讗 讛讜讗 谞驻住诇 注讚 讝讜诪诐 讞讬讚讜砖 讛讜讗 诪讗讬 讞讝讬转 讚住诪讻转 讗讛谞讬 住诪讜讱 讗讛谞讬 讗讬谉 诇讱 讘讜 讗诇讗 诪砖注转 讞讬讚讜砖讜 讜讗讬诇讱

Rava says that he is disqualified only from that point forward because the disqualification of a conspiring witness is a novelty, i.e., it is not based on logic. The reason is that this is a case of two witnesses against two other witnesses, in which case the testimony of neither should be accepted. What did you see that causes you to rely on the second set of witnesses, who testify that the first set were not at the scene of the purported event? You could instead rely upon the first set of witnesses, who testify to the event, and consequently disbelieve the second set. Yet the Torah teaches that the second set of witnesses is always deemed credible and the first set is subjected to punishment as conspiring witnesses. Therefore, as the disqualification of a conspiring witness is an anomaly, you have the right to disqualify him only from the time of its novelty and onward; this counterintuitive disqualification is not applied retroactively.

讗讬讻讗 讚讗诪专讬 专讘讗 谞诪讬 讻讗讘讬讬 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讜诪讗讬 讟注诐 拽讗诪专 诪讻讗谉 讜诇讛讘讗 诪砖讜诐 驻住讬讚讗 讚诇拽讜讞讜转

There are those who say that Rava also holds like Abaye, who says that by rights a conspiring witness should be disqualified retroactively from when he provided his testimony. And what is the reason Rava says that the witness is disqualified only from that point forward? It is due to the potential monetary loss for purchasers, whose acquisitions had been validated by these witnesses between the time of the witnesses鈥 first testimony and when they were rendered conspiring witnesses. If the disqualification of the witnesses were applied retroactively, as by right it should, all these transactions would be nullified, which would cause a loss to these purchasers.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讚讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬 转专讬 讘讞讚 讗讬 谞诪讬 讚驻住诇讬谞讛讜 讘讙讝诇谞讜转讗

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two explanations of Rava鈥檚 opinion? After all, according to both explanations Rava did not apply the disqualification of conspiring witnesses retroactively. The Gemara explains that there is a difference between them in a case where two witnesses testify about one of the witnesses that he was not at the scene of the supposed event, and two other witnesses testify about the other witness in a similar manner. Alternatively, there is a practical difference between the two explanations in a case where two witnesses disqualified the first set of witnesses by testifying that the first set had once committed robbery and are therefore unfit to give testimony. If the reason Rava does not disqualify conspiring witnesses retroactively is that it is a novel ruling, it is limited to that case. But if it is to protect purchasers, that would apply to the disqualifications of all witnesses, not only conspiring witnesses.

讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛 诪讚讬驻转讬 注讘讚 专讘 驻驻讬 注讜讘讚讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘讗 诪专 讘专 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚讗讘讬讬

And Rav Yirmeya of Difti related: Rav Pappi once performed an action, i.e., issued a practical ruling, in accordance with the opinion of Rava. Mar bar Rav Ashi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚讗讘讬讬 讘讬注诇 拽讙诐

The Gemara comments: And in disputes between Abaye and Rava the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, except for six cases in which the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye. They are: In the cases represented by the mnemonic yod, ayin, lamed, kuf, gimmel, mem: Unknown despair [ye鈥檜sh]; conspiring witnesses [eidim] who are disqualified retroactively; a side post [le岣] standing alone; betrothal [kiddushin] that is not given to consummation; revealing intent with a bill of divorce [get]; and an apostate [mumar] who sins rebelliously.

诪讜诪专 讗讜讻诇 谞讘讬诇讜转 诇转讬讗讘讜谉 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇

搂 The Gemara cites another dispute between Abaye and Rava with regard to disqualification of a witness. Concerning a transgressor who eats carcasses, i.e., non-kosher meat, due to appetite, i.e., because he desires this type of meat, or because it is less expensive or otherwise more accessible, everyone agrees that he is disqualified from bearing witness; it is suspected that just as he transgresses the halakhot of the Torah to satisfy his appetite, so too, he is willing to testify falsely for personal benefit.

诇讛讻注讬住 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 驻住讜诇 专讘讗 讗诪专 讻砖专

With regard to one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence, Abaye says that he is disqualified from bearing witness and Rava says that he is fit.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 驻住讜诇 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 专砖注 讜专讞诪谞讗 讗诪专 讗诇 转砖转 专砖注 注讚 讜专讘讗 讗诪专 讻砖专 专砖注 讚讞诪住 讘注讬谞谉

Abaye says he is disqualified because he is wicked, and the Merciful One states: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness. And Rava says that he is fit because for one to be disqualified from bearing witness we require him to be a wicked person guilty of specifically a monetary transgression [de岣mas], e.g., robbery. This is because the verse: 鈥淒o not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous [岣mas] witness鈥 (Exodus 23:1) alludes to such a transgression.

诪讬转讬讘讬 壮讗诇 转砖转 专砖注 注讚壮 壮讗诇 转砖转 讞诪住 注讚壮 讗诇讜 讙讝诇谞讬谉 讜诪讜注诇讬谉 讘砖讘讜注讜转 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讞讚 砖讘讜注转 砖讜讗 讜讗讞讚 砖讘讜注转 诪诪讜谉

The Gemara raises an objection to Rava鈥檚 opinion from a baraita: The verse: 鈥淒o not put your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous [岣mas] witness,鈥 is interpreted in the following manner: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness; do not put one who is guilty of a monetary transgression in a position to serve as a witness. These are robbers and those who betray oaths, who are disqualified from bearing witness. The Gemara explains the objection: What, doesn鈥檛 the category of those who betray oaths refer to both one who takes an oath in vain, without any monetary application, and one who falsely takes an oath concerning monetary matters? Apparently, any transgressor is disqualified, even if he did so to express insolence and not for monetary gain.

诇讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 砖讘讜注转 诪诪讜谉 讜诪讗讬 砖讘讜注讜转 砖讘讜注讜转 讚注诇诪讗

The Gemara answers: No, both this and that oath included in the phrase in the baraita: Those who betray oaths, are oaths concerning monetary matters. And accordingly, what is the reason the baraita uses the word oaths, in the plural? The baraita is referring to oaths in general, not to multiple categories of oaths.

诪讬转讬讘讬 壮讗诇 转砖转 专砖注 注讚壮 壮讗诇 转砖转 讞诪住 注讚壮 讗诇讜 讙讝诇谞讬谉 讜诪诇讜讬 专讘讬讜转 转讬讜讘转讗 讚讗讘讬讬 转讬讜讘转讗

The Gemara raises an objection to Abaye鈥檚 opinion from a baraita: Do not put the wicked in a position to serve as a witness; do not put one who is guilty of a monetary transgression in a position to serve as a witness. These are robbers and those who lend money with interest. The fact that only monetary transgressions are mentioned does not accord with the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Abaye is indeed a conclusive refutation.

谞讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 注讚 讝讜诪诐 驻住讜诇 诇讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讜诪专 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讛讜讝诐 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讗讘诇 讛讜讝诐 讘讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讻砖专 诇讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m: A conspiring witness is disqualified from bearing witness about any matter in the entire Torah. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: In what situation is this statement said? Where he was rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a case of capital law; since he is assumed to have testified falsely with regard to a matter of life and death, he would certainly treat less serious testimonies lightly. Therefore, he is disqualified from bearing witness about any matter. But if he was rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a case of monetary law, he is fit to testify about cases of capital law, as there is no indication that he treats this matter lightly.

谞讬诪讗 讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讗 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗诪专 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪拽讜诇讗 诇讞讜诪专讗 讜专讘讗 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讚讗诪专 诪讞讜诪专讗 诇拽讜诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉 诪拽讜诇讗 诇讞讜诪专讗 诇讗 讗诪专讬谞谉

The Gemara concludes its suggestion: Let us say that the opinion of Abaye is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the opinion of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara clarifies: The opinion of Abaye is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that we say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a minor issue one is disqualified from bearing witness even with regard to a major issue. And the opinion of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that we say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a relatively major issue one is disqualified with regard to a relatively minor issue; but we do not say that from being rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a relatively minor issue one is disqualified even with regard to a relatively major issue.

诇讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No. Everyone agrees that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei one who is rendered a conspiring witness with regard to a minor issue is not suspected of lying about a major issue. When Abaye and Rava disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, i.e., they disagree concerning what Rabbi Meir holds.

讗讘讬讬 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讙讘讬 注讚 讝讜诪诐 讚诪诪讜谉 讚专注 诇砖诪讬诐 讜专注 诇讘专讬讜转 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚专注 诇砖诪讬诐 讜讗讬谉 专注 诇讘专讬讜转 诇讗

Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and derives from his opinion that one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence is disqualified from bearing witness. And Rava holds that only there, with regard to a conspiring witness in a monetary case, does Rabbi Meir state his ruling that one who is rendered a conspiring witness about a minor issue is suspected of lying with regard to major issues as well. Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that he is both bad toward Heaven, having transgressed the prohibition against bearing false witness, and bad toward people, having caused another to lose money unrightfully. He is therefore suspected of testifying falsely with regard to any matter. But here, with regard to one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence, a person who is bad toward Heaven but is not proven to be bad toward people, he is not disqualified.

讜讛诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚讗讘讬讬 讜讛讗 讗讬转讜转讘 讛讛讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara asks: But wasn鈥檛 his opinion conclusively refuted? The Gemara answers: That baraita from which Abaye鈥檚 opinion was refuted is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and Abaye does not accept his opinion.

讜转讬讛讜讬 谞诪讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬

The Gemara asks: And let it even be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. According to the principles of halakhic ruling, in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. How can his opinion be rejected?

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讛讬讻讗 住转诐 诇谉

The Gemara answers: There it is different, as the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it is a general principle that the halakha is in accordance with rulings found in unattributed mishnayot. The Gemara asks: And where did the tanna teach us such an unattributed mishna?

讻讬 讛讗 讚讘专 讞诪讗 拽讟诇 谞驻砖讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讬砖 讙诇讜转讗 诇专讘 讗讘讗 讘专 讬注拽讘 驻讜拽 注讬讬谉 讘讛 讗讬 讜讚讗讬 拽讟诇 诇讬讻讛讬讜讛讜 诇注讬谞讬讛 讗转讜 转专讬 住讛讚讬 讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讚讜讚讗讬 拽讟诇 讗讝诇 讗讬讛讜 讗讬讬转讬 转专讬 住讛讚讬 讗住讛讬讚讜 讘讬讛 讘讞讚 诪讛谞讱 讞讚 讗诪专 拽诪讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讙谞讘 拽讘讗 讚讞讜砖诇讗 讜讞讚 讗诪专 拽诪讗讬 讚讬讚讬 讙谞讘

The Gemara answers that this was established through a certain incident, as that incident occurred in which a man named bar 岣ma killed a person. The Exilarch said to Rav Abba bar Ya鈥檃kov: Go investigate this case, and if he certainly killed him, let them put his eyes out. Subsequently two witnesses came and testified that he certainly killed him. Bar 岣ma then went and brought two other witnesses, who testified about one of those first witnesses. One said: He stole, in my presence, a kav of barley; and one said: He stole, in my presence,

拽转讗 讚讘讜专讟讬讗

the handle of a spear [devortiya].

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗讬 讚注转讬讱 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讗诪专 讛讜讝诐 讘讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讻砖专 诇讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转

Rav Abba bar Ya鈥檃kov said to bar 岣ma: Why did you bring these witnesses? What do you hold? Do you hold like Rabbi Meir, that one who is guilty of a monetary transgression is disqualified from bearing witness in capital cases too? But in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Yosei say that if one was rendered a conspiring witness in a case of monetary law he is fit to testify in cases of capital law?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 驻驻讬 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚诇讗 住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讻讗 住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专

Rav Pappi immediately said to him: This statement applies only where the tanna did not teach us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Here, the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

诪诪讗讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 诪讛讗 讚转谞谉 讻诇 讛专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讬讗 讛讗 讗讬讻讗 注讚 讝讜诪诐 讚诪诪讜谉 讚讻砖专 诇讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讜驻住讜诇 诇讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗

The Gemara asks: From what mishna is it seen that the tanna taught an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If we say it is from that which we learned in a mishna (Nidda 49b): Anyone who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law, that is inconclusive. Even though one can compare the halakhot of disqualifying judges to the halakhot of disqualifying witnesses, one cannot cite this as an example of a mishna taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Whose opinion is recorded in this mishna? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, isn鈥檛 there the counterexample of a conspiring witness in monetary matters, who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law but is disqualified from adjudicating cases of monetary law? Rather, is the ruling of the mishna not the opinion of Rabbi Meir?

诪诪讗讬 讚讬诇诪讗 讘驻住讜诇讬 讬讜讞住讬谉 拽讗讬

The Gemara explains why this cannot be the source: If this is the unattributed mishna Rav Pappi was referring to, from where is it derived that it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Perhaps the mishna is referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage, e.g., converts and mamzerim, not those who are disqualified due to sin.

讚讗讬 诇讗 转讬诪讗 讛讻讬 住讬驻讗 讚拽转谞讬 讬砖 专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讗讬谉 专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讗诪讗讬 讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 讚讗讬转讝诐 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 专讗讜讬 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讛讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 驻住讜诇 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讘驻住讜诇 讬讜讞住讬谉 拽讗讬 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讘驻住讜诇 讬讜讞住讬谉 拽讗讬

As, if you do not say so, then with regard to the latter clause of that mishna, which teaches: There is one who is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law but is unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law, to whom could this be referring? Why would one be unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law? If it is referring to one who was rendered a conspiring witness in a case of capital law, is he fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law? But doesn鈥檛 everyone agree that he is disqualified? Rather, the mishna is clearly referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage. Here too, in the first clause, the mishna is referring to those who are disqualified from serving as judges due to their lineage.

讗诇讗 讛讻讗 拽讗 住转诐 诇谉 转谞讗 讚转谞谉 讗诇讜 讛谉 讛驻住讜诇讬诐 讛诪砖讞拽 讘拽讜讘讬讗 讜诪诇讜讬 讘专讘讬转 讜诪驻专讬讞讬 讬讜谞讬诐 讜住讜讞专讬 砖讘讬注讬转 讜讛注讘讚讬诐 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讻诇 注讚讜转 砖讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 讻砖讬专讛 诇讛 讗祝 讛谉 讗讬谉 讻砖讬专讬谉 诇讛

Rather, the tanna taught us an unattributed mishna here, as we learned in a mishna (Rosh HaShana 22a): These people are disqualified from bearing witness, as they are considered wicked and guilty of monetary transgressions: One who plays with dice, and those who lend money with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants who trade in produce of the Sabbatical Year. And Canaanite slaves are also disqualified. This is the principle: For any testimony for which a woman is not fit, these too are not fit. Although in certain cases a woman鈥檚 testimony is accepted, e.g., testimony concerning the death of someone鈥檚 husband, in most cases her testimony is not valid.

诪谞讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜讛讗讬讻讗 注讚讜转 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 砖讗讬谉 讛讗砖讛 讻砖专讛 诇讛 讜讛谉 讻砖专讬谉 诇讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讬讗

In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that is difficult: But isn鈥檛 there testimony in cases of capital law, for which a woman is not fit but for which those considered wicked due to having committed monetary transgressions are fit? Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains these people are disqualified from testifying in cases of capital law as well? Apparently, this unspecified mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Therefore, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion.

拽诐 讘专 讞诪讗 谞砖拽讬讛 讗讻专注讬讛 讜拽讘诇讬讛 诇讻专讙讬讛 讚讻讜诇讬 砖谞讬讛

Based on this conclusion, one of the witnesses who testified against bar 岣ma with regard to the murder was disqualified, and bar 岣ma was acquitted. Bar 岣ma then arose and kissed Rabbi Pappi on his feet and accepted upon himself to pay his tax [karga] for all of his years.

诪转谞讬壮 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 讛拽专讜讘讬谉 讗讞讬讜 讜讗讞讬 讗讘讬讜 讜讗讞讬 讗诪讜 讜讘注诇 讗讞讜转讜 讜讘注诇 讗讞讜转 讗讘讬讜 讜讘注诇 讗讞讜转 讗诪讜 讜讘注诇 讗诪讜 讜讞诪讬讜 讜讙讬住讜 讛谉 讜讘谞讬讛谉 讜讞转谞讬讛谉 讜讞讜专讙讜 诇讘讚讜

MISHNA: And these are the ones disqualified from bearing witness or from serving as judges due to their status as relatives of one of the litigants or of each other: One鈥檚 brother, and his paternal uncle, and his maternal uncle, and his sister鈥檚 husband, and the husband of his paternal aunt, and the husband of his maternal aunt, and his mother鈥檚 husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, i.e., the husband of his wife鈥檚 sister. They themselves, all of these people, and also their sons, and their sons-in-law are considered relatives. And his stepson alone is disqualified, but not his stepson鈥檚 sons or sons-in-law.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讝讜 诪砖谞转 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讘诇 诪砖谞讛 专讗砖讜谞讛 讚讜讚讜 讜讘谉 讚讜讚讜 讜讻诇 讛专讗讜讬 诇讬讜专砖讜 讜讻诇 讛拽专讜讘 诇讜 讘讗讜转讛 砖注讛

Rabbi Yosei says: This aforementioned halakha is Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 version of the mishna. But the initial version of the mishna reads as follows: His uncle and the son of his uncle, and anyone who is fit to inherit from him. Only paternal relatives, who are fit to inherit from him, are disqualified; maternal relatives, who do not inherit from him, are not disqualified from bearing witness about him or from adjudicating his case. And the halakha disqualifying a relative from bearing witness or serving as a judge is referring to anyone who is related to him at the time of the trial.

讛讬讛 拽专讜讘 讜谞转专讞拽 讛专讬 讝讛 讻砖专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 诪转讛 讘转讜 讜讬砖 诇讜 讘谞讬诐 诪诪谞讛 讛专讬 讝讛 拽专讜讘

If one was once a relative and became unrelated by the time of the trial, e.g., he married the daughter of one of the litigants, but she died or they were divorced, in this case he is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if his daughter died but her husband, the former son-in-law, has children from her, he is still considered a relative; the children cause them to remain related.

讛讗讜讛讘 讜讛砖讜谞讗 讗讜讛讘 讝讛 砖讜砖讘讬谞讜 砖讜谞讗 讻诇 砖诇讗 讚讘专 注诪讜 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讘讗讬讘讛 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇讗 谞讞砖讚讜 讬砖专讗诇 注诇 讻讱

One who loves or one who hates one of the litigants is also disqualified. With regard to one who loves one of the litigants, this is referring to his groomsman. One who hates is referring to anyone who, out of enmity, did not speak with the litigant for three days. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The Jewish people are not suspected of bearing false witness due to love or hate.

讙诪壮 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讚转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗诐 诇诇诪讚 砖诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 讘注讜谉 讘谞讬诐 讜讘谞讬诐 讘注讜谉 讗讘讜转 讛专讬 讻讘专 谞讗诪专 讗讬砖 讘讞讟讗讜 讬讜诪转讜

GEMARA: From where is this matter, that relatives are disqualified from bearing witness, derived? The Gemara answers: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: 鈥淭he fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin鈥 (Deuteronomy 24:16). Why must the verse state this first clause? If it is to teach that the fathers shall not be put to death for the sin of the children, nor shall the children be put to death for the sin of the fathers, this is unnecessary, as it is in any event stated: 鈥淓very man shall be put to death for his own sin.鈥

讗诇讗 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐 讘注讚讜转 讘谞讬诐 讜讘谞讬诐 诇讗 讬讜诪转讜 注诇 讗讘讜转 讘注讚讜转 讗讘讜转

Rather, the statement 鈥淭he fathers shall not be put to death for the children鈥 should be interpreted to mean that they shall not be put to death by the testimony of the children, and the statement 鈥淣either shall the children be put to death for the fathers鈥 should be interpreted to mean that they shall not be put to death by the testimony of the fathers.

讜讘谞讬诐 讘注讜谉 讗讘讜转 诇讗 讜讛讻转讬讘 驻拽讚 注讜谉 讗讘讜转 注诇 讘谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: And are children not put to death for the sin of the fathers? But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淰isiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children鈥檚 children, unto the third and unto the fourth generation鈥 (Exodus 34:7)?

讛转诐 讻砖讗讜讞讝讬谉 诪注砖讛 讗讘讜转讬讛谉 讘讬讚讬讛谉

The Gemara answers: There, the verse is referring to a situation where the children adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own. If they do not behave like their ancestors they are not punished for their ancestors鈥 sins.

讻讚转谞讬讗 讜讗祝 讘注讜谞转 讗讘转诐 讗转诐 讬诪拽讜 讻砖讗讜讞讝讬谉 诪注砖讛 讗讘讜转讬讛诐 讘讬讚讬讛诐 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 讻砖讗讜讞讝讬谉 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 讻砖讗讬谉 讗讜讞讝讬谉 讻砖讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬砖 讘讞讟讗讜 讬讜诪转讜 讛专讬 讻砖讗讜讞讝讬谉 诪注砖讛 讗讘讜转讬讛谉 讘讬讚讬讛谉

This is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse: 鈥淎nd also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them鈥 (Leviticus 26:39), is referring to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own. Do you say that it is referring specifically to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors, or perhaps it applies even where they do not adopt their ancestors鈥 actions? When the verse states: 鈥淓very man shall be put to death for his own sin,鈥 the Torah explicates that one is not put to death if he did not sin. Therefore, the verse in Leviticus is clearly referring to a case where they adopt the actions of their ancestors as their own.

讜诇讗 讜讛讻转讬讘 讜讻砖诇讜 讗讬砖 讘讗讞讬讜 讗讬砖 讘注讜谉 讗讞讬讜 诪诇诪讚 砖讻讜诇谉 注专讘讬诐 讝讛 讘讝讛

The Gemara asks: And are descendants not punished for the sins of their ancestors unless they adopt their behavior? But isn鈥檛 it written: 鈥淎nd they shall stumble one upon another鈥 (Leviticus 26:37)? This verse is homiletically interpreted to mean that the Jewish people shall stumble, one due to the iniquity of another, i.e., they are punished for each other鈥檚 sins, which teaches that all Jews are considered guarantors, i.e., responsible, for one another.

讛转诐 砖讛讬讛 讘讬讚诐 诇诪讞讜转 讜诇讗 诪讬讞讜

The Gemara answers: There, in the verse in Leviticus, the reference is to a case where others had the ability to protest the sin but they did not protest. Consequently, they are punished for not protesting, regardless of any familial relationship they may have with the sinner.

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