Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

The Mishna presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding a thought during the slaughtering of a sacrifice to leave the blood or the parts designated for burning until the next day. Rabbi Yehuda rules that such a thought disqualifies the offering, while the rabbis disagree, arguing that the thought does not pertain to “consumption,” and therefore does not invalidate the sacrifice.

The Mishna further clarifies that only specific types of improper intent disqualify a sacrifice: namely, intent involving “outside of time,” “outside of location,” or “not for the sake of the correct sacrifice” and the latter only in the cases of sin offerings and the Paschal offering. It then enumerates several examples of thoughts that do not disqualify the offering, such as intending that an impure or uncircumcised person will eat the meat, or that the blood will be placed on the wrong altar or in the wrong location on the altar.

Rabbi Yehuda’s position is initially derived from the verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 7:15, which states “lo yaniach” – “do not leave it” – referring to meat left beyond its designated time. However, the Gemara ultimately rejects this derivation, noting that it cannot be applied to thoughts of “outside of location.” Additionally, a braita clarifies that Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is based on logical inference: if physically leaving the blood beyond its designated time or place disqualifies the sacrifice, then merely intending to do so should also disqualify it.

Rabbi Yehuda does not extend his logic to the other cases listed in the Mishna, such as consumption by an impure or uncircumcised person, because even if these acts were actually carried out, the sacrifice itself would not be invalidated. The Gemara analyzes each of the cases mentioned in the Mishna and explains why none of them would disqualify the offering.

Rabbi Abba explains that although Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies a sacrifice when there is intent to leave the blood until the next day, if a pigul thought is later introduced, such as intending that the meat be eaten after its designated time, the sacrifice becomes pigul, despite the earlier disqualifying thought. Rava attempts to support Rabbi Abba’s statement, but his proof is ultimately rejected. Rav Huna raises a challenge to Rabbi Abba’s position, which remains unresolved.

Rav Chisda presents two statements, both of which Rava attempts to prove, though each proof is refuted. The first states that if one intends for impure individuals to eat the sacrifice on the following day, the offering becomes pigul and is punishable by karet, even though impure individuals are already prohibited from eating it. The second concerns a Paschal offering that was not roasted, or a thanksgiving offering brought without its accompanying loaves. Although the meat of these offerings is forbidden to be eaten in such cases, if an impure person consumes them, it is still punishable by karet.

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the minimum number of blood applications required on the altar for a sin offering. Both agree that for all sacrifices offered on the outer altar, except for the sin offering, if only one blood application is performed, the sacrifice is still valid. However, they differ on the sin offering itself: Beit Shammai maintains that at least two applications are required, while Beit Hillel holds that one suffices.

In a case where only one application is required, if the first application is performed properly and a pigul thought (i.e., intent to eat the meat after its designated time) occurs during the second application, the sacrifice is not disqualified. However, if the first application is performed with a pigul thought and the second is done properly, the sacrifice is rendered pigul and is punishable by karet, since the disqualifying thought occurred during the essential act that permits the meat to be eaten.

In contrast, for sacrifices offered on the inner altar, all blood applications are essential. Therefore, if a disqualifying thought, such as intending to eat or burn the meat beyond its designated time, occurs during only part of the applications, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, it is not considered pigul and is not punishable by karet, because pigul status only applies when the improper intent accompanies the entire act that permits the consumption of the meat.

During the Paschal sacrifice, the drain in the floor of the Azara was plugged to ensure that any spilled blood would be collected. Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis offer different explanations for this practice. Rabbi Yehuda says the blood was collected and placed on the altar in case some of the blood from the sacrifices had spilled and had not yet been brought to the altar. The rabbis explain that it was to demonstrate the dedication of the kohanim, who stood knee-deep in blood as they performed their service.

Each opinion faces challenges. Regarding Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks how the blood could be valid for the altar if it had not been collected in a sanctified vessel. After resolving this, another issue is raised: the dam hatamtzit, the residual internal blood, might nullify the dam hanefesh, the lifeblood that exits during slaughter and is valid for the altar. Regarding the rabbis, the Gemara questions whether the accumulated blood would create a chatzitza, an interposition between the kohanim’s feet and the floor, potentially invalidating their service. It also asks whether the blood-soaked garments would be rendered unfit for priestly service. All these objections are ultimately resolved.

The laws of pigul apply only to parts of the animal designated for consumption or burning on the altar. If a priest has a pigul thought, such as intending to eat or burn a part of the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, it only renders the sacrifice pigul if the thought concerns a part meant to be eaten or burned. Non-edible or non-sacrificial parts, such as the hide, tendons, horns, and similar items, are not subject to pigul. In a female animal, a thought regarding the fetus, placenta, or eggs does not render the sacrifice pigul. If a sacrifice becomes pigul, consuming the milk or eggs does not incur karet.

Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis disagree about whether a pigul thought regarding a non-sacrificial item, such as intending to eat something not meant to be eaten or burn something not meant to be burned, can render the offering pigul. Rabbi Eliezer is more stringent, while the rabbis are lenient. Rabbi Elazar adds that while a thought about a fetus or similar part does not independently render the sacrifice pigul, if the animal itself becomes pigul due to improper intent, then those parts, like the fetus, are also considered pigul.

Three sources, including the Mishna under discussion, are brought to support Rabbi Elazar’s position. Attempts to refute his view are made, but ultimately only an inference from our Mishna stands as a conclusive proof in his favor.

A Mishna in Zevachim 84a records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis regarding a blemished animal that was mistakenly brought to the altar. Rabbi Akiva holds that if the animal has already been placed on the altar, it is not removed. The rabbis disagree, requiring its removal. The Gemara qualifies Rabbi Akiva’s leniency with three limitations: the ruling applies only to certain types of blemishes; if the blemish was present before the animal was sanctified, it must be removed; and a female animal designated for a burnt offering is also removed. Rabbi Zeira raises a challenge to the third limitation based on a braita previously cited in a discussion concerning Rabbi Eliezer. This challenge is ultimately resolved.

How can the verse “do not touch kodesh” be used by Reish Lakish to teach that one cannot eat sacrificial meat in a state of impurity, when that verse is needed to derive the prohibition for an impure person to eat sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled? To resolve the difficulty, the Gemara explains how both can be derived from the same verse.

There is a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding an impure person who eats sacrificial meat before the blood is sprinkled – is it punishable by lashes or not? Abaye and Rava disagree about the scope of the debate.

Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish also disagree about whether one who brings parts of the body of a non-kosher animal onto the altar receives lashes or not. However, after raising a difficulty with this, they explain that all agree it is forbidden, but not punishable by lashes, as it is a negative commandment that is not written explicitly, but derived from a positive commandment. The debate is regarding a different, but similar issue – bringing a non-domesticated animal – is it a violation of a positive commandment, or is it only forbidden ab initio?

Three versions of a question are brought regarding shirayim. If a disqualified person accepted and sprinkled the blood, does it render the animal disqualified from being used for a sacrifice, e.g. can one take more blood from the animal and sprinkle it on the altar? Or, if a cup with the blood was taken out of the Azara, can one get more blood from the animal? Or, if multiple cups were used to get blood from the animal and one was used for the altar, does the blood from the other cups also get poured on the base of the altar (as shirayim)?

How does the Mishna allow for some mistakes to be rectified? Why are there three different cases like this mentioned in the Mishna – what is unique about each case?

Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara (Temple courtyard), it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover. Despite his impurity, he is permitted to proceed with the purification process, which requires partial entry into the Azara. Ulla resolves this difficulty.

A braita is brought in support of Ulla’s statement, discussing the smicha (laying of hands) on the guilt offering of a leper, which is performed outside the Azara. The implication is that if partial entry were permitted, the leper could simply insert his hands into the Azara to perform the smicha. Rav Yosef rejects this support, and there are two distinct versions of how he rejects this.

A difficulty is raised against the content of the braita: if the guilt offering requires smicha by Torah law, and if smicha must be performed immediately prior to slaughtering, then it should be permitted to perform the smicha inside the Azara. Rav Ada bar Matna resolves this challenge, though there are differing accounts of how he does so.

Ravina and Ravin each offer alternative resolutions to the difficulty with Ulla’s statement. Ravina maintains that partial entry into the Azara is prohibited only by a penalty of lashes, without the more severe punishment of karet. Ravin, on the other hand, argues that Ulla’s citation of Reish Lakish was inaccurate. According to Ravin, Reish Lakish was referring to lashes incurred by one who touches sacrificial items (kodashim), not one who enters the Azara.

This leads to a broader debate between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the interpretation of the verse “do not touch kodesh.” Reish Lakish understands it as referring to sacrificial items, while Rabbi Yochanan interprets it as referring to teruma.

A question arises: how can Reish Lakish derive both the prohibition to touch and the prohibition to eat sacrificial items from the same verse, as he does in a separate debate with Rabbi Yochanan? The Gemara addresses this and explains how both prohibitions can be learned from the same textual source.

Who is permitted to slaughter an animal for a sacrifice? The Mishna presents the matter in a way that suggests slaughter by a non-priest is only valid post facto. However, this seems to contradict another source that explicitly permits such slaughter ab initio. Upon further analysis, this apparent contradiction is resolved: non-priests are indeed permitted to slaughter sacrificial animals from the outset.

If an impure person performs the slaughter, the sacrifice remains valid. Yet another source seems to prohibit this. The resolution lies in distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law: while biblically valid, rabbinic authorities forbade impure individuals from slaughtering as a precaution, lest they come into contact with the sacrificial animal and thereby render it impure.

There are two different versions of a braita relating to the prohibition for an impure person to slaughter or do smicha on the animal. Each version has a different understanding of the prohibition to enter the Azara (Temple courtyard). Is it prohibited even for a small part of one’s body to enter or only for the majority?

Ulla said in the name of Reish Lakish that even if an impure person inserts only a small part of their body into the Azara, it is forbidden. Rav Hoshaya challenges this ruling based on a case involving a leper who experienced a seminal emission on the eve of Passover, who is allowed to go ahead with the purification process, which requires a small part of his body to enter the Azara. Ulla resolves the difficulty.

Rav Yosef infers from Ulla’s resolution that in a parallel case—where zavim became impure through contact with the dead before Passover—the same ruling would apply. Abaye, however, raises two objections to Rav Yosef’s inference.