The Mishna mentioned different expressions of a vow using forms of the word korban, sacrifice, which would not be valid. This Mishna is attributed to Rabbi Meir, as it cannot be attributed to Rabbi Yehuda. The same expressions if used with the word shevua (oath), will be valid. One of the expressions mentioned was “shevua that I will eat from you, which is understood as “I am taking an oath that I will not eat from you.” This contradicts a Mishna is Shevuot that lists four different kinds of oaths – and two of them are that I will eat or will not eat, understanding “I will eat” as its simple meaning and not as our Mishna understands is as “I will not eat.” Abaye answers by saying that it depends on the context and one must rely on the context to establish what the meaning is in each particular situation. Rav Ashi answers by emending the text to read “shevua she’iy ochal”, which mean “shevua that I will not eat.” According to this reading, the reason the Mishna needs to list this case is that one not think that maybe it came out as a stutter and one really meant to say “that I will eat.” Why do each of them (Abaye and Rav Ashi) not hold like the other? The Mishna refers back to a previous Mishna stating that there it was clear what are the stringencies of an oath that are not in a vow. To what Mishna was this referring? The Mishna then states the stringencies of a vow, if one vows to not do a mitzva, this is a valid vow and one must not go against the vow. Why does this not apply to oaths as well? Rava and Abaye both answer in a similar matter, that for the vow to be effective, it must be worded in a way that the vow applies to the object of the mitzva and not to the person fulfilling the mitzva. However, they differ on the exact wording of the vow – does it include the word “benefit” at all or not, as Rava argues that the performance of mitzvot is not considered a benefit.
Nedarim 16
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Joseph Cohen, Yosef ben Moshe HaCohen, z”l. “He was hard working, loved to sing, esp. as a chazan, and was very dedicated to his family and community.”
Nedarim 16
גְּמָ׳ מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ ״קׇרְבָּן״ וְלָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ ״הַקׇּרְבָּן״.
GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is apparently the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As, if it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, there is a contradiction, because he does not differentiate whether one takes a vow by saying: An offering, and he does not differentiate whether he takes a vow by saying: This offering. In both cases the vow does not take effect, as he did not use the phrase: Like an offering. The mishna, by contrast, indicates that only a vow that is phrased: An offering that I will not eat of yours, or: This offering that I will eat of yours, does not take effect. If it is phrased: An offering I will eat of yours, it takes effect, as it indicates that his eating will be like an offering.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר. וְהָתְנַן: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן יְהֵא, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״.
The Gemara continues its analysis: Say the latter clause of the mishna: If he says: That which I will not eat of yours is not an offering, the food is permitted. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (13a) that if one said: That which I will not eat of yours will be for an offering [lekorban], Rabbi Meir forbids the food to him? And Rabbi Abba said that it is rendered as one who says: Your food will be to me for an offering; therefore, I will not eat of yours. The mishna appears to be incompatible with the opinion of Rabbi Meir as well.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״לַקׇּרְבָּן״, הָא דְּאָמַר ״לָא לְקׇרְבָּן״ — דְּלָא הָוֵי קׇרְבָּן קָאָמַר.
The Gemara answers that this is not difficult. That mishna is referring to one who said: For an offering [lekorban], and the vow therefore takes effect. This mishna is referring to one who said: Not for an offering [la lekorban], where he is saying that it should not be an offering, and therefore the vow does not take effect.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁבוּעָה לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ, הָא שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ, לָא שְׁבוּעָה לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ — אָסוּר.
MISHNA: If one says: An oath that I will not eat of yours, or: This is an oath that I will eat of yours [she’okhal lekha], or: Not an oath that I will not eat of yours, the food is forbidden.
גְּמָ׳ מִכְּלָל דְּהָא שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ — דְּלָא אָכֵילְנָא מַשְׁמַע. וּרְמִינְהוּ: שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע. שֶׁאוֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל, שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי. מִדְּקָאָמַר שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל, שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי, מִכְּלָל דְּשֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ — דְּאָכֵילְנָא מַשְׁמַע!
GEMARA: By inference from the mishna, it may be derived that the statement: This is an oath that I will eat of yours, indicates that I will not eat. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Shevuot 19b): There are two basic types of oaths that are in fact four: An oath that I will eat, and: That I will not eat; an oath that I ate, and: That I did not eat. From the fact that the mishna states: That I will eat, in contradistinction to: That I will not eat; that I ate, and in contradistinction: That I did not eat, it may be derived by inference that an oath that I will eat of yours [she’okhal lekha] indicates: An oath that I will eat. This contradicts our mishna.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ שְׁתֵּי לְשׁוֹנוֹת מַשְׁמַע. הָיוּ מְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וְאָמַר: ״אָכֵילְנָא אָכֵילְנָא״, וְתוּ: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל״ — דְּאָכֵילְנָא מַשְׁמַע. אֲבָל אָמַר: ״לָא אָכֵילְנָא לָא אָכֵילְנָא״, וְתוּ אָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל״ — ״דְּלָא אָכֵילְנָא״ קָאָמַר.
Abaye said: The phrase: That I will eat [she’okhal], indicates two expressions, depending on the context in which it is used. How so? If they were importuning [mesarevin] him to eat, and he said: I will eat, I will eat, and he furthermore said: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], it indicates: That I will eat. However, if he said: I will not eat, I will not eat, and he furthermore said: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], he is saying: That I will not eat. The oath is intended to reinforce his refusal to eat.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ דִּשְׁבוּעָה — ״שֶׁאִי אוֹכַל״ קָאָמַר. אִם כֵּן, פְּשִׁיטָא! מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מֵיקַם לִישָּׁנָא הִיא דְּאִיתְּקִיל לֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rav Ashi said that the phrase: That I will eat [she’okhal], cited in the mishna with regard to an oath, is actually saying that he said: That I will not eat [she’i okhal]. The Gemara asks: If so, the prohibition is obvious, as he explicitly took an oath not to eat. What is the purpose of stating this halakha? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that he blundered in properly upholding the wording, i.e., he mispronounced the vow, as his intention was to say: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], the mishna teaches us that he meant that he will not eat.
אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר טַעַם כְּרַב אָשֵׁי — דְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁאִי אוֹכַל״.
Abaye did not state the reason for the ruling of the mishna that was stated by Rav Ashi, as the mishna does not teach the case of: That I will not eat [she’i okhal]. Rather, it teaches the case of that I will eat [she’okhal].
וְרַב אָשֵׁי נָאדֵי מִן טַעַם דְּאַבָּיֵי. קָסָבַר ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ נָמֵי, מַשְׁמַע שְׁתֵּי לְשׁוֹנוֹת. הָיוּ מְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל וְאָמַר: ״לָא אָכֵילְנָא לָא אָכֵילְנָא״, וְאָמַר נָמֵי: ״שְׁבוּעָה״, בֵּין ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ בֵּין ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ — הָדֵין ״אָכֵילְנָא״ מַשְׁמַע דְּאָמַר.
And Rav Ashi turned away [nadei] from the reason that Abaye stated, because he held that the phrase: That I will not eat, also indicates two expressions, depending on the context. For example, if they were importuning him to eat and he said: I will not eat, I will not eat, and subsequently he also said: An oath, then, in this case, whether the wording of the oath was: That I will eat, or: That I will not eat, this expression indicates that he is saying: I will eat. The statement: An oath that I will not eat, should be interpreted rhetorically in this context: Did I take an oath that I will not eat? Certainly I did not, as I will eat.
וְאִיכָּא לְתָרוֹצַהּ נָמֵי לִישָּׁנָא ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ — ״שְׁבוּעָה דְּלָא אָכֵילְנָא״ קָאָמַר. אֶלָּא תַּנָּא פַּסְקַהּ: ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ — ״דְּאָכֵילְנָא״ מַשְׁמַע, וְ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ — ״לֹא אוֹכַל״ מַשְׁמַע.
And there is also a way to interpret the expression: An oath that I will not eat, as indicating its straightforward meaning, i.e., that he is saying: An oath that I will not eat. Therefore, the mishna cannot be interpreted in this manner. Rather, the tanna in tractate Shevuot clearly established a principle: That I will eat, indicates that I will eat, and: That I will not eat, indicates I will not eat. Therefore, the correct version of the mishna must be: That I will not eat [she’i okhal].
מַתְנִי׳ זֶה חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מִבַּנְּדָרִים, וְחוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר: ״קֻוֽנָּם סוּכָּה שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשֶׂה״, ״לוּלָב שֶׁאֲנִי נוֹטֵל״, ״תְּפִילִּין שֶׁאֲנִי מַנִּיחַ״ — בַּנְּדָרִים אָסוּר, בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מוּתָּר, שֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת.
MISHNA: This rule, that oaths can render actions, which do not have actual substance, either prohibited or obligatory, is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows, which do not take effect with regard to matters that do not have actual substance. And there is also a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? With regard to one who said: Making a sukka is konam for me, or: Taking a lulav is konam for me, or: Donning phylacteries is konam for me, in the case of vows, the items are rendered forbidden, and he may not perform the mitzva until the vow is dissolved. However, in the case of similar oaths, these items are permitted, as one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot.
גְּמָ׳ ״חוֹמֶר״, מִכְּלָל דְּנֶדֶר הוּא. וְהָא ״מוּתָּר״ קָתָנֵי!
GEMARA: It is stated in the mishna: This is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows. The Gemara presumes that the mishna is referring to the distinction stated in previous mishnayot between saying: An offering that I will not eat of yours, and saying: An oath that I will not eat of yours. The Gemara asks: Should it be derived by inference that the statement: An offering that I will not eat of yours, is a valid vow by rabbinic law, and it is merely less stringent than the corresponding oath, which takes effect by Torah law? But doesn’t the mishna teach that it is permitted for him to eat, implying that the vow does not take effect at all?
אַסֵּיפָא דְּאִידַּךְ בָּבָא קָתָנֵי. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵינִי יָשֵׁן״, ״שֶׁאֵינִי מְדַבֵּר״, ״שֶׁאֵינִי מְהַלֵּךְ״ — אָסוּר. זֶה חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מִבַּנְּדָרִים.
The Gemara answers: This is taught with regard to the latter clause of the other section. As opposed to a vow that is taken with regard to a matter that does not have actual substance, which takes effect only by rabbinic law, as articulated in the mishna (14b) and Gemara (15a), the subsequent mishna (15b) teaches that if someone says: An oath that I will not sleep, or: That I will not speak, or: That I will not walk, this activity is forbidden to him. It is concerning this contrast that the mishna says: This is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows.
חוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת כֵּיצַד כּוּ׳. רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי: אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב. וְרַב טָבְיוֹמֵי מַתְנֵי: אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל. מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״, ״דְּבָרוֹ לֹא יַחֵל״ — אֲבָל מֵיחֵל הוּא לְחֶפְצֵי שָׁמַיִם.
§ It is stated in the mishna that there is a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? Whereas a vow can override a mitzva, an oath cannot. Rav Kahana teaches that Rav Giddel said that Rav said, and Rav Tavyumei teaches the same statement with a different attribution, i.e., Rav Giddel said that Shmuel said: From where is it derived that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot? The verse states: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3). It is inferred that his word, i.e., the prohibition he accepted upon himself, he shall not profane. However, he may profane it for the desires of Heaven. If he took an oath to act against the will of God, the oath does not take effect.
מַאי שְׁנָא נֶדֶר — דִּכְתִיב: ״אִישׁ כִּי יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַה׳ … לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״. שְׁבוּעָה נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״אוֹ הִשָּׁבַע שְׁבֻעָה לַה׳ לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״!
The Gemara asks: What is different about a vow that enables it to override mitzvot? Granted, as it is written in the Torah: “When a man takes a vow to the Lord…he shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that even with regard to matters that pertain to the Lord, i.e., mitzvot, one shall not profane his word, as the vow takes effect. However, with regard to an oath it is also written in the same verse: “Or swears an oath” to God, “he shall not profane his word.”
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא דְּאָמַר ״הֲנָאַת סוּכָּה עָלַי״, הָא דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶהֱנֶה מִן הַסּוּכָּה״.
Abaye said: The distinction is not between oaths and vows per se, but rather between the phraseology in each case. How so? This case, in which the prohibition overrides the mitzva, is referring to one who said: The benefit derived from a sukka is hereby forbidden to me. Since the vow renders the sukka a forbidden object, it takes effect and overrides the mitzva, as one may not be fed what is forbidden to him, even if it is forbidden only to him. By contrast, that case, in which the prohibition does not take effect, is referring to one who said: I hereby take an oath that I will not derive benefit from the sukka. The oath does not take effect, as one is not entitled to take an oath to abstain from an act that he is obligated to perform.
אָמַר רָבָא: וְכִי מִצְוֹת לֵיהָנוֹת נִיתְּנוּ? אֶלָּא, אָמַר רָבָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״יְשִׁיבַת סוּכָּה עָלַי״, וְהָא דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֵשֵׁב בַּסּוּכָּה״.
Rava said in objection to the explanation of Abaye: But were mitzvot given for the purpose of deriving benefit? The performance of mitzvot is not considered benefit. Why then would performance of the mitzva with the sukka be considered deriving benefit? Rather, Rava said a different explanation: This case is referring to one who said: Dwelling in a sukka is hereby prohibited to me, and that case is referring to one who said: I hereby take an oath that I will not dwell in a sukka.
וְשֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא לֵיהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל, יָכוֹל יְהֵא חַיָּיב —
§ The Gemara asks: And is the principle that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot derived from here, i.e., the above verse? It is derived from there, i.e., another verse, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that if one takes an oath to nullify a mitzva and does not nullify it, one might have thought that he will be liable for violating an oath on a statement.
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It’s not always easy, but it is so worthwhile, and it has strengthened my love of learning. It is part of my life now.
Beit Shemesh, Israel
I had never heard of Daf Yomi and after reading the book, The Weight of Ink, I explored more about it. I discovered that it was only 6 months before a whole new cycle started and I was determined to give it a try. I tried to get a friend to join me on the journey but after the first few weeks they all dropped it. I haven’t missed a day of reading and of listening to the podcast.
Elkins Park, United States
I had dreamed of doing daf yomi since I had my first serious Talmud class 18 years ago at Pardes with Rahel Berkovitz, and then a couple of summers with Leah Rosenthal. There is no way I would be able to do it without another wonderful teacher, Michelle, and the Hadran organization. I wake up and am excited to start each day with the next daf.
Irvine, United States
A few years back, after reading Ilana Kurshan’s book, “If All The Seas Were Ink,” I began pondering the crazy, outlandish idea of beginning the Daf Yomi cycle. Beginning in December, 2019, a month before the previous cycle ended, I “auditioned” 30 different podcasts in 30 days, and ultimately chose to take the plunge with Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle. Such joy!
HUNTINGTON, United States
I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!
Tzur Hadassah, Israel
What a great experience to learn with Rabbanit Michelle Farber. I began with this cycle in January 2020 and have been comforted by the consistency and energy of this process throughout the isolation period of Covid. Week by week, I feel like I am exploring a treasure chest with sparkling gems and puzzling antiquities. The hunt is exhilarating.
Pennsylvania, United States
I started learning with rabbis. I needed to know more than the stories. My first teacher to show me “the way of the Talmud” as well as the stories was Samara Schwartz.
Michelle Farber started the new cycle 2 yrs ago and I jumped on for the ride.
I do not look back.
Houston, United States
I heard the new Daf Yomi cycle was starting and I was curious, so I searched online for a women’s class and was pleasently surprised to find Rabanit Michelle’s great class reviews in many online articles. It has been a splendid journey. It is a way to fill my days with Torah, learning so many amazing things I have never heard before during my Tanach learning at High School. Thanks so much .
Panama, Panama
Philadelphia, United States
Bronx, United States
In January 2020 on a Shabbaton to Baltimore I heard about the new cycle of Daf Yomi after the siyum celebration in NYC stadium. I started to read “ a daily dose of Talmud “ and really enjoyed it . It led me to google “ do Orthodox women study Talmud? “ and found HADRAN! Since then I listen to the podcast every morning, participate in classes and siyum. I love to learn, this is amazing! Thank you
Atlanta, United States
Nedarim 16
גְּמָ׳ מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין — רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ ״קׇרְבָּן״ וְלָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ ״הַקׇּרְבָּן״.
GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is apparently the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As, if it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, there is a contradiction, because he does not differentiate whether one takes a vow by saying: An offering, and he does not differentiate whether he takes a vow by saying: This offering. In both cases the vow does not take effect, as he did not use the phrase: Like an offering. The mishna, by contrast, indicates that only a vow that is phrased: An offering that I will not eat of yours, or: This offering that I will eat of yours, does not take effect. If it is phrased: An offering I will eat of yours, it takes effect, as it indicates that his eating will be like an offering.
אֵימָא סֵיפָא: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — מוּתָּר. וְהָתְנַן: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ — רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר, וְאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר: ״לַקׇּרְבָּן יְהֵא, לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״.
The Gemara continues its analysis: Say the latter clause of the mishna: If he says: That which I will not eat of yours is not an offering, the food is permitted. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (13a) that if one said: That which I will not eat of yours will be for an offering [lekorban], Rabbi Meir forbids the food to him? And Rabbi Abba said that it is rendered as one who says: Your food will be to me for an offering; therefore, I will not eat of yours. The mishna appears to be incompatible with the opinion of Rabbi Meir as well.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״לַקׇּרְבָּן״, הָא דְּאָמַר ״לָא לְקׇרְבָּן״ — דְּלָא הָוֵי קׇרְבָּן קָאָמַר.
The Gemara answers that this is not difficult. That mishna is referring to one who said: For an offering [lekorban], and the vow therefore takes effect. This mishna is referring to one who said: Not for an offering [la lekorban], where he is saying that it should not be an offering, and therefore the vow does not take effect.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁבוּעָה לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ, הָא שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ, לָא שְׁבוּעָה לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ — אָסוּר.
MISHNA: If one says: An oath that I will not eat of yours, or: This is an oath that I will eat of yours [she’okhal lekha], or: Not an oath that I will not eat of yours, the food is forbidden.
גְּמָ׳ מִכְּלָל דְּהָא שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ — דְּלָא אָכֵילְנָא מַשְׁמַע. וּרְמִינְהוּ: שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע. שֶׁאוֹכַל וְשֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל, שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי. מִדְּקָאָמַר שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל, שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי וְשֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי, מִכְּלָל דְּשֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ — דְּאָכֵילְנָא מַשְׁמַע!
GEMARA: By inference from the mishna, it may be derived that the statement: This is an oath that I will eat of yours, indicates that I will not eat. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Shevuot 19b): There are two basic types of oaths that are in fact four: An oath that I will eat, and: That I will not eat; an oath that I ate, and: That I did not eat. From the fact that the mishna states: That I will eat, in contradistinction to: That I will not eat; that I ate, and in contradistinction: That I did not eat, it may be derived by inference that an oath that I will eat of yours [she’okhal lekha] indicates: An oath that I will eat. This contradicts our mishna.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ שְׁתֵּי לְשׁוֹנוֹת מַשְׁמַע. הָיוּ מְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וְאָמַר: ״אָכֵילְנָא אָכֵילְנָא״, וְתוּ: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל״ — דְּאָכֵילְנָא מַשְׁמַע. אֲבָל אָמַר: ״לָא אָכֵילְנָא לָא אָכֵילְנָא״, וְתוּ אָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל״ — ״דְּלָא אָכֵילְנָא״ קָאָמַר.
Abaye said: The phrase: That I will eat [she’okhal], indicates two expressions, depending on the context in which it is used. How so? If they were importuning [mesarevin] him to eat, and he said: I will eat, I will eat, and he furthermore said: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], it indicates: That I will eat. However, if he said: I will not eat, I will not eat, and he furthermore said: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], he is saying: That I will not eat. The oath is intended to reinforce his refusal to eat.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ דִּשְׁבוּעָה — ״שֶׁאִי אוֹכַל״ קָאָמַר. אִם כֵּן, פְּשִׁיטָא! מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מֵיקַם לִישָּׁנָא הִיא דְּאִיתְּקִיל לֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Rav Ashi said that the phrase: That I will eat [she’okhal], cited in the mishna with regard to an oath, is actually saying that he said: That I will not eat [she’i okhal]. The Gemara asks: If so, the prohibition is obvious, as he explicitly took an oath not to eat. What is the purpose of stating this halakha? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that he blundered in properly upholding the wording, i.e., he mispronounced the vow, as his intention was to say: An oath that I will eat [she’okhal], the mishna teaches us that he meant that he will not eat.
אַבָּיֵי לָא אָמַר טַעַם כְּרַב אָשֵׁי — דְּלָא קָתָנֵי ״שֶׁאִי אוֹכַל״.
Abaye did not state the reason for the ruling of the mishna that was stated by Rav Ashi, as the mishna does not teach the case of: That I will not eat [she’i okhal]. Rather, it teaches the case of that I will eat [she’okhal].
וְרַב אָשֵׁי נָאדֵי מִן טַעַם דְּאַבָּיֵי. קָסָבַר ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ נָמֵי, מַשְׁמַע שְׁתֵּי לְשׁוֹנוֹת. הָיוּ מְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל וְאָמַר: ״לָא אָכֵילְנָא לָא אָכֵילְנָא״, וְאָמַר נָמֵי: ״שְׁבוּעָה״, בֵּין ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ בֵּין ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ — הָדֵין ״אָכֵילְנָא״ מַשְׁמַע דְּאָמַר.
And Rav Ashi turned away [nadei] from the reason that Abaye stated, because he held that the phrase: That I will not eat, also indicates two expressions, depending on the context. For example, if they were importuning him to eat and he said: I will not eat, I will not eat, and subsequently he also said: An oath, then, in this case, whether the wording of the oath was: That I will eat, or: That I will not eat, this expression indicates that he is saying: I will eat. The statement: An oath that I will not eat, should be interpreted rhetorically in this context: Did I take an oath that I will not eat? Certainly I did not, as I will eat.
וְאִיכָּא לְתָרוֹצַהּ נָמֵי לִישָּׁנָא ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ — ״שְׁבוּעָה דְּלָא אָכֵילְנָא״ קָאָמַר. אֶלָּא תַּנָּא פַּסְקַהּ: ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ — ״דְּאָכֵילְנָא״ מַשְׁמַע, וְ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״ — ״לֹא אוֹכַל״ מַשְׁמַע.
And there is also a way to interpret the expression: An oath that I will not eat, as indicating its straightforward meaning, i.e., that he is saying: An oath that I will not eat. Therefore, the mishna cannot be interpreted in this manner. Rather, the tanna in tractate Shevuot clearly established a principle: That I will eat, indicates that I will eat, and: That I will not eat, indicates I will not eat. Therefore, the correct version of the mishna must be: That I will not eat [she’i okhal].
מַתְנִי׳ זֶה חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מִבַּנְּדָרִים, וְחוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר: ״קֻוֽנָּם סוּכָּה שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשֶׂה״, ״לוּלָב שֶׁאֲנִי נוֹטֵל״, ״תְּפִילִּין שֶׁאֲנִי מַנִּיחַ״ — בַּנְּדָרִים אָסוּר, בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מוּתָּר, שֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת.
MISHNA: This rule, that oaths can render actions, which do not have actual substance, either prohibited or obligatory, is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows, which do not take effect with regard to matters that do not have actual substance. And there is also a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? With regard to one who said: Making a sukka is konam for me, or: Taking a lulav is konam for me, or: Donning phylacteries is konam for me, in the case of vows, the items are rendered forbidden, and he may not perform the mitzva until the vow is dissolved. However, in the case of similar oaths, these items are permitted, as one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot.
גְּמָ׳ ״חוֹמֶר״, מִכְּלָל דְּנֶדֶר הוּא. וְהָא ״מוּתָּר״ קָתָנֵי!
GEMARA: It is stated in the mishna: This is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows. The Gemara presumes that the mishna is referring to the distinction stated in previous mishnayot between saying: An offering that I will not eat of yours, and saying: An oath that I will not eat of yours. The Gemara asks: Should it be derived by inference that the statement: An offering that I will not eat of yours, is a valid vow by rabbinic law, and it is merely less stringent than the corresponding oath, which takes effect by Torah law? But doesn’t the mishna teach that it is permitted for him to eat, implying that the vow does not take effect at all?
אַסֵּיפָא דְּאִידַּךְ בָּבָא קָתָנֵי. ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵינִי יָשֵׁן״, ״שֶׁאֵינִי מְדַבֵּר״, ״שֶׁאֵינִי מְהַלֵּךְ״ — אָסוּר. זֶה חוֹמֶר בַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת מִבַּנְּדָרִים.
The Gemara answers: This is taught with regard to the latter clause of the other section. As opposed to a vow that is taken with regard to a matter that does not have actual substance, which takes effect only by rabbinic law, as articulated in the mishna (14b) and Gemara (15a), the subsequent mishna (15b) teaches that if someone says: An oath that I will not sleep, or: That I will not speak, or: That I will not walk, this activity is forbidden to him. It is concerning this contrast that the mishna says: This is a stringency of oaths vis-à-vis vows.
חוֹמֶר בַּנְּדָרִים מִבַּשְּׁבוּעוֹת כֵּיצַד כּוּ׳. רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי: אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב. וְרַב טָבְיוֹמֵי מַתְנֵי: אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל. מִנַּיִן שֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״, ״דְּבָרוֹ לֹא יַחֵל״ — אֲבָל מֵיחֵל הוּא לְחֶפְצֵי שָׁמַיִם.
§ It is stated in the mishna that there is a stringency of vows vis-à-vis oaths. How so? Whereas a vow can override a mitzva, an oath cannot. Rav Kahana teaches that Rav Giddel said that Rav said, and Rav Tavyumei teaches the same statement with a different attribution, i.e., Rav Giddel said that Shmuel said: From where is it derived that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot? The verse states: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3). It is inferred that his word, i.e., the prohibition he accepted upon himself, he shall not profane. However, he may profane it for the desires of Heaven. If he took an oath to act against the will of God, the oath does not take effect.
מַאי שְׁנָא נֶדֶר — דִּכְתִיב: ״אִישׁ כִּי יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַה׳ … לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״. שְׁבוּעָה נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״אוֹ הִשָּׁבַע שְׁבֻעָה לַה׳ לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ״!
The Gemara asks: What is different about a vow that enables it to override mitzvot? Granted, as it is written in the Torah: “When a man takes a vow to the Lord…he shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3), which indicates that even with regard to matters that pertain to the Lord, i.e., mitzvot, one shall not profane his word, as the vow takes effect. However, with regard to an oath it is also written in the same verse: “Or swears an oath” to God, “he shall not profane his word.”
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא דְּאָמַר ״הֲנָאַת סוּכָּה עָלַי״, הָא דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶהֱנֶה מִן הַסּוּכָּה״.
Abaye said: The distinction is not between oaths and vows per se, but rather between the phraseology in each case. How so? This case, in which the prohibition overrides the mitzva, is referring to one who said: The benefit derived from a sukka is hereby forbidden to me. Since the vow renders the sukka a forbidden object, it takes effect and overrides the mitzva, as one may not be fed what is forbidden to him, even if it is forbidden only to him. By contrast, that case, in which the prohibition does not take effect, is referring to one who said: I hereby take an oath that I will not derive benefit from the sukka. The oath does not take effect, as one is not entitled to take an oath to abstain from an act that he is obligated to perform.
אָמַר רָבָא: וְכִי מִצְוֹת לֵיהָנוֹת נִיתְּנוּ? אֶלָּא, אָמַר רָבָא: הָא דְּאָמַר ״יְשִׁיבַת סוּכָּה עָלַי״, וְהָא דְּאָמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אֵשֵׁב בַּסּוּכָּה״.
Rava said in objection to the explanation of Abaye: But were mitzvot given for the purpose of deriving benefit? The performance of mitzvot is not considered benefit. Why then would performance of the mitzva with the sukka be considered deriving benefit? Rather, Rava said a different explanation: This case is referring to one who said: Dwelling in a sukka is hereby prohibited to me, and that case is referring to one who said: I hereby take an oath that I will not dwell in a sukka.
וְשֶׁאֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין לַעֲבוֹר עַל הַמִּצְוֹת מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא לֵיהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל נִשְׁבַּע לְבַטֵּל אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְלֹא בִּיטֵּל, יָכוֹל יְהֵא חַיָּיב —
§ The Gemara asks: And is the principle that one cannot take an oath to transgress the mitzvot derived from here, i.e., the above verse? It is derived from there, i.e., another verse, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that if one takes an oath to nullify a mitzva and does not nullify it, one might have thought that he will be liable for violating an oath on a statement.
