The Gemara raises two more difficulties against Rav’s ruling that a receipt of payment is not returned to the borrower if found among documents of the creditor, and resolves them. The second chapter begins with a list of items that if one finds them on the street in a particular manner, they can assume the owner lost them and is not expected to retrieve them and can therefore keep them. One of the items listed is scattered fruits – how were they left? How many and in what size space is this referring to? Rabbi Yirmia asks questions on the answer to these questions to understand whether it is because the amount of these fruits is not significant or because it is too much trouble to collect. Abaye and Rava disagree on the subject of ‘despair that is not known’ – if it is not known that the owner has despaired on finding their lost item, when they later despair, can we view it as if they despaired from the beginning and the finder can keep the object? Rava rules that the finder can keep the object, and Abaye rules that the finder cannot. The Gemara explains that in certain cases both will agree that there is certainly immediate despair or no despair at all. Then they bring a series of questions against Abaye from tannaitic sources, most of them from our Mishna. Abaye explains all the difficulties against him as cases where we can be certain the owner knows immediately that it is lost and is sure to have given up. One difficulty from a braita is raised on Rava and is resolved.
Bava Metzia
Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v’Yehuda Tzvi.
רבות בנות עשו חיל ואת עלית על־כלנה
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
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Bava Metzia
Masechet Bava Metzia is sponsored by Rabbi Art Gould in memory of his beloved bride of 50 years, Carol Joy Robinson, Karina Gola bat Huddah v’Yehuda Tzvi.
רבות בנות עשו חיל ואת עלית על־כלנה
This month’s learning is sponsored by Marci Glazer in loving memory of her teacher and chevruta, Rachel Brodie, Rachel Aviva bat Devora Chana, on her 4th yahrzeit. “She brought her love of Torah to thousands of people in her all-too-short life. A lover of Midrash, she still invited me on this Daf Yomi journey.”
Bava Metzia 21
דְּשָׁיְילִינַן לְהוּ לְסָהֲדִי אִי פָּרוּעַ אִי לָא פָּרוּעַ.
as we ask the witnesses whether the loan was repaid or whether it was not repaid.
תָּא שְׁמַע: סִמְפּוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – כָּשֵׁר. מַאי עֵדִים? עֵדֵי קִיּוּם.
Come and hear another challenge from a baraita: A simpon upon which witnesses are signed is valid. Apparently, it is valid even if it is found in the possession of the creditor, as no distinction is made. The Gemara answers: To what witnesses is the baraita referring? It is referring to witnesses of ratification. The fact that the simpon was ratified by the court proves its validity.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְשֶׁאֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים – פָּסוּל. מַאי ״אֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים״? אִילֵּימָא דְּלֵיכָּא עִלָּוֵיהּ עֵדִים כְּלָל, צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר דְּפָסוּל?! אֶלָּא לָאו עֵדֵי קִיּוּם.
The Gemara notes that this too stands to reason, from the fact that the baraita teaches in the latter clause: And a simpon upon which witnesses are not signed is invalid. What is meant by the expression: Upon which witnesses are not signed? If we say that it means that there are no witnesses signed on it at all, does it need to be said that it is invalid? Rather, is it not referring to a simpon on which witnesses are signed, just not witnesses of ratification?
גּוּפָא. סִמְפּוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – יִתְקַיֵּים בְּחוֹתְמָיו. אֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים וְיוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יְדֵי שָׁלִישׁ, אוֹ שֶׁיּוֹצֵא לְאַחַר חִיתּוּם שְׁטָרוֹת – כָּשֵׁר.
The Gemara discusses the baraita itself cited above: A simpon upon which witnesses are signed is ratified by means of its signatories. If there are no witnesses signed on it, but the simpon emerges from the possession of a third party serving as a trustee, or if it emerges after the signing of the documents, i.e., the simpon was written on the promissory note beneath the content of the note and the witnesses’ signatures, it is valid.
יוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יְדֵי שָׁלִישׁ, דְּהָא הֵימְנֵיהּ מַלְוֶה לְשָׁלִישׁ. יוֹצֵא לְאַחַר חִיתּוּם שְׁטָרוֹת נָמֵי, דְּאִי לָאו דִּפְרִיעַ לָא הֲוָה מַרַע לֵיהּ לִשְׁטָרֵיהּ.
The Gemara explains: The reason that it is valid if it emerges from the possession of a third party is that the creditor granted credibility to the third party by placing the simpon in his possession. So too, the simpon is valid in a case where it emerges after the signing of the documents, as, if not for the fact that the debt was repaid, the creditor would not have undermined his note by allowing the simpon to be written on it.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין
מַתְנִי׳ אֵלּוּ מְצִיאוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ, וְאֵלּוּ חַיָּיב לְהַכְרִיז.
MISHNA: In a case where one discovers lost items, which found items belong to him, and for which items is one obligated to proclaim his find so that the owner of the lost items can come and reclaim them?
אֵלּוּ מְצִיאוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ: מָצָא פֵּירוֹת מְפוּזָּרִין, מָעוֹת מְפוּזָּרוֹת, כְּרִיכוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְעִגּוּלֵי דְבֵילָה, כִּכָּרוֹת שֶׁל נַחְתּוֹם, מַחְרוֹזוֹת שֶׁל דָּגִים, וַחֲתִיכוֹת שֶׁל בָּשָׂר, וְגִיזֵּי צֶמֶר הַלְּקוּחִין מִמְּדִינָתָן, וַאֲנִיצֵי פִשְׁתָּן, וּלְשׁוֹנוֹת שֶׁל אַרְגָּמָן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
These found items belong to him: If one found scattered produce, scattered coins, bundles of grain in a public area, round cakes of pressed figs, baker’s loaves, strings of fish, cuts of meat, unprocessed wool fleeces that are taken from their state of origin directly after shearing, bound flax stalks, or bound strips of combed purple wool, these belong to him, as they have no distinguishing marks that would enable their owners to claim them. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שִׁינּוּי – חַיָּיב לְהַכְרִיז. כֵּיצַד? מָצָא עִגּוּל וּבְתוֹכוֹ חֶרֶס, כִּכָּר וּבְתוֹכוֹ מָעוֹת.
Rabbi Yehuda says: If one finds any lost item in which there is an alteration, he is obligated to proclaim his find. How so? If he found a round cake of pressed figs with an earthenware shard inside it or a loaf of bread with coins inside it, he is obligated to proclaim his find, as perhaps the owner of the item inserted them as a distinguishing mark by means of which he could reclaim his property in case it became lost.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל כְּלֵי אַנְפּוּרְיָא אֵין חַיָּיב לְהַכְרִיז.
Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If one finds any anpurya vessels, since their shape is uniform and they are indistinguishable, he is not obligated to proclaim his find.
גְּמָ׳ מָצָא פֵּירוֹת מְפוּזָּרִין. וְכַמָּה? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת.
GEMARA: The mishna teaches as an example of items that one finds without any distinguishing mark: If one found scattered produce. The Gemara asks: And how much produce in how large an area constitutes scattered produce? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: It is considered scattered produce when it has a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דֶּרֶךְ נְפִילָה – אֲפִילּוּ טוּבָא נָמֵי! וְאִי דֶּרֶךְ הִינּוּחַ – אֲפִילּוּ בְּצִיר מֵהָכִי נָמֵי לָא!
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If he found the produce scattered in a manner indicating that it came there by falling and was not deliberately placed there, then even if the volume of produce in that area was greater than this limit, it should also belong to him, because there is no distinguishing mark that would enable the owner to reclaim it. And if he found produce scattered in a manner indicating intentional placement, then even if the volume of produce in an area that size was less than this limit, he should also not be allowed to keep the produce, as clearly the owner plans on returning to reclaim his produce.
אָמַר רַב עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא: בְּמַכְנַשְׁתָּא דְּבֵי דָרֵי עָסְקִינַן. קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ – לָא טָרַח אִינִישׁ וְלָא הָדַר אָתֵי וְשָׁקֵיל לְהוּ, אַפְקוֹרֵי מַפְקַר לְהוּ. בְּצִיר מֵהָכִי – טָרַח וְהָדַר אָתֵי וְשָׁקֵיל לְהוּ, וְלָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
Rav Ukva bar Ḥama said: We are dealing with kernels of wheat that remained during the gathering of grain on the threshing floor. For kernels scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, whose gathering requires great exertion, a person does not exert himself and does not return and take them. Therefore, he renounces his ownership of them and one who finds the kernels may keep them. For kernels scattered in an area smaller than that, the owner exerts himself and returns and takes them. And therefore, he does not renounce his ownership of them.
בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: חֲצִי קַב בִּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת, מַהוּ? קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ. חֲצִי קַב בִּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא נְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ – לָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ. אוֹ דִּלְמָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי, וַחֲצִי קַב בִּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי – מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If a half-kav of kernels were scattered in an area of two by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces his ownership of the kernels? It is due to the fact that gathering the kernels requires great exertion. In the case of a half-kav of kernels scattered in an area of two by four cubits, since gathering them does not require great exertion, he does not renounce his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that they are not of significant value. In the case of a half-kav of kernels scattered in an area of two by four cubits, since they are certainly not of significant value, he renounces his ownership of the kernels.
קַבַּיִים בִּשְׁמוֹנֶה אַמּוֹת, מַהוּ? קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן קַבַּיִים בִּשְׁמוֹנֶה אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דִּנְפִישׁא טִרְחַיְיהוּ טְפֵי – מַפְקַר לְהוּ. אוֹ דִלְמָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי, וְקַבַּיִים בִּשְׁמוֹנֶה אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דַּחֲשִׁיבִי – לָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
Rabbi Yirmeya raises a related dilemma: If two kav of kernels were scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: If one kav of kernels is scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. This is true all the more so in the case of two kav of kernels scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, and since gathering them requires even greater exertion, the owner renounces his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces his ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that they are not of significant value. But in the case of two kav of kernels scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, since they are of significant value, he does not renounce his ownership of them.
קַב שׁוּמְשְׁמִין בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, מַהוּ? קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי, וְשׁוּמְשְׁמִין כֵּיוָן דַּחֲשִׁיבִי – לָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ. אוֹ דִלְמָא: מִשּׁוּם דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן שׁוּמְשְׁמִין, כֵּיוָן דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ טְפֵי – מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
If one kav of sesame seeds was scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that they are not of significant value. And in the case of sesame seeds, since they are of significant value he does not renounce his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. That is true all the more so in the case of sesame seeds. Since gathering them requires even greater exertion, he renounces his ownership of them.
קַב תַּמְרֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, קַב רִמּוֹנֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, מַהוּ? קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, טַעְמָא מַאי? מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי. קַב תַּמְרֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, קַב רִמּוֹנֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי – מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
If one kav of dates was scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, or if one kav of pomegranates was scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that they are not of significant value; and also in the case of one kav of dates in an area of four by four cubits or one kav of pomegranates in an area of four by four cubits, since they are not of significant value he renounces ownership of the fruit.
אוֹ דִלְמָא: מִשּׁוּם דִּנְפִישׁא טִרְחַיְיהוּ, וְקַב תַּמְרֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, וְקַב רִמּוֹנֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא נְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ – לָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ. מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.
Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. And in the case of one kav of dates in an area of four by four cubits or one kav of pomegranates in an area of four by four cubits, since gathering them does not require great exertion he does not renounce his ownership of them. In all these cases, what is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: All these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
אִיתְּמַר:
§ It was stated:
יֵאוּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: לָא הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ. וְרָבָא אָמַר: הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ.
With regard to one’s despair of recovering his lost item that is not a conscious feeling, i.e., were he aware of the loss of his property, he would have despaired of its recovery, but he was unaware of his loss when the finder discovered the item, Abaye said: It is not considered despair; the owner maintains ownership of the item, and the finder may not keep it. And Rava said: It is considered despair and the finder may keep it.
בְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ סִימָן – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּמִיָּאַשׁ לְסוֹף, לָא הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ, דְּכִי אֲתָא לִידֵיהּ – בְּאִיסּוּרָא הוּא דַּאֲתָא לִידֵיהּ, דִּלְכִי יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ לָא מִיָּאַשׁ, מֵימָר אָמַר: סִימָנָא אִית לִי בְּגַוֵּיהּ, יָהֵבְנָא סִימָנָא וְשָׁקֵילְנָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara limits the scope of the dispute. In the case of an item on which there is a distinguishing mark, everyone agrees that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. And even though we hear that he ultimately despairs of recovering the item, it is not considered despair, as when the item came into the possession of the finder, it was in a prohibited manner that it came into his possession. It is prohibited because when the owner learns that it fell from his possession, he does not despair of its recovery immediately. Instead, he says: I have a distinguishing mark on the item; I will provide the distinguishing mark to the finder, and I will take it.
בְּזוּטוֹ שֶׁל יָם וּבִשְׁלוּלִיתוֹ שֶׁל נָהָר, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִית בֵּיהּ סִימָן, רַחֲמָנָא שַׁרְיֵיהּ, כִּדְבָעֵינַן לְמֵימַר לְקַמַּן.
With regard to an item swept away by the tide of the sea or by the flooding of a river, even though the item has a distinguishing mark, the Merciful One permits the finder to keep it as we seek to state below, later in the discussion.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ סִימָן. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: לָא הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ, דְּהָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ. רָבָא אָמַר: הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ, דִּלְכִי יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ – מִיָּאַשׁ. מֵימָר אָמַר: סִימָנָא לֵית לִי בְּגַוֵּיהּ, מֵהַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּמִיָּאַשׁ.
When they disagree, it is with regard to an item in which there is no distinguishing mark. Abaye said: Despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, as he did not know that the item fell from him; therefore, he cannot despair of recovering it. Rava said: Despair that is not conscious is considered despair, as when he discovers that it fell from him, he will despair of its recovery; as he says upon this discovery: I have no distinguishing mark on the item. Therefore, it is considered from now, when the item fell, that he despairs.
(סִימַן פמג״ש ממקגט״י ככסע״ז)
The Gemara proceeds to cite a series of proofs for and against the opinions of Abaye and Rava and provides a mnemonic representing those proofs: Peh, mem, gimmel, shin; mem, mem, kuf, gimmel, tet, yod; kaf, kaf, samekh, ayin, zayin.
תָּא שְׁמַע: פֵּירוֹת מְפוּזָּרִין, הָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ! הָא אָמַר רַב עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא: הָכָא בְּמַכְנַשְׁתָּא (דְּבִיזְרֵי) [דְּבֵי דָרֵי] עָסְקִינַן, דַּאֲבֵידָה מִדַּעַת הִיא.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found scattered produce, it belongs to him. The Gemara asks: Why does it belong to him; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: Didn’t Rav Ukva bar Ḥama say: We are dealing with kernels of wheat that remained during the gathering of grain on the threshing floor? The owner knowingly left the kernels on the threshing floor because it was not worth his while to gather them. That is a deliberate loss, and therefore the despair is conscious. Therefore, this clause in the mishna is not relevant to the dispute in question.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מָעוֹת מְפוּזָּרוֹת – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, אַמַּאי? הָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ! הָתָם נָמֵי כִּדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק דְּאָמַר: אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּכִיסוֹ בְּכׇל שָׁעָה וְשָׁעָה. הָכָא נָמֵי אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּכִיסוֹ בְּכׇל שָׁעָה וְשָׁעָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found scattered coins, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: Why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who says: A person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly. Here too, a person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the coins fell, the owner became aware of his loss.
תָּא שְׁמַע: עִיגּוּלֵי דְבֵילָה וְכִכָּרוֹת שֶׁל נַחְתּוֹם – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ. אַמַּאי? וְהָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ? הָתָם נָמֵי, אַגַּב דְּיַקִּירֵי מִידָּע יָדַע בְּהוּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found round cakes of pressed figs or baker’s loaves, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: Why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair. Since these items are heavy he knows that they fell, and it is reasonable to assume that shortly after they fell the owner became aware of his loss.
תָּא שְׁמַע: וּלְשׁוֹנוֹת שֶׁל אַרְגָּמָן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ. וְאַמַּאי? הָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ! הָתָם נָמֵי, אַגַּב דַּחֲשִׁיבִי מַשְׁמוּשֵׁי מְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּהוּ, וְכִדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found strips of purple wool, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: And why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair. Since they are significant and valuable, the owner feels around for them to ensure that they are not lost, and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the strips fell, the owner became aware of his loss. This reasoning is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak with regard to coins.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמּוֹצֵא מָעוֹת בְּבָתֵּי כְנֵסִיּוֹת וּבְבָתֵּי מִדְרָשׁוֹת, וּבְכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁהָרַבִּים מְצוּיִין שָׁם – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מִתְיָאֲשִׁין מֵהֶן. וְהָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּכִיסוֹ בְּכׇל שָׁעָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of one who finds coins in synagogues, and in study halls, and in any place where the multitudes are found, these coins belong to him due to the fact that the owners despair of their recovery. Why do they belong to him; isn’t the owner unaware that the coins fell from him? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the coins fell, the owner became aware of his loss.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מֵאֵימָתַי כׇּל אָדָם מוּתָּרִים בַּלֶּקֶט? מִשֶּׁיֵּלְכוּ בָּהּ הַנָּמוֹשׁוֹת. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאי נָמוֹשׁוֹת? וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: סָבֵי דְּאָזְלִי אַתִּיגְרָא. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: לָקוֹטֵי בָּתַר לָקוֹטֵי.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Pe’a 8:1): From when is it permitted for any person to collect gleanings, which the Torah designates as exclusively for the poor (see Leviticus 19:9–10)? It is permitted once the nemushot have walked in the field. And we say in interpreting the mishna: What are nemushot? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They are the elderly people who walk leaning on a cane. Since they walk slowly, they will see any stalks that remain and take them. Reish Lakish said: They are the second wave of gleaners who pass through the field after the initial gleaners, collecting any stalks that remain.
וְאַמַּאי? נְהִי דַּעֲנִיִּים דְּהָכָא מִיָּאֲשִׁי – אִיכָּא עֲנִיִּים בְּדוּכְתָּא אַחְרִיתָא דְּלָא מִיָּאֲשִׁי! אָמְרִי: כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא עֲנִיִּים הָכָא, הָנָךְ מֵעִיקָּרָא אִיָּאוֹשֵׁי מִיָּאַשׁ, וְאָמְרִי: עֲנִיִּים דְּהָתָם מְלַקְּטִי לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: And why is it permitted for any person to take the stalks, given that although the poor who are here renounce ownership of the stalks after seeing the nemushot pass through the field, there are poor people in another place who are unaware of the passing of the nemushot and do not renounce ownership? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Sages say in rejecting that proof: Since there are poor people here, those poor people in the other places despair of the gleanings from the outset, and they say: The poor people who are there gather the gleanings.
תָּא שְׁמַע: קְצִיעוֹת בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּצַד שְׂדֵה קְצִיעוֹת, וְכֵן תְּאֵנָה הַנּוֹטָה לַדֶּרֶךְ, וּמָצָא תְּאֵנִים תַּחְתֶּיהָ – מוּתָּרוֹת מִשּׁוּם גָּזֵל, וּפְטוּרוֹת מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר. בְּזֵיתִים וּבְחָרוּבִים – אָסוּר.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Ma’asrot 3:4): If dried figs are found on the path, and even if they were found at the side of a field where dried figs are spread to dry, and likewise, if there is a fig tree whose branches extend over a path and one found figs beneath it, those figs are permitted and taking them is not prohibited due to the prohibition of robbery. And as these are ownerless property, one who finds them is exempt from the obligation to separate tithes. In the case of olives or of carobs, it is prohibited to take the fruit.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא לְאַבָּיֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא: אַגַּב דַּחֲשִׁיבִי – מְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּהוּ. תְּאֵנָה נָמֵי מִידָּע יְדִיעַ דְּנָתְרָא.
Granted, the first clause of the mishna is not difficult according to the opinion of Abaye, as he can explain that one consciously despairs of recovering the dried figs. Since dried figs are significant and valuable, one feels around for them to ensure that they have not become lost. It is reasonable to assume that shortly after the fruits fell, the owner became aware of his loss and despaired of recovering them. In the case of the fig tree, too, one knows that it is a common occurrence for the fruit of the fig tree to fall from the tree and he renounces ownership from the outset.
אֶלָּא סֵיפָא לְרָבָא קַשְׁיָא, דְּקָתָנֵי ״בְּזֵיתִים וּבְחָרוּבִים אָסוּר״, אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שָׁאנֵי זַיִת, הוֹאִיל וְחָזוּתוֹ מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּנָתְרִין זֵיתֵי מִידָּע יְדִיעַ, דּוּכְתָּא דְּאִינִישׁ אִינִישׁ הוּא.
But the latter clause of the mishna is difficult according to the opinion of Rava, as it teaches: In the case of olives or of carobs, it is prohibited to take the fruit. Apparently, despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. Rabbi Abbahu said: The halakha of an olive is different, since its appearance proves the identity of the owner, as the fruit fallen from the tree appears similar to the fruit on that tree, and even though the olives fall off the tree, the one who finds the olives knows that an olive tree that is located in a place that is owned by a specific person belongs to that person and the owner will not renounce ownership of his fruit.
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ רֵישָׁא נָמֵי! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: תְּאֵנָה עִם נְפִילָתָהּ נִמְאֶסֶת.
The Gemara asks: If so, then even in the first clause as well, it should be prohibited to take the fruit that fell from the fig tree. Rav Pappa said: A fig becomes disgusting with its fall from the tree. Even if the fruit can be attributed to the tree of origin, since it is no longer fit for consumption, the owner would not want the fruit and consequently renounces his ownership of it.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַגַּנָּב שֶׁנָּטַל מִזֶּה וְנָתַן לָזֶה, וְכֵן גַּזְלָן שֶׁנָּטַל מִזֶּה וְנָתַן לָזֶה,
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: A thief who took an item from this person and gave it to that person, and likewise, a robber who took an item from this person and gave it to that person,
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Bava Metzia 21
דְּשָׁיְילִינַן לְהוּ לְסָהֲדִי אִי פָּרוּעַ אִי לָא פָּרוּעַ.
as we ask the witnesses whether the loan was repaid or whether it was not repaid.
תָּא שְׁמַע: סִמְפּוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – כָּשֵׁר. מַאי עֵדִים? עֵדֵי קִיּוּם.
Come and hear another challenge from a baraita: A simpon upon which witnesses are signed is valid. Apparently, it is valid even if it is found in the possession of the creditor, as no distinction is made. The Gemara answers: To what witnesses is the baraita referring? It is referring to witnesses of ratification. The fact that the simpon was ratified by the court proves its validity.
הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְשֶׁאֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים – פָּסוּל. מַאי ״אֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים״? אִילֵּימָא דְּלֵיכָּא עִלָּוֵיהּ עֵדִים כְּלָל, צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר דְּפָסוּל?! אֶלָּא לָאו עֵדֵי קִיּוּם.
The Gemara notes that this too stands to reason, from the fact that the baraita teaches in the latter clause: And a simpon upon which witnesses are not signed is invalid. What is meant by the expression: Upon which witnesses are not signed? If we say that it means that there are no witnesses signed on it at all, does it need to be said that it is invalid? Rather, is it not referring to a simpon on which witnesses are signed, just not witnesses of ratification?
גּוּפָא. סִמְפּוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלָיו עֵדִים – יִתְקַיֵּים בְּחוֹתְמָיו. אֵין עָלָיו עֵדִים וְיוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יְדֵי שָׁלִישׁ, אוֹ שֶׁיּוֹצֵא לְאַחַר חִיתּוּם שְׁטָרוֹת – כָּשֵׁר.
The Gemara discusses the baraita itself cited above: A simpon upon which witnesses are signed is ratified by means of its signatories. If there are no witnesses signed on it, but the simpon emerges from the possession of a third party serving as a trustee, or if it emerges after the signing of the documents, i.e., the simpon was written on the promissory note beneath the content of the note and the witnesses’ signatures, it is valid.
יוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת יְדֵי שָׁלִישׁ, דְּהָא הֵימְנֵיהּ מַלְוֶה לְשָׁלִישׁ. יוֹצֵא לְאַחַר חִיתּוּם שְׁטָרוֹת נָמֵי, דְּאִי לָאו דִּפְרִיעַ לָא הֲוָה מַרַע לֵיהּ לִשְׁטָרֵיהּ.
The Gemara explains: The reason that it is valid if it emerges from the possession of a third party is that the creditor granted credibility to the third party by placing the simpon in his possession. So too, the simpon is valid in a case where it emerges after the signing of the documents, as, if not for the fact that the debt was repaid, the creditor would not have undermined his note by allowing the simpon to be written on it.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין
מַתְנִי׳ אֵלּוּ מְצִיאוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ, וְאֵלּוּ חַיָּיב לְהַכְרִיז.
MISHNA: In a case where one discovers lost items, which found items belong to him, and for which items is one obligated to proclaim his find so that the owner of the lost items can come and reclaim them?
אֵלּוּ מְצִיאוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ: מָצָא פֵּירוֹת מְפוּזָּרִין, מָעוֹת מְפוּזָּרוֹת, כְּרִיכוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְעִגּוּלֵי דְבֵילָה, כִּכָּרוֹת שֶׁל נַחְתּוֹם, מַחְרוֹזוֹת שֶׁל דָּגִים, וַחֲתִיכוֹת שֶׁל בָּשָׂר, וְגִיזֵּי צֶמֶר הַלְּקוּחִין מִמְּדִינָתָן, וַאֲנִיצֵי פִשְׁתָּן, וּלְשׁוֹנוֹת שֶׁל אַרְגָּמָן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
These found items belong to him: If one found scattered produce, scattered coins, bundles of grain in a public area, round cakes of pressed figs, baker’s loaves, strings of fish, cuts of meat, unprocessed wool fleeces that are taken from their state of origin directly after shearing, bound flax stalks, or bound strips of combed purple wool, these belong to him, as they have no distinguishing marks that would enable their owners to claim them. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שִׁינּוּי – חַיָּיב לְהַכְרִיז. כֵּיצַד? מָצָא עִגּוּל וּבְתוֹכוֹ חֶרֶס, כִּכָּר וּבְתוֹכוֹ מָעוֹת.
Rabbi Yehuda says: If one finds any lost item in which there is an alteration, he is obligated to proclaim his find. How so? If he found a round cake of pressed figs with an earthenware shard inside it or a loaf of bread with coins inside it, he is obligated to proclaim his find, as perhaps the owner of the item inserted them as a distinguishing mark by means of which he could reclaim his property in case it became lost.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל כְּלֵי אַנְפּוּרְיָא אֵין חַיָּיב לְהַכְרִיז.
Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If one finds any anpurya vessels, since their shape is uniform and they are indistinguishable, he is not obligated to proclaim his find.
גְּמָ׳ מָצָא פֵּירוֹת מְפוּזָּרִין. וְכַמָּה? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת.
GEMARA: The mishna teaches as an example of items that one finds without any distinguishing mark: If one found scattered produce. The Gemara asks: And how much produce in how large an area constitutes scattered produce? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: It is considered scattered produce when it has a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דֶּרֶךְ נְפִילָה – אֲפִילּוּ טוּבָא נָמֵי! וְאִי דֶּרֶךְ הִינּוּחַ – אֲפִילּוּ בְּצִיר מֵהָכִי נָמֵי לָא!
The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If he found the produce scattered in a manner indicating that it came there by falling and was not deliberately placed there, then even if the volume of produce in that area was greater than this limit, it should also belong to him, because there is no distinguishing mark that would enable the owner to reclaim it. And if he found produce scattered in a manner indicating intentional placement, then even if the volume of produce in an area that size was less than this limit, he should also not be allowed to keep the produce, as clearly the owner plans on returning to reclaim his produce.
אָמַר רַב עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא: בְּמַכְנַשְׁתָּא דְּבֵי דָרֵי עָסְקִינַן. קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ – לָא טָרַח אִינִישׁ וְלָא הָדַר אָתֵי וְשָׁקֵיל לְהוּ, אַפְקוֹרֵי מַפְקַר לְהוּ. בְּצִיר מֵהָכִי – טָרַח וְהָדַר אָתֵי וְשָׁקֵיל לְהוּ, וְלָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
Rav Ukva bar Ḥama said: We are dealing with kernels of wheat that remained during the gathering of grain on the threshing floor. For kernels scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, whose gathering requires great exertion, a person does not exert himself and does not return and take them. Therefore, he renounces his ownership of them and one who finds the kernels may keep them. For kernels scattered in an area smaller than that, the owner exerts himself and returns and takes them. And therefore, he does not renounce his ownership of them.
בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: חֲצִי קַב בִּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת, מַהוּ? קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ. חֲצִי קַב בִּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא נְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ – לָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ. אוֹ דִּלְמָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי, וַחֲצִי קַב בִּשְׁתֵּי אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי – מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If a half-kav of kernels were scattered in an area of two by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces his ownership of the kernels? It is due to the fact that gathering the kernels requires great exertion. In the case of a half-kav of kernels scattered in an area of two by four cubits, since gathering them does not require great exertion, he does not renounce his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that they are not of significant value. In the case of a half-kav of kernels scattered in an area of two by four cubits, since they are certainly not of significant value, he renounces his ownership of the kernels.
קַבַּיִים בִּשְׁמוֹנֶה אַמּוֹת, מַהוּ? קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן קַבַּיִים בִּשְׁמוֹנֶה אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דִּנְפִישׁא טִרְחַיְיהוּ טְפֵי – מַפְקַר לְהוּ. אוֹ דִלְמָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי, וְקַבַּיִים בִּשְׁמוֹנֶה אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דַּחֲשִׁיבִי – לָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
Rabbi Yirmeya raises a related dilemma: If two kav of kernels were scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: If one kav of kernels is scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. This is true all the more so in the case of two kav of kernels scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, and since gathering them requires even greater exertion, the owner renounces his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces his ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that they are not of significant value. But in the case of two kav of kernels scattered in an area of eight by four cubits, since they are of significant value, he does not renounce his ownership of them.
קַב שׁוּמְשְׁמִין בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, מַהוּ? קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי, וְשׁוּמְשְׁמִין כֵּיוָן דַּחֲשִׁיבִי – לָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ. אוֹ דִלְמָא: מִשּׁוּם דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן שׁוּמְשְׁמִין, כֵּיוָן דִּנְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ טְפֵי – מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
If one kav of sesame seeds was scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that they are not of significant value. And in the case of sesame seeds, since they are of significant value he does not renounce his ownership of them. Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. That is true all the more so in the case of sesame seeds. Since gathering them requires even greater exertion, he renounces his ownership of them.
קַב תַּמְרֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, קַב רִמּוֹנֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, מַהוּ? קַב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, טַעְמָא מַאי? מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי. קַב תַּמְרֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, קַב רִמּוֹנֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא חֲשִׁיבִי – מַפְקַר לְהוּ.
If one kav of dates was scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, or if one kav of pomegranates was scattered with a dispersal ratio of one kav in an area of four by four cubits, what is the halakha? The aspects of the dilemma are: In the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits, what is the reason that the owner renounces ownership? It is due to the fact that they are not of significant value; and also in the case of one kav of dates in an area of four by four cubits or one kav of pomegranates in an area of four by four cubits, since they are not of significant value he renounces ownership of the fruit.
אוֹ דִלְמָא: מִשּׁוּם דִּנְפִישׁא טִרְחַיְיהוּ, וְקַב תַּמְרֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, וְקַב רִמּוֹנֵי בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא נְפִישׁ טִרְחַיְיהוּ – לָא מַפְקַר לְהוּ. מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.
Or perhaps, the owner renounces ownership in the case of one kav of kernels scattered in an area of four by four cubits due to the fact that gathering them requires great exertion. And in the case of one kav of dates in an area of four by four cubits or one kav of pomegranates in an area of four by four cubits, since gathering them does not require great exertion he does not renounce his ownership of them. In all these cases, what is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: All these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
אִיתְּמַר:
§ It was stated:
יֵאוּשׁ שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: לָא הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ. וְרָבָא אָמַר: הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ.
With regard to one’s despair of recovering his lost item that is not a conscious feeling, i.e., were he aware of the loss of his property, he would have despaired of its recovery, but he was unaware of his loss when the finder discovered the item, Abaye said: It is not considered despair; the owner maintains ownership of the item, and the finder may not keep it. And Rava said: It is considered despair and the finder may keep it.
בְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ סִימָן – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּמִיָּאַשׁ לְסוֹף, לָא הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ, דְּכִי אֲתָא לִידֵיהּ – בְּאִיסּוּרָא הוּא דַּאֲתָא לִידֵיהּ, דִּלְכִי יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ לָא מִיָּאַשׁ, מֵימָר אָמַר: סִימָנָא אִית לִי בְּגַוֵּיהּ, יָהֵבְנָא סִימָנָא וְשָׁקֵילְנָא לֵיהּ.
The Gemara limits the scope of the dispute. In the case of an item on which there is a distinguishing mark, everyone agrees that despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. And even though we hear that he ultimately despairs of recovering the item, it is not considered despair, as when the item came into the possession of the finder, it was in a prohibited manner that it came into his possession. It is prohibited because when the owner learns that it fell from his possession, he does not despair of its recovery immediately. Instead, he says: I have a distinguishing mark on the item; I will provide the distinguishing mark to the finder, and I will take it.
בְּזוּטוֹ שֶׁל יָם וּבִשְׁלוּלִיתוֹ שֶׁל נָהָר, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִית בֵּיהּ סִימָן, רַחֲמָנָא שַׁרְיֵיהּ, כִּדְבָעֵינַן לְמֵימַר לְקַמַּן.
With regard to an item swept away by the tide of the sea or by the flooding of a river, even though the item has a distinguishing mark, the Merciful One permits the finder to keep it as we seek to state below, later in the discussion.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ סִימָן. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: לָא הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ, דְּהָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ. רָבָא אָמַר: הָוֵי יֵאוּשׁ, דִּלְכִי יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ – מִיָּאַשׁ. מֵימָר אָמַר: סִימָנָא לֵית לִי בְּגַוֵּיהּ, מֵהַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּמִיָּאַשׁ.
When they disagree, it is with regard to an item in which there is no distinguishing mark. Abaye said: Despair that is not conscious is not considered despair, as he did not know that the item fell from him; therefore, he cannot despair of recovering it. Rava said: Despair that is not conscious is considered despair, as when he discovers that it fell from him, he will despair of its recovery; as he says upon this discovery: I have no distinguishing mark on the item. Therefore, it is considered from now, when the item fell, that he despairs.
(סִימַן פמג״ש ממקגט״י ככסע״ז)
The Gemara proceeds to cite a series of proofs for and against the opinions of Abaye and Rava and provides a mnemonic representing those proofs: Peh, mem, gimmel, shin; mem, mem, kuf, gimmel, tet, yod; kaf, kaf, samekh, ayin, zayin.
תָּא שְׁמַע: פֵּירוֹת מְפוּזָּרִין, הָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ! הָא אָמַר רַב עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא: הָכָא בְּמַכְנַשְׁתָּא (דְּבִיזְרֵי) [דְּבֵי דָרֵי] עָסְקִינַן, דַּאֲבֵידָה מִדַּעַת הִיא.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found scattered produce, it belongs to him. The Gemara asks: Why does it belong to him; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: Didn’t Rav Ukva bar Ḥama say: We are dealing with kernels of wheat that remained during the gathering of grain on the threshing floor? The owner knowingly left the kernels on the threshing floor because it was not worth his while to gather them. That is a deliberate loss, and therefore the despair is conscious. Therefore, this clause in the mishna is not relevant to the dispute in question.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מָעוֹת מְפוּזָּרוֹת – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, אַמַּאי? הָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ! הָתָם נָמֵי כִּדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק דְּאָמַר: אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּכִיסוֹ בְּכׇל שָׁעָה וְשָׁעָה. הָכָא נָמֵי אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּכִיסוֹ בְּכׇל שָׁעָה וְשָׁעָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found scattered coins, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: Why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who says: A person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly. Here too, a person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the coins fell, the owner became aware of his loss.
תָּא שְׁמַע: עִיגּוּלֵי דְבֵילָה וְכִכָּרוֹת שֶׁל נַחְתּוֹם – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ. אַמַּאי? וְהָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ? הָתָם נָמֵי, אַגַּב דְּיַקִּירֵי מִידָּע יָדַע בְּהוּ.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found round cakes of pressed figs or baker’s loaves, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: Why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair. Since these items are heavy he knows that they fell, and it is reasonable to assume that shortly after they fell the owner became aware of his loss.
תָּא שְׁמַע: וּלְשׁוֹנוֹת שֶׁל אַרְגָּמָן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ. וְאַמַּאי? הָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ! הָתָם נָמֵי, אַגַּב דַּחֲשִׁיבִי מַשְׁמוּשֵׁי מְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּהוּ, וְכִדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one found strips of purple wool, these belong to him. The Gemara asks: And why do they belong to the one who finds them; isn’t the owner unaware that they fell from him? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Gemara rejects that proof: There too, it is not a case of unconscious despair. Since they are significant and valuable, the owner feels around for them to ensure that they are not lost, and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the strips fell, the owner became aware of his loss. This reasoning is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak with regard to coins.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמּוֹצֵא מָעוֹת בְּבָתֵּי כְנֵסִיּוֹת וּבְבָתֵּי מִדְרָשׁוֹת, וּבְכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁהָרַבִּים מְצוּיִין שָׁם – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁלּוֹ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מִתְיָאֲשִׁין מֵהֶן. וְהָא לָא יָדַע דִּנְפַל מִינֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: אָדָם עָשׂוּי לְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּכִיסוֹ בְּכׇל שָׁעָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of one who finds coins in synagogues, and in study halls, and in any place where the multitudes are found, these coins belong to him due to the fact that the owners despair of their recovery. Why do they belong to him; isn’t the owner unaware that the coins fell from him? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his money pouch constantly; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that shortly after the coins fell, the owner became aware of his loss.
תָּא שְׁמַע: מֵאֵימָתַי כׇּל אָדָם מוּתָּרִים בַּלֶּקֶט? מִשֶּׁיֵּלְכוּ בָּהּ הַנָּמוֹשׁוֹת. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאי נָמוֹשׁוֹת? וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: סָבֵי דְּאָזְלִי אַתִּיגְרָא. רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: לָקוֹטֵי בָּתַר לָקוֹטֵי.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Pe’a 8:1): From when is it permitted for any person to collect gleanings, which the Torah designates as exclusively for the poor (see Leviticus 19:9–10)? It is permitted once the nemushot have walked in the field. And we say in interpreting the mishna: What are nemushot? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They are the elderly people who walk leaning on a cane. Since they walk slowly, they will see any stalks that remain and take them. Reish Lakish said: They are the second wave of gleaners who pass through the field after the initial gleaners, collecting any stalks that remain.
וְאַמַּאי? נְהִי דַּעֲנִיִּים דְּהָכָא מִיָּאֲשִׁי – אִיכָּא עֲנִיִּים בְּדוּכְתָּא אַחְרִיתָא דְּלָא מִיָּאֲשִׁי! אָמְרִי: כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא עֲנִיִּים הָכָא, הָנָךְ מֵעִיקָּרָא אִיָּאוֹשֵׁי מִיָּאַשׁ, וְאָמְרִי: עֲנִיִּים דְּהָתָם מְלַקְּטִי לֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: And why is it permitted for any person to take the stalks, given that although the poor who are here renounce ownership of the stalks after seeing the nemushot pass through the field, there are poor people in another place who are unaware of the passing of the nemushot and do not renounce ownership? Apparently, despair that is not conscious is considered despair. The Sages say in rejecting that proof: Since there are poor people here, those poor people in the other places despair of the gleanings from the outset, and they say: The poor people who are there gather the gleanings.
תָּא שְׁמַע: קְצִיעוֹת בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּצַד שְׂדֵה קְצִיעוֹת, וְכֵן תְּאֵנָה הַנּוֹטָה לַדֶּרֶךְ, וּמָצָא תְּאֵנִים תַּחְתֶּיהָ – מוּתָּרוֹת מִשּׁוּם גָּזֵל, וּפְטוּרוֹת מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר. בְּזֵיתִים וּבְחָרוּבִים – אָסוּר.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Ma’asrot 3:4): If dried figs are found on the path, and even if they were found at the side of a field where dried figs are spread to dry, and likewise, if there is a fig tree whose branches extend over a path and one found figs beneath it, those figs are permitted and taking them is not prohibited due to the prohibition of robbery. And as these are ownerless property, one who finds them is exempt from the obligation to separate tithes. In the case of olives or of carobs, it is prohibited to take the fruit.
בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא לְאַבָּיֵי לָא קַשְׁיָא: אַגַּב דַּחֲשִׁיבִי – מְמַשְׁמֵשׁ בְּהוּ. תְּאֵנָה נָמֵי מִידָּע יְדִיעַ דְּנָתְרָא.
Granted, the first clause of the mishna is not difficult according to the opinion of Abaye, as he can explain that one consciously despairs of recovering the dried figs. Since dried figs are significant and valuable, one feels around for them to ensure that they have not become lost. It is reasonable to assume that shortly after the fruits fell, the owner became aware of his loss and despaired of recovering them. In the case of the fig tree, too, one knows that it is a common occurrence for the fruit of the fig tree to fall from the tree and he renounces ownership from the outset.
אֶלָּא סֵיפָא לְרָבָא קַשְׁיָא, דְּקָתָנֵי ״בְּזֵיתִים וּבְחָרוּבִים אָסוּר״, אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שָׁאנֵי זַיִת, הוֹאִיל וְחָזוּתוֹ מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּנָתְרִין זֵיתֵי מִידָּע יְדִיעַ, דּוּכְתָּא דְּאִינִישׁ אִינִישׁ הוּא.
But the latter clause of the mishna is difficult according to the opinion of Rava, as it teaches: In the case of olives or of carobs, it is prohibited to take the fruit. Apparently, despair that is not conscious is not considered despair. Rabbi Abbahu said: The halakha of an olive is different, since its appearance proves the identity of the owner, as the fruit fallen from the tree appears similar to the fruit on that tree, and even though the olives fall off the tree, the one who finds the olives knows that an olive tree that is located in a place that is owned by a specific person belongs to that person and the owner will not renounce ownership of his fruit.
אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ רֵישָׁא נָמֵי! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: תְּאֵנָה עִם נְפִילָתָהּ נִמְאֶסֶת.
The Gemara asks: If so, then even in the first clause as well, it should be prohibited to take the fruit that fell from the fig tree. Rav Pappa said: A fig becomes disgusting with its fall from the tree. Even if the fruit can be attributed to the tree of origin, since it is no longer fit for consumption, the owner would not want the fruit and consequently renounces his ownership of it.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַגַּנָּב שֶׁנָּטַל מִזֶּה וְנָתַן לָזֶה, וְכֵן גַּזְלָן שֶׁנָּטַל מִזֶּה וְנָתַן לָזֶה,
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: A thief who took an item from this person and gave it to that person, and likewise, a robber who took an item from this person and gave it to that person,
