Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

August 17, 2017 | ื›ืดื” ื‘ืื‘ ืชืฉืขืดื–

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok.

  • This monthโ€™s learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. โ€œAnd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.โ€

Sanhedrin 32

In bothย monetary and capital cases, the judges question the witnesses in a thorough manner. ย ย The gemara questions this based on a braita and gives a number of potential solutions. ย The mishna delineates many differences between monetary and capital cases. ย The gemara begins by explaining details of things that are unique to capital cases that were mentioned in the mishna.


If the lesson doesn't play, click "Download"

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืื—ื“ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืื—ื“ ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื‘ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ืžืฉืคื˜ ืื—ื“ ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื›ื

MISHNA: Both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to the requirement for inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses, as it is stated: โ€œYou shall have one manner of lawโ€ (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform.

ืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืœื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืฉืœืฉื” ื•ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื‘ืขืฉืจื™ื ื•ืฉืœืฉื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ื•ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื”

Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. What are the differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law? Cases of monetary law are judged by a court of three judges, and cases of capital law are judged by a court of twenty-three judges. In cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. And in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืžื˜ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื—ื“ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ื•ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืžื˜ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื—ื“ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื ื™ื ืœื—ื•ื‘ื”

In cases of monetary law, the court directs, i.e., issues, the ruling based on a majority of one judge, either to exempt, or to find liable. But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืžื—ื–ื™ืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืžื—ื–ื™ืจื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžื—ื–ื™ืจื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื”

In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื”ื›ืœ ืžืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ื—ื•ื‘ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื”ื›ืœ ืžืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ื”ื›ืœ ืžืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื—ื•ื‘ื”

In cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื”ืžืœืžื“ ื—ื•ื‘ื” ืžืœืžื“ ื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ื”ืžืœืžื“ ื–ื›ื•ืช ืžืœืžื“ ื—ื•ื‘ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื”ืžืœืžื“ ื—ื•ื‘ื” ืžืœืžื“ ื–ื›ื•ืช ืื‘ืœ ื”ืžืœืžื“ ื–ื›ื•ืช ืื™ืŸ ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื—ื–ื•ืจ ื•ืœืœืžื“ ื—ื•ื‘ื”

In cases of monetary law, one who initially teaches a reason to find the accused liable may then teach a reason to exempt him, and one who initially teaches a reason to exempt him may then teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื“ื ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ื•ื ื•ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื“ื ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ื•ื ื•ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ื•ื

In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ื‘ื™ื•ื ืฉืœืื—ืจื™ื• ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ืœืคื™ื›ืš ืื™ืŸ ื“ื ื™ืŸ ืœื ื‘ืขืจื‘ ืฉื‘ืช ื•ืœื ื‘ืขืจื‘ ื™ื•ื ื˜ื•ื‘

In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื”ื˜ืžืื•ืช ื•ื”ื˜ื”ืจื•ืช ืžืชื—ื™ืœื™ืŸ ืžืŸ ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœ ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืžืชื—ื™ืœื™ืŸ ืžืŸ ื”ืฆื“

In cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit.

ื”ื›ืœ ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ ืœื“ื•ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ื”ื›ืœ ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ ืœื“ื•ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืืœื ื›ื”ื ื™ื ืœื•ื™ื ื•ื™ืฉืจืืœื™ื ื”ืžืฉื™ืื™ืŸ ืœื›ื”ื•ื ื”

All are fit to judge cases of monetary law. But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.

ื’ืžืณ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืžื™ ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื—ืงื™ืจื” ื•ืจืžื™ื ื”ื• ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื–ืžื ื• ื›ืชื•ื‘ ื‘ืื—ื“ ื‘ื ื™ืกืŸ ื‘ืฉืžื™ื˜ื” ื•ื‘ืื• ืขื“ื™ื ื•ืืžืจื• ืณื”ื™ืืš ืืชื ืžืขื™ื“ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ืฉื˜ืจ ื–ื” ื•ื”ืœื ื‘ื™ื•ื ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืขืžื ื• ื”ื™ื™ืชื ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืคืœื•ื ื™ืณ ืฉื˜ืจ ื›ืฉืจ ื•ืขื“ื™ื• ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ืฉื™ื ืŸ ืฉืžื ืื™ื—ืจื•ื”ื• ื•ื›ืชื‘ื•ื”ื•

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses. The Gemara asks: Do we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 1:2): With regard to a promissory note whose date is written on the first of Nisan of the Sabbatical Year, and witnesses came and said to the signatory witnesses: How is it that you are testifying concerning this promissory note? But is it not so that on such and such day on which the promissory note was written you were with us in such and such place? The promissory note is nevertheless valid, and its witnesses remain fit to bear witness. The reason they are not proven to have signed the promissory note falsely is that we are concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it, i.e., the loan was given on an earlier date, and the promissory note was postdated.

ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื—ืงื™ืจื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื—ื™ื™ืฉื™ื ืŸ ืฉืžื ืื™ื—ืจื•ื”ื• ื•ื›ืชื‘ื•ื”ื•

The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if it enters your mind to say that we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, how are we concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it? The signatory witnesses would be asked on which day they signed the promissory note, and when that does not accord with what is written in the promissory note, their testimony would be disregarded.

ื•ืœื™ื˜ืขืžื™ืš ืชื™ืงืฉื™ ืœืš ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ืฉื˜ืจื™ ื—ื•ื‘ ื”ืžื•ืงื“ืžื™ืŸ ืคืกื•ืœื™ื ื•ื”ืžืื•ื—ืจื™ื ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื—ืงื™ืจื” ืžืื•ื—ืจื™ืŸ ืืžืื™ ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ

The Gemara counters: And according to your reasoning that we do not require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, the mishna elsewhere should pose a difficulty for you as well. As mishnayot are more authoritative than baraitot, it is preferable to raise a contradiction between two mishnayot than to raise a contradiction from a baraita to a mishna. The mishna teaches (Sheviโ€™it 10:5): Antedated promissory notes are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. And if it enters your mind to say we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law and that if there is a contradiction the testimony is not accepted, why are postdated promissory notes valid? The witnessesโ€™ testimony does not accord with what is written in the document.

ื”ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื“ืขื“ื™ืคื ืžื™ื ื” ืงืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื“ืืคื™ืœื• ืื—ื“ ื‘ื ื™ืกืŸ ื“ืœื ืฉื›ื™ื—ื™ ืื™ื ืฉื™ ื“ืžื•ื–ืคื™ ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ืฉืžื ืื™ื—ืจื•ื”ื• ื•ื›ืชื‘ื•ื”ื• ื“ืœื ืžืจืข ืœืฉื˜ืจื™ื” ืืคื™ืœื• ื”ื›ื™ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ืกื•ืคื” ืžืฉืžื˜ืช ืžื›ืฉืจื™ื ืŸ

The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. There is a reason why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna. We are saying a better, i.e., stronger, contradiction than the one from the mishna. As one sees in the baraita that even with regard to a promissory note written on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical Year, when it is not common to find people to lend money, as all debts are canceled at the close of the Sabbatical Year, where it is not as reasonable to say that perhaps they delayed and wrote the promissory note, as one would not damage his promissory note by postdating it so close to the end of the Sabbatical Year; even so, since the Sabbatical Year cancels debts only at its close, we are concerned that the promissory note is postdated and we deem it valid. This is why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna.

ืžื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื ืงืฉื™ื ืกื™ืžืŸ ื—ืจืคืฉ

The Gemara returns to its question: In any case, the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is difficult. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for the following discussion, with each letter representing the name of a Sage who suggests an answer: แธคet, reish, peh, shin.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืื—ื“ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืื—ื“ ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื‘ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ืžืฉืคื˜ ืื—ื“ ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื›ื ื•ืžื” ื˜ืขื ืืžืจื• ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืœื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื—ืงื™ืจื” ื›ื“ื™ ืฉืœื ืชื ืขื•ืœ ื“ืœืช ื‘ืคื ื™ ืœื•ื™ืŸ

The Gemara cites the first answer. Rabbi แธคanina says: By Torah law, both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to inquiry and interrogation of witnesses, as it is stated: โ€œYou shall have one manner of lawโ€ (Leviticus 24:22). And what is the reason the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not need inquiry and interrogation? It is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. The Sages were concerned that intensive examination of the witnesses would often result in contradictory testimony and render it difficult for lenders to collect their debts. This could lead to people refraining from lending money.

ืืœื ืžืขืชื”

The Gemara asks: If that is so that the Sages removed the requirement for inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law,

ื˜ืขื• ืœื ื™ืฉืœืžื• ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ ืฉืชื ืขื•ืœ ื“ืœืช ื‘ืคื ื™ ืœื•ื•ื™ืŸ

then if the judges erred they should not need to pay the party they wronged, as they can claim that they were prevented from examining the witnesses effectively. The Gemara answers: If that were to be the halakha, all the more so that this would lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If people know that the courts are not responsible for an error in judgment, they will not be willing to lend money.

ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื“ื”ื›ื ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืงื ืกื•ืช ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื‘ื”ื•ื“ืื•ืช ื•ื”ืœื•ืื•ืช

Rava says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to laws of fines, not standard cases of monetary law. And the other sources, i.e., the mishna in tractate Sheviโ€™it and the baraita, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, are stated with regard to cases of admissions and loans, in which there is cause to relax the procedures of deliberation, as explained.

ืจื‘ ืคืคื ืืžืจ ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ื‘ื”ื•ื“ืื” ื•ื”ืœื•ืื” ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ืŸ ืžืจื•ืžื” ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžืจื•ืžื”

Rav Pappa says: This and that, i.e., both the mishna here and the other sources, are stated with regard to cases of an admission and a loan. The distinction between them is that the mishna here, which rules that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court suspects that one party is attempting to defraud the other party and have witnesses offer false testimony on his own behalf. There, in the baraita and in the mishna in tractate Sheviโ€™it, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, the ruling is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

ื›ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืจืžื™ ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ืฆื“ืง ืชืฉืคื˜ ืขืžื™ืชืš ื•ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืฆื“ืง ืฆื“ืง ืชืจื“ืฃ ื”ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ืŸ ืžืจื•ืžื” ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืจื•ืžื”

This distinction is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: โ€œIn justice shall you judge your neighborโ€ (Leviticus 19:15), and it is written in another verse: โ€œJustice, justice, shall you followโ€ (Deuteronomy 16:21), with the repetition indicating that it is not enough to merely judge with justice. He continues: How can these texts be reconciled? Here, this latter verse is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court must take extra care to judge with justice; and there, that former verse is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื›ื“ืฉื ื™ืŸ ืงืจืื™ ืื—ื“ ืœื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื—ื“ ืœืคืฉืจื”

Rav Ashi says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is as we answered, i.e., in accordance with any one of the answers offered by the other amoraโ€™im. And those verses were not stated with regard to fraudulent trials; rather, one is stated with regard to judgment, in which the court must pursue justice extensively, and one is stated with regard to compromise.

ื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ืฆื“ืง ืฆื“ืง ืชืจื“ืฃ ืื—ื“ ืœื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื—ื“ ืœืคืฉืจื” ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืฉืชื™ ืกืคื™ื ื•ืช ืขื•ื‘ืจื•ืช ื‘ื ื”ืจ ื•ืคื’ืขื• ื–ื” ื‘ื–ื” ืื ืขื•ื‘ืจื•ืช ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ื˜ื•ื‘ืขื•ืช ื‘ื–ื” ืื—ืจ ื–ื” ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ืขื•ื‘ืจื•ืช ื•ื›ืŸ ืฉื ื™ ื’ืžืœื™ื ืฉื”ื™ื• ืขื•ืœื™ื ื‘ืžืขืœื•ืช ื‘ื™ืช ื—ื•ืจื•ืŸ ื•ืคื’ืขื• ื–ื” ื‘ื–ื” ืื ืขืœื• ืฉื ื™ื”ืŸ ืฉื ื™ื”ืŸ ื ื•ืคืœื™ืŸ ื‘ื–ื” ืื—ืจ ื–ื” ืฉื ื™ื”ืŸ ืขื•ืœื™ืŸ

As it is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: โ€œJustice, justice, shall you follow,โ€ one mention of โ€œjusticeโ€ is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats traveling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, as the river is not wide enough for both to pass. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit แธคoron, where there is a narrow steep path, and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend.

ื”ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื˜ืขื•ื ื” ื•ืฉืื™ื ื” ื˜ืขื•ื ื” ืชื™ื“ื—ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ื˜ืขื•ื ื” ืžืคื ื™ ื˜ืขื•ื ื” ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ื•ืฉืื™ื ื” ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ืชื™ื“ื—ื” ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ืžืคื ื™ ืฉืื™ื ื” ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ื”ื™ื• ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ืงืจื•ื‘ื•ืช ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ืจื—ื•ืงื•ืช ื”ื˜ืœ ืคืฉืจื” ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ื•ืžืขืœื•ืช ืฉื›ืจ ื–ื• ืœื–ื•

How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืฆื“ืง ืฆื“ืง ืชืจื“ืฃ ื”ืœืš ืื—ืจ ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื™ืคื” ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืœืœื•ื“ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืœื‘ืจื•ืจ ื—ื™ืœ

ยง The Sages taught: The verse states: โ€œJustice, justice, shall you follow.โ€ This teaches that one should follow the best, most prestigious, court of the generation. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai to Beror แธคayil.

ืชื ื ืงื•ืœ ืจื™ื—ื™ื ื‘ื‘ื•ืจื ื™ ืฉื‘ื•ืข ื”ื‘ืŸ ืฉื‘ื•ืข ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื•ืจ ื”ื ืจ ื‘ื‘ืจื•ืจ ื—ื™ืœ ืžืฉืชื” ืฉื ืžืฉืชื” ืฉื

The Sages taught: When the gentile authorities issued decrees outlawing observance of the mitzvot, members of Jewish communities devised clandestine ways of indicating observance of mitzvot to each other. For example: If one produces the sound of a millstone in the city called Burni, this is tantamount to announcing: Week of the son, week of the son, i.e., there will be a circumcision. If one displays the light of a lamp in the city called Beror แธคayil, this is tantamount to announcing: There is a wedding feast there, there is a wedding feast there.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืฆื“ืง ืฆื“ืง ืชืจื“ืฃ ื”ืœืš ืื—ืจ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืœื™ืฉื™ื‘ื” ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืœืœื•ื“ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืœื‘ืจื•ืจ ื—ื™ืœ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืœืคืงื™ืขื™ืŸ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ืŸ ื’ืžืœื™ืืœ ืœื™ื‘ื ื ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืœื‘ื ื™ ื‘ืจืง ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืชื™ื ืœืจื•ืžื™ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื ื™ื” ื‘ืŸ ืชืจื“ื™ื•ืŸ ืœืกื™ื›ื ื™ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืœืฆื™ืคื•ืจื™ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืŸ ื‘ืชื™ืจื” ืœื ืฆื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืœื’ื•ืœื” ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืœื‘ื™ืช ืฉืขืจื™ื ืื—ืจ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืœืœืฉื›ืช ื”ื’ื–ื™ืช

The Sages taught: The verse states: โ€œJustice, justice, shall you follow.โ€ This teaches that one should follow the Sages to the academy where they are found. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai to Beror แธคayil, after Rabbi Yehoshua to Pekiโ€™in, after Rabban Gamliel to Yavne, after Rabbi Akiva to Bnei Brak, after Rabbi Matya to Rome [Romi], after Rabbi แธคananya ben Teradyon to Sikhnei, after Rabbi Yosei to Tzippori, after Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira to Netzivin, after Rabbi Yehoshua to the exile [gola], i.e., Babylonia, after Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to Beit Sheโ€™arim, and after the Sages in the time of the Temple to the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืณ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื”ื• ืžื™ ื™ื™ืžืจ ื›ื“ืงืืžืจื™ืชื•

ยง The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable. The Gemara asks: How do we say this opening stage of the deliberations? In other words, with what claim does the court begin deliberating? Rav Yehuda said: We say this to the witnesses: Who says that the event occurred as you said? Perhaps you erred?

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืขื•ืœื ื•ื”ื ื—ืกืžื™ื ืŸ ืœื”ื• ื•ืœื™ื—ืกืžื• ืžื™ ืœื ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืกื™ืขื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืขื“ื™ื ืžืžืงื•ื ืœืžืงื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืฉืชื™ื˜ืจืฃ ื“ืขืชืŸ ื•ื™ื—ื–ืจื• ื‘ื”ืŸ

Ulla said to him: But by confronting the witnesses in this manner, we silence them. The witnesses will think that the court suspects them of lying, and they will not testify. Rav Yehuda said to him: And let them be silenced. Isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says: In cases of capital law, the court brings the witnesses from one place to another place in order to confuse them so that they will retract their testimony if they are lying.

ืžื™ ื“ืžื™ ื”ืชื ืžืžื™ืœื ืงื ืžื™ื“ื—ื• ื”ื›ื ืงื ื“ื—ื™ื ืŸ ืœื”ื• ื‘ื™ื“ื™ื

The Gemara rejects this argument: Are the halakhot comparable? There, where Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says to bring the witnesses from place to place, the witnesses are repressed by themselves, whereas here, we repress them by direct action, and that the court should not do.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืขื•ืœื ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื™ืฉ ืœืš ืขื“ื™ื ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื” ื•ื›ื™ ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ื‘ื–ื›ื•ืชื• ืฉืœ ื–ื” ืฉื”ื™ื ื—ื•ื‘ืชื• ืฉืœ ื–ื”

Rather, Ulla says: We say this to the accused: Do you have witnesses to determine that the witnesses who testified against you are conspiring witnesses? Rabba said to him: But do we open the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused that is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses? This claim can lead to the witnesses incurring liability for their testimony.

ื•ืžื™ ื”ื•ื™ื ื—ื•ื‘ืชื• ื•ื”ืชื ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืขื“ื™ื ื–ื•ืžืžื™ืŸ ื ื”ืจื’ื™ืŸ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื’ืžืจ ื”ื“ื™ืŸ

The Gemara questions Rabbaโ€™s assumption: But is this to the liability of the witnesses? But didnโ€™t we learn in a mishna (Makkot 5b): Conspiring witnesses are not killed for their testimony until the verdict of the one concerning whom they testified is issued? Therefore, if they will be shown to be conspiring witnesses at this early stage of the proceedings, they will not be liable.

ื”ื›ื™ ืืžื™ื ื ืื™ืœื• ืฉืชื™ืง ื”ืื™ ืขื“ ื“ืžื™ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื™ื” ื•ืžื™ื™ืชื™ ืขื“ื™ื ื•ืžื–ื™ื ืœื”ื• ื”ื•ื™ื ืœื™ื” ื—ื•ื‘ืชื• ืฉืœ ื–ื” ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื™ืฉ ืœืš ืขื“ื™ื ืœื”ื›ื—ื™ืฉืŸ

The Gemara restates Rabbaโ€™s objection: This is what I say: If the accused would be silent until his verdict is issued and then brings witnesses and the court determines them to be conspiring witnesses, it will be found that the statement of the court is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses. Rather, Rabba says: We say to the accused: Do you have witnesses to contradict them? If the first witnesses are contradicted as to the facts of the case, no one is liable.

ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืืžืจ ืžื“ื‘ืจื™ื›ื ื ื–ื“ื›ื” ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื•ืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจื™ ืชืจื•ื™ื™ื”ื• ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ืœื ืงื˜ืœืช ืœื ืชื“ื—ืœ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืžื™ ืฉื™ื•ื“ืข ืœื• ื–ื›ื•ืช ื™ื‘ื ื•ื™ืœืžื“ ืขืœื™ื•

Rav Kahana said: We say to the witnesses: Based on your statements, so-and-so is acquitted. The court issues a pro forma declaration that it is possible to find a reason to acquit based on the testimony of the witnesses, and then they begin the deliberations. Abaye and Rava both say: We say to the accused: For example, if you did not kill anyone, do not fear the consequences of these proceedings, as you will be acquitted. Rav Ashi says: The court announces: Whoever knows of a reason to acquit the accused should come and teach this reason concerning him.

ืชื ื™ื ื›ื•ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ืื‘ื™ื™ ื•ืจื‘ื ืจื‘ื™ ืื•ืžืจ ืณืื ืœื ืฉื›ื‘ ืื™ืฉ ืื•ืชืš ื•ืื ืœื ืฉื˜ื™ืชืณ ื•ื’ื•ืณ

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Abaye and Rava. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The priest administering the sota rite to the sota says to her: โ€œIf no man has lain with you and if you have not gone astray to impurity while under your husband, you shall be free from this water of bitterness that causes the curse. But if you have gone astray while under your husbandโ€ฆโ€ (Numbers 5:19โ€“20). The priest first states the scenario in which the woman is innocent of adultery.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok.

  • This monthโ€™s learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. โ€œAnd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.โ€

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Sanhedrin 32

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 32

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ืื—ื“ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืื—ื“ ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื‘ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ืžืฉืคื˜ ืื—ื“ ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื›ื

MISHNA: Both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to the requirement for inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses, as it is stated: โ€œYou shall have one manner of lawโ€ (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform.

ืžื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืœื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืฉืœืฉื” ื•ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื‘ืขืฉืจื™ื ื•ืฉืœืฉื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ื•ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื”

Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. What are the differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law? Cases of monetary law are judged by a court of three judges, and cases of capital law are judged by a court of twenty-three judges. In cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. And in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืžื˜ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื—ื“ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ื•ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืžื˜ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื—ื“ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื ื™ื ืœื—ื•ื‘ื”

In cases of monetary law, the court directs, i.e., issues, the ruling based on a majority of one judge, either to exempt, or to find liable. But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืžื—ื–ื™ืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืžื—ื–ื™ืจื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžื—ื–ื™ืจื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื”

In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื”ื›ืœ ืžืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ื—ื•ื‘ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื”ื›ืœ ืžืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ื”ื›ืœ ืžืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ื—ื•ื‘ื”

In cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื”ืžืœืžื“ ื—ื•ื‘ื” ืžืœืžื“ ื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ื”ืžืœืžื“ ื–ื›ื•ืช ืžืœืžื“ ื—ื•ื‘ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื”ืžืœืžื“ ื—ื•ื‘ื” ืžืœืžื“ ื–ื›ื•ืช ืื‘ืœ ื”ืžืœืžื“ ื–ื›ื•ืช ืื™ืŸ ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื—ื–ื•ืจ ื•ืœืœืžื“ ื—ื•ื‘ื”

In cases of monetary law, one who initially teaches a reason to find the accused liable may then teach a reason to exempt him, and one who initially teaches a reason to exempt him may then teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื“ื ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ื•ื ื•ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ืœื™ืœื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื“ื ื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ื•ื ื•ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื™ื•ื

In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื’ื•ืžืจื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ืœื–ื›ื•ืช ื•ื‘ื™ื•ื ืฉืœืื—ืจื™ื• ืœื—ื•ื‘ื” ืœืคื™ื›ืš ืื™ืŸ ื“ื ื™ืŸ ืœื ื‘ืขืจื‘ ืฉื‘ืช ื•ืœื ื‘ืขืจื‘ ื™ื•ื ื˜ื•ื‘

In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื”ื˜ืžืื•ืช ื•ื”ื˜ื”ืจื•ืช ืžืชื—ื™ืœื™ืŸ ืžืŸ ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœ ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืžืชื—ื™ืœื™ืŸ ืžืŸ ื”ืฆื“

In cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit.

ื”ื›ืœ ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ ืœื“ื•ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ื”ื›ืœ ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ ืœื“ื•ืŸ ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ืืœื ื›ื”ื ื™ื ืœื•ื™ื ื•ื™ืฉืจืืœื™ื ื”ืžืฉื™ืื™ืŸ ืœื›ื”ื•ื ื”

All are fit to judge cases of monetary law. But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.

ื’ืžืณ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืžื™ ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื—ืงื™ืจื” ื•ืจืžื™ื ื”ื• ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื–ืžื ื• ื›ืชื•ื‘ ื‘ืื—ื“ ื‘ื ื™ืกืŸ ื‘ืฉืžื™ื˜ื” ื•ื‘ืื• ืขื“ื™ื ื•ืืžืจื• ืณื”ื™ืืš ืืชื ืžืขื™ื“ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ืฉื˜ืจ ื–ื” ื•ื”ืœื ื‘ื™ื•ื ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืขืžื ื• ื”ื™ื™ืชื ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืคืœื•ื ื™ืณ ืฉื˜ืจ ื›ืฉืจ ื•ืขื“ื™ื• ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ืฉื™ื ืŸ ืฉืžื ืื™ื—ืจื•ื”ื• ื•ื›ืชื‘ื•ื”ื•

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses. The Gemara asks: Do we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 1:2): With regard to a promissory note whose date is written on the first of Nisan of the Sabbatical Year, and witnesses came and said to the signatory witnesses: How is it that you are testifying concerning this promissory note? But is it not so that on such and such day on which the promissory note was written you were with us in such and such place? The promissory note is nevertheless valid, and its witnesses remain fit to bear witness. The reason they are not proven to have signed the promissory note falsely is that we are concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it, i.e., the loan was given on an earlier date, and the promissory note was postdated.

ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื—ืงื™ืจื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื—ื™ื™ืฉื™ื ืŸ ืฉืžื ืื™ื—ืจื•ื”ื• ื•ื›ืชื‘ื•ื”ื•

The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if it enters your mind to say that we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, how are we concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it? The signatory witnesses would be asked on which day they signed the promissory note, and when that does not accord with what is written in the promissory note, their testimony would be disregarded.

ื•ืœื™ื˜ืขืžื™ืš ืชื™ืงืฉื™ ืœืš ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ืฉื˜ืจื™ ื—ื•ื‘ ื”ืžื•ืงื“ืžื™ืŸ ืคืกื•ืœื™ื ื•ื”ืžืื•ื—ืจื™ื ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ ื•ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื—ืงื™ืจื” ืžืื•ื—ืจื™ืŸ ืืžืื™ ื›ืฉืจื™ืŸ

The Gemara counters: And according to your reasoning that we do not require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, the mishna elsewhere should pose a difficulty for you as well. As mishnayot are more authoritative than baraitot, it is preferable to raise a contradiction between two mishnayot than to raise a contradiction from a baraita to a mishna. The mishna teaches (Sheviโ€™it 10:5): Antedated promissory notes are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. And if it enters your mind to say we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law and that if there is a contradiction the testimony is not accepted, why are postdated promissory notes valid? The witnessesโ€™ testimony does not accord with what is written in the document.

ื”ื ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื“ืขื“ื™ืคื ืžื™ื ื” ืงืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื“ืืคื™ืœื• ืื—ื“ ื‘ื ื™ืกืŸ ื“ืœื ืฉื›ื™ื—ื™ ืื™ื ืฉื™ ื“ืžื•ื–ืคื™ ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ ืฉืžื ืื™ื—ืจื•ื”ื• ื•ื›ืชื‘ื•ื”ื• ื“ืœื ืžืจืข ืœืฉื˜ืจื™ื” ืืคื™ืœื• ื”ื›ื™ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ืกื•ืคื” ืžืฉืžื˜ืช ืžื›ืฉืจื™ื ืŸ

The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. There is a reason why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna. We are saying a better, i.e., stronger, contradiction than the one from the mishna. As one sees in the baraita that even with regard to a promissory note written on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical Year, when it is not common to find people to lend money, as all debts are canceled at the close of the Sabbatical Year, where it is not as reasonable to say that perhaps they delayed and wrote the promissory note, as one would not damage his promissory note by postdating it so close to the end of the Sabbatical Year; even so, since the Sabbatical Year cancels debts only at its close, we are concerned that the promissory note is postdated and we deem it valid. This is why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna.

ืžื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื ืงืฉื™ื ืกื™ืžืŸ ื—ืจืคืฉ

The Gemara returns to its question: In any case, the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is difficult. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for the following discussion, with each letter representing the name of a Sage who suggests an answer: แธคet, reish, peh, shin.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ื“ื‘ืจ ืชื•ืจื” ืื—ื“ ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ื•ืื—ื“ ื“ื™ื ื™ ื ืคืฉื•ืช ื‘ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื” ืฉื ืืžืจ ืžืฉืคื˜ ืื—ื“ ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื›ื ื•ืžื” ื˜ืขื ืืžืจื• ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืœื ื‘ืขื™ื ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ื•ื—ืงื™ืจื” ื›ื“ื™ ืฉืœื ืชื ืขื•ืœ ื“ืœืช ื‘ืคื ื™ ืœื•ื™ืŸ

The Gemara cites the first answer. Rabbi แธคanina says: By Torah law, both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to inquiry and interrogation of witnesses, as it is stated: โ€œYou shall have one manner of lawโ€ (Leviticus 24:22). And what is the reason the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not need inquiry and interrogation? It is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. The Sages were concerned that intensive examination of the witnesses would often result in contradictory testimony and render it difficult for lenders to collect their debts. This could lead to people refraining from lending money.

ืืœื ืžืขืชื”

The Gemara asks: If that is so that the Sages removed the requirement for inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law,

ื˜ืขื• ืœื ื™ืฉืœืžื• ื›ืœ ืฉื›ืŸ ืฉืชื ืขื•ืœ ื“ืœืช ื‘ืคื ื™ ืœื•ื•ื™ืŸ

then if the judges erred they should not need to pay the party they wronged, as they can claim that they were prevented from examining the witnesses effectively. The Gemara answers: If that were to be the halakha, all the more so that this would lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If people know that the courts are not responsible for an error in judgment, they will not be willing to lend money.

ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื“ื”ื›ื ื‘ื“ื™ื ื™ ืงื ืกื•ืช ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื‘ื”ื•ื“ืื•ืช ื•ื”ืœื•ืื•ืช

Rava says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to laws of fines, not standard cases of monetary law. And the other sources, i.e., the mishna in tractate Sheviโ€™it and the baraita, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, are stated with regard to cases of admissions and loans, in which there is cause to relax the procedures of deliberation, as explained.

ืจื‘ ืคืคื ืืžืจ ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ื‘ื”ื•ื“ืื” ื•ื”ืœื•ืื” ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ืŸ ืžืจื•ืžื” ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžืจื•ืžื”

Rav Pappa says: This and that, i.e., both the mishna here and the other sources, are stated with regard to cases of an admission and a loan. The distinction between them is that the mishna here, which rules that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court suspects that one party is attempting to defraud the other party and have witnesses offer false testimony on his own behalf. There, in the baraita and in the mishna in tractate Sheviโ€™it, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, the ruling is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

ื›ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ื“ืจื™ืฉ ืœืงื™ืฉ ืจืžื™ ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื‘ืฆื“ืง ืชืฉืคื˜ ืขืžื™ืชืš ื•ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืฆื“ืง ืฆื“ืง ืชืจื“ืฃ ื”ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ืŸ ืžืจื•ืžื” ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืจื•ืžื”

This distinction is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: โ€œIn justice shall you judge your neighborโ€ (Leviticus 19:15), and it is written in another verse: โ€œJustice, justice, shall you followโ€ (Deuteronomy 16:21), with the repetition indicating that it is not enough to merely judge with justice. He continues: How can these texts be reconciled? Here, this latter verse is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court must take extra care to judge with justice; and there, that former verse is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื›ื“ืฉื ื™ืŸ ืงืจืื™ ืื—ื“ ืœื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื—ื“ ืœืคืฉืจื”

Rav Ashi says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is as we answered, i.e., in accordance with any one of the answers offered by the other amoraโ€™im. And those verses were not stated with regard to fraudulent trials; rather, one is stated with regard to judgment, in which the court must pursue justice extensively, and one is stated with regard to compromise.

ื›ื“ืชื ื™ื ืฆื“ืง ืฆื“ืง ืชืจื“ืฃ ืื—ื“ ืœื“ื™ืŸ ื•ืื—ื“ ืœืคืฉืจื” ื›ื™ืฆื“ ืฉืชื™ ืกืคื™ื ื•ืช ืขื•ื‘ืจื•ืช ื‘ื ื”ืจ ื•ืคื’ืขื• ื–ื” ื‘ื–ื” ืื ืขื•ื‘ืจื•ืช ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ื˜ื•ื‘ืขื•ืช ื‘ื–ื” ืื—ืจ ื–ื” ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ืขื•ื‘ืจื•ืช ื•ื›ืŸ ืฉื ื™ ื’ืžืœื™ื ืฉื”ื™ื• ืขื•ืœื™ื ื‘ืžืขืœื•ืช ื‘ื™ืช ื—ื•ืจื•ืŸ ื•ืคื’ืขื• ื–ื” ื‘ื–ื” ืื ืขืœื• ืฉื ื™ื”ืŸ ืฉื ื™ื”ืŸ ื ื•ืคืœื™ืŸ ื‘ื–ื” ืื—ืจ ื–ื” ืฉื ื™ื”ืŸ ืขื•ืœื™ืŸ

As it is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: โ€œJustice, justice, shall you follow,โ€ one mention of โ€œjusticeโ€ is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats traveling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, as the river is not wide enough for both to pass. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit แธคoron, where there is a narrow steep path, and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend.

ื”ื ื›ื™ืฆื“ ื˜ืขื•ื ื” ื•ืฉืื™ื ื” ื˜ืขื•ื ื” ืชื™ื“ื—ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ื˜ืขื•ื ื” ืžืคื ื™ ื˜ืขื•ื ื” ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ื•ืฉืื™ื ื” ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ืชื™ื“ื—ื” ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ืžืคื ื™ ืฉืื™ื ื” ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ื”ื™ื• ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ืงืจื•ื‘ื•ืช ืฉืชื™ื”ืŸ ืจื—ื•ืงื•ืช ื”ื˜ืœ ืคืฉืจื” ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ื•ืžืขืœื•ืช ืฉื›ืจ ื–ื• ืœื–ื•

How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืฆื“ืง ืฆื“ืง ืชืจื“ืฃ ื”ืœืš ืื—ืจ ื‘ื™ืช ื“ื™ืŸ ื™ืคื” ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืœืœื•ื“ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืœื‘ืจื•ืจ ื—ื™ืœ

ยง The Sages taught: The verse states: โ€œJustice, justice, shall you follow.โ€ This teaches that one should follow the best, most prestigious, court of the generation. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai to Beror แธคayil.

ืชื ื ืงื•ืœ ืจื™ื—ื™ื ื‘ื‘ื•ืจื ื™ ืฉื‘ื•ืข ื”ื‘ืŸ ืฉื‘ื•ืข ื”ื‘ืŸ ืื•ืจ ื”ื ืจ ื‘ื‘ืจื•ืจ ื—ื™ืœ ืžืฉืชื” ืฉื ืžืฉืชื” ืฉื

The Sages taught: When the gentile authorities issued decrees outlawing observance of the mitzvot, members of Jewish communities devised clandestine ways of indicating observance of mitzvot to each other. For example: If one produces the sound of a millstone in the city called Burni, this is tantamount to announcing: Week of the son, week of the son, i.e., there will be a circumcision. If one displays the light of a lamp in the city called Beror แธคayil, this is tantamount to announcing: There is a wedding feast there, there is a wedding feast there.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืฆื“ืง ืฆื“ืง ืชืจื“ืฃ ื”ืœืš ืื—ืจ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืœื™ืฉื™ื‘ื” ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืœืœื•ื“ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ืŸ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื–ื›ืื™ ืœื‘ืจื•ืจ ื—ื™ืœ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืœืคืงื™ืขื™ืŸ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ืŸ ื’ืžืœื™ืืœ ืœื™ื‘ื ื ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืœื‘ื ื™ ื‘ืจืง ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืžืชื™ื ืœืจื•ืžื™ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื ื™ื” ื‘ืŸ ืชืจื“ื™ื•ืŸ ืœืกื™ื›ื ื™ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืœืฆื™ืคื•ืจื™ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื‘ืŸ ื‘ืชื™ืจื” ืœื ืฆื™ื‘ื™ืŸ ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ืฉืข ืœื’ื•ืœื” ืื—ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืœื‘ื™ืช ืฉืขืจื™ื ืื—ืจ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืœืœืฉื›ืช ื”ื’ื–ื™ืช

The Sages taught: The verse states: โ€œJustice, justice, shall you follow.โ€ This teaches that one should follow the Sages to the academy where they are found. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yoแธฅanan ben Zakkai to Beror แธคayil, after Rabbi Yehoshua to Pekiโ€™in, after Rabban Gamliel to Yavne, after Rabbi Akiva to Bnei Brak, after Rabbi Matya to Rome [Romi], after Rabbi แธคananya ben Teradyon to Sikhnei, after Rabbi Yosei to Tzippori, after Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira to Netzivin, after Rabbi Yehoshua to the exile [gola], i.e., Babylonia, after Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to Beit Sheโ€™arim, and after the Sages in the time of the Temple to the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

ื“ื™ื ื™ ืžืžื•ื ื•ืช ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืณ ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื”ื• ืžื™ ื™ื™ืžืจ ื›ื“ืงืืžืจื™ืชื•

ยง The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable. The Gemara asks: How do we say this opening stage of the deliberations? In other words, with what claim does the court begin deliberating? Rav Yehuda said: We say this to the witnesses: Who says that the event occurred as you said? Perhaps you erred?

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืขื•ืœื ื•ื”ื ื—ืกืžื™ื ืŸ ืœื”ื• ื•ืœื™ื—ืกืžื• ืžื™ ืœื ืชื ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ืืœื™ืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืกื™ืขื™ืŸ ืืช ื”ืขื“ื™ื ืžืžืงื•ื ืœืžืงื•ื ื›ื“ื™ ืฉืชื™ื˜ืจืฃ ื“ืขืชืŸ ื•ื™ื—ื–ืจื• ื‘ื”ืŸ

Ulla said to him: But by confronting the witnesses in this manner, we silence them. The witnesses will think that the court suspects them of lying, and they will not testify. Rav Yehuda said to him: And let them be silenced. Isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says: In cases of capital law, the court brings the witnesses from one place to another place in order to confuse them so that they will retract their testimony if they are lying.

ืžื™ ื“ืžื™ ื”ืชื ืžืžื™ืœื ืงื ืžื™ื“ื—ื• ื”ื›ื ืงื ื“ื—ื™ื ืŸ ืœื”ื• ื‘ื™ื“ื™ื

The Gemara rejects this argument: Are the halakhot comparable? There, where Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says to bring the witnesses from place to place, the witnesses are repressed by themselves, whereas here, we repress them by direct action, and that the court should not do.

ืืœื ืืžืจ ืขื•ืœื ื”ื›ื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื™ืฉ ืœืš ืขื“ื™ื ืœื”ื–ื™ืžื ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ื” ื•ื›ื™ ืคื•ืชื—ื™ืŸ ื‘ื–ื›ื•ืชื• ืฉืœ ื–ื” ืฉื”ื™ื ื—ื•ื‘ืชื• ืฉืœ ื–ื”

Rather, Ulla says: We say this to the accused: Do you have witnesses to determine that the witnesses who testified against you are conspiring witnesses? Rabba said to him: But do we open the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused that is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses? This claim can lead to the witnesses incurring liability for their testimony.

ื•ืžื™ ื”ื•ื™ื ื—ื•ื‘ืชื• ื•ื”ืชื ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ืขื“ื™ื ื–ื•ืžืžื™ืŸ ื ื”ืจื’ื™ืŸ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื’ืžืจ ื”ื“ื™ืŸ

The Gemara questions Rabbaโ€™s assumption: But is this to the liability of the witnesses? But didnโ€™t we learn in a mishna (Makkot 5b): Conspiring witnesses are not killed for their testimony until the verdict of the one concerning whom they testified is issued? Therefore, if they will be shown to be conspiring witnesses at this early stage of the proceedings, they will not be liable.

ื”ื›ื™ ืืžื™ื ื ืื™ืœื• ืฉืชื™ืง ื”ืื™ ืขื“ ื“ืžื™ื’ืžืจ ื“ื™ื ื™ื” ื•ืžื™ื™ืชื™ ืขื“ื™ื ื•ืžื–ื™ื ืœื”ื• ื”ื•ื™ื ืœื™ื” ื—ื•ื‘ืชื• ืฉืœ ื–ื” ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ื™ืฉ ืœืš ืขื“ื™ื ืœื”ื›ื—ื™ืฉืŸ

The Gemara restates Rabbaโ€™s objection: This is what I say: If the accused would be silent until his verdict is issued and then brings witnesses and the court determines them to be conspiring witnesses, it will be found that the statement of the court is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses. Rather, Rabba says: We say to the accused: Do you have witnesses to contradict them? If the first witnesses are contradicted as to the facts of the case, no one is liable.

ืจื‘ ื›ื”ื ื ืืžืจ ืžื“ื‘ืจื™ื›ื ื ื–ื“ื›ื” ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืื‘ื™ื™ ื•ืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจื™ ืชืจื•ื™ื™ื”ื• ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ืœื™ื” ืื™ ืœื ืงื˜ืœืช ืœื ืชื“ื—ืœ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืžื™ ืฉื™ื•ื“ืข ืœื• ื–ื›ื•ืช ื™ื‘ื ื•ื™ืœืžื“ ืขืœื™ื•

Rav Kahana said: We say to the witnesses: Based on your statements, so-and-so is acquitted. The court issues a pro forma declaration that it is possible to find a reason to acquit based on the testimony of the witnesses, and then they begin the deliberations. Abaye and Rava both say: We say to the accused: For example, if you did not kill anyone, do not fear the consequences of these proceedings, as you will be acquitted. Rav Ashi says: The court announces: Whoever knows of a reason to acquit the accused should come and teach this reason concerning him.

ืชื ื™ื ื›ื•ื•ืชื™ื” ื“ืื‘ื™ื™ ื•ืจื‘ื ืจื‘ื™ ืื•ืžืจ ืณืื ืœื ืฉื›ื‘ ืื™ืฉ ืื•ืชืš ื•ืื ืœื ืฉื˜ื™ืชืณ ื•ื’ื•ืณ

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Abaye and Rava. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The priest administering the sota rite to the sota says to her: โ€œIf no man has lain with you and if you have not gone astray to impurity while under your husband, you shall be free from this water of bitterness that causes the curse. But if you have gone astray while under your husbandโ€ฆโ€ (Numbers 5:19โ€“20). The priest first states the scenario in which the woman is innocent of adultery.

Scroll To Top