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Today's Daf Yomi

February 3, 2019 | 讻状讞 讘砖讘讟 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Chullin 68

Details of a ben pekua – a fetus that was inside at the time of the mother’s slaughter. The animal is permitted without needing to be slaughtered. What if the part of the fetus came out before the shechita? What if it brought that limb back in before the mother was slaughtered, what is that status of that limb?


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诪转谞讬壮 讘讛诪讛 讛诪拽砖讛 诇讬诇讚 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讛注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讜 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 专讗砖讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬专讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讻讬诇讜讚

MISHNA: When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and meanwhile the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal鈥檚 womb and then brought it back inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus extended its head outside the womb, even if it then brought it back inside, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter.

讞讜转讱 诪注讜讘专 砖讘诪注讬讛 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 诪谉 讛讟讞讜诇 讜诪谉 讛讻诇讬讜转 讗住讜专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讚讘专 砖讙讜驻讛 讗住讜专 讜砖讗讬谞讛 讙讜驻讛 诪讜转专

If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in the womb and leaves those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their consumption is prohibited, because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal鈥檚 body that was severed prior to its slaughter is prohibited even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讗讘专 注爪诪讜 讗住讜专

GEMARA: The Gemara qualifies the first ruling of the mishna: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: But as for the limb itself, i.e., the foreleg, its consumption is prohibited, even though the fetus brought it back inside prior to the slaughter.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讘砖专 讘砖讚讛 讟专驻讛 诇讗 转讗讻诇讜 讻讬讜谉 砖讬爪讗 讘砖专 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转讜 谞讗住专

What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states: 鈥淎nd flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat鈥 (Exodus 22:30). A tereifa is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months; its consumption is prohibited even if it is ritually slaughtered. The Gemara interprets the verse as teaching a principle: Once flesh whose permitted status is dependent on being within a certain area, e.g., sacrificial meat within the Temple courtyard, has gone outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted, which the verse describes as being 鈥渋n the field,鈥 it becomes permanently prohibited, like a tereifa. Likewise, the permitted status of a fetus is dependent on its being within the womb when the mother animal is slaughtered. Accordingly, if any part of the fetus leaves the womb before the slaughter, it is rendered permanently prohibited.

转谞谉 讘讛诪讛 讛诪拽砖讛 诇讬诇讚 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讛注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讜 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讗讘专 诇讗 讗注讜讘专

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal鈥檚 body but then brought it back, and then the animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara assumes: What, is the mishna not referring to the entire fetus, including the limb, i.e., the foreleg, when it states that its consumption is permitted by the slaughter? This would contradict Rav鈥檚 ruling. The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, apart from the foreleg.

讗讬 讗注讜讘专 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 谞诪讬 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诪讬转谞讗 住讬驻讗 讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 专讗砖讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬专讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讻讬诇讜讚 转谞讗 谞诪讬 专讬砖讗 讛讞讝讬专讜

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, why state specifically that the fetus brought back its foreleg? Even if it did not bring it back the rest of the fetus would still be permitted. The Gemara answers: The same is true, that the rest of the fetus is permitted, even if it did not bring back its foreleg. But since the tanna of the mishna wants to teach in the latter clause: If the fetus extended its head, even though it brought it back, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn and is permitted only through its own slaughter, therefore he also taught in the first clause that the fetus brought back its foreleg, for stylistic reasons, despite the fact that the ruling is not limited to that case.

讜住讬驻讗 诪讗讬 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 讛讜讬讗 诇讛 诇讬讚讛 转谞讬谞讗 讗讬讝讛讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谞讬诐 讛讘讗 讗讞专 谞驻诇讬诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讗讜 讘谉 转砖注讛 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 诪转

The Gemara asks: And concerning this latter clause itself, what does it teach us? Does it teach that once the fetus extended its head, that is considered a birth? But we have already learned this in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a): Who is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not considered a firstborn with regard to the requirement to be redeemed by giving five shekels to the priests? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus. The mishna adds that the category of stillbirth includes the case of a child who did not reach full term, even if its head emerged alive, or a fully developed, nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead.

讟注诪讗 讚专讗砖讜 诪转 讛讗 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讛讘讗 讗讞专讬讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 讛讜讬

The Gemara infers from the final clause of the mishna: The reason a son born following the miscarriage is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of the miscarriage emerged only after it was already dead. But if its head had initially emerged alive, even if it then died before being fully delivered, the son born after him would not be considered a firstborn even with regard to inheritance. Apparently, this is because the emergence of the head alive is considered a birth, and therefore any subsequent child cannot be considered the firstborn. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach this definition of a birth.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘讗讚诐 讜拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讘讘讛诪讛

And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us the definition of birth with regard to a person, and the mishna here teaches us that the same definition applies to an animal, another problem remains, as the Gemara will presently explain.

讚讗讚诐 诪讘讛诪讛 诇讗 讬诇讬祝 讚讗讬谉 驻专讜讝讚讜专 诇讘讛诪讛 讜讘讛诪讛 诪讗讚诐 诇讗 讬诇驻讗 讚讞砖讬讘 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 讚讬讚讬讛

Before explaining the problem with this suggestion, the Gemara explains why it is necessary to teach the definition with regard to both people and animals: Because the definition of birth with regard to a person cannot be derived from that of an animal, as an animal does not have a concealed opening [prozdor] to the womb, unlike women, whose thighs conceal the opening to their womb. Consequently, even if the definition were stated with regard to an animal, one might limit it to animals, as that stage is immediately visible; whereas in women it is not. And conversely, the definition of birth with regard to an animal cannot be derived from that of a person, as the form of a person鈥檚 face is significant because people are created in the image of God, and their faces bear the mark of their intelligence, which is not true of animals. Consequently, perhaps the emergence of the head alone is considered a birth only with regard to a person.

讛讗 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 砖诇讬讗 砖讬爪转讛 诪拽爪转讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讗讻讬诇讛 讻住讬诪谉 讜诇讚 讘讗砖讛 讻讱 住讬诪谉 讜诇讚 讘讘讛诪讛

The Gemara proceeds to explain why the above suggestion is not a solution: With regard to this halakha also, that the emergence of the head of an animal is considered a birth, we have already learned it in a mishna (77a): If part of a placenta emerged from the womb of an animal before it was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited even after the mother animal is slaughtered. The reason for this is just as the placenta is an indication of the presence of a fetus in a woman, so too, it is an indication of the presence of a fetus in an animal. Consequently, it is possible that the part of the placenta that emerged contained the head of the fetus, and accordingly it would be considered to have been born. The slaughter of the mother animal would therefore not permit it for consumption. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach the definition of a birth even with regard to an animal.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 讚专讬砖讗 讚讜拽讗 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗讟讜 专讬砖讗

The Gemara has established that the latter clause does not teach any novelty. Accordingly, it returns to challenging Rav鈥檚 ruling: Granted, the mishna is understood if you say that the statement that the fetus brought its foreleg back inside the mother animal, which is mentioned in the first clause of the mishna, is written specifically in order to teach the novelty that the foreleg is permitted if it was brought back before the slaughter, in contrast to Rav鈥檚 ruling. If so, then one can claim the mishna taught it in the latter clause due to the first clause, so that they would be parallel stylistically, and no novelty is necessary in the latter clause.

讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诇讗 讚专讬砖讗 讚讜拽讗 讜诇讗 讚住讬驻讗 讚讜拽讗 诇诪讛 诇讬讛 诇诪转谞讬讬讛 讻诇诇

But if you say the first clause is not written specifically and does not teach a novelty, but rather the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, which is permitted even if it does not bring back its foreleg, and you also say the latter clause is not written specifically to teach a novelty, since the definition of birth is already taught in a mishna elsewhere, then why does it need to teach the halakha that the foreleg or head were brought back at all? Perforce, the first clause must be referring to the permitted status of the foreleg and limiting it specifically to the case where it was brought back inside. This contradicts Rav鈥檚 ruling.

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗注讜讘专 讜讻讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱

The Gemara responds: No; actually, the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, but nevertheless, the statement that the fetus brought back its foreleg does teach a novelty. This is similar to that which Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of a cut limb on the fetus鈥檚 body. If the foreleg were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside of the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus鈥檚 body would also be prohibited. Here too, one can explain that the ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not bring back its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is also prohibited.

转讗 砖诪注 讘讛诪讛 讛诪拽砖讛 诇讬诇讚 讛讜爪讬讗 注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讛讞讝讬专讛 讗住讜专 讘讗讻讬诇讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a challenge to Rav鈥檚 ruling from a baraita: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth, and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal鈥檚 body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward did the fetus return its foreleg back inside, its consumption is prohibited.

讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讞转讻讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 砖讘讞讜抓 讟诪讗 讜讗住讜专 讜砖讘驻谞讬诐 讟讛讜专 讜诪讜转专

If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and one cut it off, and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, then the part of the foreleg that was outside and was cut off is ritually impure and its consumption is prohibited, as it has the status of a limb cut from a living animal, which is forbidden. And the rest of the fetus that was inside is ritually pure and its consumption is permitted by virtue the slaughter of the mother animal.

砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讞转讻讜

If one slaughtered its mother and only afterward cut off the foreleg that had been extended outside,

讛讘砖专 诪讙注 谞讘诇讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

then the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus, excluding the foreleg, is impure due to contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg of the now dead fetus was not permitted through an act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass. It therefore imparts impurity to the rest of the flesh, which was in contact with it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讙注 讟专驻讛 砖讞讜讟讛

And the Rabbis say: Although the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the foreleg, it does serve to prevent the foreleg from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass. Accordingly, the flesh has the status of having been in contact with a slaughtered tereifa. By Torah law, consumption of the animal is prohibited but it does not impart ritual impurity. The Sages decreed it to be impure in that it disqualifies sacrificial flesh with which it comes in contact.

拽转谞讬 诪讬讛讗 专讬砖讗 讛讜爪讬讗 注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讗讘专 诇讗 讗注讜讘专

The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav鈥檚 ruling: In any event, the first clause of the baraita teaches: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal鈥檚 body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted. What, is it not referring to the limb, i.e., the foreleg, and the baraita rules that it is permitted, in contradiction to Rav鈥檚 ruling? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to the rest of the fetus.

讗讬 讗注讜讘专 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讛讞讝讬专讜 讗住讜专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 讜讗讬 注讜讘专 讗诪讗讬 讗住讜专

The Gemara questions this: If the baraita is referring to the fetus, say the latter clause: If one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward the fetus returned its foreleg inside, its consumption is prohibited. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is referring to the fetus, why should it be prohibited in this case?

讻讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱

The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to the fetus, and should be explained in a manner similar to that which Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the fetus鈥檚 body. If the foreleg was severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and outside when it was extended outside the womb, the location of the cut on the fetus鈥檚 body is also prohibited. Here too, one can explain that this ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not return its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is prohibited as well. The foreleg itself, though, is prohibited even if it was brought back inside before the slaughter.

讗讬谞讬 讜讛讗 讻讬 讗转讗 讗讘讬诪讬 诪讘讬 讞讜讝讗讬 讗转讗 讜讗讬讬转讬 诪转谞讬转讗 讘讬讚讬讛 驻专住讛 讛讞讝讬专 讗讻讜诇 驻专住讜转 讛讞讝讬专 讗讻讜诇 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讛讞讝讬专 驻专住讛 讗讻讜诇 驻专住讛

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei 岣zai he came and brought a baraita with him: One of the sources (see 69a) that the slaughter of a pregnant animal also serves to permit the consumption of the fetus is the verse: 鈥淎nd every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:6). The verse mentions both 鈥渉oof鈥 in the singular and 鈥渉ooves鈥 in the plural to teach that sometimes one may eat two hooves and sometimes only one, as follows: If the fetus extended two of its hooves outside the womb, if it returned one hoof one may eat, if it brought back both hooves one may eat. What, is it not that the baraita means that if it brought back one hoof one may eat that hoof, and likewise if it brought back both hooves one may eat both of them, in contradiction to Rav鈥檚 ruling?

诇讗 讛讞讝讬专 驻专住讛 讗讻讜诇 注讜讘专 讗讬 注讜讘专 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讛讞讝讬专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛讞讝讬专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱

The Gemara responds: No, it means that if it brought back one hoof or even both, one may eat the rest of the fetus but not the hooves. The Gemara objects: If it is referring to the permitted status of the fetus, why does it specifically state that it brought back the hoof? Even if it did not bring it back the fetus would be permitted. Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said the ruling of the baraita is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the body of the fetus. If the limb were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside when it was extended outside the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus鈥檚 body would also be prohibited, but only if the fetus had not brought back that limb before the mother animal was slaughtered.

讜讛讗 转专讬 拽专讗讬 拽讗 谞住讬讘 诇讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讞讚 诇讗讘专 讜讞讚 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱 诇讗 讞讚 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱 讜讞讚 诇拽诇讜讟 讘诪注讬 驻专讛

The Gemara persists: But even given Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k鈥檚 claim the baraita adduces two verses, i.e., the mention of hoof and hooves. What, is it not that one serves to permit the limb, in contradiction to Rav鈥檚 ruling, and the other one serves to permit the location of the cut, in accordance with Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k鈥檚 ruling? The Gemara responds: No; one mention does serve to permit the location of the cut, but the other one serves to permit a fetus with non-cloven hooves [kalut] found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species, it is nevertheless permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother.

讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 拽诇讜讟 讘谉 驻专讛 讗住讜专 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚讬爪讗 诇讗讜讬专 讛注讜诇诐 讗讘诇 讘诪注讬 讗诪讜 砖专讬

And it is necessary to have a specific source to permit this according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species. The verse teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it was still inside its mother鈥檚 womb when the mother was slaughtered, it is permitted.

注讜诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讗讘专 注爪诪讜 诪讜转专

搂 The Gemara attempted to challenge Rav鈥檚 ruling that once a limb of a fetus is extended outside the mother animal鈥檚 body it becomes prohibited even if it was then brought back, but did not find a conclusive refutation. It now presents a dissenting opinion: Ulla says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: And even the limb itself is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诇注讜诇讗 讜讛讗 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗讘专 注爪诪讜 讗住讜专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗谉 讬讛讬讘 诇谉 诪注驻专讗 讚专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讜诪诇讬谞谉 注讬讬谞讬谉 讗诇讗 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 讛讬讜 讘讻诇诇 讘砖专 讘砖讚讛 讟专驻讛 诇讗 转讗讻诇讜

Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But Rav and Shmuel both say the limb itself is prohibited; how can you say otherwise? Ulla said to him: Who will give us some of the dust of the graves of Rav and Shmuel and we will fill our eyes with it; such is the greatness of those Sages. But I follow the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, and this is what Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Initially one would assume all flesh that is permitted due to being within a certain boundary, e.g., a fetus inside its mother鈥檚 womb, the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order within the Temple courtyard, and the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, was included in the verse: 鈥淎nd flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat鈥 (Exodus 22:30). The verse is interpreted to teach that if such flesh leaves its boundaries it is rendered forbidden, even should it subsequently return.

讻砖驻专讟 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讙讘讬 讞讟讗转 砖讬爪转讛 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转讛 讜讞讝专讛 讗住讜专 讞讟讗转 讛讜讗 讚驻专讟 专讞诪谞讗 讘讛 讗讘诇 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讚讜专 砖专讬

Once another verse applies the concept for you specifically with regard to a sin offering, teaching that if it went outside of its boundary and returned it is prohibited (see Leviticus 10:18), then it is apparent that the Merciful One specifically applied the concept to a sin offering. But with regard to all other items that left their boundary, once they are brought back they are permitted, including the limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb and then was brought back.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讘砖专 讘砖讚讛 讟专驻讛 诇讗 转讗讻诇讜 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇驻讬 砖诪爪讬谞讜 讘诪注砖专 砖谞讬 讜讘讻讜专讬诐 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬爪讗讜 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转谉 讜讞讝专讜 诪讜转专讬谉 讬讻讜诇 讗祝 讝讛 讻谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讟专驻讛

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yo岣nan from a baraita: It is derived from the verse: 鈥淎nd flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat,鈥 that flesh that leaves the boundary in which it is permitted is thereby rendered forbidden like a tereifa. Why must the verse state that it is like a tereifa? The baraita explains: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that even though they went outside of their boundary, which is the city of Jerusalem and the only place where it is permitted to eat them, nevertheless if they are brought back to there they are once again permitted, one might have thought that also with regard to this prohibition, that of flesh that leaves its boundary, it is so, i.e., if it is brought back it once again becomes permitted for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎 tereifa.鈥

诪讗讬 转诇诪讜讚讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讻讟专驻讛 诪讛 讟专驻讛 讻讬讜谉 砖谞讟专驻讛 砖讜讘 讗讬谉 诇讛 讛讬转专 讗祝 讘砖专 讻讬讜谉 砖讬爪讗 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转讜 砖讜讘 讗讬谉 诇讜 讛讬转专 转讬讜讘转讗 讚注讜诇讗 转讬讜讘转讗

The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation from the term 鈥渁 tereifa鈥? Rabba said: The verse indicates that the prohibition of flesh that left its boundary is like the prohibition of a tereifa. Just as with regard to a tereifa, once an animal is mortally wounded, rendering it a tereifa, it can no longer regain a permitted status, so too with regard to flesh referred to in the verse: Once it has gone outside of its boundary it can no longer regain permitted status. Accordingly, if the limb of a fetus was extended outside the womb it would thereby become permanently prohibited, contradicting the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yo岣nan. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the statement of Ulla is indeed a conclusive refutation.

讗诪专 诪专 诇驻讬 砖诪爪讬谞讜 讘诪注砖专 砖谞讬 讜讘讻讜专讬诐 讛讬讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜

The Gemara analyzes the baraita, which states: The Master said: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that although they left their boundary, if they are brought back there they are again permitted. The Gemara asks: Where did we find this, i.e., what is the source for this halakha?

讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讜讻诇 诇讗讻诇 讘砖注专讬讱 诪注砖专 讚讙谞讱 讜讙讜壮 讘砖注专讬讱 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 转讬讻讜诇 讗讘诇 讬爪讗讜 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转谉 讜讞讝专讜 诪讜转专讬谉

The Gemara explains that it is written: 鈥淵ou may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows that you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand. But you shall eat them before the Lord your God鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:17鈥18). The phrase 鈥渢he tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil鈥 is referring to second tithe, and the phrase 鈥渢he offering of your hand鈥 is referring to first fruits. The verse states that all the items listed may be eaten only 鈥渂efore the Lord your God,鈥 i.e., within the city of Jerusalem. The prohibition stated in the verse is that within your gates, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, you may not eat these items. But by inference, if these items went outside of their boundary, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, and then were brought back, they are permitted.

讘诪注专讘讗 诪转谞讜 讛讻讬 专讘 讗诪专 讬砖 诇讬讚讛 诇讗讘专讬诐 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗讬谉 诇讬讚讛 诇讗讘专讬诐

搂 The Gemara explained the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yo岣nan in the way in which it was taught in Babylonia. The Gemara notes that in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught the dispute like this: Rav says there is a concept of birth with regard to limbs. When a limb is extended outside the womb, it is considered born and is independent of the mother animal. Consequently, it can never be permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says that there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs. Since the limb is never considered to have been born, as long as it is inside the mother animal when the mother animal is slaughtered it will be permitted by virtue of that slaughter.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇诪讬住专 诪讬注讜讟 讗讘专 砖讘驻谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two versions which explain why Rav deemed the limb forbidden? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case in which only the majority of a limb was extended outside the womb. In that case, the issue is whether or not to prohibit the minority of the limb that remained inside. If the limb is forbidden because it is considered to have been born, the entire limb would be forbidden and not just the part that was extended. If the limb is forbidden because it left its boundary, then only the part that extended outside the womb would be forbidden.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇讚讘专讬 讛讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇讬讚讛 诇讗讘专讬诐 讛讜爪讬讗 讛注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讞讝专 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 注讚 砖讛砖诇讬诪讜 诇专讜讘讜 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 谞驻拽 诇讬讛 专讜讘讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讚专 讛讚专

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs, if the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb and brought it back, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and brought it back, and continued to extend parts of its body outside until the total amount that had been outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that ultimately the majority of the fetus has left the womb and the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born, and consequently the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit its being consumed? Or perhaps, since it brought each limb back, the limbs are considered to have been brought back; therefore, the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb and it is not regarded as having been born. In that case, the slaughter of its mother would still permit its being consumed.

讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讚专 讛讚专 讛讜爪讬讗 注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讞转讻讛 讜讞讝专 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讞转讻讛 注讚 砖讛砖诇讬诪讜 诇专讜讘讜 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 谞驻讬拽 诇讬讛 专讜讘讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 专讜讘讗 讘讘转 讗讞转 讘注讬谞谉

The Gemara asks: If you want to say that since it brought back each limb, they are considered to have been brought back and the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb, the following dilemma still arises: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and someone severed it, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and someone severed it, and this continued with its other limbs until the total amount outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the majority of the fetus has left the womb, the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born and therefore the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit it? Or perhaps, in order for the fetus to be regarded as having been born we require a majority of the fetus to leave simultaneously, which does not exist in this case.

转讗 砖诪注

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna:

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Chullin 68

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Chullin 68

诪转谞讬壮 讘讛诪讛 讛诪拽砖讛 诇讬诇讚 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讛注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讜 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 专讗砖讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬专讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讻讬诇讜讚

MISHNA: When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and meanwhile the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal鈥檚 womb and then brought it back inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus extended its head outside the womb, even if it then brought it back inside, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter.

讞讜转讱 诪注讜讘专 砖讘诪注讬讛 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 诪谉 讛讟讞讜诇 讜诪谉 讛讻诇讬讜转 讗住讜专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 讝讛 讛讻诇诇 讚讘专 砖讙讜驻讛 讗住讜专 讜砖讗讬谞讛 讙讜驻讛 诪讜转专

If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in the womb and leaves those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their consumption is prohibited, because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal鈥檚 body that was severed prior to its slaughter is prohibited even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter.

讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讜讗讘专 注爪诪讜 讗住讜专

GEMARA: The Gemara qualifies the first ruling of the mishna: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: But as for the limb itself, i.e., the foreleg, its consumption is prohibited, even though the fetus brought it back inside prior to the slaughter.

诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讚讗诪专 拽专讗 讜讘砖专 讘砖讚讛 讟专驻讛 诇讗 转讗讻诇讜 讻讬讜谉 砖讬爪讗 讘砖专 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转讜 谞讗住专

What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states: 鈥淎nd flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat鈥 (Exodus 22:30). A tereifa is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months; its consumption is prohibited even if it is ritually slaughtered. The Gemara interprets the verse as teaching a principle: Once flesh whose permitted status is dependent on being within a certain area, e.g., sacrificial meat within the Temple courtyard, has gone outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted, which the verse describes as being 鈥渋n the field,鈥 it becomes permanently prohibited, like a tereifa. Likewise, the permitted status of a fetus is dependent on its being within the womb when the mother animal is slaughtered. Accordingly, if any part of the fetus leaves the womb before the slaughter, it is rendered permanently prohibited.

转谞谉 讘讛诪讛 讛诪拽砖讛 诇讬诇讚 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讛注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讜 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讗讘专 诇讗 讗注讜讘专

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal鈥檚 body but then brought it back, and then the animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara assumes: What, is the mishna not referring to the entire fetus, including the limb, i.e., the foreleg, when it states that its consumption is permitted by the slaughter? This would contradict Rav鈥檚 ruling. The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, apart from the foreleg.

讗讬 讗注讜讘专 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 谞诪讬 讛讜讗 讛讚讬谉 讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚诇讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 讜讗讬讬讚讬 讚拽讗 讘注讬 诪讬转谞讗 住讬驻讗 讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 专讗砖讜 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讛讞讝讬专讜 讛专讬 讝讛 讻讬诇讜讚 转谞讗 谞诪讬 专讬砖讗 讛讞讝讬专讜

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, why state specifically that the fetus brought back its foreleg? Even if it did not bring it back the rest of the fetus would still be permitted. The Gemara answers: The same is true, that the rest of the fetus is permitted, even if it did not bring back its foreleg. But since the tanna of the mishna wants to teach in the latter clause: If the fetus extended its head, even though it brought it back, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn and is permitted only through its own slaughter, therefore he also taught in the first clause that the fetus brought back its foreleg, for stylistic reasons, despite the fact that the ruling is not limited to that case.

讜住讬驻讗 诪讗讬 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉 讚讻讬讜谉 讚讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 讛讜讬讗 诇讛 诇讬讚讛 转谞讬谞讗 讗讬讝讛讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 讜讗讬谞讜 讘讻讜专 诇讻讛谞讬诐 讛讘讗 讗讞专 谞驻诇讬诐 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讗讜 讘谉 转砖注讛 砖讬爪讗 专讗砖讜 诪转

The Gemara asks: And concerning this latter clause itself, what does it teach us? Does it teach that once the fetus extended its head, that is considered a birth? But we have already learned this in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a): Who is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not considered a firstborn with regard to the requirement to be redeemed by giving five shekels to the priests? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus. The mishna adds that the category of stillbirth includes the case of a child who did not reach full term, even if its head emerged alive, or a fully developed, nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead.

讟注诪讗 讚专讗砖讜 诪转 讛讗 专讗砖讜 讞讬 讛讘讗 讗讞专讬讜 讘讻讜专 诇谞讞诇讛 谞诪讬 诇讗 讛讜讬

The Gemara infers from the final clause of the mishna: The reason a son born following the miscarriage is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of the miscarriage emerged only after it was already dead. But if its head had initially emerged alive, even if it then died before being fully delivered, the son born after him would not be considered a firstborn even with regard to inheritance. Apparently, this is because the emergence of the head alive is considered a birth, and therefore any subsequent child cannot be considered the firstborn. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach this definition of a birth.

讜讻讬 转讬诪讗 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讘讗讚诐 讜拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讘讘讛诪讛

And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us the definition of birth with regard to a person, and the mishna here teaches us that the same definition applies to an animal, another problem remains, as the Gemara will presently explain.

讚讗讚诐 诪讘讛诪讛 诇讗 讬诇讬祝 讚讗讬谉 驻专讜讝讚讜专 诇讘讛诪讛 讜讘讛诪讛 诪讗讚诐 诇讗 讬诇驻讗 讚讞砖讬讘 驻专爪讜祝 驻谞讬诐 讚讬讚讬讛

Before explaining the problem with this suggestion, the Gemara explains why it is necessary to teach the definition with regard to both people and animals: Because the definition of birth with regard to a person cannot be derived from that of an animal, as an animal does not have a concealed opening [prozdor] to the womb, unlike women, whose thighs conceal the opening to their womb. Consequently, even if the definition were stated with regard to an animal, one might limit it to animals, as that stage is immediately visible; whereas in women it is not. And conversely, the definition of birth with regard to an animal cannot be derived from that of a person, as the form of a person鈥檚 face is significant because people are created in the image of God, and their faces bear the mark of their intelligence, which is not true of animals. Consequently, perhaps the emergence of the head alone is considered a birth only with regard to a person.

讛讗 谞诪讬 转谞讬谞讗 砖诇讬讗 砖讬爪转讛 诪拽爪转讛 讗住讜专讛 讘讗讻讬诇讛 讻住讬诪谉 讜诇讚 讘讗砖讛 讻讱 住讬诪谉 讜诇讚 讘讘讛诪讛

The Gemara proceeds to explain why the above suggestion is not a solution: With regard to this halakha also, that the emergence of the head of an animal is considered a birth, we have already learned it in a mishna (77a): If part of a placenta emerged from the womb of an animal before it was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited even after the mother animal is slaughtered. The reason for this is just as the placenta is an indication of the presence of a fetus in a woman, so too, it is an indication of the presence of a fetus in an animal. Consequently, it is possible that the part of the placenta that emerged contained the head of the fetus, and accordingly it would be considered to have been born. The slaughter of the mother animal would therefore not permit it for consumption. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach the definition of a birth even with regard to an animal.

讗讬 讗诪专转 讘砖诇诪讗 讛讞讝讬专讜 讚专讬砖讗 讚讜拽讗 转谞讗 住讬驻讗 讗讟讜 专讬砖讗

The Gemara has established that the latter clause does not teach any novelty. Accordingly, it returns to challenging Rav鈥檚 ruling: Granted, the mishna is understood if you say that the statement that the fetus brought its foreleg back inside the mother animal, which is mentioned in the first clause of the mishna, is written specifically in order to teach the novelty that the foreleg is permitted if it was brought back before the slaughter, in contrast to Rav鈥檚 ruling. If so, then one can claim the mishna taught it in the latter clause due to the first clause, so that they would be parallel stylistically, and no novelty is necessary in the latter clause.

讗诇讗 讗讬 讗诪专转 诇讗 讚专讬砖讗 讚讜拽讗 讜诇讗 讚住讬驻讗 讚讜拽讗 诇诪讛 诇讬讛 诇诪转谞讬讬讛 讻诇诇

But if you say the first clause is not written specifically and does not teach a novelty, but rather the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, which is permitted even if it does not bring back its foreleg, and you also say the latter clause is not written specifically to teach a novelty, since the definition of birth is already taught in a mishna elsewhere, then why does it need to teach the halakha that the foreleg or head were brought back at all? Perforce, the first clause must be referring to the permitted status of the foreleg and limiting it specifically to the case where it was brought back inside. This contradicts Rav鈥檚 ruling.

诇讗 诇注讜诇诐 讗注讜讘专 讜讻讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱

The Gemara responds: No; actually, the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, but nevertheless, the statement that the fetus brought back its foreleg does teach a novelty. This is similar to that which Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of a cut limb on the fetus鈥檚 body. If the foreleg were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside of the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus鈥檚 body would also be prohibited. Here too, one can explain that the ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not bring back its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is also prohibited.

转讗 砖诪注 讘讛诪讛 讛诪拽砖讛 诇讬诇讚 讛讜爪讬讗 注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讛讞讝讬专讛 讗住讜专 讘讗讻讬诇讛

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a challenge to Rav鈥檚 ruling from a baraita: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth, and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal鈥檚 body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward did the fetus return its foreleg back inside, its consumption is prohibited.

讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讞转讻讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 砖讘讞讜抓 讟诪讗 讜讗住讜专 讜砖讘驻谞讬诐 讟讛讜专 讜诪讜转专

If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and one cut it off, and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, then the part of the foreleg that was outside and was cut off is ritually impure and its consumption is prohibited, as it has the status of a limb cut from a living animal, which is forbidden. And the rest of the fetus that was inside is ritually pure and its consumption is permitted by virtue the slaughter of the mother animal.

砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讞转讻讜

If one slaughtered its mother and only afterward cut off the foreleg that had been extended outside,

讛讘砖专 诪讙注 谞讘诇讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

then the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus, excluding the foreleg, is impure due to contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg of the now dead fetus was not permitted through an act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass. It therefore imparts impurity to the rest of the flesh, which was in contact with it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪讙注 讟专驻讛 砖讞讜讟讛

And the Rabbis say: Although the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the foreleg, it does serve to prevent the foreleg from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass. Accordingly, the flesh has the status of having been in contact with a slaughtered tereifa. By Torah law, consumption of the animal is prohibited but it does not impart ritual impurity. The Sages decreed it to be impure in that it disqualifies sacrificial flesh with which it comes in contact.

拽转谞讬 诪讬讛讗 专讬砖讗 讛讜爪讬讗 注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讗讞专 讻讱 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 诪讜转专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讗讗讘专 诇讗 讗注讜讘专

The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav鈥檚 ruling: In any event, the first clause of the baraita teaches: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal鈥檚 body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted. What, is it not referring to the limb, i.e., the foreleg, and the baraita rules that it is permitted, in contradiction to Rav鈥檚 ruling? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to the rest of the fetus.

讗讬 讗注讜讘专 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 砖讞讟 讗转 讗诪讜 讜讗讞专 讻讱 讛讞讝讬专讜 讗住讜专 讘讗讻讬诇讛 讜讗讬 注讜讘专 讗诪讗讬 讗住讜专

The Gemara questions this: If the baraita is referring to the fetus, say the latter clause: If one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward the fetus returned its foreleg inside, its consumption is prohibited. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is referring to the fetus, why should it be prohibited in this case?

讻讚讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱

The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to the fetus, and should be explained in a manner similar to that which Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the fetus鈥檚 body. If the foreleg was severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and outside when it was extended outside the womb, the location of the cut on the fetus鈥檚 body is also prohibited. Here too, one can explain that this ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not return its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is prohibited as well. The foreleg itself, though, is prohibited even if it was brought back inside before the slaughter.

讗讬谞讬 讜讛讗 讻讬 讗转讗 讗讘讬诪讬 诪讘讬 讞讜讝讗讬 讗转讗 讜讗讬讬转讬 诪转谞讬转讗 讘讬讚讬讛 驻专住讛 讛讞讝讬专 讗讻讜诇 驻专住讜转 讛讞讝讬专 讗讻讜诇 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讛讞讝讬专 驻专住讛 讗讻讜诇 驻专住讛

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei 岣zai he came and brought a baraita with him: One of the sources (see 69a) that the slaughter of a pregnant animal also serves to permit the consumption of the fetus is the verse: 鈥淎nd every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat鈥 (Deuteronomy 14:6). The verse mentions both 鈥渉oof鈥 in the singular and 鈥渉ooves鈥 in the plural to teach that sometimes one may eat two hooves and sometimes only one, as follows: If the fetus extended two of its hooves outside the womb, if it returned one hoof one may eat, if it brought back both hooves one may eat. What, is it not that the baraita means that if it brought back one hoof one may eat that hoof, and likewise if it brought back both hooves one may eat both of them, in contradiction to Rav鈥檚 ruling?

诇讗 讛讞讝讬专 驻专住讛 讗讻讜诇 注讜讘专 讗讬 注讜讘专 诪讗讬 讗讬专讬讗 讛讞讝讬专 讗驻讬诇讜 诇讗 讛讞讝讬专 谞诪讬 讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 诇讗 谞爪专讻讛 讗诇讗 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱

The Gemara responds: No, it means that if it brought back one hoof or even both, one may eat the rest of the fetus but not the hooves. The Gemara objects: If it is referring to the permitted status of the fetus, why does it specifically state that it brought back the hoof? Even if it did not bring it back the fetus would be permitted. Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said the ruling of the baraita is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the body of the fetus. If the limb were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside when it was extended outside the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus鈥檚 body would also be prohibited, but only if the fetus had not brought back that limb before the mother animal was slaughtered.

讜讛讗 转专讬 拽专讗讬 拽讗 谞住讬讘 诇讛 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讞讚 诇讗讘专 讜讞讚 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱 诇讗 讞讚 诇诪拽讜诐 讞转讱 讜讞讚 诇拽诇讜讟 讘诪注讬 驻专讛

The Gemara persists: But even given Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k鈥檚 claim the baraita adduces two verses, i.e., the mention of hoof and hooves. What, is it not that one serves to permit the limb, in contradiction to Rav鈥檚 ruling, and the other one serves to permit the location of the cut, in accordance with Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k鈥檚 ruling? The Gemara responds: No; one mention does serve to permit the location of the cut, but the other one serves to permit a fetus with non-cloven hooves [kalut] found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species, it is nevertheless permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother.

讜讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 拽诇讜讟 讘谉 驻专讛 讗住讜专 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讛讬讻讗 讚讬爪讗 诇讗讜讬专 讛注讜诇诐 讗讘诇 讘诪注讬 讗诪讜 砖专讬

And it is necessary to have a specific source to permit this according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species. The verse teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it was still inside its mother鈥檚 womb when the mother was slaughtered, it is permitted.

注讜诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讜讗讘专 注爪诪讜 诪讜转专

搂 The Gemara attempted to challenge Rav鈥檚 ruling that once a limb of a fetus is extended outside the mother animal鈥檚 body it becomes prohibited even if it was then brought back, but did not find a conclusive refutation. It now presents a dissenting opinion: Ulla says that Rabbi Yo岣nan says: And even the limb itself is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 诇注讜诇讗 讜讛讗 专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讗讘专 注爪诪讜 讗住讜专 讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪讗谉 讬讛讬讘 诇谉 诪注驻专讗 讚专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讜诪诇讬谞谉 注讬讬谞讬谉 讗诇讗 讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛讻诇 讛讬讜 讘讻诇诇 讘砖专 讘砖讚讛 讟专驻讛 诇讗 转讗讻诇讜

Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But Rav and Shmuel both say the limb itself is prohibited; how can you say otherwise? Ulla said to him: Who will give us some of the dust of the graves of Rav and Shmuel and we will fill our eyes with it; such is the greatness of those Sages. But I follow the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, and this is what Rabbi Yo岣nan says: Initially one would assume all flesh that is permitted due to being within a certain boundary, e.g., a fetus inside its mother鈥檚 womb, the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order within the Temple courtyard, and the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, was included in the verse: 鈥淎nd flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat鈥 (Exodus 22:30). The verse is interpreted to teach that if such flesh leaves its boundaries it is rendered forbidden, even should it subsequently return.

讻砖驻专讟 诇讱 讛讻转讜讘 讙讘讬 讞讟讗转 砖讬爪转讛 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转讛 讜讞讝专讛 讗住讜专 讞讟讗转 讛讜讗 讚驻专讟 专讞诪谞讗 讘讛 讗讘诇 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讚讜专 砖专讬

Once another verse applies the concept for you specifically with regard to a sin offering, teaching that if it went outside of its boundary and returned it is prohibited (see Leviticus 10:18), then it is apparent that the Merciful One specifically applied the concept to a sin offering. But with regard to all other items that left their boundary, once they are brought back they are permitted, including the limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb and then was brought back.

诪讬转讬讘讬 讘砖专 讘砖讚讛 讟专驻讛 诇讗 转讗讻诇讜 诪讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇驻讬 砖诪爪讬谞讜 讘诪注砖专 砖谞讬 讜讘讻讜专讬诐 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讬爪讗讜 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转谉 讜讞讝专讜 诪讜转专讬谉 讬讻讜诇 讗祝 讝讛 讻谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讟专驻讛

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yo岣nan from a baraita: It is derived from the verse: 鈥淎nd flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat,鈥 that flesh that leaves the boundary in which it is permitted is thereby rendered forbidden like a tereifa. Why must the verse state that it is like a tereifa? The baraita explains: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that even though they went outside of their boundary, which is the city of Jerusalem and the only place where it is permitted to eat them, nevertheless if they are brought back to there they are once again permitted, one might have thought that also with regard to this prohibition, that of flesh that leaves its boundary, it is so, i.e., if it is brought back it once again becomes permitted for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎 tereifa.鈥

诪讗讬 转诇诪讜讚讗 讗诪专 专讘讛 讻讟专驻讛 诪讛 讟专驻讛 讻讬讜谉 砖谞讟专驻讛 砖讜讘 讗讬谉 诇讛 讛讬转专 讗祝 讘砖专 讻讬讜谉 砖讬爪讗 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转讜 砖讜讘 讗讬谉 诇讜 讛讬转专 转讬讜讘转讗 讚注讜诇讗 转讬讜讘转讗

The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation from the term 鈥渁 tereifa鈥? Rabba said: The verse indicates that the prohibition of flesh that left its boundary is like the prohibition of a tereifa. Just as with regard to a tereifa, once an animal is mortally wounded, rendering it a tereifa, it can no longer regain a permitted status, so too with regard to flesh referred to in the verse: Once it has gone outside of its boundary it can no longer regain permitted status. Accordingly, if the limb of a fetus was extended outside the womb it would thereby become permanently prohibited, contradicting the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yo岣nan. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the statement of Ulla is indeed a conclusive refutation.

讗诪专 诪专 诇驻讬 砖诪爪讬谞讜 讘诪注砖专 砖谞讬 讜讘讻讜专讬诐 讛讬讻谉 诪爪讬谞讜

The Gemara analyzes the baraita, which states: The Master said: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that although they left their boundary, if they are brought back there they are again permitted. The Gemara asks: Where did we find this, i.e., what is the source for this halakha?

讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 转讜讻诇 诇讗讻诇 讘砖注专讬讱 诪注砖专 讚讙谞讱 讜讙讜壮 讘砖注专讬讱 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 转讬讻讜诇 讗讘诇 讬爪讗讜 讞讜抓 诇诪讞讬爪转谉 讜讞讝专讜 诪讜转专讬谉

The Gemara explains that it is written: 鈥淵ou may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows that you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand. But you shall eat them before the Lord your God鈥 (Deuteronomy 12:17鈥18). The phrase 鈥渢he tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil鈥 is referring to second tithe, and the phrase 鈥渢he offering of your hand鈥 is referring to first fruits. The verse states that all the items listed may be eaten only 鈥渂efore the Lord your God,鈥 i.e., within the city of Jerusalem. The prohibition stated in the verse is that within your gates, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, you may not eat these items. But by inference, if these items went outside of their boundary, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, and then were brought back, they are permitted.

讘诪注专讘讗 诪转谞讜 讛讻讬 专讘 讗诪专 讬砖 诇讬讚讛 诇讗讘专讬诐 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗讬谉 诇讬讚讛 诇讗讘专讬诐

搂 The Gemara explained the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yo岣nan in the way in which it was taught in Babylonia. The Gemara notes that in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught the dispute like this: Rav says there is a concept of birth with regard to limbs. When a limb is extended outside the womb, it is considered born and is independent of the mother animal. Consequently, it can never be permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. And Rabbi Yo岣nan says that there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs. Since the limb is never considered to have been born, as long as it is inside the mother animal when the mother animal is slaughtered it will be permitted by virtue of that slaughter.

诪讗讬 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗讬讻讗 讘讬谞讬讬讛讜 诇诪讬住专 诪讬注讜讟 讗讘专 砖讘驻谞讬诐

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two versions which explain why Rav deemed the limb forbidden? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case in which only the majority of a limb was extended outside the womb. In that case, the issue is whether or not to prohibit the minority of the limb that remained inside. If the limb is forbidden because it is considered to have been born, the entire limb would be forbidden and not just the part that was extended. If the limb is forbidden because it left its boundary, then only the part that extended outside the womb would be forbidden.

讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 诇讚讘专讬 讛讗讜诪专 讗讬谉 诇讬讚讛 诇讗讘专讬诐 讛讜爪讬讗 讛注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讜讞讝专 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 注讚 砖讛砖诇讬诪讜 诇专讜讘讜 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 谞驻拽 诇讬讛 专讜讘讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讚专 讛讚专

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs, if the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb and brought it back, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and brought it back, and continued to extend parts of its body outside until the total amount that had been outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that ultimately the majority of the fetus has left the womb and the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born, and consequently the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit its being consumed? Or perhaps, since it brought each limb back, the limbs are considered to have been brought back; therefore, the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb and it is not regarded as having been born. In that case, the slaughter of its mother would still permit its being consumed.

讗诐 转诪爪讬 诇讜诪专 讻讬讜谉 讚讛讚专 讛讚专 讛讜爪讬讗 注讜讘专 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讞转讻讛 讜讞讝专 讜讛讜爪讬讗 讗转 讬讚讜 讜讞转讻讛 注讚 砖讛砖诇讬诪讜 诇专讜讘讜 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 讛讗 谞驻讬拽 诇讬讛 专讜讘讗 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 专讜讘讗 讘讘转 讗讞转 讘注讬谞谉

The Gemara asks: If you want to say that since it brought back each limb, they are considered to have been brought back and the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb, the following dilemma still arises: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and someone severed it, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and someone severed it, and this continued with its other limbs until the total amount outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the majority of the fetus has left the womb, the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born and therefore the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit it? Or perhaps, in order for the fetus to be regarded as having been born we require a majority of the fetus to leave simultaneously, which does not exist in this case.

转讗 砖诪注

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna:

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