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Today's Daf Yomi

August 18, 2017 | 讻状讜 讘讗讘 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Sanhedrin 33

A contradiction is brought between our mishna that indicates that monetary cases can be overturned and a mishna in bechorot that indicates that when a mistake is made, the ruling stays and the judge pays the difference. 聽Several answers are brought. 聽The gemara then discusses why in capital cases the judgement can only be overturned to acquit. 聽The gemara derives that there are other categories that are treated like capital cases in this regard.

诪讬讻谉 砖驻讜转讞讬谉 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 转讞诇讛 诇讝讻讜转

From here it is derived that in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations by first raising a claim to acquit the accused. This baraita corresponds to the explanation of Abaya and Rava that the court notifies the accused that he has nothing to fear if he is innocent.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讻讜壮 讜专诪讬谞讛讜 讚谉 讗转 讛讚讬谉 讝讬讻讛 讗转 讛讞讬讬讘 讞讬讬讘 讗转 讛讝讻讗讬 讟讬诪讗 讗转 讛讟讛讜专 讟讬讛专 讗转 讛讟诪讗 诪讛 砖注砖讛 注砖讜讬 讜讬砖诇诐 诪讘讬转讜

搂 The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, whether with a claim to exempt him or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a judge issued a judgment and erred, so that he exempts a liable party or finds an innocent party liable, or if he ruled that a pure item is impure or ruled that an impure item is pure, and by doing so he caused a litigant a monetary loss; what he did is done, i.e., the judgment stands, and the judge must pay damages from his home, i.e., from his personal funds. This indicates that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘诪讜诪讞讛 讻讗谉 讘砖讗讬谞讜 诪讜诪讞讛 讜讘诪讜诪讞讛 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讜讛拽转谞讬 讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讜诪讞讛 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐

Rav Yosef says: This is not difficult. The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a judge who was an expert, whereas the mishna there in tractate Bekhorot, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a judge who was not an expert. The Gemara asks: And does one bring the accused back in the case of a judge who was an expert? But that mishna in tractate Bekhorot teaches: If he was an expert accepted by the court he is exempt from liability to pay. This indicates that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, even if the judge is an expert; otherwise there would be no need to state that the judge is exempt from liability to pay.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻讗谉 砖讬砖 讙讚讜诇 讛讬诪谞讜 讘讞讻诪讛 讜讘诪谞讬谉 讻讗谉 砖讗讬谉 讙讚讜诇 讛讬诪谞讜 讘讞讻诪讛 讜讘诪谞讬谉

Rav Na岣an says a different explanation: The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a case where there is a court greater than this one in wisdom and number of students that can judge the case again. The mishna there, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a case where there is no court greater than his in wisdom and number of students that can judge the case again. If this judge erred, the error will not be corrected.

专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讻讗谉 砖讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讻讗谉 砖讟注讛 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讚讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专 讟注讛 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专

Rav Sheshet says a different explanation: The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a case where the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, i.e., he forgot an explicit mishnaic ruling, in which case the verdict is void. The mishna there, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a case where the judge erred in his deliberation. As Rav Sheshet says that Rav Asi says: In the case of a judge who erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, but in the case of a judge who erred in his deliberation, the decision is not revoked.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讟注讛 讘专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讜专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬讚讬 讜讚讬讚讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讟讜 讗谞谉 拽讟诇讬 拽谞讬 讘讗讙诪讗 讗谞谉

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does the category of: Erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, include even one who erred concerning a statement of Rabbi 岣yya and Rabbi Oshaya, who were among the last of the tanna鈥檌m? Rav Ashi said to him: Yes. Ravina asked him: Does it include even one who erred concerning a statement of the first-generation amora鈥檌m Rav and Shmuel? Rav Ashi said to him: Yes. Ravina asked him: Does it include even one who erred concerning statements of mine and yours, as we are of the final generation of amora鈥檌m? Rav Ashi said to him: Is that to say that we are reed cutters in the pond? That is, our statements are in this category as well.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻讙讜谉 转专讬 转谞讗讬 讗讜 转专讬 讗诪讜专讗讬 讚驻诇讬讙讬 讗讛讚讚讬 讜诇讗 讗讬转诪专 讛诇讻转讗 诇讗 讻诪专 讜诇讗 讻诪专 讜讗讬拽专讬 讜注讘讚 讻讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讜住讜讙讬讗 讚砖诪注转讗 讗讝诇讬 讻讗讬讚讱 讛讬讬谞讜 砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转

The Gemara clarifies: What is considered an error in a deliberation? Rav Pappa says: For example, two tanna鈥檌m or two amora鈥檌m who disagree with each other, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with this Sage or in accordance with that Sage, and it occurred that the judge acted in accordance with one of them, and the discussion of the halakha goes in accordance with the other opinion, i.e., most judges rule in accordance with the opposing opinion; this is an error in a deliberation.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 诇专讘 砖砖转 诪注砖讛 讘驻专讛 砖诇 讘讬转 诪谞讞诐 砖谞讬讟诇讛 讛讗诐 砖诇讛 讜讛讗讻讬诇讛 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 诇讻诇讘讬诐

Rav Hamnuna raised an objection to Rav Sheshet from the continuation of the mishna cited earlier (Bekhorot 28b): There was an incident involving a cow of the household of Mena岣m whose womb was removed, and when Rabbi Tarfon was consulted he ruled that it is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which is forbidden for consumption. And based on the ruling of Rabbi Tarfon, the questioner fed it to the dogs.

讜讘讗 诪注砖讛 诇驻谞讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讘讬讘谞讛 讜讛转讬专讜讛 砖讗诪专 转讜讚讜住 讛专讜驻讗 讗讬谉 驻专讛 讜讞讝讬专讛 讬讜爪讗转 诪讗诇讻住谞讚专讬讗 砖诇 诪爪专讬诐 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讞讜转讻讬谉 讛讗诐 砖诇讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转诇讚 讗诪专 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 壮讛诇讻讛 讞诪讜专讱 讟专驻讜谉壮 讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 壮驻讟讜专 讗转讛 砖讻诇 讛诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐壮

The mishna continues: And the incident came before the Sages of the court in Yavne, and they ruled that such an animal is permitted and is not a tereifa. As Theodosius [Todos] the doctor said: A cow or pig does not emerge from Alexandria of Egypt unless the residents sever its womb so that it will not give birth in the future. The breeds of cows and pigs in Alexandria were of exceptional quality and the people of Alexandria did not want them reproduced elsewhere. The fact that these animals lived long lives after their wombs were removed proves that the hysterectomy did not render them tereifot. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Tarfon said: Your donkey is gone, Tarfon, as he believed he was required to compensate the owner for the cow that he ruled to be a tereifa. Rabbi Akiva said to him: You are exempt, as any judge accepted as an expert for the public is exempt from liability to pay.

讜讗讬 讗讬转讗 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 讟讜注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讗转讛 讜讟讜注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专

Rav Hamnuna states his objection to Rav Sheshet: And if it is so that there is a distinction between the two types of judicial errors, let Rabbi Akiva say to Rabbi Tarfon: You err in a matter that appears in the Mishna, as the ruling that an animal whose womb has been removed is permitted is recorded in a mishna (see 岣llin 54a), and in the case of one who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked.

讞讚讗 讜注讜讚 拽讗诪专 讞讚讗 讚讟讜注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讗转讛 讜讟讜注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专 讜注讜讚 讗讬 谞诪讬 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讟注讬转 诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐 讗转讛 讜讻诇 讛诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva states one reason and adds another reason. One: As you err in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and in the case of one who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. Another: Even if you erred in a deliberation, you are a judge accepted as an expert for the public, and any judge accepted as an expert for the public is exempt from liability to pay.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇专讘讗 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪讜转讬讘 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 诇专讘 砖砖转 诪驻专讛 驻专讛 讛专讬 讛讗讻讬诇讛 诇讻诇讘讬诐 讜诇讬转讗 讚转讛讚专

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said to Rava: What was the objection raised by Rav Hamnuna to Rav Sheshet from the incident of the cow? After all, the owner had already fed the cow to the dogs, and it is not possible to revoke the ruling and judge the case again.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讗诇诪讗 拽诐 讚讬谞讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讚拽讗 诪驻讞讬讚 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬讛讜 诪讜诪讞讛 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗转讛 讜讗转讛 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬诇讜 讛讜讗讬 驻专讛 讚讬谞讱 诇讗讜 讚讬谞讗 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 注讘讚转 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讻诇讜诐 注讘讚转

Rava answered: This is what Rav Hamnuna was saying to Rav Sheshet: Granted, if you say that in the case of a judge who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is not revoked, which evidently indicates that the verdict stands as it is, that is why Rabbi Tarfon feared that he would have to pay, and Rabbi Akiva said to him: You are an expert accepted by the court, and are exempt from liability to pay. But if you say that in the case of a judge who erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, let Rabbi Akiva say to Rabbi Tarfon: Since if the cow were to be here, your verdict is not a verdict and you did nothing, now as well, you did nothing and you are not liable to pay. It was the action of the owner that caused the loss, as he fed the cow to the dogs.

专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 讻讗谉 砖谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讻讗谉 砖诇讗 谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚

Rav 岣sda says that the contradiction between the mishna here and the mishna in tractate Bekhorot as to whether or not the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises can be answered as follows: The mishna there in tractate Bekhorot is stated with regard to a case where a judge took the item in question from one litigant and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. In this case, the judge is liable to pay. The mishna here is stated with regard to a case where a judge of the court did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand. The court merely issued a ruling, and the litigants executed the verdict on their own. Therefore, the court is not liable to pay, and the judges retry the case.

讘砖诇诪讗 讞讬讬讘 讗转 讛讝讻讗讬 讻讙讜谉 砖谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讗诇讗 讝讬讻讛 讗转 讛讞讬讬讘 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻讟讜专 讗转讛 讜讛讗 诇讗 谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 驻讟讜专 讗转讛 讻诪讜 砖谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: Granted, one can explain the clause from the mishna in tractate Bekhorot: He finds an innocent party liable, in a case where the judge took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. But how can you find him giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party? As, the judge said to the litigant only: You are exempt from liability to pay, but the judge did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand. The Gemara explains: Once he says: You are exempt from liability to pay, it is considered as if he took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand, as there is no need for any further action.

讗诇讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诇讝讻讜转 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪注讬拽专讗 讞讬讬讘 讗转讛 讜诇讗 谞讟诇 讜诇讗 谞转谉 讘讬讚 讗诇讗 诇讞讜讘讛 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻讟讜专 讗转讛 讜讛讗诪专转 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻讟讜专 讗转讛 讻诪讜 砖谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: But what of the mishna, which teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable? Granted, you can find the example of: To exempt, where the court says at the outset to one litigant: You are liable to pay, and a judge did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand, as Rav 岣sda holds that the verdict is revoked and the court does not pay. But how can you find the example of judging the case again to find him liable? As once the court says to the litigant: You are exempt, the case cannot be judged again. But you said that once a judge says: You are exempt from liability to pay, it is considered as if he took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. If so, the court must pay and the judgment will not be revoked.

讞讚讗 拽转谞讬 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 砖讛讬讗 讞讜讘讛 讚讻讜讜转讛 讙讘讬 谞驻砖讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讝讻讜转

The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches only that one statement, and it should be understood as follows: In cases of monetary law, the court brings the litigant back to be judged again to exempt that litigant, which is to the liability of the other litigant, while in the corresponding situation with regard to cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to acquit him,

讜讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讝讻讜转 讙专讬讚转讗 讜讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 诇讝讻讜转 砖讛讬讗 讞讜讘讛

but they do not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. When the mishna says: The court brings the accused back to acquit him, this is an acquittal alone and is not to anyone鈥檚 liability. When it says: But they do not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable, this is an acquittal that is also a liability. The court does not bring the accused back to acquit him if this entails a liability to another.

讞讜讘转讬讛 讚诪讗谉 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讞讜讘转讬讛 讚讙讜讗诇 讛讚诐 诪砖讜诐 讞讜讘转讬讛 讚讙讜讗诇 讛讚诐 拽讟诇讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇讛讗讬 讜注讜讚 诪讗讬 讘讬谉 讘讬谉 拽砖讬讗

The Gemara clarifies: A liability for whom? There is no other litigant in cases of capital law. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, this is to the liability, i.e., the detriment, of the blood redeemer, as he desires that the murderer be killed, and he will no longer be allowed to kill him. The Gemara questions this explanation: Is it reasonable that due to the liability of the blood redeemer, we kill this one and do not reverse the verdict to acquit him even when there is a reason to do so? And further, what is the meaning of the term: Whether with a claim to exempt the accused, or whether with a claim to find him liable? It is clear that this is referring to two separate matters, not to two types of acquittal. The Gemara comments: This is difficult.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 诇讜 讘讬讚讜 诪砖讻讜谉 讜谞讟诇讜 诪诪谞讜

The Gemara cites another explanation of how one can find a judge giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party. Ravina said: It is possible in a case where the one who lodged the claim had in his possession an item belonging to the other litigant that functioned as collateral for a debt, and when the judge issued a verdict in favor of the other he took the collateral from him, thereby physically transferring it to the wrong party.

讟讬诪讗 讗转 讛讟讛讜专 讚讗讙注讬 讘讬讛 砖专抓 讟讬讛专 讗转 讛讟诪讗 砖注讬专讘谉 讘讬谉 驻讬专讜转讬讜

In the case from the mishna in tractate Bekhorot: He ruled that a pure item is impure, how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is where he had the litigant鈥檚 ritually pure item touch a creeping animal to emphasize that he believes it was already impure, and he thereby imparted impurity to it. In that mishna鈥檚 case of: He ruled that an impure item is pure, how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is where he mixed this impure produce of the litigant鈥檚 with the litigant鈥檚 ritually pure produce, and he thereby caused all of the produce to be considered impure.

讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讻讜壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诪谞讬讬谉 诇讬讜爪讗 诪讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讗诪专 讗讞讚 壮讬砖 诇讬 诇诇诪讚 注诇讬讜 讝讻讜转壮 诪谞讬讬谉 砖诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讗讜转讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮谞拽讬 讗诇 转讛专讙壮

搂 The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. To explain the terms 鈥渋nnocent鈥 and 鈥渞ighteous鈥 in the verse: 鈥淎nd the innocent and the righteous you shall not slay鈥 (Exodus 23:7), the Sages taught: From where is it derived that with regard to one who is leaving the court having been found liable, and someone said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court brings the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: The innocent you shall not slay, and the accused may in fact be innocent.

讜诪谞讬讬谉 诇讬讜爪讗 诪讘讬转 讚讬谉 讝讻讗讬 讜讗诪专 讗讞讚 壮讬砖 诇讬 诇诇诪讚 注诇讬讜 讞讜讘讛壮 诪谞讬讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讗讜转讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮爪讚讬拽 讗诇 转讛专讙壮

And from where is it derived that with regard to one who is leaving the court, having been acquitted, and someone says: I have the ability to teach a reason to find him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: 鈥淭he righteous you shall not slay,鈥 and the accused was found righteous in his trial.

讗诪专 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 讜讞讬诇讜驻讗 诇诪住讬转 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讞诪诇 讜诇讗 转讻住讛 注诇讬讜 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪转谞讬 诪讻讬 讛专讙 转讛专讙谞讜

Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: And the opposite of this is the halakha with regard to one who entices others to engage in idol worship, as it is written concerning him: 鈥淣either shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:9). He is brought back to court to find him liable, but not to acquit him. Rav Kahana teaches this last halakha citing a different verse concerning the enticer: 鈥淏ut you shall kill him [harog tahargennu]鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:10). The repetition of the verb indicates that he is killed even in circumstances where transgressors of other prohibitions would not be.

讘注讗 诪谞讬讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪专讘 砖砖转 讞讬讬讘讬 讙诇讬讜转 诪谞讬讬谉 讗转讬讗 专爪讞 专爪讞

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to be exiled to a city of refuge for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term 鈥渕urderer鈥 stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:16) and the term 鈥渕urderer鈥 stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally (see Numbers 35:19).

讞讬讬讘讬 诪诇拽讬讜转 诪谞讬讬谉 讗转讬讗 专砖注 专砖注

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to receive forty lashes is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term 鈥渨icked鈥 stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:31) and the term 鈥渨icked鈥 stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes (see Deuteronomy 25:2).

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讞讬讬讘讬 讙诇讬讜转 诪谞讬讬谉 讗转讬讗 壮专爪讞壮 壮专爪讞壮 讞讬讬讘讬 诪诇拽讜转 诪谞讬讬谉 讗转讬讗 壮专砖注壮 壮专砖注壮

The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:3): From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to be exiled for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term 鈥渕urderer鈥 stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term 鈥渕urderer鈥 stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally. From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to receive forty lashes is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term 鈥渨icked鈥 stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term 鈥渨icked鈥 stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes.

讜讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讜讗 砖讟注讛 讘讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讛爪讚讜拽讬谉 诪讜讚讬谉 讘讜 讗讘诇 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 砖讛爪讚讜拽讬谉 诪讜讚讬谉 讘讜 讝讬诇 拽专讬 讘讬 专讘 讛讜讗

搂 The mishna teaches concerning cases of capital law: But the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: And this is the halakha only in a case where the judge erred with regard to a matter for which the Sadducees do not admit to its validity, i.e., he erred in a matter learned from tradition or established by the Sages. But if the judge erred in a matter for which the Sadducees admit to its validity, i.e., a matter that is written explicitly in the Torah, it is a topic that you could go learn in a children鈥檚 school, and such an error negates the verdict and is reversed.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 诪专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讟注讛 讘谞讜讗祝 讜谞讜讗驻转 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讚诪讜拽讚讱 讬拽讬讚 讝讬诇 拽讜抓 拽专讱 讜爪诇讬 讗讬转诪专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讟注讛 讘谞讜讗祝 讞讜讝专

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba asked of Rabbi Yo岣nan: What is the halakha in the case of a judge who erred with regard to the judgment of an adulterer and adulteress, by ruling that only the man is liable but not the woman? Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him: While your fire is burning, cut your squash and roast it, i.e., seize the opportunity to add this case to the principle I taught you earlier. It was also stated: Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Concerning a judge who erred with regard to an adulterer, the court revokes the verdict.

讗诇讗 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬谉 讞讜讝专讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讟注讛 砖诇讗 讻讚专讻讛

The Gemara asks: Rather, what are the circumstances where the court does not revoke the acquittal? Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: In a case where he erred and acquitted the adulterer who engaged in sexual intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse. The halakha that this is considered sexual intercourse is not explicit in a verse. Therefore, if a court acquits one so accused, the verdict is not revoked.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讛讻诇 讻讜壮 讛讻诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 注讚讬诐 谞讬诪讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讜诇讗 专讘谞谉

搂 The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. The Gemara asks: In capital cases, may all those present teach a reason to acquit, and even witnesses? The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

讚转谞讬讗 壮讜注讚 讗讞讚 诇讗 讬注谞讛 讘谞驻砖壮 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 注讜谞讛 诇讝讻讜转 讜讗讬谉 注讜谞讛 诇讞讜讘讛

The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淏ut one witness shall not testify against any person that he die鈥 (Numbers 35:30). A witness cannot state anything other than his testimony, whether to provide a reason to acquit the accused or to provide a reason to find him liable; this is the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A witness may answer to provide a reason to acquit, but a witness may not answer to provide a reason to find the accused liable. The mishna here seems to be in accordance with the minority opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讗讞讚 诪谉 讛转诇诪讬讚讬诐 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

Rav Pappa says: When the mishna refers to all those present at the trial, it is not referring to the witnesses but to one of the students sitting before the court, and therefore all agree with the ruling of the mishna.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Sanhedrin 33

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 33

诪讬讻谉 砖驻讜转讞讬谉 讘讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 转讞诇讛 诇讝讻讜转

From here it is derived that in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations by first raising a claim to acquit the accused. This baraita corresponds to the explanation of Abaya and Rava that the court notifies the accused that he has nothing to fear if he is innocent.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讻讜壮 讜专诪讬谞讛讜 讚谉 讗转 讛讚讬谉 讝讬讻讛 讗转 讛讞讬讬讘 讞讬讬讘 讗转 讛讝讻讗讬 讟讬诪讗 讗转 讛讟讛讜专 讟讬讛专 讗转 讛讟诪讗 诪讛 砖注砖讛 注砖讜讬 讜讬砖诇诐 诪讘讬转讜

搂 The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, whether with a claim to exempt him or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a judge issued a judgment and erred, so that he exempts a liable party or finds an innocent party liable, or if he ruled that a pure item is impure or ruled that an impure item is pure, and by doing so he caused a litigant a monetary loss; what he did is done, i.e., the judgment stands, and the judge must pay damages from his home, i.e., from his personal funds. This indicates that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘诪讜诪讞讛 讻讗谉 讘砖讗讬谞讜 诪讜诪讞讛 讜讘诪讜诪讞讛 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讜讛拽转谞讬 讗诐 讛讬讛 诪讜诪讞讛 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐

Rav Yosef says: This is not difficult. The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a judge who was an expert, whereas the mishna there in tractate Bekhorot, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a judge who was not an expert. The Gemara asks: And does one bring the accused back in the case of a judge who was an expert? But that mishna in tractate Bekhorot teaches: If he was an expert accepted by the court he is exempt from liability to pay. This indicates that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, even if the judge is an expert; otherwise there would be no need to state that the judge is exempt from liability to pay.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讻讗谉 砖讬砖 讙讚讜诇 讛讬诪谞讜 讘讞讻诪讛 讜讘诪谞讬谉 讻讗谉 砖讗讬谉 讙讚讜诇 讛讬诪谞讜 讘讞讻诪讛 讜讘诪谞讬谉

Rav Na岣an says a different explanation: The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a case where there is a court greater than this one in wisdom and number of students that can judge the case again. The mishna there, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a case where there is no court greater than his in wisdom and number of students that can judge the case again. If this judge erred, the error will not be corrected.

专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 讻讗谉 砖讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讻讗谉 砖讟注讛 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讚讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专 讟注讛 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专

Rav Sheshet says a different explanation: The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a case where the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, i.e., he forgot an explicit mishnaic ruling, in which case the verdict is void. The mishna there, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a case where the judge erred in his deliberation. As Rav Sheshet says that Rav Asi says: In the case of a judge who erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, but in the case of a judge who erred in his deliberation, the decision is not revoked.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讟注讛 讘专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讜专讘讬 讗讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讚讬讚讬 讜讚讬讚讱 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讟讜 讗谞谉 拽讟诇讬 拽谞讬 讘讗讙诪讗 讗谞谉

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does the category of: Erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, include even one who erred concerning a statement of Rabbi 岣yya and Rabbi Oshaya, who were among the last of the tanna鈥檌m? Rav Ashi said to him: Yes. Ravina asked him: Does it include even one who erred concerning a statement of the first-generation amora鈥檌m Rav and Shmuel? Rav Ashi said to him: Yes. Ravina asked him: Does it include even one who erred concerning statements of mine and yours, as we are of the final generation of amora鈥檌m? Rav Ashi said to him: Is that to say that we are reed cutters in the pond? That is, our statements are in this category as well.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻讙讜谉 转专讬 转谞讗讬 讗讜 转专讬 讗诪讜专讗讬 讚驻诇讬讙讬 讗讛讚讚讬 讜诇讗 讗讬转诪专 讛诇讻转讗 诇讗 讻诪专 讜诇讗 讻诪专 讜讗讬拽专讬 讜注讘讚 讻讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讜住讜讙讬讗 讚砖诪注转讗 讗讝诇讬 讻讗讬讚讱 讛讬讬谞讜 砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转

The Gemara clarifies: What is considered an error in a deliberation? Rav Pappa says: For example, two tanna鈥檌m or two amora鈥檌m who disagree with each other, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with this Sage or in accordance with that Sage, and it occurred that the judge acted in accordance with one of them, and the discussion of the halakha goes in accordance with the other opinion, i.e., most judges rule in accordance with the opposing opinion; this is an error in a deliberation.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 诇专讘 砖砖转 诪注砖讛 讘驻专讛 砖诇 讘讬转 诪谞讞诐 砖谞讬讟诇讛 讛讗诐 砖诇讛 讜讛讗讻讬诇讛 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 诇讻诇讘讬诐

Rav Hamnuna raised an objection to Rav Sheshet from the continuation of the mishna cited earlier (Bekhorot 28b): There was an incident involving a cow of the household of Mena岣m whose womb was removed, and when Rabbi Tarfon was consulted he ruled that it is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which is forbidden for consumption. And based on the ruling of Rabbi Tarfon, the questioner fed it to the dogs.

讜讘讗 诪注砖讛 诇驻谞讬 讞讻诪讬诐 讘讬讘谞讛 讜讛转讬专讜讛 砖讗诪专 转讜讚讜住 讛专讜驻讗 讗讬谉 驻专讛 讜讞讝讬专讛 讬讜爪讗转 诪讗诇讻住谞讚专讬讗 砖诇 诪爪专讬诐 讗诇讗 讗诐 讻谉 讞讜转讻讬谉 讛讗诐 砖诇讛 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 转诇讚 讗诪专 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 壮讛诇讻讛 讞诪讜专讱 讟专驻讜谉壮 讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 壮驻讟讜专 讗转讛 砖讻诇 讛诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐壮

The mishna continues: And the incident came before the Sages of the court in Yavne, and they ruled that such an animal is permitted and is not a tereifa. As Theodosius [Todos] the doctor said: A cow or pig does not emerge from Alexandria of Egypt unless the residents sever its womb so that it will not give birth in the future. The breeds of cows and pigs in Alexandria were of exceptional quality and the people of Alexandria did not want them reproduced elsewhere. The fact that these animals lived long lives after their wombs were removed proves that the hysterectomy did not render them tereifot. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Tarfon said: Your donkey is gone, Tarfon, as he believed he was required to compensate the owner for the cow that he ruled to be a tereifa. Rabbi Akiva said to him: You are exempt, as any judge accepted as an expert for the public is exempt from liability to pay.

讜讗讬 讗讬转讗 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 讟讜注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讗转讛 讜讟讜注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专

Rav Hamnuna states his objection to Rav Sheshet: And if it is so that there is a distinction between the two types of judicial errors, let Rabbi Akiva say to Rabbi Tarfon: You err in a matter that appears in the Mishna, as the ruling that an animal whose womb has been removed is permitted is recorded in a mishna (see 岣llin 54a), and in the case of one who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked.

讞讚讗 讜注讜讚 拽讗诪专 讞讚讗 讚讟讜注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讗转讛 讜讟讜注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专 讜注讜讚 讗讬 谞诪讬 讘砖讬拽讜诇 讛讚注转 讟注讬转 诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐 讗转讛 讜讻诇 讛诪讜诪讞讛 诇专讘讬诐 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva states one reason and adds another reason. One: As you err in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and in the case of one who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. Another: Even if you erred in a deliberation, you are a judge accepted as an expert for the public, and any judge accepted as an expert for the public is exempt from liability to pay.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇专讘讗 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪讜转讬讘 专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 诇专讘 砖砖转 诪驻专讛 驻专讛 讛专讬 讛讗讻讬诇讛 诇讻诇讘讬诐 讜诇讬转讗 讚转讛讚专

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said to Rava: What was the objection raised by Rav Hamnuna to Rav Sheshet from the incident of the cow? After all, the owner had already fed the cow to the dogs, and it is not possible to revoke the ruling and judge the case again.

讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讜讝专 讗诇诪讗 拽诐 讚讬谞讗 讛讬讬谞讜 讚拽讗 诪驻讞讬讚 专讘讬 讟专驻讜谉 讜拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬讛讜 诪讜诪讞讛 诇讘讬转 讚讬谉 讗转讛 讜讗转讛 驻讟讜专 诪诇砖诇诐 讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 诪砖谞讛 讞讜讝专 诇讬诪讗 诇讬讛 讻讬讜谉 讚讗讬诇讜 讛讜讗讬 驻专讛 讚讬谞讱 诇讗讜 讚讬谞讗 讜诇讗 讻诇讜诐 注讘讚转 讛砖转讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 讻诇讜诐 注讘讚转

Rava answered: This is what Rav Hamnuna was saying to Rav Sheshet: Granted, if you say that in the case of a judge who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is not revoked, which evidently indicates that the verdict stands as it is, that is why Rabbi Tarfon feared that he would have to pay, and Rabbi Akiva said to him: You are an expert accepted by the court, and are exempt from liability to pay. But if you say that in the case of a judge who erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, let Rabbi Akiva say to Rabbi Tarfon: Since if the cow were to be here, your verdict is not a verdict and you did nothing, now as well, you did nothing and you are not liable to pay. It was the action of the owner that caused the loss, as he fed the cow to the dogs.

专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 讻讗谉 砖谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讻讗谉 砖诇讗 谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚

Rav 岣sda says that the contradiction between the mishna here and the mishna in tractate Bekhorot as to whether or not the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises can be answered as follows: The mishna there in tractate Bekhorot is stated with regard to a case where a judge took the item in question from one litigant and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. In this case, the judge is liable to pay. The mishna here is stated with regard to a case where a judge of the court did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand. The court merely issued a ruling, and the litigants executed the verdict on their own. Therefore, the court is not liable to pay, and the judges retry the case.

讘砖诇诪讗 讞讬讬讘 讗转 讛讝讻讗讬 讻讙讜谉 砖谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讗诇讗 讝讬讻讛 讗转 讛讞讬讬讘 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻讟讜专 讗转讛 讜讛讗 诇讗 谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 驻讟讜专 讗转讛 讻诪讜 砖谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: Granted, one can explain the clause from the mishna in tractate Bekhorot: He finds an innocent party liable, in a case where the judge took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. But how can you find him giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party? As, the judge said to the litigant only: You are exempt from liability to pay, but the judge did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand. The Gemara explains: Once he says: You are exempt from liability to pay, it is considered as if he took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand, as there is no need for any further action.

讗诇讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚拽转谞讬 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讘砖诇诪讗 诇讝讻讜转 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪注讬拽专讗 讞讬讬讘 讗转讛 讜诇讗 谞讟诇 讜诇讗 谞转谉 讘讬讚 讗诇讗 诇讞讜讘讛 讛讬讻讬 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻讟讜专 讗转讛 讜讛讗诪专转 讻讬讜谉 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 驻讟讜专 讗转讛 讻诪讜 砖谞讟诇 讜谞转谉 讘讬讚 讚诪讬

The Gemara asks: But what of the mishna, which teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable? Granted, you can find the example of: To exempt, where the court says at the outset to one litigant: You are liable to pay, and a judge did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand, as Rav 岣sda holds that the verdict is revoked and the court does not pay. But how can you find the example of judging the case again to find him liable? As once the court says to the litigant: You are exempt, the case cannot be judged again. But you said that once a judge says: You are exempt from liability to pay, it is considered as if he took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. If so, the court must pay and the judgment will not be revoked.

讞讚讗 拽转谞讬 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 砖讛讬讗 讞讜讘讛 讚讻讜讜转讛 讙讘讬 谞驻砖讜转 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讝讻讜转

The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches only that one statement, and it should be understood as follows: In cases of monetary law, the court brings the litigant back to be judged again to exempt that litigant, which is to the liability of the other litigant, while in the corresponding situation with regard to cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to acquit him,

讜讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讝讻讜转 讙专讬讚转讗 讜讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 诇讝讻讜转 砖讛讬讗 讞讜讘讛

but they do not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. When the mishna says: The court brings the accused back to acquit him, this is an acquittal alone and is not to anyone鈥檚 liability. When it says: But they do not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable, this is an acquittal that is also a liability. The court does not bring the accused back to acquit him if this entails a liability to another.

讞讜讘转讬讛 讚诪讗谉 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讞讜讘转讬讛 讚讙讜讗诇 讛讚诐 诪砖讜诐 讞讜讘转讬讛 讚讙讜讗诇 讛讚诐 拽讟诇讬谞谉 诇讬讛 诇讛讗讬 讜注讜讚 诪讗讬 讘讬谉 讘讬谉 拽砖讬讗

The Gemara clarifies: A liability for whom? There is no other litigant in cases of capital law. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, this is to the liability, i.e., the detriment, of the blood redeemer, as he desires that the murderer be killed, and he will no longer be allowed to kill him. The Gemara questions this explanation: Is it reasonable that due to the liability of the blood redeemer, we kill this one and do not reverse the verdict to acquit him even when there is a reason to do so? And further, what is the meaning of the term: Whether with a claim to exempt the accused, or whether with a claim to find him liable? It is clear that this is referring to two separate matters, not to two types of acquittal. The Gemara comments: This is difficult.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖讛讬讛 诇讜 讘讬讚讜 诪砖讻讜谉 讜谞讟诇讜 诪诪谞讜

The Gemara cites another explanation of how one can find a judge giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party. Ravina said: It is possible in a case where the one who lodged the claim had in his possession an item belonging to the other litigant that functioned as collateral for a debt, and when the judge issued a verdict in favor of the other he took the collateral from him, thereby physically transferring it to the wrong party.

讟讬诪讗 讗转 讛讟讛讜专 讚讗讙注讬 讘讬讛 砖专抓 讟讬讛专 讗转 讛讟诪讗 砖注讬专讘谉 讘讬谉 驻讬专讜转讬讜

In the case from the mishna in tractate Bekhorot: He ruled that a pure item is impure, how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is where he had the litigant鈥檚 ritually pure item touch a creeping animal to emphasize that he believes it was already impure, and he thereby imparted impurity to it. In that mishna鈥檚 case of: He ruled that an impure item is pure, how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is where he mixed this impure produce of the litigant鈥檚 with the litigant鈥檚 ritually pure produce, and he thereby caused all of the produce to be considered impure.

讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讻讜壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诪谞讬讬谉 诇讬讜爪讗 诪讘讬转 讚讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讜讗诪专 讗讞讚 壮讬砖 诇讬 诇诇诪讚 注诇讬讜 讝讻讜转壮 诪谞讬讬谉 砖诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讗讜转讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮谞拽讬 讗诇 转讛专讙壮

搂 The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. To explain the terms 鈥渋nnocent鈥 and 鈥渞ighteous鈥 in the verse: 鈥淎nd the innocent and the righteous you shall not slay鈥 (Exodus 23:7), the Sages taught: From where is it derived that with regard to one who is leaving the court having been found liable, and someone said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court brings the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: The innocent you shall not slay, and the accused may in fact be innocent.

讜诪谞讬讬谉 诇讬讜爪讗 诪讘讬转 讚讬谉 讝讻讗讬 讜讗诪专 讗讞讚 壮讬砖 诇讬 诇诇诪讚 注诇讬讜 讞讜讘讛壮 诪谞讬讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讗讜转讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮爪讚讬拽 讗诇 转讛专讙壮

And from where is it derived that with regard to one who is leaving the court, having been acquitted, and someone says: I have the ability to teach a reason to find him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: 鈥淭he righteous you shall not slay,鈥 and the accused was found righteous in his trial.

讗诪专 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讗砖讬 讜讞讬诇讜驻讗 诇诪住讬转 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讞诪诇 讜诇讗 转讻住讛 注诇讬讜 专讘 讻讛谞讗 诪转谞讬 诪讻讬 讛专讙 转讛专讙谞讜

Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: And the opposite of this is the halakha with regard to one who entices others to engage in idol worship, as it is written concerning him: 鈥淣either shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:9). He is brought back to court to find him liable, but not to acquit him. Rav Kahana teaches this last halakha citing a different verse concerning the enticer: 鈥淏ut you shall kill him [harog tahargennu]鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:10). The repetition of the verb indicates that he is killed even in circumstances where transgressors of other prohibitions would not be.

讘注讗 诪谞讬讛 专讘讬 讝讬专讗 诪专讘 砖砖转 讞讬讬讘讬 讙诇讬讜转 诪谞讬讬谉 讗转讬讗 专爪讞 专爪讞

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to be exiled to a city of refuge for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term 鈥渕urderer鈥 stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:16) and the term 鈥渕urderer鈥 stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally (see Numbers 35:19).

讞讬讬讘讬 诪诇拽讬讜转 诪谞讬讬谉 讗转讬讗 专砖注 专砖注

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to receive forty lashes is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term 鈥渨icked鈥 stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:31) and the term 鈥渨icked鈥 stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes (see Deuteronomy 25:2).

转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讞讬讬讘讬 讙诇讬讜转 诪谞讬讬谉 讗转讬讗 壮专爪讞壮 壮专爪讞壮 讞讬讬讘讬 诪诇拽讜转 诪谞讬讬谉 讗转讬讗 壮专砖注壮 壮专砖注壮

The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:3): From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to be exiled for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term 鈥渕urderer鈥 stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term 鈥渕urderer鈥 stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally. From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to receive forty lashes is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term 鈥渨icked鈥 stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term 鈥渨icked鈥 stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes.

讜讗讬谉 诪讞讝讬专讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讛讜讗 砖讟注讛 讘讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讛爪讚讜拽讬谉 诪讜讚讬谉 讘讜 讗讘诇 讟注讛 讘讚讘专 砖讛爪讚讜拽讬谉 诪讜讚讬谉 讘讜 讝讬诇 拽专讬 讘讬 专讘 讛讜讗

搂 The mishna teaches concerning cases of capital law: But the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: And this is the halakha only in a case where the judge erred with regard to a matter for which the Sadducees do not admit to its validity, i.e., he erred in a matter learned from tradition or established by the Sages. But if the judge erred in a matter for which the Sadducees admit to its validity, i.e., a matter that is written explicitly in the Torah, it is a topic that you could go learn in a children鈥檚 school, and such an error negates the verdict and is reversed.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 诪专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讟注讛 讘谞讜讗祝 讜谞讜讗驻转 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讚诪讜拽讚讱 讬拽讬讚 讝讬诇 拽讜抓 拽专讱 讜爪诇讬 讗讬转诪专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讟注讛 讘谞讜讗祝 讞讜讝专

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba asked of Rabbi Yo岣nan: What is the halakha in the case of a judge who erred with regard to the judgment of an adulterer and adulteress, by ruling that only the man is liable but not the woman? Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him: While your fire is burning, cut your squash and roast it, i.e., seize the opportunity to add this case to the principle I taught you earlier. It was also stated: Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Concerning a judge who erred with regard to an adulterer, the court revokes the verdict.

讗诇讗 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬谉 讞讜讝专讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讻讙讜谉 砖讟注讛 砖诇讗 讻讚专讻讛

The Gemara asks: Rather, what are the circumstances where the court does not revoke the acquittal? Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: In a case where he erred and acquitted the adulterer who engaged in sexual intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse. The halakha that this is considered sexual intercourse is not explicit in a verse. Therefore, if a court acquits one so accused, the verdict is not revoked.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讛讻诇 讻讜壮 讛讻诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 注讚讬诐 谞讬诪讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讬讗 讜诇讗 专讘谞谉

搂 The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. The Gemara asks: In capital cases, may all those present teach a reason to acquit, and even witnesses? The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

讚转谞讬讗 壮讜注讚 讗讞讚 诇讗 讬注谞讛 讘谞驻砖壮 讘讬谉 诇讝讻讜转 讘讬谉 诇讞讜讘讛 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 注讜谞讛 诇讝讻讜转 讜讗讬谉 注讜谞讛 诇讞讜讘讛

The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淏ut one witness shall not testify against any person that he die鈥 (Numbers 35:30). A witness cannot state anything other than his testimony, whether to provide a reason to acquit the accused or to provide a reason to find him liable; this is the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A witness may answer to provide a reason to acquit, but a witness may not answer to provide a reason to find the accused liable. The mishna here seems to be in accordance with the minority opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讘讗讞讚 诪谉 讛转诇诪讬讚讬诐 讜讚讘专讬 讛讻诇

Rav Pappa says: When the mishna refers to all those present at the trial, it is not referring to the witnesses but to one of the students sitting before the court, and therefore all agree with the ruling of the mishna.

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