Menachot 2
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This week’s learning is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family for the refuah shleima of our dear friend and co-learner, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשא רחל. “Phyllis, you continue to inspire and uplift us with your messages throughout this time. Your emunah is the embodiment of ה’ רועי לא אחסר. May הקב”ה grant you strength, healing and stamina each and every day.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Pnina Lipskier in loving memory of Major Yaniv Kula and Staff-Sgt. Itay Yavetz, both from Modi’in, who were killed in Gaza. “Yaniv brought light, wisdom, and values wherever he went. Throughout his life, he acted to make the country better—and out of a deep sense of mission, he said: ‘Now it is my turn.’ Itay, charismatic and full of strength, left behind words of depth and significance, writing that the world is full of infinite meaning. May their memory be a blessing.”
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Summary
If one takes a dough of a mincha that was designated for a specific type of meal offering and takes the kemitza with the intention that it be offered for a different type of mincha, the sacrifice is not invalidated. It must still be offered according to its original designation. However, it does not fulfill the obligation of the person who brought the mincha. There are exceptions to this rule – cases in which the wrong intent completely disqualifies the offering – specifically in a mincha of a sinner and of the sotah.
The Gemara raises a question: Why does the Mishna use the word “ela” (“but”) instead of “ve” (“and”) in the phrase “but with the wrong intent does not fulfill the owner’s obligation”? The answer given is that although the sacrifice does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, its original sanctity and designation remain intact. Therefore, the remaining sacrificial rites must be performed in accordance with its original purpose. This explanation aligns with a statement made by Rava, and two reasons are offered to support this ruling – one derived from a biblical verse, and the other based on logical reasoning.
It seems, at first glance, that the Mishna does not accord with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who explains that a mincha offered for the sake of a different sacrifice is valid and fulfills the obligation of the owner. The Gemara refers then to a contradiction between two different sources within Rabbi Shimon – in one it says it does fulfill the obligation, in the other it says it does not. Raba, Rava, and Rav Ashi each offer different resolutions to the contradiction. According to Rav Ashi’s resolution, one can reconcile our Mishna with Rabbi Shimon in the same manner. But according to Raba and Rava, that is not possible, as their explanations for the second braita cannot be used for our Mishna, as the language of our Mishna would not fit with that explanation. Therefore, according to them, Rabbi Shimon must be offering a position that is counter to the position of our Mishna.
After making mention of the contradictory sources of Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara brings the other braita and begins to explain the resolutions. Raba’s explanation is brought and Abaye raises a difficulty, which Raba himself resolves. Then a number of other questions are raised against Raba.
Today’s daily daf tools:
This week’s learning is sponsored by the Hadran Zoom family for the refuah shleima of our dear friend and co-learner, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשא רחל. “Phyllis, you continue to inspire and uplift us with your messages throughout this time. Your emunah is the embodiment of ה’ רועי לא אחסר. May הקב”ה grant you strength, healing and stamina each and every day.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Pnina Lipskier in loving memory of Major Yaniv Kula and Staff-Sgt. Itay Yavetz, both from Modi’in, who were killed in Gaza. “Yaniv brought light, wisdom, and values wherever he went. Throughout his life, he acted to make the country better—and out of a deep sense of mission, he said: ‘Now it is my turn.’ Itay, charismatic and full of strength, left behind words of depth and significance, writing that the world is full of infinite meaning. May their memory be a blessing.”
Today’s daf is sponsored by Miki Kadosh in loving memory of her father, Daniel Hirsh.
Menachot 2
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּקְמְצוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁירוֹת, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה, חוּץ מִמִּנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּמִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת.
MISHNA: When one brings a meal offering to the Temple, the priest removes a handful from it, places the handful into a service vessel, conveys it to the altar, and burns it. At that point, the remainder is permitted to the priests for consumption and the owner has fulfilled his obligation. In this context, the mishna teaches: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who must therefore bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all meal offerings except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy, which is brought as part of the rite of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota]. In those cases, if the priest removed the handful not for its own sake, the offering is disqualified.
מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּמִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת שֶׁקְּמָצָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, נָתַן בִּכְלִי וְהָלַךְ וְהִקְטִיר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, אוֹ לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן – פְּסוּלוֹת.
With regard to the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy from which the priest removed a handful not for their sake, or where he placed a handful from them in a vessel, or conveyed the handful to the altar, or burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake, or for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, they are disqualified.
כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּלְשֵׁם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה. שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן – לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה וּלְשֵׁם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא.
The mishna elaborates: How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? It is in a case where one removed the handful with two intentions: For the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and for the sake of a voluntary meal offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? It is in a case where one removed the handful with two intentions: For the sake of a voluntary meal offering and for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner.
גְּמָ׳ לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנָא ״אֶלָּא״? לִיתְנֵי: וְלֹא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה!
GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach: But these offerings did not [ella shelo] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [velo] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word ella add?
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לַבְּעָלִים הוּא דְּלֹא עָלוּ לְשׁוּם חוֹבָה, הָא מִנְחָה גּוּפַהּ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְאָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי, כִּדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – אָסוּר לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.
The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency of these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner; but the meal offering itself is valid and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of its sacrificial process. For example, if a handful was removed from a meal offering not for its own sake, it is prohibited to also burn it not for its own sake. This halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its own sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its own sake.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: מִשּׁוּם דִּמְשַׁנֵּי בַּהּ, כֹּל הָנֵי לִישַׁנֵּי בָּהּ וְנֵיזִיל?
The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement; and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, by removing the handful, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא, ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ נְדָבָה״, נְדָבָה? נֶדֶר הוּא! קָרֵי לֵיהּ נֶדֶר וְקָרֵי לֵיהּ נְדָבָה! אֶלָּא, אִם כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַרְתָּ עָשִׂיתָ – יְהֵא נֶדֶר, וְאִם לָאו – יְהֵא נְדָבָה.
And if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed as a gift offering to the Lord your God, that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara analyzes the verse: Is it a gift offering? It is a vow offering. Why does the verse first call it a vow offering and subsequently call it a gift offering? Rather, the verse teaches that if you acted in accordance with how you vowed, i.e., if you sacrificed the offering for its own sake, your obligation to fulfill your vow will be fulfilled; but if you did not act in accordance with your vow, it does not fulfill the obligation incurred by the vow, and will be considered a gift offering.
וּנְדָבָה מִי שְׁרֵי לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי בַּהּ?
The Gemara concludes the proof from the verse: And with regard to a gift offering, is it permitted to deviate from its protocol ab initio? Clearly one may not do so. Accordingly, if one of the sacrificial rites of a meal offering was performed for the sake of a different meal offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of its other sacrificial rites improperly.
לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּקְמְצוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁירוֹת, וְעָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה.
§ The mishna teaches that all the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice but they do not fulfill the obligation of the owner. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice and they even satisfy the obligation of the owner.
שֶׁאֵין הַמְּנָחוֹת דּוֹמוֹת לִזְבָחִים, שֶׁהַקּוֹמֵץ מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ לְשׁוּם מַחֲבַת, חֲרֵיבָה לְשׁוּם בְּלוּלָה – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ לְשׁוּם חֲרֵיבָה.
The baraita continues: Conversely, consecrated animals that were sacrificed not for their sake do not fulfill the obligation of the owner, as in this regard meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. The difference is that when one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, its mode of preparation proves that it is in fact for the sake of a pan meal offering, as the two offerings differ in appearance. Similarly, with regard to a dry meal offering, e.g., the meal offering of a sinner, which contains no oil, whose handful is removed for the sake of a meal offering that is mixed with oil, its mode of preparation proves that it is for the sake of a dry meal offering, and one’s improper intent is therefore disregarded.
אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵן, שְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, וּזְרִיקָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, וְקַבָּלָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן.
But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so, as there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings. Since the differentiation between slaughtered offerings is established only through intention, one who sacrifices an animal offering not for its own sake does not fulfill the obligation of the owner. Rabbi Shimon apparently disagrees with the tanna of the mishna on two counts: First, he claims that if the handful of a meal offering was removed not for its own sake it satisfies the obligation of the owner, whereas the mishna teaches that the obligation is not fulfilled. Second, Rabbi Shimon does not differentiate between the meal offering of a sinner or the meal offering of jealousy, and the other types of meal offerings.
הָנִיחָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, דְּאָמַר: כָּאן בְּקוֹמֵץ מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת, כָּאן בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מִנְחַת מַרְחֶשֶׁת –
The Gemara comments: This works out well, i.e., the mishna can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, according to Rav Ashi, who says (3b), in a resolution of two apparently contradictory statements of Rabbi Shimon: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel, not the type of meal offering. Conversely, there, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.
מַתְנִיתִין מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה הִיא. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּה וְרָבָא מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
Accordingly, it can be explained that the mishna is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, which is why it does not satisfy the obligation of the owner. But according to the statements of Rabba and Rava, who resolved that contradiction in a different manner, what can be said?
וְכִי תֵימָא, כִּדְקָא מְשַׁנֵּי רַבָּה: כָּאן בְּשִׁינּוּי קֹדֶשׁ, כָּאן בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים –
The Gemara elaborates: And if you would say that the contradiction addressed by Rav Ashi is resolved as Rabba answers, this is problematic. Rabba resolved the contradiction as follows: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon.
הָא מַתְנִיתִין שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ הוּא, דְּקָתָנֵי: ״כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן״ – לְשׁוּם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּלְשׁוּם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה.
The Gemara explains that the reason this is problematic is that if one accepts Rabba’s resolution, how can the mishna be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The mishna is clearly discussing the case of a change of sanctity, as it teaches: How are these rites performed for their sake and then not for their sake, whereby the offering does not satisfy the owner’s obligation? It is in a case where one initially removed the handful for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and then for the sake of a voluntary meal offering. This is a change involving a different type of meal offering.
וְאִי נָמֵי כִּדְקָא מְשַׁנֵּי רָבָא: כָּאן בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה, כָּאן בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם זֶבַח –
And alternatively, if you would say that the contradiction addressed by Rav Ashi is resolved as Rava answers, this is equally problematic. Rava resolved the contradiction as follows: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, whereas there, where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.
הָא מַתְנִיתִין מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה הִיא, דְּקָתָנֵי: ״שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן״ – לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּה וְרָבָא מְחַוַּורְתָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
The Gemara explains that if one accepts Rava’s resolution, the mishna cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: The mishna is discussing a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, as it teaches: How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? It is a case where one removed the handful for the sake of a voluntary meal offering and then for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner. The Gemara concludes: Rather, according to the resolutions offered by Rabba and Rava, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַדְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הִיא כְּחַטָּאת וּכְאָשָׁם״ – יֵשׁ מֵהֶן כְּחַטָּאת, וְיֵשׁ מֵהֶן כְּאָשָׁם.
§ The Gemara cites the baraita that is the basis for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon, which was mentioned in the previous discussion: And a Sage raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Shimon and another statement of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse written concerning the meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10), indicates that there are some meal offerings whose halakha is like that of a sin offering, and there are some whose halakha is like that of a guilt offering.
מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא הֲרֵי הִיא כְּחַטָּאת, לְפִיכָךְ קְמָצָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – פְּסוּלָה, כַּחַטָּאת; מִנְחַת נְדָבָה הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאָשָׁם, לְפִיכָךְ קְמָצָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – כְּשֵׁירָה.
Rabbi Shimon elaborates: The halakha with regard to the meal offering of a sinner is like that of a sin offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is disqualified, just like a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake. Conversely, the halakha with regard to a voluntary meal offering is like that of a guilt offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is valid, like a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake.
וּכְאָשָׁם – מָה אָשָׁם כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה, אַף מִנְחַת נְדָבָה כְּשֵׁירָה וְאֵינָהּ מְרַצָּה.
Rabbi Shimon adds: And a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering in another aspect as well: Just as a guilt offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, so too, a voluntary meal offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Shimon here apparently contradicts his ruling that all meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake satisfy the obligation of the owner.
אָמַר רַבָּה, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, כָּאן בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים.
Rabba said in resolution of this contradiction: This is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִכְּדֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דִּפְסַל רַחֲמָנָא הֶקֵּישָׁא הִיא, מָה לִי שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, מָה לִי שִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים?
Abaye said to Rabba: Now consider, the fact that the Merciful One disqualifies a meal offering due to improper intent is derived from the Torah’s comparison of meal offerings to sin offerings and guilt offerings. If so, what difference is there to me if there was a change of sanctity, and what difference is there to me if there was a change of owner? In the case of a guilt offering either of these changes prevents it from satisfying the obligation of the owner.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, סְבָרָא הִיא, דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דָּרֵישׁ טַעְמָא דִּקְרָא.
Rabba said to Abaye: The claim that its mode of preparation proves one’s intent, which Rabbi Shimon states in explanation of why offerings are disqualified through improper intent, is based on logical reasoning, as Rabbi Shimon interprets the reason behind the mitzva in the verse and draws halakhic conclusions based on that interpretation.
מַחְשָׁבָה דְּלָא מִינַּכְרָא – פְּסַל רַחֲמָנָא, מַחְשָׁבָה דְמִינַּכְרָא – לָא פְּסַל רַחֲמָנָא.
Rabba continues: This is significant, as Rabbi Shimon holds that the Merciful One disqualifies improper intent that is not recognizably false, i.e., when the intent is not in clear contradiction to the sacrificial rites performed. The intent to sacrifice an offering for the sake of another owner does not include a change in the sacrificial rites and it therefore disqualifies the offering. The Merciful One does not disqualify improper intent that is recognizably false and contradicts the sacrificial rites performed, e.g., if one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, as the different substance itself indicates that it is a pan meal offering.
(סִימָן: עוֹלָה, עוֹלָה, מָלַק וּמִיצָּה, חַטַּאת הָעוֹף, קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים.)
The Gemara lists several questions with regard to Rabba’s statement, for which it provides a mnemonic: Burnt offering, burnt offering, pinched and squeezed, bird sin offering, offerings of the most sacred order, offerings of lesser sanctity.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, עוֹלַת הָעוֹף שֶׁמְּלָקָהּ לְמַעְלָה מִשּׁוּם חַטַּאת הָעוֹף, תְּרַצֶּה? מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ דְּעוֹלַת הָעוֹף הִיא, דְּאִי חַטַּאת הָעוֹף הִיא – לְמַטָּה הֲוֵי עָבֵיד לַהּ.
The Gemara first asks: But if that is so, that only intent that is not recognizably false disqualifies an offering, then in the case of a bird burnt offering where one pinched the nape of its neck above the red line that divides the upper and lower halves of the altar for the sake of a bird sin offering, it should effect acceptance according to Rabbi Shimon. The reason is the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird burnt offering. Because if it is in fact a bird sin offering, he would have performed the pinching below the red line while standing beside the altar. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon agrees with the ruling of the mishna (Zevaḥim 64b) that this bird offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
אַטּוּ חַטַּאת הָעוֹף לְמַעְלָה מִי לֵיתָא? הָאָמַר מָר: מְלִיקָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם בַּמִּזְבֵּחַ כְּשֵׁרָה!
The Gemara rejects this: Is that to say that a case of a bird sin offering that is pinched above the red line is not possible? Didn’t the Master say: The pinching of a bird sin offering that is performed in any place on the altar is valid after the fact? Accordingly, there is no discernible difference between the pinching of a bird burnt offering and the pinching of a bird sin offering, so the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.
עוֹלַת הָעוֹף שֶׁמִּיצָּה דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת הָעוֹף תְּרַצֶּה, מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ דְּעוֹלַת הָעוֹף הִיא, דְּאִי חַטַּאת הָעוֹף הִיא – לְמַטָּה הֲוָה עָבֵיד לַהּ הַזָּאָה.
The Gemara raises another difficulty: If recognizably false intent does not disqualify an offering, then a bird burnt offering where a priest squeezed its blood above the red line for the sake of a bird sin offering should effect acceptance, as the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird burnt offering. Because if it is in fact a bird sin offering, he would have performed the required act of holding the body of the bird and sprinkling its blood below the red line, instead of squeezing out its blood above that line.
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Menachot 2
מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּקְמְצוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁירוֹת, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה, חוּץ מִמִּנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּמִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת.
MISHNA: When one brings a meal offering to the Temple, the priest removes a handful from it, places the handful into a service vessel, conveys it to the altar, and burns it. At that point, the remainder is permitted to the priests for consumption and the owner has fulfilled his obligation. In this context, the mishna teaches: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who must therefore bring another offering. This is the halakha with regard to all meal offerings except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy, which is brought as part of the rite of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota]. In those cases, if the priest removed the handful not for its own sake, the offering is disqualified.
מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּמִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת שֶׁקְּמָצָן שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, נָתַן בִּכְלִי וְהָלַךְ וְהִקְטִיר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, אוֹ לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן – פְּסוּלוֹת.
With regard to the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy from which the priest removed a handful not for their sake, or where he placed a handful from them in a vessel, or conveyed the handful to the altar, or burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake, or for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, they are disqualified.
כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּלְשֵׁם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה. שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן – לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה וּלְשֵׁם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא.
The mishna elaborates: How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? It is in a case where one removed the handful with two intentions: For the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and for the sake of a voluntary meal offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? It is in a case where one removed the handful with two intentions: For the sake of a voluntary meal offering and for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner.
גְּמָ׳ לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנָא ״אֶלָּא״? לִיתְנֵי: וְלֹא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה!
GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach: But these offerings did not [ella shelo] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [velo] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word ella add?
הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לַבְּעָלִים הוּא דְּלֹא עָלוּ לְשׁוּם חוֹבָה, הָא מִנְחָה גּוּפַהּ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְאָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי, כִּדְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: עוֹלָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – אָסוּר לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.
The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency of these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner; but the meal offering itself is valid and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of its sacrificial process. For example, if a handful was removed from a meal offering not for its own sake, it is prohibited to also burn it not for its own sake. This halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its own sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its own sake.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: מִשּׁוּם דִּמְשַׁנֵּי בַּהּ, כֹּל הָנֵי לִישַׁנֵּי בָּהּ וְנֵיזִיל?
The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement; and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, by removing the handful, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא, ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ נְדָבָה״, נְדָבָה? נֶדֶר הוּא! קָרֵי לֵיהּ נֶדֶר וְקָרֵי לֵיהּ נְדָבָה! אֶלָּא, אִם כְּמָה שֶׁנָּדַרְתָּ עָשִׂיתָ – יְהֵא נֶדֶר, וְאִם לָאו – יְהֵא נְדָבָה.
And if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed as a gift offering to the Lord your God, that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara analyzes the verse: Is it a gift offering? It is a vow offering. Why does the verse first call it a vow offering and subsequently call it a gift offering? Rather, the verse teaches that if you acted in accordance with how you vowed, i.e., if you sacrificed the offering for its own sake, your obligation to fulfill your vow will be fulfilled; but if you did not act in accordance with your vow, it does not fulfill the obligation incurred by the vow, and will be considered a gift offering.
וּנְדָבָה מִי שְׁרֵי לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי בַּהּ?
The Gemara concludes the proof from the verse: And with regard to a gift offering, is it permitted to deviate from its protocol ab initio? Clearly one may not do so. Accordingly, if one of the sacrificial rites of a meal offering was performed for the sake of a different meal offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of its other sacrificial rites improperly.
לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַמְּנָחוֹת שֶׁנִּקְמְצוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן כְּשֵׁירוֹת, וְעָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים לְשֵׁם חוֹבָה.
§ The mishna teaches that all the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice but they do not fulfill the obligation of the owner. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice and they even satisfy the obligation of the owner.
שֶׁאֵין הַמְּנָחוֹת דּוֹמוֹת לִזְבָחִים, שֶׁהַקּוֹמֵץ מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ לְשׁוּם מַחֲבַת, חֲרֵיבָה לְשׁוּם בְּלוּלָה – מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ לְשׁוּם חֲרֵיבָה.
The baraita continues: Conversely, consecrated animals that were sacrificed not for their sake do not fulfill the obligation of the owner, as in this regard meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. The difference is that when one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, its mode of preparation proves that it is in fact for the sake of a pan meal offering, as the two offerings differ in appearance. Similarly, with regard to a dry meal offering, e.g., the meal offering of a sinner, which contains no oil, whose handful is removed for the sake of a meal offering that is mixed with oil, its mode of preparation proves that it is for the sake of a dry meal offering, and one’s improper intent is therefore disregarded.
אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵן, שְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, וּזְרִיקָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, וְקַבָּלָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן.
But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so, as there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings. Since the differentiation between slaughtered offerings is established only through intention, one who sacrifices an animal offering not for its own sake does not fulfill the obligation of the owner. Rabbi Shimon apparently disagrees with the tanna of the mishna on two counts: First, he claims that if the handful of a meal offering was removed not for its own sake it satisfies the obligation of the owner, whereas the mishna teaches that the obligation is not fulfilled. Second, Rabbi Shimon does not differentiate between the meal offering of a sinner or the meal offering of jealousy, and the other types of meal offerings.
הָנִיחָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, דְּאָמַר: כָּאן בְּקוֹמֵץ מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת, כָּאן בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מִנְחַת מַרְחֶשֶׁת –
The Gemara comments: This works out well, i.e., the mishna can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, according to Rav Ashi, who says (3b), in a resolution of two apparently contradictory statements of Rabbi Shimon: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel, not the type of meal offering. Conversely, there, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.
מַתְנִיתִין מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה הִיא. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּה וְרָבָא מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
Accordingly, it can be explained that the mishna is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, which is why it does not satisfy the obligation of the owner. But according to the statements of Rabba and Rava, who resolved that contradiction in a different manner, what can be said?
וְכִי תֵימָא, כִּדְקָא מְשַׁנֵּי רַבָּה: כָּאן בְּשִׁינּוּי קֹדֶשׁ, כָּאן בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים –
The Gemara elaborates: And if you would say that the contradiction addressed by Rav Ashi is resolved as Rabba answers, this is problematic. Rabba resolved the contradiction as follows: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon.
הָא מַתְנִיתִין שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ הוּא, דְּקָתָנֵי: ״כֵּיצַד לִשְׁמָן וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן״ – לְשׁוּם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא וּלְשׁוּם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה.
The Gemara explains that the reason this is problematic is that if one accepts Rabba’s resolution, how can the mishna be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The mishna is clearly discussing the case of a change of sanctity, as it teaches: How are these rites performed for their sake and then not for their sake, whereby the offering does not satisfy the owner’s obligation? It is in a case where one initially removed the handful for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and then for the sake of a voluntary meal offering. This is a change involving a different type of meal offering.
וְאִי נָמֵי כִּדְקָא מְשַׁנֵּי רָבָא: כָּאן בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה, כָּאן בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם זֶבַח –
And alternatively, if you would say that the contradiction addressed by Rav Ashi is resolved as Rava answers, this is equally problematic. Rava resolved the contradiction as follows: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, whereas there, where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.
הָא מַתְנִיתִין מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה הִיא, דְּקָתָנֵי: ״שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְלִשְׁמָן״ – לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת נְדָבָה לְשֵׁם מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּה וְרָבָא מְחַוַּורְתָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
The Gemara explains that if one accepts Rava’s resolution, the mishna cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: The mishna is discussing a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, as it teaches: How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? It is a case where one removed the handful for the sake of a voluntary meal offering and then for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner. The Gemara concludes: Rather, according to the resolutions offered by Rabba and Rava, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַדְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הִיא כְּחַטָּאת וּכְאָשָׁם״ – יֵשׁ מֵהֶן כְּחַטָּאת, וְיֵשׁ מֵהֶן כְּאָשָׁם.
§ The Gemara cites the baraita that is the basis for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon, which was mentioned in the previous discussion: And a Sage raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Shimon and another statement of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse written concerning the meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10), indicates that there are some meal offerings whose halakha is like that of a sin offering, and there are some whose halakha is like that of a guilt offering.
מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא הֲרֵי הִיא כְּחַטָּאת, לְפִיכָךְ קְמָצָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – פְּסוּלָה, כַּחַטָּאת; מִנְחַת נְדָבָה הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאָשָׁם, לְפִיכָךְ קְמָצָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – כְּשֵׁירָה.
Rabbi Shimon elaborates: The halakha with regard to the meal offering of a sinner is like that of a sin offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is disqualified, just like a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake. Conversely, the halakha with regard to a voluntary meal offering is like that of a guilt offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is valid, like a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake.
וּכְאָשָׁם – מָה אָשָׁם כָּשֵׁר וְאֵינוֹ מְרַצֶּה, אַף מִנְחַת נְדָבָה כְּשֵׁירָה וְאֵינָהּ מְרַצָּה.
Rabbi Shimon adds: And a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering in another aspect as well: Just as a guilt offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, so too, a voluntary meal offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Shimon here apparently contradicts his ruling that all meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake satisfy the obligation of the owner.
אָמַר רַבָּה, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּשִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, כָּאן בְּשִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים.
Rabba said in resolution of this contradiction: This is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִכְּדֵי מַחְשָׁבָה דִּפְסַל רַחֲמָנָא הֶקֵּישָׁא הִיא, מָה לִי שִׁינּוּי קוֹדֶשׁ, מָה לִי שִׁינּוּי בְּעָלִים?
Abaye said to Rabba: Now consider, the fact that the Merciful One disqualifies a meal offering due to improper intent is derived from the Torah’s comparison of meal offerings to sin offerings and guilt offerings. If so, what difference is there to me if there was a change of sanctity, and what difference is there to me if there was a change of owner? In the case of a guilt offering either of these changes prevents it from satisfying the obligation of the owner.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, סְבָרָא הִיא, דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דָּרֵישׁ טַעְמָא דִּקְרָא.
Rabba said to Abaye: The claim that its mode of preparation proves one’s intent, which Rabbi Shimon states in explanation of why offerings are disqualified through improper intent, is based on logical reasoning, as Rabbi Shimon interprets the reason behind the mitzva in the verse and draws halakhic conclusions based on that interpretation.
מַחְשָׁבָה דְּלָא מִינַּכְרָא – פְּסַל רַחֲמָנָא, מַחְשָׁבָה דְמִינַּכְרָא – לָא פְּסַל רַחֲמָנָא.
Rabba continues: This is significant, as Rabbi Shimon holds that the Merciful One disqualifies improper intent that is not recognizably false, i.e., when the intent is not in clear contradiction to the sacrificial rites performed. The intent to sacrifice an offering for the sake of another owner does not include a change in the sacrificial rites and it therefore disqualifies the offering. The Merciful One does not disqualify improper intent that is recognizably false and contradicts the sacrificial rites performed, e.g., if one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, as the different substance itself indicates that it is a pan meal offering.
(סִימָן: עוֹלָה, עוֹלָה, מָלַק וּמִיצָּה, חַטַּאת הָעוֹף, קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים.)
The Gemara lists several questions with regard to Rabba’s statement, for which it provides a mnemonic: Burnt offering, burnt offering, pinched and squeezed, bird sin offering, offerings of the most sacred order, offerings of lesser sanctity.
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, עוֹלַת הָעוֹף שֶׁמְּלָקָהּ לְמַעְלָה מִשּׁוּם חַטַּאת הָעוֹף, תְּרַצֶּה? מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ דְּעוֹלַת הָעוֹף הִיא, דְּאִי חַטַּאת הָעוֹף הִיא – לְמַטָּה הֲוֵי עָבֵיד לַהּ.
The Gemara first asks: But if that is so, that only intent that is not recognizably false disqualifies an offering, then in the case of a bird burnt offering where one pinched the nape of its neck above the red line that divides the upper and lower halves of the altar for the sake of a bird sin offering, it should effect acceptance according to Rabbi Shimon. The reason is the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird burnt offering. Because if it is in fact a bird sin offering, he would have performed the pinching below the red line while standing beside the altar. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon agrees with the ruling of the mishna (Zevaḥim 64b) that this bird offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
אַטּוּ חַטַּאת הָעוֹף לְמַעְלָה מִי לֵיתָא? הָאָמַר מָר: מְלִיקָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם בַּמִּזְבֵּחַ כְּשֵׁרָה!
The Gemara rejects this: Is that to say that a case of a bird sin offering that is pinched above the red line is not possible? Didn’t the Master say: The pinching of a bird sin offering that is performed in any place on the altar is valid after the fact? Accordingly, there is no discernible difference between the pinching of a bird burnt offering and the pinching of a bird sin offering, so the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.
עוֹלַת הָעוֹף שֶׁמִּיצָּה דָּמָהּ לְמַעְלָה לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת הָעוֹף תְּרַצֶּה, מַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ דְּעוֹלַת הָעוֹף הִיא, דְּאִי חַטַּאת הָעוֹף הִיא – לְמַטָּה הֲוָה עָבֵיד לַהּ הַזָּאָה.
The Gemara raises another difficulty: If recognizably false intent does not disqualify an offering, then a bird burnt offering where a priest squeezed its blood above the red line for the sake of a bird sin offering should effect acceptance, as the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird burnt offering. Because if it is in fact a bird sin offering, he would have performed the required act of holding the body of the bird and sprinkling its blood below the red line, instead of squeezing out its blood above that line.
