Chullin 120

אמתניתין העור והרוטב והקיפה וכו׳ מצטרפין לטמא טומאת אוכלין

maintaining that the dispute is with regard to that which is taught in the mishna: The attached hide, and the congealed gravy attached to the meat, and the spices, and the meat residue, and the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves all join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.

אמר ריש לקיש לא שנו אלא עצם דהוי שומר אבל נימא לא הויא שומר ורבי יוחנן אמר אפילו נימא נמי הויא שומר

Reish Lakish said: The Sages taught that only a bone and the other items mentioned in the mishna join together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity because they constitute protection for the meat. But a hair does not join together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity because it is not protection for the meat. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even a hair is protection for the meat and therefore joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity.

אמר ליה ריש לקיש לרבי יוחנן ומי איכא שומר על גבי שומר חלחולי מחלחל

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: But the hide protects the flesh, and the hair is on top of the hide. Is the halakha of protection applicable with regard to protection that is on top of another protection? Rabbi Yoḥanan answered: The hair penetrates through the hide and touches the flesh, thereby providing protection directly for the flesh.

מתקיף לה רב אחא אלא מעתה תפילין היכי כתבינן הא בעינן כתיבה תמה וליכא

Rav Aḥa objects to this answer: If that is so, that there are perforations in the hide through which the hairs penetrate, how can we write phylacteries? Don’t we require phylacteries to be written with a perfect writing with no perforations in the letters? And that is not possible if there are perforations in the hide.

אישתמיטתיה הא דאמרי במערבא כל נקב שהדיו עובר עליו אינו נקב

The Gemara answers: That halakha which they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, escaped Rav Aḥa: Any perforation over which the ink passes and which it covers is not considered a perforation that invalidates the writing.

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש עור שיש עליו כזית בשר הנוגע בציב היוצא ממנו ובשערה שכנגדו טמא מאי לאו משום שומר לא משום יד

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish opinion from the mishna taught later (124a): In the case of the hide of an animal carcass upon which there is an olive-bulk of flesh, one who touches a strand of flesh emerging from the flesh or touches a hair that is on the side of the hide opposite the flesh is ritually impure, even though he did not touch an olive-bulk of the flesh. What is the reason that one who touches the strand of flesh or the hair becomes impure? Is it not because they constitute protection for the flesh? The Gemara answers: No, it is because the hair constitutes a handle for the flesh.

נימא אחת למאי חזיא כדאמר רבי אילעא במלאי שבין המלאין הכי נמי בנימא שבין הנימין

The Gemara asks: For what function is one hair fit such that it constitutes a handle? The Gemara answers: One can explain that mishna as Rabbi Ela said in explanation of a different mishna: It is stated with regard to the case of an awn among many awns. Here too, the mishna is stated with regard to the case of a hair among many hairs and not the case of a single hair. The hair serves as a handle for the flesh because one can hold the hair and lift the flesh without the hair becoming detached.

והיכא איתמר דרבי אילעא אהא דתנן המלאי שבשבלין מטמאין ומיטמאין ואין מצטרפין מלאי למאי חזיא אמר רבי אילעא במלאי שבין המלאין

And where was the opinion of Rabbi Ela stated? It was stated with regard to that which we learned in a mishna: An awn that is on top of a stalk can become impure and impart impurity, but it does not join together with the grains to constitute the requisite measure to impart impurity. It was asked: For what function is an awn fit such that it is considered to be a handle for the stalk? Rabbi Ela said: The mishna is stated with regard to the case of an awn among many awns.

והרוטב מאי רוטב אמר רבא שומנא

§The mishna teaches: The gravy [rotev] joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, but an egg-bulk of gravy itself is not susceptible to impurity. The Gemara asks: To what is the term rotev referring? Rava said: The term rotev is referring to the fat that floats on top of a soup of cooked meat.

אמר ליה אביי הוא עצמו יטמא טומאת אוכלין אלא חלב דקריש

Abaye said to Rava: That fat itself is eaten and is therefore susceptible to impurity of food. Rather, the term rotev is referring to fat that oozed out of the meat and congealed. That fat is not eaten, but it does join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.

מאי איריא קריש כי לא קריש נמי דאמר ריש לקיש ציר שעל גבי ירק מצטרף לככותבת ביום הכפורים

The Gemara asks: Why is the mishna referring specifically to congealed fat? Even in a case where the fat did not congeal it joins together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, as Reish Lakish said: Brine on a vegetable, even though it is a liquid, combines with the vegetable to constitute a large date-bulk [kakotevet] with regard to rendering one liable for violating the prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur. Similarly, liquid fat should combine with the meat to constitute the requisite volume to impart the impurity of food.

התם משום יתובי דעתא הוא בכל דהו מיתבא דעתיה

The Gemara answers: Liquids and solids do not join together to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food. The reason for the halakha there, with regard to Yom Kippur, is because one is liable even for the consumption of a liquid that is not characterized as food if the mind of the one who consumes it is settled. This is because with regard to the fast of Yom Kippur the Torah is concerned with a person’s affliction, as the verse states: “You shall afflict your souls” (Leviticus 23:27). Therefore, one is liable on Yom Kippur for any eating that settles his mind.

הכא משום איצטרופי הוא אי קריש מצטרף אי לא קריש לא מצטרף

But that is not the case here with regard to impurity. For two substances to join together to impart impurity, a combination between substances that have a common requisite measure for imparting impurity is necessary. Liquid and solid foods do not have the same requisite measure. Therefore, if the fat is congealed, it joins together with the meat. If it is not congealed, it does not join together with the meat.

והקיפה מאי קיפה אמר רבה פירמא

§The mishna teaches: The spices [kifa] join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food, but an egg-bulk of kifa itself is not susceptible to impurity. The Gemara asks: To what is the term kifa referring? Rabba said: The term kifa is referring to a congealed hash of cooked meat that settled to the bottom of the pot.

אמר ליה אביי הוא עצמו יטמא טומאת אוכלין אלא אמר רב פפא תבלין

Abaye said to Rabba: That hash itself is eaten and is therefore susceptible to the impurity of food. Rather, Rav Pappa said: The term kifa is referring to spices, which are not eaten themselves but do join together with the meat to constitute the requisite egg-bulk to impart the impurity of food.

תנן התם הקפה את הדם ואכלו או שהמחה את החלב וגמעו חייב

§Since the mishna mentions kifa, which, according to Rabba, is referring to a congealed substance, the Gemara discusses the halakha of one who congealed a forbidden substance and consumed it. We learned in a baraita there: One who caused blood to coagulate and ate it or melted forbidden fat and swallowed it is liable.

בשלמא הקפה את הדם ואכלו כיון דאקפיה אחשובי אחשביה אלא המחה את החלב וגמעו אכילה כתיבא ביה והא לאו אכילה היא

The Gemara objects: Granted, one who caused blood to coagulate and ate it is liable. Although blood is not normally eaten in such a manner, since he caused the blood to coagulate, he ascribed the significance of food to it, and the Torah prohibits the eating of blood, as it is written: “You shall eat neither fat nor blood” (Leviticus 3:17). But why is one who melted forbidden fat and swallowed it liable? Eating, and not drinking, is stated in the Torah with regard to the prohibition against the consumption of forbidden fat, as it is written: “You shall eat no fat of ox or sheep or goat” (Leviticus 7:23), and this swallowing of a liquid is not eating.

אמר ריש לקיש אמר קרא נפש לרבות את השותה

Reish Lakish said: One is liable even for drinking the melted forbidden fat of an animal. The verse states: “For all who eat the fat of the animal that one could offer from it a fire offering to the Lord, the soul that eats it shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:25). The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include in the prohibition one who drinks the fat.

תניא נמי גבי חמץ כהאי גונא המחהו וגמעו אם חמץ הוא ענוש כרת אם מצה היא אין אדם יוצא בה ידי חובתו בפסח

The Gemara comments: A novelty of this kind is also taught in a baraita with regard to the prohibition against eating leavened bread on Passover: If one took bread, dissolved it in water, and swallowed this mixture on Passover, the halakha is as follows: If it is leavened bread, he is punished with karet; if it is matza, then a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover with this food.

בשלמא אם מצה היא אין אדם יוצא בה ידי חובתו בפסח לחם עני אמר רחמנא והאי לאו לחם עני הוא אלא אם חמץ הוא ענוש כרת אכילה כתיבא ביה

The Gemara objects: Granted, if it is matza, a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover with this food, as the Merciful One states with regard to the prohibition against eating leavened bread on Passover: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat unleavened bread with it, even the bread of affliction” (Deuteronomy 16:3), indicating that one must eat the bread of affliction, but this bread dissolved in water is not considered the bread of affliction. But if the bread is leavened bread, why is he punished with karet? Eating is written with regard to the prohibition against leavened bread, and in this case he did not eat it but rather drank it.

אמר ריש לקיש אמר קרא נפש לרבות את השותה

Reish Lakish said: One is liable even for drinking leavened bread. The verse states: “For all who eat leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel” (Exodus 12:15). The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include in the prohibition one who drinks leavened bread.

ותניא נמי גבי נבלת עוף טהור כהאי גונא המחהו באור טמא בחמה טהור והוינן בה אכילה כתיב ביה

The Gemara comments: A novelty of this kind is also taught in the Tosefta (Zavim 5:9) with regard to one who eats the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird: One who liquefied the carcass of an unslaughtered kosher bird in fire and drank the substance is impure. But one who liquefied it in the sun and drank it is pure. And we discussed it: Eating and not drinking is stated with regard to the impurity of a carcass, as it is written: “And every soul that eats an unslaughtered carcass or that which is mauled by an animal, whether he is native or stranger, he shall wash his garments, bathe in water, and shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). Why, then, does one who drinks a kosher bird carcass become impure?

אמר ריש לקיש אמר קרא נפש לרבות את השותה אי הכי בחמה נמי בחמה איסרוחי מסרח

Reish Lakish said: He becomes impure because the verse states: “And every soul.” The term “soul” is interpreted homiletically to include one who drinks. The Gemara objects: If so, one who drinks a carcass that is melted in the sun should also become impure. The Gemara explains: A carcass takes a long time to melt in the sun. Therefore, the liquid becomes rotten and unfit for consumption.

וצריכי דאי כתב רחמנא חלב חמץ לא אתי מיניה שכן לא היתה לו שעת הכושר נבלה לא אתי מיניה שכן ענוש כרת

The Gemara cited three instances in which Reish Lakish interpreted the term “soul” as including one who drinks. The Gemara explains: All three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to forbidden fat, liability for drinking liquefied leavened bread could not have been derived from it, since the prohibition against the consumption of forbidden fat has an element of stringency that does not apply to leavened bread in that the forbidden fat had no period of fitness for consumption. Leavened bread, on the other hand, may be consumed before Passover. Likewise, impurity contracted by drinking a liquefied carcass could not be derived from the halakha of forbidden fat because the consumption of forbidden fat is punishable by karet, which is not the case with regard to the consumption of a carcass.

ואי כתב רחמנא חמץ חלב לא אתי מיניה שכן לא הותר מכללו ונבלה לא אתיא מיניה שכן ענוש כרת

And if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to leavened bread, liability for drinking melted forbidden fat could not be derived from it, as there are no circumstances in which the general prohibition against eating leavened bread was permitted. The consumption of forbidden fat, on the other hand, is permitted with regard to the fat of an undomesticated animal. And similarly, impurity contracted by drinking a liquefied carcass could not be derived from the halakha of leavened bread, because the halakha of leavened bread has an element of stringency that does not apply to a carcass in that its consumption is punishable by karet.

ואי כתב רחמנא בנבלה הנך לא אתיא מינה שכן מטמאה

And if the Merciful One had written the term “soul” only with regard to a carcass, those prohibitions against drinking melted fat and liquefied leavened bread could not be derived from it, because a carcass has an element of stringency that does not apply to those prohibitions in that it transmits impurity to one who eats it. Therefore, all three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary.

חדא מחדא לא אתיא תיתי חדא מתרתי הי תיתי לא לכתוב רחמנא בנבלה ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן ענוש כרת

The Gemara objects: It is true that one halakha cannot be derived from either one of the others, as detailed above. Nevertheless, one can derive the halakha of one of them from the other two. The Gemara responds: This is not possible, as which halakha can one derive from the others? Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to a liquefied carcass and derive it from these other prohibitions against eating forbidden fat and leavened bread. One can refute this derivation: What is notable about these other prohibitions? They are notable in that one who transgresses them is punished with karet, contrary to one who eats a carcass.

לא לכתוב רחמנא בחמץ ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן לא היתה להן שעת הכושר

The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to dissolved leavened bread and derive it from these halakhot of forbidden fat and a carcass. The Gemara refutes the derivation: What is notable about these halakhot? They are notable in that they had no period of fitness for consumption, as opposed to leavened bread, which was fit for consumption before Passover.

לא לכתוב רחמנא בחלב ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן לא הותר מכללן תאמר בחלב שהותר מכללו

The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write this halakha with regard to forbidden fat and derive it from these halakhot of consuming leavened bread and a carcass. The Gemara refutes the derivation: What is notable about these halakhot? They are notable in that there are no circumstances in which their general prohibition was permitted. Shall you say the same with regard to forbidden fat, whose general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances? Therefore, all three mentions of the term “soul” are necessary.

ומאי ניהו אילימא חלב בהמה לגבוה נבלה נמי אשתראי מליקת עוף לגבוה

The Gemara asks: And what is the case in which forbidden fat is permitted? If we say that it is the fat of a domesticated animal that is permitted to be sacrificed in the Temple to the Most High, a bird carcass is also permitted to be sacrificed in the Temple. Although pinching the nape of the neck of a bird renders it an unslaughtered carcass and forbidden for consumption, bird offerings are sacrificed to the Most High in such a manner.

ואלא חלב חיה להדיוט נבלה נמי אשתראי מליקה דחטאת העוף לכהנים

And if the reference is rather to the forbidden fat of an undomesticated animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person, one may respond that a carcass is also permitted for a person’s consumption in a certain case, as the pinching of the nape of the neck of a bird sin offering renders it fit for consumption of the priests.

לעולם חלב חיה להדיוט ודקא קשיא לך כהנים כהנים משלחן גבוה קא זכו

The Gemara answers: Actually, the reference is to the forbidden fat of an undomesticated animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person. And that which is difficult for you with regard to the fact that the priests eat the carcass of a bird which is brought as a sin offering is not difficult, as the priests receive their portion from the table of the Most High. Since this carcass is permitted as an offering to God, it is permitted to the priests as well. Therefore, this does not qualify as a case of an unslaughtered carcass permitted to ordinary people.

והא דתניא הטמאים לאסור צירן ורוטבן וקיפה שלהן למה לי ליגמר מהני

§The Gemara challenges: But that which is taught in the following baraita is difficult. The Torah states with regard to the prohibition against eating creeping animals: “These are they that are impure [hatteme’im] to you among all the creeping animals” (Leviticus 11:31). The Sages interpret the letter heh in the term “hatteme’im” to forbid their juice that oozes from their carcasses, and their gravy that is produced when they are cooked, and sediments of their flesh that congeal at the bottom of the dish when cooked. The Gemara explains the challenge: Why do I need a verse to teach this halakha? Let this halakha be learned from these halakhot of melted forbidden fat, a liquefied bird carcass, and dissolved leavened bread.

צריכי דאי לא כתב רחמנא הוה אמינא דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון מה התם עד דאיכא כזית אף הכא נמי עד דאיכא כזית

The Gemara answers: It is necessary for this halakha to be written, as if the Merciful One had not written this halakha with regard to creeping animals and instead the halakha was derived from the other halakhot, I would say: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Accordingly, just as there, one who consumes melted forbidden fat, a liquefied carcass, or dissolved leavened bread is not liable until he consumes an olive-bulk, so too here, with regard to consuming the juice, gravy, and sediments of creeping animals, one is not liable until he consumes an olive-bulk. Therefore, a separate verse is necessary to teach that one is liable even for consuming a lentil-bulk of the juice, gravy, or sediments of a creeping animal, just as one is liable for consuming this measure of the creeping animal itself.

וליכתוב רחמנא בשרצים וליתו הנך וליגמרו מינייהו

The Gemara objects: Let the Merciful One write the prohibition against consuming the juice, gravy, and sediments of creeping animals and let these halakhot of consuming liquefied forbidden fat, dissolved leavened bread, and a melted carcass of a bird come and be learned from it. The Torah does not need to state those halakhot explicitly.

משום דאיכא למיפרך מה לשרצים שכן טומאתן במשהו

The Gemara explains: It is not possible to derive those halakhot in such a manner because that derivation can be refuted: What is notable about creeping animals? They are notable in that their impurity is imparted in any amount. Those other halakhot, on the other hand, do not apply to less than an olive-bulk.

והא דתניא הטבל והחדש וההקדש והשביעית והכלאים כולן משקין היוצאין מהן כמותן מנלן

§The Gemara continues to examine the source for the status of liquids with regard to various halakhot based on that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to untithed produce; and the new crop of grain of the year, which is forbidden until after the omer offering is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:14); and consecrated produce; and the produce of the Sabbatical Year after the designated time when it must be removed from one’s house; and diverse kinds, i.e., the produce of a vineyard in which grains were sown; with regard to all of them, it is prohibited to consume liquid that emerges from them just as it is prohibited to consume them themselves. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha?

וכי תימא ליגמר מהנך מה להנך שכן איסור הבא מאליו הוו

And if you would say: Let those prohibitions be learned from these prohibitions of consuming the liquid that seeps from creeping animals, liquefied fat, dissolved leavened bread, and liquefied bird carcasses, one can respond that this derivation can be refuted. What is notable about these prohibitions? They are notable in that each of them is a prohibition that develops on its own without any human intervention, as opposed to the prohibitions in the baraita, which do not necessarily share this element of stringency.

תינח היכא דאיסור בא מאליו היכא דלאו איסור הבא מאליו מנלן

Therefore, it works out well to derive the prohibition against consuming liquids that emerged from a solid where the prohibition is one that develops on its own, such as untithed produce, the new crop, Sabbatical Year produce and diverse kinds. But with regard to consecrated produce, where the prohibition does not develop on its own but rather only after a person consecrates the produce, from where do we derive that it is prohibited to consume the liquid that emerges from the produce just as it is prohibited to consume the produce itself?

גמרינן מבכורים ובכורים גופייהו מנלן

The Gemara answers: We learn this halakha from the case of first fruits. Consumption of first fruits is a prohibition that does not develop on its own, because the owner must set aside the first fruits. And consumption of the liquid that emerges from first fruits is prohibited like consumption of the fruit itself. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to first fruits themselves?

דתני רבי יוסי פרי פרי אתה מביא ואי אתה מביא משקה הביא ענבים ודרכן מנין תלמוד לומר תביא

The Gemara answers that first fruits can be brought as wine, as Rabbi Yosei teaches: The verse states with regard to first fruits: “You shall take of the first of all the fruit of the ground, which you shall bring in from your land” (Deuteronomy 26:2). Since the verse mentions fruit, this indicates that you must bring actual fruit, and you may not bring the first fruits in the form of beverages. But if one brought grapes and he had already pressed them into wine, from where is it derived that he has fulfilled his obligation? The verse states: “You shall bring in from your land.” This superfluous term serves to teach that if one brings wine for the mitzva of first fruits, he has fulfilled his obligation.

איכא למיפרך מה לבכורים שכן טעונין קרייה והנחה

But this derivation from the case of first fruits can be refuted: What is notable about first fruits? They are notable in that they require reciting the passage which begins: “My father was a wandering Aramean” (Deuteronomy 26:5), and placing the fruits in the Temple, whereas no such requirements exists with regard to consecrated produce.

אלא גמר מתרומה

Rather, one can derive the prohibition against consuming the liquid that emerges from consecrated produce from the prohibition against consuming liquid that emerges from teruma, i.e., the portion of produce designated for the priest.

ותרומה גופה מנלן דאיתקש לבכורים דאמר מר ותרומת ידך אלו בכורים

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to teruma itself? the Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that teruma is compared to first fruits, as it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your cattle and of your flocks, or any of your vows that you will vow, or your pledges, nor the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17), and the Master said with regard to the phrase “nor the offering [teruma] of your hand” that these are the first fruits. Since the verse uses the term “teruma” with regard to first fruits, the halakha of teruma is compared to the halakha of first fruits: Just as liquid that emerges from first fruits is forbidden like the fruit itself, so too liquid that emerges from teruma is forbidden like the produce itself. Consequently, the prohibition against consuming the liquid that emerges from consecrated produce can be derived from teruma.

מה לתרומה שכן חייבין עליה מיתה וחומש

The Gemara refutes this derivation from teruma: What is notable about teruma? It is notable in that a non-priest is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven for consuming teruma, and he must restore the value of the produce he ate, adding one-fifth of its value as a fine. This element of stringency does not exist with regard to one who consumes consecrated produce.

אלא גמר מתרוייהו מתרומה ובכורים מה לתרומה ובכורים שכן חייבין עליהם מיתה וחומש

Rather, one can learn the prohibition against consuming the liquid that emerges from consecrated produce from both teruma and first fruits. The Gemara refutes this derivation: What is notable about teruma and first fruits? They are notable in that a non-priest is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven for consuming teruma or first fruits, and he must restore the value of the produce he ate, adding one-fifth of its value as a fine. This is not true with regard to one who consumes consecrated produce.

אלא אתיא מתרומה וחד מהנך או מבכורים וחד מהנך

Rather, the prohibition against consuming the liquid that emerges from consecrated produce is derived from teruma and one of these prohibitions, i.e., a liquefied carcass of a bird or dissolved leavened bread; or it can be derived from first fruits and one of these prohibitions.

והא דתנן דבש תמרים ויין תפוחים וחומץ סיתווניות ושאר מיני פירות של תרומה רבי אליעזר מחייב קרן וחומש ורבי יהושע פוטר

§The Gemara elaborates on the comparison between teruma and first fruits with regard to the halakha that the status of liquid that emerges from produce is like that of the produce itself, and it explains that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 11:2): If a non-priest ate date honey, or apple wine, or vinegar made from grapes of autumn that grow stunted at the end of the season and are unfit for wine production, or any of the other types of juice made from fruits of teruma, Rabbi Eliezer deems him obligated to repay the principal and an additional fifth, like the penalty for one who ate the teruma produce itself. And Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt from payment.

במאי פליגי בדון מינה ומינה ובדון מינה ואוקי באתרה קמיפלגי

The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? They disagree with regard to the principles governing the process of deriving one halakha from another halakha. One maintains the exegetical principle: Infer from it, and again from it, i.e., when one case is derived from another all the details of the source case are applied to the other case; and one maintains the principle: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, i.e., one derives only the basic principle of the source case, whereas all other aspects of the source case are not applied to the case at hand.

דרבי אליעזר סבר דון מינה ומינה מה בכורים משקין היוצא מהן כמותן אף תרומה נמי משקין היוצא מהן כמותן ומינה מה בכורים אפילו שאר מינין אף תרומה נמי אפילו שאר מינין

As Rabbi Eliezer holds: Infer from it, and again from it. Just as with regard to first fruits, the status of the liquid that emerges from them is like that of the produce itself, so too with regard to teruma, the status of the liquid that emerges from it is like that of the produce itself. And again infer from it: Just as the halakha of first fruits includes not only olives and grapes but even other types of produce from the seven species for which Eretz Yisrael is praised, and the status of liquid that emerges from that produce is like that of the produce itself, so too with regard to teruma, although oil and wine are the only liquids from which one is obligated to separate teruma, even liquid that emerges from other types of produce designated as teruma besides olives and grapes has the same status as the produce itself.

ורבי יהושע סבר דון מינה מה בכורים משקין היוצאין מהן כמותן אף תרומה משקין היוצאין מהן כמותן ואוקי באתרה מה משקין דקדשים בתרומה תירוש ויצהר אין מידי אחרינא לא אף משקין היוצאין מהן כמותן תירוש ויצהר אין מידי אחרינא לא

And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: Infer from it that just as with regard to first fruits the status of the liquid that emerges from them is like that of the produce itself, so too with regard to teruma, the status of the liquid that emerges from it is like that of the produce itself. But interpret the halakha according to its own place: Just as in the case of liquids that are consecrated as teruma, with regard to wine and oil, yes, they are included, but other types are not included, so too in the case of liquid that emerges from teruma, as with regard to wine and oil, yes, they are like the produce itself, but any other type of liquid that emerges from teruma is not like the produce itself. Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua deems exempt a non-priest who consumed any of the beverages mentioned in the mishna.

והא דתנן אין מביאין בכורים משקה אלא היוצא מן הזיתים ומן הענבים מני

The Gemara cites that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 11:3): One may bring beverages made from first fruits to the Temple only in the case of that which emerges from the olives, i.e., oil, or from the grapes, i.e., wine. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that mishna?

רבי יהושע היא דאמר דון מינה ואוקי באתרה וגמר להו לבכורים מתרומה

The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. He derives the halakha of liquid that emerges from teruma from first fruits only with regard to wine and oil, and in the opposite direction, he derives the halakha of liquid that emerges from first fruits from teruma. Therefore, even with regard to first fruits the status of liquid that emerges from the produce is like that of the produce itself only with regard to wine and oil. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the halakha of liquid that emerges from teruma is derived from first fruits even with regard to other types of produce besides grapes and olives, contrary to the statement of that mishna, one may bring beverages extracted from other first fruits besides wine and oil to the Temple.

והא דתנן אין סופגין את הארבעים משום ערלה אלא על היוצא מן הזיתים ומן הענבים מני

The Gemara cites that which we learned in the same mishna (Terumot 11:3): One incurs the forty lashes due to drinking the juice squeezed from orla, i.e., the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting, only for that which emerges from the olives or from the grapes. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that mishna?

רבי יהושע היא דאמר דון מינה ואוקי באתרה וגמר להו לבכורים מתרומה

The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, and he derives the halakha of liquid that emerges from first fruits from teruma. Therefore, even with regard to first fruits, the status of liquid that emerges from the produce is like that of the produce itself only with regard to wine and oil.