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Nedarim 87

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Summary

Today’s daf is sponsored by Gordon Marx in honor of Sara Marx’s Hebrew birthday. “Happy birthday!”

If the Mishna teaches us that one needs to know exactly whose vow he is nullifying from the verse in the Torah saying “her”, why when it comes to a mourner, a braita rules that tearing clothing for a relative, if the tearing is done with the wrong person in mind, it is valid, even though it is learned from a verse “for Shaul and for Yonatan” which would seem to also indicate the need one to know for whom they are tearing. Two different answers are brought to resolve the contradiction between the Mishna and the braita. The first answer is to distinguish between a case (the braita) where one did it generally or was told generally about a relative and then intended when tearing for the wrong person, and a case (our Mishna) where one was told or did the action specifically for a particular person and it turns out it was the wrong person. The second answer is that in the braita, he realized the mistake within a few seconds (toch k’dei dibur) and therefore it was valid and the Mishna was in a case where he realized his error beyond that short time frame. A braita is brought to support each response. If one forbade two things in one vow, if the husband/father ratifies part, the whole thing is ratified. But if he nullified only part, neither part is nullified. The Gemara explains that the Mishna goes according to Rabbi Yishmael and then brings Rabbi Akiva and the rabbi’s positions who each disagree with Rabbi Yishmael and with each other. From where do they each derive their opinions? If one didn’t know that he could nullify his wife’s/daughter’s vows, even if he heard the vow earlier, he can nullify it on the day he learns that he can nullify it. But if he knew he could nullify but not that it was a vow that needed to be/could be nullified, Rabbi Meir and the rabbis disagree about whether he can/cannot nullify it later when he discovers that. Rabbi Meir’s opinion here contradicts his opinion regarding a blind accidental murderer who is punished by having to go to a refuge city even though his knowledge was only partial, whereas, in our Mishna, Rabbi Meir agrees with the rabbis in the first case and considered partial knowledge only partial.

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Nedarim 87

וְהָא גַּבֵּי קְרָעִים דִּכְתִיב ״עַל״ ״עַל״, דִּכְתִיב: ״עַל שָׁאוּל וְעַל יְהוֹנָתָן בְּנוֹ״.

The Gemara comments: But is it not so that with regard to the tears in one’s clothing that are made for the dead, as it is written “for,” “for,” and about which is written: “And David took hold of his garments and rent them, and likewise all the men that were with him, and they wailed, and wept, and fasted until the evening, for Saul, and for Jonathan his son, and for the people of the Lord, and for the house of Israel, because they were fallen by the sword” (II Samuel 1:11–12). The use of the word “for” with regard to each of them indicates that one must make a separate tear in his garment for each person who died.

וְתַנְיָא: אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״מֵת אָבִיו״ וְקָרַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצָא בְּנוֹ — יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה.

The Gemara asks: And yet it is taught in a baraita: If they said to him that his father had died and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. This shows that even if a person mistakenly tore his garment for the wrong person he has nevertheless fulfilled the obligation. Here too, if a man nullified the vow of his wife, thinking that it was the vow of his daughter, his nullification should be effective.

אָמְרִי, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בִּסְתָם, וְהָא בִּמְפָרֵשׁ.

The Gemara responds: The apparent contradiction is not difficult. That baraita refers to a case where he received a non-specific report, i.e., he was told that an unspecified relative died. In such a case his obligation to rend his garment has been discharged. And this mishna refers to a case where the bearer of the news mistakenly specified that his daughter had taken the vow, when in reality his wife had. In such a case, his nullification is ineffective.

וְהָתַנְיָא: אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״מֵת אָבִיו״ וְקָרַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצָא בְּנוֹ — לֹא יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה. אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״מֵת לוֹ מֵת״, וּכְסָבוּר אָבִיו הוּא וְקָרַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצָא בְּנוֹ — יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה.

And it is taught similarly in the following baraita: If they said to him that his father had died and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. If, however, they said to him that a relative of his had died, and he thought it was his father and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. This proves that a distinction is made between one who rends his garment relying on a specific report and one who does so following a non-specific report.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כָּאן בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר, כָּאן לְאַחַר כְּדֵי דִבּוּר.

Rav Ashi says that the discrepancy between the baraitot with regard to the rending of garments can be reconciled in a different manner: Here, the person who rent his garment for the wrong relative realized his error within the time required for speaking the short phrase: Greetings to you, my teacher. Until that time has passed his action is seen as incomplete and can therefore still be modified. There, the mistake was noted only after the time required for speaking a short phrase.

הָא דְּקָאָמְרַתְּ יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה — שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּנוֹ בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר. הָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ לֹא יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה — לְאַחַר כְּדֵי דִבּוּר.

This case, where you said that he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment even though he had initially been told explicitly that his father died, deals with a situation where it was discovered within the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., immediately after he rent his garment, that the deceased was his son. However, that case, where you said that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment, deals with a situation where he became aware of his mistake after the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., a short while later.

וְהָתַנְיָא: מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ חוֹלֶה בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ וְנִתְעַלֵּף, וְכִמְדוּמֶּה שֶׁמֵּת, וְקָרַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת — לֹא יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן פַּזִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי מִשּׁוּם בַּר קַפָּרָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁמֵּת לְאַחַר כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר, אֲבָל בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר — כְּדִבּוּר דָּמֵי.

And it is taught in the following baraita: One who has an ill relative in his house, and the latter fainted and lost consciousness, and it seemed to him that the ill person had died and therefore he rent his garment over his assumed death, if it turned out that he had not yet actually died at that point and it was only afterward that he died, the relative has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. And with regard to this baraita, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: They taught that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending only if the ill person died after the time required for speaking a short phrase. But if he passed away within the time required for speaking a short phrase, it is all considered like continuous speech, and his relative has fulfilled his obligation. That is to say, his act of rending is not viewed as complete until the time required for saying a short phrase has elapsed, and until that time has passed the act can still be modified.

וְהִילְכְתָא: תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר — כְּדִבּוּר דָּמֵי, חוּץ מִמְּגַדֵּף וְעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּמְקַדֵּשׁ וּמְגָרֵשׁ.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is: The legal status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, and so a person can retract what he first said if he issues the retraction within this period of time after he finished speaking. This principle holds true in almost every area of halakha, except for the case of one who blasphemes God; or in the case of an idol worshipper, who verbally accepts an idol as his god; or one who betroths a woman; or one who divorces his wife. In these four cases, a person cannot undo his action, even if he immediately retracts what he said within the time required for saying a short phrase.

מַתְנִי׳ אָמְרָה ״קֻוֽנָּם תְּאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֶמֶת״, קִיֵּים לִתְאֵנִים — כּוּלּוֹ קַיָּים, הֵפֵר לִתְאֵנִים — אֵינוֹ מוּפָר עַד שֶׁיָּפֵר אַף לַעֲנָבִים. אָמְרָה ״קֻוֽנָּם תְּאֵנָה שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֶמֶת וַעֲנָבָה שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֶמֶת״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שְׁנֵי נְדָרִים.

MISHNA: If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld, but if he nullified it with regard to figs it is not nullified until he also nullifies the vow with regard to grapes. If she said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows; if the husband upholds one of the vows it has no effect on the other one.

גְּמָ׳ מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״, אָמְרָה ״קֻוֽנָּם תְּאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֶמֶת״, קִיֵּים לִתְאֵנִים — כּוּלּוֹ קַיָּים,

GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The Gemara answers: It follows the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse concerning vows that states: “Her husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it” (Numbers 30:14), may be expounded as follows. If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld.

הֵפֵר לִתְאֵנִים — אֵינוֹ מוּפָר עַד שֶׁיָּפֵר אַף לַעֲנָבִים, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״, מָה ״יְקִימֶנּוּ״ — מִמֶּנּוּ, אַף ״יְפֵרֶנּוּ״ — מִמֶּנּוּ. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: מִי כְּתִיב ״יָפֵר מִמֶּנּוּ״? וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: מַקִּישׁ הֲפָרָה לַהֲקָמָה, מָה הֲקָמָה — מִמֶּנּוּ, אַף הֲפָרָה — מִמֶּנּוּ.

But if he nullified it with regard to figs, it is not nullified until he will also nullify the vow for grapes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says that the verse states: “Her husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it.” Just as the words “may uphold it” [yekimennu] should be understood as if they read: He may uphold part of it [yakim mimmennu], implying that if he upheld part of the vow he has upheld all of it, so too, the words “he may nullify it” [yeferennu] should be understood as if they read: He may nullify part of it [yafer mimmennu]. And Rabbi Yishmael retorts: Is it written: He may nullify part of it, with a mem, as it is written with respect to a husband who upholds the vow? And Rabbi Akiva replies: The verse juxtaposes nullification to upholding; just as upholding means part of it, so too, nullification means part of it.

אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַקִּישׁ הֲקָמָה לַהֲפָרָה; מָה הֲפָרָה — מַה שֶּׁהֵפֵר הֵפֵר, אַף הֲקָמָה — מַה שֶּׁקִּיֵּים קִיֵּים.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This opinion, that a vow is treated as a single unit, so that the entire vow is upheld even if the husband upheld only a part of it, is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. But the Rabbis say: The verse juxtaposes upholding to nullification; just as with regard to nullification, that which he nullified he has nullified, so too, with regard to upholding, that which he upheld he has upheld, but no more.

אָמְרָה ״קֻוֽנָּם תְּאֵנָה״, אָמַר רָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. דְּאָמַר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה״ לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.

The mishna teaches that if a woman said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows. Rava said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon said that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance, for example, if he says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, unless he states an expression of an oath to each and every one of the creditors, for example by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours. Here too, only if she says: Tasting, with respect to each fruit are they viewed as two separate vows.

מַתְנִי׳ ״יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ נְדָרִים, אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ מְפִירִין״, יָפֵר. ״יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מְפִירִין, אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁזֶּה נֶדֶר״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא יָפֵר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יָפֵר.

MISHNA: If a man’s wife or daughter took a vow and he failed to nullify the vow on the day he heard it, but afterward he said: I know that there are vows, but I don’t know that there are those who can nullify them, i.e., he was unaware of the possibility of nullifying vows, he can nullify the vow of his wife or his daughter on the day he learned that he can nullify vows. If, however, he said: I know there are those who can nullify vows, but I refrained from nullifying the vow that I heard because I do not know that this is considered a vow, Rabbi Meir says he cannot nullify the vow at this point, but the Rabbis say that even in this case he can nullify the vow on the day that he learned of his mistake.

גְּמָ׳ וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״בְּלֹא רְאוֹת״, פְּרָט לַסּוֹמֵא. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַסּוֹמֵא.

GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: With regard to one who kills unintentionally, the verse states: “Without seeing” (Numbers 35:23), which serves to exclude a blind person from the category of those who are exiled to a city of refuge due to having killed unintentionally, as the verse indicates that it was only in this instance that he did not see, but he is generally able to see. A blind person who kills another unintentionally is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says the verse serves to include a blind person in the category of those who are exiled, as he too does not see. This shows that Rabbi Meir does not distinguish between different kinds of lack of knowledge, whereas the mishna suggests that he does accept such a distinction. The opposite is true of Rabbi Yehuda, who, unless it is otherwise indicated, is assumed to be Rabbi Meir’s disputant in all places.

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I started the daf at the beginning of this cycle in January 2020. My husband, my children, grandchildren and siblings have been very supportive. As someone who learned and taught Tanach and mefarshim for many years, it has been an amazing adventure to complete the six sedarim of Mishnah, and now to study Talmud on a daily basis along with Rabbanit Michelle and the wonderful women of Hadran.

Rookie Billet
Rookie Billet

Jerusalem, Israel

The start of my journey is not so exceptional. I was between jobs and wanted to be sure to get out every day (this was before corona). Well, I was hooked after about a month and from then on only looked for work-from-home jobs so I could continue learning the Daf. Daf has been a constant in my life, though hurricanes, death, illness/injury, weddings. My new friends are Rav, Shmuel, Ruth, Joanna.
Judi Felber
Judi Felber

Raanana, Israel

I started learning at the beginning of this Daf Yomi cycle because I heard a lot about the previous cycle coming to an end and thought it would be a good thing to start doing. My husband had already bought several of the Koren Talmud Bavli books and they were just sitting on the shelf, not being used, so here was an opportunity to start using them and find out exactly what was in them. Loving it!

Caroline Levison
Caroline Levison

Borehamwood, United Kingdom

I attended the Siyum so that I could tell my granddaughter that I had been there. Then I decided to listen on Spotify and after the siyum of Brachot, Covid and zoom began. It gave structure to my day. I learn with people from all over the world who are now my friends – yet most of us have never met. I can’t imagine life without it. Thank you Rabbanit Michelle.

Emma Rinberg
Emma Rinberg

Raanana, Israel

In early January of 2020, I learned about Siyyum HaShas and Daf Yomi via Tablet Magazine’s brief daily podcast about the Daf. I found it compelling and fascinating. Soon I discovered Hadran; since then I have learned the Daf daily with Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber. The Daf has permeated my every hour, and has transformed and magnified my place within the Jewish Universe.

Lisa Berkelhammer
Lisa Berkelhammer

San Francisco, CA , United States

I started last year after completing the Pesach Sugiyot class. Masechet Yoma might seem like a difficult set of topics, but for me made Yom Kippur and the Beit HaMikdash come alive. Liturgy I’d always had trouble connecting with took on new meaning as I gained a sense of real people moving through specific spaces in particular ways. It was the perfect introduction; I am so grateful for Hadran!

Debbie Engelen-Eigles
Debbie Engelen-Eigles

Minnesota, United States

Nedarim 87

וְהָא גַּבֵּי קְרָעִים דִּכְתִיב ״עַל״ ״עַל״, דִּכְתִיב: ״עַל שָׁאוּל וְעַל יְהוֹנָתָן בְּנוֹ״.

The Gemara comments: But is it not so that with regard to the tears in one’s clothing that are made for the dead, as it is written “for,” “for,” and about which is written: “And David took hold of his garments and rent them, and likewise all the men that were with him, and they wailed, and wept, and fasted until the evening, for Saul, and for Jonathan his son, and for the people of the Lord, and for the house of Israel, because they were fallen by the sword” (II Samuel 1:11–12). The use of the word “for” with regard to each of them indicates that one must make a separate tear in his garment for each person who died.

וְתַנְיָא: אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״מֵת אָבִיו״ וְקָרַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצָא בְּנוֹ — יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה.

The Gemara asks: And yet it is taught in a baraita: If they said to him that his father had died and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. This shows that even if a person mistakenly tore his garment for the wrong person he has nevertheless fulfilled the obligation. Here too, if a man nullified the vow of his wife, thinking that it was the vow of his daughter, his nullification should be effective.

אָמְרִי, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בִּסְתָם, וְהָא בִּמְפָרֵשׁ.

The Gemara responds: The apparent contradiction is not difficult. That baraita refers to a case where he received a non-specific report, i.e., he was told that an unspecified relative died. In such a case his obligation to rend his garment has been discharged. And this mishna refers to a case where the bearer of the news mistakenly specified that his daughter had taken the vow, when in reality his wife had. In such a case, his nullification is ineffective.

וְהָתַנְיָא: אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״מֵת אָבִיו״ וְקָרַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצָא בְּנוֹ — לֹא יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה. אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״מֵת לוֹ מֵת״, וּכְסָבוּר אָבִיו הוּא וְקָרַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצָא בְּנוֹ — יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה.

And it is taught similarly in the following baraita: If they said to him that his father had died and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. If, however, they said to him that a relative of his had died, and he thought it was his father and he rent his garment over his death, and afterward it was discovered that it was not his father who died, but his son, he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. This proves that a distinction is made between one who rends his garment relying on a specific report and one who does so following a non-specific report.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כָּאן בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר, כָּאן לְאַחַר כְּדֵי דִבּוּר.

Rav Ashi says that the discrepancy between the baraitot with regard to the rending of garments can be reconciled in a different manner: Here, the person who rent his garment for the wrong relative realized his error within the time required for speaking the short phrase: Greetings to you, my teacher. Until that time has passed his action is seen as incomplete and can therefore still be modified. There, the mistake was noted only after the time required for speaking a short phrase.

הָא דְּקָאָמְרַתְּ יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה — שֶׁנִּמְצָא בְּנוֹ בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר. הָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ לֹא יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה — לְאַחַר כְּדֵי דִבּוּר.

This case, where you said that he has fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment even though he had initially been told explicitly that his father died, deals with a situation where it was discovered within the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., immediately after he rent his garment, that the deceased was his son. However, that case, where you said that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment, deals with a situation where he became aware of his mistake after the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., a short while later.

וְהָתַנְיָא: מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ חוֹלֶה בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ וְנִתְעַלֵּף, וְכִמְדוּמֶּה שֶׁמֵּת, וְקָרַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת — לֹא יָצָא יְדֵי קְרִיעָה. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן פַּזִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי מִשּׁוּם בַּר קַפָּרָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁמֵּת לְאַחַר כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר, אֲבָל בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר — כְּדִבּוּר דָּמֵי.

And it is taught in the following baraita: One who has an ill relative in his house, and the latter fainted and lost consciousness, and it seemed to him that the ill person had died and therefore he rent his garment over his assumed death, if it turned out that he had not yet actually died at that point and it was only afterward that he died, the relative has not fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment. And with regard to this baraita, Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: They taught that he has not fulfilled his obligation of rending only if the ill person died after the time required for speaking a short phrase. But if he passed away within the time required for speaking a short phrase, it is all considered like continuous speech, and his relative has fulfilled his obligation. That is to say, his act of rending is not viewed as complete until the time required for saying a short phrase has elapsed, and until that time has passed the act can still be modified.

וְהִילְכְתָא: תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר — כְּדִבּוּר דָּמֵי, חוּץ מִמְּגַדֵּף וְעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּמְקַדֵּשׁ וּמְגָרֵשׁ.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is: The legal status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, and so a person can retract what he first said if he issues the retraction within this period of time after he finished speaking. This principle holds true in almost every area of halakha, except for the case of one who blasphemes God; or in the case of an idol worshipper, who verbally accepts an idol as his god; or one who betroths a woman; or one who divorces his wife. In these four cases, a person cannot undo his action, even if he immediately retracts what he said within the time required for saying a short phrase.

מַתְנִי׳ אָמְרָה ״קֻוֽנָּם תְּאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֶמֶת״, קִיֵּים לִתְאֵנִים — כּוּלּוֹ קַיָּים, הֵפֵר לִתְאֵנִים — אֵינוֹ מוּפָר עַד שֶׁיָּפֵר אַף לַעֲנָבִים. אָמְרָה ״קֻוֽנָּם תְּאֵנָה שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֶמֶת וַעֲנָבָה שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֶמֶת״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שְׁנֵי נְדָרִים.

MISHNA: If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld, but if he nullified it with regard to figs it is not nullified until he also nullifies the vow with regard to grapes. If she said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows; if the husband upholds one of the vows it has no effect on the other one.

גְּמָ׳ מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״, אָמְרָה ״קֻוֽנָּם תְּאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֶמֶת״, קִיֵּים לִתְאֵנִים — כּוּלּוֹ קַיָּים,

GEMARA: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The Gemara answers: It follows the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse concerning vows that states: “Her husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it” (Numbers 30:14), may be expounded as follows. If a woman said: Tasting these figs and grapes is konam for me, and her husband upheld her vow with regard to figs, the entire vow is upheld.

הֵפֵר לִתְאֵנִים — אֵינוֹ מוּפָר עַד שֶׁיָּפֵר אַף לַעֲנָבִים, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״, מָה ״יְקִימֶנּוּ״ — מִמֶּנּוּ, אַף ״יְפֵרֶנּוּ״ — מִמֶּנּוּ. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: מִי כְּתִיב ״יָפֵר מִמֶּנּוּ״? וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: מַקִּישׁ הֲפָרָה לַהֲקָמָה, מָה הֲקָמָה — מִמֶּנּוּ, אַף הֲפָרָה — מִמֶּנּוּ.

But if he nullified it with regard to figs, it is not nullified until he will also nullify the vow for grapes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says that the verse states: “Her husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it.” Just as the words “may uphold it” [yekimennu] should be understood as if they read: He may uphold part of it [yakim mimmennu], implying that if he upheld part of the vow he has upheld all of it, so too, the words “he may nullify it” [yeferennu] should be understood as if they read: He may nullify part of it [yafer mimmennu]. And Rabbi Yishmael retorts: Is it written: He may nullify part of it, with a mem, as it is written with respect to a husband who upholds the vow? And Rabbi Akiva replies: The verse juxtaposes nullification to upholding; just as upholding means part of it, so too, nullification means part of it.

אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַקִּישׁ הֲקָמָה לַהֲפָרָה; מָה הֲפָרָה — מַה שֶּׁהֵפֵר הֵפֵר, אַף הֲקָמָה — מַה שֶּׁקִּיֵּים קִיֵּים.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This opinion, that a vow is treated as a single unit, so that the entire vow is upheld even if the husband upheld only a part of it, is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. But the Rabbis say: The verse juxtaposes upholding to nullification; just as with regard to nullification, that which he nullified he has nullified, so too, with regard to upholding, that which he upheld he has upheld, but no more.

אָמְרָה ״קֻוֽנָּם תְּאֵנָה״, אָמַר רָבָא: מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. דְּאָמַר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״שְׁבוּעָה״ לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.

The mishna teaches that if a woman said: Tasting a fig and tasting a grape are konam for me, these are viewed as two separate vows. Rava said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon said that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance, for example, if he says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, unless he states an expression of an oath to each and every one of the creditors, for example by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours. Here too, only if she says: Tasting, with respect to each fruit are they viewed as two separate vows.

מַתְנִי׳ ״יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ נְדָרִים, אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ מְפִירִין״, יָפֵר. ״יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מְפִירִין, אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁזֶּה נֶדֶר״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא יָפֵר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יָפֵר.

MISHNA: If a man’s wife or daughter took a vow and he failed to nullify the vow on the day he heard it, but afterward he said: I know that there are vows, but I don’t know that there are those who can nullify them, i.e., he was unaware of the possibility of nullifying vows, he can nullify the vow of his wife or his daughter on the day he learned that he can nullify vows. If, however, he said: I know there are those who can nullify vows, but I refrained from nullifying the vow that I heard because I do not know that this is considered a vow, Rabbi Meir says he cannot nullify the vow at this point, but the Rabbis say that even in this case he can nullify the vow on the day that he learned of his mistake.

גְּמָ׳ וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״בְּלֹא רְאוֹת״, פְּרָט לַסּוֹמֵא. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַסּוֹמֵא.

GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: With regard to one who kills unintentionally, the verse states: “Without seeing” (Numbers 35:23), which serves to exclude a blind person from the category of those who are exiled to a city of refuge due to having killed unintentionally, as the verse indicates that it was only in this instance that he did not see, but he is generally able to see. A blind person who kills another unintentionally is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says the verse serves to include a blind person in the category of those who are exiled, as he too does not see. This shows that Rabbi Meir does not distinguish between different kinds of lack of knowledge, whereas the mishna suggests that he does accept such a distinction. The opposite is true of Rabbi Yehuda, who, unless it is otherwise indicated, is assumed to be Rabbi Meir’s disputant in all places.

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