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Today's Daf Yomi

August 17, 2017 | 讻状讛 讘讗讘 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Sanhedrin 32

In both聽monetary and capital cases, the judges question the witnesses in a thorough manner. 聽聽The gemara questions this based on a braita and gives a number of potential solutions. 聽The mishna delineates many differences between monetary and capital cases. 聽The gemara begins by explaining details of things that are unique to capital cases that were mentioned in the mishna.


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诪转谞讬壮 讗讞讚 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讗讞讚 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讘讚专讬砖讛 讜讘讞拽讬专讛 砖谞讗诪专 诪砖驻讟 讗讞讚 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐

MISHNA: Both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to the requirement for inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall have one manner of law鈥 (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform.

诪讛 讘讬谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 讜讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讘注砖专讬诐 讜砖诇砖讛 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 驻讜转讞讬谉 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讜讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 驻讜转讞讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讜讗讬谉 驻讜转讞讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛

Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. What are the differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law? Cases of monetary law are judged by a court of three judges, and cases of capital law are judged by a court of twenty-three judges. In cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. And in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讟讬谉 注诇 驻讬 讗讞讚 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讜讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 诪讟讬谉 注诇 驻讬 讗讞讚 诇讝讻讜转 讜注诇 驻讬 砖谞讬诐 诇讞讜讘讛

In cases of monetary law, the court directs, i.e., issues, the ruling based on a majority of one judge, either to exempt, or to find liable. But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讜讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛

In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讛讻诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讝讻讜转 讜讞讜讘讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讛讻诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讝讻讜转 讜讗讬谉 讛讻诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讞讜讘讛

In cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讛诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛 诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讜讛诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讛诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛 诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讗讘诇 讛诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讜诇诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛

In cases of monetary law, one who initially teaches a reason to find the accused liable may then teach a reason to exempt him, and one who initially teaches a reason to exempt him may then teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讙讜诪专讬谉 讘诇讬诇讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讙讜诪专讬谉 讘讬讜诐

In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讙讜诪专讬谉 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讙讜诪专讬谉 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 诇讝讻讜转 讜讘讬讜诐 砖诇讗讞专讬讜 诇讞讜讘讛 诇驻讬讻讱 讗讬谉 讚谞讬谉 诇讗 讘注专讘 砖讘转 讜诇讗 讘注专讘 讬讜诐 讟讜讘

In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讛讟诪讗讜转 讜讛讟讛专讜转 诪转讞讬诇讬谉 诪谉 讛讙讚讜诇 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 诪转讞讬诇讬谉 诪谉 讛爪讚

In cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit.

讛讻诇 讻砖专讬谉 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讗讬谉 讛讻诇 讻砖专讬谉 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讗诇讗 讻讛谞讬诐 诇讜讬诐 讜讬砖专讗诇讬诐 讛诪砖讬讗讬谉 诇讻讛讜谞讛

All are fit to judge cases of monetary law. But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.

讙诪壮 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讬 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 讜专诪讬谞讛讜 砖讟专 砖讝诪谞讜 讻转讜讘 讘讗讞讚 讘谞讬住谉 讘砖诪讬讟讛 讜讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗诪专讜 壮讛讬讗讱 讗转诐 诪注讬讚讬谉 注诇 砖讟专 讝讛 讜讛诇讗 讘讬讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 注诪谞讜 讛讬讬转诐 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬壮 砖讟专 讻砖专 讜注讚讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讗讬讞专讜讛讜 讜讻转讘讜讛讜

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses. The Gemara asks: Do we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 1:2): With regard to a promissory note whose date is written on the first of Nisan of the Sabbatical Year, and witnesses came and said to the signatory witnesses: How is it that you are testifying concerning this promissory note? But is it not so that on such and such day on which the promissory note was written you were with us in such and such place? The promissory note is nevertheless valid, and its witnesses remain fit to bear witness. The reason they are not proven to have signed the promissory note falsely is that we are concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it, i.e., the loan was given on an earlier date, and the promissory note was postdated.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 讛讬讻讬 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讗讬讞专讜讛讜 讜讻转讘讜讛讜

The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if it enters your mind to say that we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, how are we concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it? The signatory witnesses would be asked on which day they signed the promissory note, and when that does not accord with what is written in the promissory note, their testimony would be disregarded.

讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 转讬拽砖讬 诇讱 诪转谞讬转讬谉 砖讟专讬 讞讜讘 讛诪讜拽讚诪讬谉 驻住讜诇讬诐 讜讛诪讗讜讞专讬诐 讻砖专讬谉 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 诪讗讜讞专讬谉 讗诪讗讬 讻砖专讬谉

The Gemara counters: And according to your reasoning that we do not require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, the mishna elsewhere should pose a difficulty for you as well. As mishnayot are more authoritative than baraitot, it is preferable to raise a contradiction between two mishnayot than to raise a contradiction from a baraita to a mishna. The mishna teaches (Shevi鈥檌t 10:5): Antedated promissory notes are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. And if it enters your mind to say we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law and that if there is a contradiction the testimony is not accepted, why are postdated promissory notes valid? The witnesses鈥 testimony does not accord with what is written in the document.

讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讚注讚讬驻讗 诪讬谞讛 拽讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讗讞讚 讘谞讬住谉 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讚诪讜讝驻讬 讚诇讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 砖诪讗 讗讬讞专讜讛讜 讜讻转讘讜讛讜 讚诇讗 诪专注 诇砖讟专讬讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讻讬讜谉 讚砖讘讬注讬转 住讜驻讛 诪砖诪讟转 诪讻砖专讬谞谉

The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. There is a reason why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna. We are saying a better, i.e., stronger, contradiction than the one from the mishna. As one sees in the baraita that even with regard to a promissory note written on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical Year, when it is not common to find people to lend money, as all debts are canceled at the close of the Sabbatical Year, where it is not as reasonable to say that perhaps they delayed and wrote the promissory note, as one would not damage his promissory note by postdating it so close to the end of the Sabbatical Year; even so, since the Sabbatical Year cancels debts only at its close, we are concerned that the promissory note is postdated and we deem it valid. This is why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna.

诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 拽砖讬讗 住讬诪谉 讞专驻砖

The Gemara returns to its question: In any case, the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is difficult. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for the following discussion, with each letter representing the name of a Sage who suggests an answer: 岣t, reish, peh, shin.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讗讞讚 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讗讞讚 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讘讚专讬砖讛 讜讘讞拽讬专讛 砖谞讗诪专 诪砖驻讟 讗讞讚 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转谞注讜诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讬谉

The Gemara cites the first answer. Rabbi 岣nina says: By Torah law, both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to inquiry and interrogation of witnesses, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall have one manner of law鈥 (Leviticus 24:22). And what is the reason the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not need inquiry and interrogation? It is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. The Sages were concerned that intensive examination of the witnesses would often result in contradictory testimony and render it difficult for lenders to collect their debts. This could lead to people refraining from lending money.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛

The Gemara asks: If that is so that the Sages removed the requirement for inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law,

讟注讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诪讜 讻诇 砖讻谉 砖转谞注讜诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讜讬谉

then if the judges erred they should not need to pay the party they wronged, as they can claim that they were prevented from examining the witnesses effectively. The Gemara answers: If that were to be the halakha, all the more so that this would lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If people know that the courts are not responsible for an error in judgment, they will not be willing to lend money.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讛讻讗 讘讚讬谞讬 拽谞住讜转 讜讗讬讚讱 讘讛讜讚讗讜转 讜讛诇讜讗讜转

Rava says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to laws of fines, not standard cases of monetary law. And the other sources, i.e., the mishna in tractate Shevi鈥檌t and the baraita, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, are stated with regard to cases of admissions and loans, in which there is cause to relax the procedures of deliberation, as explained.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘讛讜讚讗讛 讜讛诇讜讗讛 讻讗谉 讘讚讬谉 诪专讜诪讛 讻讗谉 讘讚讬谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诪专讜诪讛

Rav Pappa says: This and that, i.e., both the mishna here and the other sources, are stated with regard to cases of an admission and a loan. The distinction between them is that the mishna here, which rules that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court suspects that one party is attempting to defraud the other party and have witnesses offer false testimony on his own behalf. There, in the baraita and in the mishna in tractate Shevi鈥檌t, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, the ruling is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

讻讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 专诪讬 讻转讬讘 讘爪讚拽 转砖驻讟 注诪讬转讱 讜讻转讬讘 爪讚拽 爪讚拽 转专讚祝 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讻讗谉 讘讚讬谉 诪专讜诪讛 讻讗谉 讘讚讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪专讜诪讛

This distinction is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: 鈥淚n justice shall you judge your neighbor鈥 (Leviticus 19:15), and it is written in another verse: 鈥淛ustice, justice, shall you follow鈥 (Deuteronomy 16:21), with the repetition indicating that it is not enough to merely judge with justice. He continues: How can these texts be reconciled? Here, this latter verse is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court must take extra care to judge with justice; and there, that former verse is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻讚砖谞讬谉 拽专讗讬 讗讞讚 诇讚讬谉 讜讗讞讚 诇驻砖专讛

Rav Ashi says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is as we answered, i.e., in accordance with any one of the answers offered by the other amora鈥檌m. And those verses were not stated with regard to fraudulent trials; rather, one is stated with regard to judgment, in which the court must pursue justice extensively, and one is stated with regard to compromise.

讻讚转谞讬讗 爪讚拽 爪讚拽 转专讚祝 讗讞讚 诇讚讬谉 讜讗讞讚 诇驻砖专讛 讻讬爪讚 砖转讬 住驻讬谞讜转 注讜讘专讜转 讘谞讛专 讜驻讙注讜 讝讛 讘讝讛 讗诐 注讜讘专讜转 砖转讬讛谉 砖转讬讛谉 讟讜讘注讜转 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 砖转讬讛谉 注讜讘专讜转 讜讻谉 砖谞讬 讙诪诇讬诐 砖讛讬讜 注讜诇讬诐 讘诪注诇讜转 讘讬转 讞讜专讜谉 讜驻讙注讜 讝讛 讘讝讛 讗诐 注诇讜 砖谞讬讛谉 砖谞讬讛谉 谞讜驻诇讬谉 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 砖谞讬讛谉 注讜诇讬谉

As it is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: 鈥淛ustice, justice, shall you follow,鈥 one mention of 鈥渏ustice鈥 is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats traveling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, as the river is not wide enough for both to pass. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit 岣ron, where there is a narrow steep path, and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend.

讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讟注讜谞讛 讜砖讗讬谞讛 讟注讜谞讛 转讬讚讞讛 砖讗讬谞讛 讟注讜谞讛 诪驻谞讬 讟注讜谞讛 拽专讜讘讛 讜砖讗讬谞讛 拽专讜讘讛 转讬讚讞讛 拽专讜讘讛 诪驻谞讬 砖讗讬谞讛 拽专讜讘讛 讛讬讜 砖转讬讛谉 拽专讜讘讜转 砖转讬讛谉 专讞讜拽讜转 讛讟诇 驻砖专讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪注诇讜转 砖讻专 讝讜 诇讝讜

How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 爪讚拽 爪讚拽 转专讚祝 讛诇讱 讗讞专 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讬驻讛 讗讞专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诇诇讜讚 讗讞专 专讘谉 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讝讻讗讬 诇讘专讜专 讞讬诇

The Sages taught: The verse states: 鈥淛ustice, justice, shall you follow.鈥 This teaches that one should follow the best, most prestigious, court of the generation. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yo岣nan ben Zakkai to Beror 岣yil.

转谞讗 拽讜诇 专讬讞讬诐 讘讘讜专谞讬 砖讘讜注 讛讘谉 砖讘讜注 讛讘谉 讗讜专 讛谞专 讘讘专讜专 讞讬诇 诪砖转讛 砖诐 诪砖转讛 砖诐

The Sages taught: When the gentile authorities issued decrees outlawing observance of the mitzvot, members of Jewish communities devised clandestine ways of indicating observance of mitzvot to each other. For example: If one produces the sound of a millstone in the city called Burni, this is tantamount to announcing: Week of the son, week of the son, i.e., there will be a circumcision. If one displays the light of a lamp in the city called Beror 岣yil, this is tantamount to announcing: There is a wedding feast there, there is a wedding feast there.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 爪讚拽 爪讚拽 转专讚祝 讛诇讱 讗讞专 讞讻诪讬诐 诇讬砖讬讘讛 讗讞专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诇诇讜讚 讗讞专 专讘谉 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讝讻讗讬 诇讘专讜专 讞讬诇 讗讞专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诇驻拽讬注讬谉 讗讞专 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讬讘谞讗 讗讞专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讘谞讬 讘专拽 讗讞专 专讘讬 诪转讬讗 诇专讜诪讬 讗讞专 专讘讬 讞谞谞讬讛 讘谉 转专讚讬讜谉 诇住讬讻谞讬 讗讞专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇爪讬驻讜专讬 讗讞专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 讘转讬专讛 诇谞爪讬讘讬谉 讗讞专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诇讙讜诇讛 讗讞专 专讘讬 诇讘讬转 砖注专讬诐 讗讞专 讞讻诪讬诐 诇诇砖讻转 讛讙讝讬转

The Sages taught: The verse states: 鈥淛ustice, justice, shall you follow.鈥 This teaches that one should follow the Sages to the academy where they are found. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yo岣nan ben Zakkai to Beror 岣yil, after Rabbi Yehoshua to Peki鈥檌n, after Rabban Gamliel to Yavne, after Rabbi Akiva to Bnei Brak, after Rabbi Matya to Rome [Romi], after Rabbi 岣nanya ben Teradyon to Sikhnei, after Rabbi Yosei to Tzippori, after Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira to Netzivin, after Rabbi Yehoshua to the exile [gola], i.e., Babylonia, after Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to Beit She鈥檃rim, and after the Sages in the time of the Temple to the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 驻讜转讞讬谉 讻讜壮 讛讬讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讛讜 诪讬 讬讬诪专 讻讚拽讗诪专讬转讜

搂 The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable. The Gemara asks: How do we say this opening stage of the deliberations? In other words, with what claim does the court begin deliberating? Rav Yehuda said: We say this to the witnesses: Who says that the event occurred as you said? Perhaps you erred?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 注讜诇讗 讜讛讗 讞住诪讬谞谉 诇讛讜 讜诇讬讞住诪讜 诪讬 诇讗 转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪住讬注讬谉 讗转 讛注讚讬诐 诪诪拽讜诐 诇诪拽讜诐 讻讚讬 砖转讬讟专祝 讚注转谉 讜讬讞讝专讜 讘讛谉

Ulla said to him: But by confronting the witnesses in this manner, we silence them. The witnesses will think that the court suspects them of lying, and they will not testify. Rav Yehuda said to him: And let them be silenced. Isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says: In cases of capital law, the court brings the witnesses from one place to another place in order to confuse them so that they will retract their testimony if they are lying.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 诪诪讬诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讚讞讜 讛讻讗 拽讗 讚讞讬谞谉 诇讛讜 讘讬讚讬诐

The Gemara rejects this argument: Are the halakhot comparable? There, where Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says to bring the witnesses from place to place, the witnesses are repressed by themselves, whereas here, we repress them by direct action, and that the court should not do.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讬砖 诇讱 注讚讬诐 诇讛讝讬诪诐 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讛 讜讻讬 驻讜转讞讬谉 讘讝讻讜转讜 砖诇 讝讛 砖讛讬讗 讞讜讘转讜 砖诇 讝讛

Rather, Ulla says: We say this to the accused: Do you have witnesses to determine that the witnesses who testified against you are conspiring witnesses? Rabba said to him: But do we open the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused that is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses? This claim can lead to the witnesses incurring liability for their testimony.

讜诪讬 讛讜讬讗 讞讜讘转讜 讜讛转谞谉 讗讬谉 注讚讬诐 讝讜诪诪讬谉 谞讛专讙讬谉 注讚 砖讬讙诪专 讛讚讬谉

The Gemara questions Rabba鈥檚 assumption: But is this to the liability of the witnesses? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Makkot 5b): Conspiring witnesses are not killed for their testimony until the verdict of the one concerning whom they testified is issued? Therefore, if they will be shown to be conspiring witnesses at this early stage of the proceedings, they will not be liable.

讛讻讬 讗诪讬谞讗 讗讬诇讜 砖转讬拽 讛讗讬 注讚 讚诪讬讙诪专 讚讬谞讬讛 讜诪讬讬转讬 注讚讬诐 讜诪讝讬诐 诇讛讜 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讛 讞讜讘转讜 砖诇 讝讛 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讬砖 诇讱 注讚讬诐 诇讛讻讞讬砖谉

The Gemara restates Rabba鈥檚 objection: This is what I say: If the accused would be silent until his verdict is issued and then brings witnesses and the court determines them to be conspiring witnesses, it will be found that the statement of the court is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses. Rather, Rabba says: We say to the accused: Do you have witnesses to contradict them? If the first witnesses are contradicted as to the facts of the case, no one is liable.

专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 诪讚讘专讬讻诐 谞讝讚讻讛 驻诇讜谞讬 讗讘讬讬 讜专讘讗 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讗讬 诇讗 拽讟诇转 诇讗 转讚讞诇 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻诇 诪讬 砖讬讜讚注 诇讜 讝讻讜转 讬讘讗 讜讬诇诪讚 注诇讬讜

Rav Kahana said: We say to the witnesses: Based on your statements, so-and-so is acquitted. The court issues a pro forma declaration that it is possible to find a reason to acquit based on the testimony of the witnesses, and then they begin the deliberations. Abaye and Rava both say: We say to the accused: For example, if you did not kill anyone, do not fear the consequences of these proceedings, as you will be acquitted. Rav Ashi says: The court announces: Whoever knows of a reason to acquit the accused should come and teach this reason concerning him.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚讗讘讬讬 讜专讘讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 壮讗诐 诇讗 砖讻讘 讗讬砖 讗讜转讱 讜讗诐 诇讗 砖讟讬转壮 讜讙讜壮

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Abaye and Rava. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The priest administering the sota rite to the sota says to her: 鈥淚f no man has lain with you and if you have not gone astray to impurity while under your husband, you shall be free from this water of bitterness that causes the curse. But if you have gone astray while under your husband鈥︹ (Numbers 5:19鈥20). The priest first states the scenario in which the woman is innocent of adultery.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

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Sanhedrin 32

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 32

诪转谞讬壮 讗讞讚 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讗讞讚 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讘讚专讬砖讛 讜讘讞拽讬专讛 砖谞讗诪专 诪砖驻讟 讗讞讚 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐

MISHNA: Both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to the requirement for inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall have one manner of law鈥 (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform.

诪讛 讘讬谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讘砖诇砖讛 讜讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讘注砖专讬诐 讜砖诇砖讛 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 驻讜转讞讬谉 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讜讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 驻讜转讞讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讜讗讬谉 驻讜转讞讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛

Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. What are the differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law? Cases of monetary law are judged by a court of three judges, and cases of capital law are judged by a court of twenty-three judges. In cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. And in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讟讬谉 注诇 驻讬 讗讞讚 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讜讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 诪讟讬谉 注诇 驻讬 讗讞讚 诇讝讻讜转 讜注诇 驻讬 砖谞讬诐 诇讞讜讘讛

In cases of monetary law, the court directs, i.e., issues, the ruling based on a majority of one judge, either to exempt, or to find liable. But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讜讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛

In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讛讻诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讝讻讜转 讜讞讜讘讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讛讻诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讝讻讜转 讜讗讬谉 讛讻诇 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讞讜讘讛

In cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讛诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛 诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讜讛诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讛诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛 诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讗讘诇 讛诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讗讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讜诇诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛

In cases of monetary law, one who initially teaches a reason to find the accused liable may then teach a reason to exempt him, and one who initially teaches a reason to exempt him may then teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讙讜诪专讬谉 讘诇讬诇讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讙讜诪专讬谉 讘讬讜诐

In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讙讜诪专讬谉 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讙讜诪专讬谉 讘讜 讘讬讜诐 诇讝讻讜转 讜讘讬讜诐 砖诇讗讞专讬讜 诇讞讜讘讛 诇驻讬讻讱 讗讬谉 讚谞讬谉 诇讗 讘注专讘 砖讘转 讜诇讗 讘注专讘 讬讜诐 讟讜讘

In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讛讟诪讗讜转 讜讛讟讛专讜转 诪转讞讬诇讬谉 诪谉 讛讙讚讜诇 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 诪转讞讬诇讬谉 诪谉 讛爪讚

In cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit.

讛讻诇 讻砖专讬谉 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讗讬谉 讛讻诇 讻砖专讬谉 诇讚讜谉 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讗诇讗 讻讛谞讬诐 诇讜讬诐 讜讬砖专讗诇讬诐 讛诪砖讬讗讬谉 诇讻讛讜谞讛

All are fit to judge cases of monetary law. But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.

讙诪壮 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讬 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 讜专诪讬谞讛讜 砖讟专 砖讝诪谞讜 讻转讜讘 讘讗讞讚 讘谞讬住谉 讘砖诪讬讟讛 讜讘讗讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗诪专讜 壮讛讬讗讱 讗转诐 诪注讬讚讬谉 注诇 砖讟专 讝讛 讜讛诇讗 讘讬讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 注诪谞讜 讛讬讬转诐 讘诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬壮 砖讟专 讻砖专 讜注讚讬讜 讻砖专讬谉 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讗讬讞专讜讛讜 讜讻转讘讜讛讜

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses. The Gemara asks: Do we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 1:2): With regard to a promissory note whose date is written on the first of Nisan of the Sabbatical Year, and witnesses came and said to the signatory witnesses: How is it that you are testifying concerning this promissory note? But is it not so that on such and such day on which the promissory note was written you were with us in such and such place? The promissory note is nevertheless valid, and its witnesses remain fit to bear witness. The reason they are not proven to have signed the promissory note falsely is that we are concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it, i.e., the loan was given on an earlier date, and the promissory note was postdated.

讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 讛讬讻讬 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 砖诪讗 讗讬讞专讜讛讜 讜讻转讘讜讛讜

The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if it enters your mind to say that we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, how are we concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it? The signatory witnesses would be asked on which day they signed the promissory note, and when that does not accord with what is written in the promissory note, their testimony would be disregarded.

讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 转讬拽砖讬 诇讱 诪转谞讬转讬谉 砖讟专讬 讞讜讘 讛诪讜拽讚诪讬谉 驻住讜诇讬诐 讜讛诪讗讜讞专讬诐 讻砖专讬谉 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 诪讗讜讞专讬谉 讗诪讗讬 讻砖专讬谉

The Gemara counters: And according to your reasoning that we do not require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, the mishna elsewhere should pose a difficulty for you as well. As mishnayot are more authoritative than baraitot, it is preferable to raise a contradiction between two mishnayot than to raise a contradiction from a baraita to a mishna. The mishna teaches (Shevi鈥檌t 10:5): Antedated promissory notes are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. And if it enters your mind to say we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law and that if there is a contradiction the testimony is not accepted, why are postdated promissory notes valid? The witnesses鈥 testimony does not accord with what is written in the document.

讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讚注讚讬驻讗 诪讬谞讛 拽讗诪专讬谞谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 讗讞讚 讘谞讬住谉 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讚诪讜讝驻讬 讚诇讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 砖诪讗 讗讬讞专讜讛讜 讜讻转讘讜讛讜 讚诇讗 诪专注 诇砖讟专讬讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讛讻讬 讻讬讜谉 讚砖讘讬注讬转 住讜驻讛 诪砖诪讟转 诪讻砖专讬谞谉

The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. There is a reason why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna. We are saying a better, i.e., stronger, contradiction than the one from the mishna. As one sees in the baraita that even with regard to a promissory note written on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical Year, when it is not common to find people to lend money, as all debts are canceled at the close of the Sabbatical Year, where it is not as reasonable to say that perhaps they delayed and wrote the promissory note, as one would not damage his promissory note by postdating it so close to the end of the Sabbatical Year; even so, since the Sabbatical Year cancels debts only at its close, we are concerned that the promissory note is postdated and we deem it valid. This is why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna.

诪讻诇 诪拽讜诐 拽砖讬讗 住讬诪谉 讞专驻砖

The Gemara returns to its question: In any case, the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is difficult. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for the following discussion, with each letter representing the name of a Sage who suggests an answer: 岣t, reish, peh, shin.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讗讞讚 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讜讗讞讚 讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讘讚专讬砖讛 讜讘讞拽讬专讛 砖谞讗诪专 诪砖驻讟 讗讞讚 讬讛讬讛 诇讻诐 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诇讗 讘注讬谞谉 讚专讬砖讛 讜讞拽讬专讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转谞注讜诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讬谉

The Gemara cites the first answer. Rabbi 岣nina says: By Torah law, both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to inquiry and interrogation of witnesses, as it is stated: 鈥淵ou shall have one manner of law鈥 (Leviticus 24:22). And what is the reason the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not need inquiry and interrogation? It is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. The Sages were concerned that intensive examination of the witnesses would often result in contradictory testimony and render it difficult for lenders to collect their debts. This could lead to people refraining from lending money.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛

The Gemara asks: If that is so that the Sages removed the requirement for inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law,

讟注讜 诇讗 讬砖诇诪讜 讻诇 砖讻谉 砖转谞注讜诇 讚诇转 讘驻谞讬 诇讜讜讬谉

then if the judges erred they should not need to pay the party they wronged, as they can claim that they were prevented from examining the witnesses effectively. The Gemara answers: If that were to be the halakha, all the more so that this would lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If people know that the courts are not responsible for an error in judgment, they will not be willing to lend money.

专讘讗 讗诪专 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讛讻讗 讘讚讬谞讬 拽谞住讜转 讜讗讬讚讱 讘讛讜讚讗讜转 讜讛诇讜讗讜转

Rava says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to laws of fines, not standard cases of monetary law. And the other sources, i.e., the mishna in tractate Shevi鈥檌t and the baraita, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, are stated with regard to cases of admissions and loans, in which there is cause to relax the procedures of deliberation, as explained.

专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘讛讜讚讗讛 讜讛诇讜讗讛 讻讗谉 讘讚讬谉 诪专讜诪讛 讻讗谉 讘讚讬谉 砖讗讬谞讜 诪专讜诪讛

Rav Pappa says: This and that, i.e., both the mishna here and the other sources, are stated with regard to cases of an admission and a loan. The distinction between them is that the mishna here, which rules that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court suspects that one party is attempting to defraud the other party and have witnesses offer false testimony on his own behalf. There, in the baraita and in the mishna in tractate Shevi鈥檌t, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, the ruling is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

讻讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 专诪讬 讻转讬讘 讘爪讚拽 转砖驻讟 注诪讬转讱 讜讻转讬讘 爪讚拽 爪讚拽 转专讚祝 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讻讗谉 讘讚讬谉 诪专讜诪讛 讻讗谉 讘讚讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪专讜诪讛

This distinction is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: 鈥淚n justice shall you judge your neighbor鈥 (Leviticus 19:15), and it is written in another verse: 鈥淛ustice, justice, shall you follow鈥 (Deuteronomy 16:21), with the repetition indicating that it is not enough to merely judge with justice. He continues: How can these texts be reconciled? Here, this latter verse is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court must take extra care to judge with justice; and there, that former verse is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻讚砖谞讬谉 拽专讗讬 讗讞讚 诇讚讬谉 讜讗讞讚 诇驻砖专讛

Rav Ashi says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is as we answered, i.e., in accordance with any one of the answers offered by the other amora鈥檌m. And those verses were not stated with regard to fraudulent trials; rather, one is stated with regard to judgment, in which the court must pursue justice extensively, and one is stated with regard to compromise.

讻讚转谞讬讗 爪讚拽 爪讚拽 转专讚祝 讗讞讚 诇讚讬谉 讜讗讞讚 诇驻砖专讛 讻讬爪讚 砖转讬 住驻讬谞讜转 注讜讘专讜转 讘谞讛专 讜驻讙注讜 讝讛 讘讝讛 讗诐 注讜讘专讜转 砖转讬讛谉 砖转讬讛谉 讟讜讘注讜转 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 砖转讬讛谉 注讜讘专讜转 讜讻谉 砖谞讬 讙诪诇讬诐 砖讛讬讜 注讜诇讬诐 讘诪注诇讜转 讘讬转 讞讜专讜谉 讜驻讙注讜 讝讛 讘讝讛 讗诐 注诇讜 砖谞讬讛谉 砖谞讬讛谉 谞讜驻诇讬谉 讘讝讛 讗讞专 讝讛 砖谞讬讛谉 注讜诇讬谉

As it is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: 鈥淛ustice, justice, shall you follow,鈥 one mention of 鈥渏ustice鈥 is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats traveling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, as the river is not wide enough for both to pass. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit 岣ron, where there is a narrow steep path, and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend.

讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讟注讜谞讛 讜砖讗讬谞讛 讟注讜谞讛 转讬讚讞讛 砖讗讬谞讛 讟注讜谞讛 诪驻谞讬 讟注讜谞讛 拽专讜讘讛 讜砖讗讬谞讛 拽专讜讘讛 转讬讚讞讛 拽专讜讘讛 诪驻谞讬 砖讗讬谞讛 拽专讜讘讛 讛讬讜 砖转讬讛谉 拽专讜讘讜转 砖转讬讛谉 专讞讜拽讜转 讛讟诇 驻砖专讛 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讜诪注诇讜转 砖讻专 讝讜 诇讝讜

How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 爪讚拽 爪讚拽 转专讚祝 讛诇讱 讗讞专 讘讬转 讚讬谉 讬驻讛 讗讞专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诇诇讜讚 讗讞专 专讘谉 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讝讻讗讬 诇讘专讜专 讞讬诇

The Sages taught: The verse states: 鈥淛ustice, justice, shall you follow.鈥 This teaches that one should follow the best, most prestigious, court of the generation. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yo岣nan ben Zakkai to Beror 岣yil.

转谞讗 拽讜诇 专讬讞讬诐 讘讘讜专谞讬 砖讘讜注 讛讘谉 砖讘讜注 讛讘谉 讗讜专 讛谞专 讘讘专讜专 讞讬诇 诪砖转讛 砖诐 诪砖转讛 砖诐

The Sages taught: When the gentile authorities issued decrees outlawing observance of the mitzvot, members of Jewish communities devised clandestine ways of indicating observance of mitzvot to each other. For example: If one produces the sound of a millstone in the city called Burni, this is tantamount to announcing: Week of the son, week of the son, i.e., there will be a circumcision. If one displays the light of a lamp in the city called Beror 岣yil, this is tantamount to announcing: There is a wedding feast there, there is a wedding feast there.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 爪讚拽 爪讚拽 转专讚祝 讛诇讱 讗讞专 讞讻诪讬诐 诇讬砖讬讘讛 讗讞专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诇诇讜讚 讗讞专 专讘谉 讬讜讞谞谉 讘谉 讝讻讗讬 诇讘专讜专 讞讬诇 讗讞专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诇驻拽讬注讬谉 讗讞专 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讬讘谞讗 讗讞专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讘谞讬 讘专拽 讗讞专 专讘讬 诪转讬讗 诇专讜诪讬 讗讞专 专讘讬 讞谞谞讬讛 讘谉 转专讚讬讜谉 诇住讬讻谞讬 讗讞专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 诇爪讬驻讜专讬 讗讞专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘谉 讘转讬专讛 诇谞爪讬讘讬谉 讗讞专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 诇讙讜诇讛 讗讞专 专讘讬 诇讘讬转 砖注专讬诐 讗讞专 讞讻诪讬诐 诇诇砖讻转 讛讙讝讬转

The Sages taught: The verse states: 鈥淛ustice, justice, shall you follow.鈥 This teaches that one should follow the Sages to the academy where they are found. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yo岣nan ben Zakkai to Beror 岣yil, after Rabbi Yehoshua to Peki鈥檌n, after Rabban Gamliel to Yavne, after Rabbi Akiva to Bnei Brak, after Rabbi Matya to Rome [Romi], after Rabbi 岣nanya ben Teradyon to Sikhnei, after Rabbi Yosei to Tzippori, after Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira to Netzivin, after Rabbi Yehoshua to the exile [gola], i.e., Babylonia, after Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to Beit She鈥檃rim, and after the Sages in the time of the Temple to the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 驻讜转讞讬谉 讻讜壮 讛讬讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讛讜 诪讬 讬讬诪专 讻讚拽讗诪专讬转讜

搂 The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable. The Gemara asks: How do we say this opening stage of the deliberations? In other words, with what claim does the court begin deliberating? Rav Yehuda said: We say this to the witnesses: Who says that the event occurred as you said? Perhaps you erred?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 注讜诇讗 讜讛讗 讞住诪讬谞谉 诇讛讜 讜诇讬讞住诪讜 诪讬 诇讗 转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪住讬注讬谉 讗转 讛注讚讬诐 诪诪拽讜诐 诇诪拽讜诐 讻讚讬 砖转讬讟专祝 讚注转谉 讜讬讞讝专讜 讘讛谉

Ulla said to him: But by confronting the witnesses in this manner, we silence them. The witnesses will think that the court suspects them of lying, and they will not testify. Rav Yehuda said to him: And let them be silenced. Isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says: In cases of capital law, the court brings the witnesses from one place to another place in order to confuse them so that they will retract their testimony if they are lying.

诪讬 讚诪讬 讛转诐 诪诪讬诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讚讞讜 讛讻讗 拽讗 讚讞讬谞谉 诇讛讜 讘讬讚讬诐

The Gemara rejects this argument: Are the halakhot comparable? There, where Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says to bring the witnesses from place to place, the witnesses are repressed by themselves, whereas here, we repress them by direct action, and that the court should not do.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 注讜诇讗 讛讻讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讬砖 诇讱 注讚讬诐 诇讛讝讬诪诐 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讛 讜讻讬 驻讜转讞讬谉 讘讝讻讜转讜 砖诇 讝讛 砖讛讬讗 讞讜讘转讜 砖诇 讝讛

Rather, Ulla says: We say this to the accused: Do you have witnesses to determine that the witnesses who testified against you are conspiring witnesses? Rabba said to him: But do we open the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused that is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses? This claim can lead to the witnesses incurring liability for their testimony.

讜诪讬 讛讜讬讗 讞讜讘转讜 讜讛转谞谉 讗讬谉 注讚讬诐 讝讜诪诪讬谉 谞讛专讙讬谉 注讚 砖讬讙诪专 讛讚讬谉

The Gemara questions Rabba鈥檚 assumption: But is this to the liability of the witnesses? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna (Makkot 5b): Conspiring witnesses are not killed for their testimony until the verdict of the one concerning whom they testified is issued? Therefore, if they will be shown to be conspiring witnesses at this early stage of the proceedings, they will not be liable.

讛讻讬 讗诪讬谞讗 讗讬诇讜 砖转讬拽 讛讗讬 注讚 讚诪讬讙诪专 讚讬谞讬讛 讜诪讬讬转讬 注讚讬诐 讜诪讝讬诐 诇讛讜 讛讜讬讗 诇讬讛 讞讜讘转讜 砖诇 讝讛 讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讬砖 诇讱 注讚讬诐 诇讛讻讞讬砖谉

The Gemara restates Rabba鈥檚 objection: This is what I say: If the accused would be silent until his verdict is issued and then brings witnesses and the court determines them to be conspiring witnesses, it will be found that the statement of the court is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses. Rather, Rabba says: We say to the accused: Do you have witnesses to contradict them? If the first witnesses are contradicted as to the facts of the case, no one is liable.

专讘 讻讛谞讗 讗诪专 诪讚讘专讬讻诐 谞讝讚讻讛 驻诇讜谞讬 讗讘讬讬 讜专讘讗 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讗讬 诇讗 拽讟诇转 诇讗 转讚讞诇 专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻诇 诪讬 砖讬讜讚注 诇讜 讝讻讜转 讬讘讗 讜讬诇诪讚 注诇讬讜

Rav Kahana said: We say to the witnesses: Based on your statements, so-and-so is acquitted. The court issues a pro forma declaration that it is possible to find a reason to acquit based on the testimony of the witnesses, and then they begin the deliberations. Abaye and Rava both say: We say to the accused: For example, if you did not kill anyone, do not fear the consequences of these proceedings, as you will be acquitted. Rav Ashi says: The court announces: Whoever knows of a reason to acquit the accused should come and teach this reason concerning him.

转谞讬讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚讗讘讬讬 讜专讘讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 壮讗诐 诇讗 砖讻讘 讗讬砖 讗讜转讱 讜讗诐 诇讗 砖讟讬转壮 讜讙讜壮

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Abaye and Rava. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The priest administering the sota rite to the sota says to her: 鈥淚f no man has lain with you and if you have not gone astray to impurity while under your husband, you shall be free from this water of bitterness that causes the curse. But if you have gone astray while under your husband鈥︹ (Numbers 5:19鈥20). The priest first states the scenario in which the woman is innocent of adultery.

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