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Today's Daf Yomi

October 7, 2021 | 讗壮 讘诪专讞砖讜讜谉 转砖驻状讘

Masechet Beitzah is dedicated by new friends of Hadran in appreciation of all who find new ways to be marbitzei Torah ba-Rabim ve Rabot.

This month's shiurim are dedicated by Tamara Katz in memory of her maternal grandparents, Sarah bat Chaya v'Tzvi Hirsh and Meir Leib ben Esther v'Harav Yehoshua Zelig whose yahrzeits are both this month.

A month of shiurim are sponsored for a refuah shleima for Noam Eliezer ben Yael Chaya v'Aytan Yehoshua.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Beitzah 37

The month of Cheshvan is sponsored by Tamara Katz in memory of her maternal grandparents, Sarah bat Chaya ve Tzvi Hirsh and Meir Leib ben Esther ve Harav Yehoshua Zelig whose yahrzeits are both this month.

Today’s daf is sponsored by Lisa Denker in honor of David Denker and Ariel Bruce on the birth of their daughter, Nava Eliana. “May she grow to a life of Torah, a never-ending fascination with study and learning, a life of giving and receiving love, and a life of ma鈥檃sim tovim. All our unconditional and unending love, Savta Lisa and Saba Steve.”

The Gemara continues one by one to discuss the cases listed in the Mishna, explaining why the ones in the category 鈥渙ptional鈥 are not considered mitzvot and why the actions listed are forbidden on Shabbat/Yom Tov. They also question the language of the Mishna as really all of the categories are forbidden by Rabbinic law (shvut) and not just the first category. As such, the Mishna is explained as fitting into a structure of 鈥lo mebaya鈥 鈥 the same is true for all, however, the first case is more obvious and then they bring more cases which are less obvious that they would be forbidden by rabbinic law. Our Mishna stated that the laws for Shabbat and Yom Tov are the same, other than for food needs; however, the previous Mishna distinguished between Shabbat and Yom Tov on other issues and permitted lowering the produce through the chimney. Rav Yosef answers that each Mishna holds by a different tanna and connects between these Mishnas and a braita referring to an animal and its offspring that fell into a pit on Yom Tov and one can only slaughter one of them as an animal and its offspring can鈥檛 be slaughtered in one day. Rabbi Eliezer permits only bringing one out 鈥 the other can be given food to survive until Yom Tov ends. Rabbi Yehoshua permits taking out the first one with the intent to slaughter, then one can decide that one is not interested in slaughtering it and prefers the other. In that way, one can save them both. Since Rabbi Eliezer is more strict, Rav Yosef connects our Mishna with his opinion and the previous Mishna with Rabbi Yehoshua. Abaye rejects the comparison and suggests reasons why what applies in the animal case would not apply in the case of the produce on the roof. Rav Papa suggests a different answer – that the two Mishnas follow different tannaitic opinions the stricter, Beit Shamai who does not permit carrying not for the purposes of eating and the lenient one Beit Hillel who permits carrying not only for food purposes. The Gemara tries to reject this answer by saying that issue of carrying in the public domain is not the same as moving fruits within a private domain (muktze issue). However, this is rejected as the prohibition for carrying in one’s property was instituted by the rabbis so as to make sure people didn鈥檛 come to carry in the public domain. The next Mishna discusses Shabbat limits as they relate to items that are owned by a person. A person’s limits of techum Shabbat apply to animals and vessels in one’s possession as well. If one gives one’s animal to one’s shepherd or son, it still can only go as far as the owner. The Mishna discusses various other cases such as brothers who share an inheritance, one who borrows an item from a friend, or bread that was made partially from borrowed ingredients and partially from one’s own ingredients. Does the Mishna disagree with Rabbi Dosa’s opinion as he holds that the techum of the animal follows the shepherd? No! One can explain that the Mishna was dealing with a different case (2 shepherds in the area). Shared items can be moved only as far as the shared techum of both owners. Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding two people who purchase a barrel of wine and an animal to share (and divide). Rav holds the wine can be taken for each one according to his techum, but the animal can only be taken into the shared techum. Why the distinction? Since an animal before it is slaughtered on Yom Tov each of its body parts depends on the others, it is considered shared and not able to be subject to laws of breira, retroactive designation. Shmuel doesn’t hold at all by retroactive designation and therefore limits both cases. What is the law regarding breira? It is also a debate between rabbi Hoshaya and Rabbi Yochanan. The Gemara questions the opinion attributed to Rabbi Hoshaya based on what he holds in a different sugya.

讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗砖讛 讜讘谞讬诐

because it is dealing with a case in which he already has a wife and children, so that he has already fulfilled the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply, and his betrothal of another woman is only an optional act.

诇讗 讞讜诇爪讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讘诪讬谉 讜讛讗 诪爪讜讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讙讚讜诇 讜诪爪讜讛 讘讙讚讜诇 诇讬讘诐

Nor perform 岣litza, nor perform levirate marriage: The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 one perform a mitzva through these acts? Why are they categorized as optional? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the mishna to categorize them as optional, as it is speaking of a case when there is an older brother. Since the general principle is that the preferable way to carry out the mitzva is for the oldest brother to perform levirate marriage, the performance of levirate marriage by a younger brother is classified as optional.

讜讻诇讛讜 讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讙讝专讛 砖诪讗 讬讻转讜讘

The Gemara clarifies the reason for the prohibition against judging, betrothing, etc., on Shabbat and Festivals: And in all these cases, what is the reason they may not be performed? It is a decree lest one write down the proceedings of these acts in a document, such as the verdict of a judgment, the document of betrothal, a document testifying to the 岣litza, or a marriage contract in the case of levirate marriage.

讜讗诇讜 讛谉 诪砖讜诐 诪爪讜讛 诇讗 诪拽讚讬砖讬谉 讜诇讗 诪注专讬讻讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讞专讬诪讬谉 讙讝专讛 诪砖讜诐 诪拽讞 讜诪诪讻专

搂 It was taught in the mishna: And the following are notable because of the full-fledged mitzva involved in them, yet are prohibited on Shabbat: One may not consecrate, nor take a valuation vow, nor consecrate objects for use by the priests or the Temple. The Gemara explains: All these cases are prohibited because of a decree due to their similarity to commerce. These acts, which all involve the transfer of ownership to the Temple treasury, resemble commerce, which is prohibited on a Festival.

讜诇讗 诪讙讘讬讛讬谉 转专讜诪讜转 讜诪注砖专讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 转谞讬 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗 谞爪专讻讗 讗诇讗 诇讬转谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讘讜 讘讬讜诐

搂 It was taught in the mishna: And one may not separate terumot and tithes. The Gemara asks: Is it not obvious that this is so? In doing so one makes forbidden food usable, a form of repairing, which is a prohibited labor. Rav Yosef taught: It is necessary for the mishna to teach this only to state that it is prohibited even to separate teruma in order to give it to a priest on the same day. One could have thought that since he is separating the produce in order to give it to a priest it should be permitted like any other preparation of food; the mishna therefore states explicitly that it is prohibited.

讜讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 驻讬专讬 讚讟讘讬诇讬 诪讗转诪讜诇 讗讘诇 驻讬专讬 讚讟讘讬诇讬 讛讗讬讚谞讗 讻讙讜谉 注讬住讛 诇讗驻专讜砖讬 诪讬谞讛 讞诇讛 诪驻专砖讬谞谉 讜讬讛讘讬谞谉 诇讻讛谉

The Gemara comments: And this applies only to produce that had the status of untithed produce, and therefore was required to be tithed, the day before the Festival. However, produce that became untithed now on the Festival itself, such as dough prepared on the Festival, which becomes untithed and requires 岣lla to be taken from it only after the dough is made: With regard to separating 岣lla from it, one may separate the 岣lla and give it to a priest even on a Festival.

讜讛谞讬 诪砖讜诐 专砖讜转 讗讬讻讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘讜转 诇讬讻讗 讜讛谞讬 诪砖讜诐 诪爪讜讛 讗讬讻讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘讜转 诇讬讻讗

The Gemara asks a question. When the mishna describes those cases as notable because they are optional, is this to say that to say that their prohibition is not because of a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest [shevut]? Likewise, with regard to those cases described as notable because they are mitzvot, is this to say that their prohibition is not because of shevut? The mishna, by referring only to the first of its three categories as shevut, implies that the acts listed in the following categories do not involve shevut. But this is not so; as the Gemara stated above, all these acts are prohibited by rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat and the Festival as days of rest.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 诪讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讘注讬讗 砖讘讜转 讙专讬讚转讗 讚讗住讜专 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 砖讘讜转 讚专砖讜转 谞诪讬 讗住讜专 讜诇讗 诪讘注讬讗 砖讘讜转 讚专砖讜转 讚讗住讜专 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 砖讘讜转 讚诪爪讜讛 谞诪讬 讗住讜专

Rabbi Yitz岣k said: They are indeed all prohibited as shevut. The mishna lists three types of shevut: Those that involve no mitzva whatsoever, those that have a mitzva aspect to them, and those that constitute a full-fledged mitzva. And the tanna is speaking and arranges his list employing the style of: There is no need, i.e., he arranges the cases in order of increasing notability. First, there is no need to state, i.e., it is most obvious, that plain shevut, which involves no mitzva at all, is prohibited, but even shevut of an optional act, i.e., an act that is a minor mitzva, is also prohibited. And there is no need to state, i.e., it is obvious, that shevut of an optional act is prohibited, but even shevut of a full-fledged mitzva is also prohibited.

讻诇 讗诇讜 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讗诪专讜 讜专诪讬谞讛讜 诪砖讬诇讬谉 讚专讱 讗专讜讘讛 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘砖讘转

搂 It was taught in the mishna: The Sages spoke of all these acts being prohibited even with regard to a Festival; all the more so are they prohibited on Shabbat. There is no difference between a Festival and Shabbat except for work involving food. The Gemara raises a contradiction against this from an earlier mishna: One may lower produce from the roof into the house through a skylight to prevent it from being spoiled by the rain on a Festival, but not on Shabbat. This shows that there is another difference between a Festival and Shabbat besides food preparation: Doing a strenuous activity to prevent a loss is permitted on a Festival but prohibited on Shabbat.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注

Rav Yosef said: This is not difficult, as this mishna here, which does not include the halakha of lowering produce as an example of a difference between Shabbat and a Festival, is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, whereas that previous mishna that does cite it as a difference is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua.

讚转谞讬讗 讗讜转讜 讜讗转 讘谞讜 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讘讜专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪注诇讛 讗转 讛专讗砖讜谉 注诇 诪谞转 诇砖讜讞讟讜 讜砖讜讞讟讜 讜讛砖谞讬 注讜砖讛 诇讜 驻专谞住讛 讘诪拽讜诪讜 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 讬诪讜转

Rav Yosef elaborates on his statement: As it is taught in a baraita: If a cow and her calf, which may not be slaughtered on the same day because of the biblical prohibition: 鈥淵ou shall not kill it and its offspring both in one day鈥 (Leviticus 22:28), fell into a pit on a Festival, and their owner wishes to take them out, Rabbi Eliezer says: One may raise the first in order to slaughter it and then slaughter it, and as for the second, he provides it sustenance in its place so that it will not die in the pit. It is prohibited to undertake the strenuous task of raising an animal out of a pit except for the purpose of eating it on the Festival. Therefore, since one cannot slaughter both animals on the Festival, only one can be raised, while the other should be sustained in its place until after the Festival.

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 诪注诇讛 讗转 讛专讗砖讜谉 注诇 诪谞转 诇砖讜讞讟讜 讜讗讬谞讜 砖讜讞讟讜 讜讞讜讝专 讜诪注专讬诐 讜诪注诇讛 讛砖谞讬 专爪讛 讝讛 砖讜讞讟 专爪讛 讝讛 砖讜讞讟

Rabbi Yehoshua, however, says: One may raise the first with the intent of slaughtering it and then change his mind and not slaughter it. Then he may go back and employ artifice by deciding that he prefers to slaughter the second one, and he raises the second. Having raised both animals, if he so desires he may slaughter this one; if he so desires he may slaughter that one. Rav Yosef understands the argument between the two Sages as follows: Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that it is permitted to perform a strenuous activity on a Festival in order to prevent a loss, and therefore he may raise both animals, lest the one left behind die in the pit. Rabbi Eliezer, on the other hand, holds that one may not perform a strenuous activity to prevent a loss, so the second animal must be left in the pit even though it may die there. It may therefore be posited that the mishna that permits lowering produce on a Festival to prevent loss is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua鈥檚 opinion. Rabbi Eliezer would disagree with this leniency, and the principle that there is no difference between Shabbat and a Festival other than food preparation would remain intact.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪诪讗讬 讚讬诇诪讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚讗驻砖专 讘驻专谞住讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 讘驻专谞住讛 诇讗

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: From where do you know that this analysis of these Sages鈥 opinions is correct? Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion that a strenuous activity to prevent monetary loss is prohibited on a Festival only thus far, there in the case of the animals in the pit, where it is possible to sustain the second animal in the pit and keep it from dying. But here, in the case of the produce on the roof, where there is no possibility of preventing the loss through providing sustenance, he would not prohibit lowering the produce to save it from loss.

讗讬 谞诪讬 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚讗驻砖专 诇讗注专讜诪讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 诇讗注专讜诪讬 诇讗

Alternatively, one can propose an opposite argument: Rabbi Yehoshua stated his opinion that a strenuous activity to prevent loss is permitted only thus far, there in the case of the two animals, because it is possible to employ artifice to raise the second animal, so that an observer might assume that that he was not acting to preserve his property, but wished to eat the first animal and subsequently changed his mind. But here, in the case of the produce on the roof, where it is not possible to employ artifice, as it is clear that he is acting to salvage his produce, Rabbi Yehoshua would not be lenient. Therefore, Rav Yosef鈥檚 approach to resolving the contradiction has no support from this baraita.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇

Rather, Rav Pappa said: This resolution of the contradiction is to be rejected in favor of the following: This is not difficult, as this case is in accordance with Beit Shammai, whereas that case follows the approach of Beit Hillel.

讚转谞谉 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇讗 讗转 讛拽讟谉 讜诇讗 讗转 讛诇讜诇讘 讜诇讗 讗转 住驻专 转讜专讛 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪转讬专讬谉

As we learned in a mishna: Beit Shammai say: On a Festival one may not take out a child who cannot walk, nor a lulav, nor a Torah scroll into the public domain, as none of these are required for the preparation of food, and Beit Hillel permit it. It is certainly prohibited to carry out any item into the public domain on Shabbat, yet Beit Hillel permit it on a Festival. Therefore, it may be posited that just as Beit Hillel allow carrying out items on a Festival but not on Shabbat, so would they permit moving the produce off the roof on a Festival but not on Shabbat. According to Beit Shammai, who forbid carrying items out on a Festival and on Shabbat equally, moving the produce from the roof would also be equally prohibited, and the principle that there is no difference between Shabbat and a Festival other than food preparation would remain intact.

讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讛讬讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 讗诪专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讗讛讜爪讗讛 讗讘诇 讗讟诇讟讜诇 诇讗 讗讟讜 讟诇讟讜诇 诇讗讜 爪讜专讱 讛讜爪讗讛 讛讜讗

The Gemara at first refutes this explanation: Perhaps that is not so, as it is possible that Beit Shammai stated their opinion only thus far, there with regard to the prohibition against transferring objects from one domain to another, but not with regard to moving objects, such as produce, from place to place in the house. The Gemara rejects this claim: Is that to say that moving is not performed for the sake of taking out to the public domain? The decree against moving items unnecessarily, i.e., not for use on Shabbat or a Festival, was enacted due to a concern that one might take objects into the public domain. Rav Pappa鈥檚 explanation that it is only Beit Shammai who would prohibit lowering the produce from the roof therefore stands.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讘讛诪讛 讜讛讻诇讬诐 讻专讙诇讬 讛讘注诇讬诐 讛诪讜住专 讘讛诪转讜 诇讘谞讜 讗讜 诇专讜注讛 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讻专讙诇讬 讛讘注诇讬诐

MISHNA: The status of animals and vessels on Festivals is as the feet of their owner, meaning that one鈥檚 animals and vessels are governed by his own travel limitations on Shabbat and Festivals. In the case of one who delivers his animal to his son or to a shepherd before the Festival to care for it, these are as the feet of the owner, rather than those of the son or the shepherd.

讻诇讬诐 讛诪讬讜讞讚讬谉 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 砖讘讘讬转 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讻专讙诇讬讜 讜砖讗讬谉 诪讬讜讞讚讬谉 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讻诪拽讜诐 砖讛讜诇讻讬谉

Vessels that have been inherited by several brothers and have not been divided among them but are still owned jointly, if they are designated for the use of one of the brothers in the house and the other brothers have no part in them, these are as his feet, and they are subject to his travel limitations. And as for those that are not designated for any particular brother, these are as a place where they may all go. They are limited by the travel limitations of every one of the brothers, as when one brother made a joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv te岣min] and the others did not.

讛砖讜讗诇 讻诇讬 诪讞讘讬专讜 诪注专讘 讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讻专讙诇讬 讛砖讜讗诇 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讻专讙诇讬 讛诪砖讗讬诇 讜讻谉 讛讗砖讛 砖砖讗诇讛 诪讞讘专转讛 转讘诇讬谉 讜诪讬诐 讜诪诇讞 诇注讬住转讛 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讻专讙诇讬 砖转讬讛谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 驻讜讟专 讘诪讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 诪诪砖

One who borrows a vessel from another on the eve of a Festival, it is as the feet of the borrower rather than the owner, as when the Festival began the vessel established its place of rest in possession of the borrower. However, if he borrowed it on the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the lender, since at the start of the Festival its place of rest was established in the possession of its owner. And similarly, a woman who borrowed spices from another to put in a dish, or water and salt to put in her dough, these foods, i.e., the dish and the dough, which contain ingredients belonging to both parties, are as the feet of both of them; they are limited by the travel limitations of both parties. Rabbi Yehuda exempts one from travel limitations in the case of water, because it has no substance in the mixture and therefore is not considered connected to the original owner.

讙诪壮 诪转谞讬转讬谉

GEMARA: The Gemara asserts: The mishna

讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讗讜诪专 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 讗讘讗 砖讗讜诇 讗讜诪专 讛诇讜拽讞 讘讛诪讛 诪讞讘专讜 诪注专讘 讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 诪住专讛 诇讜 讗诇讗 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻专讙诇讬 讛诇讜拽讞 讜讛诪讜住专 讘讛诪讛 诇专讜注讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 诪住专讛 诇讜 讗诇讗 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻专讙诇讬 讛专讜注讛

is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Dosa says, and some say Abba Shaul says: One who purchases an animal from another on the eve of a Festival, even if he did not deliver it to him until the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the purchaser. And one who delivers his animal to a shepherd, even if he did not deliver it to him until the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the shepherd. The mishna, on the other hand, teaches that an animal delivered to a shepherd remains as the feet of the owner, therefore apparently contradicting Rabbi Dosa.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘专讜注讛 讗讞讚 讻讗谉 讘砖谞讬 专讜注讬诐 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 诇讘谞讜 讗讜 诇专讜注讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara rejects the assertion that this is a contradiction. You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Dosa, and it is not difficult. Here, in the baraita, it is referring to a town that has only one shepherd. In that case the owner knows with certainty beforehand that he will be delivering his animal to this shepherd over the course of the Festival, and therefore the animal鈥檚 place of rest is established as being identical to that of the shepherd. There, however, the mishna is referring to a town where there are two shepherds. Since the issue of which of them will receive this animal is undetermined when the Festival begins, the animal remains as the feet of its owner.The Gemara strengthens this assertion that the mishna is dealing with a case where there are two shepherds: The language of the mishna is also precise in accordance with this interpretation, as it teaches: To his son or to a shepherd, suggesting that initially he did know to whom he would give the animal. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that this is so.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻讬 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻住转诐 诪砖谞讛 讜转谞谉 讛讘讛诪讛 讜讛讻诇讬诐 讻专讙诇讬 讛讘注诇讬诐

Rabba bar bar 岣na said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, that animals given to a shepherd are as the feet of the shepherd. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yo岣nan actually say this? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan say a general principle that the halakha always follows an unattributed statement in a mishna? And we learned in the mishna: Animals and vessels are as the feet of the owner. One who delivers his animal to his son or to a shepherd, it is as the feet of the owner.

讜诇讗讜 讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 讻讗谉 讘专讜注讛 讗讞讚 讻讗谉 讘砖谞讬 专讜注讬诐

The Gemara answers: And did we not establish that the baraita of Rabbi Dosa is dealing with a different case than the mishna, that here in the baraita it is dealing with a town with one shepherd, whereas there in the mishna it is dealing with a town with two shepherds? There is consequently no contradiction between establishing the halakha both in accordance with Rabbi Dosa and in accordance with the mishna.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖谞讬诐 砖砖讗诇讜 讞诇讜拽 讗讞讚 讘砖讜转驻讜转 讝讛 诇讬诇讱 讘讜 砖讞专讬转 诇讘讬转 讛诪讚专砖 讜讝讛 诇讬讻谞住 讘讜 注专讘讬转 诇讘讬转 讛诪砖转讛 讝讛 注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇爪驻讜谉 讜讝讛 注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇讚专讜诐 讝讛 砖注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇爪驻讜谉 诪讛诇讱 诇爪驻讜谉 讻专讙诇讬 诪讬 砖注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇讚专讜诐

The Sages taught: In the case of two people who borrowed one robe in partnership from a third party, this person in order to go to the study hall with it in the morning and that person in order to enter a wedding feast with it in the evening, and this one made a joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv te岣min] for himself to the north in order to reach his destination, and that one made an eiruv for himself to the south in order to reach his destination, the one who made an eiruv for himself to the north may walk with the robe only to the north as far as it is permitted for the feet of the one who made an eiruv for himself to the south, i.e., he may go north only as far as the other borrower may go.

讜讝讛 砖注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇讚专讜诐 诪讛诇讱 诇讚专讜诐 讻专讙诇讬 诪讬 砖注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇爪驻讜谉

And similarly, the one who made an eiruv for himself to the south may walk with the robe to the south only as far as is permitted for the feet of the one who made an eiruv for himself to the north, as the robe is as the feet of both borrowers and may go only as far as both of them may walk. If each of them placed his eiruv at a distance of one thousand cubits from their house, to the north and south respectively, they may each walk, without the robe, three thousand cubits from their regular dwelling-place, one partner toward the north and the other partner toward the south. The three thousand cubits are comprised of the thousand cubits from the house to the eiruv plus another two thousand, the standard Shabbat limit, from the location of the eiruv. The one whose eiruv is in the north may not wear the robe farther than one thousand cubits north of his house, as he would then be going beyond the farthest extent of the other鈥檚 Shabbat limit, and vice versa for the one whose eiruv is in the south.

讜讗诐 诪爪注讜 讗转 讛转讞讜诐 讛专讬 讝讛 诇讗 讬讝讬讝谞讛 诪诪拽讜诪讛

And if they made their respective limits end in the center, i.e., if one placed his eiruv two thousand cubits from the house to the south, so that the house is his farthest limit to the north, and the other placed his eiruv two thousand cubits to the north of the house, the house being his farthest limit to the south, then each of them may not move the robe from its place at all.

讗转诪专 砖谞讬诐 砖诇拽讞讜 讞讘讬转 讜讘讛诪讛 讘砖讜转驻讜转 专讘 讗诪专 讞讘讬转 诪讜转专转 讜讘讛诪讛 讗住讜专讛 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讞讘讬转 谞诪讬 讗住讜专讛

The Gemara records a dispute between amora鈥檌m. It was said: In the case of two people who purchased a barrel of wine or an animal in partnership before a Festival, in order to divide the contents of the barrel or the meat of the animal between them on the Festival itself, what is the halakha if the two people have different Shabbat limits? Rav said: The barrel is permitted to each of them, and each may take his portion on the Festival and transfer it within his respective Shabbat limit, which is also applicable to Festivals; but the animal is prohibited, and each portion of it may be transferred only within the limits that are shared by both purchasers. And Shmuel said: The barrel is also prohibited to be transferred beyond the limits shared by both people.

诪讗讬 拽住讘专 专讘 讗讬 拽讗 住讘专 讬砖 讘专讬专讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讛诪讛 转砖转专讬 讜讗讬 拽住讘专 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讞讘讬转 谞诪讬 讗住讜专讛

The Gemara questions the opinion of Rav, who distinguished between the case of the barrel and that of the animal. What does Rav hold? If he holds that there is retroactive designation, so that after the division of the barrel it becomes clarified retroactively which portion belonged to which partner, and the Festival place of rest for each portion is established at the start of the Festival in accordance with the person who will later become its owner, then even the animal should be permitted. And if he holds that there is no retroactive designation, so that at the start of the Festival both portions of the animal belong jointly to both of them and may therefore be transferred only within the limits shared by both people, then even the barrel should be prohibited.

诇注讜诇诐 拽住讘专 讬砖 讘专讬专讛 讜砖谞讬讗 讘讛诪讛 讚拽讗 讬谞拽讬 转讞讜诪讬谉 诪讛讚讚讬 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜专讘 讗住讬 诇专讘 诇讗讬住讜专 诪讜拽爪讛 诇讗 讞砖砖讜 诇讗讬住讜专 转讞讜诪讬谉 讞砖砖讜 砖转讬拽 专讘

The Gemara answers: Actually, the explanation for Rav is that he holds there is retroactive designation, and the reason Rav was stringent in the case of the animal is that an animal is different, as the limits absorb from each other. A live animal cannot be divided into two parts for ownership; each part of its body depends on and is nourished by the other. Consequently, even if the designation of the respective portions takes place retroactively, each portion continues to draw from the other part, so that at the time of division the two portions are once again mixed together. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: If that is your rationale, this indicates that the Sages were not concerned about the prohibition of muktze, as it is not assumed that each of them removed the portion of his partner from his mind, thereby prohibiting it from his own use, and yet they were concerned about the prohibition of Shabbat limits. Isn鈥檛 this illogical? Rav was silent and offered no response.

诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 讬砖 讘专讬专讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about this issue? Rabbi Hoshaya said: In general, there is retroactive designation, and they can therefore each transport their portions of both the barrel and the animal to their respective places. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: There is no retroactive designation, and therefore they may not move their portions of either the barrel or the animal except within the limits shared by both of them.

讜住讘专 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讬砖 讘专讬专讛 讜讛转谞谉 讛诪转 讘讘讬转 讜诇讜 驻转讞讬诐 讛专讘讛 讻讜诇谉 讟诪讗讬诐 谞驻转讞 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讛讜讗 讟诪讗 讜讻讜诇谉 讟讛讜专讬诐 讞砖讘 诇讛讜爪讬讗讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讗讜 讘讞诇讜谉 砖讬砖 讘讜 讗专讘注讛 注诇 讗专讘注讛 诪爪诇转 注诇 讛驻转讞讬诐 讻讜诇谉

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Hoshaya really hold there is retroactive designation? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna: If there is a corpse in a house that has many entrances, all the entrances are ritually impure, i.e., everything situated in the space of the entrance becomes impure, even in the part that lies beyond a closed door, separating it from the corpse. Since any of the entrances might be used to remove the corpse, and none are designated for that purpose, all are rendered impure. However, if one of them was subsequently opened, then the space of that particular entrance is impure, while all the others are pure, as it is assumed that that the corpse will be removed by way of the open door. Even if none of the entrances was actually open, if one merely intended to remove the corpse through a particular one of the entrances or through a window that is at least four by four handbreadths in size, this intention of his saves all the other entrances from impurity.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讜讛讜讗 砖讞砖讘 注诇讬讜 注讚 砖诇讗 讬诪讜转 讛诪转 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗祝 诪砖讬诪讜转 讛诪转

The details of this last halakha are disputed by tanna鈥檌m. Beit Shammai say: And this applies only if he had this intention before the dead person died, so that at the time of death it was known which entrance would be used. And Beit Hillel say: It applies even if he had this intention only after the dead person died.

讜讗转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 诇讟讛专 讗转 讛驻转讞讬诐 诪讻讗谉 讜诇讛讘讗 诪讻讗谉 讜诇讛讘讗 讗讬谉 诇诪驻专注 诇讗

And it is stated with regard to this mishna: Rabbi Hoshaya said: When Beit Hillel said that the other entrances are pure even if one thought of removing the corpse via a particular entrance only after the person died, they meant only to purify the entrances from that point and onward; from the moment of his intention there is no more impurity in the other entrances. From this the Gemara infers: From here and onward: Yes, the other entrances are saved from impurity, but retroactively: No. Whatever was in the doorways before this intent was formulated has already contracted ritual impurity and this cannot be reversed retroactively by one鈥檚 subsequent thoughts. This indicates that the principle of retroactive designation is not accepted by Rabbi Hoshaya.

讗驻讜讱 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讬砖 讘专讬专讛

The Gemara resolves this contradiction in the following manner: Reverse the presentation of their opinions given above, and say: Rabbi Hoshaya said: There is no retroactive designation, and Rabbi Yo岣nan said: There is retroactive designation.

讜诪讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘专讬专讛 讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讗讞讬谉 砖讞诇拽讜 诇拽讜讞讜转 讛谉 讜诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讬讜讘诇

The Gemara questions this resolution: And does Rabbi Yo岣nan really accept the principle of retroactive designation? But didn鈥檛 Rav Asi say that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Brothers who divided property received as an inheritance are considered purchasers from each other, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee year, at which point they may redistribute the property? This demonstrates that Rabbi Yo岣nan does not hold that it is retroactively established that each brother鈥檚 portion was designated for him directly upon their father鈥檚 death, but rather it is considered that all the land was joint property until the brothers traded or bought their respective portions from each other.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讻讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘专讬专讛 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘诇 讘讚专讘谞谉 讗讬转 诇讬讛

And if you should say: When does Rabbi Yo岣nan not accept the principle of retroactive designation? Only in regard to matters that are Torah law, but he does hold of retroactive designation in regard to matters of rabbinic law, such as the halakhot of Shabbat limits; this would account for the discrepancy.

讜讘讚专讘谞谉 诪讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讜讛转谞讬 讗讬讜

But does he accept retroactive designation in matters of rabbinic law? Didn鈥檛 the Sage Ayo teach otherwise in regard to the halakhot of joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv te岣min]? As it was taught in a mishna: One who has heard that a rabbi will be coming to a place near his town to deliver a lesson on Shabbat, but is unsure where the lecture will take place, may place two eiruvin on Shabbat eve in two different directions, while stipulating that only the eiruv on the side where the rabbi will teach will take effect. Furthermore, if he hears that two rabbis will be coming to two different locations, he may place two eiruvin and stipulate that he will decide on Shabbat which rabbi he prefers, and consequently which of the two eiruvin will take effect.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪转谞讛 注诇 砖谞讬 讚讘专讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讗诇讗 讗诐 讘讗 讞讻诐 诇诪讝专讞 注讬专讜讘讜 诇诪讝专讞 诇诪注专讘 注讬专讜讘讜 诇诪注专讘 讜讗讬诇讜 诇讻讗谉 讜诇讻讗谉 诇讗

Ayo taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with this halakha and said: A person may not make a stipulation with regard to two contradictory things at once, and therefore if two Sages will be arriving, his condition is of no effect. Rather, it is true that in the first case, where he knows that a rabbi is coming but does not know from which direction, he may place two eiruvin and stipulate that if the rabbi comes from the east his eiruv in the east will take effect, and if the rabbi comes from the west, his eiruv in the west will take effect. However, in the second case, when two rabbis come to the two locations, one of them arriving here and the other arriving there, and one wants to place two eiruvin and decide on Shabbat which of the two lecture he will attend, this he may not do; that would require the identity of the functional eiruv to be determined retroactively, and one鈥檚 place of rest must be determined when Shabbat begins.

Masechet Beitzah is dedicated by new friends of Hadran in appreciation of all who find new ways to be marbitzei Torah ba-Rabim ve Rabot.

A month of shiurim are sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik in honor of her daughter, Rivkah Wyner, who recently made aliyah, and in memory of Rivkah's namesake, Lisa's grandmother, Regina Post z"l, a Holocaust survivor from Lubaczow, Poland who lived in Brooklyn, NY.

And for a refuah shleima for Noam Eliezer ben Yael Chaya v'Aytan Yehoshua.

This month's shiurim are dedicated by Tamara Katz in memory of her maternal grandparents, Sarah bat Chaya v'Tzvi Hirsh and Meir Leib ben Esther v'Harav Yehoshua Zelig whose yahrzeits are both this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Terri Krivosha for the Refuah Shlemah of her husband Harav Hayim Yehuda Ben Faiga Rivah.聽

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

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Beitzah 37

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Beitzah 37

讚讗讬转 诇讬讛 讗砖讛 讜讘谞讬诐

because it is dealing with a case in which he already has a wife and children, so that he has already fulfilled the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply, and his betrothal of another woman is only an optional act.

诇讗 讞讜诇爪讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讬讘诪讬谉 讜讛讗 诪爪讜讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬讻讗 讙讚讜诇 讜诪爪讜讛 讘讙讚讜诇 诇讬讘诐

Nor perform 岣litza, nor perform levirate marriage: The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 one perform a mitzva through these acts? Why are they categorized as optional? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the mishna to categorize them as optional, as it is speaking of a case when there is an older brother. Since the general principle is that the preferable way to carry out the mitzva is for the oldest brother to perform levirate marriage, the performance of levirate marriage by a younger brother is classified as optional.

讜讻诇讛讜 讟注诪讗 诪讗讬 讙讝专讛 砖诪讗 讬讻转讜讘

The Gemara clarifies the reason for the prohibition against judging, betrothing, etc., on Shabbat and Festivals: And in all these cases, what is the reason they may not be performed? It is a decree lest one write down the proceedings of these acts in a document, such as the verdict of a judgment, the document of betrothal, a document testifying to the 岣litza, or a marriage contract in the case of levirate marriage.

讜讗诇讜 讛谉 诪砖讜诐 诪爪讜讛 诇讗 诪拽讚讬砖讬谉 讜诇讗 诪注专讬讻讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讞专讬诪讬谉 讙讝专讛 诪砖讜诐 诪拽讞 讜诪诪讻专

搂 It was taught in the mishna: And the following are notable because of the full-fledged mitzva involved in them, yet are prohibited on Shabbat: One may not consecrate, nor take a valuation vow, nor consecrate objects for use by the priests or the Temple. The Gemara explains: All these cases are prohibited because of a decree due to their similarity to commerce. These acts, which all involve the transfer of ownership to the Temple treasury, resemble commerce, which is prohibited on a Festival.

讜诇讗 诪讙讘讬讛讬谉 转专讜诪讜转 讜诪注砖专讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 转谞讬 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗 谞爪专讻讗 讗诇讗 诇讬转谞讛 诇讻讛谉 讘讜 讘讬讜诐

搂 It was taught in the mishna: And one may not separate terumot and tithes. The Gemara asks: Is it not obvious that this is so? In doing so one makes forbidden food usable, a form of repairing, which is a prohibited labor. Rav Yosef taught: It is necessary for the mishna to teach this only to state that it is prohibited even to separate teruma in order to give it to a priest on the same day. One could have thought that since he is separating the produce in order to give it to a priest it should be permitted like any other preparation of food; the mishna therefore states explicitly that it is prohibited.

讜讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 驻讬专讬 讚讟讘讬诇讬 诪讗转诪讜诇 讗讘诇 驻讬专讬 讚讟讘讬诇讬 讛讗讬讚谞讗 讻讙讜谉 注讬住讛 诇讗驻专讜砖讬 诪讬谞讛 讞诇讛 诪驻专砖讬谞谉 讜讬讛讘讬谞谉 诇讻讛谉

The Gemara comments: And this applies only to produce that had the status of untithed produce, and therefore was required to be tithed, the day before the Festival. However, produce that became untithed now on the Festival itself, such as dough prepared on the Festival, which becomes untithed and requires 岣lla to be taken from it only after the dough is made: With regard to separating 岣lla from it, one may separate the 岣lla and give it to a priest even on a Festival.

讜讛谞讬 诪砖讜诐 专砖讜转 讗讬讻讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘讜转 诇讬讻讗 讜讛谞讬 诪砖讜诐 诪爪讜讛 讗讬讻讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘讜转 诇讬讻讗

The Gemara asks a question. When the mishna describes those cases as notable because they are optional, is this to say that to say that their prohibition is not because of a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest [shevut]? Likewise, with regard to those cases described as notable because they are mitzvot, is this to say that their prohibition is not because of shevut? The mishna, by referring only to the first of its three categories as shevut, implies that the acts listed in the following categories do not involve shevut. But this is not so; as the Gemara stated above, all these acts are prohibited by rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat and the Festival as days of rest.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 诪讘注讬讗 拽讗诪专 诇讗 诪讘注讬讗 砖讘讜转 讙专讬讚转讗 讚讗住讜专 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 砖讘讜转 讚专砖讜转 谞诪讬 讗住讜专 讜诇讗 诪讘注讬讗 砖讘讜转 讚专砖讜转 讚讗住讜专 讗诇讗 讗驻讬诇讜 砖讘讜转 讚诪爪讜讛 谞诪讬 讗住讜专

Rabbi Yitz岣k said: They are indeed all prohibited as shevut. The mishna lists three types of shevut: Those that involve no mitzva whatsoever, those that have a mitzva aspect to them, and those that constitute a full-fledged mitzva. And the tanna is speaking and arranges his list employing the style of: There is no need, i.e., he arranges the cases in order of increasing notability. First, there is no need to state, i.e., it is most obvious, that plain shevut, which involves no mitzva at all, is prohibited, but even shevut of an optional act, i.e., an act that is a minor mitzva, is also prohibited. And there is no need to state, i.e., it is obvious, that shevut of an optional act is prohibited, but even shevut of a full-fledged mitzva is also prohibited.

讻诇 讗诇讜 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讗诪专讜 讜专诪讬谞讛讜 诪砖讬诇讬谉 讚专讱 讗专讜讘讛 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讗讘诇 诇讗 讘砖讘转

搂 It was taught in the mishna: The Sages spoke of all these acts being prohibited even with regard to a Festival; all the more so are they prohibited on Shabbat. There is no difference between a Festival and Shabbat except for work involving food. The Gemara raises a contradiction against this from an earlier mishna: One may lower produce from the roof into the house through a skylight to prevent it from being spoiled by the rain on a Festival, but not on Shabbat. This shows that there is another difference between a Festival and Shabbat besides food preparation: Doing a strenuous activity to prevent a loss is permitted on a Festival but prohibited on Shabbat.

讗诪专 专讘 讬讜住祝 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注

Rav Yosef said: This is not difficult, as this mishna here, which does not include the halakha of lowering produce as an example of a difference between Shabbat and a Festival, is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, whereas that previous mishna that does cite it as a difference is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua.

讚转谞讬讗 讗讜转讜 讜讗转 讘谞讜 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讘讜专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讜诪专 诪注诇讛 讗转 讛专讗砖讜谉 注诇 诪谞转 诇砖讜讞讟讜 讜砖讜讞讟讜 讜讛砖谞讬 注讜砖讛 诇讜 驻专谞住讛 讘诪拽讜诪讜 讻讚讬 砖诇讗 讬诪讜转

Rav Yosef elaborates on his statement: As it is taught in a baraita: If a cow and her calf, which may not be slaughtered on the same day because of the biblical prohibition: 鈥淵ou shall not kill it and its offspring both in one day鈥 (Leviticus 22:28), fell into a pit on a Festival, and their owner wishes to take them out, Rabbi Eliezer says: One may raise the first in order to slaughter it and then slaughter it, and as for the second, he provides it sustenance in its place so that it will not die in the pit. It is prohibited to undertake the strenuous task of raising an animal out of a pit except for the purpose of eating it on the Festival. Therefore, since one cannot slaughter both animals on the Festival, only one can be raised, while the other should be sustained in its place until after the Festival.

专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讗讜诪专 诪注诇讛 讗转 讛专讗砖讜谉 注诇 诪谞转 诇砖讜讞讟讜 讜讗讬谞讜 砖讜讞讟讜 讜讞讜讝专 讜诪注专讬诐 讜诪注诇讛 讛砖谞讬 专爪讛 讝讛 砖讜讞讟 专爪讛 讝讛 砖讜讞讟

Rabbi Yehoshua, however, says: One may raise the first with the intent of slaughtering it and then change his mind and not slaughter it. Then he may go back and employ artifice by deciding that he prefers to slaughter the second one, and he raises the second. Having raised both animals, if he so desires he may slaughter this one; if he so desires he may slaughter that one. Rav Yosef understands the argument between the two Sages as follows: Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that it is permitted to perform a strenuous activity on a Festival in order to prevent a loss, and therefore he may raise both animals, lest the one left behind die in the pit. Rabbi Eliezer, on the other hand, holds that one may not perform a strenuous activity to prevent a loss, so the second animal must be left in the pit even though it may die there. It may therefore be posited that the mishna that permits lowering produce on a Festival to prevent loss is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua鈥檚 opinion. Rabbi Eliezer would disagree with this leniency, and the principle that there is no difference between Shabbat and a Festival other than food preparation would remain intact.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诪诪讗讬 讚讬诇诪讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚讗驻砖专 讘驻专谞住讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 讘驻专谞住讛 诇讗

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: From where do you know that this analysis of these Sages鈥 opinions is correct? Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion that a strenuous activity to prevent monetary loss is prohibited on a Festival only thus far, there in the case of the animals in the pit, where it is possible to sustain the second animal in the pit and keep it from dying. But here, in the case of the produce on the roof, where there is no possibility of preventing the loss through providing sustenance, he would not prohibit lowering the produce to save it from loss.

讗讬 谞诪讬 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讚讗驻砖专 诇讗注专讜诪讬 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讗 讗驻砖专 诇讗注专讜诪讬 诇讗

Alternatively, one can propose an opposite argument: Rabbi Yehoshua stated his opinion that a strenuous activity to prevent loss is permitted only thus far, there in the case of the two animals, because it is possible to employ artifice to raise the second animal, so that an observer might assume that that he was not acting to preserve his property, but wished to eat the first animal and subsequently changed his mind. But here, in the case of the produce on the roof, where it is not possible to employ artifice, as it is clear that he is acting to salvage his produce, Rabbi Yehoshua would not be lenient. Therefore, Rav Yosef鈥檚 approach to resolving the contradiction has no support from this baraita.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘 驻驻讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讗 讘讬转 讛诇诇

Rather, Rav Pappa said: This resolution of the contradiction is to be rejected in favor of the following: This is not difficult, as this case is in accordance with Beit Shammai, whereas that case follows the approach of Beit Hillel.

讚转谞谉 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬谉 诇讗 讗转 讛拽讟谉 讜诇讗 讗转 讛诇讜诇讘 讜诇讗 讗转 住驻专 转讜专讛 诇专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 诪转讬专讬谉

As we learned in a mishna: Beit Shammai say: On a Festival one may not take out a child who cannot walk, nor a lulav, nor a Torah scroll into the public domain, as none of these are required for the preparation of food, and Beit Hillel permit it. It is certainly prohibited to carry out any item into the public domain on Shabbat, yet Beit Hillel permit it on a Festival. Therefore, it may be posited that just as Beit Hillel allow carrying out items on a Festival but not on Shabbat, so would they permit moving the produce off the roof on a Festival but not on Shabbat. According to Beit Shammai, who forbid carrying items out on a Festival and on Shabbat equally, moving the produce from the roof would also be equally prohibited, and the principle that there is no difference between Shabbat and a Festival other than food preparation would remain intact.

讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讛讬讗 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗 讗诪专讬 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛转诐 讗诇讗 讗讛讜爪讗讛 讗讘诇 讗讟诇讟讜诇 诇讗 讗讟讜 讟诇讟讜诇 诇讗讜 爪讜专讱 讛讜爪讗讛 讛讜讗

The Gemara at first refutes this explanation: Perhaps that is not so, as it is possible that Beit Shammai stated their opinion only thus far, there with regard to the prohibition against transferring objects from one domain to another, but not with regard to moving objects, such as produce, from place to place in the house. The Gemara rejects this claim: Is that to say that moving is not performed for the sake of taking out to the public domain? The decree against moving items unnecessarily, i.e., not for use on Shabbat or a Festival, was enacted due to a concern that one might take objects into the public domain. Rav Pappa鈥檚 explanation that it is only Beit Shammai who would prohibit lowering the produce from the roof therefore stands.

诪转谞讬壮 讛讘讛诪讛 讜讛讻诇讬诐 讻专讙诇讬 讛讘注诇讬诐 讛诪讜住专 讘讛诪转讜 诇讘谞讜 讗讜 诇专讜注讛 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讻专讙诇讬 讛讘注诇讬诐

MISHNA: The status of animals and vessels on Festivals is as the feet of their owner, meaning that one鈥檚 animals and vessels are governed by his own travel limitations on Shabbat and Festivals. In the case of one who delivers his animal to his son or to a shepherd before the Festival to care for it, these are as the feet of the owner, rather than those of the son or the shepherd.

讻诇讬诐 讛诪讬讜讞讚讬谉 诇讗讞讚 诪谉 讛讗讞讬谉 砖讘讘讬转 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讻专讙诇讬讜 讜砖讗讬谉 诪讬讜讞讚讬谉 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讻诪拽讜诐 砖讛讜诇讻讬谉

Vessels that have been inherited by several brothers and have not been divided among them but are still owned jointly, if they are designated for the use of one of the brothers in the house and the other brothers have no part in them, these are as his feet, and they are subject to his travel limitations. And as for those that are not designated for any particular brother, these are as a place where they may all go. They are limited by the travel limitations of every one of the brothers, as when one brother made a joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv te岣min] and the others did not.

讛砖讜讗诇 讻诇讬 诪讞讘讬专讜 诪注专讘 讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讻专讙诇讬 讛砖讜讗诇 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讻专讙诇讬 讛诪砖讗讬诇 讜讻谉 讛讗砖讛 砖砖讗诇讛 诪讞讘专转讛 转讘诇讬谉 讜诪讬诐 讜诪诇讞 诇注讬住转讛 讛专讬 讗诇讜 讻专讙诇讬 砖转讬讛谉 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 驻讜讟专 讘诪讬诐 诪驻谞讬 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 诪诪砖

One who borrows a vessel from another on the eve of a Festival, it is as the feet of the borrower rather than the owner, as when the Festival began the vessel established its place of rest in possession of the borrower. However, if he borrowed it on the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the lender, since at the start of the Festival its place of rest was established in the possession of its owner. And similarly, a woman who borrowed spices from another to put in a dish, or water and salt to put in her dough, these foods, i.e., the dish and the dough, which contain ingredients belonging to both parties, are as the feet of both of them; they are limited by the travel limitations of both parties. Rabbi Yehuda exempts one from travel limitations in the case of water, because it has no substance in the mixture and therefore is not considered connected to the original owner.

讙诪壮 诪转谞讬转讬谉

GEMARA: The Gemara asserts: The mishna

讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讗讜诪专 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 讗讘讗 砖讗讜诇 讗讜诪专 讛诇讜拽讞 讘讛诪讛 诪讞讘专讜 诪注专讘 讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 诪住专讛 诇讜 讗诇讗 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻专讙诇讬 讛诇讜拽讞 讜讛诪讜住专 讘讛诪讛 诇专讜注讛 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 诪住专讛 诇讜 讗诇讗 讘讬讜诐 讟讜讘 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讻专讙诇讬 讛专讜注讛

is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Dosa says, and some say Abba Shaul says: One who purchases an animal from another on the eve of a Festival, even if he did not deliver it to him until the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the purchaser. And one who delivers his animal to a shepherd, even if he did not deliver it to him until the Festival itself, it is as the feet of the shepherd. The mishna, on the other hand, teaches that an animal delivered to a shepherd remains as the feet of the owner, therefore apparently contradicting Rabbi Dosa.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讗谉 讘专讜注讛 讗讞讚 讻讗谉 讘砖谞讬 专讜注讬诐 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 诇讘谞讜 讗讜 诇专讜注讛 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara rejects the assertion that this is a contradiction. You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Dosa, and it is not difficult. Here, in the baraita, it is referring to a town that has only one shepherd. In that case the owner knows with certainty beforehand that he will be delivering his animal to this shepherd over the course of the Festival, and therefore the animal鈥檚 place of rest is established as being identical to that of the shepherd. There, however, the mishna is referring to a town where there are two shepherds. Since the issue of which of them will receive this animal is undetermined when the Festival begins, the animal remains as the feet of its owner.The Gemara strengthens this assertion that the mishna is dealing with a case where there are two shepherds: The language of the mishna is also precise in accordance with this interpretation, as it teaches: To his son or to a shepherd, suggesting that initially he did know to whom he would give the animal. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that this is so.

讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讘专 讞谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻专讘讬 讚讜住讗 讜诪讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻讬 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛诇讻讛 讻住转诐 诪砖谞讛 讜转谞谉 讛讘讛诪讛 讜讛讻诇讬诐 讻专讙诇讬 讛讘注诇讬诐

Rabba bar bar 岣na said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, that animals given to a shepherd are as the feet of the shepherd. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yo岣nan actually say this? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan say a general principle that the halakha always follows an unattributed statement in a mishna? And we learned in the mishna: Animals and vessels are as the feet of the owner. One who delivers his animal to his son or to a shepherd, it is as the feet of the owner.

讜诇讗讜 讗讜拽讬诪谞讗 讻讗谉 讘专讜注讛 讗讞讚 讻讗谉 讘砖谞讬 专讜注讬诐

The Gemara answers: And did we not establish that the baraita of Rabbi Dosa is dealing with a different case than the mishna, that here in the baraita it is dealing with a town with one shepherd, whereas there in the mishna it is dealing with a town with two shepherds? There is consequently no contradiction between establishing the halakha both in accordance with Rabbi Dosa and in accordance with the mishna.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 砖谞讬诐 砖砖讗诇讜 讞诇讜拽 讗讞讚 讘砖讜转驻讜转 讝讛 诇讬诇讱 讘讜 砖讞专讬转 诇讘讬转 讛诪讚专砖 讜讝讛 诇讬讻谞住 讘讜 注专讘讬转 诇讘讬转 讛诪砖转讛 讝讛 注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇爪驻讜谉 讜讝讛 注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇讚专讜诐 讝讛 砖注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇爪驻讜谉 诪讛诇讱 诇爪驻讜谉 讻专讙诇讬 诪讬 砖注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇讚专讜诐

The Sages taught: In the case of two people who borrowed one robe in partnership from a third party, this person in order to go to the study hall with it in the morning and that person in order to enter a wedding feast with it in the evening, and this one made a joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv te岣min] for himself to the north in order to reach his destination, and that one made an eiruv for himself to the south in order to reach his destination, the one who made an eiruv for himself to the north may walk with the robe only to the north as far as it is permitted for the feet of the one who made an eiruv for himself to the south, i.e., he may go north only as far as the other borrower may go.

讜讝讛 砖注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇讚专讜诐 诪讛诇讱 诇讚专讜诐 讻专讙诇讬 诪讬 砖注专讘 注诇讬讜 诇爪驻讜谉

And similarly, the one who made an eiruv for himself to the south may walk with the robe to the south only as far as is permitted for the feet of the one who made an eiruv for himself to the north, as the robe is as the feet of both borrowers and may go only as far as both of them may walk. If each of them placed his eiruv at a distance of one thousand cubits from their house, to the north and south respectively, they may each walk, without the robe, three thousand cubits from their regular dwelling-place, one partner toward the north and the other partner toward the south. The three thousand cubits are comprised of the thousand cubits from the house to the eiruv plus another two thousand, the standard Shabbat limit, from the location of the eiruv. The one whose eiruv is in the north may not wear the robe farther than one thousand cubits north of his house, as he would then be going beyond the farthest extent of the other鈥檚 Shabbat limit, and vice versa for the one whose eiruv is in the south.

讜讗诐 诪爪注讜 讗转 讛转讞讜诐 讛专讬 讝讛 诇讗 讬讝讬讝谞讛 诪诪拽讜诪讛

And if they made their respective limits end in the center, i.e., if one placed his eiruv two thousand cubits from the house to the south, so that the house is his farthest limit to the north, and the other placed his eiruv two thousand cubits to the north of the house, the house being his farthest limit to the south, then each of them may not move the robe from its place at all.

讗转诪专 砖谞讬诐 砖诇拽讞讜 讞讘讬转 讜讘讛诪讛 讘砖讜转驻讜转 专讘 讗诪专 讞讘讬转 诪讜转专转 讜讘讛诪讛 讗住讜专讛 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讞讘讬转 谞诪讬 讗住讜专讛

The Gemara records a dispute between amora鈥檌m. It was said: In the case of two people who purchased a barrel of wine or an animal in partnership before a Festival, in order to divide the contents of the barrel or the meat of the animal between them on the Festival itself, what is the halakha if the two people have different Shabbat limits? Rav said: The barrel is permitted to each of them, and each may take his portion on the Festival and transfer it within his respective Shabbat limit, which is also applicable to Festivals; but the animal is prohibited, and each portion of it may be transferred only within the limits that are shared by both purchasers. And Shmuel said: The barrel is also prohibited to be transferred beyond the limits shared by both people.

诪讗讬 拽住讘专 专讘 讗讬 拽讗 住讘专 讬砖 讘专讬专讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讛诪讛 转砖转专讬 讜讗讬 拽住讘专 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讞讘讬转 谞诪讬 讗住讜专讛

The Gemara questions the opinion of Rav, who distinguished between the case of the barrel and that of the animal. What does Rav hold? If he holds that there is retroactive designation, so that after the division of the barrel it becomes clarified retroactively which portion belonged to which partner, and the Festival place of rest for each portion is established at the start of the Festival in accordance with the person who will later become its owner, then even the animal should be permitted. And if he holds that there is no retroactive designation, so that at the start of the Festival both portions of the animal belong jointly to both of them and may therefore be transferred only within the limits shared by both people, then even the barrel should be prohibited.

诇注讜诇诐 拽住讘专 讬砖 讘专讬专讛 讜砖谞讬讗 讘讛诪讛 讚拽讗 讬谞拽讬 转讞讜诪讬谉 诪讛讚讚讬 讗诪专讬 诇讬讛 专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜专讘 讗住讬 诇专讘 诇讗讬住讜专 诪讜拽爪讛 诇讗 讞砖砖讜 诇讗讬住讜专 转讞讜诪讬谉 讞砖砖讜 砖转讬拽 专讘

The Gemara answers: Actually, the explanation for Rav is that he holds there is retroactive designation, and the reason Rav was stringent in the case of the animal is that an animal is different, as the limits absorb from each other. A live animal cannot be divided into two parts for ownership; each part of its body depends on and is nourished by the other. Consequently, even if the designation of the respective portions takes place retroactively, each portion continues to draw from the other part, so that at the time of division the two portions are once again mixed together. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: If that is your rationale, this indicates that the Sages were not concerned about the prohibition of muktze, as it is not assumed that each of them removed the portion of his partner from his mind, thereby prohibiting it from his own use, and yet they were concerned about the prohibition of Shabbat limits. Isn鈥檛 this illogical? Rav was silent and offered no response.

诪讗讬 讛讜讬 注诇讛 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 讬砖 讘专讬专讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about this issue? Rabbi Hoshaya said: In general, there is retroactive designation, and they can therefore each transport their portions of both the barrel and the animal to their respective places. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: There is no retroactive designation, and therefore they may not move their portions of either the barrel or the animal except within the limits shared by both of them.

讜住讘专 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讬砖 讘专讬专讛 讜讛转谞谉 讛诪转 讘讘讬转 讜诇讜 驻转讞讬诐 讛专讘讛 讻讜诇谉 讟诪讗讬诐 谞驻转讞 讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讛讜讗 讟诪讗 讜讻讜诇谉 讟讛讜专讬诐 讞砖讘 诇讛讜爪讬讗讜 讘讗讞讚 诪讛谉 讗讜 讘讞诇讜谉 砖讬砖 讘讜 讗专讘注讛 注诇 讗专讘注讛 诪爪诇转 注诇 讛驻转讞讬诐 讻讜诇谉

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Hoshaya really hold there is retroactive designation? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a mishna: If there is a corpse in a house that has many entrances, all the entrances are ritually impure, i.e., everything situated in the space of the entrance becomes impure, even in the part that lies beyond a closed door, separating it from the corpse. Since any of the entrances might be used to remove the corpse, and none are designated for that purpose, all are rendered impure. However, if one of them was subsequently opened, then the space of that particular entrance is impure, while all the others are pure, as it is assumed that that the corpse will be removed by way of the open door. Even if none of the entrances was actually open, if one merely intended to remove the corpse through a particular one of the entrances or through a window that is at least four by four handbreadths in size, this intention of his saves all the other entrances from impurity.

讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 讜讛讜讗 砖讞砖讘 注诇讬讜 注讚 砖诇讗 讬诪讜转 讛诪转 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 讗祝 诪砖讬诪讜转 讛诪转

The details of this last halakha are disputed by tanna鈥檌m. Beit Shammai say: And this applies only if he had this intention before the dead person died, so that at the time of death it was known which entrance would be used. And Beit Hillel say: It applies even if he had this intention only after the dead person died.

讜讗转诪专 注诇讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 诇讟讛专 讗转 讛驻转讞讬诐 诪讻讗谉 讜诇讛讘讗 诪讻讗谉 讜诇讛讘讗 讗讬谉 诇诪驻专注 诇讗

And it is stated with regard to this mishna: Rabbi Hoshaya said: When Beit Hillel said that the other entrances are pure even if one thought of removing the corpse via a particular entrance only after the person died, they meant only to purify the entrances from that point and onward; from the moment of his intention there is no more impurity in the other entrances. From this the Gemara infers: From here and onward: Yes, the other entrances are saved from impurity, but retroactively: No. Whatever was in the doorways before this intent was formulated has already contracted ritual impurity and this cannot be reversed retroactively by one鈥檚 subsequent thoughts. This indicates that the principle of retroactive designation is not accepted by Rabbi Hoshaya.

讗驻讜讱 专讘讬 讛讜砖注讬讗 讗诪专 讗讬谉 讘专讬专讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讬砖 讘专讬专讛

The Gemara resolves this contradiction in the following manner: Reverse the presentation of their opinions given above, and say: Rabbi Hoshaya said: There is no retroactive designation, and Rabbi Yo岣nan said: There is retroactive designation.

讜诪讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘专讬专讛 讜讛讗诪专 专讘 讗住讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讗讞讬谉 砖讞诇拽讜 诇拽讜讞讜转 讛谉 讜诪讞讝讬专讬谉 讝讛 诇讝讛 讘讬讜讘诇

The Gemara questions this resolution: And does Rabbi Yo岣nan really accept the principle of retroactive designation? But didn鈥檛 Rav Asi say that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Brothers who divided property received as an inheritance are considered purchasers from each other, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee year, at which point they may redistribute the property? This demonstrates that Rabbi Yo岣nan does not hold that it is retroactively established that each brother鈥檚 portion was designated for him directly upon their father鈥檚 death, but rather it is considered that all the land was joint property until the brothers traded or bought their respective portions from each other.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讻讬 诇讬转 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讘专讬专讛 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讗讘诇 讘讚专讘谞谉 讗讬转 诇讬讛

And if you should say: When does Rabbi Yo岣nan not accept the principle of retroactive designation? Only in regard to matters that are Torah law, but he does hold of retroactive designation in regard to matters of rabbinic law, such as the halakhot of Shabbat limits; this would account for the discrepancy.

讜讘讚专讘谞谉 诪讬 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讜讛转谞讬 讗讬讜

But does he accept retroactive designation in matters of rabbinic law? Didn鈥檛 the Sage Ayo teach otherwise in regard to the halakhot of joining of Shabbat boundaries [eiruv te岣min]? As it was taught in a mishna: One who has heard that a rabbi will be coming to a place near his town to deliver a lesson on Shabbat, but is unsure where the lecture will take place, may place two eiruvin on Shabbat eve in two different directions, while stipulating that only the eiruv on the side where the rabbi will teach will take effect. Furthermore, if he hears that two rabbis will be coming to two different locations, he may place two eiruvin and stipulate that he will decide on Shabbat which rabbi he prefers, and consequently which of the two eiruvin will take effect.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪转谞讛 注诇 砖谞讬 讚讘专讬诐 讻讗讞讚 讗诇讗 讗诐 讘讗 讞讻诐 诇诪讝专讞 注讬专讜讘讜 诇诪讝专讞 诇诪注专讘 注讬专讜讘讜 诇诪注专讘 讜讗讬诇讜 诇讻讗谉 讜诇讻讗谉 诇讗

Ayo taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with this halakha and said: A person may not make a stipulation with regard to two contradictory things at once, and therefore if two Sages will be arriving, his condition is of no effect. Rather, it is true that in the first case, where he knows that a rabbi is coming but does not know from which direction, he may place two eiruvin and stipulate that if the rabbi comes from the east his eiruv in the east will take effect, and if the rabbi comes from the west, his eiruv in the west will take effect. However, in the second case, when two rabbis come to the two locations, one of them arriving here and the other arriving there, and one wants to place two eiruvin and decide on Shabbat which of the two lecture he will attend, this he may not do; that would require the identity of the functional eiruv to be determined retroactively, and one鈥檚 place of rest must be determined when Shabbat begins.

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