Sanhedrin 28
אַשְׁכְּחַן אָבוֹת לְבָנִים, וּבָנִים לְאָבוֹת.
§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of the source for the disqualification of relatives from bearing witness. From the fact that the verse: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children” (Deuteronomy 24:16), is not phrased in the singular, i.e., A father shall not be put to death for his child, it is derived that not only are a father and child disqualified from bearing witness about one another, but closely related relatives, i.e., brothers, are also disqualified from bearing witness about each other’s children. Consequently, we found a source for the disqualification of fathers from bearing witness about their children or the children of their brothers, and for the disqualification of children from bearing witness about their fathers or their fathers’ brothers.
וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן אָבוֹת לַהֲדָדֵי.
And all the more so, the related fathers, e.g., brothers, are disqualified from bearing witness about each other, as they are certainly more closely related to each other than are a nephew and an uncle.
בָּנִים לְבָנִים – מְנָלַן?
But from where do we derive that one brother’s children cannot bear witness about the children of the other brother?
אִם כֵּן, לִיכְתּוֹב קְרָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בֵּן״! מַאי ״בָּנִים״? דַּאֲפִילּוּ בָּנִים לַהֲדָדֵי.
The Gemara answers: If so, if the children of one brother can bear witness about the children of the other brother, let the verse write: The fathers shall not be put to death for the child. For what reason is “children” written, in the plural? It is derived from here that even children of brothers are disqualified from bearing witness about each other.
אַשְׁכְּחַן בָּנִים לַהֲדָדֵי, בָּנִים לְעָלְמָא מְנָלַן?
We found a source for the halakha that the children of brothers cannot bear witness about each other. From where do we derive that the children of brothers cannot bear witness together about others?
אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: סְבָרָא הוּא, כִּדְתַנְיָא: אֵין הָעֵדִים נַעֲשִׂין זוֹמְמִין עַד שֶׁיִּזּוֹמּוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בָּנִים לְעָלְמָא כְּשֵׁרִין, נִמְצָא עֵד זוֹמֵם נֶהֱרָג בְּעֵדוּת אָחִיו.
Rami bar Ḥama says: This halakha is based on logical reasoning, and is not derived from a verse. This is as it is taught in a baraita: The witnesses are not rendered conspiring witnesses unless they are both rendered conspiring witnesses. And therefore, if it enters your mind that related children are fit to bear witness together about others, a conspiring witness can be found to be executed based on the testimony of his brother, i.e., his relative. Since a conspiring witness is executed for his testimony only if his co-witness is also rendered a conspiring witness, the testimony of his co-witness, who is a relative, is what causes him to be executed. This is tantamount to relatives bearing witness about each other. Therefore, relatives cannot serve as witnesses together.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, הָא דִּתְנַן: שְׁלֹשָׁה אַחִין וְאֶחָד מִצְטָרֵף עִמָּהֶן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שָׁלֹשׁ עֵדִיּוֹת, וְהֵן עֵדוּת אַחַת לַהֲזָמָה.
Rava said to him: But according to your reasoning, there is a difficulty arising from that which we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 56b): If one occupied land for three years, this serves in court as proof that he is the legal owner. If three brothers testify to his three-year possession of the land, with each one testifying separately about one year, and one unrelated individual joins with each of the brothers as the second witness, these are considered three distinct testimonies and are therefore accepted by the court. If they were to be considered one testimony it would not be accepted, as brothers may not testify together. But they are considered one testimony for the purpose of rendering them conspiring witnesses. In other words, they are punished only if all six of the witnesses are rendered conspiring witnesses, and the liability is divided among them.
נִמְצָא עֵד זוֹמֵם מְשַׁלֵּם מָמוֹן בְּעֵדוּת אָחִיו.
Rava states his objection: If so, a conspiring witness can be found to be paying money due to the testimony of his brother, and nevertheless, the brothers’ testimony is not disqualified.
אֶלָּא, הֲזָמָה מֵעָלְמָא קָאָתֵי. הָכָא נָמֵי, הֲזָמָה מֵעָלְמָא קָאָתֵי.
Rather, this is clearly not considered tantamount to brothers bearing witness about each other, as the rendering of one as a conspiring witness comes not from his co-witness but from others, i.e., the witnesses who testify that he had been with them. Here too, it cannot be proven logically that relatives are disqualified from bearing witness together, as the rendering of one as a conspiring witness comes from others.
אֶלָּא, אִם כֵּן לִיכְתּוֹב קְרָא ״וּבֵן עַל אָבוֹת״, אִי נָמֵי ״הֵם עַל אָבוֹת״. מַאי ״וּבָנִים״? אֲפִילּוּ בָּנִים לְעָלְמָא.
Rather, the halakha that relatives are disqualified from bearing witness together is derived from a different source: If it is so that relatives can bear witness together, let the verse write: And a child shall not be put to death for the fathers, or: They shall not be put to death for the fathers. For what reason is “and the children” written in the plural? This indicates that related children are disqualified from bearing witness even about others.
אַשְׁכְּחַן קְרוֹבֵי הָאָב, קְרוֹבֵי הָאֵם מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״אָבוֹת״ ״אָבוֹת״ תְּרֵי זִימְנֵי. אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לִקְרוֹבֵי הָאָב, תְּנֵיהוּ עִנְיָן לִקְרוֹבֵי הָאֵם.
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the disqualification of paternal relatives. From where do we derive the disqualification of maternal relatives? The Gemara answers: The verse states “fathers,” “fathers,” i.e., it states the word twice. This repetition is unnecessary, as the verse could have stated: And the children shall not be put to death for them. If the superfluous word “fathers” is not needed to teach the matter of paternal relatives, as this matter was already derived from the verse, apply it to the matter of maternal relatives.
אַשְׁכְּחַן לְחוֹבָה, לִזְכוּת מְנָא לַן?
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that one cannot bear witness to the detriment of his relative, as the verse states: “Shall not be put to death.” From where do we derive that one cannot testify to the benefit of his relative?
אָמַר קְרָא: ״יוּמְתוּ״, ״יוּמְתוּ״ – תְּרֵי זִימְנֵי. אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְחוֹבָה, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לִזְכוּת.
The Gemara answers: The verse states the term “shall not be put to death,” “shall not be put to death,” twice. If it is not needed to teach the matter of testimony to the detriment of one’s relative, as this halakha was already derived from the verse, apply it to the matter of testimony to the benefit of one’s relative.
אַשְׁכְּחַן בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, בְּדִינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מְנָלַן?
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the disqualification of relatives in cases of capital law, as the verse is referring to execution. From where do we derive this halakha in cases of monetary law?
אָמַר קְרָא: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״ – מִשְׁפָּט הַשָּׁוֶה לָכֶם.
The Gemara answers that the verse states: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), which is interpreted to mean: A law that is equal for you. In other words, monetary law and capital law essentially follow the same guidelines.
אָמַר רַב: אֲחִי אַבָּא לֹא יָעִיד לִי, הוּא וּבְנוֹ וַחֲתָנוֹ. אַף אֲנִי לֹא אָעִיד לוֹ, אֲנִי וּבְנִי וַחֲתָנִי.
§ Rav says: My paternal uncle will not testify about me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law, in accordance with the ruling of the mishna. Furthermore, I will not testify about him, neither I, nor my son, nor my son-in-law.
וְאַמַּאי? הָוֵה לֵיהּ שְׁלִישִׁי בְּרִאשׁוֹן, וַאֲנַן שֵׁנִי בְּשֵׁנִי תְּנַן, שְׁנֵי בְּרִאשׁוֹן תְּנַן, שְׁלִישִׁי בְּרִאשׁוֹן לָא תְּנַן!
The Gemara asks: And why, for example, can Rav’s son not testify about the brother of his father’s father? But it is the testimony of a member of the third generation with regard to a related member of the first generation, as there is a two-generation difference between them. And we learned in the mishna that a member of the second generation cannot testify about a member of the second generation, e.g., one cannot testify about the son of his paternal uncle. We also learned that a member of the second generation cannot testify about a member of the first generation, e.g., one cannot testify about his uncle. But we did not learn that a member of the third generation cannot testify about a member of the first generation.
מַאי ״חֲתָנוֹ״ דְּקָתָנֵי בְּמַתְנִיתִין? חֲתַן בְּנוֹ.
The Gemara answers: In the statement that is taught in the mishna: They themselves, and their sons, and their sons-in-law are considered relatives, what is the ruling of the mishna concerning his son-in-law referring to? It is referring to the son-in-law of his son. Accordingly, the mishna disqualifies the testimony of a member of the third generation about a member of the first generation.
וְלִיתְנֵי ״בֶּן בְּנוֹ״!
The Gemara asks: But if so, let the mishna teach: And his son and the son of his son, instead of: His son-in-law. This would be a more straightforward manner of conveying the halakha with regard to a member of the third generation testifying about a member of the first generation.
מִילְּתָא אַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּבַעַל כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ.
The Gemara answers: By mentioning his son-in-law, the mishna teaches us a matter in passing: That with regard to the different levels of familial relationships, a husband is like his wife. Therefore, there is no difference between one’s son and one’s son-in-law.
וְאֶלָּא הָא דְתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: שְׁמוֹנָה אָבוֹת, שֶׁהֵן עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה – הָנֵי תְּלָתִין וְתַרְתֵּין הָוֵי!
The Gemara asks: But if the mishna is referring to the son-in-law of his son, a difficulty is posed by that which Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches in a baraita: Eight fathers, i.e., eight principal relatives mentioned in the mishna, are disqualified, which are twenty-four including the son and son-in-law of each. If the mishna is referring to one’s grandson these are thirty-two, as the son, the son-in-law, and the grandson of each are included.
אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם חֲתָנוֹ מַמָּשׁ. וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ ״חֲתַן בְּנוֹ״? כֵּיוָן דְּמֵעָלְמָא קָאָתֵי, כְּדוֹר אַחֵר דָּמֵי.
The Gemara consequently rejects the explanation that the mishna is referring to the son-in-law of one’s son: Rather, the mishna is in fact referring to his actual son-in-law. And why does Rav refer to him as the son-in-law of his son, deriving from this case that a member of the third generation cannot testify about a member of the first generation? Since one’s son-in-law comes from outside the family he is considered a more distant relative than his son, as if he belongs to another generation.
אִי הָכִי, הָוֵה לֵיהּ שְׁלִישִׁי בְּשֵׁנִי, וְרַב אַכְשַׁר שְׁלִישִׁי בְּשֵׁנִי.
The Gemara challenges this: If that is so, then the testimony of an individual with regard to the son-in-law of his father is equivalent to that of a member of the third generation with regard to a member of the second generation. And Rav is known to have deemed a member of the third generation fit to bear witness about a member of the second generation.
אֶלָּא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר, כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֲחִי אַבָּא לֹא יָעִיד לִי – הוּא וּבְנוֹ וַחֲתָנוֹ, כָּךְ בֶּן אֲחִי אַבָּא לֹא יָעִיד לִי – הוּא וּבְנוֹ וַחֲתָנוֹ.
Rather, Rav stated his ruling not in accordance with the mishna, but in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: Just as my paternal uncle will not testify about me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law, so too, the son of my paternal uncle will not testify about me, neither he, nor his son, nor his son-in-law. Accordingly, one cannot testify about the grandchild of his brother.
וְאַכַּתִּי הָוֵה לֵיהּ שְׁלִישִׁי בְּשֵׁנִי, וְרַב אַכְשַׁר שְׁלִישִׁי בְּשֵׁנִי.
The Gemara asks: But still, according to Rabbi Elazar, the grandson of one’s uncle cannot testify about his great-great uncle, which is the testimony of a member of the third generation about a member of the second generation; and Rav deemed a member of the third generation fit to bear witness about a member of the second generation.
רַב סָבַר לֵיהּ כְּוָותֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, וּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא.
The Gemara answers: Rav holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar’s opinion in one case, i.e., he disqualifies testimony of a member of the third generation with regard to a member of the first generation, and he disagrees with him in one case, i.e., he does not disqualify the testimony of a member of the third generation about a member of the second generation.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים וּבָנִים״, לְרַבּוֹת דּוֹר אַחֵר.
What is the reason for the opinion of Rav? It is as the verse states: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, and the children shall not be put to death for the fathers.” The phrase “for the children, and the children” is interpreted to include another generation, the grandchildren of one’s brother; they are also disqualified.
וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, ״עַל בָּנִים״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: פְּסוּלֵי דְאָבוֹת שְׁדִי אַבָּנִים.
And Rabbi Elazar derives his opinion from the fact that the Merciful One states: “For the children,” which is interpreted to mean that the ones disqualified from bearing witness about the fathers are cast on the children as well. In other words, anyone who is disqualified from bearing witness about a father is also disqualified from bearing witness about his children.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אֲחִי חֲמוֹתִי לֹא יָעִיד לִי, בֶּן אֲחִי חֲמוֹתִי לֹא יָעִיד לִי, בֶּן אֲחוֹת חֲמוֹתִי לֹא יָעִיד לִי. וּתְנָא תּוּנָא: בַּעַל אֲחוֹתוֹ, וּבַעַל אֲחוֹת אָבִיו, וּבַעַל אֲחוֹת אִמּוֹ, הֵן וּבְנֵיהֶן וְחַתְנֵיהֶן.
§ Rav Naḥman says: The brother of my mother-in-law will not testify about me; the son of the brother of my mother-in-law will not testify about me; the son of the sister of my mother-in-law will not testify about me. And the tanna of the mishna also taught this halakha: His sister’s husband, and the husband of his father’s sister, and the husband of his mother’s sister, and his mother’s husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, they themselves, and their sons, and their sons-in-law. This describes the same familial relationship from the perspective of the younger generation.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי עוּלָּא, אִיבְּעִי לַן: אֲחִי חָמִיו מַהוּ? בֶּן אֲחִי חָמִיו מַהוּ? בֶּן אֲחוֹת חָמִיו מַהוּ?
Rav Ashi said: When we were in Ulla’s study hall, we were asked: With regard to testifying about the brother of one’s father-in-law, what is the halakha? With regard to the son of the brother of one’s father-in-law, what is the halakha? With regard to the son of the sister of one’s father-in-law, what is the halakha?
אֲמַר לַן: תְּנֵיתוּהָ, אָחִיו וַאֲחִי אָבִיו וַאֲחִי אִמּוֹ – הֵן וּבְנֵיהֶן וְחַתְנֵיהֶן.
And Ulla said to us: You learned the answer to this question in the mishna: His brother, and his paternal uncle, and his maternal uncle, and his mother’s husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law, they themselves, and their sons, and their sons-in-law. These relationships are the same as those you were asked about, from the perspective of the younger generation.
רַב אִיקְּלַע לְמִזְבַּן
Rav arrived at a certain place to buy
גְּוִילֵי. בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ: מַהוּ שֶׁיָּעִיד אָדָם בְּאֵשֶׁת חוֹרְגוֹ?
scrolls of parchment. They asked of him there: What is the halakha as to whether a man can testify with regard to the wife of his stepson?
בְּסוּרָא אָמְרִי: בַּעַל כְּאִשְׁתּוֹ.
In Sura they say that Rav gave the following answer: A husband is considered like his wife. Since he is married to the son’s mother, the son’s wife is considered like his daughter-in-law.
בְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא אָמְרִי: אִשָּׁה כְּבַעְלָהּ. דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מִנַּיִין שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה כְּבַעְלָהּ? דִּכְתִיב: ״עֶרְוַת אֲחִי אָבִיךָ לֹא תְגַלֵּה אֶל אִשְׁתּוֹ לֹא תִקְרָב דֹּדָתְךָ הִיא״. וַהֲלֹא אֵשֶׁת דּוֹדוֹ הִיא! מִכְּלָל דְּאִשָּׁה כְּבַעְלָהּ.
In Pumbedita they say a different version of Rav’s answer: A wife is considered like her husband. Therefore, the wife of his stepson is considered like his stepson, and he cannot testify about her. As Rav Huna says that Rav Naḥman says: From where is it derived that a wife is considered like her husband? As it is written: “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your father’s brother; you shall not approach his wife: She is your aunt” (Leviticus 18:14). Isn’t she the wife of his uncle, and not his aunt, i.e., his father’s sister? It can therefore be concluded, by inference, that a wife is considered like her husband.
וּבַעַל אִמּוֹ, הוּא וּבְנוֹ וַחֲתָנוֹ. בְּנוֹ – הַיְינוּ אָחִיו?
§ The mishna teaches that among the relatives disqualified from testifying are his mother’s husband, he, i.e., the mother’s husband himself, and his son, and his son-in-law. The Gemara challenges: The son of his mother’s husband is the same as his brother, i.e., his half brother, and the mishna already stated that his brother is disqualified.
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לַאֲחִי הָאָח.
Rabbi Yirmeya said: Mentioning this case is necessary only for the half brother of the half brother, i.e., the son of his stepfather from another woman. Although they are not biologically related, they are considered relatives.
רַב חִסְדָּא אַכְשַׁר בַּאֲחִי הָאָח. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: לָא שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ הָא דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה? אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי, כְּלוֹמַר, לָא סְבִירָא לִי.
Rav Ḥisda deemed the testimony of the half brother of the half brother fit. The other Sages said to him: Did you not hear this statement of Rabbi Yirmeya, that the half brother of the half brother is disqualified? Rav Ḥisda said to them: I did not hear this, as if to say: I do not hold in accordance with this opinion.
אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ אָחִיו! תְּנָא אָחִיו מִן הָאָב, וְקָתָנֵי אָחִיו מִן הָאֵם.
The Gemara asks: If so, the question asked above recurs: The son of his mother’s husband is the same as his brother. The Gemara answers: The mishna taught the case of a paternal half brother, and it also teaches the case of a maternal half brother.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אֲבִי חָתָן וַאֲבִי כַּלָּה מְעִידִין זֶה עַל זֶה, וְלָא דָּמוּ לַהֲדָדֵי אֶלָּא כִּי אַכְלָא לְדַנָּא.
§ Rav Ḥisda says: The father of the groom and the father of the bride can testify about each other, and this is because they are considered to each other only like a lid on a barrel, which is not part of the barrel, but merely rests on top of it.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה: מֵעִיד אָדָם לְאִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה. אָמַר רָבִינָא: לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִינַּהּ, אֲבָל לְעַיּוֹלֵי לַהּ – לָא מְהֵימַן.
Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: A man can testify about his betrothed wife; they are considered related only after marriage. Ravina says: We said this halakha only for testimony that removes money from her possession; but for testimony that awards her money, his testimony is not deemed credible, as he will ultimately marry her and benefit from the money.
וְלָא הִיא, לָא שְׁנָא לְאַפּוֹקֵי וְלָא שְׁנָא לְעַיּוֹלֵי – לָא מְהֵימַן.
The Gemara rejects this opinion: But that is not so. There is no difference whether the testimony removes money from her possession, and there is no difference whether it awards her money. In both cases, his testimony is not deemed credible.
מַאי דַּעְתָּיךְ? כִּדְאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַמֵּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: אִשְׁתּוֹ אֲרוּסָה לֹא אוֹנֵן וְלֹא מִטַּמֵּא לַהּ, וְכֵן הִיא לֹא אוֹנֶנֶת וְלֹא מִטַּמְּאָה לוֹ. מֵתָה – אֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁהּ, מֵת הוּא – גּוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ.
The Gemara explains: What is your thinking that you deem a man fit to bear witness concerning his betrothed wife? It is as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: One does not enter acute mourning on the day of the death of his betrothed wife, nor may he become ritually impure to bury her if he is a priest. Similarly, she does not enter acute mourning for him and is not obligated to become ritually impure to bury him. If she dies, he does not inherit her property. If he dies, she collects payment of her marriage contract if he wrote it at the time of the betrothal, as it is treated like any other monetary document. Evidently, a betrothed woman is not considered related to her husband.
הָתָם, בִּשְׁאֵרוֹ תְּלָה רַחֲמָנָא, אַכַּתִּי לָאו שְׁאֵרוֹ הִיא. הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם אִיקָּרוֹבֵי דַּעְתָּא הוּא, וְהָא אִיקָּרַבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ לְגַבַּהּ.
The Gemara comments: That halakha does not serve as a proof for the halakha of testimony, as there, with regard to ritual impurity and the like, the Merciful One renders it dependent on the question of whether the woman is “his kin” (Leviticus 21:2), and a betrothed woman is not yet his kin, as they are not yet married. But here, with regard to testimony, it is due to a sense of affinity that he is disqualified, and one feels a sense of affinity toward his betrothed.
חוֹרְגוֹ לְבַדּוֹ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: חוֹרְגוֹ לְבַדּוֹ. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: גִּיסוֹ. וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: גִּיסוֹ לְבַדּוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: חוֹרְגוֹ.
§ The mishna teaches that his stepson alone is disqualified from bearing witness about him, but not his stepson’s sons or sons-in-law. The Sages taught in a baraita: His stepson alone is disqualified. Rabbi Yosei says: His brother-in-law. And it is taught in another baraita: His brother-in-law alone is disqualified. Rabbi Yehuda says: His stepson.
מַאי קָאָמַר? אִילֵּימָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: חוֹרְגוֹ לְבַדּוֹ, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְגִיסוֹ. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: גִּיסוֹ לְבַדּוֹ, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְחוֹרְגוֹ. אֶלָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי: גִּיסוֹ הוּא וּבְנוֹ וַחֲתָנוֹ, מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְלָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? If we say that this is what it is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, and the same is true with regard to his brother-in-law, i.e., a brother-in-law alone is disqualified but not a brother-in-law’s son or son-in-law; and Rabbi Yosei comes to say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, and the same is true with regard to his stepson; that interpretation is difficult. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna, which teaches that his brother-in-law is disqualified, and this disqualification applies to he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as they both agree that the son and son-in-law of one’s brother-in-law are not disqualified.
וְאֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: חוֹרְגוֹ לְבַדּוֹ, אֲבָל גִּיסוֹ – הוּא וּבְנוֹ וַחֲתָנוֹ. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: גִּיסוֹ לְבַדּוֹ, אֲבָל חוֹרְגוֹ – הוּא וּבְנוֹ וַחֲתָנוֹ.
Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, but as for his brother-in-law, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. And Rabbi Yosei comes to disagree and say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, but as for his stepson, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. Accordingly, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
וְאֶלָּא, הָא דְתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: שְׁמוֹנָה אָבוֹת, שֶׁהֵן עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה, כְּמַאן? לָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְלָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה!
The Gemara asks: But then, in accordance with whose opinion is the baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches, that eight fathers, which are the eight principal relatives mentioned in the mishna, are disqualified, which are twenty-four including the son and son-in-law of each? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: חוֹרְגוֹ לְבַדּוֹ, אֲבָל גִּיסוֹ – הוּא וּבְנוֹ וַחֲתָנוֹ. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: גִּיסוֹ לְבַדּוֹ, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן חוֹרְגוֹ. וּמַתְנִיתִין – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, בָּרַיְיתָא – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
Rather, the above interpretation should be rejected, and this is what the baraita is saying: His stepson alone is disqualified, but as for his brother-in-law, he himself, and his son, and his son-in-law are disqualified. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that his brother-in-law alone is disqualified, excluding his son and son-in-law, and all the more so his stepson. And accordingly, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the baraita that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
הָהִיא מַתַּנְתָּא דַּהֲווֹ חֲתִימִי עֲלַהּ תְּרֵי גִּיסֵי, סְבַר רַב יוֹסֵף לְאַכְשׁוֹרַהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
The Gemara relates: There was a certain deed of gift on which two brothers-in-law were signed. Rav Yosef thought to deem it valid, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Yosef assumed that Shmuel was referring to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion as cited in the mishna, that only relatives who are fit to inherit are disqualified, and one does not inherit from his brother-in-law.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִמַּאי דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי דְּמַתְנִיתִין, דְּמַכְשַׁר בְּגִיסוֹ? דִּילְמָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי דְּבָרַיְיתָא, דְּפָסֵיל בְּגִיסוֹ?
Abaye said to him: From where do you conclude that Shmuel was referring to Rabbi Yosei as cited in the mishna, who deems one’s brother-in-law fit to bear witness with or about him? Perhaps he was referring to Rabbi Yosei as cited in the baraita, who deems one’s brother-in-law, though not the latter’s son and son-in-law, disqualified?
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כְּגוֹן אֲנָא וּפִנְחָס דְּהָוֵינַן אֲחֵי וְגִיסֵי, אֲבָל גִּיסֵי דְּעָלְמָא שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי.
Rav Yosef answered: Do not let it enter your mind that Shmuel was referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei as cited in the baraita; as Shmuel said: For example, my brother Pineḥas and I are disqualified from bearing witness about one another. Apparently, he meant to say: We are disqualified because we are both brothers and brothers-in-law, as we married two sisters. But by inference, other brothers-in-law may well testify about each other.
וְדִילְמָא, כְּגוֹן אֲנָא וּפִנְחָס, מִשּׁוּם גִיסוֹ קָאָמַר?!
Abaye raised an objection: But perhaps Shmuel said: For example, Pineḥas and I are disqualified, only because Pineḥas was his brother-in-law; he did not mean to say that they were disqualified only because they were brothers.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל, קַנְיַהּ בְּעֵדֵי מְסִירָה, כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר.
Due to Abaye’s objection, Rav Yosef said to the one holding the deed of gift: Since the witnesses signed on the document are disqualified from bearing witness together, go and acquire the gift by means of the witnesses who observed the transmission of the deed to you, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who maintains that the witnesses who effect the transaction are not those who signed the deed but rather those who observed its transmission. A legal document is signed by witnesses merely to enhance its authority, not to effect the transaction.
וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בִּמְזוּיָּף מִתּוֹכוֹ שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל, לָא שָׁבְקִי לִי דְּאוֹתְבִינֵּיהּ לָךְ.
Abaye raised an objection: But doesn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rabbi Elazar concedes with regard to a document whose falsification is inherent in it, that the deed is not valid despite the fact that it was properly transferred? In other words, although the signatures on a legal document are unnecessary insofar as effecting the transaction is concerned, a document that includes invalid signatures is not valid, and this is in order to prevent others from relying upon these witnesses. Rav Yosef said to the one holding the deed of gift: Go away; the rabbis do not let me give you the gift.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי תַּנְחוּם אָמַר רַבִּי טַבְלָא אָמַר רַבִּי בְּרוֹנָא אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says that if the witness married the daughter of one of the litigants he is disqualified even if the daughter died, provided that he has children from her. Rabbi Tanḥum says that Rabbi Tavla says that Rabbi Beruna says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And likewise Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ לְהָא דְּרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אַהָא: אֶת זוֹ דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, ״וּבָאתָ אֶל הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם וְאֶל הַשֹּׁפֵט אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם״. וְכִי תַּעֲלֶה עַל דַּעְתְּךָ שֶׁאָדָם הוֹלֵךְ אֵצֶל שׁוֹפֵט שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּיָמָיו? אֶלָּא זֶה שֶׁהָיָה קָרוֹב וְנִתְרַחֵק.
There are those who teach this ruling of Rabba bar bar Ḥana with regard to this baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interpreted this verse: “And you shall come to the priests the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days” (Deuteronomy 17:9). Rabbi Yosei HaGelili asks: What is the meaning of the phrase “who will be in those days”? But will it enter your mind that a person would go to a judge that was not in his days? Rather, this is referring to one who was a relative of one of the litigants due to marriage, and then became not related. The litigant can therefore come before him only in those days that they are not related, and not while they are still related.
אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי.
It is with regard to this baraita that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. The ruling is the same as in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s aforementioned statement, i.e., a relative who became unrelated is fit to bear witness or serve as a judge, but it was stated in a different context.
בְּנֵי חֲמוּהּ דְּמָר עוּקְבָא
The Gemara relates: The sons of the father-in-law of Mar Ukva
