Please ensure Javascript is enabled for purposes of website accessibility Skip to content

Today's Daf Yomi

October 9, 2017 | ื™ืดื˜ ื‘ืชืฉืจื™ ืชืฉืขืดื—

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Sanhedrin 85

Is one allowed to perform a medical procedure on a parent?ย  Is one allowed to administer lashes in the court or cursing (during the process of excommunication) to a parent as a messenger of the court?ย  Does the commandment not to curse or hit a parent apply to those who are no longer “part of the nation.”ย  Do they apply after death?ย  Is there a distinction between hitting and cursing regarding these two issues?

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื”ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืžืœืื›ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ืœื’ื•ืคื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืขืœื™ื”

and doesnโ€™t Rabbi Shimon say: With regard to one who performs any prohibited labor that is not necessary for its own sake, it is labor for which he is exempt? In this case, causing the wound was inadvertent and was not his objective when performing the action.

ื‘ืขื• ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืžืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ื‘ืŸ ืžื”ื• ืฉื™ืขืฉื” ืฉืœื™ื— ืœืื‘ื™ื• ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ื•ืœืงืœืœื•

ยง The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may be designated an agent of the court in order to flog his father or to curse him if the court sentenced him to ostracism?

ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ื•ืื—ืจ ืžื™ ื”ืชื™ืจื• ืืœื ื›ื‘ื•ื“ ืฉืžื™ื ืขื“ื™ืฃ ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ื›ื‘ื•ื“ ืฉืžื™ื ืขื“ื™ืฃ

Rav Sheshet said to them: And did the Torah render it permitted to flog or curse another who is not his father? The Torah prohibited such actions. Rather, the reason that an agent of the court may flog or curse the one found liable is that the honor of Heaven takes precedence over the honor due to another. Here too, a son may serve as an agent of the court because the honor of Heaven takes precedence over the honor due to his father.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื•ืžื” ืžื™ ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืœื ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืžื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืœื ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื•

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: And just as with regard to one who is commanded to strike him there is a mitzva not to strike him under other circumstances, with regard to one who is not commanded to strike him is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him?

ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ื”ื ื‘ื‘ื ื• ื”ื ื‘ืื—ืจ

The Gemara explains the baraita: What, is it not that both this first clause of the statement of the baraita and that latter clause of the statement of the baraita are referring to a situation where striking another is a mitzva, e.g., where the other is liable to receive lashes. The distinction between them is that this latter clause, which is referring to one who is not commanded to strike him, is concerning a case where the agent is his son and is therefore prohibited from striking his father even in that capacity, while that first clause, which is referring to one who is commanded to strike him, is concerning a case where the agent is another individual and not his son. This indicates that it is prohibited for a son to flog his father as an agent of the court.

ืœื ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ืœื ืฉื ื ื‘ื ื• ื•ืœื ืฉื ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื›ืืŸ ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ื›ืืŸ ืฉืœื ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื”

The Gemara answers: No, in both this clause and that clause it is no different if the agent is his son and it is no different if the agent is another. And it is not difficult to distinguish between the clauses: Here, in the first clause, the reference is to a situation where striking another is a mitzva, as he is an agent of the court; there, in the latter clause, the reference is not to a situation where striking another is a mitzva.

ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืชื ื™ ื•ืžื” ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืœื ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืฉืœื ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืœื ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื•

And accordingly, this is what the baraita is teaching: And just as in a situation where striking another is a mitzva, where the agent of the court is commanded to strike him, there is a mitzva not to strike him even one lash beyond the number determined by the court, as it is written: โ€œForty lashes shall he strike him, he shall not exceed, lest if he shall exceed to strike himโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:3), accordingly, in a situation where striking another is not a mitzva, where one is not commanded to strike him, is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him? The general prohibition against striking another in any situation is derived from this verse.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ื”ื™ื•ืฆื ืœื™ื”ืจื’ ื•ื‘ื ื‘ื ื• ื•ื”ื›ื”ื• ื•ืงื™ืœืœื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื ืื—ืจ ื•ื”ื›ื”ื• ื•ืงื™ืœืœื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื” ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื‘ื ื• ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ื‘ืžืกืจื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ืœืฆืืช ื•ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ืฆื

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of one who emerges from the court condemned to be executed and his son came and struck him or cursed him, the son is liable to be executed for striking or cursing his father. If another came and struck him or cursed him, he is exempt. And we discussed it as follows: What is different about the case where his son strikes or curses him that he is liable, and what is different about the case where another strikes or curses him that he is exempt? And Rav แธคisda says: The baraita is referring to a case where they are imploring the condemned man to emerge from the court to be executed but he is not emerging. Therefore, it is necessary to employ force. Apparently, even under those circumstances, where the use of force is sanctioned by the court, it is prohibited for the son to strike his father.

ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืžื•ืงื™ ืœื” ื‘ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืกืจื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ืœืฆืืช

The Gemara rejects this proof: Rav Sheshet interprets this baraita as referring to a case where they are not imploring him to emerge from the court for his execution. It is referring to a case where the condemned man is proceeding willingly, and it is not an agent of the court but someone else who strikes and curses him at his own initiative.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืื—ืจ ื ืžื™ ืื—ืจ ื’ื‘ืจื ืงื˜ื™ืœื ื”ื•ื

The Gemara challenges: If so, even another who strikes one who is condemned to death should be liable, as it is prohibited to strike or curse another. The Gemara responds: If another does so he is exempt, since the legal status of the one condemned to death is that of a dead man. Therefore, one is not liable for striking or humiliating him.

ื•ื”ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ื‘ื™ื™ืฉื• ื™ืฉืŸ ื•ืžืช ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื‘ืฉื”ื›ื”ื• ื”ื›ืื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ื‘ื” ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื”

The Gemara asks: But doesnโ€™t Rav Sheshet himself say: If one humiliates another who is sleeping and the individual never awakens and dies, the one who humiliated him is liable to compensate his heirs for that humiliation? Apparently, even if the status of the condemned is that of a dead person, the one who cursed him should be liable to compensate his heirs. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta, in which case no compensation is paid.

ื•ื”ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ื›ื”ื• ื”ื›ืื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ื‘ื” ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืœื•ืงื” ืžืื™ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื“ืงืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืžืžื•ืŸ

The Gemara asks: But doesnโ€™t Rabbi Ami say that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: In a case where one struck another with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta, he is flogged for violating the prohibition: โ€œHe shall not exceedโ€? Why does the baraita exempt another entirely? The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the term exempt that is stated in this baraita? It means that he is exempt from monetary restitution, but he is liable to receive lashes.

ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ื‘ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืžืžื•ืŸ ืืœื ื‘ื“ื™ื ื• ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื•

The Gemara asks: If the clause of the baraita that discusses a case where another individual strikes or curses him and states that he is exempt only from payment of restitution, one may conclude by inference that the clause of the baraita that discusses his son states that he is liable to pay monetary restitution. That is certainly not the case. Rather, the clause of the baraita that discusses his son states that he is liable to be punished in accordance with his appropriate sentence; here too, the clause of the baraita that discusses another individual states that he is exempt from punishment in accordance with his appropriate sentence. The question remains: Why is another exempt from receiving lashes in a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta?

ืืœื ืื—ืจ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื ืฉื™ื ื‘ืขืžืš ืœื ืชืืจ ื‘ืขื•ืฉื” ืžืขืฉื” ืขืžืš

The Gemara answers: Rather, this is the reason that another is exempt: As the verse states: โ€œNor curse a ruler of your peopleโ€ (Exodus 22:27), from which it is inferred that this prohibition applies only with regard to one who performs an action of โ€œyour people,โ€ i.e., an action befitting a Jew. There is no prohibition against cursing one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew.

ื”ืชื™ื ื— ืงืœืœื” ื”ื›ืื” ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื”

The Gemara asks: This explanation works out well with regard to cursing, as that is the prohibition mentioned in that verse. From where do we derive that the halakha is the same with regard to striking? The Gemara answers: We derive that the halakha is the same for both, as we liken striking to cursing based on the juxtaposition between the verses that address the cases of one who strikes his father (Exodus 21:15) and one who curses his father (Exodus 21:17).

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื‘ื ื• ื ืžื™ ื›ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคื™ื ื—ืก ื‘ืฉืขืฉื” ืชืฉื•ื‘ื” ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ื‘ืฉืขืฉื” ืชืฉื•ื‘ื”

The Gemara challenges: If so, and the prohibition does not apply to one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew, his son too should be exempt if he strikes or curses his father whose conduct is inappropriate. The Gemara explains: As Rav Pineแธฅas says in another context that the reference is to a case where the one in question repented, so too, the baraita is referring to a case where the condemned man repented. Although he is being taken to his execution, because he repented he is considered as one who performs actions โ€œof your people,โ€ and his son is liable for striking or cursing him.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืื—ืจ ื ืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืžืจื™ ื‘ืขืžืš ื‘ืžืงื•ื™ื ืฉื‘ืขืžืš

The Gemara challenges: If so, and the baraita is referring to one who repented, another should be rendered liable as well. Rav Mari says: One derives from the expression โ€œof your peopleโ€ that the prohibition applies only to one enduring among your people, not to one whose execution is imminent.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื‘ื ื• ื ืžื™

The Gemara challenges: If so, his son should be exempt as well, since his fatherโ€™s execution is imminent.

ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื”

The Gemara answers: The halakha here is just as it is after the death of his father, and the son is liable for cursing his father even after his death. Therefore, he is also liable when his fatherโ€™s death is imminent.

ืžืื™ ื”ื•ื” ืขืœื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื•ื›ืŸ ืชื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ืœื›ืœ ืื™ืŸ ื”ื‘ืŸ ื ืขืฉื” ืฉืœื™ื— ืœืื‘ื™ื• ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ื•ืœืงืœืœื• ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืžืกื™ืช ืฉื”ืจื™ ืืžืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ืณื•ืœื ืชื—ืžืœ ื•ืœื ืชื›ืกื” ืขืœื™ื•ืณ

Despite several attempts to cite proof contradicting his opinion, there is no conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Sheshet that a son may serve as an agent of the court to punish his father. The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rabba bar Rav Huna says, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: With regard to all cases a son is not designated as an agent to strike his father or to curse him, except in a case where his father incites others to worship idols, as the Torah states: โ€œNeither shall you spare, nor shall you conceal himโ€ (Deuteronomy 13:9).

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ืžื›ื” ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืขื“ ืฉื™ืขืฉื” ื‘ื”ืŸ ื—ื‘ื•ืจื” ื–ื” ื—ื•ืžืจ ื‘ืžืงืœืœ ืžื‘ืžื›ื” ืฉื”ืžืงืœืœ ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื”ืžื›ื” ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ

MISHNA: One who strikes his father or his mother is not liable to be executed unless he wounds one of them. This is a stringency with regard to one who curses his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who strikes his father, as one who curses his father or his mother after his or her death is liable, but one who strikes one of them after his or her death is exempt, as he did not cause a wound.

ื’ืžืณ ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืณืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืงืœืœืณ ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื” ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืžื›ื” ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืžืงืœืœ ืžื” ืžื›ื” ืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืžื—ื™ื™ื ืืฃ ื”ืžืงืœืœ ืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืžื—ื™ื™ื

gemara The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: โ€œFor any man who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him who curses his father and his mother shall die; he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon himโ€ (Leviticus 20:9). This is referring to one who curses his parents even after their death, as one might have thought: Since one is liable for striking and one is liable for cursing, just as one who strikes is liable only when his father or mother are alive, so too, one who curses is liable only when they are alive.

ื•ืขื•ื“ ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ืžื›ื” ืฉืขืฉื” ื‘ื• ืฉืœื ืณื‘ืขืžืšืณ ื›ืณื‘ืขืžืšืณ ืœื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื• ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื” ืžืงืœืœ ืฉืœื ืขืฉื” ื‘ื• ืฉืœื ืณื‘ืขืžืšืณ ื›ืณื‘ืขืžืšืณ ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืœื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื• ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื”

Furthermore, one may draw an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to one who strikes another, where the Torah deemed the status of striking one who performs actions not of your people, i.e., a sinner, like that of striking one who performs actions that are of your people, yet the Torah did not deem him liable for striking another after death, then with regard to one who curses, where the Torah deemed the status of cursing one who performs actions not of your people like that of cursing one who performs actions that are of your people, is it not right that the Torah did not deem him liable for cursing another after their death?

ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืงืœืœืณ ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื”

Therefore, the verse states the extraneous phrase: โ€œHe has cursed his father and his mother,โ€ to include even one who curses his father or mother after that parentโ€™s death.

ื”ื ื™ื—ื ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื ืชืŸ ื“ืžื™ื™ืชืจ ืœื™ื” ืงืจื ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืืœื ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ืืฉื™ื” ืžืื™ ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, for whom the phrase โ€œhis father and his motherโ€ is extraneous. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, who disagrees with him, what is there to say?

ื“ืชื ื™ื ืณืื™ืฉ ืื™ืฉืณ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณืื™ืฉ ืื™ืฉืณ ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืช ื˜ื•ืžื˜ื•ื ื•ืื ื“ืจื•ื’ื™ื ื•ืก ืณืืฉืจ ื™ืงืœืœ ืืช ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืช ืืžื•ืณ ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืื‘ื™ื• ืฉืœื ืืžื• ืืžื• ืฉืœื ืื‘ื™ื• ืžื ื™ื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืงืœืœืณ ืื‘ื™ื• ืงืœืœ ืืžื• ืงืœืœ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืืฉื™ื”

This is as it is taught in a baraita that it is written: โ€œFor any man [ish ish] who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him.โ€ What is the meaning when the verse states redundantly: โ€œIsh ishโ€? It serves to include not only a son, but also a daughter, one whose sexual organs are indeterminate [tumtum], and a hermaphrodite who curse their parent. When the verse states: โ€œWho curses his father and his mother,โ€ I have derived only liability for cursing both his father and his mother. From where is liability derived for one who cursed his father but who did not curse his mother, or one who cursed his mother but who did not curse his father? The verse states: โ€œHe has cursed his father and his mother,โ€ from which it is derived that the halakha is as if the verse states: He cursed his father or he cursed his mother. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื ืชืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฉืžืข ืฉื ื™ื”ืŸ ื›ืื—ื“ ื•ืžืฉืžืข ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“ ื‘ืคื ื™ ืขืฆืžื• ืขื“ ืฉื™ืคืจื˜ ืœืš ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืณื™ื—ื“ื™ื•ืณ

Rabbi Yonatan says: In verses of this kind when two subjects are joined with a prefix of the letter vav, that prefix indicates the conjunction โ€œand,โ€ meaning both subjects together, and it also indicates the conjunction โ€œor,โ€ meaning each one by itself, unless the verse specifies with the word: โ€œTogether,โ€ in which case the meaning is both together. Therefore, the phrase โ€œhe has cursed his father and his motherโ€ is extraneous.

ืžื ื ืœื™ื” ื ืคืงื ืœื™ื” ืžื•ืžืงืœืœ ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืžื•ืช ื™ื•ืžืช

Since according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, the phrase is not redundant, from where does he derive that one is liable for cursing his father after his death? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which is written: โ€œAnd one who curses his father or his mother shall be put to deathโ€ (Exodus 21:17).

ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื”ื”ื•ื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืช ื˜ื•ืžื˜ื•ื ื•ืื ื“ืจื•ื’ื™ื ื•ืก

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yonatan, what does he derive from that verse? The Gemara answers: He requires the other verse to include a daughter, a tumtum, and a hermaphrodite in the prohibition against cursing a parent.

ื•ืชื™ืคื•ืง ืœื™ื” ืžืื™ืฉ ืื™ืฉ ื“ื‘ืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ื›ืœืฉื•ืŸ ื‘ื ื™ ืื“ื

The Gemara challenges: But let him derive that halakha from the redundant use of โ€œish ish,โ€ as Rabbi Yoshiya does. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yonatan holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people. The repetition of the term ish is merely a rhetorical flourish commonly employed in speech, and no additional halakhot can be derived from it.

ื•ืœื™ืชื ื™ ื—ื•ืžืจ ื‘ืžื›ื” ืžื‘ืžืงืœืœ ืฉื”ืžื›ื” ืขืฉื” ื‘ื• ืฉืœื ื‘ืขืžืš ื›ื‘ืขืžืš ืžื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ื›ืŸ ื‘ืžืงืœืœ ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื”

ยง The Gemara asks with regard to the mishna: And let the tanna teach a second stringency in the mishna: This is a stringency with regard to one who strikes his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who curses his father, that with regard to one who strikes a parent the Torah deemed the status of striking one who performs actions not of your people to be like that of striking one who performs actions of your people, which is not so with regard to one who curses a parent. The Gemara responds: The tanna of the mishna disagrees and holds that we liken striking to cursing based on the juxtaposition of the verses.

ืœื™ืžื ื”ื ื™ ืชื ืื™ ื›ื”ื ื™ ืชื ืื™ ื“ืชื ื™ ื—ื“ื ื›ื•ืชื™ ืืชื” ืžืฆื•ื•ื” ืขืœ ื”ื›ืืชื• ื•ืื™ ืืชื” ืžืฆื•ื•ื” ืขืœ ืงืœืœืชื• ื•ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš ืื™ ืืชื” ืžืฆื•ื•ื” ืœื ืขืœ ืงืœืœืชื• ื•ืœื ืขืœ ื”ื›ืืชื•

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinions of these following tannaโ€™im are parallel to the opinions of those following tannaโ€™im, as it is taught in one baraita: With regard to a Samaritan, you are commanded to refrain from striking him, but you are not commanded to refrain from cursing him. And it is taught in another baraita: You are commanded neither to refrain from cursing him nor to refrain from striking him.

ืกื‘ืจื•ื” ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ื›ื•ืชื™ื ื’ื™ืจื™ ืืžืช ื”ืŸ ืžืื™ ืœืื• ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื” ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื”

It is assumed that everyone, i.e., the tanna of each baraita, agrees that Samaritans are true converts. Since their conversion was sincere, their status is that of a Jew who sinned. Based on that assumption, the Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree about this: That one Sage, the tanna of the second baraita, holds that we liken striking to cursing and the halakha is the same with regard to both, and therefore it is neither prohibited to strike a Samaritan, nor is it prohibited to curse him; and one Sage, the tanna of the first baraita, holds that we do not liken striking to cursing, and there is no prohibition against cursing a sinner, but there is a prohibition against striking him?

ืœื ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ืœื ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื” ื•ื”ื›ื ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ื›ื•ืชื™ื ื’ื™ืจื™ ืืžืช ื”ืŸ ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ื›ื•ืชื™ื ื’ื™ืจื™ ืืจื™ื•ืช ื”ืŸ

The Gemara rejects the parallel between the two tannaitic disputes. No, everyone, i.e., the tannaโ€™im in each baraita, agrees that we do not liken striking to cursing, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, the tanna of the first baraita, holds that Samaritans are true converts and their status is that of a Jew who sinned. Therefore, there is no prohibition against cursing him, but there is a prohibition against striking him. And one Sage, the tanna of the second baraita, holds that Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat of lions (see IIย Kings, chapter 17) and their conversion was never valid. Therefore, their legal status is that of a gentile and it is neither prohibited to strike a Samaritan nor to curse him.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืขืœื” ื•ืฉื•ืจื• ื›ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืืœื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื‘ื”ื™ืงื™ืฉื ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”

The Gemara asks: If so, is that consistent with that which is taught with regard to the second baraita: And in terms of damage caused to his ox his status is like that of a Jew? Apparently, even the tanna of the second baraita holds that the conversion of the Samaritans was sincere. Rather, learn from it that the two tannaโ€™im disagree with regard to the juxtaposition of the two prohibitions, as initially suggested; their dispute is not with regard to the status of a Samaritan. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is the crux of their dispute.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ื ืคืฉ ืžื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื›ื ื™ืกื ื• ืœืจืฉื•ืชื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื›ื ื™ืกื ื• ืœืจืฉื•ืชื• ื•ื™ืฉืชืžืฉ ื‘ื• ืฉื ืืžืจ ื•ื”ืชืขืžืจ ื‘ื• ื•ืžื›ืจื• ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ืืช ื‘ื ื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ื ื• ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื‘ืจื•ืงื” ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืคื•ื˜ืจื™ืŸ ื’ื ื‘ ืžื™ ืฉื—ืฆื™ื• ืขื‘ื“ ื•ื—ืฆื™ื• ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืคื•ื˜ืจื™ืŸ

mishna One who abducts a Jewish person is not liable to be executed unless he brings the abductee into his domain. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable unless he brings him into his domain and exploits him, as it is stated: โ€œIf a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall dieโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:7). The phrase โ€œexploited himโ€ indicates using him for labor. With regard to one who abducts his own son and sells him, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Beroka, deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. If one abducted one who is a half-slave half-freeman, i.e., a Canaanite slave who belonged to two owners and was emancipated by one of them, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

ื’ืžืณ ื•ืชื ื ืงืžื ืœื ื‘ืขื™ ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ืคื—ื•ืช ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื•

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And does the first tanna not require exploitation as a condition for liability? The Torah states it explicitly in the verse in Deuteronomy. Rabbi Aแธฅa, son of Rava, says: The difference between them is in a case of exploitation worth less than the value of one peruta. The first tanna holds that one is liable for any exploitation and there is no minimum value in order to establish liability. Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable only if one derives benefit equal to at least one peruta from his exploitation.

ื‘ืขื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื’ื ื‘ื• ื•ืžื›ืจื• ื™ืฉืŸ ืžื”ื• ืžื›ืจ ืืฉื” ืœืขื•ื‘ืจื” ืžื”ื• ื™ืฉ ื“ืจืš ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืš ืื• ืื™ืŸ ื“ืจืš ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืš

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one abducted another and sold him while he was asleep, what is the halakha? If one abducted and sold a pregnant woman solely for benefit from her fetus, what is the halakha? Is that a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed or is that not a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed?

ื•ืชื™ืคื•ืง ืœื™ื” ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื›ืœืœ ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื™ืฉืŸ ื“ื–ื’ื ืขืœื™ื” ืืฉื” ื“ืื•ืงืžื ื‘ืืคื™ ื–ื™ืงื ื“ืจืš ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืš ืื• ืื™ืŸ ื“ืจืš ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืš ืžืื™ ืชื™ืงื•

The Gemara asks with regard to the dilemmas raised by Rabbi Yirmeya: But let him derive that the abductor is not liable, as there is no exploitation at all of a sleeping individual or a fetus. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma only with regard to the sleeping individual in a case where one reclines on him, and with regard to the pregnant woman where one stands her in the face of the wind to protect himself from the wind. In those cases, is that a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed or is that not a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed? What is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [teiku] unresolved.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืณื›ื™ ื™ืžืฆื ืื™ืฉ ื’ื ื‘ ื ืคืฉ ืžืื—ื™ื•ืณ ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ืื™ืฉ ืฉื’ื ื‘ ืืฉื” ืžื ื™ื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณื•ื’ื ื‘ ืื™ืฉืณ

The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: โ€œIf a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall dieโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:7). I have derived only that a man who abducted another is liable. From where is it derived that a woman who abducts another is liable as well? It is derived from the verse that states: And one who abducts a man, and sells him, if he be found in his hand, he shall be put to deathโ€ (Exodus 21:16), where the sex of the abductor is not specified.

ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ืื™ืฉ ืฉื’ื ื‘ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืืฉื” ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืื™ืฉ ื•ืืฉื” ืฉื’ื ื‘ื” ืื™ืฉ ืืฉื” ืฉื’ื ื‘ื” ืืฉื” ืžื ื™ื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณื•ืžืช ื”ื’ื ื‘ ื”ื”ื•ืืณ ืžื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื

I have derived only that a man who abducted another, whether a man or a woman, is liable, as it is written: โ€œIf a man shall be found abducting a personโ€; the abductor is male but the sex of the abductee is not specified. And I derived that a woman who abducted a man is liable, as it is written: โ€œAnd one who abducts a manโ€; the sex of the abductor is not specified but the abductee is male. From where is it derived that a woman who abducted a woman is liable as well? It is derived from the verse that states: โ€œThen that abductor shall dieโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:7); the abductor shall die in any case, regardless of the sex of the one who was abducted.

ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš ืณื›ื™ ื™ืžืฆื ืื™ืฉ ื’ื ื‘ ื ืคืฉ ืžืื—ื™ื•ืณ ืื—ื“ ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ืืช ื”ืื™ืฉ ื•ืื—ื“ ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ืืช ื”ืืฉื” ื•ืื—ื“ ื’ืจ ื•ืื—ื“ ืขื‘ื“ ืžืฉื•ื—ืจืจ ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื’ื ื‘ื• ื•ืœื ืžื›ืจื• ืžื›ืจื• ื•ืขื“ื™ื™ืŸ ื™ืฉื ื• ื‘ืจืฉื•ืชื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื›ืจื• ืœืื‘ื™ื• ืื• ืœืื—ื™ื• ืื• ืœืื—ื“ ืžืŸ ื”ืงืจื•ื‘ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ืืช ื”ืขื‘ื“ื™ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ

It is taught in another baraita that it is written: โ€œIf a man is found abducting a person of his brethren,โ€ from which it is derived that whether he abducts a man, or whether he abducts a woman, or whether he abducts a convert, or whether he abducts an emancipated slave or a minor, he is liable. If he abducted another but did not sell him, or if he sold him but he remains in his domain, the abductor is exempt. If he sold him to the father of the abductee, or to his brother, or to one of his other relatives, the abductor is liable. One who abducts slaves is exempt.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Want to explore more about the Daf?

See insights from our partners, contributors and community of women learners

Sorry, there aren't any posts in this category yet. We're adding more soon!

Sanhedrin 85

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Sanhedrin 85

ื•ืจื‘ื™ ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ื”ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ืžืœืื›ื” ืฉืื™ื ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ืœื’ื•ืคื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืขืœื™ื”

and doesnโ€™t Rabbi Shimon say: With regard to one who performs any prohibited labor that is not necessary for its own sake, it is labor for which he is exempt? In this case, causing the wound was inadvertent and was not his objective when performing the action.

ื‘ืขื• ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืžืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ื‘ืŸ ืžื”ื• ืฉื™ืขืฉื” ืฉืœื™ื— ืœืื‘ื™ื• ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ื•ืœืงืœืœื•

ยง The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may be designated an agent of the court in order to flog his father or to curse him if the court sentenced him to ostracism?

ืืžืจ ืœื”ื• ื•ืื—ืจ ืžื™ ื”ืชื™ืจื• ืืœื ื›ื‘ื•ื“ ืฉืžื™ื ืขื“ื™ืฃ ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ื›ื‘ื•ื“ ืฉืžื™ื ืขื“ื™ืฃ

Rav Sheshet said to them: And did the Torah render it permitted to flog or curse another who is not his father? The Torah prohibited such actions. Rather, the reason that an agent of the court may flog or curse the one found liable is that the honor of Heaven takes precedence over the honor due to another. Here too, a son may serve as an agent of the court because the honor of Heaven takes precedence over the honor due to his father.

ืžื™ืชื™ื‘ื™ ื•ืžื” ืžื™ ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืœื ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืžื™ ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืœื ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื•

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: And just as with regard to one who is commanded to strike him there is a mitzva not to strike him under other circumstances, with regard to one who is not commanded to strike him is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him?

ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ื”ื ื‘ื‘ื ื• ื”ื ื‘ืื—ืจ

The Gemara explains the baraita: What, is it not that both this first clause of the statement of the baraita and that latter clause of the statement of the baraita are referring to a situation where striking another is a mitzva, e.g., where the other is liable to receive lashes. The distinction between them is that this latter clause, which is referring to one who is not commanded to strike him, is concerning a case where the agent is his son and is therefore prohibited from striking his father even in that capacity, while that first clause, which is referring to one who is commanded to strike him, is concerning a case where the agent is another individual and not his son. This indicates that it is prohibited for a son to flog his father as an agent of the court.

ืœื ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ืœื ืฉื ื ื‘ื ื• ื•ืœื ืฉื ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืœื ืงืฉื™ื ื›ืืŸ ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ื›ืืŸ ืฉืœื ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื”

The Gemara answers: No, in both this clause and that clause it is no different if the agent is his son and it is no different if the agent is another. And it is not difficult to distinguish between the clauses: Here, in the first clause, the reference is to a situation where striking another is a mitzva, as he is an agent of the court; there, in the latter clause, the reference is not to a situation where striking another is a mitzva.

ื•ื”ื›ื™ ืงืชื ื™ ื•ืžื” ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืœื ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืฉืœื ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžืฆื•ื” ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืžืฆื•ื” ืฉืœื ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื•

And accordingly, this is what the baraita is teaching: And just as in a situation where striking another is a mitzva, where the agent of the court is commanded to strike him, there is a mitzva not to strike him even one lash beyond the number determined by the court, as it is written: โ€œForty lashes shall he strike him, he shall not exceed, lest if he shall exceed to strike himโ€ (Deuteronomy 25:3), accordingly, in a situation where striking another is not a mitzva, where one is not commanded to strike him, is it not right that there is a mitzva not to strike him? The general prohibition against striking another in any situation is derived from this verse.

ืชื ืฉืžืข ื”ื™ื•ืฆื ืœื™ื”ืจื’ ื•ื‘ื ื‘ื ื• ื•ื”ื›ื”ื• ื•ืงื™ืœืœื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื ืื—ืจ ื•ื”ื›ื”ื• ื•ืงื™ืœืœื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ื”ื•ื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื” ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื‘ื ื• ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืื—ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ื‘ืžืกืจื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ืœืฆืืช ื•ืื™ื ื• ื™ื•ืฆื

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of one who emerges from the court condemned to be executed and his son came and struck him or cursed him, the son is liable to be executed for striking or cursing his father. If another came and struck him or cursed him, he is exempt. And we discussed it as follows: What is different about the case where his son strikes or curses him that he is liable, and what is different about the case where another strikes or curses him that he is exempt? And Rav แธคisda says: The baraita is referring to a case where they are imploring the condemned man to emerge from the court to be executed but he is not emerging. Therefore, it is necessary to employ force. Apparently, even under those circumstances, where the use of force is sanctioned by the court, it is prohibited for the son to strike his father.

ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ืžื•ืงื™ ืœื” ื‘ืฉืื™ืŸ ืžืกืจื‘ื™ืŸ ื‘ื• ืœืฆืืช

The Gemara rejects this proof: Rav Sheshet interprets this baraita as referring to a case where they are not imploring him to emerge from the court for his execution. It is referring to a case where the condemned man is proceeding willingly, and it is not an agent of the court but someone else who strikes and curses him at his own initiative.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืื—ืจ ื ืžื™ ืื—ืจ ื’ื‘ืจื ืงื˜ื™ืœื ื”ื•ื

The Gemara challenges: If so, even another who strikes one who is condemned to death should be liable, as it is prohibited to strike or curse another. The Gemara responds: If another does so he is exempt, since the legal status of the one condemned to death is that of a dead man. Therefore, one is not liable for striking or humiliating him.

ื•ื”ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืฉืช ื‘ื™ื™ืฉื• ื™ืฉืŸ ื•ืžืช ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื›ื ื‘ืžืื™ ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื‘ืฉื”ื›ื”ื• ื”ื›ืื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ื‘ื” ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื”

The Gemara asks: But doesnโ€™t Rav Sheshet himself say: If one humiliates another who is sleeping and the individual never awakens and dies, the one who humiliated him is liable to compensate his heirs for that humiliation? Apparently, even if the status of the condemned is that of a dead person, the one who cursed him should be liable to compensate his heirs. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here in the baraita? We are dealing with a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta, in which case no compensation is paid.

ื•ื”ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื”ื›ื”ื• ื”ื›ืื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ื‘ื” ืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืœื•ืงื” ืžืื™ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื“ืงืืžืจ ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžืžืžื•ืŸ

The Gemara asks: But doesnโ€™t Rabbi Ami say that Rabbi Yoแธฅanan says: In a case where one struck another with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta, he is flogged for violating the prohibition: โ€œHe shall not exceedโ€? Why does the baraita exempt another entirely? The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the term exempt that is stated in this baraita? It means that he is exempt from monetary restitution, but he is liable to receive lashes.

ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ื‘ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืžืžื•ืŸ ืืœื ื‘ื“ื™ื ื• ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ื‘ื“ื™ื ื•

The Gemara asks: If the clause of the baraita that discusses a case where another individual strikes or curses him and states that he is exempt only from payment of restitution, one may conclude by inference that the clause of the baraita that discusses his son states that he is liable to pay monetary restitution. That is certainly not the case. Rather, the clause of the baraita that discusses his son states that he is liable to be punished in accordance with his appropriate sentence; here too, the clause of the baraita that discusses another individual states that he is exempt from punishment in accordance with his appropriate sentence. The question remains: Why is another exempt from receiving lashes in a case where he struck him with a blow that does not have sufficient force to cause damage worth one peruta?

ืืœื ืื—ืจ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืคื˜ื•ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืงืจื ื•ื ืฉื™ื ื‘ืขืžืš ืœื ืชืืจ ื‘ืขื•ืฉื” ืžืขืฉื” ืขืžืš

The Gemara answers: Rather, this is the reason that another is exempt: As the verse states: โ€œNor curse a ruler of your peopleโ€ (Exodus 22:27), from which it is inferred that this prohibition applies only with regard to one who performs an action of โ€œyour people,โ€ i.e., an action befitting a Jew. There is no prohibition against cursing one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew.

ื”ืชื™ื ื— ืงืœืœื” ื”ื›ืื” ืžื ืœืŸ ื“ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื”

The Gemara asks: This explanation works out well with regard to cursing, as that is the prohibition mentioned in that verse. From where do we derive that the halakha is the same with regard to striking? The Gemara answers: We derive that the halakha is the same for both, as we liken striking to cursing based on the juxtaposition between the verses that address the cases of one who strikes his father (Exodus 21:15) and one who curses his father (Exodus 21:17).

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื‘ื ื• ื ืžื™ ื›ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคื™ื ื—ืก ื‘ืฉืขืฉื” ืชืฉื•ื‘ื” ื”ื›ื™ ื ืžื™ ื‘ืฉืขืฉื” ืชืฉื•ื‘ื”

The Gemara challenges: If so, and the prohibition does not apply to one whose actions are inconsistent with the conduct appropriate for a Jew, his son too should be exempt if he strikes or curses his father whose conduct is inappropriate. The Gemara explains: As Rav Pineแธฅas says in another context that the reference is to a case where the one in question repented, so too, the baraita is referring to a case where the condemned man repented. Although he is being taken to his execution, because he repented he is considered as one who performs actions โ€œof your people,โ€ and his son is liable for striking or cursing him.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืื—ืจ ื ืžื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืžืจื™ ื‘ืขืžืš ื‘ืžืงื•ื™ื ืฉื‘ืขืžืš

The Gemara challenges: If so, and the baraita is referring to one who repented, another should be rendered liable as well. Rav Mari says: One derives from the expression โ€œof your peopleโ€ that the prohibition applies only to one enduring among your people, not to one whose execution is imminent.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื‘ื ื• ื ืžื™

The Gemara challenges: If so, his son should be exempt as well, since his fatherโ€™s execution is imminent.

ืžื™ื“ื™ ื“ื”ื•ื” ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื”

The Gemara answers: The halakha here is just as it is after the death of his father, and the son is liable for cursing his father even after his death. Therefore, he is also liable when his fatherโ€™s death is imminent.

ืžืื™ ื”ื•ื” ืขืœื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื” ื‘ืจ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื•ื›ืŸ ืชื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ืœื›ืœ ืื™ืŸ ื”ื‘ืŸ ื ืขืฉื” ืฉืœื™ื— ืœืื‘ื™ื• ืœื”ื›ื•ืชื• ื•ืœืงืœืœื• ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืžืกื™ืช ืฉื”ืจื™ ืืžืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ืณื•ืœื ืชื—ืžืœ ื•ืœื ืชื›ืกื” ืขืœื™ื•ืณ

Despite several attempts to cite proof contradicting his opinion, there is no conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Sheshet that a son may serve as an agent of the court to punish his father. The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rabba bar Rav Huna says, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: With regard to all cases a son is not designated as an agent to strike his father or to curse him, except in a case where his father incites others to worship idols, as the Torah states: โ€œNeither shall you spare, nor shall you conceal himโ€ (Deuteronomy 13:9).

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ืžื›ื” ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืขื“ ืฉื™ืขืฉื” ื‘ื”ืŸ ื—ื‘ื•ืจื” ื–ื” ื—ื•ืžืจ ื‘ืžืงืœืœ ืžื‘ืžื›ื” ืฉื”ืžืงืœืœ ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื” ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื”ืžื›ื” ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื” ืคื˜ื•ืจ

MISHNA: One who strikes his father or his mother is not liable to be executed unless he wounds one of them. This is a stringency with regard to one who curses his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who strikes his father, as one who curses his father or his mother after his or her death is liable, but one who strikes one of them after his or her death is exempt, as he did not cause a wound.

ื’ืžืณ ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืณืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืงืœืœืณ ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื” ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœ ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืžื›ื” ื•ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ืžืงืœืœ ืžื” ืžื›ื” ืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืžื—ื™ื™ื ืืฃ ื”ืžืงืœืœ ืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืžื—ื™ื™ื

gemara The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: โ€œFor any man who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him who curses his father and his mother shall die; he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon himโ€ (Leviticus 20:9). This is referring to one who curses his parents even after their death, as one might have thought: Since one is liable for striking and one is liable for cursing, just as one who strikes is liable only when his father or mother are alive, so too, one who curses is liable only when they are alive.

ื•ืขื•ื“ ืงืœ ื•ื—ื•ืžืจ ื•ืžื” ืžื›ื” ืฉืขืฉื” ื‘ื• ืฉืœื ืณื‘ืขืžืšืณ ื›ืณื‘ืขืžืšืณ ืœื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื• ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื” ืžืงืœืœ ืฉืœื ืขืฉื” ื‘ื• ืฉืœื ืณื‘ืขืžืšืณ ื›ืณื‘ืขืžืšืณ ืื™ื ื• ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืœื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื‘ื• ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื”

Furthermore, one may draw an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to one who strikes another, where the Torah deemed the status of striking one who performs actions not of your people, i.e., a sinner, like that of striking one who performs actions that are of your people, yet the Torah did not deem him liable for striking another after death, then with regard to one who curses, where the Torah deemed the status of cursing one who performs actions not of your people like that of cursing one who performs actions that are of your people, is it not right that the Torah did not deem him liable for cursing another after their death?

ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืงืœืœืณ ืœืื—ืจ ืžื™ืชื”

Therefore, the verse states the extraneous phrase: โ€œHe has cursed his father and his mother,โ€ to include even one who curses his father or mother after that parentโ€™s death.

ื”ื ื™ื—ื ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื ืชืŸ ื“ืžื™ื™ืชืจ ืœื™ื” ืงืจื ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืืœื ืœืจื‘ื™ ื™ืืฉื™ื” ืžืื™ ืื™ื›ื ืœืžื™ืžืจ

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, for whom the phrase โ€œhis father and his motherโ€ is extraneous. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, who disagrees with him, what is there to say?

ื“ืชื ื™ื ืณืื™ืฉ ืื™ืฉืณ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณืื™ืฉ ืื™ืฉืณ ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืช ื˜ื•ืžื˜ื•ื ื•ืื ื“ืจื•ื’ื™ื ื•ืก ืณืืฉืจ ื™ืงืœืœ ืืช ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืช ืืžื•ืณ ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืื‘ื™ื• ืฉืœื ืืžื• ืืžื• ืฉืœื ืื‘ื™ื• ืžื ื™ื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืงืœืœืณ ืื‘ื™ื• ืงืœืœ ืืžื• ืงืœืœ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืืฉื™ื”

This is as it is taught in a baraita that it is written: โ€œFor any man [ish ish] who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him.โ€ What is the meaning when the verse states redundantly: โ€œIsh ishโ€? It serves to include not only a son, but also a daughter, one whose sexual organs are indeterminate [tumtum], and a hermaphrodite who curse their parent. When the verse states: โ€œWho curses his father and his mother,โ€ I have derived only liability for cursing both his father and his mother. From where is liability derived for one who cursed his father but who did not curse his mother, or one who cursed his mother but who did not curse his father? The verse states: โ€œHe has cursed his father and his mother,โ€ from which it is derived that the halakha is as if the verse states: He cursed his father or he cursed his mother. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื ืชืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืžืฉืžืข ืฉื ื™ื”ืŸ ื›ืื—ื“ ื•ืžืฉืžืข ืื—ื“ ื•ืื—ื“ ื‘ืคื ื™ ืขืฆืžื• ืขื“ ืฉื™ืคืจื˜ ืœืš ื”ื›ืชื•ื‘ ืณื™ื—ื“ื™ื•ืณ

Rabbi Yonatan says: In verses of this kind when two subjects are joined with a prefix of the letter vav, that prefix indicates the conjunction โ€œand,โ€ meaning both subjects together, and it also indicates the conjunction โ€œor,โ€ meaning each one by itself, unless the verse specifies with the word: โ€œTogether,โ€ in which case the meaning is both together. Therefore, the phrase โ€œhe has cursed his father and his motherโ€ is extraneous.

ืžื ื ืœื™ื” ื ืคืงื ืœื™ื” ืžื•ืžืงืœืœ ืื‘ื™ื• ื•ืืžื• ืžื•ืช ื™ื•ืžืช

Since according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, the phrase is not redundant, from where does he derive that one is liable for cursing his father after his death? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which is written: โ€œAnd one who curses his father or his mother shall be put to deathโ€ (Exodus 21:17).

ื•ืื™ื“ืš ื”ื”ื•ื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืช ื˜ื•ืžื˜ื•ื ื•ืื ื“ืจื•ื’ื™ื ื•ืก

The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yonatan, what does he derive from that verse? The Gemara answers: He requires the other verse to include a daughter, a tumtum, and a hermaphrodite in the prohibition against cursing a parent.

ื•ืชื™ืคื•ืง ืœื™ื” ืžืื™ืฉ ืื™ืฉ ื“ื‘ืจื” ืชื•ืจื” ื›ืœืฉื•ืŸ ื‘ื ื™ ืื“ื

The Gemara challenges: But let him derive that halakha from the redundant use of โ€œish ish,โ€ as Rabbi Yoshiya does. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yonatan holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people. The repetition of the term ish is merely a rhetorical flourish commonly employed in speech, and no additional halakhot can be derived from it.

ื•ืœื™ืชื ื™ ื—ื•ืžืจ ื‘ืžื›ื” ืžื‘ืžืงืœืœ ืฉื”ืžื›ื” ืขืฉื” ื‘ื• ืฉืœื ื‘ืขืžืš ื›ื‘ืขืžืš ืžื” ืฉืื™ืŸ ื›ืŸ ื‘ืžืงืœืœ ืงืกื‘ืจ ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื”

ยง The Gemara asks with regard to the mishna: And let the tanna teach a second stringency in the mishna: This is a stringency with regard to one who strikes his father that is more severe than the halakha with regard to one who curses his father, that with regard to one who strikes a parent the Torah deemed the status of striking one who performs actions not of your people to be like that of striking one who performs actions of your people, which is not so with regard to one who curses a parent. The Gemara responds: The tanna of the mishna disagrees and holds that we liken striking to cursing based on the juxtaposition of the verses.

ืœื™ืžื ื”ื ื™ ืชื ืื™ ื›ื”ื ื™ ืชื ืื™ ื“ืชื ื™ ื—ื“ื ื›ื•ืชื™ ืืชื” ืžืฆื•ื•ื” ืขืœ ื”ื›ืืชื• ื•ืื™ ืืชื” ืžืฆื•ื•ื” ืขืœ ืงืœืœืชื• ื•ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš ืื™ ืืชื” ืžืฆื•ื•ื” ืœื ืขืœ ืงืœืœืชื• ื•ืœื ืขืœ ื”ื›ืืชื•

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinions of these following tannaโ€™im are parallel to the opinions of those following tannaโ€™im, as it is taught in one baraita: With regard to a Samaritan, you are commanded to refrain from striking him, but you are not commanded to refrain from cursing him. And it is taught in another baraita: You are commanded neither to refrain from cursing him nor to refrain from striking him.

ืกื‘ืจื•ื” ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ื›ื•ืชื™ื ื’ื™ืจื™ ืืžืช ื”ืŸ ืžืื™ ืœืื• ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ื“ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื” ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ืœื ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื”

It is assumed that everyone, i.e., the tanna of each baraita, agrees that Samaritans are true converts. Since their conversion was sincere, their status is that of a Jew who sinned. Based on that assumption, the Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree about this: That one Sage, the tanna of the second baraita, holds that we liken striking to cursing and the halakha is the same with regard to both, and therefore it is neither prohibited to strike a Samaritan, nor is it prohibited to curse him; and one Sage, the tanna of the first baraita, holds that we do not liken striking to cursing, and there is no prohibition against cursing a sinner, but there is a prohibition against striking him?

ืœื ื“ื›ื•ืœื™ ืขืœืžื ืœื ืžืงืฉื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ืื” ืœืงืœืœื” ื•ื”ื›ื ื‘ื”ื ืงืžื™ืคืœื’ื™ ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ื›ื•ืชื™ื ื’ื™ืจื™ ืืžืช ื”ืŸ ื•ืžืจ ืกื‘ืจ ื›ื•ืชื™ื ื’ื™ืจื™ ืืจื™ื•ืช ื”ืŸ

The Gemara rejects the parallel between the two tannaitic disputes. No, everyone, i.e., the tannaโ€™im in each baraita, agrees that we do not liken striking to cursing, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, the tanna of the first baraita, holds that Samaritans are true converts and their status is that of a Jew who sinned. Therefore, there is no prohibition against cursing him, but there is a prohibition against striking him. And one Sage, the tanna of the second baraita, holds that Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat of lions (see IIย Kings, chapter 17) and their conversion was never valid. Therefore, their legal status is that of a gentile and it is neither prohibited to strike a Samaritan nor to curse him.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืขืœื” ื•ืฉื•ืจื• ื›ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืืœื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ื‘ื”ื™ืงื™ืฉื ืคืœื™ื’ื™ ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”

The Gemara asks: If so, is that consistent with that which is taught with regard to the second baraita: And in terms of damage caused to his ox his status is like that of a Jew? Apparently, even the tanna of the second baraita holds that the conversion of the Samaritans was sincere. Rather, learn from it that the two tannaโ€™im disagree with regard to the juxtaposition of the two prohibitions, as initially suggested; their dispute is not with regard to the status of a Samaritan. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is the crux of their dispute.

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ื ืคืฉ ืžื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื›ื ื™ืกื ื• ืœืจืฉื•ืชื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ืขื“ ืฉื™ื›ื ื™ืกื ื• ืœืจืฉื•ืชื• ื•ื™ืฉืชืžืฉ ื‘ื• ืฉื ืืžืจ ื•ื”ืชืขืžืจ ื‘ื• ื•ืžื›ืจื• ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ืืช ื‘ื ื• ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ื ื• ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ื—ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื‘ืจื•ืงื” ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืคื•ื˜ืจื™ืŸ ื’ื ื‘ ืžื™ ืฉื—ืฆื™ื• ืขื‘ื“ ื•ื—ืฆื™ื• ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืžื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื•ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืคื•ื˜ืจื™ืŸ

mishna One who abducts a Jewish person is not liable to be executed unless he brings the abductee into his domain. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable unless he brings him into his domain and exploits him, as it is stated: โ€œIf a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall dieโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:7). The phrase โ€œexploited himโ€ indicates using him for labor. With regard to one who abducts his own son and sells him, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoแธฅanan ben Beroka, deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. If one abducted one who is a half-slave half-freeman, i.e., a Canaanite slave who belonged to two owners and was emancipated by one of them, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

ื’ืžืณ ื•ืชื ื ืงืžื ืœื ื‘ืขื™ ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืื—ื ื‘ืจื™ื” ื“ืจื‘ื ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ืคื—ื•ืช ืžืฉื•ื” ืคืจื•ื˜ื” ืื™ื›ื ื‘ื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื•

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And does the first tanna not require exploitation as a condition for liability? The Torah states it explicitly in the verse in Deuteronomy. Rabbi Aแธฅa, son of Rava, says: The difference between them is in a case of exploitation worth less than the value of one peruta. The first tanna holds that one is liable for any exploitation and there is no minimum value in order to establish liability. Rabbi Yehuda holds that one is liable only if one derives benefit equal to at least one peruta from his exploitation.

ื‘ืขื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืจืžื™ื” ื’ื ื‘ื• ื•ืžื›ืจื• ื™ืฉืŸ ืžื”ื• ืžื›ืจ ืืฉื” ืœืขื•ื‘ืจื” ืžื”ื• ื™ืฉ ื“ืจืš ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืš ืื• ืื™ืŸ ื“ืจืš ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืš

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one abducted another and sold him while he was asleep, what is the halakha? If one abducted and sold a pregnant woman solely for benefit from her fetus, what is the halakha? Is that a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed or is that not a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed?

ื•ืชื™ืคื•ืง ืœื™ื” ื“ืœื™ื›ื ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื›ืœืœ ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื™ืฉืŸ ื“ื–ื’ื ืขืœื™ื” ืืฉื” ื“ืื•ืงืžื ื‘ืืคื™ ื–ื™ืงื ื“ืจืš ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืš ืื• ืื™ืŸ ื“ืจืš ืขื™ืžื•ืจ ื‘ื›ืš ืžืื™ ืชื™ืงื•

The Gemara asks with regard to the dilemmas raised by Rabbi Yirmeya: But let him derive that the abductor is not liable, as there is no exploitation at all of a sleeping individual or a fetus. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma only with regard to the sleeping individual in a case where one reclines on him, and with regard to the pregnant woman where one stands her in the face of the wind to protect himself from the wind. In those cases, is that a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed or is that not a manner of exploitation for which one is liable to be executed? What is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [teiku] unresolved.

ืชื ื• ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืณื›ื™ ื™ืžืฆื ืื™ืฉ ื’ื ื‘ ื ืคืฉ ืžืื—ื™ื•ืณ ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ืื™ืฉ ืฉื’ื ื‘ ืืฉื” ืžื ื™ื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณื•ื’ื ื‘ ืื™ืฉืณ

The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written: โ€œIf a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall dieโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:7). I have derived only that a man who abducted another is liable. From where is it derived that a woman who abducts another is liable as well? It is derived from the verse that states: And one who abducts a man, and sells him, if he be found in his hand, he shall be put to deathโ€ (Exodus 21:16), where the sex of the abductor is not specified.

ืื™ืŸ ืœื™ ืืœื ืื™ืฉ ืฉื’ื ื‘ ื‘ื™ืŸ ืืฉื” ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืื™ืฉ ื•ืืฉื” ืฉื’ื ื‘ื” ืื™ืฉ ืืฉื” ืฉื’ื ื‘ื” ืืฉื” ืžื ื™ื™ืŸ ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ืณื•ืžืช ื”ื’ื ื‘ ื”ื”ื•ืืณ ืžื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื

I have derived only that a man who abducted another, whether a man or a woman, is liable, as it is written: โ€œIf a man shall be found abducting a personโ€; the abductor is male but the sex of the abductee is not specified. And I derived that a woman who abducted a man is liable, as it is written: โ€œAnd one who abducts a manโ€; the sex of the abductor is not specified but the abductee is male. From where is it derived that a woman who abducted a woman is liable as well? It is derived from the verse that states: โ€œThen that abductor shall dieโ€ (Deuteronomy 24:7); the abductor shall die in any case, regardless of the sex of the one who was abducted.

ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš ืณื›ื™ ื™ืžืฆื ืื™ืฉ ื’ื ื‘ ื ืคืฉ ืžืื—ื™ื•ืณ ืื—ื“ ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ืืช ื”ืื™ืฉ ื•ืื—ื“ ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ืืช ื”ืืฉื” ื•ืื—ื“ ื’ืจ ื•ืื—ื“ ืขื‘ื“ ืžืฉื•ื—ืจืจ ื•ืงื˜ืŸ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื’ื ื‘ื• ื•ืœื ืžื›ืจื• ืžื›ืจื• ื•ืขื“ื™ื™ืŸ ื™ืฉื ื• ื‘ืจืฉื•ืชื• ืคื˜ื•ืจ ืžื›ืจื• ืœืื‘ื™ื• ืื• ืœืื—ื™ื• ืื• ืœืื—ื“ ืžืŸ ื”ืงืจื•ื‘ื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ื”ื’ื•ื ื‘ ืืช ื”ืขื‘ื“ื™ื ืคื˜ื•ืจ

It is taught in another baraita that it is written: โ€œIf a man is found abducting a person of his brethren,โ€ from which it is derived that whether he abducts a man, or whether he abducts a woman, or whether he abducts a convert, or whether he abducts an emancipated slave or a minor, he is liable. If he abducted another but did not sell him, or if he sold him but he remains in his domain, the abductor is exempt. If he sold him to the father of the abductee, or to his brother, or to one of his other relatives, the abductor is liable. One who abducts slaves is exempt.

Scroll To Top