Menachot 102

Menachot 102

וְאִי בָּעֵי זָרֵיק, וְקָתָנֵי דְּאֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין. מַאי לָאו דְּפַיגֵּל בִּזְרִיקָה? לָא, דְּפַיגֵּל בִּשְׁחִיטָה.

and if he had wanted, he could have sprinkled the blood of these offerings properly? Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon teaches in the baraita that the meat of an offering that was rendered piggul is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. What, is it not referring to a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of sprinkling? If so, since the offering stood to have its blood sprinkled, it is considered as though it has been sprinkled, and the offering was considered fit for consumption before he rendered it piggul; therefore, it should be susceptible to the impurity of food. The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is referring to a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of slaughtering, and the blood never stood to be sprinkled.

אֲבָל פַּיגֵּל בִּזְרִיקָה, מַאי? הָכִי נָמֵי דִּמְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין.

The Gemara asks: But if he rendered it piggul during the rite of the sprinkling, what is the halakha? Is the halakha that the meat of the offering indeed becomes susceptible to the ritual impurity of food?

אַדְּתָנֵי פִּיגֵּל בְּמִנְחָה מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין, לִיפְלוֹג בְּדִידַהּ, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? דְּפַיגֵּל בִּשְׁחִיטָה, אֲבָל פַּיגֵּל בִּזְרִיקָה – מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין!

The Gemara challenges: If so, rather than continuing and teaching that if he rendered the meal offering piggul it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, i.e., instead of contrasting the animal offering case with a case involving an meal offering, let the tanna distinguish within the case of the animal offering itself in the following way: In what case is this statement, that if one renders an offering piggul the meat is not susceptible to the impurity of food, said? It is said in a case where he rendered it piggul during the rite of slaughtering, but if he rendered it piggul during the rite of sprinkling, it is susceptible to the impurity of food.

פִּיגֵּל בְּמִנְחָה אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּפַיגֵּל בִּקְמִיצָה, דְּקוֹמֶץ בְּמִנְחָה כִּשְׁחִיטָה דָּמֵי, אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי – מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין, הוֹאִיל וְהָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר מֵעִיקָּרוֹ.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to contrast it with a case of one who rendered a meal offering piggul in order to teach that even though he already rendered it piggul at the time of the removal of the handful, and the principle is that the removal of the handful of a meal offering is equivalent to the slaughtering of an animal offering, and an offering that was rendered piggul at the time of slaughtering is not susceptible to the impurity of food, even so, the meal offering is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it initially had a time that was fit for consumption, when the flour was not yet consecrated as a meal offering.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא לָן מַמָּשׁ, וַאֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא דְּפַיגֵּל בִּזְרִיקָה.

Rav Ashi said: I related this discussion in the presence of Rav Naḥman and explained Rabbi Shimon’s opinion differently: Even if you say that the case in the baraita is one in which the meat was actually left overnight and there was time to sprinkle the blood during the day, and even if you say that he rendered the offering piggul at the time of the sprinkling of the blood rather than during the slaughtering, Rabbi Shimon does not consider those to be cases in which the offering had a time when it was fit for consumption.

דְּאִי בָּעֵי פָּרֵיק – אָמְרִינַן, אִי בָּעֵי הֲוָה זָרֵיק – לָא אָמְרִינַן.

Rabbi Shimon said only that if he had wanted, he would have redeemed it, and therefore an item that stands to be redeemed is treated as if it were already redeemed. Redemption is simple and requires only a verbal statement. According to Rabbi Shimon we do not say that if he had wanted, he would have sprinkled it, i.e., that the sprinkling of the blood and similar actions that stand to take place are treated as having taken place already.

מֵיתִיבִי, כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: כֹּל שֶׁהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים – אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ, וְכֹל שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים – מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ashi’s opinion from a mishna (Me’ila 2a): Rabbi Yehoshua states a principle about the misuse of offerings that became disqualified: With regard to any offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests before it became disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it, and with regard to any offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests before it became disqualified, one is liable for misusing it. Misuse of consecrated property applies only to offerings that are considered fully reserved for God. Once the priests are permitted to partake of the offering it is no longer categorized as consecrated property.

וְאֵיזֶהוּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים? שֶׁלָּנָה, וְשֶׁנִּטְמֵאת, וְשֶׁיָּצְאָה.

Rabbi Yehoshua clarifies: And what is a disqualified offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests? Examples of such a situation are as follows: When, after the blood was sprinkled, the meat of the offering was left overnight; or when the meat of an offering became ritually impure; or when an offering left the Temple courtyard. One is not liable for misuse in these cases, since the meat of these offerings became permitted to the priests once the blood was sprinkled and only subsequently was it disqualified.

וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים? שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ, וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ, וְשֶׁקִּבְּלוּ פְּסוּלִין וְזָרְקוּ אֶת דָּמָהּ.

And what is a disqualified offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests? Examples of such a situation are as follows: When, at the time that it was slaughtered, he intended to eat it, sprinkle the blood, or burn the sacrificial potions on the altar beyond its designated time or outside its designated area; or when priests who were disqualified for Temple service collected or sprinkled its blood. In these cases, since there was never a time that it was permitted for the priests to consume the meat of the offering, one is liable for the misuse of consecrated property.

קָתָנֵי מִיהָא רֵישָׁא שֶׁלָּנָה, וְשֶׁנִּטְמֵאת, וְשֶׁיָּצְאָה. מַאי לָאו לָנָה מַמָּשׁ, וְהָכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי הֲוָה זָרֵיק הוּא, וְקָתָנֵי דְּאֵין מוֹעֲלִין.

The Gemara addresses the objection to Rav Ashi’s opinion: In any event, the first clause teaches that meat of an offering that was left overnight, and meat that became impure, and meat that left the courtyard all had a time when they were permitted to the priests. What, is it not referring to a case where it was actually left overnight, i.e., both the blood and the meat of the offering, and here the case is an instance of: If he had wanted, he could have sprinkled the blood, and for that reason the mishna teaches that one is not liable for misusing it? It is considered as having had a time that it was permitted to the priests since he could have sprinkled the blood during the day, and therefore the offering is treated as if the sprinkling already happened, counter to Rav Ashi’s claim that such reasoning does not apply with regard to the sprinkling of the blood.

לָא, רְאוּיָה לָצֵאת, וּרְאוּיָה לִטַּמֵּא, וּרְאוּיָה לָלִין.

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to cases where the meat left the courtyard at a time when it was fit to leave, and the meat became impure when it was fit to become impure, and was left over when it was fit to be left over, i.e., the mishna is discussing cases where these occurred after the blood was sprinkled, rendering the meat fit to be consumed by the priests. For that reason it was not subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property.

אֲבָל לִינָה מַמָּשׁ, מַאי? הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמוֹעֲלִין! הַאי ״כׇּל (שהיה) [שֶׁהָיְתָה] לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים״ וְ״כֹל שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים״?

The Gemara again challenges Rav Ashi’s opinion: But according to this, what is the halakha with regard to a case where the whole offering, including the blood, was actually left overnight? Is that indeed a case where one is liable for misusing consecrated property, as the priests never had a time when it was permitted to consume the meat? If so, those statements in the mishna: Any offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests, and any offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests, are imprecise. They indicate that the critical factor is whether the meat had a time that it was potentially permitted, even if it was ultimately disqualified.

״כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ״, וְ״כֹל שֶׁאֵין לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!

Instead, the mishna should have stated: With regard to any offering that has, in actuality, a time that it is permitted for consumption by the priests, one is not liable for misusing it. And, similarly, with regard to any offering that does not have a time that it is permitted for consumption by the priests, one is liable for misusing it.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מְעִילָה אַטּוּמְאָה קָא רָמֵית?

It must be that Rav Ashi concedes that the mishna in Me’ila should be understood to include the case where both the blood and the meat were leftover, and that under such circumstances one is not liable for misuse of the offering due to the fact that once the blood could have been sprinkled, the offering is already considered permitted to the priests. Rav Ashi nevertheless claims that this mishna does not pose a difficulty to his understanding of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to an offering’s status as susceptible to the impurity of food. Rather, Rav Ashi says: Are you raising a contradiction between the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property and the halakhot of ritual impurity?

מְעִילָה מִשּׁוּם קְדוּשָּׁה וְלָאו קְדוּשָּׁה הִיא, לְבָתַר דְּפָקְעָה לַהּ קְדוּשְּׁתֵיהּ, בְּמַאי הָדְרָא רָכְבָא לַהּ?

These cannot be compared, as liability for misuse of consecrated property is due to the sanctity or lack of sanctity of an item, i.e., on whether it is classified as fully reserved for God. Therefore, after the sanctity of the offering has lapsed, which occurs when the blood is ready to be sprinkled, as at that point it is already regarded as permitted to the priests, how can it return and be inured in it?

טוּמְאָה מִשּׁוּם אוּכְלָא וְלָאו (מִשּׁוּם) אוּכְלָא הִיא, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי זָרֵיק מָצֵי זָרֵיק לֵיהּ – מְשַׁוֵּי לֵיהּ אוּכְלָא, וּמְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין. הֵיכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי (מָצֵי) זָרֵיק לָא מָצֵי זָרֵיק – לָא מְשַׁוֵּי לֵיהּ אוּכְלָא, [וְלָא] מְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין.

But with regard to impurity, the offering’s susceptibility to the impurity of food is due to whether it is considered food or not considered food. Therefore, in any case where if he wants to sprinkle the blood he could sprinkle it, it is only in sprinkling the blood that he grants the meat the status of food, and then it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. But in a case where if he wants to sprinkle the blood he cannot sprinkle it for some reason, and the offering is subsequently disqualified, he does not grant it the status of food, since it never became permitted to eat and it therefore is not susceptible to the impurity of food.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַמֵּבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, וְנוֹדַע שֶׁלֹּא חָטָא – אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁחַט נוֹדַע לוֹ, יֵצֵא וְיִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים:

The Gemara raises another objection from a mishna (Karetot 23b) to Rav Ashi’s opinion that with regard to susceptibility to the impurity of food, blood that is ready to be sprinkled is not considered as if it were sprinkled: With regard to one who brings a provisional guilt offering to be sacrificed, because he is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering (see Leviticus 5:17–19), and later it becomes known to him that he has not sinned, the status of the offering is as follows: If it became known to him that he had not sinned before the offering was slaughtered, the consecrated ram should go out and graze in the flock as a non-sacred animal, as the consecration was performed in error. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say

יִרְעֶה עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֵב וְיִמָּכֵר וְיִפְּלוּ דָּמָיו לִנְדָבָה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: יַקְרִיב, שֶׁאִם אֵינוֹ בָּא עַל חֵטְא זֶה הֲרֵי הוּא בָּא עַל חֵטְא אַחֵר.

it is treated as a guilt offering that was disqualified and it should graze until it becomes blemished, and then it is sold, and its money that is received from the sale is allocated for communal gift offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: It should be sacrificed in its current state, since if it does not come to atone for this sin, it will come for a different sin, as he certainly committed some sin of which he is unaware.

מִשֶּׁנִּשְׁחַט, נוֹדַע לוֹ – הַדָּם יִשָּׁפֵךְ, וְהַבָּשָׂר יִשָּׂרֵף.

If, after the provisional guilt offering was slaughtered, it became known to him that he had not sinned, the blood collected in a cup to sprinkle on the altar should be spilled into the Temple courtyard drain and the meat should be burned in the place of burning, in accordance with the halakhot of a disqualified offering.

נִזְרַק הַדָּם – הַבָּשָׂר יֵאָכֵל, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ הַדָּם בַּכּוֹס – יִזָּרֵק וְהַבָּשָׂר יֵאָכֵל.

If the blood was already sprinkled on the altar when it became known to him that he had not sinned, the meat of the offering is eaten by the priests in the normal manner. And Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he discovered that he had not sinned while the blood was still in the cup, it is sprinkled on the altar and the meat is eaten.

וְאָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּשִׁיטַת רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אֲמָרָהּ, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִזְרוֹק – כְּזָרוּק דָּמֵי.

And Rava says in explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: Rabbi Yosei stated this ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that for any blood that stands to be sprinkled on the altar, it is as if it has already been sprinkled. Therefore, once the blood is in the cup and is ready to be sprinkled, the meat is permitted as though the blood already had been sprinkled. This statement contradicts Rav Ashi’s opinion that with regard to the status of the meat as food, an offering whose blood stands to be sprinkled is not necessarily considered as though it has already been sprinkled.

מִידֵּי הוּא טַעְמָא? אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּקָסָבַר כְּלֵי שָׁרֵת מְקַדְּשִׁין אֶת הַפְּסוּלִין לְכַתְּחִילָּה לִיקְרַב.

The Gemara responds: Is that the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s opinion? They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei: His reasoning is that he holds that a service vessel sanctifies disqualified offerings to be sacrificed on the altar ab initio, and in this case the blood was already in the service vessel.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: מִדְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִזְרוֹק כְּזָרוּק דָּמֵי, כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִשְׂרוֹף נָמֵי כְּשָׂרוּף דָּמֵי – נוֹתָר וּפָרָה אַמַּאי מִטַּמְּאִין טוּמְאַת אֳכָלִין? עַפְרָא בְּעָלְמָא נִינְהוּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חִיבַּת הַקּוֹדֶשׁ מַכְשַׁרְתָּן.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Since Rabbi Shimon said that for any blood that stands to be sprinkled on the altar it is as if it has already been sprinkled, and for any item that stands to be burned it is as if it is already burned, why does he hold, as the Gemara mentioned previously (101b), that meat from an offering that is leftover, and the meat of a red heifer that is not yet burned on its pyre, are both susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since there was a time that they were fit for consumption by the priests? They are merely dust, as they stand to be burned, and therefore should no longer retain the status of food. Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi in response: Nevertheless, regard for the sanctity of sacred property renders them susceptible to the impurity of food.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: נְהִי דְּמַהְנְיָא לְהוּ חִיבַּת הַקּוֹדֶשׁ לְאִיפְּסוֹלֵי דְּגוּפֵיהּ, לִיקְּרוֹיֵי טָמֵא נָמֵי, לְמִימְנֵי בֵּיהּ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי?

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Granted that the regard for the sanctity of sacred property is effective in order to disqualify the meat itself if it becomes impure, but is it also considered impure to the extent that one counts first- and second-degree with regard to it, as indicated by the language: Susceptible to the ritual impurity of food? Accordingly, if the meat came into contact with a primary source of impurity, it would have first-degree impurity and it would subsequently transfer second-degree impurity to an item that comes into contact with it.

תִּפְשׁוֹט דְּבָעֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: צָרִיד שֶׁל מְנָחוֹת, מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי, אוֹ אֵין מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי?

If that were the case, one could resolve the dilemma that Reish Lakish raises: With regard to a dry portion of flour taken from one of the meal offerings that has not come into contact with a liquid and is therefore susceptible to impurity due only to regard for its sanctity, does one count first- and second-degree impurity with it, or does one not count first- and second-degree impurity with it? Since Reish Lakish’s inquiry is unresolved, presumably the same uncertainty applies here.

כִּי מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ – דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, כִּי קָאָמְרִינַן – דְּרַבָּנַן.

The Gemara responds: When Reish Lakish raises the dilemma, it is with regard to the status of the dry mass of the meal offering by Torah law, as consecrated items are burned only when rendered impure by Torah law. When we said that leftover meat and the meat of the red heifer are susceptible to the impurity of food, we were inquiring about the status of the leftover meat and of the red heifer by rabbinic law, and therefore nothing can be derived from the dilemma raised by Reish Lakish.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי בְּמַחֲבַת״ וְהֵבִיא בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, ״בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת״ וְהֵבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת – מַה שֶּׁהֵבִיא הֵבִיא, וִידֵי חוֹבָתוֹ לֹא יָצָא.

MISHNA: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan instead, the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation that he undertook with his vow and he must therefore bring another meal offering.

״זוֹ לְהָבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת״, וְהֵבִיא בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת; ״בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת״, וְהֵבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת – הֲרֵי זוֹ פְּסוּלָה.

If he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought it prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, this offering is not valid, because he did not fulfill what he had stated concerning that tenth of an ephah of flour.

הָאוֹמֵר: ״הֲרֵי עָלַי שְׁנֵי עֶשְׂרוֹנוֹת לְהָבִיא בִּכְלִי אֶחָד״, וְהֵבִיא בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים, ״בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים״, וְהֵבִיא בִּכְלִי אֶחָד – מַה שֶּׁהֵבִיא הֵבִיא, וִידֵי חוֹבָתוֹ לֹא יָצָא.

In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided it and brought it in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah for two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and removed one handful from it, then the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation.

״אֵלּוּ בִּכְלִי אֶחָד״, וְהֵבִיא בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים; ״בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים״, וְהֵבִיא בִּכְלִי אֶחָד – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּסוּלִין.

If he says: These two tenths of an ephah before me are a meal offering in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: These tenths of an ephah are two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought them in one vessel, both of these offerings are not valid, because in both cases he deviated from the number of handfuls that he vowed to remove.

״הֲרֵי עָלַי שְׁנֵי עֶשְׂרוֹנוֹת לְהָבִיא בִּכְלִי אֶחָד״, וְהֵבִיא בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״בִּכְלִי אֶחָד נָדַרְתָּ״. הִקְרִיבָן בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים – פְּסוּלִין, בִּכְלִי אֶחָד – כְּשֵׁרִין.

In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, and others said to him: You vowed to bring a meal offering in one vessel, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels they are not valid even as voluntary meal offerings, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill his obligation. His failure to respond and explain that it was not his intention to fulfill his vow with this offering indicates that he does intend to fulfill his vow with it. Since he deviated from his vow, the offering is not valid. If he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in one vessel after he was reminded, it is valid, as he fulfilled his vow.

״הֲרֵי עָלַי שְׁנֵי עֶשְׂרוֹנוֹת לְהָבִיא בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים״, וְהֵבִיא בִּכְלִי אֶחָד, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים נָדַרְתָּ״. הִקְרִיבָן בִּשְׁנֵי כֵּלִים – כְּשֵׁרִין, נְתָנוֹ לִכְלִי אֶחָד – כִּשְׁתֵּי מְנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּתְעָרְבוּ.

Likewise, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two meal offerings totaling two tenths of an ephah in two vessels, and he brought it all in one vessel, and others said to him: You vowed to bring meal offerings in two vessels, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels as he had originally vowed, they are valid. If he placed it all in one vessel, its halakhic status is like that of two meal offerings that were intermingled prior to removal of the handfuls. Therefore, if one can remove a handful from each meal offering in and of itself, they are valid. If not, they are not valid, as the Gemara explained on 23a.

גְּמָ׳ וּצְרִיכָא.

GEMARA: The mishna cites cases where one vowed to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan and instead brought one prepared in a deep pan and vice versa, as well as cases where one vowed to bring two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and instead brought them in two vessels and vice versa. In all these cases, the offering is accepted but he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the mishna to mention both types of changes from the initial vow.

דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר ״בְּמַחֲבַת״ וְקָא מַיְיתֵי בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּאִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּמַחֲבַת, וְאִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, אֵימָא יְדֵי נִדְרוֹ נָמֵי יָצָא.

It is necessary because had the tanna taught us only this first case, one might think that perhaps this individual does not fulfill his obligation because he said: In a shallow pan, and he brought it instead in a deep pan. But here, where he changes the number of offerings but both this, the offering specified in his vow, and that, the offering that he actually brought, are in a shallow pan, or both this and that are in a deep pan, I would say that he has indeed fulfilled his vow, as the difference in number of offerings brought is not significant. Therefore, the tanna taught the second case as well, to teach that the change in the number is in fact significant.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָךְ, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא פָּלֵיג לַהּוֹ, אֲבָל הָתָם דְּלָא פָּלֵיג בֵּיהּ – אֵימָא לָא. צְרִיכָא.

And conversely, had the tanna taught us only this case, where there was a discrepancy between the number of offerings he vowed to bring and the number he actually brought, one might think that he does not fulfill his obligation only because he divided the two tenths of an ephah that were supposed to be brought together. But there, where he changed the type of pan but did not divide the flour to be used, I would say that it is not a case where he failed to fulfill his obligation. Therefore, it was necessary for the tanna to teach that where he changes the type of pan, he does not, in fact, fulfill his obligation.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַה שֶּׁהֵבִיא – הֵבִיא, וִידֵי נִדְרוֹ לֹא יָצָא. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אַף יְדֵי נִדְרוֹ נָמֵי יָצָא.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita a case similar to that of the mishna: If one brings a meal offering somewhat different from that which he vowed to bring, then the one that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his vow. Rabbi Shimon says: He has even fulfilled his vow, as Rabbi Shimon maintains that the type of pan or the number of offerings is not significant.

זוֹ לְהָבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת – וְהָא תַּנְיָא: לֹא קִידְּשׁוּם כְּלֵי שָׁרֵת? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא קִידְּשׁוּם לִיקְרַב, אֲבָל קִידְּשׁוּם לִיפָּסֵל.

§ The mishna teaches that if he says: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead, it is not valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that in this case the service vessel does not consecrate the flour, since he brought it in a different service vessel than he had vowed? Therefore, the meal offering is still non-sacred and can be used. The Gemara answers that the baraita should be understood according to that which Abaye says: Under such circumstances, the service vessel does not sanctify them with regard to being sacrificed on the altar, but it does sanctify them in order to become disqualified.

וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ

And Abaye says an additional comment about the previous case: The Sages taught in the mishna that in the case of a change in the type of meal offering, the meal offering not valid