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Today's Daf Yomi

April 16, 2018 | 讗壮 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Zevachim 3

Several contradictions are raised against statements brought in the name of Rav relating to cases in which sacrifices are/are not disqualified. Comparisons are made to divorce documents, impurities in utensils (what things are considered a barrier that the impurity cannot pass through), and聽laws within the topic itself (various different聽cases where thoughts disqualify/don’t disqualify the sacrifices).


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讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讻转讘 诇讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜谞诪诇讱 诪爪讗讜 讘谉 注讬专讜 讜讗诪专 诇讜 砖诪讬 讻砖诪讱 讜砖诐 讗砖转讬 讻砖诐 讗砖转讱 驻住讜诇 诇讙专砖 讘讜

Moreover, if a husband wrote a bill of divorce with which to divorce his wife but later reconsidered, and a resident of his town found him and said to him: My name is the same as your name, and my wife鈥檚 name is the same as your wife鈥檚 name, and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce and I will use it, the bill of divorce is unfit for the second man to divorce his wife with it. Evidently, even if the bill of divorce was written to be used for divorce, if it was not written specifically for the given woman it is not valid.

讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬谞转讬拽 诇讬讛 诇砖诐 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚讛讛讜讗

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the bill of divorce was specifically designated For the sake of that man鈥檚 divorce, and therefore it is not valid for the second man鈥檚 divorce. But a bill of divorce that was written without specification might be valid if written for the sake of divorce.

讗诇讗 诪讛讗 讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讬砖 诇讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 砖砖诪讜转讬讛谉 砖讜讜转 讻转讘 诇讙专砖 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇讛 诇讗 讬讙专砖 讘讜 讗转 讛拽讟谞讛

Rather, derive it from the subsequent clause in that mishna: Moreover, if he has two wives whose names are identical, and he wrote a bill of divorce to divorce the older one, and then reconsidered, he may not divorce the younger one with it. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written specifically to divorce a specific wife.

讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬谞转讬拽 诇讬讛 诇砖诐 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚讛讛讬讗

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the bill of divorce was specifically designated for the sake of the divorce of that other wife.

讗诇讗 诪讛讗 讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讗诪专 诇诇讘诇专 讻转讜讘 讜诇讗讬讝讛 砖讗专爪讛 讗讙专砖 驻住讜诇 诇讙专砖 讘讜

Rather, derive it from the subsequent clause in that mishna: Moreover, if he said to the scribe [lalavlar]: Write a bill of divorce for one of my two wives who have identical names, and I will use it to divorce whichever one of them that I want, this bill of divorce is unfit to divorce either wife with it. Evidently, it must be written for the divorce of a specific woman.

讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as there is no retroactive designation. The designation of the bill of divorce cannot be determined retroactively. It cannot be used for either wife because it was possibly written for the sake of the other wife. But a bill of divorce written without specification may be valid.

讗诇讗 诪讛讗 讛讻讜转讘 讟讜驻住讬 讙讬讟讬谉 爪专讬讱 砖讬谞讬讞 诪拽讜诐 讛讗讬砖 讜诪拽讜诐 讛讗砖讛 讜诪拽讜诐 讛注讚讬诐 讜诪拽讜诐 讛讝诪谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗祝 爪专讬讱 砖讬谞讬讞 诪拽讜诐 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐

Rather, derive it from that mishna (Gittin 26a): With regard to a scribe who writes the standard part of [tofesei] bills of divorce in advance, so that when one requests a bill of divorce, he will have to add only the details unique to the case, he must leave empty the place of the name of the man, and the place of the name of the woman, and the place of the names of the witnesses, and the place of the date. And in addition, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A scribe must also leave the place of the essential phrase: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, since it must be written for the sake of that specific woman. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written for a specific husband and wife, and if not it is not valid, even if it was written for the sake of divorce.

转讜 专诪讬 诪讬诇转讗 讗讞专讬转讬 诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖讬专讛 讗诇诪讗 讚诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 讚诇讗讜 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

搂 Ravina continued to inform Rav Pappa of Rava鈥檚 statements: Rava further raises another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered the animal for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, it is fit? Apparently, only improper intent that is of its type, i.e., for the sake of another offering, ruins the offering and renders it unfit, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type, i.e., for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, is disregarded and does not ruin it.

讜专诪讬谞讛讜 讻诇 讛讙讟 砖谞讻转讘 砖诇讗 诇砖诐 讗砖讛 驻住讜诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇砖诐 讙讜讬讛 谞诪讬 驻住讜诇

And Rava raises a contradiction from the aforementioned mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman who is being divorced with it is not valid; and by inference, even if it was written for the sake of a gentile woman, it is not valid. With regard to the matter of divorce, a gentile woman is not of the same type as a Jewish woman, as the halakhot of bills of divorce are irrelevant to her.

讜砖谞讬 讙讟 讚诇 讙讜讬讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 住转诪讗 讜住转诪讗 驻住讜诇 拽讚砖讬诐 讚诇 讞讜诇讬谉 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 住转诪讗 讜住转诪讗 讻砖讬专讬诐

And Rava resolves the contradiction: If a bill of divorce is written for the sake of a gentile woman it is not valid, because if you remove the intent for the sake of a gentile woman from it, it is considered to be without specification of the woman who is divorced with it, and a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid. But if sacrificial animals are slaughtered for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, they remain fit, since if you remove the non-sacred intent from them, they are considered to be without specification, and offerings slaughtered without specification are fit.

讜专诪讗 诪讬诇转讗 讗讞专讬转讬 诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖讬专讛 讗诇诪讗 讚诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 讚诇讗 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

And Rava raised another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat it is fit? Apparently, he holds that only improper intent that is of its type ruins it, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type does not ruin it.

讜讛转谞讬讗 转讜讻讜 讜诇讗 转讜讱 转讜讻讜 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬 砖讟祝 诪爪讬诇

But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to ritually impure carcasses of creeping animals: 鈥淎nd every earthen vessel into whose interior any of them falls, anything that is in its interior shall be impure鈥 (Leviticus 11:33). From the word 鈥渋nterior鈥 it is derived that only food in its interior is rendered impure, but not any food that is in the interior of its interior, i.e., in another vessel within the earthenware vessel. And this is the halakha not only if the inner vessel is an earthenware vessel; even if it is a metal or wooden vessel, which is purified though rinsing in a ritual bath and is therefore susceptible to impurity from its exterior, it nevertheless protects food that is inside it from being rendered impure. Evidently, even a vessel that is not of the same type serves to nullify the status of the interior of an earthenware vessel.

讜砖谞讬 注砖讜 讞讜诇讬谉 讗爪诇 拽讚砖讬诐 讻诪讞讬爪讛 讗爪诇 转谞讜专 诪讛 诪讞讬爪讛 讗爪诇 转谞讜专 诇讗 诪讛谞讬讗 诇讛 讻诇诇 讗祝 讞讜诇讬谉 讗爪诇 拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 诪讛谞讬讗 诇讬讛 讻诇诇

And Rava resolves the contradiction as follows: A vessel purified through rinsing is actually considered of the same type as an earthenware vessel, since they are both vessels. Concerning the halakhot of impurity, the equivalent of intent with regard to the consumption of non-sacred meat is an item that is not a vessel at all; the Sages rendered non-sacred meat with regard to sacrificial animals like a partition with regard to an earthenware oven: Just as a partition in an oven is not effective at all in preventing the transmission of impurity from one side to the other since it is not a vessel, so too, slaughtering an offering for the consumption of non-sacred meat is not effective at all with regard to rendering sacrificial animals unfit.

讚转谞谉 转谞讜专 砖讞爪爪讜 讘谞住专讬诐 讗讜 讘讬专讬注讜转 讜谞诪爪讗 砖专抓 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞讚 讛讻诇 讟诪讗

This is as we learned in a mishna (Kelim 8:1): In the case of an oven that one divided with boards or with curtains, and the carcass of a creeping animal was found in one place, all of the food in the oven, including that on the other side of the partition, is rendered impure.

讻讜讜专转 砖讛讬讗 驻讞讜转讛 讜驻拽讜拽讛 讘拽砖 讜诪砖讜诇砖诇转 诇讗讜讬专 讛转谞讜专 砖专抓 讘转讜讻讛 讛转谞讜专 讟诪讗 砖专抓 讘转谞讜专 讗讜讻诇讬谉 砖讘转讜讻讛 讟诪讗讬谉 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讟讛专

The mishna continues: In the case of a round barrel that is broken and plugged up with straw and lowered into the airspace of the oven, if the carcass of a creeping animal is inside the barrel, the oven is rendered impure. And if the carcass of a creeping animal is in the oven, the food that is inside the barrel is rendered impure. The broken barrel is not considered a vessel despite its being plugged up with straw, and therefore it does not prevent the transmission of impurity between the creeping animal and the oven. And Rabbi Eliezer deems the food in the barrel pure.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讗诐 讛爪讬诇 讘诪转 讛讞诪讜专 诇讗 转爪讬诇 讘讻诇讬 讞专住 讛拽诇

The mishna continues: Rabbi Eliezer said: My opinion can be inferred a fortiori: If a barrel or any other partition between some item and a corpse under the same roof protects the item from becoming impure, even though impurity imparted by a corpse is severe in that it lasts seven days, shouldn鈥檛 a partition protect food in the airspace of an earthenware vessel from impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, which is mild by comparison?

讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇讗

The mishna continues: The Rabbis said to him: Your inference is not correct.

讗诐 讛爪讬诇 讘诪转 讞诪讜专 砖讻谉 讞诇讜拽讛 讘讗讜讛诇讬谉 转爪讬诇 讘讻诇讬 讞专砖 讛拽诇 砖讗讬谉 讞诇讜拽讬谉 讘讗讜讛诇讬谉

If a partition protects an item from impurity imparted by a corpse, which is severe, this is only because such impurity is unique in that it is imparted to that which is in the same tent, i.e., under the same roof, and tents are divided by partitions. If so, should a partition protect food from impurity imparted in an earthenware vessel, which, although mild, is not divided by partitions, like tents are?

讛转讬谞讞 诇专讘谞谉 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara notes: The comparison between non-sacred meat vis-脿-vis offerings and a partition in an earthenware vessel works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that a partition does not prevent transmission of impurity inside an earthenware vessel. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that a partition is effective in an earthenware oven, what can be said? How is this compatible with the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type?

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 拽讗诪专

The Gemara responds: Rabbi Eliezer agrees with this principle. Yet he says that a partition in an earthenware vessel is effective due to his a fortiori inference, which overrides the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讛转诐 谞诪讬 诇讬诪讗 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讞讜诇讬谉 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The Gemara challenges: If that is so, that an a fortiori inference overrides this principle, let us say an a fortiori inference there as well, with regard to a sin offering that was slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat: If slaughtering sacrificial animals for the sake of other sacrificial animals desecrates those sacrificial animals, all the more so is it not clear that slaughtering them for the consumption of non-sacred meat desecrates them?

讗诇讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘 讜诇讗 讬讞诇诇讜 讗转 拽讚砖讬 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 讗转 讗砖专 讬专讬诪讜 诇讛壮 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讞讜诇讬谉 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐

The Gemara responds: Rather, the reasoning behind the statement of Rav that a sin offering slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat is fit is not in accordance with this principle at all, but it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reasoning behind the statement of Rav? The verse: 鈥淎nd they shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they set apart unto the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 22:15), teaches that only improper intentions for the sake of sacred items, i.e., offerings, desecrate sacred items, but non-sacred intent does not desecrate sacred items.

讗诇诪讗 讗转讗 拽专讗 讗驻拽讬讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讬转讬 转讜讻讜 诇驻拽讬讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

The Gemara notes: Apparently, an inference from a verse can come to rule out a conflicting a fortiori inference. If so, here too, with regard to a partition in an oven, let the verse 鈥渁nd every earthen vessel into whose interior any of them falls鈥 come to rule out Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 a fortiori inference that a partition prevents food in an oven from becoming impure.

讛讗讬 转讜讻讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讗讜讻诇讬谉 砖讙讬讘诇谉 讘讟讬讟 讜讛讻谞讬住谉 诇讗讜讬专 转谞讜专 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讘谞讙讬注讛 诇讗 诪讟诪讗 讘讗讜讬专讜 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讟诪讜 [拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉]

The Gemara responds: This expression: 鈥淲hose interior,鈥 does not indicate that a partition is ineffective, as it is necessary to teach another halakha, namely, that food that one kneaded with clay, covering it from all sides, and put in the airspace of an oven that had the carcass of a creeping animal in it is impure. Because it might enter your mind to say that since the food cannot become impure by touching an impure item, as the clay serves as an interposition, it also cannot become impure by being put in the airspace of an impure oven. The phrase 鈥渋n whose interior any of them falls鈥 teaches us that the food does contract impurity.

讜专讘谞谉 讛谞讱 诇讗 爪专讬讻讬 拽专讗

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, who apparently do interpret the verse as teaching that a partition is ineffective in preventing the contracting of impurity in an earthenware vessel, how do they derive that food covered with clay and placed in an impure oven is impure? The Gemara answers: These matters do not need a verse to teach them. Such food has the same status as any other food in an impure oven, and the halakha therefore is self-evident.

专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 讗诪讬 专诪讬 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 讗砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 讜诪砖谞讬

Rav Yosef bar Ami raises a contradiction between Rav鈥檚 statement with regard to deviation with regard to the type of offering, i.e., slaughtering for the sake of a different type of offering, and Rav鈥檚 statement with regard to deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., slaughtering for the sake of someone other than the offering鈥檚 owner, and he then resolves the contradiction.

诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转 讻砖讬专讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 讗诇诪讗 讚诇讗讜 诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 讚诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

The contradiction is as follows: Did Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering, i.e., one that the owner is obligated to bring for a different transgression, is fit, but that if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit? Apparently, slaughtering an offering with an improper intention not of its type ruins it; whereas intent that is of its type does not ruin it.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 驻住讜诇讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 注讜诇讛 讻砖专讛 讗诇诪讗 讚讘专 诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 讚诇讗讜 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

But doesn鈥檛 Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not its owner but who nevertheless is obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit? Apparently, an improper intention that is of its type ruins the offering, whereas intent not of its type does not ruin it.

讜诪砖谞讬 讛转诐 讜砖讞讟 讗转讛 诇讞讟讗转 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛专讬 讞讟讗转 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转 谞砖讞讟讛

And he resolves the contradiction as follows: There, with regard to deviation from the type of offering, the Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33). And here a sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, and therefore although it was for the sake of a different sin offering, it remains fit.

讛讻讗 讜讻驻专 注诇讬讜 讻转讬讘 注诇讬讜 讜诇讗 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 讞讘讬专讜 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讬讚讬讛 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 讻驻专讛 讻诪讜转讛

Here, concerning deviation with regard to the owner, it is written in the Torah concerning a sin offering: 鈥淎nd he shall be forgiven鈥 (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that specifically he, the owner, but not another person, shall be forgiven. Therefore, if a sin offering is slaughtered for the sake of another person, it is unfit. The other person to whom this is referring is presumably similar to him, the owner of the sin offering, in that he is obligated to make atonement similar to that of the owner. Therefore, if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.

专讘 讞讘讬讘讗 专诪讬 砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 讗转讜讱 转讜讻讜 讜诪砖谞讬

Rav 岣viva raises a contradiction between Rav鈥檚 statement concerning deviation with regard to the owner and the aforementioned baraita concerning the interior of its interior, i.e., a vessel placed in an earthenware vessel, and resolves the contradiction.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 [讞讟讗转 驻住讜诇讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘] 注讜诇讛 讻砖讬专讛 讗诇诪讗 讚诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 诇讗讜 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

The contradiction is as follows: But did Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who is also obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for a person obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit? Apparently, an improper intention that is of its type ruins it, whereas intent that is not of its type does not ruin it.

讜讛转谞讬讗 转讜讻讜 讜诇讗 转讜讱 转讜讻讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬 砖讟祝 诪爪讬诇

But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that if the carcass of a creeping animal is found inside an earthenware vessel, the vessel鈥檚 interior is rendered impure but not the interior of its interior, and even a vessel purified through rinsing, if placed in the earthenware vessel, protects food inside it from contracting impurity? Evidently, impurity in the airspace of an earthenware vessel can be contained by something not of its type.

讜诪砖谞讬 讗专讘注讛 转讜讻讜 讻转讬讘讬 (转讜讻讜) 转讜讱 转讜讻讜 转讜讱 转讜讻讜

And Rav 岣viva resolves the contradiction as follows: The expression: Whose interior [tokho], is written four times. In other words, in the verse: 鈥淎nd every earthen vessel into whose interior [tokho] any of them falls, anything that is in its interior [tokho] shall be impure鈥 (Leviticus 11:33), the word tokho is mentioned twice, and each time, the verse could have written: The interior. Since the possessive: Its, is added to each instance, the verse is interpreted exegetically as though the word interior [tokh] were mentioned four times: Interior [tokh], whose interior [tokho], interior [tokh], and its interior [tokho].

讞讚 诇讙讜驻讬讛 讜讞讚 诇讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛

One of these is necessary to teach the matter itself, that an im-pure earthenware vessel imparts impurity to food in its airspace; and one instance is used for a verbal analogy between the two instances of the word interior, from which it is derived that an earthenware vessel itself contracts impurity from impure items in its airspace.

讞讚 转讜讻讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜诇讗 转讜讻讜 砖诇 讗讞专 讗讬讚讱 转讜讻讜 讜诇讗 转讜讱 转讜讻讜 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬 砖讟祝 诪爪讬诇

One indicates that the interior airspace of this, i.e., an earthenware vessel, renders food impure, but not the interior of another type of vessel, which imparts impurity only through contact; and the other instance indicates that its interior, but not the interior of its interior, imparts impurity, and that even a vessel purified through rinsing, if placed in the earthenware vessel, protects food inside it from becoming impure. Consequently, it is derived from a verse that inside an earthenware vessel, other vessels not of its type can block the transmission of impurity. Since this halakha is derived from a verse written in that context, there is no reason to assume that a similar halakha would apply to slaughter.

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Zevachim 3

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Zevachim 3

讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讻转讘 诇讙专砖 讗转 讗砖转讜 讜谞诪诇讱 诪爪讗讜 讘谉 注讬专讜 讜讗诪专 诇讜 砖诪讬 讻砖诪讱 讜砖诐 讗砖转讬 讻砖诐 讗砖转讱 驻住讜诇 诇讙专砖 讘讜

Moreover, if a husband wrote a bill of divorce with which to divorce his wife but later reconsidered, and a resident of his town found him and said to him: My name is the same as your name, and my wife鈥檚 name is the same as your wife鈥檚 name, and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce and I will use it, the bill of divorce is unfit for the second man to divorce his wife with it. Evidently, even if the bill of divorce was written to be used for divorce, if it was not written specifically for the given woman it is not valid.

讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬谞转讬拽 诇讬讛 诇砖诐 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚讛讛讜讗

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the bill of divorce was specifically designated For the sake of that man鈥檚 divorce, and therefore it is not valid for the second man鈥檚 divorce. But a bill of divorce that was written without specification might be valid if written for the sake of divorce.

讗诇讗 诪讛讗 讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讬砖 诇讜 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 砖砖诪讜转讬讛谉 砖讜讜转 讻转讘 诇讙专砖 讗转 讛讙讚讜诇讛 诇讗 讬讙专砖 讘讜 讗转 讛拽讟谞讛

Rather, derive it from the subsequent clause in that mishna: Moreover, if he has two wives whose names are identical, and he wrote a bill of divorce to divorce the older one, and then reconsidered, he may not divorce the younger one with it. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written specifically to divorce a specific wife.

讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬谞转讬拽 诇讬讛 诇砖诐 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讚讛讛讬讗

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the bill of divorce was specifically designated for the sake of the divorce of that other wife.

讗诇讗 诪讛讗 讬转专 注诇 讻谉 讗诪专 诇诇讘诇专 讻转讜讘 讜诇讗讬讝讛 砖讗专爪讛 讗讙专砖 驻住讜诇 诇讙专砖 讘讜

Rather, derive it from the subsequent clause in that mishna: Moreover, if he said to the scribe [lalavlar]: Write a bill of divorce for one of my two wives who have identical names, and I will use it to divorce whichever one of them that I want, this bill of divorce is unfit to divorce either wife with it. Evidently, it must be written for the divorce of a specific woman.

讚讬诇诪讗 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as there is no retroactive designation. The designation of the bill of divorce cannot be determined retroactively. It cannot be used for either wife because it was possibly written for the sake of the other wife. But a bill of divorce written without specification may be valid.

讗诇讗 诪讛讗 讛讻讜转讘 讟讜驻住讬 讙讬讟讬谉 爪专讬讱 砖讬谞讬讞 诪拽讜诐 讛讗讬砖 讜诪拽讜诐 讛讗砖讛 讜诪拽讜诐 讛注讚讬诐 讜诪拽讜诐 讛讝诪谉 讜讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗祝 爪专讬讱 砖讬谞讬讞 诪拽讜诐 讛专讬 讗转 诪讜转专转 诇讻诇 讗讚诐

Rather, derive it from that mishna (Gittin 26a): With regard to a scribe who writes the standard part of [tofesei] bills of divorce in advance, so that when one requests a bill of divorce, he will have to add only the details unique to the case, he must leave empty the place of the name of the man, and the place of the name of the woman, and the place of the names of the witnesses, and the place of the date. And in addition, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A scribe must also leave the place of the essential phrase: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, since it must be written for the sake of that specific woman. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written for a specific husband and wife, and if not it is not valid, even if it was written for the sake of divorce.

转讜 专诪讬 诪讬诇转讗 讗讞专讬转讬 诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖讬专讛 讗诇诪讗 讚诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 讚诇讗讜 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

搂 Ravina continued to inform Rav Pappa of Rava鈥檚 statements: Rava further raises another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered the animal for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, it is fit? Apparently, only improper intent that is of its type, i.e., for the sake of another offering, ruins the offering and renders it unfit, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type, i.e., for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, is disregarded and does not ruin it.

讜专诪讬谞讛讜 讻诇 讛讙讟 砖谞讻转讘 砖诇讗 诇砖诐 讗砖讛 驻住讜诇 讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇砖诐 讙讜讬讛 谞诪讬 驻住讜诇

And Rava raises a contradiction from the aforementioned mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman who is being divorced with it is not valid; and by inference, even if it was written for the sake of a gentile woman, it is not valid. With regard to the matter of divorce, a gentile woman is not of the same type as a Jewish woman, as the halakhot of bills of divorce are irrelevant to her.

讜砖谞讬 讙讟 讚诇 讙讜讬讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 住转诪讗 讜住转诪讗 驻住讜诇 拽讚砖讬诐 讚诇 讞讜诇讬谉 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讛讜讛 诇讬讛 住转诪讗 讜住转诪讗 讻砖讬专讬诐

And Rava resolves the contradiction: If a bill of divorce is written for the sake of a gentile woman it is not valid, because if you remove the intent for the sake of a gentile woman from it, it is considered to be without specification of the woman who is divorced with it, and a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid. But if sacrificial animals are slaughtered for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, they remain fit, since if you remove the non-sacred intent from them, they are considered to be without specification, and offerings slaughtered without specification are fit.

讜专诪讗 诪讬诇转讗 讗讞专讬转讬 诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讜诇讬谉 讻砖讬专讛 讗诇诪讗 讚诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 讚诇讗 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

And Rava raised another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat it is fit? Apparently, he holds that only improper intent that is of its type ruins it, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type does not ruin it.

讜讛转谞讬讗 转讜讻讜 讜诇讗 转讜讱 转讜讻讜 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬 砖讟祝 诪爪讬诇

But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to ritually impure carcasses of creeping animals: 鈥淎nd every earthen vessel into whose interior any of them falls, anything that is in its interior shall be impure鈥 (Leviticus 11:33). From the word 鈥渋nterior鈥 it is derived that only food in its interior is rendered impure, but not any food that is in the interior of its interior, i.e., in another vessel within the earthenware vessel. And this is the halakha not only if the inner vessel is an earthenware vessel; even if it is a metal or wooden vessel, which is purified though rinsing in a ritual bath and is therefore susceptible to impurity from its exterior, it nevertheless protects food that is inside it from being rendered impure. Evidently, even a vessel that is not of the same type serves to nullify the status of the interior of an earthenware vessel.

讜砖谞讬 注砖讜 讞讜诇讬谉 讗爪诇 拽讚砖讬诐 讻诪讞讬爪讛 讗爪诇 转谞讜专 诪讛 诪讞讬爪讛 讗爪诇 转谞讜专 诇讗 诪讛谞讬讗 诇讛 讻诇诇 讗祝 讞讜诇讬谉 讗爪诇 拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 诪讛谞讬讗 诇讬讛 讻诇诇

And Rava resolves the contradiction as follows: A vessel purified through rinsing is actually considered of the same type as an earthenware vessel, since they are both vessels. Concerning the halakhot of impurity, the equivalent of intent with regard to the consumption of non-sacred meat is an item that is not a vessel at all; the Sages rendered non-sacred meat with regard to sacrificial animals like a partition with regard to an earthenware oven: Just as a partition in an oven is not effective at all in preventing the transmission of impurity from one side to the other since it is not a vessel, so too, slaughtering an offering for the consumption of non-sacred meat is not effective at all with regard to rendering sacrificial animals unfit.

讚转谞谉 转谞讜专 砖讞爪爪讜 讘谞住专讬诐 讗讜 讘讬专讬注讜转 讜谞诪爪讗 砖专抓 讘诪拽讜诐 讗讞讚 讛讻诇 讟诪讗

This is as we learned in a mishna (Kelim 8:1): In the case of an oven that one divided with boards or with curtains, and the carcass of a creeping animal was found in one place, all of the food in the oven, including that on the other side of the partition, is rendered impure.

讻讜讜专转 砖讛讬讗 驻讞讜转讛 讜驻拽讜拽讛 讘拽砖 讜诪砖讜诇砖诇转 诇讗讜讬专 讛转谞讜专 砖专抓 讘转讜讻讛 讛转谞讜专 讟诪讗 砖专抓 讘转谞讜专 讗讜讻诇讬谉 砖讘转讜讻讛 讟诪讗讬谉 讜专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讟讛专

The mishna continues: In the case of a round barrel that is broken and plugged up with straw and lowered into the airspace of the oven, if the carcass of a creeping animal is inside the barrel, the oven is rendered impure. And if the carcass of a creeping animal is in the oven, the food that is inside the barrel is rendered impure. The broken barrel is not considered a vessel despite its being plugged up with straw, and therefore it does not prevent the transmission of impurity between the creeping animal and the oven. And Rabbi Eliezer deems the food in the barrel pure.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讗诐 讛爪讬诇 讘诪转 讛讞诪讜专 诇讗 转爪讬诇 讘讻诇讬 讞专住 讛拽诇

The mishna continues: Rabbi Eliezer said: My opinion can be inferred a fortiori: If a barrel or any other partition between some item and a corpse under the same roof protects the item from becoming impure, even though impurity imparted by a corpse is severe in that it lasts seven days, shouldn鈥檛 a partition protect food in the airspace of an earthenware vessel from impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, which is mild by comparison?

讗诪专讜 诇讜 诇讗

The mishna continues: The Rabbis said to him: Your inference is not correct.

讗诐 讛爪讬诇 讘诪转 讞诪讜专 砖讻谉 讞诇讜拽讛 讘讗讜讛诇讬谉 转爪讬诇 讘讻诇讬 讞专砖 讛拽诇 砖讗讬谉 讞诇讜拽讬谉 讘讗讜讛诇讬谉

If a partition protects an item from impurity imparted by a corpse, which is severe, this is only because such impurity is unique in that it is imparted to that which is in the same tent, i.e., under the same roof, and tents are divided by partitions. If so, should a partition protect food from impurity imparted in an earthenware vessel, which, although mild, is not divided by partitions, like tents are?

讛转讬谞讞 诇专讘谞谉 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara notes: The comparison between non-sacred meat vis-脿-vis offerings and a partition in an earthenware vessel works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that a partition does not prevent transmission of impurity inside an earthenware vessel. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that a partition is effective in an earthenware oven, what can be said? How is this compatible with the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type?

专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 拽讗诪专

The Gemara responds: Rabbi Eliezer agrees with this principle. Yet he says that a partition in an earthenware vessel is effective due to his a fortiori inference, which overrides the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讛转诐 谞诪讬 诇讬诪讗 拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讞讜诇讬谉 诇讗 讻诇 砖讻谉

The Gemara challenges: If that is so, that an a fortiori inference overrides this principle, let us say an a fortiori inference there as well, with regard to a sin offering that was slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat: If slaughtering sacrificial animals for the sake of other sacrificial animals desecrates those sacrificial animals, all the more so is it not clear that slaughtering them for the consumption of non-sacred meat desecrates them?

讗诇讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘 讻专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚专讘 讜诇讗 讬讞诇诇讜 讗转 拽讚砖讬 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 讗转 讗砖专 讬专讬诪讜 诇讛壮 拽讚砖讬诐 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐 讜讗讬谉 讞讜诇讬谉 诪讞诇诇讬谉 拽讚砖讬诐

The Gemara responds: Rather, the reasoning behind the statement of Rav that a sin offering slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat is fit is not in accordance with this principle at all, but it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reasoning behind the statement of Rav? The verse: 鈥淎nd they shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they set apart unto the Lord鈥 (Leviticus 22:15), teaches that only improper intentions for the sake of sacred items, i.e., offerings, desecrate sacred items, but non-sacred intent does not desecrate sacred items.

讗诇诪讗 讗转讗 拽专讗 讗驻拽讬讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讬转讬 转讜讻讜 诇驻拽讬讛 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专

The Gemara notes: Apparently, an inference from a verse can come to rule out a conflicting a fortiori inference. If so, here too, with regard to a partition in an oven, let the verse 鈥渁nd every earthen vessel into whose interior any of them falls鈥 come to rule out Rabbi Eliezer鈥檚 a fortiori inference that a partition prevents food in an oven from becoming impure.

讛讗讬 转讜讻讜 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 诇讗讜讻诇讬谉 砖讙讬讘诇谉 讘讟讬讟 讜讛讻谞讬住谉 诇讗讜讬专 转谞讜专 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讗诪讬谞讗 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讘谞讙讬注讛 诇讗 诪讟诪讗 讘讗讜讬专讜 谞诪讬 诇讗 诪讟诪讜 [拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉]

The Gemara responds: This expression: 鈥淲hose interior,鈥 does not indicate that a partition is ineffective, as it is necessary to teach another halakha, namely, that food that one kneaded with clay, covering it from all sides, and put in the airspace of an oven that had the carcass of a creeping animal in it is impure. Because it might enter your mind to say that since the food cannot become impure by touching an impure item, as the clay serves as an interposition, it also cannot become impure by being put in the airspace of an impure oven. The phrase 鈥渋n whose interior any of them falls鈥 teaches us that the food does contract impurity.

讜专讘谞谉 讛谞讱 诇讗 爪专讬讻讬 拽专讗

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, who apparently do interpret the verse as teaching that a partition is ineffective in preventing the contracting of impurity in an earthenware vessel, how do they derive that food covered with clay and placed in an impure oven is impure? The Gemara answers: These matters do not need a verse to teach them. Such food has the same status as any other food in an impure oven, and the halakha therefore is self-evident.

专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专 讗诪讬 专诪讬 砖讬谞讜讬 拽讜讚砖 讗砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 讜诪砖谞讬

Rav Yosef bar Ami raises a contradiction between Rav鈥檚 statement with regard to deviation with regard to the type of offering, i.e., slaughtering for the sake of a different type of offering, and Rav鈥檚 statement with regard to deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., slaughtering for the sake of someone other than the offering鈥檚 owner, and he then resolves the contradiction.

诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转 讻砖讬专讛 诇砖诐 注讜诇讛 驻住讜诇讛 讗诇诪讗 讚诇讗讜 诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 讚诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

The contradiction is as follows: Did Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering, i.e., one that the owner is obligated to bring for a different transgression, is fit, but that if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit? Apparently, slaughtering an offering with an improper intention not of its type ruins it; whereas intent that is of its type does not ruin it.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 讞讟讗转 驻住讜诇讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 注讜诇讛 讻砖专讛 讗诇诪讗 讚讘专 诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 讚诇讗讜 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

But doesn鈥檛 Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not its owner but who nevertheless is obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit? Apparently, an improper intention that is of its type ruins the offering, whereas intent not of its type does not ruin it.

讜诪砖谞讬 讛转诐 讜砖讞讟 讗转讛 诇讞讟讗转 讗诪专 专讞诪谞讗 讜讛专讬 讞讟讗转 诇砖诐 讞讟讗转 谞砖讞讟讛

And he resolves the contradiction as follows: There, with regard to deviation from the type of offering, the Merciful One states in the Torah: 鈥淎nd slaughter it for a sin offering鈥 (Leviticus 4:33). And here a sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, and therefore although it was for the sake of a different sin offering, it remains fit.

讛讻讗 讜讻驻专 注诇讬讜 讻转讬讘 注诇讬讜 讜诇讗 注诇 讞讘讬专讜 讞讘讬专讜 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讬讚讬讛 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 讻驻专讛 讻诪讜转讛

Here, concerning deviation with regard to the owner, it is written in the Torah concerning a sin offering: 鈥淎nd he shall be forgiven鈥 (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that specifically he, the owner, but not another person, shall be forgiven. Therefore, if a sin offering is slaughtered for the sake of another person, it is unfit. The other person to whom this is referring is presumably similar to him, the owner of the sin offering, in that he is obligated to make atonement similar to that of the owner. Therefore, if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.

专讘 讞讘讬讘讗 专诪讬 砖讬谞讜讬 讘注诇讬诐 讗转讜讱 转讜讻讜 讜诪砖谞讬

Rav 岣viva raises a contradiction between Rav鈥檚 statement concerning deviation with regard to the owner and the aforementioned baraita concerning the interior of its interior, i.e., a vessel placed in an earthenware vessel, and resolves the contradiction.

讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 讞讟讗转 砖砖讞讟讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘 [讞讟讗转 驻住讜诇讛 注诇 诪讬 砖诪讞讜讬讬讘] 注讜诇讛 讻砖讬专讛 讗诇诪讗 讚诪讬谞讛 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛 诇讗讜 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 诪讞专讬讘 讘讛

The contradiction is as follows: But did Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who is also obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for a person obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit? Apparently, an improper intention that is of its type ruins it, whereas intent that is not of its type does not ruin it.

讜讛转谞讬讗 转讜讻讜 讜诇讗 转讜讱 转讜讻讜 讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬 砖讟祝 诪爪讬诇

But isn鈥檛 it taught in a baraita that if the carcass of a creeping animal is found inside an earthenware vessel, the vessel鈥檚 interior is rendered impure but not the interior of its interior, and even a vessel purified through rinsing, if placed in the earthenware vessel, protects food inside it from contracting impurity? Evidently, impurity in the airspace of an earthenware vessel can be contained by something not of its type.

讜诪砖谞讬 讗专讘注讛 转讜讻讜 讻转讬讘讬 (转讜讻讜) 转讜讱 转讜讻讜 转讜讱 转讜讻讜

And Rav 岣viva resolves the contradiction as follows: The expression: Whose interior [tokho], is written four times. In other words, in the verse: 鈥淎nd every earthen vessel into whose interior [tokho] any of them falls, anything that is in its interior [tokho] shall be impure鈥 (Leviticus 11:33), the word tokho is mentioned twice, and each time, the verse could have written: The interior. Since the possessive: Its, is added to each instance, the verse is interpreted exegetically as though the word interior [tokh] were mentioned four times: Interior [tokh], whose interior [tokho], interior [tokh], and its interior [tokho].

讞讚 诇讙讜驻讬讛 讜讞讚 诇讙讝讬专讛 砖讜讛

One of these is necessary to teach the matter itself, that an im-pure earthenware vessel imparts impurity to food in its airspace; and one instance is used for a verbal analogy between the two instances of the word interior, from which it is derived that an earthenware vessel itself contracts impurity from impure items in its airspace.

讞讚 转讜讻讜 砖诇 讝讛 讜诇讗 转讜讻讜 砖诇 讗讞专 讗讬讚讱 转讜讻讜 讜诇讗 转讜讱 转讜讻讜 讜讗驻讬诇讜 讻诇讬 砖讟祝 诪爪讬诇

One indicates that the interior airspace of this, i.e., an earthenware vessel, renders food impure, but not the interior of another type of vessel, which imparts impurity only through contact; and the other instance indicates that its interior, but not the interior of its interior, imparts impurity, and that even a vessel purified through rinsing, if placed in the earthenware vessel, protects food inside it from becoming impure. Consequently, it is derived from a verse that inside an earthenware vessel, other vessels not of its type can block the transmission of impurity. Since this halakha is derived from a verse written in that context, there is no reason to assume that a similar halakha would apply to slaughter.

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