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Today's Daf Yomi

January 20, 2023 | 讻状讝 讘讟讘转 转砖驻状讙

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

Nedarim 87

Today’s daf is sponsored by Gordon Marx in honor of Sara Marx鈥檚 Hebrew birthday. 鈥淗appy birthday!鈥

If the Mishna teaches us that one needs to know exactly whose vow he is nullifying from the verse in the Torah saying “her”, why when it comes to a mourner, a braita rules that tearing clothing for a relative, if the tearing is done with the wrong person in mind, it is valid, even though it is learned from a verse “for Shaul and for Yonatan” which would seem to also indicate the need one to know for whom they are tearing. Two different answers are brought to resolve the contradiction between the Mishna and the braita. The first answer is to distinguish between a case (the braita) where one did it generally or was told generally about a relative and then intended when tearing for the wrong person, and a case (our Mishna) where one was told or did the action specifically for a particular person and it turns out it was the wrong person. The second answer is that in the braita, he realized the mistake within a few seconds (toch k’dei dibur) and therefore it was valid and the Mishna was in a case where he realized his error beyond that short time frame. A braita is brought to support each response. If one forbade two things in one vow, if the husband/father ratifies part, the whole thing is ratified. But if he nullified only part, neither part is nullified. The Gemara explains that the Mishna goes according to Rabbi Yishmael and then brings Rabbi Akiva and the rabbi’s positions who each disagree with Rabbi Yishmael and with each other. From where do they each derive their opinions? If one didn’t know that he could nullify his wife’s/daughter’s vows, even if he heard the vow earlier, he can nullify it on the day he learns that he can nullify it. But if he knew he could nullify but not that it was a vow that needed to be/could be nullified, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether he can/cannot nullify it later when he discovers that. Rabbi Meir’s opinion here contradicts his opinion regarding a blind accidental murderer who is punished by having to go to a refuge city even though his knowledge was only partial, whereas, in our Mishna, Rabbi Meir agrees with the rabbis in the first case and considered partial knowledge only partial.

讜讛讗 讙讘讬 拽专注讬诐 讚讻转讬讘 注诇 注诇 讚讻转讬讘 注诇 砖讗讜诇 讜注诇 讬讛讜谞转谉 讘谞讜

The Gemara comments: But is it not so that with regard to the tears in one鈥檚 clothing that are made for the dead, as it is written 鈥渇or,鈥 鈥渇or,鈥 and about which is written: 鈥淎nd David took hold of his garments and rent them, and likewise all the men that were with him, and they wailed, and wept, and fasted until the evening, for Saul, and for Jonathan his son, and for the people of the Lord, and for the house of Israel, because they were fallen by the sword鈥 (II聽Samuel 1:11鈥12). The use of the word 鈥渇or鈥 with regard to each of them indicates that one must make a separate tear in his garment for each person who died.

讜转谞讬讗 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转 讗讘讬讜 讜拽专注 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞诪爪讗 讘谞讜 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛

The Gemara asks: And yet it is taught in a baraita: If they said to him that his father had died and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. This shows that even if a person mistakenly tore his garment for the wrong person he has nevertheless fulfilled the obligation. Here too, if a man nullified the vow of his wife, thinking that it was the vow of his daughter, his nullification should be effective.

讗诪专讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘住转诐 讜讛讗 讘诪驻专砖

The Gemara responds: The apparent contradiction is not difficult. That baraita refers to a case where he received a non-specific report, i.e., he was told that an unspecified relative died. In such a case his obligation to rend his garment has been discharged. And this mishna refers to a case where the bearer of the news mistakenly specified that his daughter had taken the vow, when in reality his wife had. In such a case, his nullification is ineffective.

讜讛转谞讬讗 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转 讗讘讬讜 讜拽专注 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞诪爪讗 讘谞讜 诇讗 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转 诇讜 诪转 讜讻住讘讜专 讗讘讬讜 讛讜讗 讜拽专注 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞诪爪讗 讘谞讜 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛

And it is taught similarly in the following baraita: If they said to him that his father had died and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. If, however, they said to him that a relative of his had died, and he thought it was his father and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. This proves that a distinction is made between one who rends his garment relying on a specific report and one who does so following a non-specific report.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻讗谉 讘转讜讱 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专 讻讗谉 诇讗讞专 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专

Rav Ashi says that the discrepancy between the baraitot with regard to the rending of garments can be reconciled in a different manner: Here, the person who rent his garment for the wrong relative realized his error within the time required for speaking the short phrase: Greetings to you, my teacher. Until that time has passed his action is seen as incomplete and can therefore still be modified. There, the mistake was noted only after the time required for speaking a short phrase.

讛讗 讚拽讗诪专转 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛 砖谞诪爪讗 讘谞讜 讘转讜讱 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专 讛讗 讚讗诪专转 诇讗 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛 诇讗讞专 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专

This case, where you said that he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment even though he had initially been told explicitly that his father died, deals with a situation where it was discovered within the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., immediately after he rent his garment, that the deceased was his son. However, that case, where you said that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment, deals with a situation where he became aware of his mistake after the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., a short while later.

讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讜 讞讜诇讛 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讜谞转注诇祝 讜讻诪讚讜诪讛 砖诪转 讜拽专注 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 诇讗 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 驻讝讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 诪砖讜诐 讘专 拽驻专讗 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 砖诪转 诇讗讞专 讻讚讬 讚讬讘讜专 讗讘诇 讘转讜讱 讻讚讬 讚讬讘讜专 讻讚讘讜专 讚诪讬

And it is taught in the following baraita: One who has an ill relative in his house, and the latter fainted and lost consciousness, and it seemed to him that the ill person had died and therefore he rent his garment over his assumed death, if it turned out that he had not yet actually died at that point and it was only afterward that he died, the relative has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. And with regard to this baraita, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: They taught that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending only if the ill person died after the time required for speaking a short phrase. But if he passed away within the time required for speaking a short phrase, it is all considered like continuous speech, and his relative has fulfilled his obligation. That is to say, his act of rending is not viewed as complete until the time required for saying a short phrase has elapsed, and until that time has passed the act can still be modified.

讜讛讬诇讻转讗 转讜讱 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专 讻讚讘讜专 讚诪讬 讞讜抓 诪诪讙讚祝 讜注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜诪拽讚砖 讜诪讙专砖

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is: The legal status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, and so a person can retract what he first said if he issues the retraction within this period of time after he finished speaking. This principle holds true in almost every area of halakha, except for the case of one who blasphemes God; or in the case of an idol worshipper, who verbally accepts an idol as his god; or one who betroths a woman; or one who divorces his wife. In these four cases, a person cannot undo his action, even if he immediately retracts what he said within the time required for saying a short phrase.

诪转谞讬壮 讗诪专讛 拽讜谞诐 转讗谞讬诐 讜注谞讘讬诐 讗诇讜 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诪转 拽讬讬诐 诇转讗谞讬诐 讻讜诇讜 拽讬讬诐 讛驻专 诇转讗谞讬诐 讗讬谞讜 诪讜驻专 注讚 砖讬驻专 讗祝 诇注谞讘讬诐 讗诪专讛 拽讜谞诐 转讗谞讛 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诪转 讜注谞讘讛 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诪转 讛专讬 讗诇讜 砖谞讬 谞讚专讬诐

MISHNA: If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld, but if he nullified it with regard to figs it is not nullified until he also nullifies the vow with regard to grapes. If she said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows; if the husband upholds one of the vows it has no effect on the other one.

讙诪壮 诪谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讚转谞讬讗 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讗诪专讛 拽讜谞诐 转讗谞讬诐 讜注谞讘讬诐 讗诇讜 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诪转 拽讬讬诐 诇转讗谞讬诐 讻讜诇讜 拽讬讬诐

GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The Gemara answers: It follows the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse concerning vows that states: 鈥淗er husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14), may be expounded as follows. If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld.

讛驻专 诇转讗谞讬诐 讗讬谞讜 诪讜驻专 注讚 砖讬驻专 讗祝 诇注谞讘讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 诪讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 诪诪谞讜 讗祝 讬驻专谞讜 诪诪谞讜 讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诪讬 讻转讬讘 讬驻专 诪诪谞讜 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪拽讬砖 讛驻专讛 诇讛拽诪讛 诪讛 讛拽诪讛 诪诪谞讜 讗祝 讛驻专讛 诪诪谞讜

But if he nullified it with regard to figs, it is not nullified until he will also nullify the vow for grapes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says that the verse states: 鈥淗er husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it.鈥 Just as the words 鈥渕ay uphold it鈥 [yekimennu] should be understood as if they read: He may uphold part of it [yakim mimmennu], implying that if he upheld part of the vow he has upheld all of it, so too, the words 鈥渉e may nullify it鈥 [yeferennu] should be understood as if they read: He may nullify part of it [yafer mimmennu]. And Rabbi Yishmael retorts: Is it written: He may nullify part of it, with a mem, as it is written with respect to a husband who upholds the vow? And Rabbi Akiva replies: The verse juxtaposes nullification to upholding; just as upholding means part of it, so too, nullification means part of it.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讝讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讘诇 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪拽讬砖 讛拽诪讛 诇讛驻专讛 诪讛 讛驻专讛 诪讛 砖讛驻专 讛驻专 讗祝 讛拽诪讛 诪讛 砖拽讬讬诐 拽讬讬诐

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: This opinion, that a vow is treated as a single unit, so that the entire vow is upheld even if the husband upheld only a part of it, is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. But the Rabbis say: The verse juxtaposes upholding to nullification; just as with regard to nullification, that which he nullified he has nullified, so too, with regard to upholding, that which he upheld he has upheld, but no more.

讗诪专讛 拽讜谞诐 转讗谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚

The mishna teaches that if a woman said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows. Rava said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon said that that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance, for example, if he says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, unless he states an expression of an oath to each and every one of the creditors, for example by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours. Here too, only if she says: Tasting, with respect to each fruit are they viewed as two separate vows.

诪转谞讬壮 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖讬砖 谞讚专讬诐 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讬砖 诪驻讬专讬谉 讬驻专 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖讬砖 诪驻讬专讬谉 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讝讛 谞讚专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬驻专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬驻专

MISHNA: If a man鈥檚 wife or daughter took a vow and he failed to nullify the vow on the day he heard it, but afterward he said: I know that there are vows, but I don鈥檛 know that there are those who can nullify them, i.e., he was unaware of the possibility of nullifying vows, he can nullify the vow of his wife or his daughter on the day he learned that he can nullify vows. If, however, he said: I know there are those who can nullify vows, but I refrained from nullifying the vow that I heard because I do not know that this is considered a vow, Rabbi Meir says he cannot nullify the vow at this point, but the Rabbis say that even in this case he can nullify the vow on the day that he learned of his mistake.

讙诪壮 讜专诪讬谞讛讜 讘诇讗 专讗讜转 驻专讟 诇住讜诪讗 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛住讜诪讗

GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: With regard to one who kills unintentionally, the verse states: 鈥淲ithout seeing鈥 (Numbers 35:23), which serves to exclude a blind person from the category of those who are exiled to a city of refuge due to having killed unintentionally, as the verse indicates that it was only in this instance that he did not see, but he is generally able to see. A blind person who kills another unintentionally is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says the verse serves to include a blind person in the category of those who are exiled, as he too does not see. This shows that Rabbi Meir does not distinguish between different kinds of lack of knowledge, whereas the mishna suggests that he does accept such a distinction. The opposite is true of Rabbi Yehuda, who, unless it is otherwise indicated, is assumed to be Rabbi Meir鈥檚 disputant in all places.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok.

  • Masechet Nedarim is sponsored by Aviva and Benny Adler in honor of our mother Lorraine Kahane and in loving memory of our parents Joseph Kahane z"l, Miriam and Ari Adler z"l.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

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Nedarim 87

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Nedarim 87

讜讛讗 讙讘讬 拽专注讬诐 讚讻转讬讘 注诇 注诇 讚讻转讬讘 注诇 砖讗讜诇 讜注诇 讬讛讜谞转谉 讘谞讜

The Gemara comments: But is it not so that with regard to the tears in one鈥檚 clothing that are made for the dead, as it is written 鈥渇or,鈥 鈥渇or,鈥 and about which is written: 鈥淎nd David took hold of his garments and rent them, and likewise all the men that were with him, and they wailed, and wept, and fasted until the evening, for Saul, and for Jonathan his son, and for the people of the Lord, and for the house of Israel, because they were fallen by the sword鈥 (II聽Samuel 1:11鈥12). The use of the word 鈥渇or鈥 with regard to each of them indicates that one must make a separate tear in his garment for each person who died.

讜转谞讬讗 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转 讗讘讬讜 讜拽专注 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞诪爪讗 讘谞讜 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛

The Gemara asks: And yet it is taught in a baraita: If they said to him that his father had died and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. This shows that even if a person mistakenly tore his garment for the wrong person he has nevertheless fulfilled the obligation. Here too, if a man nullified the vow of his wife, thinking that it was the vow of his daughter, his nullification should be effective.

讗诪专讬 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘住转诐 讜讛讗 讘诪驻专砖

The Gemara responds: The apparent contradiction is not difficult. That baraita refers to a case where he received a non-specific report, i.e., he was told that an unspecified relative died. In such a case his obligation to rend his garment has been discharged. And this mishna refers to a case where the bearer of the news mistakenly specified that his daughter had taken the vow, when in reality his wife had. In such a case, his nullification is ineffective.

讜讛转谞讬讗 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转 讗讘讬讜 讜拽专注 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞诪爪讗 讘谞讜 诇讗 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛 讗诪专讜 诇讜 诪转 诇讜 诪转 讜讻住讘讜专 讗讘讬讜 讛讜讗 讜拽专注 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞诪爪讗 讘谞讜 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛

And it is taught similarly in the following baraita: If they said to him that his father had died and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. If, however, they said to him that a relative of his had died, and he thought it was his father and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. This proves that a distinction is made between one who rends his garment relying on a specific report and one who does so following a non-specific report.

专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讻讗谉 讘转讜讱 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专 讻讗谉 诇讗讞专 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专

Rav Ashi says that the discrepancy between the baraitot with regard to the rending of garments can be reconciled in a different manner: Here, the person who rent his garment for the wrong relative realized his error within the time required for speaking the short phrase: Greetings to you, my teacher. Until that time has passed his action is seen as incomplete and can therefore still be modified. There, the mistake was noted only after the time required for speaking a short phrase.

讛讗 讚拽讗诪专转 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛 砖谞诪爪讗 讘谞讜 讘转讜讱 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专 讛讗 讚讗诪专转 诇讗 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛 诇讗讞专 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专

This case, where you said that he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment even though he had initially been told explicitly that his father died, deals with a situation where it was discovered within the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., immediately after he rent his garment, that the deceased was his son. However, that case, where you said that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment, deals with a situation where he became aware of his mistake after the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., a short while later.

讜讛转谞讬讗 诪讬 砖讬砖 诇讜 讞讜诇讛 讘转讜讱 讘讬转讜 讜谞转注诇祝 讜讻诪讚讜诪讛 砖诪转 讜拽专注 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪转 诇讗 讬爪讗 讬讚讬 拽专讬注讛 讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 驻讝讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讘谉 诇讜讬 诪砖讜诐 讘专 拽驻专讗 诇讗 砖谞讜 讗诇讗 砖诪转 诇讗讞专 讻讚讬 讚讬讘讜专 讗讘诇 讘转讜讱 讻讚讬 讚讬讘讜专 讻讚讘讜专 讚诪讬

And it is taught in the following baraita: One who has an ill relative in his house, and the latter fainted and lost consciousness, and it seemed to him that the ill person had died and therefore he rent his garment over his assumed death, if it turned out that he had not yet actually died at that point and it was only afterward that he died, the relative has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. And with regard to this baraita, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: They taught that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending only if the ill person died after the time required for speaking a short phrase. But if he passed away within the time required for speaking a short phrase, it is all considered like continuous speech, and his relative has fulfilled his obligation. That is to say, his act of rending is not viewed as complete until the time required for saying a short phrase has elapsed, and until that time has passed the act can still be modified.

讜讛讬诇讻转讗 转讜讱 讻讚讬 讚讘讜专 讻讚讘讜专 讚诪讬 讞讜抓 诪诪讙讚祝 讜注讜讘讚 注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜诪拽讚砖 讜诪讙专砖

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is: The legal status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, and so a person can retract what he first said if he issues the retraction within this period of time after he finished speaking. This principle holds true in almost every area of halakha, except for the case of one who blasphemes God; or in the case of an idol worshipper, who verbally accepts an idol as his god; or one who betroths a woman; or one who divorces his wife. In these four cases, a person cannot undo his action, even if he immediately retracts what he said within the time required for saying a short phrase.

诪转谞讬壮 讗诪专讛 拽讜谞诐 转讗谞讬诐 讜注谞讘讬诐 讗诇讜 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诪转 拽讬讬诐 诇转讗谞讬诐 讻讜诇讜 拽讬讬诐 讛驻专 诇转讗谞讬诐 讗讬谞讜 诪讜驻专 注讚 砖讬驻专 讗祝 诇注谞讘讬诐 讗诪专讛 拽讜谞诐 转讗谞讛 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诪转 讜注谞讘讛 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诪转 讛专讬 讗诇讜 砖谞讬 谞讚专讬诐

MISHNA: If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld, but if he nullified it with regard to figs it is not nullified until he also nullifies the vow with regard to grapes. If she said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows; if the husband upholds one of the vows it has no effect on the other one.

讙诪壮 诪谞讬 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讚转谞讬讗 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 讗诪专讛 拽讜谞诐 转讗谞讬诐 讜注谞讘讬诐 讗诇讜 砖讗谞讬 讟讜注诪转 拽讬讬诐 诇转讗谞讬诐 讻讜诇讜 拽讬讬诐

GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The Gemara answers: It follows the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse concerning vows that states: 鈥淗er husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it鈥 (Numbers 30:14), may be expounded as follows. If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld.

讛驻专 诇转讗谞讬诐 讗讬谞讜 诪讜驻专 注讚 砖讬驻专 讗祝 诇注谞讘讬诐 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讛专讬 讛讜讗 讗讜诪专 讗讬砖讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 讜讗讬砖讛 讬驻专谞讜 诪讛 讬拽讬诪谞讜 诪诪谞讜 讗祝 讬驻专谞讜 诪诪谞讜 讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 诪讬 讻转讬讘 讬驻专 诪诪谞讜 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪拽讬砖 讛驻专讛 诇讛拽诪讛 诪讛 讛拽诪讛 诪诪谞讜 讗祝 讛驻专讛 诪诪谞讜

But if he nullified it with regard to figs, it is not nullified until he will also nullify the vow for grapes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says that the verse states: 鈥淗er husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it.鈥 Just as the words 鈥渕ay uphold it鈥 [yekimennu] should be understood as if they read: He may uphold part of it [yakim mimmennu], implying that if he upheld part of the vow he has upheld all of it, so too, the words 鈥渉e may nullify it鈥 [yeferennu] should be understood as if they read: He may nullify part of it [yafer mimmennu]. And Rabbi Yishmael retorts: Is it written: He may nullify part of it, with a mem, as it is written with respect to a husband who upholds the vow? And Rabbi Akiva replies: The verse juxtaposes nullification to upholding; just as upholding means part of it, so too, nullification means part of it.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讞讬讬讗 讘专 讗讘讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讝讜 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讜专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讘诇 讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪拽讬砖 讛拽诪讛 诇讛驻专讛 诪讛 讛驻专讛 诪讛 砖讛驻专 讛驻专 讗祝 讛拽诪讛 诪讛 砖拽讬讬诐 拽讬讬诐

Rabbi 岣yya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yo岣nan said: This opinion, that a vow is treated as a single unit, so that the entire vow is upheld even if the husband upheld only a part of it, is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. But the Rabbis say: The verse juxtaposes upholding to nullification; just as with regard to nullification, that which he nullified he has nullified, so too, with regard to upholding, that which he upheld he has upheld, but no more.

讗诪专讛 拽讜谞诐 转讗谞讛 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讚讗诪专 注讚 砖讬讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 诇讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚

The mishna teaches that if a woman said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows. Rava said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon said that that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance, for example, if he says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, unless he states an expression of an oath to each and every one of the creditors, for example by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours. Here too, only if she says: Tasting, with respect to each fruit are they viewed as two separate vows.

诪转谞讬壮 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖讬砖 谞讚专讬诐 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讬砖 诪驻讬专讬谉 讬驻专 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖讬砖 诪驻讬专讬谉 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 砖讝讛 谞讚专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诇讗 讬驻专 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 讬驻专

MISHNA: If a man鈥檚 wife or daughter took a vow and he failed to nullify the vow on the day he heard it, but afterward he said: I know that there are vows, but I don鈥檛 know that there are those who can nullify them, i.e., he was unaware of the possibility of nullifying vows, he can nullify the vow of his wife or his daughter on the day he learned that he can nullify vows. If, however, he said: I know there are those who can nullify vows, but I refrained from nullifying the vow that I heard because I do not know that this is considered a vow, Rabbi Meir says he cannot nullify the vow at this point, but the Rabbis say that even in this case he can nullify the vow on the day that he learned of his mistake.

讙诪壮 讜专诪讬谞讛讜 讘诇讗 专讗讜转 驻专讟 诇住讜诪讗 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讛住讜诪讗

GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: With regard to one who kills unintentionally, the verse states: 鈥淲ithout seeing鈥 (Numbers 35:23), which serves to exclude a blind person from the category of those who are exiled to a city of refuge due to having killed unintentionally, as the verse indicates that it was only in this instance that he did not see, but he is generally able to see. A blind person who kills another unintentionally is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says the verse serves to include a blind person in the category of those who are exiled, as he too does not see. This shows that Rabbi Meir does not distinguish between different kinds of lack of knowledge, whereas the mishna suggests that he does accept such a distinction. The opposite is true of Rabbi Yehuda, who, unless it is otherwise indicated, is assumed to be Rabbi Meir鈥檚 disputant in all places.

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