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Today's Daf Yomi

June 8, 2015 | 讻状讗 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Nedarim 15

讻讬 诇讗 诪讝讚讛讬专 讘转谞讗讛 讗讘诇 讘讗讬住讜专讗 诪讝讚讛专

Sleeping today is not prohibited for him. Rather, it causes sleeping to be prohibited for him tomorrow, because when one is not careful, it is only with regard to a condition. In the former case, sleeping on the second day merely fulfills the condition on which the prohibition was based, causing it to take effect retroactively. Therefore, there is concern that he will not be careful and retroactively cause a violation. However, one is careful with regard to a prohibition. In the latter case, sleeping on the second day is directly prohibited. Therefore, there is no concern that he will violate the prohibition.

转谞谉 拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 讬砖谉 砖讗谞讬 诪讛诇讱 砖讗谞讬 诪讚讘专 讜讻讜壮 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讻讚拽转谞讬 砖讗谞讬 讬砖谉 诪讬 讛讜讬 谞讚专讗 讜讛转谞谉 讞讜诪专 讘砖讘讜注讜转 砖讛砖讘讜注讜转 讞诇讜转 注诇 讚讘专 砖讬砖 讘讜 诪诪砖 讜注诇 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪诪砖 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘谞讚专讬诐 讜砖讬谞讛 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪诪砖 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讚讗诪专 拽讜谞诐 注讬谞讬 讘砖讬谞讛

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rav Yehuda: We learned in the mishna that one who says: Sleeping is konam for me, or: Walking is konam for me, or: Speaking is konam for me, may not violate his vow. What are the circumstances? If we say that the wording of the vow is precisely as the mishna teaches, is the vow: Sleeping is konam for me, a valid vow? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a baraita: There is stringency with regard to oaths vis-脿-vis vows, in that oaths apply to something that has actual substance and to something that does not have actual substance, which is not the case with regard to vows. And sleep is something that does not have actual substance, so how can a vow apply to sleep? Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where he said: Sleeping is konam for my eyes.

讜讗讬 讚诇讗 讬讛讬讘 砖讬注讜专讗 诪讬 砖讘拽讬谞谉 诇讬讛 注讚 讚注讘专 讗讬住讜专 讘诇 讬讞诇 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讬砖谉 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 诪诇拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 讜讬砖谉 诇讗诇转专

The Gemara questions this interpretation: And if he did not give a measurement to the prohibition created by the vow, but rather prohibited himself from sleeping for an unlimited period of time, do we let him be until he inevitably transgresses the prohibition: He shall not profane, by falling asleep? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan say that if one says: I hereby take an oath that I will not sleep for three days, the court flogs him for taking an oath in vain, and he may sleep immediately, as he is incapable of fulfilling his oath? Here too, if the prohibition has no time frame, the vow should not take effect.

讗诇讗 讚讗诪专 拽讜谞诐 注讬谞讬 讘砖讬谞讛 诇诪讞专 讗诐 讗讬砖谉 讛讬讜诐 讛讗 讗诪专转 讻诇 讘讗住讜专讬讛 诪讝讚讛专

Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where one said: Sleeping is konam to my eyes tomorrow if I sleep today. The mishna rules that he may not sleep today, lest he transgress the prohibition of: He shall not profane, by sleeping tomorrow. However, didn鈥檛 you say that with regard to this vow it is agreed that he may sleep today, as one is careful with regard to any direct prohibition and will not violate the vow tomorrow? If so, why is it prohibited for him to sleep today?

讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗诪专 拽讜谞诐 注讬谞讬 讘砖讬谞讛 讛讬讜诐 讗诐 讗讬砖谉 诇诪讞专 讜讗讬 诇讗 谞讬讬诐 讛讬讜诐 讻讬 谞讬讬诐 诇诪讞专 诪讗讬 讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讗讬讻讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讘讚谞讬讬诐 讗诇诪讗 讗讬转讬讛 讚谞讬讬诐 讜转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is referring to a case where one said: Sleeping is konam to my eyes today if I sleep tomorrow. The Gemara asks: And if he does not sleep today, when he sleeps tomorrow, what transgression of: He shall not profane his word, is there? Rather, is it not with regard to a case where he slept on the first day, and therefore the mishna warns him not to sleep on the second day lest he transgress the prohibition retroactively? Apparently, there is a situation in which he sleeps on the first day. And this is a refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda that he may not sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow as well, thereby violating the prohibition.

讻讬 拽转谞讬 讚讗讬 谞讬讬诐

The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches that he may not sleep tomorrow, it does not mean that today he may sleep ab initio. Rather, it means that if he did sleep today he must be careful not to sleep tomorrow.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讻讚拽转谞讬 讜诪讗讬 讘诇 讬讞诇 诪讚专讘谞谉

Ravina said a different answer: Actually, the mishna may be interpreted as it teaches, i.e., sleeping is konam for me. The vow does not take effect, as sleep does not have actual substance. And if so, what is the reason the mishna states that if he sleeps he is in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane? He transgresses the prohibition by rabbinic law. Although the vow does not take effect by Torah law, the Sages prohibited him from breaking his word.

讜诪讬 讗讬讻讗 讘诇 讬讞诇 诪讚专讘谞谉 讗讬谉 讜讛转谞讬讗 讚讘专讬诐 讛诪讜转专讬谉 讜讗讞专讬诐 谞讛讙讜 讘讛谉 讗讬住讜专 讗讬 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讛转讬专谉 讘驻谞讬讛诐 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜

The Gemara asks: But is there a prohibition of: He shall not profane, by rabbinic law? The Gemara answers: Yes, and it is taught in a baraita: With regard to matters that are permitted, but others are accustomed to observe a prohibition with regard to them, you may not permit these matters before those people, as it is stated: 鈥淗e shall not profane his word鈥 (Numbers 30:3). If they contravene their custom they are in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane his word, by rabbinic law, as that is similar to violating a vow.

转谞谉 砖讗转 谞讛谞讬转 诇讬 注讚 讛驻住讞 讗诐 转诇讻讬 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讱 注讚 讛讞讙 讛诇讻讛 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 讗住讜专讛 讘讛谞讗转讜 注讚 讛驻住讞

The Gemara attempts again to raise a difficulty with regard to Rav Yehuda鈥檚 opinion. We learned in a mishna (57a) that if a man said to his wife: Deriving benefit from me until Passover is konam for you if you go to your father鈥檚 house until the following festival of Sukkot, then, if she went to her father鈥檚 house before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him until Passover, as she violated the condition, thereby enabling the vow to take effect.

讛诇讻讛 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 讗住讜专讛 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 诇讗

The Gemara infers: Only if she went before Passover is it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him. However, if she did not go, she is not prohibited from deriving benefit from him. Apparently, even though she can transgress the condition retroactively until Sukkot by going to her father鈥檚 house, there is no concern that she will do so. This is difficult according to Rav Yehuda, who prohibits transgression of a conditional vow that may take effect retroactively.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讛诇讻讛 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 讗住讜专讛 讜诇讜拽讛 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 讘注诇诪讗

Rabbi Abba said that the baraita can be interpreted as follows: If she went before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him, and if she does so she is flogged. If she did not go before Passover, it is merely prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, lest she violate the condition and cause the vow to take effect retroactively. However, she is not liable to be flogged for it, as the vow has not yet taken effect.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讗讞专 讛驻住讞 讘讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讜讗讬 讚诇讗 讗讬转讛谞讬 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 讘诇 讬讞诇 讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬转讛谞讬 讗诇诪讗 诪讬转讛谞讬

The Gemara counters: Say the latter clause of that mishna, which states that if she goes to her father鈥檚 house after Passover she is in violation of: He shall not profane his word. And if the mishna is referring to a case where she did not derive benefit from him before Passover, is there a transgression of: He shall not profane? Clearly the vow was not violated. Rather, it is obvious that she derived benefit from him before Passover, and therefore if she goes to her father鈥檚 house between Passover and Sukkot she violates the vow retroactively. Apparently, she may derive benefit from him, even though she can subsequently violate the vow by transgressing the condition.

讜转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

And this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

讻讬 拽转谞讬 讚讗讬 讗讬转讛谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜

The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches this, it does not mean that before she went she was permitted to derive benefit from him ab initio. Rather, it means that if she derived benefit from him after the fact, she is in violation of: He shall not profane his word.

转谞谉 砖讗转 谞讛谞讬转 诇讬 注讚 讛讞讙 讗诐 转诇讻讬 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讱 注讚 讛驻住讞 讛诇讻讛 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 讗住讜专讛 讘讛谞讗转讜 注讚 讛讞讙 讜诪讜转专转 诇讬诇讱 讗讞专 讛驻住讞

We learn further on (57b) that if the husband said to his wife: Deriving benefit from me until the festival of Sukkot is konam for you if you go to your father鈥檚 house until Passover, then, if she went before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him until the festival of Sukkot, as the vow took effect, and she is permitted to go to her father鈥檚 house after Passover.

讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 诇讗

The Gemara infers: Only if she went before Passover is it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him. However, if she did not go it is not prohibited for her to do so. She may derive benefit from him, and there is no concern that she will subsequently go to her father鈥檚 house, transgressing the prohibition. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda that one may not perform an action that will be rendered retroactively a violation of a vow if the condition is met.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 讜诇讜拽讛 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 讘注诇诪讗

Rava said: The same is true, that even if she did not go, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him. The difference is that if she went it is not only prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, but if she does so she is flogged; whereas if she did not go, it is merely prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, lest she violate the vow by going to her father鈥檚 house before Passover.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讻讻专 讝讜 注诇讬 讛讬讜诐 讗诐 讗诇讱 诇诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 诇诪讞专 讗讻诇 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬诇讱

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yehuda: It is taught in a baraita that if one said: This loaf is forbidden to me today if I go to such and such a place tomorrow, then if he ate the loaf today, he is subject to the prohibition that he shall not go tomorrow. Apparently, he may eat it today, as there is no concern that he will go tomorrow.

诪讬 拽转谞讬 讗讜讻诇 讗讻诇 拽转谞讬 讚讻讬 讗讻诇 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬诇讱

The Gemara answers: Where is the contradiction? Does the baraita teach that he may eat the loaf ab initio? It teaches only that he ate, i.e., that once he ate, he is subject to the prohibition that he shall not go.

讛诇讱 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 诪讛诇讱 诇讗 讜拽砖讬讗 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

It is further taught in the baraita: If he went the next day, he is in violation of: He shall not profane his word. The Gemara infers from the fact that the baraita is referring only to a case in which he went after the fact, that he may not go ab initio. This indicates that he is permitted to eat the loaf, thereby prohibiting himself from going the next day. This accords with the opinion of Rav Na岣an that one may cause a vow to take effect by fulfilling its condition, and it poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚诇讬转谞讬 诪讛诇讱 讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 讗讻诇 讚诇讗 诪讬转谞讬 诇讬讛 讗讜讻诇 转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讛诇讱

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could have said to you that the same is true, that the baraita could have taught that he may go. However, since the first clause teaches the halakha where he ate the loaf after the fact, as it cannot teach that he may eat it according to Rav Yehuda, who holds that it is prohibited for him to eat it ab initio, the latter clause also teaches the halakha in the case where he went, and does not teach that he may go, to maintain a uniform style. In conclusion, neither opinion is refuted.

讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 诪砖诪砖讱 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讜讛讗 诪砖转注讘讚 诇讛 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚讻转讬讘 砖讗专讛 讻住讜转讛 讜注谞转讛 诇讗 讬讙专注

搂 It is taught in the mishna that with regard to one who says to his wife: Engaging in sexual intercourse with you is konam for me, if he violates the vow he is in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane his word. The Gemara asks: How can one render prohibited engaging in sexual intercourse with his wife? But isn鈥檛 he duty bound by Torah law to engage in sexual intercourse with her, as it is written: 鈥淗er food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights he may not diminish鈥 (Exodus 21:10)?

讘讗讜诪专 讛谞讗转 转砖诪讬砖讱 注诇讬 讜讛讗 诇讗 拽讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讘转砖诪讬砖

The Gemara answers: The vow does not take effect if it is formulated as cited. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where he says: The pleasure I derive from engaging in sexual intercourse with you is forbidden to me, and sexual intercourse is therefore not amenable to him. Since he is not obligated to experience the pleasure he derives from sexual intercourse with her, he can prohibit himself from experiencing this pleasure. In this manner he can render their sexual intercourse forbidden by means of a vow.

讚讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 转砖诪讬砖讬 注诇讬讱 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讛 讜诪砖诪砖转讜 讚砖注讘讜讚讬 诪砖讜注讘讚转 诇讬讛 讛谞讗转 转砖诪讬砖讱 注诇讬 讗住讜专 砖讗讬谉 诪讗讻讬诇讬谉 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 讚讘专 讛讗住讜专 诇讜

As Rav Kahana said: If a woman vows: Sexual intercourse with me is forbidden to you, the court coerces her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, as she is duty bound to engage in sexual intercourse with him due to his conjugal rights. However, if she vows: The pleasure I derive from engaging in sexual intercourse with you is forbidden to me, it is prohibited for them to engage in sexual intercourse, as she derives pleasure from the sexual intercourse and one may not feed a person that which is forbidden to him.

诪转谞讬壮 砖讘讜注讛 砖讗讬谞讬 讬砖谉 砖讗讬谞讬 诪讚讘专 砖讗讬谞讬 诪讛诇讱 讗住讜专 拽专讘谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 讛讗 拽专讘谉 砖讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诇讗 拽专讘谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诪讜转专

MISHNA: If one says: I take an oath that I will not sleep, or: That I will not speak, or: That I will not walk, this activity is prohibited to him. As taught earlier (10a), one of the primary methods of taking a vow is by invoking an offering. The mishna provides several examples where invoking the term korban is not effective. If one says: An offering [korban] that I will not eat of yours, or: This offering [ha korban] that I will eat of yours, or: That which I will not eat of yours is not an offering [la korban], the food is permitted.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Nedarim 15

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Nedarim 15

讻讬 诇讗 诪讝讚讛讬专 讘转谞讗讛 讗讘诇 讘讗讬住讜专讗 诪讝讚讛专

Sleeping today is not prohibited for him. Rather, it causes sleeping to be prohibited for him tomorrow, because when one is not careful, it is only with regard to a condition. In the former case, sleeping on the second day merely fulfills the condition on which the prohibition was based, causing it to take effect retroactively. Therefore, there is concern that he will not be careful and retroactively cause a violation. However, one is careful with regard to a prohibition. In the latter case, sleeping on the second day is directly prohibited. Therefore, there is no concern that he will violate the prohibition.

转谞谉 拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 讬砖谉 砖讗谞讬 诪讛诇讱 砖讗谞讬 诪讚讘专 讜讻讜壮 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讻讚拽转谞讬 砖讗谞讬 讬砖谉 诪讬 讛讜讬 谞讚专讗 讜讛转谞谉 讞讜诪专 讘砖讘讜注讜转 砖讛砖讘讜注讜转 讞诇讜转 注诇 讚讘专 砖讬砖 讘讜 诪诪砖 讜注诇 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪诪砖 诪讛 砖讗讬谉 讻谉 讘谞讚专讬诐 讜砖讬谞讛 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讘讜 诪诪砖 讛讜讗 讗诇讗 讚讗诪专 拽讜谞诐 注讬谞讬 讘砖讬谞讛

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rav Yehuda: We learned in the mishna that one who says: Sleeping is konam for me, or: Walking is konam for me, or: Speaking is konam for me, may not violate his vow. What are the circumstances? If we say that the wording of the vow is precisely as the mishna teaches, is the vow: Sleeping is konam for me, a valid vow? But didn鈥檛 we learn in a baraita: There is stringency with regard to oaths vis-脿-vis vows, in that oaths apply to something that has actual substance and to something that does not have actual substance, which is not the case with regard to vows. And sleep is something that does not have actual substance, so how can a vow apply to sleep? Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where he said: Sleeping is konam for my eyes.

讜讗讬 讚诇讗 讬讛讬讘 砖讬注讜专讗 诪讬 砖讘拽讬谞谉 诇讬讛 注讚 讚注讘专 讗讬住讜专 讘诇 讬讞诇 讜讛讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讬砖谉 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 诪诇拽讬谉 讗讜转讜 讜讬砖谉 诇讗诇转专

The Gemara questions this interpretation: And if he did not give a measurement to the prohibition created by the vow, but rather prohibited himself from sleeping for an unlimited period of time, do we let him be until he inevitably transgresses the prohibition: He shall not profane, by falling asleep? But didn鈥檛 Rabbi Yo岣nan say that if one says: I hereby take an oath that I will not sleep for three days, the court flogs him for taking an oath in vain, and he may sleep immediately, as he is incapable of fulfilling his oath? Here too, if the prohibition has no time frame, the vow should not take effect.

讗诇讗 讚讗诪专 拽讜谞诐 注讬谞讬 讘砖讬谞讛 诇诪讞专 讗诐 讗讬砖谉 讛讬讜诐 讛讗 讗诪专转 讻诇 讘讗住讜专讬讛 诪讝讚讛专

Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where one said: Sleeping is konam to my eyes tomorrow if I sleep today. The mishna rules that he may not sleep today, lest he transgress the prohibition of: He shall not profane, by sleeping tomorrow. However, didn鈥檛 you say that with regard to this vow it is agreed that he may sleep today, as one is careful with regard to any direct prohibition and will not violate the vow tomorrow? If so, why is it prohibited for him to sleep today?

讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗诪专 拽讜谞诐 注讬谞讬 讘砖讬谞讛 讛讬讜诐 讗诐 讗讬砖谉 诇诪讞专 讜讗讬 诇讗 谞讬讬诐 讛讬讜诐 讻讬 谞讬讬诐 诇诪讞专 诪讗讬 讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讗讬讻讗 讗诇讗 诇讗讜 讘讚谞讬讬诐 讗诇诪讗 讗讬转讬讛 讚谞讬讬诐 讜转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is referring to a case where one said: Sleeping is konam to my eyes today if I sleep tomorrow. The Gemara asks: And if he does not sleep today, when he sleeps tomorrow, what transgression of: He shall not profane his word, is there? Rather, is it not with regard to a case where he slept on the first day, and therefore the mishna warns him not to sleep on the second day lest he transgress the prohibition retroactively? Apparently, there is a situation in which he sleeps on the first day. And this is a refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda that he may not sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow as well, thereby violating the prohibition.

讻讬 拽转谞讬 讚讗讬 谞讬讬诐

The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches that he may not sleep tomorrow, it does not mean that today he may sleep ab initio. Rather, it means that if he did sleep today he must be careful not to sleep tomorrow.

专讘讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇注讜诇诐 讻讚拽转谞讬 讜诪讗讬 讘诇 讬讞诇 诪讚专讘谞谉

Ravina said a different answer: Actually, the mishna may be interpreted as it teaches, i.e., sleeping is konam for me. The vow does not take effect, as sleep does not have actual substance. And if so, what is the reason the mishna states that if he sleeps he is in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane? He transgresses the prohibition by rabbinic law. Although the vow does not take effect by Torah law, the Sages prohibited him from breaking his word.

讜诪讬 讗讬讻讗 讘诇 讬讞诇 诪讚专讘谞谉 讗讬谉 讜讛转谞讬讗 讚讘专讬诐 讛诪讜转专讬谉 讜讗讞专讬诐 谞讛讙讜 讘讛谉 讗讬住讜专 讗讬 讗转讛 专砖讗讬 诇讛转讬专谉 讘驻谞讬讛诐 砖谞讗诪专 诇讗 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜

The Gemara asks: But is there a prohibition of: He shall not profane, by rabbinic law? The Gemara answers: Yes, and it is taught in a baraita: With regard to matters that are permitted, but others are accustomed to observe a prohibition with regard to them, you may not permit these matters before those people, as it is stated: 鈥淗e shall not profane his word鈥 (Numbers 30:3). If they contravene their custom they are in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane his word, by rabbinic law, as that is similar to violating a vow.

转谞谉 砖讗转 谞讛谞讬转 诇讬 注讚 讛驻住讞 讗诐 转诇讻讬 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讱 注讚 讛讞讙 讛诇讻讛 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 讗住讜专讛 讘讛谞讗转讜 注讚 讛驻住讞

The Gemara attempts again to raise a difficulty with regard to Rav Yehuda鈥檚 opinion. We learned in a mishna (57a) that if a man said to his wife: Deriving benefit from me until Passover is konam for you if you go to your father鈥檚 house until the following festival of Sukkot, then, if she went to her father鈥檚 house before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him until Passover, as she violated the condition, thereby enabling the vow to take effect.

讛诇讻讛 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 讗住讜专讛 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 诇讗

The Gemara infers: Only if she went before Passover is it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him. However, if she did not go, she is not prohibited from deriving benefit from him. Apparently, even though she can transgress the condition retroactively until Sukkot by going to her father鈥檚 house, there is no concern that she will do so. This is difficult according to Rav Yehuda, who prohibits transgression of a conditional vow that may take effect retroactively.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讗讘讗 讛诇讻讛 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 讗住讜专讛 讜诇讜拽讛 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 讘注诇诪讗

Rabbi Abba said that the baraita can be interpreted as follows: If she went before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him, and if she does so she is flogged. If she did not go before Passover, it is merely prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, lest she violate the condition and cause the vow to take effect retroactively. However, she is not liable to be flogged for it, as the vow has not yet taken effect.

讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讗讞专 讛驻住讞 讘讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讜讗讬 讚诇讗 讗讬转讛谞讬 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 诪讬 讗讬讻讗 讘诇 讬讞诇 讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讗讬转讛谞讬 讗诇诪讗 诪讬转讛谞讬

The Gemara counters: Say the latter clause of that mishna, which states that if she goes to her father鈥檚 house after Passover she is in violation of: He shall not profane his word. And if the mishna is referring to a case where she did not derive benefit from him before Passover, is there a transgression of: He shall not profane? Clearly the vow was not violated. Rather, it is obvious that she derived benefit from him before Passover, and therefore if she goes to her father鈥檚 house between Passover and Sukkot she violates the vow retroactively. Apparently, she may derive benefit from him, even though she can subsequently violate the vow by transgressing the condition.

讜转讬讜讘转讗 讚专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

And this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

讻讬 拽转谞讬 讚讗讬 讗讬转讛谞讬 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜

The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches this, it does not mean that before she went she was permitted to derive benefit from him ab initio. Rather, it means that if she derived benefit from him after the fact, she is in violation of: He shall not profane his word.

转谞谉 砖讗转 谞讛谞讬转 诇讬 注讚 讛讞讙 讗诐 转诇讻讬 诇讘讬转 讗讘讬讱 注讚 讛驻住讞 讛诇讻讛 诇驻谞讬 讛驻住讞 讗住讜专讛 讘讛谞讗转讜 注讚 讛讞讙 讜诪讜转专转 诇讬诇讱 讗讞专 讛驻住讞

We learn further on (57b) that if the husband said to his wife: Deriving benefit from me until the festival of Sukkot is konam for you if you go to your father鈥檚 house until Passover, then, if she went before Passover, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him until the festival of Sukkot, as the vow took effect, and she is permitted to go to her father鈥檚 house after Passover.

讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 诇讗

The Gemara infers: Only if she went before Passover is it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him. However, if she did not go it is not prohibited for her to do so. She may derive benefit from him, and there is no concern that she will subsequently go to her father鈥檚 house, transgressing the prohibition. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav Yehuda that one may not perform an action that will be rendered retroactively a violation of a vow if the condition is met.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 讜诇讜拽讛 诇讗 讛诇讻讛 讗住讜专讛 讘注诇诪讗

Rava said: The same is true, that even if she did not go, she is prohibited from deriving benefit from him. The difference is that if she went it is not only prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, but if she does so she is flogged; whereas if she did not go, it is merely prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, lest she violate the vow by going to her father鈥檚 house before Passover.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讻讻专 讝讜 注诇讬 讛讬讜诐 讗诐 讗诇讱 诇诪拽讜诐 驻诇讜谞讬 诇诪讞专 讗讻诇 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬诇讱

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yehuda: It is taught in a baraita that if one said: This loaf is forbidden to me today if I go to such and such a place tomorrow, then if he ate the loaf today, he is subject to the prohibition that he shall not go tomorrow. Apparently, he may eat it today, as there is no concern that he will go tomorrow.

诪讬 拽转谞讬 讗讜讻诇 讗讻诇 拽转谞讬 讚讻讬 讗讻诇 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬诇讱

The Gemara answers: Where is the contradiction? Does the baraita teach that he may eat the loaf ab initio? It teaches only that he ate, i.e., that once he ate, he is subject to the prohibition that he shall not go.

讛诇讱 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 诪讛诇讱 诇讗 讜拽砖讬讗 诇专讘 讬讛讜讚讛

It is further taught in the baraita: If he went the next day, he is in violation of: He shall not profane his word. The Gemara infers from the fact that the baraita is referring only to a case in which he went after the fact, that he may not go ab initio. This indicates that he is permitted to eat the loaf, thereby prohibiting himself from going the next day. This accords with the opinion of Rav Na岣an that one may cause a vow to take effect by fulfilling its condition, and it poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Yehuda.

讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讚诇讬转谞讬 诪讛诇讱 讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽转谞讬 专讬砖讗 讗讻诇 讚诇讗 诪讬转谞讬 诇讬讛 讗讜讻诇 转谞讬 住讬驻讗 讛诇讱

The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda could have said to you that the same is true, that the baraita could have taught that he may go. However, since the first clause teaches the halakha where he ate the loaf after the fact, as it cannot teach that he may eat it according to Rav Yehuda, who holds that it is prohibited for him to eat it ab initio, the latter clause also teaches the halakha in the case where he went, and does not teach that he may go, to maintain a uniform style. In conclusion, neither opinion is refuted.

讛讗讜诪专 诇讗砖讛 拽讜谞诐 砖讗谞讬 诪砖诪砖讱 讛专讬 讝讛 讘讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讜讛讗 诪砖转注讘讚 诇讛 诪讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚讻转讬讘 砖讗专讛 讻住讜转讛 讜注谞转讛 诇讗 讬讙专注

搂 It is taught in the mishna that with regard to one who says to his wife: Engaging in sexual intercourse with you is konam for me, if he violates the vow he is in violation of the prohibition: He shall not profane his word. The Gemara asks: How can one render prohibited engaging in sexual intercourse with his wife? But isn鈥檛 he duty bound by Torah law to engage in sexual intercourse with her, as it is written: 鈥淗er food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights he may not diminish鈥 (Exodus 21:10)?

讘讗讜诪专 讛谞讗转 转砖诪讬砖讱 注诇讬 讜讛讗 诇讗 拽讗 谞讬讞讗 诇讬讛 讘转砖诪讬砖

The Gemara answers: The vow does not take effect if it is formulated as cited. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where he says: The pleasure I derive from engaging in sexual intercourse with you is forbidden to me, and sexual intercourse is therefore not amenable to him. Since he is not obligated to experience the pleasure he derives from sexual intercourse with her, he can prohibit himself from experiencing this pleasure. In this manner he can render their sexual intercourse forbidden by means of a vow.

讚讗诪专 专讘 讻讛谞讗 转砖诪讬砖讬 注诇讬讱 讻讜驻讬谉 讗讜转讛 讜诪砖诪砖转讜 讚砖注讘讜讚讬 诪砖讜注讘讚转 诇讬讛 讛谞讗转 转砖诪讬砖讱 注诇讬 讗住讜专 砖讗讬谉 诪讗讻讬诇讬谉 诇讜 诇讗讚诐 讚讘专 讛讗住讜专 诇讜

As Rav Kahana said: If a woman vows: Sexual intercourse with me is forbidden to you, the court coerces her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, as she is duty bound to engage in sexual intercourse with him due to his conjugal rights. However, if she vows: The pleasure I derive from engaging in sexual intercourse with you is forbidden to me, it is prohibited for them to engage in sexual intercourse, as she derives pleasure from the sexual intercourse and one may not feed a person that which is forbidden to him.

诪转谞讬壮 砖讘讜注讛 砖讗讬谞讬 讬砖谉 砖讗讬谞讬 诪讚讘专 砖讗讬谞讬 诪讛诇讱 讗住讜专 拽专讘谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 讛讗 拽专讘谉 砖讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诇讗 拽专讘谉 诇讗 讗讜讻诇 诇讱 诪讜转专

MISHNA: If one says: I take an oath that I will not sleep, or: That I will not speak, or: That I will not walk, this activity is prohibited to him. As taught earlier (10a), one of the primary methods of taking a vow is by invoking an offering. The mishna provides several examples where invoking the term korban is not effective. If one says: An offering [korban] that I will not eat of yours, or: This offering [ha korban] that I will eat of yours, or: That which I will not eat of yours is not an offering [la korban], the food is permitted.

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