Details of a ben pekua – a fetus that was inside at the time of the mother’s slaughter. The animal is permitted without needing to be slaughtered. What if the part of the fetus came out before the shechita? What if it brought that limb back in before the mother was slaughtered, what is that status of that limb?
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Chullin 68
מַתְנִי׳ בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, וְהוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. הוֹצִיא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד.
MISHNA: When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and meanwhile the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s womb and then brought it back inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus extended its head outside the womb, even if it then brought it back inside, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter.
חוֹתֵךְ מֵעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה. זֶה הַכְּלָל: דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ – אָסוּר, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ גּוּפָהּ – מוּתָּר.
If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in the womb and leaves those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their consumption is prohibited, because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal’s body that was severed prior to its slaughter is prohibited even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר.
GEMARA: The Gemara qualifies the first ruling of the mishna: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: But as for the limb itself, i.e., the foreleg, its consumption is prohibited, even though the fetus brought it back inside prior to the slaughter.
מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא בָּשָׂר חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתוֹ – נֶאֱסָר.
What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). A tereifa is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months; its consumption is prohibited even if it is ritually slaughtered. The Gemara interprets the verse as teaching a principle: Once flesh whose permitted status is dependent on being within a certain area, e.g., sacrificial meat within the Temple courtyard, has gone outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted, which the verse describes as being “in the field,” it becomes permanently prohibited, like a tereifa. Likewise, the permitted status of a fetus is dependent on its being within the womb when the mother animal is slaughtered. Accordingly, if any part of the fetus leaves the womb before the slaughter, it is rendered permanently prohibited.
תְּנַן: בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, וְהוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body but then brought it back, and then the animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara assumes: What, is the mishna not referring to the entire fetus, including the limb, i.e., the foreleg, when it states that its consumption is permitted by the slaughter? This would contradict Rav’s ruling. The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, apart from the foreleg.
אִי אַעוּבָּר, מַאי אִירְיָא הֶחְזִירוֹ? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ נָמֵי! הוּא הַדִּין אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ. וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָּעֵי מִיתְנֵא סֵיפָא: הוֹצִיא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד, תְּנָא נָמֵי רֵישָׁא הֶחְזִירוֹ.
The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, why state specifically that the fetus brought back its foreleg? Even if it did not bring it back the rest of the fetus would still be permitted. The Gemara answers: The same is true, that the rest of the fetus is permitted, even if it did not bring back its foreleg. But since the tanna of the mishna wants to teach in the latter clause: If the fetus extended its head, even though it brought it back, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn and is permitted only through its own slaughter, therefore he also taught in the first clause that the fetus brought back its foreleg, for stylistic reasons, despite the fact that the ruling is not limited to that case.
וְסֵיפָא, מַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לַן? דְּכֵיוָן דְּיָצָא רֹאשׁוֹ הָוְיָא לַהּ לֵידָה? תְּנֵינָא: אֵיזֶהוּ בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה וְאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לְכֹהֲנִים – הַבָּא אַחַר נְפָלִים, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי, אוֹ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת.
The Gemara asks: And concerning this latter clause itself, what does it teach us? Does it teach that once the fetus extended its head, that is considered a birth? But we have already learned this in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a): Who is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not considered a firstborn with regard to the requirement to be redeemed by giving five shekels to the priests? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus. The mishna adds that the category of stillbirth includes the case of a child who did not reach full term, even if its head emerged alive, or a fully developed, nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead.
טַעְמָא דְּרֹאשׁוֹ מֵת, הָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי – הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה נָמֵי לָא הָוֵי.
The Gemara infers from the final clause of the mishna: The reason a son born following the miscarriage is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of the miscarriage emerged only after it was already dead. But if its head had initially emerged alive, even if it then died before being fully delivered, the son born after him would not be considered a firstborn even with regard to inheritance. Apparently, this is because the emergence of the head alive is considered a birth, and therefore any subsequent child cannot be considered the firstborn. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach this definition of a birth.
וְכִי תֵּימָא, אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּאָדָם, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בִּבְהֵמָה.
And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us the definition of birth with regard to a person, and the mishna here teaches us that the same definition applies to an animal, another problem remains, as the Gemara will presently explain.
דְּאָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה לָא יָלֵיף, דְּאֵין פְּרוֹזְדוֹר לִבְהֵמָה, וּבְהֵמָה מֵאָדָם לָא יָלְפָא, דַּחֲשִׁיב פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים דִּידֵיהּ.
Before explaining the problem with this suggestion, the Gemara explains why it is necessary to teach the definition with regard to both people and animals: Because the definition of birth with regard to a person cannot be derived from that of an animal, as an animal does not have a concealed opening [prozdor] to the womb, unlike women, whose thighs conceal the opening to their womb. Consequently, even if the definition were stated with regard to an animal, one might limit it to animals, as that stage is immediately visible; whereas in women it is not. And conversely, the definition of birth with regard to an animal cannot be derived from that of a person, as the form of a person’s face is significant because people are created in the image of God, and their faces bear the mark of their intelligence, which is not true of animals. Consequently, perhaps the emergence of the head alone is considered a birth only with regard to a person.
הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שִׁלְיָא שֶׁיָּצְתָה מִקְצָתָהּ – אֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה, כְּסִימָן וָלָד בָּאִשָּׁה כָּךְ סִימָן וָלָד בַּבְּהֵמָה!
The Gemara proceeds to explain why the above suggestion is not a solution: With regard to this halakha also, that the emergence of the head of an animal is considered a birth, we have already learned it in a mishna (77a): If part of a placenta emerged from the womb of an animal before it was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited even after the mother animal is slaughtered. The reason for this is just as the placenta is an indication of the presence of a fetus in a woman, so too, it is an indication of the presence of a fetus in an animal. Consequently, it is possible that the part of the placenta that emerged contained the head of the fetus, and accordingly it would be considered to have been born. The slaughter of the mother animal would therefore not permit it for consumption. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach the definition of a birth even with regard to an animal.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא הֶחְזִירוֹ דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, תְּנָא סֵיפָא אַטּוּ רֵישָׁא.
The Gemara has established that the latter clause does not teach any novelty. Accordingly, it returns to challenging Rav’s ruling: Granted, the mishna is understood if you say that the statement that the fetus brought its foreleg back inside the mother animal, which is mentioned in the first clause of the mishna, is written specifically in order to teach the novelty that the foreleg is permitted if it was brought back before the slaughter, in contrast to Rav’s ruling. If so, then one can claim the mishna taught it in the latter clause due to the first clause, so that they would be parallel stylistically, and no novelty is necessary in the latter clause.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: לָא דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, וְלָא דְּסֵיפָא דַּוְקָא, לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִתְנְיַיהּ כְּלָל?
But if you say the first clause is not written specifically and does not teach a novelty, but rather the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, which is permitted even if it does not bring back its foreleg, and you also say the latter clause is not written specifically to teach a novelty, since the definition of birth is already taught in a mishna elsewhere, then why does it need to teach the halakha that the foreleg or head were brought back at all? Perforce, the first clause must be referring to the permitted status of the foreleg and limiting it specifically to the case where it was brought back inside. This contradicts Rav’s ruling.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אַעוּבָּר, וְכִדְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ. הָכָא נָמֵי, לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
The Gemara responds: No; actually, the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, but nevertheless, the statement that the fetus brought back its foreleg does teach a novelty. This is similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of a cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside of the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited. Here too, one can explain that the ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not bring back its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is also prohibited.
תָּא שְׁמַע: בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירָהּ – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a challenge to Rav’s ruling from a baraita: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth, and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward did the fetus return its foreleg back inside, its consumption is prohibited.
הוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – שֶׁבַּחוּץ טָמֵא וְאָסוּר, וְשֶׁבִּפְנִים טָהוֹר וּמוּתָּר.
If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and one cut it off, and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, then the part of the foreleg that was outside and was cut off is ritually impure and its consumption is prohibited, as it has the status of a limb cut from a living animal, which is forbidden. And the rest of the fetus that was inside is ritually pure and its consumption is permitted by virtue the slaughter of the mother animal.
שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ –
If one slaughtered its mother and only afterward cut off the foreleg that had been extended outside,
הַבָּשָׂר מַגַּע נְבֵלָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
then the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus, excluding the foreleg, is impure due to contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg of the now dead fetus was not permitted through an act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass. It therefore imparts impurity to the rest of the flesh, which was in contact with it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַגַּע טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה.
And the Rabbis say: Although the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the foreleg, it does serve to prevent the foreleg from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass. Accordingly, the flesh has the status of having been in contact with a slaughtered tereifa. By Torah law, consumption of the animal is prohibited but it does not impart ritual impurity. The Sages decreed it to be impure in that it disqualifies sacrificial flesh with which it comes in contact.
קָתָנֵי מִיהָא רֵישָׁא: הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה; מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.
The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav’s ruling: In any event, the first clause of the baraita teaches: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted. What, is it not referring to the limb, i.e., the foreleg, and the baraita rules that it is permitted, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to the rest of the fetus.
אִי אַעוּבָּר, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירוֹ – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה; וְאִי עוּבָּר, אַמַּאי אָסוּר?
The Gemara questions this: If the baraita is referring to the fetus, say the latter clause: If one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward the fetus returned its foreleg inside, its consumption is prohibited. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is referring to the fetus, why should it be prohibited in this case?
כִּדְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ, הָכָא נָמֵי לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to the fetus, and should be explained in a manner similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg was severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and outside when it was extended outside the womb, the location of the cut on the fetus’s body is also prohibited. Here too, one can explain that this ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not return its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is prohibited as well. The foreleg itself, though, is prohibited even if it was brought back inside before the slaughter.
אִינִי? וְהָא כִּי אֲתָא אֲבִימִי מִבֵּי חוֹזָאֵי, אֲתָא וְאַיְיתִי מַתְנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ: פַּרְסָה הֶחְזִיר – אֱכוֹל, פְּרָסוֹת הֶחְזִיר – אֱכוֹל. מַאי לָאו הֶחְזִיר פַּרְסָה – אֲכוּל פַּרְסָה?
The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei Ḥozai he came and brought a baraita with him: One of the sources (see 69a) that the slaughter of a pregnant animal also serves to permit the consumption of the fetus is the verse: “And every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:6). The verse mentions both “hoof” in the singular and “hooves” in the plural to teach that sometimes one may eat two hooves and sometimes only one, as follows: If the fetus extended two of its hooves outside the womb, if it returned one hoof one may eat, if it brought back both hooves one may eat. What, is it not that the baraita means that if it brought back one hoof one may eat that hoof, and likewise if it brought back both hooves one may eat both of them, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling?
לֹא, הֶחֱזִיר פַּרְסָה – אֱכוֹל עוּבָּר. אִי עוּבָּר, מַאי אִירְיָא הֶחְזִיר? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הֶחֱזִיר נָמֵי! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
The Gemara responds: No, it means that if it brought back one hoof or even both, one may eat the rest of the fetus but not the hooves. The Gemara objects: If it is referring to the permitted status of the fetus, why does it specifically state that it brought back the hoof? Even if it did not bring it back the fetus would be permitted. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said the ruling of the baraita is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the body of the fetus. If the limb were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside when it was extended outside the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited, but only if the fetus had not brought back that limb before the mother animal was slaughtered.
וְהָא תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי קָא נָסֵיב לַהּ! מַאי לָאו חַד לְאֵבֶר, וְחַד לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ? לָא, חַד לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ, וְחַד לְקָלוּט בִּמְעֵי פָרָה.
The Gemara persists: But even given Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s claim the baraita adduces two verses, i.e., the mention of hoof and hooves. What, is it not that one serves to permit the limb, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling, and the other one serves to permit the location of the cut, in accordance with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No; one mention does serve to permit the location of the cut, but the other one serves to permit a fetus with non-cloven hooves [kalut] found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species, it is nevertheless permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother.
וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: קָלוּט בֶּן פָּרָה אָסוּר. הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם, אֲבָל בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ – שְׁרֵי.
And it is necessary to have a specific source to permit this according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species. The verse teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it was still inside its mother’s womb when the mother was slaughtered, it is permitted.
עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ מוּתָּר.
§ The Gemara attempted to challenge Rav’s ruling that once a limb of a fetus is extended outside the mother animal’s body it becomes prohibited even if it was then brought back, but did not find a conclusive refutation. It now presents a dissenting opinion: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And even the limb itself is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יְהוּדָה לְעוּלָּא: וְהָא רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאן יָהֵיב לַן מֵעַפְרָא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל וּמָלֵינַן עַיְינִין, אֶלָּא הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל הָיוּ בִּכְלַל ״בָּשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״,
Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But Rav and Shmuel both say the limb itself is prohibited; how can you say otherwise? Ulla said to him: Who will give us some of the dust of the graves of Rav and Shmuel and we will fill our eyes with it; such is the greatness of those Sages. But I follow the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Initially one would assume all flesh that is permitted due to being within a certain boundary, e.g., a fetus inside its mother’s womb, the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order within the Temple courtyard, and the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, was included in the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). The verse is interpreted to teach that if such flesh leaves its boundaries it is rendered forbidden, even should it subsequently return.
כְּשֶׁפָּרַט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב גַּבֵּי חַטָּאת שֶׁיָּצְתָה חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָהּ וְחָזְרָה – אָסוּר, חַטָּאת הוּא דִּפְרַט רַחֲמָנָא בָּהּ, אֲבָל כֹּל מִילֵּי – כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדוּר – שְׁרֵי.
Once another verse applies the concept for you specifically with regard to a sin offering, teaching that if it went outside of its boundary and returned it is prohibited (see Leviticus 10:18), then it is apparent that the Merciful One specifically applied the concept to a sin offering. But with regard to all other items that left their boundary, once they are brought back they are permitted, including the limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb and then was brought back.
מֵיתִיבִי: ״בָּשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בְּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וּבִכּוּרִים, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצְאוּ חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָן וְחָזְרוּ – מוּתָּרִין, יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״טְרֵפָה״.
The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat,” that flesh that leaves the boundary in which it is permitted is thereby rendered forbidden like a tereifa. Why must the verse state that it is like a tereifa? The baraita explains: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that even though they went outside of their boundary, which is the city of Jerusalem and the only place where it is permitted to eat them, nevertheless if they are brought back to there they are once again permitted, one might have thought that also with regard to this prohibition, that of flesh that leaves its boundary, it is so, i.e., if it is brought back it once again becomes permitted for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: “A tereifa.”
מַאי תַּלְמוּדָא? אָמַר רַבָּה: כִּטְרֵפָה, מָה טְרֵפָה – כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּטְרְפָה שׁוּב אֵין לָהּ הֶיתֵּר, אַף בָּשָׂר – כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתוֹ שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ הֶיתֵּר! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְעוּלָּא, תְּיוּבְתָּא.
The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation from the term “a tereifa”? Rabba said: The verse indicates that the prohibition of flesh that left its boundary is like the prohibition of a tereifa. Just as with regard to a tereifa, once an animal is mortally wounded, rendering it a tereifa, it can no longer regain a permitted status, so too with regard to flesh referred to in the verse: Once it has gone outside of its boundary it can no longer regain permitted status. Accordingly, if the limb of a fetus was extended outside the womb it would thereby become permanently prohibited, contradicting the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the statement of Ulla is indeed a conclusive refutation.
אָמַר מָר: לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בְּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וּבִכּוּרִים. הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ?
The Gemara analyzes the baraita, which states: The Master said: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that although they left their boundary, if they are brought back there they are again permitted. The Gemara asks: Where did we find this, i.e., what is the source for this halakha?
דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תוּכַל לֶאֱכֹל בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנֶךָ וְגוֹ׳״, בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ הוּא דְּלָא תֵּיכוּל, אֲבָל יָצְאוּ חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָן וְחָזְרוּ – מוּתָּרִין.
The Gemara explains that it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows that you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand. But you shall eat them before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:17–18). The phrase “the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil” is referring to second tithe, and the phrase “the offering of your hand” is referring to first fruits. The verse states that all the items listed may be eaten only “before the Lord your God,” i.e., within the city of Jerusalem. The prohibition stated in the verse is that within your gates, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, you may not eat these items. But by inference, if these items went outside of their boundary, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, and then were brought back, they are permitted.
בְּמַעְרְבָא מַתְנוּ הָכִי, רַב אָמַר: יֵשׁ לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵין לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים.
§ The Gemara explained the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan in the way in which it was taught in Babylonia. The Gemara notes that in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught the dispute like this: Rav says there is a concept of birth with regard to limbs. When a limb is extended outside the womb, it is considered born and is independent of the mother animal. Consequently, it can never be permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs. Since the limb is never considered to have been born, as long as it is inside the mother animal when the mother animal is slaughtered it will be permitted by virtue of that slaughter.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ לְמֵיסַר מִיעוּט אֵבֶר שֶׁבִּפְנִים.
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two versions which explain why Rav deemed the limb forbidden? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case in which only the majority of a limb was extended outside the womb. In that case, the issue is whether or not to prohibit the minority of the limb that remained inside. If the limb is forbidden because it is considered to have been born, the entire limb would be forbidden and not just the part that was extended. If the limb is forbidden because it left its boundary, then only the part that extended outside the womb would be forbidden.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר אֵין לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים, הוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, עַד שֶׁהִשְׁלִימוֹ לְרוּבּוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן הָא נְפַק לֵיהּ רוּבָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדַר הָדַר?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs, if the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb and brought it back, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and brought it back, and continued to extend parts of its body outside until the total amount that had been outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that ultimately the majority of the fetus has left the womb and the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born, and consequently the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit its being consumed? Or perhaps, since it brought each limb back, the limbs are considered to have been brought back; therefore, the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb and it is not regarded as having been born. In that case, the slaughter of its mother would still permit its being consumed.
אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדַר הָדַר, הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכָהּ, וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכָהּ, עַד שֶׁהִשְׁלִימוֹ לְרוּבּוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן הָא נָפֵיק לֵיהּ רוּבָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא רוּבָּא בְּבַת אַחַת בָּעֵינַן?
The Gemara asks: If you want to say that since it brought back each limb, they are considered to have been brought back and the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb, the following dilemma still arises: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and someone severed it, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and someone severed it, and this continued with its other limbs until the total amount outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the majority of the fetus has left the womb, the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born and therefore the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit it? Or perhaps, in order for the fetus to be regarded as having been born we require a majority of the fetus to leave simultaneously, which does not exist in this case.
תָּא שְׁמַע:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna:
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Chullin 68
מַתְנִי׳ בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, וְהוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. הוֹצִיא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד.
MISHNA: When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and meanwhile the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s womb and then brought it back inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus extended its head outside the womb, even if it then brought it back inside, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter.
חוֹתֵךְ מֵעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה. זֶה הַכְּלָל: דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ – אָסוּר, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ גּוּפָהּ – מוּתָּר.
If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in the womb and leaves those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their consumption is prohibited, because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal’s body that was severed prior to its slaughter is prohibited even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר.
GEMARA: The Gemara qualifies the first ruling of the mishna: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: But as for the limb itself, i.e., the foreleg, its consumption is prohibited, even though the fetus brought it back inside prior to the slaughter.
מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא בָּשָׂר חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתוֹ – נֶאֱסָר.
What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). A tereifa is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months; its consumption is prohibited even if it is ritually slaughtered. The Gemara interprets the verse as teaching a principle: Once flesh whose permitted status is dependent on being within a certain area, e.g., sacrificial meat within the Temple courtyard, has gone outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted, which the verse describes as being “in the field,” it becomes permanently prohibited, like a tereifa. Likewise, the permitted status of a fetus is dependent on its being within the womb when the mother animal is slaughtered. Accordingly, if any part of the fetus leaves the womb before the slaughter, it is rendered permanently prohibited.
תְּנַן: בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, וְהוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body but then brought it back, and then the animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara assumes: What, is the mishna not referring to the entire fetus, including the limb, i.e., the foreleg, when it states that its consumption is permitted by the slaughter? This would contradict Rav’s ruling. The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, apart from the foreleg.
אִי אַעוּבָּר, מַאי אִירְיָא הֶחְזִירוֹ? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ נָמֵי! הוּא הַדִּין אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ. וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָּעֵי מִיתְנֵא סֵיפָא: הוֹצִיא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד, תְּנָא נָמֵי רֵישָׁא הֶחְזִירוֹ.
The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, why state specifically that the fetus brought back its foreleg? Even if it did not bring it back the rest of the fetus would still be permitted. The Gemara answers: The same is true, that the rest of the fetus is permitted, even if it did not bring back its foreleg. But since the tanna of the mishna wants to teach in the latter clause: If the fetus extended its head, even though it brought it back, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn and is permitted only through its own slaughter, therefore he also taught in the first clause that the fetus brought back its foreleg, for stylistic reasons, despite the fact that the ruling is not limited to that case.
וְסֵיפָא, מַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לַן? דְּכֵיוָן דְּיָצָא רֹאשׁוֹ הָוְיָא לַהּ לֵידָה? תְּנֵינָא: אֵיזֶהוּ בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה וְאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לְכֹהֲנִים – הַבָּא אַחַר נְפָלִים, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי, אוֹ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת.
The Gemara asks: And concerning this latter clause itself, what does it teach us? Does it teach that once the fetus extended its head, that is considered a birth? But we have already learned this in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a): Who is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not considered a firstborn with regard to the requirement to be redeemed by giving five shekels to the priests? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus. The mishna adds that the category of stillbirth includes the case of a child who did not reach full term, even if its head emerged alive, or a fully developed, nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead.
טַעְמָא דְּרֹאשׁוֹ מֵת, הָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי – הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה נָמֵי לָא הָוֵי.
The Gemara infers from the final clause of the mishna: The reason a son born following the miscarriage is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of the miscarriage emerged only after it was already dead. But if its head had initially emerged alive, even if it then died before being fully delivered, the son born after him would not be considered a firstborn even with regard to inheritance. Apparently, this is because the emergence of the head alive is considered a birth, and therefore any subsequent child cannot be considered the firstborn. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach this definition of a birth.
וְכִי תֵּימָא, אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּאָדָם, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בִּבְהֵמָה.
And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us the definition of birth with regard to a person, and the mishna here teaches us that the same definition applies to an animal, another problem remains, as the Gemara will presently explain.
דְּאָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה לָא יָלֵיף, דְּאֵין פְּרוֹזְדוֹר לִבְהֵמָה, וּבְהֵמָה מֵאָדָם לָא יָלְפָא, דַּחֲשִׁיב פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים דִּידֵיהּ.
Before explaining the problem with this suggestion, the Gemara explains why it is necessary to teach the definition with regard to both people and animals: Because the definition of birth with regard to a person cannot be derived from that of an animal, as an animal does not have a concealed opening [prozdor] to the womb, unlike women, whose thighs conceal the opening to their womb. Consequently, even if the definition were stated with regard to an animal, one might limit it to animals, as that stage is immediately visible; whereas in women it is not. And conversely, the definition of birth with regard to an animal cannot be derived from that of a person, as the form of a person’s face is significant because people are created in the image of God, and their faces bear the mark of their intelligence, which is not true of animals. Consequently, perhaps the emergence of the head alone is considered a birth only with regard to a person.
הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שִׁלְיָא שֶׁיָּצְתָה מִקְצָתָהּ – אֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה, כְּסִימָן וָלָד בָּאִשָּׁה כָּךְ סִימָן וָלָד בַּבְּהֵמָה!
The Gemara proceeds to explain why the above suggestion is not a solution: With regard to this halakha also, that the emergence of the head of an animal is considered a birth, we have already learned it in a mishna (77a): If part of a placenta emerged from the womb of an animal before it was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited even after the mother animal is slaughtered. The reason for this is just as the placenta is an indication of the presence of a fetus in a woman, so too, it is an indication of the presence of a fetus in an animal. Consequently, it is possible that the part of the placenta that emerged contained the head of the fetus, and accordingly it would be considered to have been born. The slaughter of the mother animal would therefore not permit it for consumption. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach the definition of a birth even with regard to an animal.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא הֶחְזִירוֹ דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, תְּנָא סֵיפָא אַטּוּ רֵישָׁא.
The Gemara has established that the latter clause does not teach any novelty. Accordingly, it returns to challenging Rav’s ruling: Granted, the mishna is understood if you say that the statement that the fetus brought its foreleg back inside the mother animal, which is mentioned in the first clause of the mishna, is written specifically in order to teach the novelty that the foreleg is permitted if it was brought back before the slaughter, in contrast to Rav’s ruling. If so, then one can claim the mishna taught it in the latter clause due to the first clause, so that they would be parallel stylistically, and no novelty is necessary in the latter clause.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: לָא דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, וְלָא דְּסֵיפָא דַּוְקָא, לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִתְנְיַיהּ כְּלָל?
But if you say the first clause is not written specifically and does not teach a novelty, but rather the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, which is permitted even if it does not bring back its foreleg, and you also say the latter clause is not written specifically to teach a novelty, since the definition of birth is already taught in a mishna elsewhere, then why does it need to teach the halakha that the foreleg or head were brought back at all? Perforce, the first clause must be referring to the permitted status of the foreleg and limiting it specifically to the case where it was brought back inside. This contradicts Rav’s ruling.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם אַעוּבָּר, וְכִדְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ. הָכָא נָמֵי, לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
The Gemara responds: No; actually, the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, but nevertheless, the statement that the fetus brought back its foreleg does teach a novelty. This is similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of a cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside of the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited. Here too, one can explain that the ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not bring back its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is also prohibited.
תָּא שְׁמַע: בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירָהּ – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a challenge to Rav’s ruling from a baraita: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth, and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward did the fetus return its foreleg back inside, its consumption is prohibited.
הוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – שֶׁבַּחוּץ טָמֵא וְאָסוּר, וְשֶׁבִּפְנִים טָהוֹר וּמוּתָּר.
If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and one cut it off, and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, then the part of the foreleg that was outside and was cut off is ritually impure and its consumption is prohibited, as it has the status of a limb cut from a living animal, which is forbidden. And the rest of the fetus that was inside is ritually pure and its consumption is permitted by virtue the slaughter of the mother animal.
שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ –
If one slaughtered its mother and only afterward cut off the foreleg that had been extended outside,
הַבָּשָׂר מַגַּע נְבֵלָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
then the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus, excluding the foreleg, is impure due to contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg of the now dead fetus was not permitted through an act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass. It therefore imparts impurity to the rest of the flesh, which was in contact with it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַגַּע טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה.
And the Rabbis say: Although the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the foreleg, it does serve to prevent the foreleg from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass. Accordingly, the flesh has the status of having been in contact with a slaughtered tereifa. By Torah law, consumption of the animal is prohibited but it does not impart ritual impurity. The Sages decreed it to be impure in that it disqualifies sacrificial flesh with which it comes in contact.
קָתָנֵי מִיהָא רֵישָׁא: הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה; מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.
The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav’s ruling: In any event, the first clause of the baraita teaches: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted. What, is it not referring to the limb, i.e., the foreleg, and the baraita rules that it is permitted, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to the rest of the fetus.
אִי אַעוּבָּר, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירוֹ – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה; וְאִי עוּבָּר, אַמַּאי אָסוּר?
The Gemara questions this: If the baraita is referring to the fetus, say the latter clause: If one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward the fetus returned its foreleg inside, its consumption is prohibited. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is referring to the fetus, why should it be prohibited in this case?
כִּדְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ, הָכָא נָמֵי לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to the fetus, and should be explained in a manner similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg was severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and outside when it was extended outside the womb, the location of the cut on the fetus’s body is also prohibited. Here too, one can explain that this ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not return its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is prohibited as well. The foreleg itself, though, is prohibited even if it was brought back inside before the slaughter.
אִינִי? וְהָא כִּי אֲתָא אֲבִימִי מִבֵּי חוֹזָאֵי, אֲתָא וְאַיְיתִי מַתְנִיתָא בִּידֵיהּ: פַּרְסָה הֶחְזִיר – אֱכוֹל, פְּרָסוֹת הֶחְזִיר – אֱכוֹל. מַאי לָאו הֶחְזִיר פַּרְסָה – אֲכוּל פַּרְסָה?
The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei Ḥozai he came and brought a baraita with him: One of the sources (see 69a) that the slaughter of a pregnant animal also serves to permit the consumption of the fetus is the verse: “And every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:6). The verse mentions both “hoof” in the singular and “hooves” in the plural to teach that sometimes one may eat two hooves and sometimes only one, as follows: If the fetus extended two of its hooves outside the womb, if it returned one hoof one may eat, if it brought back both hooves one may eat. What, is it not that the baraita means that if it brought back one hoof one may eat that hoof, and likewise if it brought back both hooves one may eat both of them, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling?
לֹא, הֶחֱזִיר פַּרְסָה – אֱכוֹל עוּבָּר. אִי עוּבָּר, מַאי אִירְיָא הֶחְזִיר? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הֶחֱזִיר נָמֵי! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.
The Gemara responds: No, it means that if it brought back one hoof or even both, one may eat the rest of the fetus but not the hooves. The Gemara objects: If it is referring to the permitted status of the fetus, why does it specifically state that it brought back the hoof? Even if it did not bring it back the fetus would be permitted. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said the ruling of the baraita is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the body of the fetus. If the limb were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside when it was extended outside the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited, but only if the fetus had not brought back that limb before the mother animal was slaughtered.
וְהָא תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי קָא נָסֵיב לַהּ! מַאי לָאו חַד לְאֵבֶר, וְחַד לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ? לָא, חַד לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ, וְחַד לְקָלוּט בִּמְעֵי פָרָה.
The Gemara persists: But even given Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s claim the baraita adduces two verses, i.e., the mention of hoof and hooves. What, is it not that one serves to permit the limb, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling, and the other one serves to permit the location of the cut, in accordance with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No; one mention does serve to permit the location of the cut, but the other one serves to permit a fetus with non-cloven hooves [kalut] found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species, it is nevertheless permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother.
וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: קָלוּט בֶּן פָּרָה אָסוּר. הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם, אֲבָל בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ – שְׁרֵי.
And it is necessary to have a specific source to permit this according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species. The verse teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it was still inside its mother’s womb when the mother was slaughtered, it is permitted.
עוּלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ מוּתָּר.
§ The Gemara attempted to challenge Rav’s ruling that once a limb of a fetus is extended outside the mother animal’s body it becomes prohibited even if it was then brought back, but did not find a conclusive refutation. It now presents a dissenting opinion: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And even the limb itself is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יְהוּדָה לְעוּלָּא: וְהָא רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאן יָהֵיב לַן מֵעַפְרָא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל וּמָלֵינַן עַיְינִין, אֶלָּא הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּל הָיוּ בִּכְלַל ״בָּשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״,
Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But Rav and Shmuel both say the limb itself is prohibited; how can you say otherwise? Ulla said to him: Who will give us some of the dust of the graves of Rav and Shmuel and we will fill our eyes with it; such is the greatness of those Sages. But I follow the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Initially one would assume all flesh that is permitted due to being within a certain boundary, e.g., a fetus inside its mother’s womb, the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order within the Temple courtyard, and the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, was included in the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). The verse is interpreted to teach that if such flesh leaves its boundaries it is rendered forbidden, even should it subsequently return.
כְּשֶׁפָּרַט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב גַּבֵּי חַטָּאת שֶׁיָּצְתָה חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָהּ וְחָזְרָה – אָסוּר, חַטָּאת הוּא דִּפְרַט רַחֲמָנָא בָּהּ, אֲבָל כֹּל מִילֵּי – כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדוּר – שְׁרֵי.
Once another verse applies the concept for you specifically with regard to a sin offering, teaching that if it went outside of its boundary and returned it is prohibited (see Leviticus 10:18), then it is apparent that the Merciful One specifically applied the concept to a sin offering. But with regard to all other items that left their boundary, once they are brought back they are permitted, including the limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb and then was brought back.
מֵיתִיבִי: ״בָּשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בְּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וּבִכּוּרִים, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצְאוּ חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָן וְחָזְרוּ – מוּתָּרִין, יָכוֹל אַף זֶה כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״טְרֵפָה״.
The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat,” that flesh that leaves the boundary in which it is permitted is thereby rendered forbidden like a tereifa. Why must the verse state that it is like a tereifa? The baraita explains: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that even though they went outside of their boundary, which is the city of Jerusalem and the only place where it is permitted to eat them, nevertheless if they are brought back to there they are once again permitted, one might have thought that also with regard to this prohibition, that of flesh that leaves its boundary, it is so, i.e., if it is brought back it once again becomes permitted for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: “A tereifa.”
מַאי תַּלְמוּדָא? אָמַר רַבָּה: כִּטְרֵפָה, מָה טְרֵפָה – כֵּיוָן שֶׁנִּטְרְפָה שׁוּב אֵין לָהּ הֶיתֵּר, אַף בָּשָׂר – כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתוֹ שׁוּב אֵין לוֹ הֶיתֵּר! תְּיוּבְתָּא דְעוּלָּא, תְּיוּבְתָּא.
The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation from the term “a tereifa”? Rabba said: The verse indicates that the prohibition of flesh that left its boundary is like the prohibition of a tereifa. Just as with regard to a tereifa, once an animal is mortally wounded, rendering it a tereifa, it can no longer regain a permitted status, so too with regard to flesh referred to in the verse: Once it has gone outside of its boundary it can no longer regain permitted status. Accordingly, if the limb of a fetus was extended outside the womb it would thereby become permanently prohibited, contradicting the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the statement of Ulla is indeed a conclusive refutation.
אָמַר מָר: לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ בְּמַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי וּבִכּוּרִים. הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ?
The Gemara analyzes the baraita, which states: The Master said: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that although they left their boundary, if they are brought back there they are again permitted. The Gemara asks: Where did we find this, i.e., what is the source for this halakha?
דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תוּכַל לֶאֱכֹל בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ מַעְשַׂר דְּגָנֶךָ וְגוֹ׳״, בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ הוּא דְּלָא תֵּיכוּל, אֲבָל יָצְאוּ חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָן וְחָזְרוּ – מוּתָּרִין.
The Gemara explains that it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows that you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand. But you shall eat them before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:17–18). The phrase “the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil” is referring to second tithe, and the phrase “the offering of your hand” is referring to first fruits. The verse states that all the items listed may be eaten only “before the Lord your God,” i.e., within the city of Jerusalem. The prohibition stated in the verse is that within your gates, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, you may not eat these items. But by inference, if these items went outside of their boundary, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, and then were brought back, they are permitted.
בְּמַעְרְבָא מַתְנוּ הָכִי, רַב אָמַר: יֵשׁ לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵין לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים.
§ The Gemara explained the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan in the way in which it was taught in Babylonia. The Gemara notes that in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught the dispute like this: Rav says there is a concept of birth with regard to limbs. When a limb is extended outside the womb, it is considered born and is independent of the mother animal. Consequently, it can never be permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs. Since the limb is never considered to have been born, as long as it is inside the mother animal when the mother animal is slaughtered it will be permitted by virtue of that slaughter.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ לְמֵיסַר מִיעוּט אֵבֶר שֶׁבִּפְנִים.
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two versions which explain why Rav deemed the limb forbidden? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case in which only the majority of a limb was extended outside the womb. In that case, the issue is whether or not to prohibit the minority of the limb that remained inside. If the limb is forbidden because it is considered to have been born, the entire limb would be forbidden and not just the part that was extended. If the limb is forbidden because it left its boundary, then only the part that extended outside the womb would be forbidden.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר אֵין לֵידָה לְאֵבָרִים, הוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, עַד שֶׁהִשְׁלִימוֹ לְרוּבּוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן הָא נְפַק לֵיהּ רוּבָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדַר הָדַר?
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs, if the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb and brought it back, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and brought it back, and continued to extend parts of its body outside until the total amount that had been outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that ultimately the majority of the fetus has left the womb and the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born, and consequently the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit its being consumed? Or perhaps, since it brought each limb back, the limbs are considered to have been brought back; therefore, the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb and it is not regarded as having been born. In that case, the slaughter of its mother would still permit its being consumed.
אִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדַר הָדַר, הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכָהּ, וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכָהּ, עַד שֶׁהִשְׁלִימוֹ לְרוּבּוֹ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן הָא נָפֵיק לֵיהּ רוּבָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא רוּבָּא בְּבַת אַחַת בָּעֵינַן?
The Gemara asks: If you want to say that since it brought back each limb, they are considered to have been brought back and the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb, the following dilemma still arises: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and someone severed it, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and someone severed it, and this continued with its other limbs until the total amount outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the majority of the fetus has left the womb, the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born and therefore the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit it? Or perhaps, in order for the fetus to be regarded as having been born we require a majority of the fetus to leave simultaneously, which does not exist in this case.
תָּא שְׁמַע:
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna:
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