Hadran: Advancing Talmud Study for Women

This is the daf for Shabbat. For the daf for Friday, click back to previous daf.

How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason?

The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed?

Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year.

Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir’s position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question.

The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama—the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling.

Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded.

The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l’mata and a regular kohen l’maala. Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context.

The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly (tadir) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?

A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering.

Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected.

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved.

A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored.

There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad.

A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya.

The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position.

A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising.

If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers.

If a kohen gadol or king sins while serving in their official role and is later removed from that position, they are still obligated to bring the unique sin offering designated for a kohen gadol or king. A braita provides the source for this ruling.

If the sin occurred before the individual became a kohen gadol or king, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon. The debate centers on whether the obligation to bring a sacrifice is determined by the time of the sin, or whether both the sin and the awareness of the sin must occur while the person holds the same status. If the status has changed between the sin and the awareness, they may be exempt. A braita provides a source for the rabbis’ position that the sacrifice follows the time of the sin.

The verse regarding the king states, “אשר נשיא יחטא” (“when a leader sins”). Why is the word “asher” used? Several drashot are offered to explain this. One interpretation suggests that it is a divine decree – that the king will inevitably sin. Another braita uses the word to exclude a king who is ill, which is clarified to mean a king afflicted with leprosy. A verse is cited about King Uziyahu, who contracted leprosy and was forced to step down. It says he lived in the “בית החפשית” (“free house”) until his death. Why was it called a “free house”? From this, the sages learn that a king is considered a servant of the people.

To illustrate this idea, a story is told about Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua. While traveling by boat, Rabbi Yehoshua brought extra flour to bake bread in case they ran out of food. When their bread supply was depleted, Rabban Gamliel borrowed flour from Rabbi Yehoshua. Impressed by his foresight, Rabban Gamliel asked why someone so wise wasn’t more successful in business. Rabbi Yehoshua replied that there were two others even wiser. Rabban Gamliel then appointed them as heads of the yeshiva. However, when Rabbi Yehoshua approached them and they declined the position as they didn’t want the honor, he explained that leadership is not a role of honor, but one of service.

Another braita interprets the word “asher” as meaning “fortunate”—fortunate is the generation whose king acknowledges his mistakes and brings a sin offering.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offered a drasha on the word “asher” from Kohelet 8:14, which opens into a broader discussion about the fate of the righteous and the wicked, and how reward and punishment are distributed in this world and the next.

Rabbi Yochanan interprets the verse in Hosea 14:10 to mean that two people may perform the exact same action, yet the righteous person succeeds while the wicked one stumbles. The Gemara attempts to illustrate this concept through a parable. Several suggestions are proposed and ultimately rejected, until the case of Lot and his daughters is brought forward. Though they all engaged in the same act, the daughters intended to fulfill a mitzvah, while Lot acted with sinful intent. Did Lot really have sinful intent? Was he not forced into it by his daughters?

A further comparison is drawn between Tamar and Kasbi, again emphasizing the critical difference between pure and impure intentions.

Rav Yehuda quotes Rav as saying that it is better to commit a sin l’shma (for the sake of Heaven) than to perform a mitzvah lo l’shma (not for the sake of Heaven). Yael is cited as an example of someone who committed a sin l’shma. However, a difficulty is raised: doesn’t Rav also teach that one should always engage in Torah and mitzvot—even lo l’shma—because through such actions, one may eventually come to act l’shma?

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin).

Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering?

The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat.

A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity.

There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

This is the daf for Shabbat. For the daf for Friday, click back to previous daf.

How could Yehoachaz have been anointed with shemen hamishcha if Yoshiyahu hid the shemen hamishcha? What else did Yoshiyahu hide, and for what reason?

The king and kohen gadol are anointed in different ways—how is each performed?

Kings were anointed near a flowing stream as a good omen, symbolizing that their reign would endure. The Gemara digresses into a broader discussion about various practices people use to seek signs—whether they will survive the year, succeed in business, return safely from a journey, and so on. Some authorities caution against relying on such signs. Abaye, however, says that since we see signs do have meaning, one should eat symbolic foods on Rosh Hashana—such as gourds, chard, dates, and others—because they grow quickly, serving as a good omen for the coming year.

Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Mishna, holding that even a kohen gadol who assumed the role by wearing the special garments (rather than being anointed) would still be required to bring a bull offering if he sinned. From where does he derive this ruling? A difficulty arises, as the continuation of the Mishna appears to align with Rabbi Meir’s position. Could it be that the Mishna is split—part following Rabbi Meir and part not? If not, how can the Mishna be reconciled? Three different answers are offered to resolve this question.

The Mishna teaches that there are five mitzvot commanded to the kohen gadol that also apply to the mashuach milchama—the kohen who addresses the people before they go out to war. A braita provides the source for this ruling.

Rava asked Rav Nachman whether a kohen gadol who becomes leprous is permitted to marry a widow. Rav Nachman did not know the answer. Rav Papa later posed the same question, and Rav Huna son of Rav Nachman responded.

The Mishna discusses differences between a kohen gadol and a regular kohen regarding the laws of mourning—specifically, whether they may perform Temple service while in the state of onen (the period between the death of a relative and burial), and how they tear their garments. The kohen gadol tears his garment l’mata and a regular kohen l’maala. Rav and Shmuel disagree about how to translate these terms in this context.

The Mishna rules that an action performed regularly (tadir) takes precedence over one that is less frequent. Additionally, if one mitzvah is more sanctified than another, it takes precedence. From where are these principles derived?

A braita explains that the words “מעם הארץ” — “from one of the land” — mentioned in the section about the individual’s sin offering serve to exclude the king and the kohen gadol. The braita then questions this drasha, noting that the king and kohen gadol are already explicitly excluded by the verses. It concludes that the exemption in the braita for the kohen gadol applies in a case where he committed a forbidden act unwittingly, but without relying on an erroneous ruling. The exemption for the king applies when he sinned before being appointed. However, this interpretation aligns only with Rabbi Shimon’s view, as the rabbis maintain that in such a case, the king must bring an individual sin offering. To reconcile this with the rabbis’ position, Rav Zevid in the name of Rava suggests a scenario in which the king ate half the requisite amount of forbidden fat (cheilev) before becoming king, and then ate the other half afterward. In this case, he would not be obligated to bring an individual sin offering.

Rava asked Rav Nachman: if someone ate half the requisite amount before becoming king, then became king, and later ceased being king before eating the second half, would the two halves combine to obligate him to bring an individual sin offering? They attempt to resolve the question by comparing it to a parallel case involving a Jew who ceased practicing religion, a meshumad, but the comparison is ultimately rejected.

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet, according to Rabbi Shimon’s position: if someone ate a piece of fat whose status — permitted or forbidden — was unclear, and only discovered the issue after becoming king, would he bring a provisional guilt offering? The reasoning is that the type of sacrifice does not change with the person’s change in status from a regular individual to a king. The question remains unresolved.

A braita presents two different drashot to derive that a meshumad does not bring an individual sin offering. The practical difference between the two derivations is explored.

There is a debate regarding which transgressions qualify someone as a meshumad.

A braita explains that when the Torah refers to a nasi, it means a king — as no one is above him except God. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi, known as Rebbi, asked Rabbi Chiya whether he would be required to bring the unique offering designated for a nasi. Rabbi Chiya responded that Rebbi had a counterpart in Babylonia, the Exilarch, and therefore did not meet the criteria of someone who has no one above him but God. A difficulty is raised, as both kings of the kingdoms of Judea and Israel would bring the offering, yet it is explained that Rebbi was subservient to the Exilarch. Rav Safra offers a different version of the discussion between Rebbi and Rabbi Chiya.

The kohen gadol who brings a unique sacrifice is specifically one who was anointed with the shemen hamishcha, the special oil prepared by Moshe. The Mishna outlines the legal differences between a kohen gadol who was anointed and one who assumed the role by wearing the special garments. It also distinguishes between a kohen gadol currently serving and one who is no longer in the position.

A braita records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether the shemen hamishcha was prepared in a miraculous manner. Rabbi Yehuda, who believes it was prepared miraculously, supports his view by citing several miracles associated with the oil, arguing that its miraculous preparation should not be surprising.

If a king inherits the throne from his father, he is not anointed, but the kohen gadol is. Only kings from the Davidic dynasty were anointed. Challenges to this theory are raised: Shlomo was anointed despite his father being king, and Yehu, an Israelite king, was also anointed. These are resolved by explaining that Yehu was anointed with balsam oil, not the shemen hamishcha, and that Shlomo’s anointment was due to uncertainty over succession. Yehoachaz, whose father was also king, was anointed because he became king instead of his older brother Yehoyakim, who was two years his senior. Was he really two years his senior? The Gemara delves into the different verses to understand the age order among the brothers.

If a kohen gadol or king sins while serving in their official role and is later removed from that position, they are still obligated to bring the unique sin offering designated for a kohen gadol or king. A braita provides the source for this ruling.

If the sin occurred before the individual became a kohen gadol or king, there is a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon. The debate centers on whether the obligation to bring a sacrifice is determined by the time of the sin, or whether both the sin and the awareness of the sin must occur while the person holds the same status. If the status has changed between the sin and the awareness, they may be exempt. A braita provides a source for the rabbis’ position that the sacrifice follows the time of the sin.

The verse regarding the king states, “אשר נשיא יחטא” (“when a leader sins”). Why is the word “asher” used? Several drashot are offered to explain this. One interpretation suggests that it is a divine decree – that the king will inevitably sin. Another braita uses the word to exclude a king who is ill, which is clarified to mean a king afflicted with leprosy. A verse is cited about King Uziyahu, who contracted leprosy and was forced to step down. It says he lived in the “בית החפשית” (“free house”) until his death. Why was it called a “free house”? From this, the sages learn that a king is considered a servant of the people.

To illustrate this idea, a story is told about Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua. While traveling by boat, Rabbi Yehoshua brought extra flour to bake bread in case they ran out of food. When their bread supply was depleted, Rabban Gamliel borrowed flour from Rabbi Yehoshua. Impressed by his foresight, Rabban Gamliel asked why someone so wise wasn’t more successful in business. Rabbi Yehoshua replied that there were two others even wiser. Rabban Gamliel then appointed them as heads of the yeshiva. However, when Rabbi Yehoshua approached them and they declined the position as they didn’t want the honor, he explained that leadership is not a role of honor, but one of service.

Another braita interprets the word “asher” as meaning “fortunate”—fortunate is the generation whose king acknowledges his mistakes and brings a sin offering.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offered a drasha on the word “asher” from Kohelet 8:14, which opens into a broader discussion about the fate of the righteous and the wicked, and how reward and punishment are distributed in this world and the next.

Rabbi Yochanan interprets the verse in Hosea 14:10 to mean that two people may perform the exact same action, yet the righteous person succeeds while the wicked one stumbles. The Gemara attempts to illustrate this concept through a parable. Several suggestions are proposed and ultimately rejected, until the case of Lot and his daughters is brought forward. Though they all engaged in the same act, the daughters intended to fulfill a mitzvah, while Lot acted with sinful intent. Did Lot really have sinful intent? Was he not forced into it by his daughters?

A further comparison is drawn between Tamar and Kasbi, again emphasizing the critical difference between pure and impure intentions.

Rav Yehuda quotes Rav as saying that it is better to commit a sin l’shma (for the sake of Heaven) than to perform a mitzvah lo l’shma (not for the sake of Heaven). Yael is cited as an example of someone who committed a sin l’shma. However, a difficulty is raised: doesn’t Rav also teach that one should always engage in Torah and mitzvot—even lo l’shma—because through such actions, one may eventually come to act l’shma?

There are several differing opinions regarding whether a king and a kohen gadol are obligated to bring a sliding scale offering (korban oleh v’yored) for certain transgressions. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds that both are exempt, since they can never become poor—a condition necessary for this type of offering. Rabbi Akiva, however, obligates the king in all cases except for withholding testimony, as a king is not permitted to testify. He exempts the kohen gadol entirely, based on a drasha derived from the unique meal offering of the kohen gadol (minchat chavitin).

Ravina raises a question about a king who contracts leprosy and is no longer considered a king: would he then be obligated to bring a sliding scale offering?

The Mishna then summarizes which sacrifices are brought by various individuals—the kohen gadol, the king, a regular individual, and the court—for both standard sin offerings and those related to idolatry (avodah zarah). It also outlines who is obligated in provisional guilt offerings (asham talui), standard guilt offerings (asham vadai), and sliding scale offerings. Two additional opinions on sliding scale offerings appear here. Rabbi Shimon states that the king is obligated in all cases except testimony, while the kohen gadol is obligated in all cases except impurity in the Temple. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the king is obligated, but instead of a sliding scale offering, he brings a goat.

A braita is cited to expand on Rabbi Shimon’s position. Although it contains an internal contradiction, this is resolved. Chizkia explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning for exempting the kohen gadol from bringing a sacrifice for impurity in the Temple: the kohen gadol has a unique Yom Kippur offering and does not receive atonement through the communal sacrifice that covers the rest of the nation. This sets him apart and excludes him from the verse regarding the punishment for entering the Temple in a state of impurity.

There is a discussion about Rabbi Eliezer’s view—specifically, whether the king’s obligation to bring a goat applies only to impurity in the Temple or to all transgressions that would normally require a sliding scale offering.

Rebbi and the rabbis disagree about the case in which a kohen gadol becomes obligated to bring a sacrifice for idol worship. According to one view, it involves a situation where he unknowingly worshipped idols. According to the other, it refers to a case where he unknowingly issued an erroneous halakhic ruling and then acted upon it. Despite this disagreement, both Rebbi and the rabbis agree that the sacrifice he brings is the same as that brought by an individual—a female goat. They also concur that the kohen gadol does not bring a provisional guilt offering (asham talui), though each derives this conclusion through a different method.

The communal sin offering—whether for general commandments or for idol worship—is only brought for transgressions where intentional violation incurs karet, and unintentional violation requires a sin offering. This same criterion applies to the unique sin offering of the kohen gadol, the king and the individual. Rebbi derives this from a gezera shava based on the word עליה  (“upon her”), which appears both in the verse about the communal offering and in the verse prohibiting a man from sleeping with his wife’s sister. The rabbis, however, interpret the verse about the sister differently for another law, and instead derive the principle from Bamidbar (Numbers) 15:29–30. What does Rebbi derive from that verse?

How do we know that the section in Bamidbar 15 refers specifically to the sin of idol worship? Three suggestions are offered, though the third is ultimately rejected.

The communal sin offering is not brought for transgressions that are punishable by a sliding scale offering (korban oleh ve’yored). The source for this exclusion is also examined.

Does the king bring his unique sin offering for a transgression that is punishable by a sliding scale offering? The Mishna presents two differing opinions on this matter.

A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse “לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם” (“for the guilt of the nation”), which compares the kohen gadol’s actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering.

This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol’s obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol’s case aligns specifically with the communal model.

Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin.

The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol.

A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi, but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא” (“for the sin which he sinned,” Vayikra 4:3).

Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places.

The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain.

The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol’s sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase “מֵעֵינֵי” (“from the eyes”).

When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, “And the same is true for the kohen gadol,” as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence “And such is true for the kohen gadol” would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.