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Today's Daf Yomi

September 15, 2017 | 讻状讚 讘讗诇讜诇 转砖注状讝

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Sanhedrin 61

Study Guide Sanhedrin 61. Rabbi Yirmiya explains that slaughtering聽was specified in the verse in the Torah to teach you that聽anyone who worships other gods in ways that God is worshiped in the temple, whether it’s the typical way of worshiping that god or not, one is obligated in the death penalty. 聽Then bowing is specified to teach that bowing has the same law (even though it is not one of the ways Jews worship God) as the others but all other methods of worshiping idols is only if they are done in the way that that idol is typically worshiped. 聽Rava bar Rav Natan questions Rabbi Yirmiya and suggests the opposite – that one should learn from bowing that any act of worshiping idols is forbidden even if not done in the typical way or worship. 聽Various difficulties with Rava’s suggestion聽are brought. 聽Rav Hamnuna is asked a question about contradictory mishnayot – one indicates that only worship is forbidden but not saying I will worship. 聽The other says that saying “I will worship idols” is enough to obligate one. 聽SEveral answers are brought to explain the contradiction. 聽Is one obligated if one worships idols out of love or fear for another?


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讗住讜专讛 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诪讜转专转

Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering of idol worship, even if its blood was not ultimately sprinkled for idol worship or its forbidden fat burned for that purpose. And Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讗 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘注讬 拽专讗

Rava bar Rav 岣nan concludes his analysis: According to Rabbi Yo岣nan, who derives this halakha from another source, this statement in the baraita works out well. The verse that mentions the slaughter of an animal in idol worship apparently teaches a principle, as it is superfluous with regard to the halakha of slaughter itself, as stated in the baraita. But according to Reish Lakish, who does not derive from any verse that one can have intention from one rite to another rite, one needs this verse to derive precisely this halakha, that one can have intention from one rite to another rite. Consequently, the verse is not superfluous, and it cannot be assumed that it teaches a principle with regard to the forms of idol worship that are punishable by death.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讜诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 讘注讬 拽专讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 讗住专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讗 讘讛诪讛 讗讘诇 讙讘专讗 诇讗 讘专 拽讟诇讗 讛讜讗 讜讗转讗 拽专讗 诇讞讬讜讘讬 讙讘专讗 诇拽讟诇讗

Rav Pappa objects to this: And according to Rabbi Yo岣nan, does one not need a verse to teach the halakha in a case of intention from one rite to another rite? Rabbi Yo岣nan initially only prohibits deriving benefit from the animal; but if not for this verse, the man who slaughtered the animal would not be liable to receive the death penalty. And therefore the verse comes to render the man liable to receive the death penalty. Therefore this verse is not superfluous according to Rabbi Yo岣nan either.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讜诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪讬 讘注讬 拽专讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 砖专讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诇讗 讘讛诪讛 讗讘诇 讙讘专讗 讘专 拽讟诇讗 讛讜讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗诪砖转讞讜讛 诇讛专 讚讛专 诪讜转专 讜注讜讘讚讛 讘住讬讬祝

Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, objects to Rava bar Rav 岣nan鈥檚 challenge to the derivation in the baraita: And even according to Reish Lakish, does one need a verse to teach that the one who slaughtered the animal is liable? Reish Lakish only permits one to derive benefit from the animal; but the man is certainly liable to receive the death penalty. This is just as the halakha is in the case of one who bows to a mountain, as deriving benefit from the mountain is permitted, but nevertheless the one who worshipped it is liable to be executed by the sword. Therefore, the verse that states that one who slaughters an offering in idol worship is liable to be executed is superfluous with regard to the issue of intention from one rite to another.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 诪讚驻转讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 诇诪讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讘专 专讘 讞谞谉 诇讗讘讬讬 讗讬诪讗 讬爪讗讛 讛砖转讞讜讗讛 诇诇诪讚 注诇 讛讻诇诇 讻讜诇讜 讗讬讻讛 讬注讘讚讜 诇诪注讜讟讬 诪讗讬

Rav A岣 of Difti said to Ravina: According to what Rava bar Rav 岣nan said to Abaye, that there is room to say that bowing was singled out in the verse to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship carries the death penalty, there is a difficulty. With regard to the verse: 鈥淭ake heed to yourself that you not be ensnared to follow them鈥aying, how do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:30), which indicates that one is liable for worshipping an idol in the manner that the gentiles worship it, this is stated to exclude what?

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 讛驻讜注专 注爪诪讜 诇讝讜讘讞讬诐 诪讛砖转讞讜讗讛 谞驻拽讗 诪讛 讛砖转讞讜讗讛 讚专讱 讻讬讘讜讚 讗祝 讻诇 讚专讱 讻讬讘讜讚

And if you would say that this verse is stated to exclude one who defecates before an idol that is worshipped by sacrificing offerings, it is not necessary to derive this halakha from this verse, as it is derived from the halakha of bowing to an idol, as follows: Just as bowing is an honorable form of worship and is punishable by death, so too, any honorable form of worship is punishable by death when performed as idol worship, which excludes an offensive act such as defecating. Therefore, the halakha that one is not liable for defecating before an idol can be derived from bowing.

讗诇讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 讛驻讜注专 注爪诪讜 诇诪专拽讜诇讬住 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜注讘讜讚转讜 讘讝讬讜谉 讛讜讗 讗祝 讻诇 讘讝讬讜谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rather, this verse is stated to exclude one who defecates before the idol called Mercury, which is not its typical manner of worship. It might enter your mind to say that since the standard manner of worship of Mercury, namely, throwing stones at it, is in any event an act of degradation, so too, one who performs any act of degradation as worship of Mercury should be liable. Therefore, the verse teaches us that one is liable only for worshiping Mercury in its standard manner of worship.

讗诇讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪谞讬谉 诇讝讜讘讞 讘讛诪讛 诇诪专拽讜诇讬住 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讗诪专 讜诇讗 讬讝讘讞讜 注讜讚 讗转 讝讘讞讬讛诐 诇砖注讬专诐

The Gemara raises an objection: But Rava bar Rav 岣nan鈥檚 interpretation of the verses appears to contradict that which Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that one who sacrifices an animal to Mercury is liable? As it is stated: 鈥淎nd they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the satyrs鈥 (Leviticus 17:7).

讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇讻讚专讻讛 讚讻转讬讘 讗讬讻讛 讬注讘讚讜 转谞讬讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖诇讗 讻讚专讻讛

Rabbi Eliezer explains: If the verse is not needed for the matter of one who worships an idol in its typical manner, i.e., one who sacrifices an animal as an offering to an idol that is worshipped by sacrificing offerings, as the halakha in this case is already written in the aforementioned verse: 鈥淗ow do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise,鈥 apply it to the matter of one who worships an idol not in its typical manner, by sacrificing an offering to an idol that is not typically worshipped by sacrificing offerings. Therefore, one who sacrifices an offering to Mercury is liable, even though that is not its typical form of worship.

砖诇讗 讻讚专讻讛 诪讛砖转讞讜讗讛 谞驻拽讗

According to Rava bar Rav 岣nan, by contrast, it is derived that one is liable for worshipping an idol in any honorable manner, even not in its typical manner of worship, from the halakha of bowing.

讛转诐 讘讝讜讘讞 诇讛讻注讬住

The Gemara answers: There, in the verse mentioned by Rabbi Eliezer, the reference is to one who sacrifices an offering to Mercury not as a form of worship, but rather in order to express insolence toward the Torah prohibition against sacrificing an offering to an idol. It is derived from the verse that this too is a transgression of the prohibition and renders one liable for the death penalty.

专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讗讬专讻住讜 诇讬讛 转讜专讬 驻讙注 讘讬讛 专讘讛 专诪讗 诇讬讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗讛讚讚讬 转谞谉 讛注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 注讜讘讚 讗讬谉 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讜讛讗谞谉 转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 壮讗注讘讜讚壮 壮讗诇讱 讜讗注讘讜讚壮 壮谞诇讱 讜谞注讘讜讚壮

搂 The Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna lost his oxen and went to search for them. Rabba met him and raised a contradiction between two mishnayot. We learned in the mishna that one who worships idols is liable. By inference, one who worships idols, yes, he is liable, but one who merely says that he will worship idols is not liable. But didn鈥檛 we learn in another mishna (67a): One who says: I will worship an idol, or: I will go and worship an idol, or: Let us go and worship an idol, is liable, just as one who actually worships an idol is liable. Evidently, one is liable for merely stating his intention to engage in idol worship.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讘讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 诪拽讘诇讜 注诇讬 讗诇讗 讘注讘讜讚讛

Rav Hamnuna said to him: The mishna here is referring to one who states: I intend to accept this idol upon myself as a god only through worship. Consequently, he is liable only when he actually worships it. One who intends to accept the idol as a god immediately is liable even before he actually worships it.

专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 转谞讗讬 砖拽诇转 诪注诇诪讗 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 壮讘讜讗讜 讜注讘讚讜谞讬壮 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 驻讜讟专

Rav Yosef said: This answer is unnecessary; have you removed the tanna鈥檌m from the world? It is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says: I am a god; come and worship me, Rabbi Meir deems him liable for incitement to idol worship, and Rabbi Yehuda deems him exempt.

讛讬讻讗 讚驻诇讞讜 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇讱 驻住诇 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讚讬讘讜专讗 讘注诇诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讚讬讘讜专讗 诪讬诇转讗 讛讬讗 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 讚讬讘讜专讗 诇讗讜 诪讬诇转讗 讛讬讗

The Gemara explains: In a case where those to whom the inciter spoke subsequently worshiped him, everyone agrees that the inciter is liable, as it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not make yourself a graven image鈥 (Exodus 20:4), which is interpreted to include a case where one establishes himself as a god. When they disagree is in a case where the incident ended in mere speech. Rabbi Meir holds that speech is a significant matter, and therefore the inciter is liable for incitement, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that speech is nothing. Therefore, the contradiction between the mishnayot can be resolved by attributing each mishna to a different tanna.

讛讚专 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗讜 诪讬诇转讗 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讬 讚讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘讚讬讘讜专讗 谞诪讬 讞讬讜讘讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 壮讗注讘讜讚壮 壮讗诇讱 讜讗注讘讜讚壮 壮谞诇讱 讜谞注讘讜讚壮

Rav Yosef then said after reconsidering the matter: What I said is not correct, as even according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is deemed liable for speech as well. As we learned in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Actually, one is not liable unless he says: I will worship, or: I will go and worship, or: Let us go and worship. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable even for speech alone, not only for actual worship.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘诪住讬转 诇注爪诪讜 讜讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 诪住讬转 诇注爪诪讜 砖诪注讬 诇讬讛 讜讗讬谉 讚拽讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 拽讜砖讟讗 讛讜讗 讜诪专 住讘专 诪住讬转 诇注爪诪讜 诇讗 砖诪注讬 诇讬讛 诪讬诪专 讗诪专讬

Accordingly, with regard to what principle do Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? They disagree with regard to the case of one who incites others to worship him, and the others say to him: Yes, we will worship you. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that when one incites others to worship him, they are apt to listen to him, and the response: Yes, that they say to him, is sincere. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds when one incites others to worship him, they are not apt to listen to him, as they say to themselves:

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讗讬讛讜 诪讬谞谉 讚讬讚谉 讜讗讬谉 讚拽讗诪专讬 讗讞讜讻讬 注诇讬讛

In what way is he different from us? The suggestion to worship him is nonsense. And the fact that they say to him: Yes, is because they ridicule him.

讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻讗谉 讘讬讞讬讚 讛谞讬住转 讻讗谉 讘专讘讬诐 讛谞住转讬诐 讬讞讬讚 诇讗 诪讬诪诇讱 讜讟注讬 讘转专讬讛 专讘讬诐 诪讬诪诇讻讬 讜诇讗 讟注讜 讘转专讬讛

And the contradiction between the mishnayot can be resolved as follows: There, where the mishna states that one is liable for speech alone, the reference is to an individual who was incited; here, where the mishna indicates that one not is liable for speech alone, it is referring to a case of an incited multitude of people. The Gemara explains: An individual who was incited does not typically change his mind, and he goes astray after idol worship. Therefore, once he agrees to the suggestion to worship an idol, he has fully accepted the idol upon himself as a god and is liable. By contrast, a multitude of people are apt to change their minds, and consequently they do not go astray after idol worship.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讗讘讛 诇讜 讜诇讗 转砖诪注 讗诇讬讜 讛讗 讗讘讛 讜砖诪注 讞讬讬讘

Rav Yosef said: From where do I say that the halakha that one is liable for merely stating that he will worship an idol is referring to an individual who was incited? As it is written with regard to one who incites people to engage in idol worship: 鈥淵ou shall not approve of him, nor listen to him鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:9), which indicates that if one approved of and listened to the inciter, stating his intention to engage in idol worship, he is liable even if he does not actually worship an idol.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 砖讗谞讬 讘讬谉 谞讬住转 讚专讘讬诐 诇谞讬住转 讬讞讬讚 讜讛转谞讬讗 壮讻讬 讬住讬转讱 讗讞讬讱 讘谉 讗诪讱壮 讗讞讚 讬讞讬讚 讛谞讬住转 讜讗讞讚 专讘讬诐 讛谞讬住转讬诐 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讛讻转讜讘 讬讞讬讚 诪讻诇诇 专讘讬诐 讜专讘讬诐 诪讻诇诇 讬讞讬讚

Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef鈥檚 opinion: Is there a difference in halakha between the cases of an incited multitude of people and an individual who was incited? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: 鈥淚f your brother, the son of your mother, or your son, or your daughter, or the wife of your bosom, or your neighbor who is like your own soul, incites you secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:7), that both an individual who was incited and an incited multitude of people are included in this halakha, but the verse singles out the individual from the category of the multitude, and another verse singles out the multitude from the category of the individual.

讬讞讬讚 诪讻诇诇 专讘讬诐 诇讛讞诪讬专 注诇 讙讜驻讜 讜诇讛拽诇 注诇 诪诪讜谞讜

The Torah states separately the halakhot of an individual who is incited to engage in idol worship and of an entire city that is subverted to engage in idol worship in order to distinguish between the two cases, as follows: An individual who was incited is singled out from the category of a subverted multitude of people in order to render the punishment to an individual鈥檚 body more stringent. The individual is executed by stoning, whereas the residents of an idolatrous city are executed by decapitation. And an individual was singled out to render the treatment of the property of an individual who was incited more lenient, as it is not destroyed like that of the residents of an idolatrous city.

专讘讬诐 诪讻诇诇 讬讞讬讚 诇讛拽诇 注诇 讙讜驻诐 讜诇讛讞诪讬专 注诇 诪诪讜谞诐

Additionally, the Torah singles out the subverted multitude of people from the category of an individual who was incited in order to render the punishment given to the bodies of the residents of an idolatrous city, decapitation, more lenient than that given to an individual who was incited, and to render the treatment of their property more stringent, as the city and the property of its residents are burned.

讘讛讗 诪讬诇转讗 讛讜讗 讚砖讗谞讬 讗讘诇 讘讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讻讬 讛讚讚讬 谞讬谞讛讜

Abaye concluded his objection to Rav Yosef鈥檚 opinion: It can be inferred from the baraita that only with regard to this matter, i.e., the halakhot mentioned in the baraita, is the halakha of an individual who was incited different than that of an incited multitude of people, but with regard to all other halakhic matters they are the same. Therefore, a distinction cannot be made between them with regard to the halakha in the case of a verbal commitment to idol worship.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讻讗谉 讘谞讬住转 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讻讗谉 讘谞讬住转 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 诪讬诪诇讱 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讙专讬专 讘转专讬讬讛讜

Rather, Abaye said that the contradiction between the mishnayot is to be resolved as follows: Here, where the mishna indicates that one is liable only for actual worship, the reference is to one who is incited by himself, i.e., no one incited him to idol worship and he made the decision on his own. Whereas there, in the mishna that deems one liable for stating that he will worship an idol, the reference is to one who is incited by others. The reason for the difference is that one who makes the decision on his own is apt to change his mind, whereas one who is incited by others is drawn after them and is unlikely to change his mind.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讗讘讛 诇讜 讜诇讗 转砖诪注 讗诇讬讜 讛讗 讗讘讛 讜砖诪注 讞讬讬讘

Abaye said: From where do I say that this distinction is correct? As it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not approve of him, nor listen to him鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:9), referring to another individual who tried to incite him, and the verse indicates that if one approved of and listened to the inciter, he is liable even for the approval alone.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘谞讬住转 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讛讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讱 讗讜讻诇转 讻讱 砖讜转讛 讻讱 诪讟讬讘讛 讻讱 诪专讬注讛 讛讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讱 讗讜讻诇转 讻讱 砖讜转讛 讻讜壮

Rava says: Both this mishna and that mishna are referring to one incited by others, and they should be differentiated as follows: That mishna, which deems one liable for merely expressing approval, is referring to a case where the inciter described the qualities of the idol and said to him: It eats like this; it drinks like this; it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this. In this case, expressing approval verbally suffices to render one liable, as he was evidently convinced by the description. This mishna, which indicates that one is not liable for speech alone, is referring to a case where the inciter did not say to him: It eats like this; it, drinks like this, it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讻转讬讘 诪讗诇讛讬 讛注诪讬诐 讗砖专 住讘讬讘转讬讻诐 讛拽专讘讬诐 讗诇讬讱 讜讙讜壮 诪讛 诇讬 拽专讜讘讬诐 讜诪讛 诇讬 专讞讜拽讬诐 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讱 诪讟讬讘讜转谉 砖诇 拽专讜讘讬诐 讗转讛 诇诪讚 诪讛 讟讬讘讜转谉 砖诇 专讞讜拽讬诐

Rava said: From where do I say that this distinction is correct? As it is written: 鈥淟et us go and worship other gods鈥from the gods of the peoples that surround you, the ones near to you or the ones far from you鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:7鈥8). What difference is there to me whether they are near, and what difference is there to me whether they are far? Why would the distance affect the prohibition? Rather, this is what the Torah is saying to you: Do not be tempted to listen to the inciter, as from the nature of the objects of idol worship that are near you, which you recognize to be false, you can derive what the nature is of the ones that are far from you. Therefore, if you are told that there is an idol in a distant land that is real, realize that it is a lie.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讱 讗讜讻诇转 讻讱 砖讜转讛 讻讱 诪讟讬讘讛 讻讱 诪专讬注讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

It is from this interpretation that Rava derives his halakhic distinction: What, is it not referring to a case where the inciter described to another the qualities of the idol and said to him: It eats like this; it drinks like this; it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this? Conclude from it that only in such a case is the incited person liable for stating his approval.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 住讬驻讗 讘讬砖专讗诇 诪砖讜诪讚

Rav Ashi says that there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the mishnayot: The latter clause of the mishna (67a), which deems one liable for speech alone, is referring to an apostate Jew; since he is already an apostate, his stated commitment to idol worship is certainly final. Consequently, he is liable. By contrast, a regular Jew is not liable for speech alone.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讗 讝讜 讗祝 讝讜 拽转谞讬

Ravina says that there is no contradiction; rather, the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that. In other words, the tanna first teaches the elementary halakha that one who worships an idol is liable, and afterward it teaches the more novel halakha that even one who merely says that he will engage in idol worship is immediately liable.

讗讬转诪专 讛注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诪讗讛讘讛 讜诪讬专讗讛 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 专讘讗 讗诪专 驻讟讜专

It was stated that amora鈥檌m engaged in a dispute concerning the following matter: In the case of one who worships idols due to his love of another who requested that he bow before the statue, or due to fear of someone coercing him to do so, but not due to faith in that idol, what is the halakha? Abaye says: He is liable. Rava says: He is exempt.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讚讛讗 驻诇讞讛 专讘讗 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 讗讬 拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讘讗诇讜讛 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗

The Gemara explains: Abaye says he is liable because he worshipped it. Rava says he is exempt, as the criterion for becoming liable for idol worship is as follows: If one sincerely accepted the idol upon himself as a god, yes, he is liable; but if he did not accept it sincerely, he is not liable.

住讬诪谉 注讘讚 讬砖转讞讜讛 诇诪砖讬讞

Abaye attempts to cite several proofs, whose mnemonic is: A slave will bow to the anointed.

讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞谉 讛注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讗讞讚 讛注讜讘讚 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讞讚 讛注讜讘讚 诪讗讛讘讛 讜诪讬专讗讛

And Abaye said: From where do I say that one who worships idols due to love or fear is liable? As we learned in the mishna: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering. What is added by the mishna by stating twice: One who worships? Is it not to include the case of one who worships idols due to love or due to fear, in addition to the case of one who worships idols out of faith? Evidently, in this case as well, the worshipper is liable.

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讱 诇讗 讻讚诪转专抓 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛

And Rava could have said to you in response that the term: One who worships, should not be understood as Abaye suggests but rather as Rabbi Yirmeya explains it, namely, that one who worships an idol in its standard manner of worship is liable, and one who sacrifices an idolatrous offering is liable even if that is not the standard manner of worship of that particular idol.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞讬讗 壮诇讗 转砖转讞讜讛 诇讛诐壮 诇讛诐 讗讬 讗转讛 诪砖转讞讜讛 讗讘诇 讗转讛 诪砖转讞讜讛 诇讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讱 讬讻讜诇 讗驻讬诇讜 谞注讘讚 讻讛诪谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮讜诇讗 转注讘讚诐壮 讜讛讗 讛诪谉 诪讬专讗讛 讛讜讛 谞注讘讚

Abaye attempts to cite another proof for his opinion. He said: From where do I say that one who worships idols due to love or fear is liable? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not bow to them nor worship them鈥 (Exodus 20:5): 鈥淭o them,鈥 to idols, you may not bow, but you may bow to a person like yourself; bowing to a person is merely the acceptance of authority. One might have thought that it is permitted to bow even to a person who is worshipped like a god, like Haman; therefore, the verse states: 鈥淣or worship them,鈥 i.e., any form of pagan worship is prohibited. Abaye concludes: And wasn鈥檛 Haman worshipped due to fear, and not because the people considered him a god? Evidently, one who engages in idol worship due to fear is liable.

讜专讘讗 讻讛诪谉 讜诇讗 讻讛诪谉 讻讛诪谉 讚讗讬讛讜 讙讜驻讬讛 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜诇讗 讻讛诪谉 讚讗讬诇讜 讛诪谉 诪讬专讗讛 讜讛讻讗 诇讗讜 诪讬专讗讛

And Rava explains this baraita as follows: One might have thought that it is permitted to bow even to a person like Haman in one regard, but not like Haman in all aspects. It is referring to one like Haman in that Haman himself was an object of idol worship, as he claimed he was a god, and one who worships a person out of belief in his divinity is liable. But the reference is to one who is not like Haman in all aspects, as while Haman was worshipped due to fear, and one who engages in idol worship due to fear is not liable, here the reference is to one who worships a person not due to fear, but because he believes in that person鈥檚 divinity.

讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞讬讗 讻讛谉 诪砖讬讞 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讘砖讙讙转 诪注砖讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘讛注诇诐 讚讘专

And Abaye furthermore said: From where do I say my opinion? As it is taught in a baraita: If an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, unwittingly engaged in idol worship, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He brings an offering for the unwitting act. And the Rabbis say: A High Priest does not bring an offering for an unwitting act of idol worship unless it was due to a lapse of awareness concerning the fundamental halakhot of idol worship, i.e., he thought that this action was halakhically permitted.

讜砖讜讬谉 砖讘砖注讬专讛 讻讬讞讬讚 讜砖讜讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讘讬讗 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬

And they agree that a High Priest brings a female goat as his offering to atone for his act of idol worship, as does an ordinary individual, and not a bull, as a High Priest brings as a sin-offering for other sins. And they agree that a High Priest does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, which is ordinarily brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires him to bring a sin-offering. In such a case, he is exempt.

讛讗讬 砖讙讙转 诪注砖讛 讚注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 拽住讘专 讘讬转 讛讻谞住转 讛讜讗 讜讛砖转讞讜讛 诇讜 讛专讬 诇讘讜 诇砖诪讬诐 讗诇讗 讚讞讝讗 讗谞讚专讟讗 讜讛砖转讞讜讛 诇讜

Abaye infers: What are the circumstances of the High Priest鈥檚 unwitting act of idol worship that is not due to a lack of awareness of the fundamental halakhot of idol worship? If the High Priest thought that a certain building was a synagogue and bowed to it, and he then realized that it is a house of idol worship, why should he be obligated to bring an offering, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Since his heart was directed toward Heaven, it is not even an unwitting transgression. Rather, it is a case where the High Priest saw the statue of a person and bowed to it.

讗讬 拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讘讗诇讜讛 诪讝讬讚 讛讜讗

This case must also be clarified: If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor, and he is liable to receive the death penalty and not to bring an offering.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Sanhedrin 61

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 61

讗住讜专讛 讜专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 诪讜转专转

Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering of idol worship, even if its blood was not ultimately sprinkled for idol worship or its forbidden fat burned for that purpose. And Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讗 诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讘注讬 拽专讗

Rava bar Rav 岣nan concludes his analysis: According to Rabbi Yo岣nan, who derives this halakha from another source, this statement in the baraita works out well. The verse that mentions the slaughter of an animal in idol worship apparently teaches a principle, as it is superfluous with regard to the halakha of slaughter itself, as stated in the baraita. But according to Reish Lakish, who does not derive from any verse that one can have intention from one rite to another rite, one needs this verse to derive precisely this halakha, that one can have intention from one rite to another rite. Consequently, the verse is not superfluous, and it cannot be assumed that it teaches a principle with regard to the forms of idol worship that are punishable by death.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 驻驻讗 讜诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 诇讗 讘注讬 拽专讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 讗住专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诇讗 讘讛诪讛 讗讘诇 讙讘专讗 诇讗 讘专 拽讟诇讗 讛讜讗 讜讗转讗 拽专讗 诇讞讬讜讘讬 讙讘专讗 诇拽讟诇讗

Rav Pappa objects to this: And according to Rabbi Yo岣nan, does one not need a verse to teach the halakha in a case of intention from one rite to another rite? Rabbi Yo岣nan initially only prohibits deriving benefit from the animal; but if not for this verse, the man who slaughtered the animal would not be liable to receive the death penalty. And therefore the verse comes to render the man liable to receive the death penalty. Therefore this verse is not superfluous according to Rabbi Yo岣nan either.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讗讞讗 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 讗讬拽讗 讜诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 诪讬 讘注讬 拽专讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 砖专讬 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诇讗 讘讛诪讛 讗讘诇 讙讘专讗 讘专 拽讟诇讗 讛讜讗 诪讬讚讬 讚讛讜讛 讗诪砖转讞讜讛 诇讛专 讚讛专 诪讜转专 讜注讜讘讚讛 讘住讬讬祝

Rav A岣, son of Rav Ika, objects to Rava bar Rav 岣nan鈥檚 challenge to the derivation in the baraita: And even according to Reish Lakish, does one need a verse to teach that the one who slaughtered the animal is liable? Reish Lakish only permits one to derive benefit from the animal; but the man is certainly liable to receive the death penalty. This is just as the halakha is in the case of one who bows to a mountain, as deriving benefit from the mountain is permitted, but nevertheless the one who worshipped it is liable to be executed by the sword. Therefore, the verse that states that one who slaughters an offering in idol worship is liable to be executed is superfluous with regard to the issue of intention from one rite to another.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讗讞讗 诪讚驻转讬 诇专讘讬谞讗 诇诪讗讬 讚拽讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讗 讘专 专讘 讞谞谉 诇讗讘讬讬 讗讬诪讗 讬爪讗讛 讛砖转讞讜讗讛 诇诇诪讚 注诇 讛讻诇诇 讻讜诇讜 讗讬讻讛 讬注讘讚讜 诇诪注讜讟讬 诪讗讬

Rav A岣 of Difti said to Ravina: According to what Rava bar Rav 岣nan said to Abaye, that there is room to say that bowing was singled out in the verse to teach, with regard to the entire category, that any honorable form of worship carries the death penalty, there is a difficulty. With regard to the verse: 鈥淭ake heed to yourself that you not be ensnared to follow them鈥aying, how do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:30), which indicates that one is liable for worshipping an idol in the manner that the gentiles worship it, this is stated to exclude what?

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 讛驻讜注专 注爪诪讜 诇讝讜讘讞讬诐 诪讛砖转讞讜讗讛 谞驻拽讗 诪讛 讛砖转讞讜讗讛 讚专讱 讻讬讘讜讚 讗祝 讻诇 讚专讱 讻讬讘讜讚

And if you would say that this verse is stated to exclude one who defecates before an idol that is worshipped by sacrificing offerings, it is not necessary to derive this halakha from this verse, as it is derived from the halakha of bowing to an idol, as follows: Just as bowing is an honorable form of worship and is punishable by death, so too, any honorable form of worship is punishable by death when performed as idol worship, which excludes an offensive act such as defecating. Therefore, the halakha that one is not liable for defecating before an idol can be derived from bowing.

讗诇讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 讛驻讜注专 注爪诪讜 诇诪专拽讜诇讬住 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜注讘讜讚转讜 讘讝讬讜谉 讛讜讗 讗祝 讻诇 讘讝讬讜谉 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

Rather, this verse is stated to exclude one who defecates before the idol called Mercury, which is not its typical manner of worship. It might enter your mind to say that since the standard manner of worship of Mercury, namely, throwing stones at it, is in any event an act of degradation, so too, one who performs any act of degradation as worship of Mercury should be liable. Therefore, the verse teaches us that one is liable only for worshiping Mercury in its standard manner of worship.

讗诇讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪谞讬谉 诇讝讜讘讞 讘讛诪讛 诇诪专拽讜诇讬住 砖讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 砖谞讗诪专 讜诇讗 讬讝讘讞讜 注讜讚 讗转 讝讘讞讬讛诐 诇砖注讬专诐

The Gemara raises an objection: But Rava bar Rav 岣nan鈥檚 interpretation of the verses appears to contradict that which Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that one who sacrifices an animal to Mercury is liable? As it is stated: 鈥淎nd they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the satyrs鈥 (Leviticus 17:7).

讗诐 讗讬谞讜 注谞讬谉 诇讻讚专讻讛 讚讻转讬讘 讗讬讻讛 讬注讘讚讜 转谞讬讛讜 注谞讬谉 诇砖诇讗 讻讚专讻讛

Rabbi Eliezer explains: If the verse is not needed for the matter of one who worships an idol in its typical manner, i.e., one who sacrifices an animal as an offering to an idol that is worshipped by sacrificing offerings, as the halakha in this case is already written in the aforementioned verse: 鈥淗ow do these nations serve their gods, so I will do likewise,鈥 apply it to the matter of one who worships an idol not in its typical manner, by sacrificing an offering to an idol that is not typically worshipped by sacrificing offerings. Therefore, one who sacrifices an offering to Mercury is liable, even though that is not its typical form of worship.

砖诇讗 讻讚专讻讛 诪讛砖转讞讜讗讛 谞驻拽讗

According to Rava bar Rav 岣nan, by contrast, it is derived that one is liable for worshipping an idol in any honorable manner, even not in its typical manner of worship, from the halakha of bowing.

讛转诐 讘讝讜讘讞 诇讛讻注讬住

The Gemara answers: There, in the verse mentioned by Rabbi Eliezer, the reference is to one who sacrifices an offering to Mercury not as a form of worship, but rather in order to express insolence toward the Torah prohibition against sacrificing an offering to an idol. It is derived from the verse that this too is a transgression of the prohibition and renders one liable for the death penalty.

专讘 讛诪谞讜谞讗 讗讬专讻住讜 诇讬讛 转讜专讬 驻讙注 讘讬讛 专讘讛 专诪讗 诇讬讛 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讗讛讚讚讬 转谞谉 讛注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 注讜讘讚 讗讬谉 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讜讛讗谞谉 转谞谉 讛讗讜诪专 壮讗注讘讜讚壮 壮讗诇讱 讜讗注讘讜讚壮 壮谞诇讱 讜谞注讘讜讚壮

搂 The Gemara relates: Rav Hamnuna lost his oxen and went to search for them. Rabba met him and raised a contradiction between two mishnayot. We learned in the mishna that one who worships idols is liable. By inference, one who worships idols, yes, he is liable, but one who merely says that he will worship idols is not liable. But didn鈥檛 we learn in another mishna (67a): One who says: I will worship an idol, or: I will go and worship an idol, or: Let us go and worship an idol, is liable, just as one who actually worships an idol is liable. Evidently, one is liable for merely stating his intention to engage in idol worship.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讘讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讬 诪拽讘诇讜 注诇讬 讗诇讗 讘注讘讜讚讛

Rav Hamnuna said to him: The mishna here is referring to one who states: I intend to accept this idol upon myself as a god only through worship. Consequently, he is liable only when he actually worships it. One who intends to accept the idol as a god immediately is liable even before he actually worships it.

专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 转谞讗讬 砖拽诇转 诪注诇诪讗 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛讗讜诪专 壮讘讜讗讜 讜注讘讚讜谞讬壮 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪讞讬讬讘 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 驻讜讟专

Rav Yosef said: This answer is unnecessary; have you removed the tanna鈥檌m from the world? It is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says: I am a god; come and worship me, Rabbi Meir deems him liable for incitement to idol worship, and Rabbi Yehuda deems him exempt.

讛讬讻讗 讚驻诇讞讜 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转注砖讛 诇讱 驻住诇 讻讬 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讚讬讘讜专讗 讘注诇诪讗 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讚讬讘讜专讗 诪讬诇转讗 讛讬讗 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 讚讬讘讜专讗 诇讗讜 诪讬诇转讗 讛讬讗

The Gemara explains: In a case where those to whom the inciter spoke subsequently worshiped him, everyone agrees that the inciter is liable, as it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not make yourself a graven image鈥 (Exodus 20:4), which is interpreted to include a case where one establishes himself as a god. When they disagree is in a case where the incident ended in mere speech. Rabbi Meir holds that speech is a significant matter, and therefore the inciter is liable for incitement, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that speech is nothing. Therefore, the contradiction between the mishnayot can be resolved by attributing each mishna to a different tanna.

讛讚专 讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗讜 诪讬诇转讗 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专讬 讚讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讘讚讬讘讜专讗 谞诪讬 讞讬讜讘讬 诪讞讬讬讘 讚转谞谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 壮讗注讘讜讚壮 壮讗诇讱 讜讗注讘讜讚壮 壮谞诇讱 讜谞注讘讜讚壮

Rav Yosef then said after reconsidering the matter: What I said is not correct, as even according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is deemed liable for speech as well. As we learned in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Actually, one is not liable unless he says: I will worship, or: I will go and worship, or: Let us go and worship. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable even for speech alone, not only for actual worship.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讘诪住讬转 诇注爪诪讜 讜讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 讗讬谉 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 诪住讬转 诇注爪诪讜 砖诪注讬 诇讬讛 讜讗讬谉 讚拽讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 拽讜砖讟讗 讛讜讗 讜诪专 住讘专 诪住讬转 诇注爪诪讜 诇讗 砖诪注讬 诇讬讛 诪讬诪专 讗诪专讬

Accordingly, with regard to what principle do Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? They disagree with regard to the case of one who incites others to worship him, and the others say to him: Yes, we will worship you. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that when one incites others to worship him, they are apt to listen to him, and the response: Yes, that they say to him, is sincere. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds when one incites others to worship him, they are not apt to listen to him, as they say to themselves:

诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讗讬讛讜 诪讬谞谉 讚讬讚谉 讜讗讬谉 讚拽讗诪专讬 讗讞讜讻讬 注诇讬讛

In what way is he different from us? The suggestion to worship him is nonsense. And the fact that they say to him: Yes, is because they ridicule him.

讜诪转谞讬转讬谉 讻讗谉 讘讬讞讬讚 讛谞讬住转 讻讗谉 讘专讘讬诐 讛谞住转讬诐 讬讞讬讚 诇讗 诪讬诪诇讱 讜讟注讬 讘转专讬讛 专讘讬诐 诪讬诪诇讻讬 讜诇讗 讟注讜 讘转专讬讛

And the contradiction between the mishnayot can be resolved as follows: There, where the mishna states that one is liable for speech alone, the reference is to an individual who was incited; here, where the mishna indicates that one not is liable for speech alone, it is referring to a case of an incited multitude of people. The Gemara explains: An individual who was incited does not typically change his mind, and he goes astray after idol worship. Therefore, once he agrees to the suggestion to worship an idol, he has fully accepted the idol upon himself as a god and is liable. By contrast, a multitude of people are apt to change their minds, and consequently they do not go astray after idol worship.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讗讘讛 诇讜 讜诇讗 转砖诪注 讗诇讬讜 讛讗 讗讘讛 讜砖诪注 讞讬讬讘

Rav Yosef said: From where do I say that the halakha that one is liable for merely stating that he will worship an idol is referring to an individual who was incited? As it is written with regard to one who incites people to engage in idol worship: 鈥淵ou shall not approve of him, nor listen to him鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:9), which indicates that if one approved of and listened to the inciter, stating his intention to engage in idol worship, he is liable even if he does not actually worship an idol.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪讬 砖讗谞讬 讘讬谉 谞讬住转 讚专讘讬诐 诇谞讬住转 讬讞讬讚 讜讛转谞讬讗 壮讻讬 讬住讬转讱 讗讞讬讱 讘谉 讗诪讱壮 讗讞讚 讬讞讬讚 讛谞讬住转 讜讗讞讚 专讘讬诐 讛谞讬住转讬诐 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讛讻转讜讘 讬讞讬讚 诪讻诇诇 专讘讬诐 讜专讘讬诐 诪讻诇诇 讬讞讬讚

Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef鈥檚 opinion: Is there a difference in halakha between the cases of an incited multitude of people and an individual who was incited? But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: 鈥淚f your brother, the son of your mother, or your son, or your daughter, or the wife of your bosom, or your neighbor who is like your own soul, incites you secretly, saying: Let us go and serve other gods鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:7), that both an individual who was incited and an incited multitude of people are included in this halakha, but the verse singles out the individual from the category of the multitude, and another verse singles out the multitude from the category of the individual.

讬讞讬讚 诪讻诇诇 专讘讬诐 诇讛讞诪讬专 注诇 讙讜驻讜 讜诇讛拽诇 注诇 诪诪讜谞讜

The Torah states separately the halakhot of an individual who is incited to engage in idol worship and of an entire city that is subverted to engage in idol worship in order to distinguish between the two cases, as follows: An individual who was incited is singled out from the category of a subverted multitude of people in order to render the punishment to an individual鈥檚 body more stringent. The individual is executed by stoning, whereas the residents of an idolatrous city are executed by decapitation. And an individual was singled out to render the treatment of the property of an individual who was incited more lenient, as it is not destroyed like that of the residents of an idolatrous city.

专讘讬诐 诪讻诇诇 讬讞讬讚 诇讛拽诇 注诇 讙讜驻诐 讜诇讛讞诪讬专 注诇 诪诪讜谞诐

Additionally, the Torah singles out the subverted multitude of people from the category of an individual who was incited in order to render the punishment given to the bodies of the residents of an idolatrous city, decapitation, more lenient than that given to an individual who was incited, and to render the treatment of their property more stringent, as the city and the property of its residents are burned.

讘讛讗 诪讬诇转讗 讛讜讗 讚砖讗谞讬 讗讘诇 讘讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讻讬 讛讚讚讬 谞讬谞讛讜

Abaye concluded his objection to Rav Yosef鈥檚 opinion: It can be inferred from the baraita that only with regard to this matter, i.e., the halakhot mentioned in the baraita, is the halakha of an individual who was incited different than that of an incited multitude of people, but with regard to all other halakhic matters they are the same. Therefore, a distinction cannot be made between them with regard to the halakha in the case of a verbal commitment to idol worship.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 讻讗谉 讘谞讬住转 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 讻讗谉 讘谞讬住转 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 诪驻讬 注爪诪讜 诪讬诪诇讱 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讙专讬专 讘转专讬讬讛讜

Rather, Abaye said that the contradiction between the mishnayot is to be resolved as follows: Here, where the mishna indicates that one is liable only for actual worship, the reference is to one who is incited by himself, i.e., no one incited him to idol worship and he made the decision on his own. Whereas there, in the mishna that deems one liable for stating that he will worship an idol, the reference is to one who is incited by others. The reason for the difference is that one who makes the decision on his own is apt to change his mind, whereas one who is incited by others is drawn after them and is unlikely to change his mind.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讗讘讛 诇讜 讜诇讗 转砖诪注 讗诇讬讜 讛讗 讗讘讛 讜砖诪注 讞讬讬讘

Abaye said: From where do I say that this distinction is correct? As it is written: 鈥淵ou shall not approve of him, nor listen to him鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:9), referring to another individual who tried to incite him, and the verse indicates that if one approved of and listened to the inciter, he is liable even for the approval alone.

专讘讗 讗诪专 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘谞讬住转 诪驻讬 讗讞专讬诐 讛讗 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讱 讗讜讻诇转 讻讱 砖讜转讛 讻讱 诪讟讬讘讛 讻讱 诪专讬注讛 讛讗 讚诇讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讱 讗讜讻诇转 讻讱 砖讜转讛 讻讜壮

Rava says: Both this mishna and that mishna are referring to one incited by others, and they should be differentiated as follows: That mishna, which deems one liable for merely expressing approval, is referring to a case where the inciter described the qualities of the idol and said to him: It eats like this; it drinks like this; it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this. In this case, expressing approval verbally suffices to render one liable, as he was evidently convinced by the description. This mishna, which indicates that one is not liable for speech alone, is referring to a case where the inciter did not say to him: It eats like this; it, drinks like this, it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this.

讗诪专 专讘讗 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚讻转讬讘 诪讗诇讛讬 讛注诪讬诐 讗砖专 住讘讬讘转讬讻诐 讛拽专讘讬诐 讗诇讬讱 讜讙讜壮 诪讛 诇讬 拽专讜讘讬诐 讜诪讛 诇讬 专讞讜拽讬诐 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讱 诪讟讬讘讜转谉 砖诇 拽专讜讘讬诐 讗转讛 诇诪讚 诪讛 讟讬讘讜转谉 砖诇 专讞讜拽讬诐

Rava said: From where do I say that this distinction is correct? As it is written: 鈥淟et us go and worship other gods鈥from the gods of the peoples that surround you, the ones near to you or the ones far from you鈥 (Deuteronomy 13:7鈥8). What difference is there to me whether they are near, and what difference is there to me whether they are far? Why would the distance affect the prohibition? Rather, this is what the Torah is saying to you: Do not be tempted to listen to the inciter, as from the nature of the objects of idol worship that are near you, which you recognize to be false, you can derive what the nature is of the ones that are far from you. Therefore, if you are told that there is an idol in a distant land that is real, realize that it is a lie.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讻讱 讗讜讻诇转 讻讱 砖讜转讛 讻讱 诪讟讬讘讛 讻讱 诪专讬注讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

It is from this interpretation that Rava derives his halakhic distinction: What, is it not referring to a case where the inciter described to another the qualities of the idol and said to him: It eats like this; it drinks like this; it does good for its worshippers like this; and it harms those who do not worship it like this? Conclude from it that only in such a case is the incited person liable for stating his approval.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 住讬驻讗 讘讬砖专讗诇 诪砖讜诪讚

Rav Ashi says that there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the mishnayot: The latter clause of the mishna (67a), which deems one liable for speech alone, is referring to an apostate Jew; since he is already an apostate, his stated commitment to idol worship is certainly final. Consequently, he is liable. By contrast, a regular Jew is not liable for speech alone.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讗 讝讜 讗祝 讝讜 拽转谞讬

Ravina says that there is no contradiction; rather, the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that. In other words, the tanna first teaches the elementary halakha that one who worships an idol is liable, and afterward it teaches the more novel halakha that even one who merely says that he will engage in idol worship is immediately liable.

讗讬转诪专 讛注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诪讗讛讘讛 讜诪讬专讗讛 讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 专讘讗 讗诪专 驻讟讜专

It was stated that amora鈥檌m engaged in a dispute concerning the following matter: In the case of one who worships idols due to his love of another who requested that he bow before the statue, or due to fear of someone coercing him to do so, but not due to faith in that idol, what is the halakha? Abaye says: He is liable. Rava says: He is exempt.

讗讘讬讬 讗诪专 讞讬讬讘 讚讛讗 驻诇讞讛 专讘讗 讗诪专 驻讟讜专 讗讬 拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讘讗诇讜讛 讗讬谉 讗讬 诇讗 诇讗

The Gemara explains: Abaye says he is liable because he worshipped it. Rava says he is exempt, as the criterion for becoming liable for idol worship is as follows: If one sincerely accepted the idol upon himself as a god, yes, he is liable; but if he did not accept it sincerely, he is not liable.

住讬诪谉 注讘讚 讬砖转讞讜讛 诇诪砖讬讞

Abaye attempts to cite several proofs, whose mnemonic is: A slave will bow to the anointed.

讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞谉 讛注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讗讞讚 讛注讜讘讚 讻讜壮 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讞讚 讛注讜讘讚 诪讗讛讘讛 讜诪讬专讗讛

And Abaye said: From where do I say that one who worships idols due to love or fear is liable? As we learned in the mishna: One who worships idols is executed by stoning. This includes one who worships an idol, and one who slaughters an animal as an idolatrous offering, and one who burns incense as an idolatrous offering. What is added by the mishna by stating twice: One who worships? Is it not to include the case of one who worships idols due to love or due to fear, in addition to the case of one who worships idols out of faith? Evidently, in this case as well, the worshipper is liable.

讜专讘讗 讗诪专 诇讱 诇讗 讻讚诪转专抓 专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛

And Rava could have said to you in response that the term: One who worships, should not be understood as Abaye suggests but rather as Rabbi Yirmeya explains it, namely, that one who worships an idol in its standard manner of worship is liable, and one who sacrifices an idolatrous offering is liable even if that is not the standard manner of worship of that particular idol.

讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞讬讗 壮诇讗 转砖转讞讜讛 诇讛诐壮 诇讛诐 讗讬 讗转讛 诪砖转讞讜讛 讗讘诇 讗转讛 诪砖转讞讜讛 诇讗讚诐 讻诪讜转讱 讬讻讜诇 讗驻讬诇讜 谞注讘讚 讻讛诪谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 壮讜诇讗 转注讘讚诐壮 讜讛讗 讛诪谉 诪讬专讗讛 讛讜讛 谞注讘讚

Abaye attempts to cite another proof for his opinion. He said: From where do I say that one who worships idols due to love or fear is liable? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not bow to them nor worship them鈥 (Exodus 20:5): 鈥淭o them,鈥 to idols, you may not bow, but you may bow to a person like yourself; bowing to a person is merely the acceptance of authority. One might have thought that it is permitted to bow even to a person who is worshipped like a god, like Haman; therefore, the verse states: 鈥淣or worship them,鈥 i.e., any form of pagan worship is prohibited. Abaye concludes: And wasn鈥檛 Haman worshipped due to fear, and not because the people considered him a god? Evidently, one who engages in idol worship due to fear is liable.

讜专讘讗 讻讛诪谉 讜诇讗 讻讛诪谉 讻讛诪谉 讚讗讬讛讜 讙讜驻讬讛 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜诇讗 讻讛诪谉 讚讗讬诇讜 讛诪谉 诪讬专讗讛 讜讛讻讗 诇讗讜 诪讬专讗讛

And Rava explains this baraita as follows: One might have thought that it is permitted to bow even to a person like Haman in one regard, but not like Haman in all aspects. It is referring to one like Haman in that Haman himself was an object of idol worship, as he claimed he was a god, and one who worships a person out of belief in his divinity is liable. But the reference is to one who is not like Haman in all aspects, as while Haman was worshipped due to fear, and one who engages in idol worship due to fear is not liable, here the reference is to one who worships a person not due to fear, but because he believes in that person鈥檚 divinity.

讜讗诪专 讗讘讬讬 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞讬讗 讻讛谉 诪砖讬讞 讘注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 讘砖讙讙转 诪注砖讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘讛注诇诐 讚讘专

And Abaye furthermore said: From where do I say my opinion? As it is taught in a baraita: If an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, unwittingly engaged in idol worship, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He brings an offering for the unwitting act. And the Rabbis say: A High Priest does not bring an offering for an unwitting act of idol worship unless it was due to a lapse of awareness concerning the fundamental halakhot of idol worship, i.e., he thought that this action was halakhically permitted.

讜砖讜讬谉 砖讘砖注讬专讛 讻讬讞讬讚 讜砖讜讬谉 砖讗讬谉 诪讘讬讗 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬

And they agree that a High Priest brings a female goat as his offering to atone for his act of idol worship, as does an ordinary individual, and not a bull, as a High Priest brings as a sin-offering for other sins. And they agree that a High Priest does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, which is ordinarily brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires him to bring a sin-offering. In such a case, he is exempt.

讛讗讬 砖讙讙转 诪注砖讛 讚注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬 拽住讘专 讘讬转 讛讻谞住转 讛讜讗 讜讛砖转讞讜讛 诇讜 讛专讬 诇讘讜 诇砖诪讬诐 讗诇讗 讚讞讝讗 讗谞讚专讟讗 讜讛砖转讞讜讛 诇讜

Abaye infers: What are the circumstances of the High Priest鈥檚 unwitting act of idol worship that is not due to a lack of awareness of the fundamental halakhot of idol worship? If the High Priest thought that a certain building was a synagogue and bowed to it, and he then realized that it is a house of idol worship, why should he be obligated to bring an offering, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Since his heart was directed toward Heaven, it is not even an unwitting transgression. Rather, it is a case where the High Priest saw the statue of a person and bowed to it.

讗讬 拽讘诇讬讛 注诇讬讛 讘讗诇讜讛 诪讝讬讚 讛讜讗

This case must also be clarified: If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor, and he is liable to receive the death penalty and not to bring an offering.

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