The Gemara discusses whether one can render someone else’s property forbidden, e.g., by slaughtering their cow for the sake of idolatry. What is the logic behind this question? What does ownership have to do with it? Does this logic apply in other arenas of halakha besides for avodah zara?
Chullin 40
sources:
- חולין מ.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָיְתָה בֶּהֱמַת חֲבֵירוֹ רְבוּצָה לִפְנֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, כֵּיוָן שֶׁשָּׁחַט בָּהּ סִימָן אֶחָד – אֲסָרָהּ. סָבַר לַהּ כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְבֶהֱמַת חֲבֵירוֹ לֹא אֲסָרָהּ, עָשָׂה בָּהּ מַעֲשֶׂה – אֲסָרָהּ.
Rav Huna says: If the animal of another was prone before an idol, once one cut one siman, the windpipe or the gullet, he rendered the animal forbidden. He holds in accordance with that which Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Although the Sages said that one who bows to the animal of another does not render it forbidden, if he performed a sacrificial rite upon it he renders it forbidden. The case cited by Rav Huna involves an action of that kind, cutting one siman; therefore, the animal is forbidden.
- חולין מ:
(נָעַ״ץ – סִימָן.) רַב נַחְמָן, וְרַב עַמְרָם, וְרַב יִצְחָק אָמְרִי: אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין שֶׁלּוֹ.
The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the names of the amora’im who participate in the discussion that ensues: Nun, Rav Naḥman; ayin, Rav Amram; tzadi, Rav Yitzḥak. Rav Naḥman, and Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzḥak all say: A person does not render forbidden an item that is not his.
- עבודה זרה נג:
כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁזָּקַף לְבֵינָה לְהִשְׁתַּחֲוֹת לָהּ, וּבָא גּוֹי וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לָהּ — אֲסָרָהּ.
The Gemara asks: And why should I associate this halakha with the war of Joshua? The Gemara answers: It teaches us a matter in passing, that the halakhot of idol worship may be derived from the war of Joshua, as may be illustrated by that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In the case of a Jew who set a brick upright in order to bow to it but did not actually bow to it, and a gentile then came and bowed to it, the gentile rendered it prohibited even though it was not his brick.
מְנָלַן דַּאֲסָרָהּ? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כַּתְּחִילָּה שֶׁל אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״וַאֲשֵׁרֵיהֶם תִּשְׂרְפוּן בָּאֵשׁ״, מִכְּדֵי יְרוּשָּׁה הִיא לָהֶם מֵאֲבוֹתֵיהֶם, וְאֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ!
The Gemara explains: From where do we derive that he rendered it prohibited? Rabbi Elazar says: This halakha is like the halakha that applied at the outset of the Jewish people’s conquest of Eretz Yisrael, when the Torah commanded them to destroy any trees that were used as part of idolatrous rites [asherim], as the Merciful One states: “And you shall break down their altars…and you shall burn their asherim with fire” (Deuteronomy 12:3). Now, Eretz Yisrael is the inheritance of the Jewish people from their ancestors, and a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his. If so, how could the gentiles render the trees forbidden, as the land was not theirs?
וְאִי מִשּׁוּם הָנָךְ דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא, בְּבִיטּוּלָא בְּעָלְמָא סַגִּי לְהוּ!
If the trees were forbidden because some of them might have been those trees that were worshipped initially, before God gave the land to Abraham, it would not have been necessary to destroy them. Rather, the Jews could have forced the gentiles to revoke their status, and since the asherim were objects of gentiles’ idol worship, a mere revocation would be sufficient to render them permitted.
אֶלָּא, מִדִּפְלַחוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל לְעֵגֶל, גַּלּוֹ אַדַּעְתַּיְיהוּ דְּנִיחָא לְהוּ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְכִי אֲתוֹ גּוֹיִם, שְׁלִיחוּתָא דִּידְהוּ עָבְדִי. הָכִי נָמֵי, יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁזָּקַף לְבֵינָה, גַּלִּיא דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְכִי אֲתָא גּוֹי וּפְלַח לַהּ, שְׁלִיחוּתָא דִּידֵיהּ קָעָבֵיד.
Rather, since the Jewish people worshipped the Golden Calf, they revealed their intentions and indicated that they were amenable to idol worship. And when the gentiles came and engaged in idol worship, they were, in effect, carrying out their agency on behalf of the Jewish people. The asherim were therefore considered objects of Jews’ idol worship, whose status cannot be revoked. So too, in the case of a Jew who set a brick upright in order to bow to it, he thereby revealed his intentions and indicated that he is amenable to idol worship. And when a gentile came and worshipped it, he was carrying out the agency on behalf of the Jew.
וְדִלְמָא בְּעֵגֶל הוּא דְּנִיחָא לְהוּ, בְּמִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא לָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֵלֶּה אֱלֹהֶיךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁאִיוּוּ לֶאֱלוֹהוֹת הַרְבֵּה.
The Gemara challenges: But perhaps it is only with regard to the Golden Calf that the Jewish people were amenable to worshipping it, but not with regard to any other type of idol worship. The Gemara counters: The verse states with regard to the Golden Calf: “And they said: These are your gods, O Israel” (Exodus 32:4), in the plural. This teaches that they desired many gods, and they did not desire to worship only the Golden Calf.
- פירוש רש”י שם
שליחותייהו עבדי – הלכך הויא עבודת כוכבים של ישראל ואינה בטילה עולמית:
Therefore, this was paganism of a Jew, and it can never be nullified.
- תוספות רי”ד ד”ה מכרה R. Yeshaya de-Trani, 13th c. Italy
אבל שליחות דהכא אינו אלא הוכחה בעלמא דברצונו הוא עובדה והוא מרשהו ולא מישתרי משום דהוי דבר שאינה שלו.
This “emissaryship” is just evidence that the gentile was worshipping the tree in accordance with the Jew’s will, and the Jew allowed; therefore, it is not permissible on the basis of the tree not belonging to the gentile.
- משנה כלאים ז:ד
הַמְסַכֵּךְ אֶת גַּפְנוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי תְבוּאָתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ, הֲרֵי זֶה קִדֵּשׁ, וְחַיָּב בְּאַחֲרָיוּתוֹ. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים, אֵין אָדָם מְקַדֵּשׁ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ:
One who causes his vine to overhang his fellow’s grain, behold he has caused the grain to be prohibited and he is responsible for it. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say: a person does not prohibit [as kilayim] that which is not his own.
- ר’ עובדיה ברטנורא 15th century Italy
אֵין אָדָם מְקַדֵּשׁ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ. וְלֹא דוֹמֶה לִשְׁאָר אִסּוּרִים שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה כְּגוֹן הַנּוֹתֵן חֵלֶב וְדָם בִּקְדֵרַת חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ בִּשֵּׁל בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ דְּאוֹסְרָן, דְּשָׁאנֵי כִּלְאַיִם דִּכְתִיב בְּהוּ (דברים כב) לֹא תִזְרַע כַּרְמְךָ כִּלְאָיִם דְּמַשְׁמַע כַּרְמְךָ וְלֹא כֶרֶם אַחֵר. וְרַבָּנָן אָמְרֵי לֹא תִזְרַע כַּרְמְךָ, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא כַּרְמְךָ כֶּרֶם אַחֵר מִנַּיִן, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר כִּלְאָיִם מִכָּל מָקוֹם. וְאֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי [וְלֹא כְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן] וְלֹא כְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא:
And this is not like other prohibitions in the Torah, such as placing [forbidden] fats and blood in the pot of his fellow, or in the meat in the milk of his fellow, which forbids them, but Kilayim/mixed seeds are different , as it is written regarding them (Deuteronomy 22:9): “You shall not sow your vineyard with a second seed,” which implies your vineyard, but not another vineyard, but the Rabbis state [that the Biblical passage] “You shall not sow your vineyard” – I do not have other than “your vineyard” – but where do I learn about another vineyard (i.e., of another person), the inference teaches us, “mixed seeds,” in any case. But the Halakha is not according to Rabbi Yossi and not according to Rabbi Akiva (who rules the same in the next mishnah).
- משנה כלאים ה:ו
הָרוֹאֶה יָרָק בַּכֶּרֶם, וְאָמַר כְּשֶׁאַגִּיעַ לוֹ אֲלַקְּטֶנּוּ, מֻתָּר. כְּשֶׁאֶחֱזֹר אֲלַקְּטֶנּוּ, אִם הוֹסִיף בְּמָאתַיִם, אָסוּר:
One who sees a vegetable in a vineyard, and said: “When I reach it I will pluck it,” it is permitted. [But if he says:] “When I come back I will pluck it,” if [the vegetable] has [in the meantime] increased by a two-hundredth, it is forbidden.
- שו”ת אבני נזר חלק אורח חיים סימן שלב R. Avrohom Bornsztain, 1838-1910
י) ומכאן נראה לי ראי’ ברורה לדברי הנודע ביהודה [מהדו”ק או”ח סי’ כ’ ד”ה ועוד] בגזל חמץ ועבר עליו הפסח דהחמץ מותר לאחר הפסח יע”ש דאתי עלה משום אין אוסר דבר שאינו שלו. וזה לשונו שם ורואה אני שהדברים קל וחומר ומה המשתחוה לבהמת חבירו לא אסרה וכו’ עיין שם…
This seems a clear proof to the words of the Noda BiYehuda regarding the situation where one stole hametz, and it subsisted through Passover, that the hametz is permitted after Passover, using the logic that one cannot make forbidden that which down not belong to them. And this is his language there: “And I see this as a fortiori: if one who bows to their fellow’s animal does not make it prohibited (though they did an act of bowing, certainly in the case of ownership of hametz which was passive, it should not be prohibited). See there…
- שולחן ערוך אורח חיים הלכות נטילת ידים סימן קס R. Yosef Cairo, 16th c
סעיף ב
עשה במים מלאכה או ששרה בהם פתו, אפילו נתכוין לשרות בכלי זה ונפל לשני, פסולים…
If one used the water for labor or soaked one’s bread in them, even if one meant to soak it in one vessel, and it fell into the other, the water is invalid for ritual handwashing…
- ברכי יוסף אורח חיים סימן קס R. Chaim Yosef David Azulai, aka, Hida, 1724-1806
או ששרה בהם פתו וכו’. אם ראובן שרה פתו במים של שמעון למאן דאמר אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו המים כשרים. אבל למאן דאמר אדם אוסר בדבר שאינו שלו יש להחמיר ד. מורינו הרב מהר”א נחום בתשובה כ”י, והאריך בצדדים וצדי צדדים ושקלא וטריא בדברי הפוסקים.
If Reuven soaked his bread in Shimon’s water, according to the one who says that one cannot prohibit something that does not belong to them, the water is valid. But according to the one who says that one can prohibit something that is not there, it is proper to be strict.
- טור יורה דעה הלכות אבילות סימן שמט R. Yaakov ben Asher, 14th c.
מת ותכריכיו אסורים בהנאה…ונויי המת המחוברים בגופו כגון פיאה נכרית (א) וכיוצא בזה אסורים כמו המת עצמו בד”א בסתם אבל אם צוה שיתנו נויי גופו המחוברים בו לבנו או לצורך דבר אחר מותרים אבל שערו ממש אפילו אם צוה עליו אסור בהנאה כמו גופו אשה שנגמר דינה ויצאה ליהרג מותר ליהנות משערה מחיים שאין גמר דינה אוסרה אלא מיתה אוסרתה ג) אבל בהמה שנגמר דינה ליסקל אסור ליהנות ממנה מחיים
The deceased and their burial shrouds are off limits even for benefit…and the accessories of the deceased that are attached to their body, such as a wig and the like are also prohibited like the deceased themself. When is this the case? Without specification, but if the deceased commanded that they give the accessories on their person to their child or for something else, they are permitted. But the deceased’s actually hair, even if they commanded about it (to give it away) is off limits for benefit like the body. A woman who was condemned to death and was being taken out to her death – it is permissible to gain benefit from her hair while she is still alive, as only death rather than the sentence makes her prohibited. But an animal that was condemned to death, one cannot benefit from it even while it is still alive.
תניא היו אביו ואמו מזרקין בו כלים מצוה על אחרים להצילן רשב”ג אומר בד”א שלא נגעו במטה אבל אם נגעו במטה הנקברת עמו אסורים משום דמחלפי בתכריכי המת ותניא באבל רבתי ה) כל המציל כלים מן המת הרי זה גוזל המתים ויש שמצילין ויש שאין מצילין עד שלא נגעו לארון מצילין משנגעו בו אין מצילין אבל מלמדין את האדם שלא יהא חבלן מפני שאמרו כל המרבה כלים על המת הרי זה עובר משום בל תשחית דברי ר”מ ר”א בר ר’ צדוק אומר מנוולו ר”ג אומר מרבה עליו הרמה
It was taught in a baraita: If one’s parents throw clothing (into the burial plot to be buried with their child) it is a mitzvah for others to save it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: When is this the case? If the clothes have not yet touched the bier, but if they have, they are prohibited because they might be mistaken for the shrouds of the deceased. And it was taught in tractate Semachot: All who save clothing from the dead is stealing from the dead. And there are some that people can save and others that they may not: if they haven’t touched the coffin, people can save them; but once they have touched the coffin, they may not save. But we teach a person not to be wasteful, as they said: all who multiply clothing over the dead violates the prohibition of wanton destruction, per R. Meir. R Elazar bar Rabbi Zadok says: it makes the deceased ugly. R. Gamliel says: it causes extra maggots to come.
עוד תניא באבל רבתי כל שהמת זוכה בו אסור בהנאה חוץ מהסל והמגריפה המיוחדין לקבורה אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו לפיכך הפורש על המת דבר שאינו שלו אפי’ לקוברו בו אינו נאסר…
It was also taught in tractage Semachot: Anything that the deceased attains is prohibited from benefit except for the basket and the shovel that are set aside for burial. A person may not prohibit that which does not belong to them. Therefore, one who places on the dead something that is not their own, even to bury the dead in it, that clothing does not become prohibited…
