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Today's Daf Yomi

October 3, 2017 | 讬状讙 讘转砖专讬 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Sanhedrin 79

Study Guide Sanhedrin 79. What type of intent is needed in order for one to receive the death penalty for murder?聽 Rabbi Shimon has a unique approach that one only gets capital punishment if one intending to kill that particular person.聽 The rabbis disagree but also have their own set of criteria.聽 The next mishna聽discusses a case of a murderer who gets mixed up with others.聽 Three different interpretations are brought to explain what the case of the mishna is.


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讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 注诇 诇讘讜 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 诪转谞讬讜 讜诇讗 讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 注诇 诪转谞讬讜 讜诪转 驻讟讜专

and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his chest over his heart, and instead the blow landed on his loins, and it was not powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his loins, and nevertheless the victim died, the assailant is exempt. Although the assailant intended to kill the victim, the blow was not powerful enough to kill. Ostensibly, his death was not a result of the blow.

谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛讻讜转 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜诇讗 讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 讛拽讟谉 讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讗转 讛拽讟谉 讜诪转 驻讟讜专 谞转讻讜谉 诇讛讻讜转 讗转 讛拽讟谉 讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讗转 讛拽讟谉 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 讛讙讚讜诇 讜诇讗 讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜诪转 驻讟讜专

If one intended to kill an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and instead the blow landed on a minor, and the blow was powerful enough to kill the minor and the minor died, the assailant is exempt. If one intended to kill a minor and the blow was powerful enough to kill a minor, and the blow landed on an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and nevertheless, the adult died, the assailant is exempt.

讗讘诇 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛讻讜转 注诇 诪转谞讬讜 讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 注诇 诪转谞讬讜 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 诇讘讜 讜诪转 讞讬讬讘 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛讻讜转 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 讛拽讟谉 讜诪转 讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讝讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讝讛 驻讟讜专

But if one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his loins, and instead the blow landed on his chest over his heart, and he died, the assailant is liable, since in any event, his intent was to kill the victim and the blow was powerful enough to kill him wherever it struck him. If one intended to strike an adult and the blow was powerful enough to kill the adult, and the blow landed on a minor and he died, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, although he would be liable for killing either, he is exempt, because one is executed only if his action completely corresponded with his intent.

讙诪壮 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗住讬驻讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 驻讜讟专 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to which clause of the mishna does Rabbi Shimon disagree? If we say that he disagrees with the latter clause of the mishna, concerning one who intended to kill an adult and killed a minor, the mishna should have employed the formulation: Rabbi Shimon exempts him, not the extended statement of: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, he is exempt.

讗诇讗 讗专讬砖讗 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讛讘讛诪讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讛讗讚诐 诇谞讻专讬 讜讛专讙 讗转 讬砖专讗诇 诇谞驻诇讬诐 讜讛专讙 讗转 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 驻讟讜专 讛讗 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讝讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讝讛 讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讝讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讝讛 驻讟讜专

Rather, he disagrees with the first clause of the mishna, which states: If one intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person, or he intended to kill a gentile and he killed a Jew, or he intended to kill non-viable newborns and he killed a viable person, the assailant is exempt from execution; and from which it may be inferred: But if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, he is exempt.

驻砖讬讟讗 拽讗讬 专讗讜讘谉 讜砖诪注讜谉 讜讗诪专 讗谞讗 诇专讗讜讘谉 拽讗 诪讬讻讜讜谞讗 诇砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讻讜讜谞讗 讛讬讬谞讜 驻诇讜讙转讬讬讛讜 讗诪专 诇讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗讬 讗讬 谞诪讬 讻住讘讜专 专讗讜讘谉 讜谞诪爪讗 砖诪注讜谉 诪讗讬 转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 壮注讚 砖讬讗诪专 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讗谞讬 诪转讻讜讜谉壮

The Gemara comments: If Reuven and Shimon were standing, and before throwing the stone or shooting the arrow, the assailant said: I intend to kill Reuven, and I do not intend to kill Shimon, it is obvious that this is the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon. If the assailant said: I intend to kill one of them, and he did not specify whether it is Reuven or Shimon, what is the halakha? Alternatively, in a case where he intended to kill one whom he thought was Reuven and he killed him and he was found to be Shimon, what is the ruling? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this matter, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable until he says: I intend to kill so-and-so, and he then kills him.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讗专讘 诇讜 讜拽诐 注诇讬讜 注讚 砖讬转讻讜讜谉 诇讜 讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 驻专讟 诇讝讜专拽 讗讘谉 诇讙讜

The Gemara seeks to clarify the rationale underlying the opinions of the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon, and asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states: 鈥淏ut if there will be a man who hates his neighbor, and he lies in wait for him and rises up against him, and strikes him mortally and he dies鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:11). Based on the repeated use of pronouns in the phrase: 鈥淎nd lies in wait for him and rises up against him,鈥 Rabbi Shimon derives: One is not liable to be executed until he intends to kill specifically him, the actual victim. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they derive from the repetitive pronouns in that phrase? The Gemara answers: The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say that one derives: This is to the exclusion of one who casts a stone into the midst of a group of people and one of them is killed. Since he did not intend to kill any specific individual, he is not executed.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转砖注讛 谞讻专讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讬砖专讗诇 讘讬谞讬讛谉 转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 讚专讜讘讗 谞讻专讬诐 谞讬谞讛讜 讗讬 谞诪讬 驻诇讙讗 讜驻诇讙讗 住驻拽 谞驻砖讜转 诇讛拽诇

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that it is a case where there are nine gentiles and one Jew among them, there is no need for a derivation; derive that he is exempt from the fact that they are a majority of gentiles, and based on that majority, the probability is that the stone will strike a gentile. Alternatively, if the group of people comprises half gentiles and half Jews, the principle is that the ruling in a case of uncertainty with regard to cases of capital law is to be lenient, and therefore the one who threw the stone will be exempt from punishment.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转砖注讛 讬砖专讗诇 讜谞讻专讬 讗讞讚 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 谞讻专讬 拽讘讜注 讜讻诇 拽讘讜注 讻诪讞爪讛 注诇 诪讞爪讛 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to have this derivation only in a case where there are nine Jews and one gentile among them, as this is a case where the gentile is a fixed presence in the group, and the principle is: The legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority. This is what the Rabbis derive from the phrase: 鈥淎nd he lies in wait for him鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:11).

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讝讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讝讛 讞讬讬讘 讚讻转讬讘 讜讻讬 讬谞爪讜 讗谞砖讬诐 讜谞讙驻讜 讗砖讛 讛专讛 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘诪爪讜转 砖讘诪讬转讛 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专 讚讻转讬讘 讗诐 讗住讜谉 讬讛讬讛 讜谞转转讛 谞驻砖 转讞转 谞驻砖

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that if one intended to kill this individual and he killed that individual he is liable, there is support for their opinion from that which is written: 鈥淚f men struggle and they hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and there is no tragedy, he shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine鈥 (Exodus 21:22). It can be inferred form the verse that if there is a tragedy, i.e., if the woman dies, there is no payment of restitution. And Rabbi Elazar says: It is with regard to a quarrel that involves the intent of each to cause the death of the other that the verse is speaking, as it is written: 鈥淏ut if there shall be a tragedy then you shall give a life for a life鈥 (Exodus 21:23). This is proof that in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed a pregnant woman instead, he is liable to be executed, which is why he does not pay restitution.

讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讗讬 讜谞转转讛 谞驻砖 转讞转 谞驻砖 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诪诪讜谉 讜讻讚专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 壮讜谞转转讛 谞驻砖 转讞转 谞驻砖壮 诪诪讜谉 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 诪诪讜谉 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 谞驻砖 诪诪砖 谞讗诪专讛 谞转讬谞讛 诇诪讟讛 讜谞讗诪专讛

But according to Rabbi Shimon, this verse: 鈥淭hen you shall give a life for a life,鈥 what does he do with it? According to his opinion, the party to the quarrel is exempt from the punishment of execution in this case. The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Shimon, 鈥渁 life for a life鈥 is not referring to execution; rather, the reference is to monetary restitution. And this understanding is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the phrase 鈥渢hen you shall give a life for a life鈥 does not mean execution, but rather monetary restitution for the life that he took. Do you say that it means monetary restitution, or does it mean only the taking of an actual life? Based on the language employed in the verse, it can be determined that the reference is to monetary payment. In these verses, a term of giving is stated below: 鈥淎nd you shall give a life for a life鈥 (Exodus 21:23). And additionally, a term is stated of

谞转讬谞讛 诇诪注诇讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 讻讗谉 诪诪讜谉

giving above: 鈥淗e shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine鈥 (Exodus 21:22). Just as there, in the phrase: 鈥淕ive as the judges determine,鈥 the reference is to monetary restitution, so too here, in the phrase: 鈥淕ive a life for a life,鈥 the reference is to monetary restitution.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讗讬 讚转谞讗 讚讘讬 讞讝拽讬讛 诪驻拽讗 诪讚专讘讬 讜诪驻拽讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 讚转谞讗 讚讘讬 讞讝拽讬讛 诪讻讛 讗讚诐 讜诪讻讛 讘讛诪讛

Rava says: That which the school of 岣zkiyya taught diverges from the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and diverges from the statement of the Rabbis. The school of 岣zkiyya holds that in the case where one intended to kill one individual and killed another individual, he is exempt from both liability to be executed, counter to the opinion of the Rabbis, and from the obligation to pay monetary restitution. As the school of 岣zkiyya taught: The verse states: 鈥淎nd he who kills an animal shall pay for it, and he who kills a man shall be put to death鈥 (Leviticus 24:21), indicating that one who kills a man and one who kills an animal are comparable.

诪讛 诪讻讛 讘讛诪讛 诇讗 讞诇拽转 讘讛 讘讬谉 砖讜讙讙 诇诪讝讬讚 讘讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇砖讗讬谞讜 诪转讻讜讬谉 讘讬谉 讚专讱 讬专讬讚讛 诇讚专讱 注诇讬讬讛 诇驻讜讟专讜 诪诪讜谉 讗诇讗 诇讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 诪讻讛 讗讚诐 诇讗 转讞诇讜拽 讘讜 讘讬谉 砖讜讙讙 诇诪讝讬讚 讘讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讘讬谉 讚专讱 讬专讬讚讛 诇讚专讱 注诇讬讬讛 诇讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 讗诇讗 诇驻讜讟专讜 诪诪讜谉

This teaches that just as with regard to one who kills an animal, the Torah did not differentiate between whether he does so unwittingly or intentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in all these cases but rather to render him liable to pay monetary restitution, as one who kills an animal is liable in any event; similarly, with regard to one who kills a person, do not differentiate concerning him whether he does so unwittingly or unintentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in any event.

诪讗讬 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讻诇诇 讛讬讬谞讜 砖讜讙讙 讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讝讛 讗诇讗 诇讝讛 讜拽转谞讬 诇讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 讗诇讗 诇驻讜讟专讜 诪诪讜谉 讜讗讬 讘专 拽讟诇讗 讛讜讗 诪讗讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讬驻讟专讬讛 诪诪讜谉

Accordingly, it is derived from here that one who commits a transgression carrying the death penalty is exempt from paying damages for his action, even if he is not given the death penalty in practice. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of with no intent? If we say that it means that he had no intent to kill at all and he happened to kill a person, that is unwitting murder that is mentioned explicitly in the baraita. Rather, it is obvious that the reference in the baraita is to one who does not intend to kill this individual, but does intend to kill that individual. And it is taught: This is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution. And if according to the school of 岣zkiyya he is liable to be executed, for what reason was it necessary to exempt him from monetary restitution? Clearly the halakha is that one who is executed is exempt from payment.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗讜 讘专 拽讟诇讗 讛讜讗 讜诇讗讜 讘专 诪诪讜谞讗 讛讜讗

Rather, must one not conclude from it that he is neither liable to be executed, nor is he liable to pay monetary restitution. With regard to liability to be executed in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed another, the school of 岣zkiyya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that he is exempt from the death penalty, and holds that he is exempt from paying monetary restitution as well.

诪转谞讬壮 专讜爪讞 砖谞转注专讘 讘讗讞专讬诐 讻讜诇谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻讜谞住讬谉 讗讜转谉 诇讻讬驻讛

MISHNA: With regard to a murderer who was intermingled with others and it is not possible to identify the murderer, all of them are exempt from liability to be executed. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber [lakippa] where they will eventually die.

讻诇 讞讬讬讘讬 诪讬转讜转 砖谞转注专讘讜 讝讛 讘讝讛 谞讬讚讜谞讬谉 讘拽诇讛 讛谞住拽诇讬谉 讘谞砖专驻讬谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 谞讬讚讜谞讬谉 讘住拽讬诇讛 砖讛砖专讬驻讛 讞诪讜专讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讬讚讜谞讬谉 讘砖专讬驻讛 砖讛住拽讬诇讛 讞诪讜专讛

With regard to all those liable to be executed with different court-imposed death penalties who became intermingled with each other and it cannot be determined which individual was sentenced to which death, they are all sentenced to the most lenient form of execution to which any of them was sentenced. In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be executed by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by burning, as stoning is a more severe form of execution than burning.

讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讬诇讜 诇讗 讛讬转讛 砖专讬驻讛 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 谞转谞讛 诇讘转 讻讛谉 砖讝谞转讛 讗诪专讜 诇讜 讗讬诇讜 诇讗 讛讬转讛 住拽讬诇讛 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 谞转谞讛 诇诪讙讚祝 讜诇注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛

Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If burning were not more severe than stoning, it would not have been administered to a priest鈥檚 daughter who committed adultery. A betrothed daughter of an Israelite who committed adultery is executed by stoning. If burning were not a more severe form of execution than stoning, it would not have been administered to the daughter of a priest who committed adultery, who would presumably receive a more severe punishment. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: If stoning were not more severe than burning it would not have been the death penalty administered to a blasphemer and to an idol worshipper, as their actions violate the very core of the Jewish faith.

讛谞讛专讙讬谉 讘谞讞谞拽讬谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘住讬讬祝 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘讞谞拽

There is a parallel dispute: In a case where those who are liable to be killed by beheading were intermingled with those who are liable to be strangled, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be beheaded with a sword, as strangulation is a more severe form of execution than beheading. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by strangulation, as beheading is a more severe form of execution than strangulation.

讙诪壮 诪讗谉 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专讬诐 讻砖专讬诐 驻砖讬讟讗 讜转讜 讘讛讗 诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讻讜谞住讬谉 讗讜转谉 诇讻讬驻讛

GEMARA: The mishna teaches the halakha of a murderer who was intermingled with others. The Gemara asks: Who are the others with whom he was intermingled? If we say that the others are upstanding individuals, it is obvious that they are exempt; why would they all be punished for the transgression of one who happened to be among them? And furthermore, shall Rabbi Yehuda say in that case: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber where they will eventually die? Can innocent people be left to die in this manner?

(住讬诪谉 讘砖专拽)

The Gemara cites a mnemonic, beit, shin, reish, kuf, for the Sages who address the above question: Rabbi Abbahu citing Shmuel, Rava, and Reish Lakish.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讗 讘专讜爪讞 砖诇讗 谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 砖谞转注专讘 讘专讜爪讞讬诐 讗讞专讬诐 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞谉 注住拽讬谞谉 专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讗讬谉 讙讜诪专讬谉 讚讬谞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讗诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讛诇讻讱 讻讜诇谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讬驻讟专讬谞讛讜 诇讙诪专讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 讻讬讜谉 讚专讜爪讞讬谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讛诇讻讱 讻讜谞住讬谉 讗讜转谉 诇讻讬驻讛

Rabbi Abbahu says that Shmuel says: Here we are dealing with a murderer about whom witnesses testified and the judges deliberated, but his verdict was not yet finalized; and he was incarcerated until the end of his trial, and he was intermingled with other murderers whose verdicts were already finalized. It cannot be determined which of them is the murderer whose verdict was not yet finalized so that he may be brought to court for the verdict. The reason for the dispute is: The Rabbis hold that a court finalizes a person鈥檚 verdict only in his presence. Since the identity of the one whose verdict was not finalized is unknown, he cannot be sentenced to death. Since one of them cannot be executed, none of them can be executed; therefore, they are all exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Completely exempting them is also not possible, since they are murderers. Therefore, the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber.

专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讘讗讚诐 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚驻讟讬专讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讘砖讜专 砖诇讗 谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 砖谞转注专讘 讘砖讜专讬诐 讗讞专讬诐 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞谉 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讻诪讬转转 讘注诇讬诐 讻讱 诪讬转转 讛砖讜专 讜讗讬谉 讙讜诪专讬谉 讚讬谞讜 砖诇 砖讜专 讗诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讛诇讻讱 讻讜诇谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 讻讜谞住讬谉 讗讜转谉 诇讻讬驻讛

Reish Lakish says: In the case where a person who was accused of killing another was intermingled with others, everyone agrees that they are all exempt, because one is not punished for a murder committed by others. But here, it is with regard to an ox whose verdict for goring a person to death was not yet finalized, that was intermingled with other oxen whose verdict was already finalized, that they disagree. The Rabbis hold that based on the juxtaposition between them (see Exodus 21:29), the halakha is that like the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox, and just as a court finalizes an individual鈥檚 verdict only in his presence, a court finalizes the verdict of an ox only in its presence. Therefore, all the oxen are exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber. Since it is an ox that gored, and the other oxen were sentenced to be stoned, they are incarcerated until they die.

讗诪专 专讘讗

Rava says:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the Refuah Shlemah of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Sanhedrin 79

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 79

讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 注诇 诇讘讜 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 诪转谞讬讜 讜诇讗 讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 注诇 诪转谞讬讜 讜诪转 驻讟讜专

and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his chest over his heart, and instead the blow landed on his loins, and it was not powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his loins, and nevertheless the victim died, the assailant is exempt. Although the assailant intended to kill the victim, the blow was not powerful enough to kill. Ostensibly, his death was not a result of the blow.

谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛讻讜转 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜诇讗 讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 讛拽讟谉 讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讗转 讛拽讟谉 讜诪转 驻讟讜专 谞转讻讜谉 诇讛讻讜转 讗转 讛拽讟谉 讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讗转 讛拽讟谉 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 讛讙讚讜诇 讜诇讗 讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜诪转 驻讟讜专

If one intended to kill an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and instead the blow landed on a minor, and the blow was powerful enough to kill the minor and the minor died, the assailant is exempt. If one intended to kill a minor and the blow was powerful enough to kill a minor, and the blow landed on an adult and the blow was not powerful enough to kill the adult, and nevertheless, the adult died, the assailant is exempt.

讗讘诇 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛讻讜转 注诇 诪转谞讬讜 讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 注诇 诪转谞讬讜 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 诇讘讜 讜诪转 讞讬讬讘 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛讻讜转 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜讛讬讛 讘讛 讻讚讬 诇讛诪讬转 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇 讜讛诇讻讛 诇讛 注诇 讛拽讟谉 讜诪转 讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讝讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讝讛 驻讟讜专

But if one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was powerful enough to kill him were it to land on his loins, and instead the blow landed on his chest over his heart, and he died, the assailant is liable, since in any event, his intent was to kill the victim and the blow was powerful enough to kill him wherever it struck him. If one intended to strike an adult and the blow was powerful enough to kill the adult, and the blow landed on a minor and he died, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, although he would be liable for killing either, he is exempt, because one is executed only if his action completely corresponded with his intent.

讙诪壮 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讛讬讬讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗住讬驻讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 驻讜讟专 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to which clause of the mishna does Rabbi Shimon disagree? If we say that he disagrees with the latter clause of the mishna, concerning one who intended to kill an adult and killed a minor, the mishna should have employed the formulation: Rabbi Shimon exempts him, not the extended statement of: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, he is exempt.

讗诇讗 讗专讬砖讗 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讛讘讛诪讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讛讗讚诐 诇谞讻专讬 讜讛专讙 讗转 讬砖专讗诇 诇谞驻诇讬诐 讜讛专讙 讗转 讘谉 拽讬讬诪讗 驻讟讜专 讛讗 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讝讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讝讛 讞讬讬讘 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 谞转讻讜讬谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讝讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讝讛 驻讟讜专

Rather, he disagrees with the first clause of the mishna, which states: If one intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person, or he intended to kill a gentile and he killed a Jew, or he intended to kill non-viable newborns and he killed a viable person, the assailant is exempt from execution; and from which it may be inferred: But if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, the assailant is liable. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: Even if one intended to kill this one and he killed that one, he is exempt.

驻砖讬讟讗 拽讗讬 专讗讜讘谉 讜砖诪注讜谉 讜讗诪专 讗谞讗 诇专讗讜讘谉 拽讗 诪讬讻讜讜谞讗 诇砖诪注讜谉 诇讗 拽讗 诪讬讻讜讜谞讗 讛讬讬谞讜 驻诇讜讙转讬讬讛讜 讗诪专 诇讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 诪讗讬 讗讬 谞诪讬 讻住讘讜专 专讗讜讘谉 讜谞诪爪讗 砖诪注讜谉 诪讗讬 转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 壮注讚 砖讬讗诪专 诇驻诇讜谞讬 讗谞讬 诪转讻讜讜谉壮

The Gemara comments: If Reuven and Shimon were standing, and before throwing the stone or shooting the arrow, the assailant said: I intend to kill Reuven, and I do not intend to kill Shimon, it is obvious that this is the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon. If the assailant said: I intend to kill one of them, and he did not specify whether it is Reuven or Shimon, what is the halakha? Alternatively, in a case where he intended to kill one whom he thought was Reuven and he killed him and he was found to be Shimon, what is the ruling? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this matter, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: He is not liable until he says: I intend to kill so-and-so, and he then kills him.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讗专讘 诇讜 讜拽诐 注诇讬讜 注讚 砖讬转讻讜讜谉 诇讜 讜专讘谞谉 讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 驻专讟 诇讝讜专拽 讗讘谉 诇讙讜

The Gemara seeks to clarify the rationale underlying the opinions of the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon, and asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states: 鈥淏ut if there will be a man who hates his neighbor, and he lies in wait for him and rises up against him, and strikes him mortally and he dies鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:11). Based on the repeated use of pronouns in the phrase: 鈥淎nd lies in wait for him and rises up against him,鈥 Rabbi Shimon derives: One is not liable to be executed until he intends to kill specifically him, the actual victim. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they derive from the repetitive pronouns in that phrase? The Gemara answers: The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say that one derives: This is to the exclusion of one who casts a stone into the midst of a group of people and one of them is killed. Since he did not intend to kill any specific individual, he is not executed.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转砖注讛 谞讻专讬诐 讜讗讞讚 讬砖专讗诇 讘讬谞讬讛谉 转讬驻讜拽 诇讬讛 讚专讜讘讗 谞讻专讬诐 谞讬谞讛讜 讗讬 谞诪讬 驻诇讙讗 讜驻诇讙讗 住驻拽 谞驻砖讜转 诇讛拽诇

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that it is a case where there are nine gentiles and one Jew among them, there is no need for a derivation; derive that he is exempt from the fact that they are a majority of gentiles, and based on that majority, the probability is that the stone will strike a gentile. Alternatively, if the group of people comprises half gentiles and half Jews, the principle is that the ruling in a case of uncertainty with regard to cases of capital law is to be lenient, and therefore the one who threw the stone will be exempt from punishment.

诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转砖注讛 讬砖专讗诇 讜谞讻专讬 讗讞讚 讘讬谞讬讛谉 讚讛讜讛 诇讬讛 谞讻专讬 拽讘讜注 讜讻诇 拽讘讜注 讻诪讞爪讛 注诇 诪讞爪讛 讚诪讬

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to have this derivation only in a case where there are nine Jews and one gentile among them, as this is a case where the gentile is a fixed presence in the group, and the principle is: The legal status of any item fixed in its place is like that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority. This is what the Rabbis derive from the phrase: 鈥淎nd he lies in wait for him鈥 (Deuteronomy 19:11).

讘砖诇诪讗 诇专讘谞谉 讚讗诪专讬 谞转讻讜讜谉 诇讛专讜讙 讗转 讝讛 讜讛专讙 讗转 讝讛 讞讬讬讘 讚讻转讬讘 讜讻讬 讬谞爪讜 讗谞砖讬诐 讜谞讙驻讜 讗砖讛 讛专讛 讜讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讘诪爪讜转 砖讘诪讬转讛 讛讻转讜讘 诪讚讘专 讚讻转讬讘 讗诐 讗住讜谉 讬讛讬讛 讜谞转转讛 谞驻砖 转讞转 谞驻砖

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that if one intended to kill this individual and he killed that individual he is liable, there is support for their opinion from that which is written: 鈥淚f men struggle and they hurt a pregnant woman so that her child departs from her, and there is no tragedy, he shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine鈥 (Exodus 21:22). It can be inferred form the verse that if there is a tragedy, i.e., if the woman dies, there is no payment of restitution. And Rabbi Elazar says: It is with regard to a quarrel that involves the intent of each to cause the death of the other that the verse is speaking, as it is written: 鈥淏ut if there shall be a tragedy then you shall give a life for a life鈥 (Exodus 21:23). This is proof that in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed a pregnant woman instead, he is liable to be executed, which is why he does not pay restitution.

讗诇讗 诇专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讗讬 讜谞转转讛 谞驻砖 转讞转 谞驻砖 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 诪诪讜谉 讜讻讚专讘讬 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讗讜诪专 壮讜谞转转讛 谞驻砖 转讞转 谞驻砖壮 诪诪讜谉 讗转讛 讗讜诪专 诪诪讜谉 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 讗诇讗 谞驻砖 诪诪砖 谞讗诪专讛 谞转讬谞讛 诇诪讟讛 讜谞讗诪专讛

But according to Rabbi Shimon, this verse: 鈥淭hen you shall give a life for a life,鈥 what does he do with it? According to his opinion, the party to the quarrel is exempt from the punishment of execution in this case. The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Shimon, 鈥渁 life for a life鈥 is not referring to execution; rather, the reference is to monetary restitution. And this understanding is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the phrase 鈥渢hen you shall give a life for a life鈥 does not mean execution, but rather monetary restitution for the life that he took. Do you say that it means monetary restitution, or does it mean only the taking of an actual life? Based on the language employed in the verse, it can be determined that the reference is to monetary payment. In these verses, a term of giving is stated below: 鈥淎nd you shall give a life for a life鈥 (Exodus 21:23). And additionally, a term is stated of

谞转讬谞讛 诇诪注诇讛 诪讛 诇讛诇谉 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 讻讗谉 诪诪讜谉

giving above: 鈥淗e shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine鈥 (Exodus 21:22). Just as there, in the phrase: 鈥淕ive as the judges determine,鈥 the reference is to monetary restitution, so too here, in the phrase: 鈥淕ive a life for a life,鈥 the reference is to monetary restitution.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讗讬 讚转谞讗 讚讘讬 讞讝拽讬讛 诪驻拽讗 诪讚专讘讬 讜诪驻拽讗 诪讚专讘谞谉 讚转谞讗 讚讘讬 讞讝拽讬讛 诪讻讛 讗讚诐 讜诪讻讛 讘讛诪讛

Rava says: That which the school of 岣zkiyya taught diverges from the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and diverges from the statement of the Rabbis. The school of 岣zkiyya holds that in the case where one intended to kill one individual and killed another individual, he is exempt from both liability to be executed, counter to the opinion of the Rabbis, and from the obligation to pay monetary restitution. As the school of 岣zkiyya taught: The verse states: 鈥淎nd he who kills an animal shall pay for it, and he who kills a man shall be put to death鈥 (Leviticus 24:21), indicating that one who kills a man and one who kills an animal are comparable.

诪讛 诪讻讛 讘讛诪讛 诇讗 讞诇拽转 讘讛 讘讬谉 砖讜讙讙 诇诪讝讬讚 讘讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇砖讗讬谞讜 诪转讻讜讬谉 讘讬谉 讚专讱 讬专讬讚讛 诇讚专讱 注诇讬讬讛 诇驻讜讟专讜 诪诪讜谉 讗诇讗 诇讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 讗祝 诪讻讛 讗讚诐 诇讗 转讞诇讜拽 讘讜 讘讬谉 砖讜讙讙 诇诪讝讬讚 讘讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讘讬谉 讚专讱 讬专讬讚讛 诇讚专讱 注诇讬讬讛 诇讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 讗诇讗 诇驻讜讟专讜 诪诪讜谉

This teaches that just as with regard to one who kills an animal, the Torah did not differentiate between whether he does so unwittingly or intentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in all these cases but rather to render him liable to pay monetary restitution, as one who kills an animal is liable in any event; similarly, with regard to one who kills a person, do not differentiate concerning him whether he does so unwittingly or unintentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in any event.

诪讗讬 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讗讬诇讬诪讗 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 讻诇诇 讛讬讬谞讜 砖讜讙讙 讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 砖讗讬谉 诪转讻讜讬谉 诇讝讛 讗诇讗 诇讝讛 讜拽转谞讬 诇讞讬讬讘讜 诪诪讜谉 讗诇讗 诇驻讜讟专讜 诪诪讜谉 讜讗讬 讘专 拽讟诇讗 讛讜讗 诪讗讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱 诇诪讬驻讟专讬讛 诪诪讜谉

Accordingly, it is derived from here that one who commits a transgression carrying the death penalty is exempt from paying damages for his action, even if he is not given the death penalty in practice. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of with no intent? If we say that it means that he had no intent to kill at all and he happened to kill a person, that is unwitting murder that is mentioned explicitly in the baraita. Rather, it is obvious that the reference in the baraita is to one who does not intend to kill this individual, but does intend to kill that individual. And it is taught: This is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution. And if according to the school of 岣zkiyya he is liable to be executed, for what reason was it necessary to exempt him from monetary restitution? Clearly the halakha is that one who is executed is exempt from payment.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗讜 讘专 拽讟诇讗 讛讜讗 讜诇讗讜 讘专 诪诪讜谞讗 讛讜讗

Rather, must one not conclude from it that he is neither liable to be executed, nor is he liable to pay monetary restitution. With regard to liability to be executed in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed another, the school of 岣zkiyya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that he is exempt from the death penalty, and holds that he is exempt from paying monetary restitution as well.

诪转谞讬壮 专讜爪讞 砖谞转注专讘 讘讗讞专讬诐 讻讜诇谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讻讜谞住讬谉 讗讜转谉 诇讻讬驻讛

MISHNA: With regard to a murderer who was intermingled with others and it is not possible to identify the murderer, all of them are exempt from liability to be executed. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber [lakippa] where they will eventually die.

讻诇 讞讬讬讘讬 诪讬转讜转 砖谞转注专讘讜 讝讛 讘讝讛 谞讬讚讜谞讬谉 讘拽诇讛 讛谞住拽诇讬谉 讘谞砖专驻讬谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 谞讬讚讜谞讬谉 讘住拽讬诇讛 砖讛砖专讬驻讛 讞诪讜专讛 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 谞讬讚讜谞讬谉 讘砖专讬驻讛 砖讛住拽讬诇讛 讞诪讜专讛

With regard to all those liable to be executed with different court-imposed death penalties who became intermingled with each other and it cannot be determined which individual was sentenced to which death, they are all sentenced to the most lenient form of execution to which any of them was sentenced. In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be executed by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by burning, as stoning is a more severe form of execution than burning.

讗诪专 诇讛谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讬诇讜 诇讗 讛讬转讛 砖专讬驻讛 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 谞转谞讛 诇讘转 讻讛谉 砖讝谞转讛 讗诪专讜 诇讜 讗讬诇讜 诇讗 讛讬转讛 住拽讬诇讛 讞诪讜专讛 诇讗 谞转谞讛 诇诪讙讚祝 讜诇注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛

Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If burning were not more severe than stoning, it would not have been administered to a priest鈥檚 daughter who committed adultery. A betrothed daughter of an Israelite who committed adultery is executed by stoning. If burning were not a more severe form of execution than stoning, it would not have been administered to the daughter of a priest who committed adultery, who would presumably receive a more severe punishment. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: If stoning were not more severe than burning it would not have been the death penalty administered to a blasphemer and to an idol worshipper, as their actions violate the very core of the Jewish faith.

讛谞讛专讙讬谉 讘谞讞谞拽讬谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘住讬讬祝 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讘讞谞拽

There is a parallel dispute: In a case where those who are liable to be killed by beheading were intermingled with those who are liable to be strangled, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be beheaded with a sword, as strangulation is a more severe form of execution than beheading. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by strangulation, as beheading is a more severe form of execution than strangulation.

讙诪壮 诪讗谉 讗讞专讬诐 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讗讞专讬诐 讻砖专讬诐 驻砖讬讟讗 讜转讜 讘讛讗 诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讻讜谞住讬谉 讗讜转谉 诇讻讬驻讛

GEMARA: The mishna teaches the halakha of a murderer who was intermingled with others. The Gemara asks: Who are the others with whom he was intermingled? If we say that the others are upstanding individuals, it is obvious that they are exempt; why would they all be punished for the transgression of one who happened to be among them? And furthermore, shall Rabbi Yehuda say in that case: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber where they will eventually die? Can innocent people be left to die in this manner?

(住讬诪谉 讘砖专拽)

The Gemara cites a mnemonic, beit, shin, reish, kuf, for the Sages who address the above question: Rabbi Abbahu citing Shmuel, Rava, and Reish Lakish.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讛讜 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讛讻讗 讘专讜爪讞 砖诇讗 谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 砖谞转注专讘 讘专讜爪讞讬诐 讗讞专讬诐 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞谉 注住拽讬谞谉 专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讗讬谉 讙讜诪专讬谉 讚讬谞讜 砖诇 讗讚诐 讗诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讛诇讻讱 讻讜诇谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪讬驻讟专讬谞讛讜 诇讙诪专讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 讻讬讜谉 讚专讜爪讞讬谉 谞讬谞讛讜 讛诇讻讱 讻讜谞住讬谉 讗讜转谉 诇讻讬驻讛

Rabbi Abbahu says that Shmuel says: Here we are dealing with a murderer about whom witnesses testified and the judges deliberated, but his verdict was not yet finalized; and he was incarcerated until the end of his trial, and he was intermingled with other murderers whose verdicts were already finalized. It cannot be determined which of them is the murderer whose verdict was not yet finalized so that he may be brought to court for the verdict. The reason for the dispute is: The Rabbis hold that a court finalizes a person鈥檚 verdict only in his presence. Since the identity of the one whose verdict was not finalized is unknown, he cannot be sentenced to death. Since one of them cannot be executed, none of them can be executed; therefore, they are all exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Completely exempting them is also not possible, since they are murderers. Therefore, the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber.

专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讘讗讚诐 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讚驻讟讬专讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讘砖讜专 砖诇讗 谞讙诪专 讚讬谞讜 砖谞转注专讘 讘砖讜专讬诐 讗讞专讬诐 砖谞讙诪专 讚讬谞谉 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讻诪讬转转 讘注诇讬诐 讻讱 诪讬转转 讛砖讜专 讜讗讬谉 讙讜诪专讬谉 讚讬谞讜 砖诇 砖讜专 讗诇讗 讘驻谞讬讜 讛诇讻讱 讻讜诇谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 住讘专 讻讜谞住讬谉 讗讜转谉 诇讻讬驻讛

Reish Lakish says: In the case where a person who was accused of killing another was intermingled with others, everyone agrees that they are all exempt, because one is not punished for a murder committed by others. But here, it is with regard to an ox whose verdict for goring a person to death was not yet finalized, that was intermingled with other oxen whose verdict was already finalized, that they disagree. The Rabbis hold that based on the juxtaposition between them (see Exodus 21:29), the halakha is that like the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox, and just as a court finalizes an individual鈥檚 verdict only in his presence, a court finalizes the verdict of an ox only in its presence. Therefore, all the oxen are exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber. Since it is an ox that gored, and the other oxen were sentenced to be stoned, they are incarcerated until they die.

讗诪专 专讘讗

Rava says:

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