Sanhedrin 34
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״עֵד אֶחָד לֹא יַעֲנֶה בְנֶפֶשׁ לָמוּת״. לָמוּת הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ עוֹנֶה, אֲבָל לִזְכוּת עוֹנֶה. וְרַבָּנַן? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּנוֹגֵעַ בְּעֵדוּתוֹ.
The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As the verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.” One can infer: That he die is the matter concerning which he does not testify, but he does testify to acquit. The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of the Rabbis? Reish Lakish says: A witness cannot offer any statements beyond his testimony because it appears as though he is biased in his testimony. If the court finds the accused liable based on the witness’s testimony, the witness could later be accused of being a conspiring witness. Therefore, it is to his advantage to have the court acquit the accused.
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״לָמוּת״ מַאי דָּרְשִׁי בֵּיהּ? מוֹקְמִי לֵיהּ בְּאֶחָד מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים. כִּדְתַנְיָא: אָמַר אֶחָד מִן הָעֵדִים ״יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו זְכוּת״, מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עֵד אֶחָד לֹא יַעֲנֶה״. מִנַּיִין לְאֶחָד מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים שֶׁאָמַר ״יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו חוֹבָה״, מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֶחָד לֹא יַעֲנֶה בְנֶפֶשׁ לָמוּת״.
The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, in what manner do they interpret this term: “That he die”? The Gemara answers: They establish it as teaching the halakha with regard to one of the students. As it is taught in a baraita: If one of the witnesses said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: “One witness shall not testify.” From where is it derived that if there is one of the students who said: I have the ability to teach a reason to deem him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.”
דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת: הַמְלַמֵּד כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁעַת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן, אֲבָל בִּשְׁעַת גְּמַר דִּין – מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה.
§ The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to deem the accused liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit him may not return and teach a reason to deem him liable. Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to the time of the deliberations of the court, but at the time of the verdict, one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable.
מֵיתִיבִי: לְמׇחֳרָת מַשְׁכִּימִין וּבָאִין. הַמְזַכֶּה אוֹמֵר: ״אֲנִי הַמְזַכֶּה, וּמְזַכֶּה אֲנִי בִּמְקוֹמִי״. הַמְחַיֵּיב אוֹמֵר: ״אֲנִי הַמְחַיֵּיב, וּמְחַיֵּיב אֲנִי בִּמְקוֹמִי״. הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת, אֲבָל הַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר וּלְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה.
The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (40a): The following day, i.e., the day after the initial deliberations, the judges would arise early and come to court. One who yesterday was of the opinion to acquit says: I said to acquit, and I acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then teach a reason to deem him liable.
וְהָא לַמׇּחֳרָת גְּמַר דִּין הוּא, וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, לַמׇּחֳרָת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן מִי לֵיכָּא? כִּי קָתָנֵי בִּשְׁעַת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן.
The Gemara explains the objection: But the following day is at the time of the verdict, and the mishna rules that a judge who had said to acquit may not change his opinion. The Gemara questions this reading of the mishna: And according to your reasoning, are there no deliberations on the following day? The deliberations may resume on the next day. Therefore, one can say that when the mishna teaches that the judge may not change his opinion, it is with regard to the time of the deliberations.
תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּנִין אֵלּוּ כְּנֶגֶד אֵלּוּ, עַד שֶׁיִּרְאֶה אֶחָד מִן הַמְחַיְּיבִין דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין. וְאִם אִיתַהּ, לִיתְנֵי נָמֵי אִיפְּכָא! תַּנָּא אַזְּכוּת קָא מְהַדַּר, אַחוֹבָה לָא קָא מְהַדַּר.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of that mishna, which teaches that if the number of judges who deem him liable is one more than the number of judges who acquit, they continue to deliberate the matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn someone to death by a majority of one judge. The Gemara states its proof: And if it is so that one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable, let the mishna also teach the opposite possibility. The Gemara explains: The tanna is searching for scenarios of acquittal, he is not searching for scenarios of liability. It may be that the halakha is the same in the opposite case, but the tanna prefers to employ an example of acquittal.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: אֶחָד מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים שֶׁזִּיכָּה וָמֵת – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ חַי וְעוֹמֵד בִּמְקוֹמוֹ. וְאַמַּאי? נֵימָא: אִילּוּ הֲוָה קַיָּים, [הֲוָה] הָדַר בֵּיהּ! הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לָא הֲדַר בֵּיהּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In a case where there was one of the students who argued to acquit and then died, the court views him as if he were alive and standing in his place and voting to acquit. The Gemara asks: But why? According to the opinion of Rav, that a judge may change his opinion at the time of the verdict, let us say: Perhaps if that student were alive, he would retract his opinion and find the accused liable. The Gemara explains: Now, in any event, he did not retract from his opinion. The assumption is that he would not have changed his opinion, although one can do so.
וְהָא שְׁלַחוּ מִתָּם: לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא, מוּצָא מִכְּלַל רַבֵּינוּ! ״אֵין מוּצָא״ אִיתְּמַר.
The Gemara questions this explanation: But the Sages sent a statement from there, Eretz Yisrael: According to this version of the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, he engages in a dispute with our teacher, i.e., Rav. Apparently, the previous explanation, which reconciles their opinions, is incorrect. The Gemara answers: That tradition was not accurate, and it was stated that he does not engage in a dispute with Rav.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁנֵי סוֹפְרֵי הַדַּיָּינִין עוֹמְדִין לִפְנֵיהֶן, אֶחָד מִן הַיָּמִין וְאֶחָד מִן הַשְּׂמֹאל, וְכוֹתְבִין דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין וְדִבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּיבִין.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: After the initial deliberations, two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right, and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable.
בִּשְׁלָמָא דִּבְרֵי הַמְחַיְּיבִין, לִמְחַר חָזוּ טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא וּבָעוּ לְמֶעְבַּד הֲלָנַת דִּין. אֶלָּא דִּבְרֵי הַמְזַכִּין, מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאִי חָזוּ טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא לְחוֹבָה, לָא מַשְׁגְּחִינַן בְּהוּ?
The Gemara explains the proof: Granted, they write the statements of those who find the accused liable even though they may not change their opinions, as on the following day they may see another reason to find the accused liable, not the reason they gave the day before. And once this new reason is given, the court is required to perform a suspension of the trial until the following day, as they may not issue a verdict in cases of capital law on the same day as the deliberations. But what is the reason the scribes write the statements of those who acquit the accused? Is it not because the halakha is that if the judges would see another reason to find the accused liable, we do not pay heed to them, and in order to ensure that the judges do not change their opinions, the scribes write their statements?
לֹא, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמְרוּ שְׁנַיִם טַעַם אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי מִקְרָאוֹת. כְּדִבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַסִּי מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אָמְרוּ שְׁנַיִם טַעַם אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי מִקְרָאוֹת, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין מוֹנִין לָהֶן אֶלָּא אֶחָד.
The Gemara answers: No, the reason they write their statements is so that two of the judges should not say one explanation to acquit from two different verses. If two judges each say the same reason to acquit, but derive their reason from different verses, they are not counted as two votes. As Rabbi Asi asked of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If two of the judges say one explanation to acquit from two different verses, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: We count them only as one, as it is clear that one of the derivations is in error.
מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״אַחַת דִּבֶּר אֱלֹהִים שְׁתַּיִם זוּ שָׁמָעְתִּי כִּי עֹז לֵאלֹהִים״. מִקְרָא אֶחָד יוֹצֵא לְכַמָּה טְעָמִים, וְאֵין טַעַם אֶחָד יוֹצֵא מִכַּמָּה מִקְרָאוֹת. דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״וּכְפַטִּישׁ יְפֹצֵץ סָלַע״ – מָה פַּטִּישׁ זֶה מִתְחַלֵּק לְכַמָּה נִיצוֹצוֹת, אַף מִקְרָא אֶחָד יוֹצֵא לְכַמָּה טְעָמִים.
§ The Gemara discusses the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan: From where is this matter derived? Abaye says: As the verse states: “God has spoken once, twice I have heard this; that strength belongs to God” (Psalms 62:12). Abaye explains: One verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations, but one explanation does not emerge from several verses. Alternatively, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: “Is not My word like as fire? says the Lord; and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces” (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as this hammer breaks a stone into several fragments, so too, one verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי טַעַם אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵי מִקְרָאוֹת? אָמַר רַב זְבִיד, כְּדִתְנַן: מִזְבֵּחַ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָרָאוּי לוֹ.
The Gemara clarifies: What is considered one explanation from two different verses? Rav Zevid says: As we learned in a mishna (Zevaḥim 83a): With regard to certain items that are disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, once they have been placed on the altar they are nevertheless sacrificed, but the altar sanctifies only items that are suited for it, as the Gemara will explain. The tanna’im disagree as to what is considered suited for the altar.
רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לָאִשִּׁים, אִם עָלָה – לֹא יֵרֵד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הָעֹלָה עַל מוֹקְדָה״. מָה עוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא רְאוּיָה לָאִשִּׁים, אִם עָלְתָה – לֹא תֵּרֵד, אַף כֹּל שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לָאִשִּׁים, אִם עָלָה – לֹא יֵרֵד.
Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, e.g., burnt-offerings and the portions of other offerings burned on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, it shall not descend. Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, as it is stated: “It is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt-offering that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too with regard to any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.
רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הָרָאוּי לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, אִם עָלָה – לֹא יֵרֵד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הִיא הָעֹלָה עַל מוֹקְדָה עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ״. מָה עוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא רְאוּיָה לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ – אִם עָלְתָה לֹא תֵּרֵד, אַף כֹּל שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לְמִזְבֵּחַ – אִם עָלָה לֹא יֵרֵד.
Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, as it is stated: “It is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar,” from which it is derived: Just as a burnt-offering that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too any item that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.
וְתַרְוַיְיהוּ מַאי קָמְרַבּוּ? פְּסוּלִין. מָר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִ״מּוֹקְדָה״, וּמָר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִ״מִּזְבֵּחַ״.
Rav Zevid explains: And what do the two of them include by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that if they ascend they do not descend. One Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, brings proof for this halakha from the term “on the pyre,” and one Sage, Rabban Gamliel, brings proof to this halakha from the term “upon the altar.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.
וְהָא הָתָם מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֵין בֵּין דִּבְרֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אֶלָּא הַדָּם וְהַנְּסָכִים, שֶׁרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: לֹא יֵרְדוּ, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: יֵרְדוּ.
The Gemara questions this example: But there, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel disagree, and their explanations cannot therefore be identical. As the latter clause of that mishna teaches: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only with regard to disqualified blood and libations, which are not consumed by the fire, but do ascend onto the altar, as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend, as they are fit to ascend on the altar, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend, as they are not burned on the altar.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר
Rather, Rav Pappa says: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From the fact that it is stated:
״כָּל הַנּוֹגֵעַ בַּמִּזְבֵּחַ יִקְדָּשׁ״ – שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי, בֵּין רָאוּי בֵּין שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כְּבָשִׂים״ – מָה כְּבָשִׂים רְאוּיִין, אַף כֹּל רָאוּי. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״עוֹלָה״ – מָה עוֹלָה רְאוּיָה, אַף כֹּל רָאוּי.
“Whatsoever touches the altar shall be sanctified” (Exodus 29:37), I would derive that this applies to every item, whether it is suited to be an offering, or unsuited to be an offering. The following verse states: “Now this is that which you shall offer upon the altar: Two lambs of the first year day by day continually” (Exodus 29:38); from this I derive: Just as lambs are suited to be offerings, so too, everything that is suited to be an offering is included in this halakha. The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says: The offerings discussed in this passage are each referred to as a burnt-offering (see Exodus 29:42). Therefore, I derive: Just as a burnt-offering is suited for the altar, so too, everything that is suited for the altar is included in this halakha.
וְתַרְוַיְיהוּ מַאי קָא מְמַעֲטוּ? פְּסוּלֵי. מָר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִ״כְּבָשִׂים״, וּמָר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מֵ״עוֹלָה״.
Rav Pappa explains: And what do the two of them exclude by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that they do not become sanctified if they touch the altar. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, brings proof for this halakha from the term “lambs,” and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term “burnt-offering.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.
וְהָאָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: עוֹלַת הָעוֹף פְּסוּלָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. מַאן דְּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִ״כְּבָשִׂים״ – כְּבָשִׂים אִין, אֲבָל עוֹלַת הָעוֹף לָא. וּמַאן דְּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ מֵ״עוֹלָה״ – אֲפִילּוּ עוֹלַת הָעוֹף נָמֵי.
The Gemara questions this example: But doesn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava say that the difference between them is with regard to a disqualified bird burnt-offering? The one who brings proof for this halakha from the term “lambs” holds that: Lambs, yes, they are included in this halakha, but a bird burnt-offering is not. And the one who brings proof for this halakha from the term “burnt-offering” holds that a bird burnt-offering is also included in this halakha.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כִּדְתַנְיָא, ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא דָּם שָׁפָךְ״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַזּוֹרֵק, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל.
Rather, Rav Ashi said: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who violates the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Tent of Meeting, the verse states: “Whatever man there be of the house of Israel, that kills an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that kills it outside the camp; and to the opening of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be imputed unto that man; he shed blood; and this man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4). This verse serves to include one who sprinkles the blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״אוֹ זָבַח״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַזּוֹרֵק. וְתַרְוַיְיהוּ מַאי קָא מְרַבּוּ? זְרִיקָה. מָר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב״, וּמָר מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מֵ״אוֹ זָבַח״.
The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva says that when the verse states: “Whatever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among them, that offers a burnt-offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8), it serves to include one who sprinkles blood of consecrated offerings outside the Tent of Meeting. Rav Ashi explains: What do the two tanna’im include by means of these explanations? One who performs sprinkling of the blood outside the Tent of Meeting. One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, brings proof for this halakha from the phrase “blood shall be imputed,” and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, brings proof for this halakha from the term “or sacrifice.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.
וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שָׁחַט וְזָרַק אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת; לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם.
The Gemara questions this example: But doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say that the difference between them is with regard to one who slaughtered the offering and sprinkled the blood, as according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable for only one transgression, and according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable for two transgressions?
הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אַף לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״שָׁם תַּעֲלֶה עֹלוֹתֶיךָ וְשָׁם תַּעֲשֶׂה״. עָרְבִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא לְכוּלְּהוּ עֲשִׂיּוֹת.
The Gemara responds: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita that Abaye says: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable for only one transgression, as the verse states: “But in the place that the Lord shall choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer your burnt-offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). The Merciful One combined all the actions with regard to offerings as one transgression. According to the explanation of Abaye, there is in fact no practical dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva with regard to this matter, and it serves as an example of one explanation from two different verses.
דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְכוּ׳. (סִימָן: מִשְׁפָּט, מַעֲנֶה, מַטֶּה.) מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר פָּפָּא: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת הָעָם בְּכׇל עֵת״.
§ The mishna teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue their ruling even at night. Before discussing this ruling, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for three of the forthcoming discussions: Judgment, answer, incline. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters concerning the time of the deliberations derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Pappa says: As the verse states: “And let them judge the people at all times” (Exodus 18:22), indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night.
אִי הָכִי, תְּחִלַּת דִּין נָמֵי? כִּדְרָבָא, דְּרָבָא רָמֵי: כְּתִיב ״וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת הָעָם בְּכׇל עֵת״, וּכְתִיב ״וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו״. הָא כֵּיצַד? יוֹם לִתְחִלַּת דִּין, לַיְלָה לִגְמַר דִּין.
The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is so that this is the source of the halakha, the court should be able to conduct the initial stage of the trial at night, as well. The Gemara explains: It is possible to resolve the matter in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: “And let them judge the people at all times,” indicating that the judgment can be during the day or at night, and it is written in another verse: “Then it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has” (Deuteronomy 21:16), indicating that cases of inheritance are judged only during the day. Rava explains: How can these texts be reconciled? The verse referring to the day is stated with regard to the initial stage of the trial, and the verse that includes the night is stated with regard to the verdict.
מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּתַנְיָא: הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״עַל פִּיהֶם יִהְיֶה כׇּל רִיב וְכׇל נָגַע״? וְכִי מָה עִנְיַן רִיבִים אֵצֶל נְגָעִים?
The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to the priests: “According to their word shall every dispute and every leprous sore be” (Deuteronomy 21:5)? And what do disputes have to do with leprous sores?
אֶלָּא מַקִּישׁ רִיבִים לִנְגָעִים: מָה נְגָעִים בַּיּוֹם, דִּכְתִיב ״וּבְיוֹם הֵרָאוֹת בּוֹ״, אַף רִיבִים בַּיּוֹם. וּמָה נְגָעִים שֶׁלֹּא בְּסוֹמִין, דִּכְתִיב ״לְכׇל מַרְאֵה עֵינֵי הַכֹּהֵן״, אַף רִיבִים שֶׁלֹּא בְּסוֹמִין. וּמַקִּישׁ נְגָעִים לְרִיבִים: מָה רִיבִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְרוֹבִים, אַף נְגָעִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְרוֹבִים.
The baraita continues: Rather, the verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous sores, teaching that just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written: “And on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure” (Leviticus 13:14), so too disputes are judged only in the daytime. And just as leprous sores are viewed by a priest who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: “As far as appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12), so too disputes are judged by sighted judges, not by blind judges. And the verse juxtaposes leprous sores to disputes, teaching that just as disputes are judged by independent judges, not by judges who are relatives of the litigants, so too leprous sores are viewed by a priest who is not a relative of the afflicted person.
אִי מָה רִיבִים בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה – אַף נְגָעִים בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה? וְדִין הוּא: מָמוֹנוֹ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, גּוּפוֹ לָא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהוּבָא אֶל אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן אוֹ אֶל אֶחָד וְגוֹ׳״. הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ כֹּהֵן אֶחָד רוֹאֶה אֶת הַנְּגָעִים.
The baraita continues: If these two matters are juxtaposed, why not say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too leprous sores are viewed by three priests? And this would be supported by a logical inference: If a case involving one’s money is judged by three judges, is it not clear all the more so that the person himself should be viewed by three priests? To counter this, the verse states: “And he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). From this you have learned that even one priest views leprous sores. In any event, as opposed to the mishna, Rabbi Meir holds that disputes are judged only during the day.
הָהוּא סַמְיָא דַּהֲוָה בְּשִׁבְבוּתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דַּהֲוָה דָּאֵין דִּינָא, וְלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְלָא מִידֵּי. הֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כִּסְתַם מִשְׁנָה, וּתְנַן: כׇּל הַכָּשֵׁר לָדוּן כָּשֵׁר לְהָעִיד, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁכָּשֵׁר לְהָעִיד וְאֵין כָּשֵׁר לָדוּן. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְאֵתוֹיֵי סוֹמֵא בְּאַחַת מֵעֵינָיו.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind man who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yoḥanan who would serve as a judge, and Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How did he do this, i.e., allow the blind man to judge? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say: The halakha is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, and we learned in an unattributed mishna (Nidda 49b): Anyone who is fit to judge is fit to testify, but there are those who are fit to testify but not fit to judge. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The latter clause serves to include one who is blind in one of his eyes, who is fit to testify but is not fit to judge. All the more so Rabbi Yoḥanan would agree that the unattributed mishna holds that one blind in both eyes is disqualified from serving as a judge.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן סְתָמָא אַחְרִיתָא אַשְׁכַּח: דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם, וְגוֹמְרִין בַּלַּיְלָה.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna, i.e., the mishna here, which indicates that a blind man can serve as a judge: In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. Accordingly, judging cases of monetary law is not compared to viewing leprous sores, which is the source for disqualifying a blind judge.
מַאי אוּלְמֵיהּ דְּהַאי סְתָמָא מֵהַאי סְתָמָא? אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: סְתָמָא דְּרַבִּים עֲדִיף, וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּקָתָנֵי לַהּ גַּבֵּי הִלְכְתָא דְּדִינָא.
The Gemara asks: In what way is the strength of this unattributed mishna greater than the strength of that unattributed mishna? Why would Rabbi Yoḥanan rule in accordance with this one and not that one? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages is preferable, as the mishna in tractate Nidda is written in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir of the baraita. And if you wish, say it is because this unattributed mishna teaches this halakha in the context of the halakhot of judgment. Since this chapter is the primary source for all halakhot of judgments, the ruling written here carries greater weight.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, הַאי ״וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת הָעָם בְּכׇל עֵת״ מַאי דָּרֵישׁ בֵּיהּ? אָמַר רָבָא: לְאֵיתוֹיֵי יוֹם הַמְעוּנָּן. דִּתְנַן: אֵין רוֹאִין אֶת הַנְּגָעִים שַׁחֲרִית, וּבֵין הָעַרְבַּיִם, וְלֹא בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת, וְלֹא בְּיוֹם הַמְעוּנָּן, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכֵּהָה נִרְאֵית עַזָּה. וְלֹא בַּצׇּהֳרַיִם, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעַזָּה נִרְאֵית כֵּהָה.
The Gemara continues its discussion of these opinions. And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: “And let them judge the people at all times”? Rava said: He interprets that it serves to include a cloudy day, teaching that although a priest does not view a leprous sore on a cloudy day, the court may judge a case on a cloudy day. As we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 2:2): A priest does not view leprous sores during the early morning when the sun is not in full force, and not during the late afternoon, and not in a house, and not on a cloudy day. This is because a dull white sore appears bright, and a bright white sore is deemed ritually impure. And a priest does not view leprous sores at midday, because a bright white spot appears dull and the priest will mistakenly deem it ritually pure. The priest views the leprous sores during the late morning or early afternoon.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, הַאי ״בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתָנֵי רַבָּה בַּר חֲנִינָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: ״וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו״ – בַּיּוֹם אַתָּה מַפִּיל נַחֲלוֹת, וְאִי אַתָּה מַפִּיל נַחֲלוֹת בַּלַּיְלָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, מַאן דְּשָׁכֵיב בִּימָמָא יִרְתוּן לֵיהּ בְּנֵיהּ, וּמַאן דְּשָׁכֵיב בְּלֵילְיָא לָא יִרְתוּן לֵיהּ בְּנֵיהּ?
And what does Rabbi Meir interpret from this verse: “On the day that he causes his sons to inherit”? He already derived from the juxtaposition to leprous sores that the court cannot issue a verdict at night. The Gemara answers: He requires that verse to teach the halakha that Rabba bar Ḥanina taught in the presence of Rav Naḥman: The verse states: “Then it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has” (Deuteronomy 21:16). The addition of the term “on the day” teaches that it is specifically during the day that you can distribute inheritances, but you cannot distribute inheritances at night. Rav Naḥman said to him: That cannot be the halakha, as, if that is so, then it ought to be that it is only in the case of one who dies during the day that his children inherit from him but that with regard to one who dies at night, his children do not inherit from him, and this is not the case.
דִּילְמָא דִּין נַחֲלוֹת קָאָמְרַתְּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְהָיְתָה לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְחֻקַּת מִשְׁפָּט״ – אוֹרְעָה כָּל הַפָּרָשָׁה כֻּולָּהּ לִהְיוֹת דִּין.
Rav Naḥman suggests: Perhaps you are stating a distinction between day and night with regard to the adjudication of inheritances. A proof for this distinction is as it is taught in a baraita: A verse in the passage concerning inheritance states: “And it shall be for the children of Israel a statute of judgment” (Numbers 27:11), teaching that the entire portion is placed [ure’a] together to be considered a matter of judgment, subject to the procedural rules that apply to a matter of the court.
כִּדְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁנִּכְנְסוּ לְבַקֵּר אֶת הַחוֹלֶה, רָצוּ – כּוֹתְבִין, רָצוּ – עוֹשִׂין דִּין. שְׁנַיִם – כּוֹתְבִין וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין דִּין.
And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In a case where there were three people who entered a room to visit an ill person, and the ill person desires to write a will in order to distribute his property following his death, if the visitors wish to do so, they can write his will and sign it as witnesses, and if they wish, they can act in judgment, i.e., they can act as a court in the matter, since they are three. Therefore, they can determine that the will has the validity of an act of the court and transfer the property to the heirs in their capacity as a court. But if only two came to visit the ill person, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment, since three are required to form a court.
וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בַּיּוֹם, אֲבָל בַּלַּיְלָה כּוֹתְבִין וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין דִּין, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָווּ לְהוּ עֵדִים, וְאֵין עֵד נַעֲשֶׂה דַּיָּין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, הָכִי קָאָמֵינָא.
And Rav Ḥisda says: This halakha was taught only in a case where the three came to visit him during the day; but if the three of them came at night, they can write the will and sign it as witnesses, but they cannot act in judgment. What is the reason that they cannot act in judgment on the next day? It is because they are already witnesses to the will of the deceased, and there is a principle that a witness cannot become a judge, i.e., one who acts as a witness in a particular matter cannot become a judge with regard to that same matter. Rabba bar Ḥanina said to Rav Naḥman: Yes, it is indeed so that this is what I was saying.
דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְכוּ׳. מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר חִיָּיא: אָמַר קְרָא, ״וְהוֹקַע אוֹתָם לַה׳ נֶגֶד הַשָּׁמֶשׁ״. אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מִנַּיִין לְהוֹקָעָה שֶׁהִיא תְּלִיָּיה? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהוֹקַעֲנוּם לַה׳ בְּגִבְעַת שָׁאוּל בְּחִיר ה׳״.
§ The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling in the daytime. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to Israelites who worshipped the idol of Peor in the wilderness: “And hang [hoka] them unto the Lord, facing the sun” (Numbers 25:4), indicating that capital cases are judged in the face of the sun, i.e., during the day. Rav Ḥisda says: From where is it derived that hoka’a is hanging? Where the Gibeonites requested to be given Saul’s sons, as it is written: “Vehoka’anum unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul, the chosen of the Lord” (II Samuel 21:6).
