Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

August 19, 2017 | 讻状讝 讘讗讘 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Sanhedrin 34

The mishna states that one who first thought to acquit cannot later bring an argument to convict. 聽Rav explains that this is only meant during the time of the deliberations but when making the final decision, one can switch positions even to convict. 聽Several attempts are made to contradict Rav’s opinion but all are resolved. 聽From where do we derive that monetary cases must begin during the day but can continue in the night? 聽Rabbi Meir disagrees with this opinion and the derivation for his opinion is brought.


If the lesson doesn't play, click "Download"

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诇讗 讬注谞讛 讘谞驻砖 诇诪讜转 诇诪讜转 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谞讜 注讜谞讛 讗讘诇 诇讝讻讜转 注讜谞讛 讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻谞讜讙注 讘注讚讜转讜

The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As the verse states: 鈥淏ut one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.鈥 One can infer: That he die is the matter concerning which he does not testify, but he does testify to acquit. The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of the Rabbis? Reish Lakish says: A witness cannot offer any statements beyond his testimony because it appears as though he is biased in his testimony. If the court finds the accused liable based on the witness鈥檚 testimony, the witness could later be accused of being a conspiring witness. Therefore, it is to his advantage to have the court acquit the accused.

讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 诇诪讜转 诪讗讬 讚专砖讬 讘讬讛 诪讜拽诪讬 诇讬讛 讘讗讞讚 诪谉 讛转诇诪讬讚讬诐 讻讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛注讚讬诐 壮讬砖 诇讬 诇诇诪讚 注诇讬讜 讝讻讜转壮 诪谞讬讬谉 砖讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮注讚 讗讞讚 诇讗 讬注谞讛壮 诪谞讬讬谉 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛转诇诪讬讚讬诐 砖讗诪专 壮讬砖 诇讬 诇诇诪讚 注诇讬讜 讞讜讘讛壮 诪谞讬讬谉 砖讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮讗讞讚 诇讗 讬注谞讛 讘谞驻砖 诇诪讜转壮

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, in what manner do they interpret this term: 鈥淭hat he die鈥? The Gemara answers: They establish it as teaching the halakha with regard to one of the students. As it is taught in a baraita: If one of the witnesses said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: 鈥淥ne witness shall not testify.鈥 From where is it derived that if there is one of the students who said: I have the ability to teach a reason to deem him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: 鈥淏ut one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.鈥

讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讛诪诇诪讚 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘砖注转 诪砖讗 讜诪转谉 讗讘诇 讘砖注转 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讞讜讝专 讜诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛

搂 The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to deem the accused liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit him may not return and teach a reason to deem him liable. Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to the time of the deliberations of the court, but at the time of the verdict, one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable.

诪讬转讬讘讬 诇诪讞专转 诪砖讻讬诪讬谉 讜讘讗讬谉 讛诪讝讻讛 讗讜诪专 壮讗谞讬 讛诪讝讻讛 讜诪讝讻讛 讗谞讬 讘诪拽讜诪讬壮 讛诪讞讬讬讘 讗讜诪专 壮讗谞讬 讛诪讞讬讬讘 讜诪讞讬讬讘 讗谞讬 讘诪拽讜诪讬壮 讛诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛 诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讗讘诇 讛诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讜诇诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (40a): The following day, i.e., the day after the initial deliberations, the judges would arise early and come to court. One who yesterday was of the opinion to acquit says: I said to acquit, and I acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then teach a reason to deem him liable.

讜讛讗 诇诪讞专转 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 诇诪讞专转 诪砖讗 讜诪转谉 诪讬 诇讬讻讗 讻讬 拽转谞讬 讘砖注转 诪砖讗 讜诪转谉

The Gemara explains the objection: But the following day is at the time of the verdict, and the mishna rules that a judge who had said to acquit may not change his opinion. The Gemara questions this reading of the mishna: And according to your reasoning, are there no deliberations on the following day? The deliberations may resume on the next day. Therefore, one can say that when the mishna teaches that the judge may not change his opinion, it is with regard to the time of the deliberations.

转讗 砖诪注 讚谞讬谉 讗诇讜 讻谞讙讚 讗诇讜 注讚 砖讬专讗讛 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛诪讝讻讬谉 讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 讗讬驻讻讗 转谞讗 讗讝讻讜转 拽讗 诪讛讚专 讗讞讜讘讛 诇讗 拽讗 诪讛讚专

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of that mishna, which teaches that if the number of judges who deem him liable is one more than the number of judges who acquit, they continue to deliberate the matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn someone to death by a majority of one judge. The Gemara states its proof: And if it is so that one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable, let the mishna also teach the opposite possibility. The Gemara explains: The tanna is searching for scenarios of acquittal, he is not searching for scenarios of liability. It may be that the halakha is the same in the opposite case, but the tanna prefers to employ an example of acquittal.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛转诇诪讬讚讬诐 砖讝讬讻讛 讜诪转 专讜讗讬谉 讗讜转讜 讻讗讬诇讜 讞讬 讜注讜诪讚 讘诪拽讜诪讜 讜讗诪讗讬 谞讬诪讗 讗讬诇讜 讛讜讛 拽讬讬诐 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: As Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina says: In a case where there was one of the students who argued to acquit and then died, the court views him as if he were alive and standing in his place and voting to acquit. The Gemara asks: But why? According to the opinion of Rav, that a judge may change his opinion at the time of the verdict, let us say: Perhaps if that student were alive, he would retract his opinion and find the accused liable. The Gemara explains: Now, in any event, he did not retract from his opinion. The assumption is that he would not have changed his opinion, although one can do so.

讜讛讗 砖诇讞讜 诪转诐 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讜爪讗 诪讻诇诇 专讘讬谞讜 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讗 讗讬转诪专

The Gemara questions this explanation: But the Sages sent a statement from there, Eretz Yisrael: According to this version of the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina, he engages in a dispute with our teacher, i.e., Rav. Apparently, the previous explanation, which reconciles their opinions, is incorrect. The Gemara answers: That tradition was not accurate, and it was stated that he does not engage in a dispute with Rav.

转讗 砖诪注 砖谞讬 住讜驻专讬 讛讚讬讬谞讬谉 注讜诪讚讬谉 诇驻谞讬讛谉 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讬诪讬谉 讜讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖诪讗诇 讜讻讜转讘讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛诪讝讻讬谉 讜讚讘专讬 讛诪讞讬讬讘讬谉

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: After the initial deliberations, two judges鈥 scribes stand before the court, one on the right, and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable.

讘砖诇诪讗 讚讘专讬 讛诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇诪讞专 讞讝讜 讟注诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讜讘注讜 诇诪注讘讚 讛诇谞转 讚讬谉 讗诇讗 讚讘专讬 讛诪讝讻讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬 讞讝讜 讟注诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 诇讞讜讘讛 诇讗 诪砖讙讞讬谞谉 讘讛讜

The Gemara explains the proof: Granted, they write the statements of those who find the accused liable even though they may not change their opinions, as on the following day they may see another reason to find the accused liable, not the reason they gave the day before. And once this new reason is given, the court is required to perform a suspension of the trial until the following day, as they may not issue a verdict in cases of capital law on the same day as the deliberations. But what is the reason the scribes write the statements of those who acquit the accused? Is it not because the halakha is that if the judges would see another reason to find the accused liable, we do not pay heed to them, and in order to ensure that the judges do not change their opinions, the scribes write their statements?

诇讗 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 讬讗诪专讜 砖谞讬诐 讟注诐 讗讞讚 诪砖谞讬 诪拽专讗讜转 讻讚讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讗住讬 诪专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专讜 砖谞讬诐 讟注诐 讗讞讚 诪砖谞讬 诪拽专讗讜转 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 诪讜谞讬谉 诇讛谉 讗诇讗 讗讞讚

The Gemara answers: No, the reason they write their statements is so that two of the judges should not say one explanation to acquit from two different verses. If two judges each say the same reason to acquit, but derive their reason from different verses, they are not counted as two votes. As Rabbi Asi asked of Rabbi Yo岣nan: If two of the judges say one explanation to acquit from two different verses, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him: We count them only as one, as it is clear that one of the derivations is in error.

诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讗讞转 讚讘专 讗诇讛讬诐 砖转讬诐 讝讜 砖诪注转讬 讻讬 注讝 诇讗诇讛讬诐 诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 讬讜爪讗 诇讻诪讛 讟注诪讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讟注诐 讗讞讚 讬讜爪讗 诪讻诪讛 诪拽专讗讜转 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 转谞讗 讜讻驻讟讬砖 讬驻爪抓 住诇注 诪讛 驻讟讬砖 讝讛 诪转讞诇拽 诇讻诪讛 谞讬爪讜爪讜转 讗祝 诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 讬讜爪讗 诇讻诪讛 讟注诪讬诐

搂 The Gemara discusses the ruling of Rabbi Yo岣nan: From where is this matter derived? Abaye says: As the verse states: 鈥淕od has spoken once, twice I have heard this; that strength belongs to God鈥 (Psalms 62:12). Abaye explains: One verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations, but one explanation does not emerge from several verses. Alternatively, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: 鈥淚s not My word like as fire? says the Lord; and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces鈥 (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as this hammer breaks a stone into several fragments, so too, one verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讟注诐 讗讞讚 诪砖谞讬 诪拽专讗讜转 讗诪专 专讘 讝讘讬讚 讻讚转谞谉 诪讝讘讞 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜

The Gemara clarifies: What is considered one explanation from two different verses? Rav Zevid says: As we learned in a mishna (Zeva岣m 83a): With regard to certain items that are disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, once they have been placed on the altar they are nevertheless sacrificed, but the altar sanctifies only items that are suited for it, as the Gemara will explain. The tanna鈥檌m disagree as to what is considered suited for the altar.

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛专讗讜讬 诇讗砖讬诐 讗诐 注诇讛 诇讗 讬专讚 砖谞讗诪专 壮讛注诇讛 注诇 诪讜拽讚讛壮 诪讛 注讜诇讛 砖讛讬讗 专讗讜讬讛 诇讗砖讬诐 讗诐 注诇转讛 诇讗 转专讚 讗祝 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 专讗讜讬 诇讗砖讬诐 讗诐 注诇讛 诇讗 讬专讚

Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, e.g., burnt-offerings and the portions of other offerings burned on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, it shall not descend. Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, as it is stated: 鈥淚t is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar鈥 (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt-offering that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too with regard to any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.

专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛专讗讜讬 诇诪讝讘讞 讗诐 注诇讛 诇讗 讬专讚 砖谞讗诪专 壮讛讬讗 讛注诇讛 注诇 诪讜拽讚讛 注诇 讛诪讝讘讞壮 诪讛 注讜诇讛 砖讛讬讗 专讗讜讬讛 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讗诐 注诇转讛 诇讗 转专讚 讗祝 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 专讗讜讬 诇诪讝讘讞 讗诐 注诇讛 诇讗 讬专讚

Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, as it is stated: 鈥淚t is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar,鈥 from which it is derived: Just as a burnt-offering that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too any item that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.

讜转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪讗讬 拽诪专讘讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪诪讜拽讚讛 讜诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪诪讝讘讞

Rav Zevid explains: And what do the two of them include by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that if they ascend they do not descend. One Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渙n the pyre,鈥 and one Sage, Rabban Gamliel, brings proof to this halakha from the term 鈥渦pon the altar.鈥 This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

讜讛讗 讛转诐 诪讬驻诇讙 驻诇讬讙讬 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗讬谉 讘讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗诇讗 讛讚诐 讜讛谞住讻讬诐 砖专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬专讚讜 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 讬专讚讜

The Gemara questions this example: But there, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel disagree, and their explanations cannot therefore be identical. As the latter clause of that mishna teaches: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only with regard to disqualified blood and libations, which are not consumed by the fire, but do ascend onto the altar, as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend, as they are fit to ascend on the altar, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend, as they are not burned on the altar.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 诪转讜讱 砖谞讗诪专

Rather, Rav Pappa says: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From the fact that it is stated:

壮讻诇 讛谞讜讙注 讘诪讝讘讞 讬拽讚砖壮 砖讜诪注 讗谞讬 讘讬谉 专讗讜讬 讘讬谉 砖讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮讻讘砖讬诐壮 诪讛 讻讘砖讬诐 专讗讜讬讬谉 讗祝 讻诇 专讗讜讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 壮注讜诇讛壮 诪讛 注讜诇讛 专讗讜讬讛 讗祝 讻诇 专讗讜讬

鈥淲hatsoever touches the altar shall be sanctified鈥 (Exodus 29:37), I would derive that this applies to every item, whether it is suited to be an offering, or unsuited to be an offering. The following verse states: 鈥淣ow this is that which you shall offer upon the altar: Two lambs of the first year day by day continually鈥 (Exodus 29:38); from this I derive: Just as lambs are suited to be offerings, so too, everything that is suited to be an offering is included in this halakha. The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says: The offerings discussed in this passage are each referred to as a burnt-offering (see Exodus 29:42). Therefore, I derive: Just as a burnt-offering is suited for the altar, so too, everything that is suited for the altar is included in this halakha.

讜转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪诪注讟讜 驻住讜诇讬 诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讻讘砖讬诐 讜诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪注讜诇讛

Rav Pappa explains: And what do the two of them exclude by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that they do not become sanctified if they touch the altar. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渓ambs,鈥 and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渂urnt-offering.鈥 This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 驻住讜诇讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗谉 讚诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讻讘砖讬诐 讻讘砖讬诐 讗讬谉 讗讘诇 注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 诇讗 讜诪讗谉 讚诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪注讜诇讛 讗驻讬诇讜 注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 谞诪讬

The Gemara questions this example: But doesn鈥檛 Rav Adda bar Ahava say that the difference between them is with regard to a disqualified bird burnt-offering? The one who brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渓ambs鈥 holds that: Lambs, yes, they are included in this halakha, but a bird burnt-offering is not. And the one who brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渂urnt-offering鈥 holds that a bird burnt-offering is also included in this halakha.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讻讚转谞讬讗 壮讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诇讗讬砖 讛讛讜讗 讚诐 砖驻讱壮 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讝讜专拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇

Rather, Rav Ashi said: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who violates the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Tent of Meeting, the verse states: 鈥淲hatever man there be of the house of Israel, that kills an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that kills it outside the camp; and to the opening of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed unto that man; he shed blood; and this man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:3鈥4). This verse serves to include one who sprinkles the blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 壮讗讜 讝讘讞壮 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讝讜专拽 讜转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪专讘讜 讝专讬拽讛 诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讚诐 讬讞砖讘 讜诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讗讜 讝讘讞

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says that when the verse states: 鈥淲hatever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, that offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice鈥 (Leviticus 17:8), it serves to include one who sprinkles blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting. Rav Ashi explains: What do the two tanna鈥檌m include by means of these explanations? One who performs sprinkling of the blood outside the Tent of Meeting. One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, brings proof for this halakha from the phrase 鈥渂lood shall be imputed,鈥 and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渙r sacrifice.鈥 This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖讞讟 讜讝专拽 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐

The Gemara questions this example: But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Abbahu say that the difference between them is with regard to one who slaughtered the offering and sprinkled the blood, as according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for only one transgression, and according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable for two transgressions?

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗祝 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 谞诪讬 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 砖诐 转注诇讛 注诇讜转讬讱 讜砖诐 转注砖讛 注专讘讬谞讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 诇讻讜诇讛讜 注砖讬讜转

The Gemara responds: Wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to that baraita that Abaye says: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable for only one transgression, as the verse states: 鈥淏ut in the place that the Lord shall choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer your burnt-offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:14). The Merciful One combined all the actions with regard to offerings as one transgression. According to the explanation of Abaye, there is in fact no practical dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva with regard to this matter, and it serves as an example of one explanation from two different verses.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讻讜壮 (住讬诪谉 诪砖驻讟 诪注谞讛 诪讟讛) 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 驻驻讗 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讜砖驻讟讜 讗转 讛注诐 讘讻诇 注转

搂 The mishna teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue their ruling even at night. Before discussing this ruling, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for three of the forthcoming discussions: Judgment, answer, incline. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters concerning the time of the deliberations derived? Rabbi 岣yya bar Pappa says: As the verse states: 鈥淎nd let them judge the people at all times鈥 (Exodus 18:22), indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night.

讗讬 讛讻讬 转讞诇转 讚讬谉 谞诪讬 讻讚专讘讗 讚专讘讗 专诪讬 讻转讬讘 讜砖驻讟讜 讗转 讛注诐 讘讻诇 注转 讜讻转讬讘 讜讛讬讛 讘讬讜诐 讛谞讞讬诇讜 讗转 讘谞讬讜 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讬讜诐 诇转讞诇转 讚讬谉 诇讬诇讛 诇讙诪专 讚讬谉

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so that this is the source of the halakha, the court should be able to conduct the initial stage of the trial at night, as well. The Gemara explains: It is possible to resolve the matter in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: 鈥淎nd let them judge the people at all times,鈥 indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night, and it is written in another verse: 鈥淭hen it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:16), indicating that cases of inheritance are judged only during the day. Rava explains: How can these texts be reconciled? The verse referring to the day is stated with regard to the initial stage of the trial, and the verse that includes the night is stated with regard to the verdict.

诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚转谞讬讗 讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮注诇 驻讬讛诐 讬讛讬讛 讻诇 专讬讘 讜讻诇 谞讙注壮 讜讻讬 诪讛 注谞讬谉 专讬讘讬诐 讗爪诇 谞讙注讬诐

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to the priests: 鈥淎ccording to their word shall every dispute and every leprous sore be鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:5)? And what do disputes have to do with leprous sores?

讗诇讗 诪拽讬砖 专讬讘讬诐 诇谞讙注讬诐 诪讛 谞讙注讬诐 讘讬讜诐 讚讻转讬讘 壮讜讘讬讜诐 讛专讗讜转 讘讜壮 讗祝 专讬讘讬诐 讘讬讜诐 讜诪讛 谞讙注讬诐 砖诇讗 讘住讜诪讬谉 讚讻转讬讘 壮诇讻诇 诪专讗讛 注讬谞讬 讛讻讛谉壮 讗祝 专讬讘讬诐 砖诇讗 讘住讜诪讬谉 讜诪拽讬砖 谞讙注讬诐 诇专讬讘讬诐 诪讛 专讬讘讬诐 砖诇讗 讘拽专讜讘讬诐 讗祝 谞讙注讬诐 砖诇讗 讘拽专讜讘讬诐

The baraita continues: Rather, the verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous sores, teaching that just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written: 鈥淎nd on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure鈥 (Leviticus 13:14), so too disputes are judged only in the daytime. And just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: 鈥淎s far as appears to the priest鈥 (Leviticus 13:12), so too disputes are judged by sighted judges, not by blind judges. And the verse juxtaposes leprous sores to disputes, teaching that just as disputes are judged by independent judges, not by judges who are relatives of the litigants, so too leprous sores are viewed by a priest who is not a relative of the afflicted person.

讗讬 诪讛 专讬讘讬诐 讘砖诇砖讛 讗祝 谞讙注讬诐 讘砖诇砖讛 讜讚讬谉 讛讜讗 诪诪讜谞讜 讘砖诇砖讛 讙讜驻讜 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮讜讛讜讘讗 讗诇 讗讛专谉 讛讻讛谉 讗讜 讗诇 讗讞讚壮 讜讙讜壮 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗驻讬诇讜 讻讛谉 讗讞讚 专讜讗讛 讗转 讛谞讙注讬诐

The baraita continues: If these two matters are juxtaposed, why not say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too leprous sores are viewed by three priests? And this would be supported by a logical inference: If a case involving one鈥檚 money is judged by three judges, is it not clear all the more so that the person himself should be viewed by three priests? To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淎nd he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests鈥 (Leviticus 13:2). From this you have learned that even one priest views leprous sores. In any event, as opposed to the mishna, Rabbi Meir holds that disputes are judged only during the day.

讛讛讜讗 住诪讬讗 讚讛讜讛 讘砖讘讘讜转讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讛讜讛 讚讗讬谉 讚讬谞讗 讜诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讛讬讻讬 注讘讬讚 讛讻讬 讜讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻住转诐 诪砖谞讛 讜转谞谉 讻诇 讛讻砖专 诇讚讜谉 讻砖专 诇讛注讬讚 讜讬砖 砖讻砖专 诇讛注讬讚 讜讗讬谉 讻砖专 诇讚讜谉 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗转讜讬讬 住讜诪讗 讘讗讞转 诪注讬谞讬讜

The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind man who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yo岣nan who would serve as a judge, and Rabbi Yo岣nan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How did he do this, i.e., allow the blind man to judge? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan himself say: The halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, and we learned in an unattributed mishna (Nidda 49b): Anyone who is fit to judge is fit to testify, but there are those who are fit to testify but not fit to judge. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The latter clause serves to include one who is blind in one of his eyes, who is fit to testify but is not fit to judge. All the more so Rabbi Yo岣nan would agree that the unattributed mishna holds that one blind in both eyes is disqualified from serving as a judge.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 住转诪讗 讗讞专讬转讗 讗砖讻讞 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讙讜诪专讬谉 讘诇讬诇讛

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yo岣nan found another unattributed mishna, i.e., the mishna here, which indicates that a blind man can serve as a judge: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. Accordingly, judging cases of monetary law is not compared to viewing leprous sores, which is the source for disqualifying a blind judge.

诪讗讬 讗讜诇诪讬讛 讚讛讗讬 住转诪讗 诪讛讗讬 住转诪讗 讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 住转诪讗 讚专讘讬诐 注讚讬祝 讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽转谞讬 诇讛 讙讘讬 讛诇讻转讗 讚讚讬谞讗

The Gemara asks: In what way is the strength of this unattributed mishna greater than the strength of that unattributed mishna? Why would Rabbi Yo岣nan rule in accordance with this one and not that one? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages is preferable, as the mishna in tractate Nidda is written in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir of the baraita. And if you wish, say it is because this unattributed mishna teaches this halakha in the context of the halakhot of judgment. Since this chapter is the primary source for all halakhot of judgments, the ruling written here carries greater weight.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讗讬 讜砖驻讟讜 讗转 讛注诐 讘讻诇 注转 诪讗讬 讚专讬砖 讘讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讬讜诐 讛诪注讜谞谉 讚转谞谉 讗讬谉 专讜讗讬谉 讗转 讛谞讙注讬诐 砖讞专讬转 讜讘讬谉 讛注专讘讬诐 讜诇讗 讘转讜讱 讛讘讬转 讜诇讗 讘讬讜诐 讛诪注讜谞谉 诪驻谞讬 砖讻讛讛 谞专讗讬转 注讝讛 讜诇讗 讘爪讛专讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖注讝讛 谞专讗讬转 讻讛讛

The Gemara continues its discussion of these opinions. And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: 鈥淎nd let them judge the people at all times鈥? Rava said: He interprets that it serves to include a cloudy day, teaching that although a priest does not view a leprous sore on a cloudy day, the court may judge a case on a cloudy day. As we learned in a mishna (Nega鈥檌m 2:2): A priest does not view leprous sores during the early morning when the sun is not in full force, and not during the late afternoon, and not in a house, and not on a cloudy day. This is because a dull white sore appears bright, and a bright white sore is deemed ritually impure. And a priest does not view leprous sores at midday, because a bright white spot appears dull and the priest will mistakenly deem it ritually pure. The priest views the leprous sores during the late morning or early afternoon.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讗讬 讘讬讜诐 讛谞讞讬诇讜 讗转 讘谞讬讜 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬 专讘讛 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 壮讜讛讬讛 讘讬讜诐 讛谞讞讬诇讜 讗转 讘谞讬讜壮 讘讬讜诐 讗转讛 诪驻讬诇 谞讞诇讜转 讜讗讬 讗转讛 诪驻讬诇 谞讞诇讜转 讘诇讬诇讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诪讗谉 讚砖讻讬讘 讘讬诪诪讗 讬专转讜谉 诇讬讛 讘谞讬讛 讜诪讗谉 讚砖讻讬讘 讘诇讬诇讬讗 诇讗 讬专转讜谉 诇讬讛 讘谞讬讛

And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: 鈥淥n the day that he causes his sons to inherit鈥? He already derived from the juxtaposition to leprous sores that the court cannot issue a verdict at night. The Gemara answers: He requires that verse to teach the halakha that Rabba bar 岣nina taught in the presence of Rav Na岣an: The verse states: 鈥淭hen it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:16). The addition of the term 鈥渙n the day鈥 teaches that it is specifically during the day that you can distribute inheritances, but you cannot distribute inheritances at night. Rav Na岣an said to him: That cannot be the halakha, as, if that is so, then it ought to be that it is only in the case of one who dies during the day that his children inherit from him but that with regard to one who dies at night, his children do not inherit from him, and this is not the case.

讚讬诇诪讗 讚讬谉 谞讞诇讜转 拽讗诪专转 讚转谞讬讗 壮讜讛讬转讛 诇讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 诇讞拽转 诪砖驻讟壮 讗讜专注讛 讻诇 讛驻专砖讛 讻讜诇讛 诇讛讬讜转 讚讬谉

Rav Na岣an suggests: Perhaps you are stating a distinction between day and night with regard to the adjudication of inheritances. A proof for this distinction is as it is taught in a baraita: A verse in the passage concerning inheritance states: 鈥淎nd it shall be for the children of Israel a statute of judgment鈥 (Numbers 27:11), teaching that the entire portion is placed [ure鈥檃] together to be considered a matter of judgment, subject to the procedural rules that apply to a matter of the court.

讻讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 砖诇砖讛 砖谞讻谞住讜 诇讘拽专 讗转 讛讞讜诇讛 专爪讜 讻讜转讘讬谉 专爪讜 注讜砖讬谉 讚讬谉 砖谞讬诐 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 讚讬谉

And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In a case where there were three people who entered a room to visit an ill person, and the ill person desires to write a will in order to distribute his property following his death, if the visitors wish to do so, they can write his will and sign it as witnesses, and if they wish, they can act in judgment, i.e., they can act as a court in the matter, since they are three. Therefore, they can determine that the will has the validity of an act of the court and transfer the property to the heirs in their capacity as a court. But if only two came to visit the ill person, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment, since three are required to form a court.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘讬讜诐 讗讘诇 讘诇讬诇讛 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 讚讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讜 诇讛讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讬谉 注讚 谞注砖讛 讚讬讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讛讻讬 拽讗诪讬谞讗

And Rav 岣sda says: This halakha was taught only in a case where the three came to visit him during the day; but if the three of them came at night, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment. What is the reason that they cannot act in judgment on the next day? It is because they are already witnesses to the will of the deceased, and there is a principle that a witness cannot become a judge, i.e., one who acts as a witness in a particular matter cannot become a judge with regard to that same matter. Rabba bar 岣nina said to Rav Na岣an: Yes, it is indeed so that this is what I was saying.

讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讻讜壮 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讞讬讬讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讛讜拽注 讗讜转诐 诇讛壮 谞讙讚 讛砖诪砖 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪谞讬讬谉 诇讛讜拽注讛 砖讛讬讗 转诇讬讬讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜讛讜拽注谞讜诐 诇讛壮 讘讙讘注转 砖讗讜诇 讘讞讬专 讛壮

搂 The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling in the daytime. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Shimi bar 岣yya says: The verse states with regard to Israelites who worshipped the idol of Peor in the wilderness: 鈥淎nd hang [hoka] them unto the Lord, facing the sun鈥 (Numbers 25:4), indicating that capital cases are judged in the face of the sun, i.e., during the day. Rav 岣sda says: From where is it derived that hoka鈥檃 is hanging? Where the Gibeonites requested to be given Saul鈥檚 sons, as it is written: 鈥Vehoka鈥檃num unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul, the chosen of the Lord鈥 (II聽Samuel 21:6).

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Sanhedrin 34

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 34

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讬讛讜讚讛 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 注讚 讗讞讚 诇讗 讬注谞讛 讘谞驻砖 诇诪讜转 诇诪讜转 讛讜讗 讚讗讬谞讜 注讜谞讛 讗讘诇 诇讝讻讜转 注讜谞讛 讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪砖讜诐 讚诪讬讞讝讬 讻谞讜讙注 讘注讚讜转讜

The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As the verse states: 鈥淏ut one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.鈥 One can infer: That he die is the matter concerning which he does not testify, but he does testify to acquit. The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of the Rabbis? Reish Lakish says: A witness cannot offer any statements beyond his testimony because it appears as though he is biased in his testimony. If the court finds the accused liable based on the witness鈥檚 testimony, the witness could later be accused of being a conspiring witness. Therefore, it is to his advantage to have the court acquit the accused.

讜专讘谞谉 讛讗讬 诇诪讜转 诪讗讬 讚专砖讬 讘讬讛 诪讜拽诪讬 诇讬讛 讘讗讞讚 诪谉 讛转诇诪讬讚讬诐 讻讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛注讚讬诐 壮讬砖 诇讬 诇诇诪讚 注诇讬讜 讝讻讜转壮 诪谞讬讬谉 砖讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮注讚 讗讞讚 诇讗 讬注谞讛壮 诪谞讬讬谉 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛转诇诪讬讚讬诐 砖讗诪专 壮讬砖 诇讬 诇诇诪讚 注诇讬讜 讞讜讘讛壮 诪谞讬讬谉 砖讗讬谉 砖讜诪注讬谉 诇讜 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮讗讞讚 诇讗 讬注谞讛 讘谞驻砖 诇诪讜转壮

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, in what manner do they interpret this term: 鈥淭hat he die鈥? The Gemara answers: They establish it as teaching the halakha with regard to one of the students. As it is taught in a baraita: If one of the witnesses said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: 鈥淥ne witness shall not testify.鈥 From where is it derived that if there is one of the students who said: I have the ability to teach a reason to deem him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: 鈥淏ut one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.鈥

讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讛诪诇诪讚 讻讜壮 讗诪专 专讘 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘砖注转 诪砖讗 讜诪转谉 讗讘诇 讘砖注转 讙诪专 讚讬谉 诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讞讜讝专 讜诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛

搂 The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to deem the accused liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit him may not return and teach a reason to deem him liable. Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to the time of the deliberations of the court, but at the time of the verdict, one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable.

诪讬转讬讘讬 诇诪讞专转 诪砖讻讬诪讬谉 讜讘讗讬谉 讛诪讝讻讛 讗讜诪专 壮讗谞讬 讛诪讝讻讛 讜诪讝讻讛 讗谞讬 讘诪拽讜诪讬壮 讛诪讞讬讬讘 讗讜诪专 壮讗谞讬 讛诪讞讬讬讘 讜诪讞讬讬讘 讗谞讬 讘诪拽讜诪讬壮 讛诪诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛 诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讗讘诇 讛诪诇诪讚 讝讻讜转 讗讬谞讜 讬讻讜诇 诇讞讝讜专 讜诇诇诪讚 讞讜讘讛

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (40a): The following day, i.e., the day after the initial deliberations, the judges would arise early and come to court. One who yesterday was of the opinion to acquit says: I said to acquit, and I acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then teach a reason to deem him liable.

讜讛讗 诇诪讞专转 讙诪专 讚讬谉 讛讜讗 讜诇讬讟注诪讬讱 诇诪讞专转 诪砖讗 讜诪转谉 诪讬 诇讬讻讗 讻讬 拽转谞讬 讘砖注转 诪砖讗 讜诪转谉

The Gemara explains the objection: But the following day is at the time of the verdict, and the mishna rules that a judge who had said to acquit may not change his opinion. The Gemara questions this reading of the mishna: And according to your reasoning, are there no deliberations on the following day? The deliberations may resume on the next day. Therefore, one can say that when the mishna teaches that the judge may not change his opinion, it is with regard to the time of the deliberations.

转讗 砖诪注 讚谞讬谉 讗诇讜 讻谞讙讚 讗诇讜 注讚 砖讬专讗讛 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛诪讝讻讬谉 讜讗诐 讗讬转讗 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 讗讬驻讻讗 转谞讗 讗讝讻讜转 拽讗 诪讛讚专 讗讞讜讘讛 诇讗 拽讗 诪讛讚专

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of that mishna, which teaches that if the number of judges who deem him liable is one more than the number of judges who acquit, they continue to deliberate the matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn someone to death by a majority of one judge. The Gemara states its proof: And if it is so that one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable, let the mishna also teach the opposite possibility. The Gemara explains: The tanna is searching for scenarios of acquittal, he is not searching for scenarios of liability. It may be that the halakha is the same in the opposite case, but the tanna prefers to employ an example of acquittal.

转讗 砖诪注 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛转诇诪讬讚讬诐 砖讝讬讻讛 讜诪转 专讜讗讬谉 讗讜转讜 讻讗讬诇讜 讞讬 讜注讜诪讚 讘诪拽讜诪讜 讜讗诪讗讬 谞讬诪讗 讗讬诇讜 讛讜讛 拽讬讬诐 讛讚专 讘讬讛 讛砖转讗 诪讬讛讗 诇讗 讛讚专 讘讬讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: As Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina says: In a case where there was one of the students who argued to acquit and then died, the court views him as if he were alive and standing in his place and voting to acquit. The Gemara asks: But why? According to the opinion of Rav, that a judge may change his opinion at the time of the verdict, let us say: Perhaps if that student were alive, he would retract his opinion and find the accused liable. The Gemara explains: Now, in any event, he did not retract from his opinion. The assumption is that he would not have changed his opinion, although one can do so.

讜讛讗 砖诇讞讜 诪转诐 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 诪讜爪讗 诪讻诇诇 专讘讬谞讜 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讗 讗讬转诪专

The Gemara questions this explanation: But the Sages sent a statement from there, Eretz Yisrael: According to this version of the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar 岣nina, he engages in a dispute with our teacher, i.e., Rav. Apparently, the previous explanation, which reconciles their opinions, is incorrect. The Gemara answers: That tradition was not accurate, and it was stated that he does not engage in a dispute with Rav.

转讗 砖诪注 砖谞讬 住讜驻专讬 讛讚讬讬谞讬谉 注讜诪讚讬谉 诇驻谞讬讛谉 讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讬诪讬谉 讜讗讞讚 诪谉 讛砖诪讗诇 讜讻讜转讘讬谉 讚讘专讬 讛诪讝讻讬谉 讜讚讘专讬 讛诪讞讬讬讘讬谉

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: After the initial deliberations, two judges鈥 scribes stand before the court, one on the right, and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable.

讘砖诇诪讗 讚讘专讬 讛诪讞讬讬讘讬谉 诇诪讞专 讞讝讜 讟注诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讜讘注讜 诇诪注讘讚 讛诇谞转 讚讬谉 讗诇讗 讚讘专讬 讛诪讝讻讬谉 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 诇讗讜 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬 讞讝讜 讟注诪讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 诇讞讜讘讛 诇讗 诪砖讙讞讬谞谉 讘讛讜

The Gemara explains the proof: Granted, they write the statements of those who find the accused liable even though they may not change their opinions, as on the following day they may see another reason to find the accused liable, not the reason they gave the day before. And once this new reason is given, the court is required to perform a suspension of the trial until the following day, as they may not issue a verdict in cases of capital law on the same day as the deliberations. But what is the reason the scribes write the statements of those who acquit the accused? Is it not because the halakha is that if the judges would see another reason to find the accused liable, we do not pay heed to them, and in order to ensure that the judges do not change their opinions, the scribes write their statements?

诇讗 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 讬讗诪专讜 砖谞讬诐 讟注诐 讗讞讚 诪砖谞讬 诪拽专讗讜转 讻讚讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬 讗住讬 诪专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专讜 砖谞讬诐 讟注诐 讗讞讚 诪砖谞讬 诪拽专讗讜转 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 诪讜谞讬谉 诇讛谉 讗诇讗 讗讞讚

The Gemara answers: No, the reason they write their statements is so that two of the judges should not say one explanation to acquit from two different verses. If two judges each say the same reason to acquit, but derive their reason from different verses, they are not counted as two votes. As Rabbi Asi asked of Rabbi Yo岣nan: If two of the judges say one explanation to acquit from two different verses, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yo岣nan said to him: We count them only as one, as it is clear that one of the derivations is in error.

诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讗讞转 讚讘专 讗诇讛讬诐 砖转讬诐 讝讜 砖诪注转讬 讻讬 注讝 诇讗诇讛讬诐 诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 讬讜爪讗 诇讻诪讛 讟注诪讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讟注诐 讗讞讚 讬讜爪讗 诪讻诪讛 诪拽专讗讜转 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 转谞讗 讜讻驻讟讬砖 讬驻爪抓 住诇注 诪讛 驻讟讬砖 讝讛 诪转讞诇拽 诇讻诪讛 谞讬爪讜爪讜转 讗祝 诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 讬讜爪讗 诇讻诪讛 讟注诪讬诐

搂 The Gemara discusses the ruling of Rabbi Yo岣nan: From where is this matter derived? Abaye says: As the verse states: 鈥淕od has spoken once, twice I have heard this; that strength belongs to God鈥 (Psalms 62:12). Abaye explains: One verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations, but one explanation does not emerge from several verses. Alternatively, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: 鈥淚s not My word like as fire? says the Lord; and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces鈥 (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as this hammer breaks a stone into several fragments, so too, one verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讟注诐 讗讞讚 诪砖谞讬 诪拽专讗讜转 讗诪专 专讘 讝讘讬讚 讻讚转谞谉 诪讝讘讞 诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛专讗讜讬 诇讜

The Gemara clarifies: What is considered one explanation from two different verses? Rav Zevid says: As we learned in a mishna (Zeva岣m 83a): With regard to certain items that are disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, once they have been placed on the altar they are nevertheless sacrificed, but the altar sanctifies only items that are suited for it, as the Gemara will explain. The tanna鈥檌m disagree as to what is considered suited for the altar.

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛专讗讜讬 诇讗砖讬诐 讗诐 注诇讛 诇讗 讬专讚 砖谞讗诪专 壮讛注诇讛 注诇 诪讜拽讚讛壮 诪讛 注讜诇讛 砖讛讬讗 专讗讜讬讛 诇讗砖讬诐 讗诐 注诇转讛 诇讗 转专讚 讗祝 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 专讗讜讬 诇讗砖讬诐 讗诐 注诇讛 诇讗 讬专讚

Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, e.g., burnt-offerings and the portions of other offerings burned on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, it shall not descend. Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, as it is stated: 鈥淚t is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar鈥 (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt-offering that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too with regard to any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.

专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讻诇 讛专讗讜讬 诇诪讝讘讞 讗诐 注诇讛 诇讗 讬专讚 砖谞讗诪专 壮讛讬讗 讛注诇讛 注诇 诪讜拽讚讛 注诇 讛诪讝讘讞壮 诪讛 注讜诇讛 砖讛讬讗 专讗讜讬讛 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讗诐 注诇转讛 诇讗 转专讚 讗祝 讻诇 砖讛讜讗 专讗讜讬 诇诪讝讘讞 讗诐 注诇讛 诇讗 讬专讚

Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, as it is stated: 鈥淚t is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar,鈥 from which it is derived: Just as a burnt-offering that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too any item that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.

讜转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪讗讬 拽诪专讘讜 驻住讜诇讬谉 诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪诪讜拽讚讛 讜诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪诪讝讘讞

Rav Zevid explains: And what do the two of them include by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that if they ascend they do not descend. One Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渙n the pyre,鈥 and one Sage, Rabban Gamliel, brings proof to this halakha from the term 鈥渦pon the altar.鈥 This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

讜讛讗 讛转诐 诪讬驻诇讙 驻诇讬讙讬 讚拽转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讗讬谉 讘讬谉 讚讘专讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗诇讗 讛讚诐 讜讛谞住讻讬诐 砖专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬专讚讜 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 讬专讚讜

The Gemara questions this example: But there, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel disagree, and their explanations cannot therefore be identical. As the latter clause of that mishna teaches: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only with regard to disqualified blood and libations, which are not consumed by the fire, but do ascend onto the altar, as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend, as they are fit to ascend on the altar, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend, as they are not burned on the altar.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 讻讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讛讙诇讬诇讬 讗讜诪专 诪转讜讱 砖谞讗诪专

Rather, Rav Pappa says: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From the fact that it is stated:

壮讻诇 讛谞讜讙注 讘诪讝讘讞 讬拽讚砖壮 砖讜诪注 讗谞讬 讘讬谉 专讗讜讬 讘讬谉 砖讗讬谞讜 专讗讜讬 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮讻讘砖讬诐壮 诪讛 讻讘砖讬诐 专讗讜讬讬谉 讗祝 讻诇 专讗讜讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 壮注讜诇讛壮 诪讛 注讜诇讛 专讗讜讬讛 讗祝 讻诇 专讗讜讬

鈥淲hatsoever touches the altar shall be sanctified鈥 (Exodus 29:37), I would derive that this applies to every item, whether it is suited to be an offering, or unsuited to be an offering. The following verse states: 鈥淣ow this is that which you shall offer upon the altar: Two lambs of the first year day by day continually鈥 (Exodus 29:38); from this I derive: Just as lambs are suited to be offerings, so too, everything that is suited to be an offering is included in this halakha. The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says: The offerings discussed in this passage are each referred to as a burnt-offering (see Exodus 29:42). Therefore, I derive: Just as a burnt-offering is suited for the altar, so too, everything that is suited for the altar is included in this halakha.

讜转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪诪注讟讜 驻住讜诇讬 诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讻讘砖讬诐 讜诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪注讜诇讛

Rav Pappa explains: And what do the two of them exclude by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that they do not become sanctified if they touch the altar. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渓ambs,鈥 and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渂urnt-offering.鈥 This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讗讚讗 讘专 讗讛讘讛 注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 驻住讜诇讛 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗谉 讚诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讻讘砖讬诐 讻讘砖讬诐 讗讬谉 讗讘诇 注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 诇讗 讜诪讗谉 讚诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪注讜诇讛 讗驻讬诇讜 注讜诇转 讛注讜祝 谞诪讬

The Gemara questions this example: But doesn鈥檛 Rav Adda bar Ahava say that the difference between them is with regard to a disqualified bird burnt-offering? The one who brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渓ambs鈥 holds that: Lambs, yes, they are included in this halakha, but a bird burnt-offering is not. And the one who brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渂urnt-offering鈥 holds that a bird burnt-offering is also included in this halakha.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讻讚转谞讬讗 壮讚诐 讬讞砖讘 诇讗讬砖 讛讛讜讗 讚诐 砖驻讱壮 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讝讜专拽 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇

Rather, Rav Ashi said: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who violates the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Tent of Meeting, the verse states: 鈥淲hatever man there be of the house of Israel, that kills an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that kills it outside the camp; and to the opening of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed unto that man; he shed blood; and this man shall be cut off from among his people鈥 (Leviticus 17:3鈥4). This verse serves to include one who sprinkles the blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 壮讗讜 讝讘讞壮 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛讝讜专拽 讜转专讜讬讬讛讜 诪讗讬 拽讗 诪专讘讜 讝专讬拽讛 诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讚诐 讬讞砖讘 讜诪专 诪讬讬转讬 诇讛 诪讗讜 讝讘讞

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says that when the verse states: 鈥淲hatever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, that offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice鈥 (Leviticus 17:8), it serves to include one who sprinkles blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting. Rav Ashi explains: What do the two tanna鈥檌m include by means of these explanations? One who performs sprinkling of the blood outside the Tent of Meeting. One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, brings proof for this halakha from the phrase 鈥渂lood shall be imputed,鈥 and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term 鈥渙r sacrifice.鈥 This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 砖讞讟 讜讝专拽 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讞讬讬讘 砖转讬诐

The Gemara questions this example: But doesn鈥檛 Rabbi Abbahu say that the difference between them is with regard to one who slaughtered the offering and sprinkled the blood, as according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for only one transgression, and according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable for two transgressions?

讛讗 讗讬转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讗祝 诇讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 谞诪讬 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 砖诐 转注诇讛 注诇讜转讬讱 讜砖诐 转注砖讛 注专讘讬谞讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 诇讻讜诇讛讜 注砖讬讜转

The Gemara responds: Wasn鈥檛 it stated with regard to that baraita that Abaye says: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable for only one transgression, as the verse states: 鈥淏ut in the place that the Lord shall choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer your burnt-offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:14). The Merciful One combined all the actions with regard to offerings as one transgression. According to the explanation of Abaye, there is in fact no practical dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva with regard to this matter, and it serves as an example of one explanation from two different verses.

讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讻讜壮 (住讬诪谉 诪砖驻讟 诪注谞讛 诪讟讛) 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 驻驻讗 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讜砖驻讟讜 讗转 讛注诐 讘讻诇 注转

搂 The mishna teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue their ruling even at night. Before discussing this ruling, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for three of the forthcoming discussions: Judgment, answer, incline. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters concerning the time of the deliberations derived? Rabbi 岣yya bar Pappa says: As the verse states: 鈥淎nd let them judge the people at all times鈥 (Exodus 18:22), indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night.

讗讬 讛讻讬 转讞诇转 讚讬谉 谞诪讬 讻讚专讘讗 讚专讘讗 专诪讬 讻转讬讘 讜砖驻讟讜 讗转 讛注诐 讘讻诇 注转 讜讻转讬讘 讜讛讬讛 讘讬讜诐 讛谞讞讬诇讜 讗转 讘谞讬讜 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 讬讜诐 诇转讞诇转 讚讬谉 诇讬诇讛 诇讙诪专 讚讬谉

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so that this is the source of the halakha, the court should be able to conduct the initial stage of the trial at night, as well. The Gemara explains: It is possible to resolve the matter in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: 鈥淎nd let them judge the people at all times,鈥 indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night, and it is written in another verse: 鈥淭hen it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:16), indicating that cases of inheritance are judged only during the day. Rava explains: How can these texts be reconciled? The verse referring to the day is stated with regard to the initial stage of the trial, and the verse that includes the night is stated with regard to the verdict.

诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚转谞讬讗 讛讬讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮注诇 驻讬讛诐 讬讛讬讛 讻诇 专讬讘 讜讻诇 谞讙注壮 讜讻讬 诪讛 注谞讬谉 专讬讘讬诐 讗爪诇 谞讙注讬诐

The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to the priests: 鈥淎ccording to their word shall every dispute and every leprous sore be鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:5)? And what do disputes have to do with leprous sores?

讗诇讗 诪拽讬砖 专讬讘讬诐 诇谞讙注讬诐 诪讛 谞讙注讬诐 讘讬讜诐 讚讻转讬讘 壮讜讘讬讜诐 讛专讗讜转 讘讜壮 讗祝 专讬讘讬诐 讘讬讜诐 讜诪讛 谞讙注讬诐 砖诇讗 讘住讜诪讬谉 讚讻转讬讘 壮诇讻诇 诪专讗讛 注讬谞讬 讛讻讛谉壮 讗祝 专讬讘讬诐 砖诇讗 讘住讜诪讬谉 讜诪拽讬砖 谞讙注讬诐 诇专讬讘讬诐 诪讛 专讬讘讬诐 砖诇讗 讘拽专讜讘讬诐 讗祝 谞讙注讬诐 砖诇讗 讘拽专讜讘讬诐

The baraita continues: Rather, the verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous sores, teaching that just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written: 鈥淎nd on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure鈥 (Leviticus 13:14), so too disputes are judged only in the daytime. And just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: 鈥淎s far as appears to the priest鈥 (Leviticus 13:12), so too disputes are judged by sighted judges, not by blind judges. And the verse juxtaposes leprous sores to disputes, teaching that just as disputes are judged by independent judges, not by judges who are relatives of the litigants, so too leprous sores are viewed by a priest who is not a relative of the afflicted person.

讗讬 诪讛 专讬讘讬诐 讘砖诇砖讛 讗祝 谞讙注讬诐 讘砖诇砖讛 讜讚讬谉 讛讜讗 诪诪讜谞讜 讘砖诇砖讛 讙讜驻讜 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮讜讛讜讘讗 讗诇 讗讛专谉 讛讻讛谉 讗讜 讗诇 讗讞讚壮 讜讙讜壮 讛讗 诇诪讚转 砖讗驻讬诇讜 讻讛谉 讗讞讚 专讜讗讛 讗转 讛谞讙注讬诐

The baraita continues: If these two matters are juxtaposed, why not say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too leprous sores are viewed by three priests? And this would be supported by a logical inference: If a case involving one鈥檚 money is judged by three judges, is it not clear all the more so that the person himself should be viewed by three priests? To counter this, the verse states: 鈥淎nd he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests鈥 (Leviticus 13:2). From this you have learned that even one priest views leprous sores. In any event, as opposed to the mishna, Rabbi Meir holds that disputes are judged only during the day.

讛讛讜讗 住诪讬讗 讚讛讜讛 讘砖讘讘讜转讬讛 讚专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讛讜讛 讚讗讬谉 讚讬谞讗 讜诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讚讬 讛讬讻讬 注讘讬讚 讛讻讬 讜讛讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻住转诐 诪砖谞讛 讜转谞谉 讻诇 讛讻砖专 诇讚讜谉 讻砖专 诇讛注讬讚 讜讬砖 砖讻砖专 诇讛注讬讚 讜讗讬谉 讻砖专 诇讚讜谉 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗转讜讬讬 住讜诪讗 讘讗讞转 诪注讬谞讬讜

The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind man who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yo岣nan who would serve as a judge, and Rabbi Yo岣nan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How did he do this, i.e., allow the blind man to judge? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan himself say: The halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, and we learned in an unattributed mishna (Nidda 49b): Anyone who is fit to judge is fit to testify, but there are those who are fit to testify but not fit to judge. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: The latter clause serves to include one who is blind in one of his eyes, who is fit to testify but is not fit to judge. All the more so Rabbi Yo岣nan would agree that the unattributed mishna holds that one blind in both eyes is disqualified from serving as a judge.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 住转诪讗 讗讞专讬转讗 讗砖讻讞 讚讬谞讬 诪诪讜谞讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讙讜诪专讬谉 讘诇讬诇讛

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yo岣nan found another unattributed mishna, i.e., the mishna here, which indicates that a blind man can serve as a judge: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. Accordingly, judging cases of monetary law is not compared to viewing leprous sores, which is the source for disqualifying a blind judge.

诪讗讬 讗讜诇诪讬讛 讚讛讗讬 住转诪讗 诪讛讗讬 住转诪讗 讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 住转诪讗 讚专讘讬诐 注讚讬祝 讜讗讬 讘注讬转 讗讬诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽转谞讬 诇讛 讙讘讬 讛诇讻转讗 讚讚讬谞讗

The Gemara asks: In what way is the strength of this unattributed mishna greater than the strength of that unattributed mishna? Why would Rabbi Yo岣nan rule in accordance with this one and not that one? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages is preferable, as the mishna in tractate Nidda is written in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir of the baraita. And if you wish, say it is because this unattributed mishna teaches this halakha in the context of the halakhot of judgment. Since this chapter is the primary source for all halakhot of judgments, the ruling written here carries greater weight.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讗讬 讜砖驻讟讜 讗转 讛注诐 讘讻诇 注转 诪讗讬 讚专讬砖 讘讬讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 讬讜诐 讛诪注讜谞谉 讚转谞谉 讗讬谉 专讜讗讬谉 讗转 讛谞讙注讬诐 砖讞专讬转 讜讘讬谉 讛注专讘讬诐 讜诇讗 讘转讜讱 讛讘讬转 讜诇讗 讘讬讜诐 讛诪注讜谞谉 诪驻谞讬 砖讻讛讛 谞专讗讬转 注讝讛 讜诇讗 讘爪讛专讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖注讝讛 谞专讗讬转 讻讛讛

The Gemara continues its discussion of these opinions. And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: 鈥淎nd let them judge the people at all times鈥? Rava said: He interprets that it serves to include a cloudy day, teaching that although a priest does not view a leprous sore on a cloudy day, the court may judge a case on a cloudy day. As we learned in a mishna (Nega鈥檌m 2:2): A priest does not view leprous sores during the early morning when the sun is not in full force, and not during the late afternoon, and not in a house, and not on a cloudy day. This is because a dull white sore appears bright, and a bright white sore is deemed ritually impure. And a priest does not view leprous sores at midday, because a bright white spot appears dull and the priest will mistakenly deem it ritually pure. The priest views the leprous sores during the late morning or early afternoon.

讜专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛讗讬 讘讬讜诐 讛谞讞讬诇讜 讗转 讘谞讬讜 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 讛讛讜讗 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讻讚转谞讬 专讘讛 讘专 讞谞讬谞讗 拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 谞讞诪谉 壮讜讛讬讛 讘讬讜诐 讛谞讞讬诇讜 讗转 讘谞讬讜壮 讘讬讜诐 讗转讛 诪驻讬诇 谞讞诇讜转 讜讗讬 讗转讛 诪驻讬诇 谞讞诇讜转 讘诇讬诇讛 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诪讗谉 讚砖讻讬讘 讘讬诪诪讗 讬专转讜谉 诇讬讛 讘谞讬讛 讜诪讗谉 讚砖讻讬讘 讘诇讬诇讬讗 诇讗 讬专转讜谉 诇讬讛 讘谞讬讛

And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: 鈥淥n the day that he causes his sons to inherit鈥? He already derived from the juxtaposition to leprous sores that the court cannot issue a verdict at night. The Gemara answers: He requires that verse to teach the halakha that Rabba bar 岣nina taught in the presence of Rav Na岣an: The verse states: 鈥淭hen it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has鈥 (Deuteronomy 21:16). The addition of the term 鈥渙n the day鈥 teaches that it is specifically during the day that you can distribute inheritances, but you cannot distribute inheritances at night. Rav Na岣an said to him: That cannot be the halakha, as, if that is so, then it ought to be that it is only in the case of one who dies during the day that his children inherit from him but that with regard to one who dies at night, his children do not inherit from him, and this is not the case.

讚讬诇诪讗 讚讬谉 谞讞诇讜转 拽讗诪专转 讚转谞讬讗 壮讜讛讬转讛 诇讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 诇讞拽转 诪砖驻讟壮 讗讜专注讛 讻诇 讛驻专砖讛 讻讜诇讛 诇讛讬讜转 讚讬谉

Rav Na岣an suggests: Perhaps you are stating a distinction between day and night with regard to the adjudication of inheritances. A proof for this distinction is as it is taught in a baraita: A verse in the passage concerning inheritance states: 鈥淎nd it shall be for the children of Israel a statute of judgment鈥 (Numbers 27:11), teaching that the entire portion is placed [ure鈥檃] together to be considered a matter of judgment, subject to the procedural rules that apply to a matter of the court.

讻讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 砖诇砖讛 砖谞讻谞住讜 诇讘拽专 讗转 讛讞讜诇讛 专爪讜 讻讜转讘讬谉 专爪讜 注讜砖讬谉 讚讬谉 砖谞讬诐 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 讚讬谉

And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In a case where there were three people who entered a room to visit an ill person, and the ill person desires to write a will in order to distribute his property following his death, if the visitors wish to do so, they can write his will and sign it as witnesses, and if they wish, they can act in judgment, i.e., they can act as a court in the matter, since they are three. Therefore, they can determine that the will has the validity of an act of the court and transfer the property to the heirs in their capacity as a court. But if only two came to visit the ill person, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment, since three are required to form a court.

讜讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 讘讬讜诐 讗讘诇 讘诇讬诇讛 讻讜转讘讬谉 讜讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 讚讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讜 诇讛讜 注讚讬诐 讜讗讬谉 注讚 谞注砖讛 讚讬讬谉 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 讛讻讬 拽讗诪讬谞讗

And Rav 岣sda says: This halakha was taught only in a case where the three came to visit him during the day; but if the three of them came at night, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment. What is the reason that they cannot act in judgment on the next day? It is because they are already witnesses to the will of the deceased, and there is a principle that a witness cannot become a judge, i.e., one who acts as a witness in a particular matter cannot become a judge with regard to that same matter. Rabba bar 岣nina said to Rav Na岣an: Yes, it is indeed so that this is what I was saying.

讚讬谞讬 谞驻砖讜转 讚谞讬谉 讘讬讜诐 讜讻讜壮 诪谞讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讗诪专 专讘 砖讬诪讬 讘专 讞讬讬讗 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讛讜拽注 讗讜转诐 诇讛壮 谞讙讚 讛砖诪砖 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪谞讬讬谉 诇讛讜拽注讛 砖讛讬讗 转诇讬讬讛 讚讻转讬讘 讜讛讜拽注谞讜诐 诇讛壮 讘讙讘注转 砖讗讜诇 讘讞讬专 讛壮

搂 The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling in the daytime. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Shimi bar 岣yya says: The verse states with regard to Israelites who worshipped the idol of Peor in the wilderness: 鈥淎nd hang [hoka] them unto the Lord, facing the sun鈥 (Numbers 25:4), indicating that capital cases are judged in the face of the sun, i.e., during the day. Rav 岣sda says: From where is it derived that hoka鈥檃 is hanging? Where the Gibeonites requested to be given Saul鈥檚 sons, as it is written: 鈥Vehoka鈥檃num unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul, the chosen of the Lord鈥 (II聽Samuel 21:6).

Scroll To Top