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Chullin 71

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Summary

The Gemara presents biblical derivations establishing that undomesticated animals (chaya) are included in the legal category of domesticated animals (behema) and vice versa. This crossover applies to kosher signs, crossbreeding laws, sacrificial impurities, and miscarriages.

The Mishna rules that if a fetus dies in utero and a midwife reaches inside and touches it, the midwife contracts seven-day corpse impurity, while the mother remains pure until the fetus emerges.

Rabba establishes that just as absorbed impurity (tuma belua) does not pass on impurity, absorbed purity (tahara beluah cannot become impure. The Gemara seeks biblical and logical sources for these principles, evaluating various kal va-chomer (a fortiori) arguments, including extending this law to animals.

Rava notes that both laws are already stated in Mishnayot concerning a swallowed ring, prompting the Gemara to clarify that Rabba’s unique ruling applies to a case where someone swallows two rings simultaneously – one pure and one impure – and the impure ring does not make the pure one impure.

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Chullin 71

בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה טְמֵאָה, בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה, וּבַלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה אָמַר לִי: חֲבָל עַל בֶּן עַזַּאי שֶׁלֹּא שִׁימֵּשׁ אֶת רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל.

And likewise, a non-kosher behema is included in the category of a non-kosher ḥayya, and a kosher behema is included in the category of a kosher ḥayya. Accordingly, although the verse here is referring to a behema, it is understood to be referring collectively to both a behema and a ḥayya, and teaches that the carcasses of both types impart impurity. And upon hearing this, ben Azzai said to me in these words: Woe [ḥaval] unto ben Azzai, who did not serve Rabbi Yishmael.

חַיָּה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״זֹאת הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכֵלוּ שׁוֹר שֵׂה כְשָׂבִים וְגוֹ׳ אַיָּל וּצְבִי וְיַחְמוּר וְגוֹ׳״, הָא כֵּיצַד? חַיָּה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה.

The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Yishmael’s statement: From where do we derive that according to the Torah, a ḥayya is included in the category of a behema? As it is written: “These are the behema that you may eat: An ox, a sheep, and a goat, a deer, and a gazelle, and a fallow deer, and a wild goat, and an oryx, and an aurochs, and a wild sheep” (Deuteronomy 14:4–5). Despite employing the term “behema,” the verse also lists the deer and the gazelle, which are undomesticated animals. How is this possible? From here it is evident that a ḥayya is included by the Torah in the category of a behema.

בְּהֵמָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ מִכׇּל הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר עַל הָאָרֶץ כֹּל מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה״, הָא כֵּיצַד? בְּהֵמָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה.

From where do we derive that according to the Torah, a behema is included in the category of a ḥayya? As it is written: “These are the ḥayya that you may eat, among all the behema that are on the earth. Whatever parts the hoof” (Leviticus 11:2–3). How is this possible, that the verse mentions a ḥayya and then refers to a behema? This indicates that a domesticated animal is included in the category of a ḥayya by the Torah.

חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – לְסִימָנִים.

The Gemara further clarifies: The principle that a kosher ḥayya is included by the Torah in the category of a kosher behema is relevant with regard to the distinguishing characteristics of kosher animals. The Torah states with regard to a domesticated animal that only a species that chews its cud and has cloven hooves is kosher. Nevertheless, this requirement is understood as a reference to both domesticated and undomesticated animals.

חַיָּה טְמֵאָה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה – לְהַרְבָּעָה.

The principle that a non-kosher ḥayya is included by the Torah in the category of a non-kosher behema is relevant with regard to the prohibition against mating one species with another. The Torah states the prohibition with regard to a behema: “You shall not let your animal [behema] mate with a diverse kind” (Leviticus 19:19). Nevertheless, this is understood as referring to both a behema and a ḥayya.

בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה טְמֵאָה – לְכִדְרַבִּי.

The principle that a non-kosher behema is included by the Torah in the category of a non-kosher ḥayya is relevant with regard to that which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse delineates a case in which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering as an atonement: “A person who touched anything impure, or the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal [ḥayya], or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal [behema], or the carcass of an impure creeping animal, and is guilty, it having being hidden from him that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2). But the nature of the transgression for which the person requires atonement is not apparent from the verse.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אֶקְרָא אֲנִי ״חַיָּה״, בְּהֵמָה לָמָּה נֶאֶמְרָה?

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Since a domesticated animal is also referred to as a ḥayya, it would be sufficient if I would read, i.e., the verse would write, only the clause about a ḥayya, and I would have known that one who touches a carcass of any non-kosher animal is impure. Why, then, is an explicit clause about a behema stated? It serves as the basis for a verbal analogy.

נֶאֶמְרָה כָּאן ״בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה״, מָה לְהַלָּן טוּמְאַת קֹדֶשׁ – אַף כָּאן טוּמְאַת קֹדֶשׁ.

It is stated here, with regard to one who is unaware that he touched an impure item: “Non-kosher behema,” and it is likewise stated below, with regard to one who was aware that he touched an impure item: “Non-kosher behema,” in the following verse: “And when any one shall touch any impure thing, whether it is the impurity of man, or a non-kosher behema, and then eats of the flesh of a peace offering to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from its people” (Leviticus 7:21). Just as below, the verse is referring to the defiling of sacrificial foods, so too here, the reference is to the defiling of sacrificial foods, and therefore one must bring a sliding-scale offering as an atonement.

בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה, לִיצִירָה, דִּתְנַן: הַמַּפֶּלֶת מִין בְּהֵמָה חַיָּה וָעוֹף, בֵּין טְמֵאִין בֵּין טְהוֹרִין, אִם זָכָר – תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר.

The Gemara clarifies the final statement: The principle that a kosher behema is included by the Torah in the category of a kosher ḥayya is relevant with regard to the formation of children. As we learned in a mishna (Nidda 21a): With regard to a woman who miscarries a fetus that appears to be in the form of a type of behema, ḥayya, or bird, whether it had the form of a non-kosher species or a kosher species, if the fetus is a male, then she observes the periods of impurity and purity required for giving birth to a male.

אִם נְקֵבָה – תֵּשֵׁב לִנְקֵבָה.

The mishna continues: And if the fetus is a female, then she observes the periods required for giving birth to a female. After giving birth to a male, a woman is impure for seven days, during which it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse. During the next thirty-three days she may immerse in a ritual bath at any time, after which she is permitted to engage in intercourse even should she then experience a discharge of uterine blood. Nevertheless, during the entire forty-day period she may not enter the Temple or be in contact with consecrated foods. After giving birth to a girl, the length of each of these periods is doubled to fourteen days and sixty-six days, respectively (see Leviticus 12:2–5).

אֵינוֹ יָדוּעַ – תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר וְלִנְקֵבָה,

If the sex of the fetus is unknown, she observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. Accordingly, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse for the fourteen days after birth, after which she immerses in a ritual bath. After that she is permitted to engage in intercourse despite any discharge of uterine blood until the fortieth day after birth, i.e., for thirty-three days following the seven days she would have been prohibited from engaging in intercourse if the fetus was male. The prohibition against entering the Temple, however, continues until eighty days have passed from the birth.

דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara elsewhere (Nidda 22b) explains that Rabbi Meir derives his opinion from the fact that the term “formation” is used to describe both the formation of man: “Then the Lord God formed man” (Genesis 2:7), and the formation of animals and birds: “The Lord God formed every animal [ḥayya] of the field, and every bird of the air” (Genesis 2:19). Furthermore, he holds that the term “ḥayya” is referring to both domesticated and undomesticated animals, and concludes that a woman observes these periods of purity and impurity if the fetus has the form of any of these types of animals.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִצּוּרַת אָדָם אֵינוֹ וָלָד.

And the Rabbis say: Any fetus that is not of human form is not regarded as an offspring with regard to observance of these periods of purity and impurity, and she is permitted to engage in intercourse provided she does not experience a discharge of uterine blood.

וּלְרַבָּנַן, הַאי קְרָא לְמָה לִי?

§ The Gemara returns to explaining the opinion of the Rabbis, cited in the mishna, who hold that a dead fetus found inside its mother’s womb does not impart impurity, irrespective of whether it is of a kosher or a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees and holds that a dead fetus inside a non-kosher animal imparts impurity. He derives this from the verse: “A person who touched anything impure, or the carcass of a non-kosher ḥayya, or the carcass of a non-kosher behema, or the carcass of an impure creeping animal, and is guilty” (Leviticus 5:2), which is referring only to non-kosher animals. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, why do I need this verse?

כּוּלֵּיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי הוּא דַּאֲתָא.

The Gemara answers: The entire verse comes to teach that which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught in the baraita cited earlier, that the verse obligates one to bring a sliding-scale offering only in cases where one partook of consecrated foods or entered the Temple while in a state of impurity of which one was unaware.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמֵּת וְלָדָהּ בְּתוֹךְ מֵעֶיהָ, וּפָשְׁטָה חַיָּה אֶת יָדָהּ וְנָגְעָה בּוֹ – הַחַיָּה טְמֵאָה טוּמְאַת שִׁבְעָה, וְהָאִשָּׁה טְהוֹרָה עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא הַוָּלָד.

MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose fetus died in her womb and the midwife extended her hand into the womb and touched the fetus, the midwife is thereby rendered impure with the seven-day impurity imparted by a corpse, and the woman remains ritually pure until the offspring emerges from the womb.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבָּה: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁטּוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה, כָּךְ טׇהֳרָה בְּלוּעָה אֵינָהּ מִיטַּמְּאָה.

GEMARA: Rabba says: Just as a ritually impure item that is encapsulated within a body does not impart impurity to an item that comes in contact with it, so too, a ritually pure item that is encapsulated within a body cannot be rendered impure if it comes in contact with an impure item. For example, if one swallowed a ring that was ritually pure and then entered a tent containing a corpse, the ring would not be rendered impure.

טוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהָאֹכֵל מִנִּבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו״, מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דַּאֲכַל סָמוּךְ לִשְׁקִיעַת הַחַמָּה, וְקָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא טָהוֹר.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that an encapsulated impure item does not impart impurity? As it is written: “And one who eats of its carcass shall wash his clothes, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:40), i.e., he must immerse his body and garments in a ritual bath, and he then becomes pure at sunset. Are we not dealing even with a case where one ate from the carcass close to sunset and then immersed? And yet the Merciful One states that he is pure once the sun sets, despite the fact that his stomach still contains pieces of the carcass that have not yet been digested. If so, it is apparent that an encapsulated impure item does not impart impurity.

וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּלָא חַזְיָא לְגֵר.

The Gemara challenges: But perhaps it is different there, as with regard to the prohibition against eating a carcass the Torah states: “You shall not eat any carcass; you may give it to the gentile resident who is in your cities” (Deuteronomy 14:21). The juxtaposition of the two parts of the verse teaches that the prohibition is limited to a carcass that is fit to be given to a gentile resident, i.e., it is fit for human consumption. Accordingly, perhaps the carcass that the person ate does not impart impurity, as it is no longer fit for a gentile resident, i.e., it is now unsuitable for human consumption.

הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ, עַד לְכֶלֶב – שַׁפִּיר.

The Gemara comments that the effectiveness of the proof depends on whether a carcass can impart impurity to a person despite its not being fit for human consumption: This proof works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: A carcass imparts impurity to both this, a person, and that, food, even if it is unfit for human consumption, until it is no longer fit for consumption by a dog. According to this opinion the proof is understood well, as the carcass in the person’s stomach still has the ability to impart impurity to him because it is still fit for consumption by a dog. Therefore, it is apparent that the only reason it does not impart impurity is that it is encapsulated within his body.

אֶלָּא לְבַר פְּדָא, דְּאָמַר: טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה לְגֵר, וְטוּמְאָה קַלָּה עַד לְכֶלֶב – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חַזְיָא לְגֵר הוּא!

But according to the opinion of bar Padda, who says a carcass has the severe form of ritual impurity, which can impart impurity to people only while it is still fit to be eaten by a gentile resident and it has the light form of ritual impurity even until the point that it is no longer fit for consumption by a dog, this proof is flawed. This is because it is possible the carcass in the person’s stomach does not render him impure simply because it is no longer fit for human consumption. Can one claim that the carcass cannot impart impurity because it is no longer fit for a gentile resident?

נְהִי דְּלָא חַזְיָא בְּפָנָיו, שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו מִיחַזְיָא חַזְיָא לֵיהּ.

Granted that the carcass is not fit to be eaten by someone when it was eaten in his presence, as he is aware that it was swallowed and considers it disgusting to eat a swallowed item, but it is still sometimes fit for a person to eat when it was eaten not in his presence and he is unaware that it had been previously swallowed. This is possible where one consumed a small piece of food and did not chew it prior to swallowing. The Gemara concedes this point and therefore accepts the proof.

אַשְׁכְּחַן טוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה, טׇהֳרָה בְּלוּעָה מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an encapsulated impure item does not impart impurity. From where do we derive that a pure item that is encapsulated within another body cannot be rendered impure if it comes in contact with an impure item?

קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה כְּלִי חֶרֶס הַמּוּקָּף צָמִיד פָּתִיל, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַצִּיל עַל טוּמְאָה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ מִלְּטַמֵּא, דְּאָמַר מָר: טוּמְאָה רְצוּצָה בּוֹקַעַת וְעוֹלָה עַד לָרָקִיעַ – מַצִּיל עַל טׇהֳרָה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ מִלְּטַמֵּא,

The Gemara explains: It is derived through an a fortiori inference: If an earthenware vessel that is closed with a tightly sealed cover, which does not shield, i.e., prevent, the impure piece of a corpse contained within it from imparting impurity to other items in the same tent as it; the Gemara interrupts the explication of the inference and clarifies: As the Master said: The impure piece of a corpse that is in a tight space; e.g., it is buried in the ground and there is not a handbreadth of hollow space above it, beneath the dirt, breaks through the earth above it and ascends up to the heavens, imparting impurity in that path. The Gemara resumes the explication of the inference: Although the tightly sealed earthenware vessel does not shield the impure item, it does shield a pure item contained within it from being rendered impure (see Numbers 19:15).

אָדָם שֶׁמַּצִּיל עַל טוּמְאָה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ מִלְּטַמֵּא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמַּצִּיל עַל טׇהֳרָה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ מִלִּיטַּמֵּא?

Then with regard to a person, who does shield the impurity of a piece of a corpse contained within him from imparting impurity to other items in the same tent, as the Gemara derived above, is it not logical that he shields a pure item contained within him from being rendered impure?

מָה לִכְלִי חֶרֶס, שֶׁכֵּן אֵין מִטַּמֵּא מִגַּבּוֹ, תֹּאמַר בָּאָדָם שֶׁמִּטַּמֵּא מִגַּבּוֹ?

The Gemara challenges the inference: What is notable about an earthenware vessel? It is notable in that it cannot become impure through a source of impurity coming in contact with its exterior. Can you say, then, that it is comparable to a person, who can become impure through a source of impurity coming in contact with his exterior? Since here the halakhot concerning impurity of a person are more stringent than those concerning an earthenware vessel, one cannot apply to a person a leniency with regard to an earthenware vessel.

אַטּוּ אֲנַן מִגַּבּוֹ קָאָמְרִינַן? מִתּוֹכוֹ קָאָמְרִינַן!

The Gemara responds: Is that to say we are speaking of rendering an item impure through a source of impurity coming in contact with its exterior? We are in fact speaking of where the impurity comes in contact with its interior. For such cases, it is reasonable to compare the case of a person with an earthenware vessel.

אַדְּרַבָּה, כְּלִי חֶרֶס חָמוּר, שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמֵּא מֵאֲוִירוֹ.

The Gemara adds: On the contrary, the contraction of impurity by an earthenware vessel is more stringent than that of a person, as it becomes impure through the presence of a source of impurity in its airspace, even if the source does not touch the vessel itself. By contrast, a person is rendered impure from a source of impurity in his airspace, e.g., in his mouth, only if it actually touches him, and the a fortiori inference remains valid.

אַשְׁכְּחַן בָּלוּעַ דִּלְמַעְלָה, בָּלוּעַ דִּלְמַטָּה מְנָלַן? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה לְמַעְלָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה עִיכּוּל – מַצִּיל, לְמַטָּה שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה עִיכּוּל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמַּצִּיל?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an impure item encapsulated in a body that entered it from above, i.e., through the mouth, does not impart impurity. From where do we derive that an impure item encapsulated in a body that entered it from below, i.e., through the rectum, also does not impart impurity? The Gemara answers: It is derived through an a fortiori inference: And if, when the impure item enters from above, through the mouth, which is a place that does not digest the food, the body nevertheless shields the impure item from imparting impurity, then with regard to a case where the impure item enters from below, which is a place that does digest food, is it not logical that the body should shield it from imparting impurity?

כְּלוּם עוֹשֶׂה עִיכּוּל לְמַטָּה אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי מַעְלָה? אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, עִיכּוּל דִּלְמַטָּה רַב.

The Gemara challenges the basis of the inference: Isn’t digestion performed below only by means of the chewing and digestive functions of the body above? The Gemara explains: Even so, the digestion performed below is greater than that performed above.

אַשְׁכְּחַן בָּלוּעַ דְּאָדָם, בָּלוּעַ דִּבְהֵמָה מְנָלַן? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אָדָם שֶׁמִּטַּמֵּא מֵחַיִּים מַצִּיל בְּבָלוּעַ, בְּהֵמָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה מֵחַיִּים – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתַּצִּיל בְּבָלוּעַ?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an impure item encapsulated in the body of a person does not impart impurity; from where do we derive that an impure item encapsulated in the body of an animal does not impart impurity? The Gemara answers: It is derived through an a fortiori inference: If the body of a person, who can impart impurity even while he is still alive, e.g., if he is a leper or a zav, nevertheless shields the impure item encapsulated inside him from imparting impurity, then with regard to an animal, which does not impart impurity while it is alive, is it not logical that it should shield an impure item encapsulated inside it from imparting impurity?

מָה לְאָדָם, שֶׁכֵּן צָרִיךְ שְׁהִיָּיה בְּבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע, תֹּאמַר בִּבְהֵמָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה שְׁהִיָּיה בְּבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע?

The Gemara challenges the inference: What is notable about the impurity of a person? It is notable in that if he entered a leprous house, in order for his garment to be rendered impure he needs to remain in the leprous house for a minimal period of time (see Leviticus 14:33–53). Can you say, then, that it is comparable to an animal, which does not need to remain in a leprous house for a minimal period of time? Rather, any utensils placed upon it are rendered impure immediately upon its entry. Since here the halakhot concerning impurity of an animal are more stringent than those concerning a person, one cannot necessarily apply to an animal a leniency with regard to a person.

בְּהֵמָה דְּאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה שְׁהִיָּיה בְּבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? לְכֵלִים שֶׁעַל גַּבָּהּ. אָדָם נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵי!

The Gemara responds: When it is stated about an animal that it does not need to remain in a leprous house for a minimal period of time, with regard to what halakha was that said? A living animal itself cannot be impure. Perforce, the statement is referring to utensils that are placed upon its back, and they are rendered impure immediately upon entry. But in this regard there is no difference between animals and people: A person as well does not need to remain in the leprous house for a minimal period of time in order to render impure any utensils placed on his back. Rather, they are rendered impure immediately upon entry.

דִּתְנַן: הַנִּכְנָס לְבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע וְכֵלָיו עַל כְּתֵפָיו, וְסַנְדָּלָיו וְטַבְּעוֹתָיו בְּיָדָיו – הוּא וְהֵן טְמֵאִין מִיָּד. הָיָה לָבוּשׁ כֵּלָיו וְסַנְדָּלָיו בְּרַגְלָיו וְטַבְּעוֹתָיו בְּאֶצְבָּעוֹ – הוּא טָמֵא מִיָּד, וְהֵן טְהוֹרִין עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁהֶא בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס, פַּת חִטִּים וְלֹא פַּת שְׂעוֹרִים, מֵיסֵב וְאוֹכֵל בְּלִיפְתָּן.

This is as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 13:9): With regard to one who enters a leprous house with his clothes resting on his shoulders but who is not wearing them in the normal manner, and his sandals and his rings are in his hands, both he and they, the clothes, sandals, and rings, are rendered ritually impure immediately. If he was dressed in his clothes, and his sandals were on his feet and his rings were on his fingers, he is rendered impure immediately upon entering the house, but they, the clothes, sandals, and rings, remain pure until he remains in the house for the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. This calculation is made with wheat bread and not with barley bread, which takes more time to eat than wheat bread. In addition, the calculation is made with regard to one who is reclining, and eating the bread together with a relish usually consumed with bread, which hastens the eating.

אָמַר רָבָא: תַּרְוַיְיהוּ תְּנַנְהִי, טוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה תְּנֵינָא, טׇהֳרָה בְּלוּעָה תְּנֵינָא!

§ Rabba stated above that an encapsulated impure item cannot impart impurity and that an item that is ritually pure that is encapsulated within another body cannot be rendered impure. Rava said: Why is this statement necessary? We learn both halakhot in a mishna: We learn about an encapsulated impure item, and we learn about an encapsulated pure item.

טוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה – דִּתְנַן: בָּלַע טַבַּעַת טְמֵאָה, טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל בִּתְרוּמָתוֹ; הֱקִיאָהּ – טְמֵאָה, וְטִמְּאַתּוּ.

Rava elaborates: With regard to an encapsulated impure item, the halakha is as we learned (Mikvaot 10:8): If someone swallowed a ring that was impure due to having been in contact with a corpse, he is thereby rendered impure. To render himself pure he immerses and then he may partake of his teruma, despite the fact that the impure ring is still inside him. The reason this is permitted is that since the ring is encapsulated inside the person’s body it cannot impart impurity. If he vomited out this ring it remains impure, as it was not purified by his immersion, and therefore it renders him impure upon its exit from his body.

טׇהֳרָה בְּלוּעָה תְּנֵינָא, דִּתְנַן: בָּלַע טַבַּעַת טְהוֹרָה, וְנִכְנַס לְאֹהֶל הַמֵּת, וְהִזָּה וְשָׁנָה וְטָבַל וֶהֱקִיאָהּ – הֲרֵי הִיא כְּמָה שֶׁהָיְתָה.

Likewise, we learn the halakha that an encapsulated pure item cannot be rendered impure, as we learn in the same mishna (Mikvaot 10:8): If one swallowed a ritually pure ring and then entered a tent containing a corpse, thereby contracting impurity, and then in order to render him pure someone sprinkled upon him the water that is mixed with the ashes of the red heifer, once on the third day and again on the seventh day as required, and then he immersed, thereby completing the purification process; and then he vomited out the ring, the ring is pure as it always was, i.e., it was not rendered impure from the corpse.

כִּי קָאָמַר רַבָּה, כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּלַע שְׁתֵּי טַבָּעוֹת, אַחַת טְמֵאָה וְאַחַת טְהוֹרָה, דְּלָא מְטַמְּיָא לַהּ טְמֵאָה לִטְהוֹרָה.

The Gemara answers: The cases in the mishna concern the possibility of imparting impurity from the ring to the body within which it is contained and vice versa. But when Rabba was speaking he was referring to imparting impurity from one item to another where both are contained together inside a body, such as where a person swallowed two rings, one impure and one pure, and they came in direct contact with one another. Rabba taught that even in this case the impure ring does not render the pure ring impure.

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“I got my job through the NY Times” was an ad campaign when I was growing up. I can headline “I got my daily Daf shiur and Hadran through the NY Times”. I read the January 4, 2020 feature on Reb. Michelle Farber and Hadran and I have been participating ever since. Thanks NY Times & Hadran!
Deborah Aschheim
Deborah Aschheim

New York, United States

Having never learned Talmud before, I started Daf Yomi in hopes of connecting to the Rabbinic tradition, sharing a daily idea on Instagram (@dafyomiadventures). With Hadran and Sefaria, I slowly gained confidence in my skills and understanding. Now, part of the Pardes Jewish Educators Program, I can’t wait to bring this love of learning with me as I continue to pass it on to my future students.

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Hannah Greenberg

Pennsylvania, United States

At almost 70 I am just beginning my journey with Talmud and Hadran. I began not late, but right when I was called to learn. It is never too late to begin! The understanding patience of staff and participants with more experience and knowledge has been fabulous. The joy of learning never stops and for me. It is a new life, a new light, a new depth of love of The Holy One, Blessed be He.
Deborah Hoffman-Wade
Deborah Hoffman-Wade

Richmond, CA, United States

I’ve been studying Talmud since the ’90s, and decided to take on Daf Yomi two years ago. I wanted to attempt the challenge of a day-to-day, very Jewish activity. Some days are so interesting and some days are so boring. But I’m still here.
Wendy Rozov
Wendy Rozov

Phoenix, AZ, United States

I started last year after completing the Pesach Sugiyot class. Masechet Yoma might seem like a difficult set of topics, but for me made Yom Kippur and the Beit HaMikdash come alive. Liturgy I’d always had trouble connecting with took on new meaning as I gained a sense of real people moving through specific spaces in particular ways. It was the perfect introduction; I am so grateful for Hadran!

Debbie Engelen-Eigles
Debbie Engelen-Eigles

Minnesota, United States

I began my journey two years ago at the beginning of this cycle of the daf yomi. It has been an incredible, challenging experience and has given me a new perspective of Torah Sh’baal Peh and the role it plays in our lives

linda kalish-marcus
linda kalish-marcus

Efrat, Israel

After enthusing to my friend Ruth Kahan about how much I had enjoyed remote Jewish learning during the earlier part of the pandemic, she challenged me to join her in learning the daf yomi cycle. I had always wanted to do daf yomi but now had no excuse. The beginning was particularly hard as I had never studied Talmud but has become easier, as I have gained some familiarity with it.

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Susan Vishner

Brookline, United States

In January 2020, my teaching partner at IDC suggested we do daf yomi. Thanks to her challenge, I started learning daily from Rabbanit Michelle. It’s a joy to be part of the Hadran community. (It’s also a tikkun: in 7th grade, my best friend and I tied for first place in a citywide gemara exam, but we weren’t invited to the celebration because girls weren’t supposed to be learning gemara).

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Sara Averick

Jerusalem, Israel

I began learning the daf in January 2022. I initially “flew under the radar,” sharing my journey with my husband and a few close friends. I was apprehensive – who, me? Gemara? Now, 2 years in, I feel changed. The rigor of a daily commitment frames my days. The intellectual engagement enhances my knowledge. And the virtual community of learners has become a new family, weaving a glorious tapestry.

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Gitta Jaroslawicz-Neufeld

Far Rockaway, United States

Inspired by Hadran’s first Siyum ha Shas L’Nashim two years ago, I began daf yomi right after for the next cycle. As to this extraordinary journey together with Hadran..as TS Eliot wrote “We must not cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we began and to know the place for the first time.

Susan Handelman
Susan Handelman

Jerusalem, Israel

I started learning Jan 2020 when I heard the new cycle was starting. I had tried during the last cycle and didn’t make it past a few weeks. Learning online from old men didn’t speak to my soul and I knew Talmud had to be a soul journey for me. Enter Hadran! Talmud from Rabbanit Michelle Farber from a woman’s perspective, a mother’s perspective and a modern perspective. Motivated to continue!

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Keren Carter

Brentwood, California, United States

I am a Reform rabbi and took Talmud courses in rabbinical school, but I knew there was so much more to learn. It felt inauthentic to serve as a rabbi without having read the entire Talmud, so when the opportunity arose to start Daf Yomi in 2020, I dove in! Thanks to Hadran, Daf Yomi has enriched my understanding of rabbinic Judaism and deepened my love of Jewish text & tradition. Todah rabbah!

Rabbi Nicki Greninger
Rabbi Nicki Greninger

California, United States

I was exposed to Talmud in high school, but I was truly inspired after my daughter and I decided to attend the Women’s Siyum Shas in 2020. We knew that this was a historic moment. We were blown away, overcome with emotion at the euphoria of the revolution. Right then, I knew I would continue. My commitment deepened with the every-morning Virtual Beit Midrash on Zoom with R. Michelle.

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Adina Hagege

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I tried Daf Yomi in the middle of the last cycle after realizing I could listen to Michelle’s shiurim online. It lasted all of 2 days! Then the new cycle started just days before my father’s first yahrzeit and my youngest daughter’s bat mitzvah. It seemed the right time for a new beginning. My family, friends, colleagues are immensely supportive!

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Catriella Freedman

Zichron Yaakov, Israel

In January 2020, my chevruta suggested that we “up our game. Let’s do Daf Yomi” – and she sent me the Hadran link. I lost my job (and went freelance), there was a pandemic, and I am still opening the podcast with my breakfast coffee, or after Shabbat with popcorn. My Aramaic is improving. I will need a new bookcase, though.

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Rhondda May

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I started learning at the start of this cycle, and quickly fell in love. It has become such an important part of my day, enriching every part of my life.

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Naomi Niederhoffer

Toronto, Canada

I started learning Daf Yomi in January 2020 after watching my grandfather, Mayer Penstein z”l, finish shas with the previous cycle. My grandfather made learning so much fun was so proud that his grandchildren wanted to join him. I was also inspired by Ilana Kurshan’s book, If All the Seas Were Ink. Two years in, I can say that it has enriched my life in so many ways.

Leeza Hirt Wilner
Leeza Hirt Wilner

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I’ve been studying Talmud since the ’90s, and decided to take on Daf Yomi two years ago. I wanted to attempt the challenge of a day-to-day, very Jewish activity. Some days are so interesting and some days are so boring. But I’m still here.
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Sarene Shanus

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I started my journey on the day I realized that the Siyum was happening in Yerushalayim and I was missing out. What? I told myself. How could I have not known about this? How can I have missed out on this opportunity? I decided that moment, I would start Daf Yomi and Nach Yomi the very next day. I am so grateful to Hadran. I am changed forever because I learn Gemara with women. Thank you.

Linda Brownstein
Linda Brownstein

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I had no formal learning in Talmud until I began my studies in the Joint Program where in 1976 I was one of the few, if not the only, woman talmud major. It was superior training for law school and enabled me to approach my legal studies with a foundation . In 2018, I began daf yomi listening to Rabbanit MIchelle’s pod cast and my daily talmud studies are one of the highlights of my life.

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Terri Krivosha

Minneapolis, United States

Chullin 71

בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה טְמֵאָה, בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה, וּבַלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה אָמַר לִי: חֲבָל עַל בֶּן עַזַּאי שֶׁלֹּא שִׁימֵּשׁ אֶת רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל.

And likewise, a non-kosher behema is included in the category of a non-kosher ḥayya, and a kosher behema is included in the category of a kosher ḥayya. Accordingly, although the verse here is referring to a behema, it is understood to be referring collectively to both a behema and a ḥayya, and teaches that the carcasses of both types impart impurity. And upon hearing this, ben Azzai said to me in these words: Woe [ḥaval] unto ben Azzai, who did not serve Rabbi Yishmael.

חַיָּה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״זֹאת הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכֵלוּ שׁוֹר שֵׂה כְשָׂבִים וְגוֹ׳ אַיָּל וּצְבִי וְיַחְמוּר וְגוֹ׳״, הָא כֵּיצַד? חַיָּה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה.

The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Yishmael’s statement: From where do we derive that according to the Torah, a ḥayya is included in the category of a behema? As it is written: “These are the behema that you may eat: An ox, a sheep, and a goat, a deer, and a gazelle, and a fallow deer, and a wild goat, and an oryx, and an aurochs, and a wild sheep” (Deuteronomy 14:4–5). Despite employing the term “behema,” the verse also lists the deer and the gazelle, which are undomesticated animals. How is this possible? From here it is evident that a ḥayya is included by the Torah in the category of a behema.

בְּהֵמָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ מִכׇּל הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר עַל הָאָרֶץ כֹּל מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה״, הָא כֵּיצַד? בְּהֵמָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה.

From where do we derive that according to the Torah, a behema is included in the category of a ḥayya? As it is written: “These are the ḥayya that you may eat, among all the behema that are on the earth. Whatever parts the hoof” (Leviticus 11:2–3). How is this possible, that the verse mentions a ḥayya and then refers to a behema? This indicates that a domesticated animal is included in the category of a ḥayya by the Torah.

חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – לְסִימָנִים.

The Gemara further clarifies: The principle that a kosher ḥayya is included by the Torah in the category of a kosher behema is relevant with regard to the distinguishing characteristics of kosher animals. The Torah states with regard to a domesticated animal that only a species that chews its cud and has cloven hooves is kosher. Nevertheless, this requirement is understood as a reference to both domesticated and undomesticated animals.

חַיָּה טְמֵאָה בִּכְלַל בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה – לְהַרְבָּעָה.

The principle that a non-kosher ḥayya is included by the Torah in the category of a non-kosher behema is relevant with regard to the prohibition against mating one species with another. The Torah states the prohibition with regard to a behema: “You shall not let your animal [behema] mate with a diverse kind” (Leviticus 19:19). Nevertheless, this is understood as referring to both a behema and a ḥayya.

בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה טְמֵאָה – לְכִדְרַבִּי.

The principle that a non-kosher behema is included by the Torah in the category of a non-kosher ḥayya is relevant with regard to that which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse delineates a case in which one is obligated to bring a sliding-scale offering as an atonement: “A person who touched anything impure, or the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal [ḥayya], or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal [behema], or the carcass of an impure creeping animal, and is guilty, it having being hidden from him that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2). But the nature of the transgression for which the person requires atonement is not apparent from the verse.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אֶקְרָא אֲנִי ״חַיָּה״, בְּהֵמָה לָמָּה נֶאֶמְרָה?

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Since a domesticated animal is also referred to as a ḥayya, it would be sufficient if I would read, i.e., the verse would write, only the clause about a ḥayya, and I would have known that one who touches a carcass of any non-kosher animal is impure. Why, then, is an explicit clause about a behema stated? It serves as the basis for a verbal analogy.

נֶאֶמְרָה כָּאן ״בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה״, מָה לְהַלָּן טוּמְאַת קֹדֶשׁ – אַף כָּאן טוּמְאַת קֹדֶשׁ.

It is stated here, with regard to one who is unaware that he touched an impure item: “Non-kosher behema,” and it is likewise stated below, with regard to one who was aware that he touched an impure item: “Non-kosher behema,” in the following verse: “And when any one shall touch any impure thing, whether it is the impurity of man, or a non-kosher behema, and then eats of the flesh of a peace offering to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from its people” (Leviticus 7:21). Just as below, the verse is referring to the defiling of sacrificial foods, so too here, the reference is to the defiling of sacrificial foods, and therefore one must bring a sliding-scale offering as an atonement.

בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בִּכְלַל חַיָּה טְהוֹרָה, לִיצִירָה, דִּתְנַן: הַמַּפֶּלֶת מִין בְּהֵמָה חַיָּה וָעוֹף, בֵּין טְמֵאִין בֵּין טְהוֹרִין, אִם זָכָר – תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר.

The Gemara clarifies the final statement: The principle that a kosher behema is included by the Torah in the category of a kosher ḥayya is relevant with regard to the formation of children. As we learned in a mishna (Nidda 21a): With regard to a woman who miscarries a fetus that appears to be in the form of a type of behema, ḥayya, or bird, whether it had the form of a non-kosher species or a kosher species, if the fetus is a male, then she observes the periods of impurity and purity required for giving birth to a male.

אִם נְקֵבָה – תֵּשֵׁב לִנְקֵבָה.

The mishna continues: And if the fetus is a female, then she observes the periods required for giving birth to a female. After giving birth to a male, a woman is impure for seven days, during which it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse. During the next thirty-three days she may immerse in a ritual bath at any time, after which she is permitted to engage in intercourse even should she then experience a discharge of uterine blood. Nevertheless, during the entire forty-day period she may not enter the Temple or be in contact with consecrated foods. After giving birth to a girl, the length of each of these periods is doubled to fourteen days and sixty-six days, respectively (see Leviticus 12:2–5).

אֵינוֹ יָדוּעַ – תֵּשֵׁב לְזָכָר וְלִנְקֵבָה,

If the sex of the fetus is unknown, she observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. Accordingly, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse for the fourteen days after birth, after which she immerses in a ritual bath. After that she is permitted to engage in intercourse despite any discharge of uterine blood until the fortieth day after birth, i.e., for thirty-three days following the seven days she would have been prohibited from engaging in intercourse if the fetus was male. The prohibition against entering the Temple, however, continues until eighty days have passed from the birth.

דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara elsewhere (Nidda 22b) explains that Rabbi Meir derives his opinion from the fact that the term “formation” is used to describe both the formation of man: “Then the Lord God formed man” (Genesis 2:7), and the formation of animals and birds: “The Lord God formed every animal [ḥayya] of the field, and every bird of the air” (Genesis 2:19). Furthermore, he holds that the term “ḥayya” is referring to both domesticated and undomesticated animals, and concludes that a woman observes these periods of purity and impurity if the fetus has the form of any of these types of animals.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִצּוּרַת אָדָם אֵינוֹ וָלָד.

And the Rabbis say: Any fetus that is not of human form is not regarded as an offspring with regard to observance of these periods of purity and impurity, and she is permitted to engage in intercourse provided she does not experience a discharge of uterine blood.

וּלְרַבָּנַן, הַאי קְרָא לְמָה לִי?

§ The Gemara returns to explaining the opinion of the Rabbis, cited in the mishna, who hold that a dead fetus found inside its mother’s womb does not impart impurity, irrespective of whether it is of a kosher or a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagrees and holds that a dead fetus inside a non-kosher animal imparts impurity. He derives this from the verse: “A person who touched anything impure, or the carcass of a non-kosher ḥayya, or the carcass of a non-kosher behema, or the carcass of an impure creeping animal, and is guilty” (Leviticus 5:2), which is referring only to non-kosher animals. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, why do I need this verse?

כּוּלֵּיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי הוּא דַּאֲתָא.

The Gemara answers: The entire verse comes to teach that which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught in the baraita cited earlier, that the verse obligates one to bring a sliding-scale offering only in cases where one partook of consecrated foods or entered the Temple while in a state of impurity of which one was unaware.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמֵּת וְלָדָהּ בְּתוֹךְ מֵעֶיהָ, וּפָשְׁטָה חַיָּה אֶת יָדָהּ וְנָגְעָה בּוֹ – הַחַיָּה טְמֵאָה טוּמְאַת שִׁבְעָה, וְהָאִשָּׁה טְהוֹרָה עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא הַוָּלָד.

MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose fetus died in her womb and the midwife extended her hand into the womb and touched the fetus, the midwife is thereby rendered impure with the seven-day impurity imparted by a corpse, and the woman remains ritually pure until the offspring emerges from the womb.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבָּה: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁטּוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה, כָּךְ טׇהֳרָה בְּלוּעָה אֵינָהּ מִיטַּמְּאָה.

GEMARA: Rabba says: Just as a ritually impure item that is encapsulated within a body does not impart impurity to an item that comes in contact with it, so too, a ritually pure item that is encapsulated within a body cannot be rendered impure if it comes in contact with an impure item. For example, if one swallowed a ring that was ritually pure and then entered a tent containing a corpse, the ring would not be rendered impure.

טוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהָאֹכֵל מִנִּבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו״, מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דַּאֲכַל סָמוּךְ לִשְׁקִיעַת הַחַמָּה, וְקָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא טָהוֹר.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that an encapsulated impure item does not impart impurity? As it is written: “And one who eats of its carcass shall wash his clothes, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:40), i.e., he must immerse his body and garments in a ritual bath, and he then becomes pure at sunset. Are we not dealing even with a case where one ate from the carcass close to sunset and then immersed? And yet the Merciful One states that he is pure once the sun sets, despite the fact that his stomach still contains pieces of the carcass that have not yet been digested. If so, it is apparent that an encapsulated impure item does not impart impurity.

וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּלָא חַזְיָא לְגֵר.

The Gemara challenges: But perhaps it is different there, as with regard to the prohibition against eating a carcass the Torah states: “You shall not eat any carcass; you may give it to the gentile resident who is in your cities” (Deuteronomy 14:21). The juxtaposition of the two parts of the verse teaches that the prohibition is limited to a carcass that is fit to be given to a gentile resident, i.e., it is fit for human consumption. Accordingly, perhaps the carcass that the person ate does not impart impurity, as it is no longer fit for a gentile resident, i.e., it is now unsuitable for human consumption.

הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ, עַד לְכֶלֶב – שַׁפִּיר.

The Gemara comments that the effectiveness of the proof depends on whether a carcass can impart impurity to a person despite its not being fit for human consumption: This proof works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: A carcass imparts impurity to both this, a person, and that, food, even if it is unfit for human consumption, until it is no longer fit for consumption by a dog. According to this opinion the proof is understood well, as the carcass in the person’s stomach still has the ability to impart impurity to him because it is still fit for consumption by a dog. Therefore, it is apparent that the only reason it does not impart impurity is that it is encapsulated within his body.

אֶלָּא לְבַר פְּדָא, דְּאָמַר: טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה לְגֵר, וְטוּמְאָה קַלָּה עַד לְכֶלֶב – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חַזְיָא לְגֵר הוּא!

But according to the opinion of bar Padda, who says a carcass has the severe form of ritual impurity, which can impart impurity to people only while it is still fit to be eaten by a gentile resident and it has the light form of ritual impurity even until the point that it is no longer fit for consumption by a dog, this proof is flawed. This is because it is possible the carcass in the person’s stomach does not render him impure simply because it is no longer fit for human consumption. Can one claim that the carcass cannot impart impurity because it is no longer fit for a gentile resident?

נְהִי דְּלָא חַזְיָא בְּפָנָיו, שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו מִיחַזְיָא חַזְיָא לֵיהּ.

Granted that the carcass is not fit to be eaten by someone when it was eaten in his presence, as he is aware that it was swallowed and considers it disgusting to eat a swallowed item, but it is still sometimes fit for a person to eat when it was eaten not in his presence and he is unaware that it had been previously swallowed. This is possible where one consumed a small piece of food and did not chew it prior to swallowing. The Gemara concedes this point and therefore accepts the proof.

אַשְׁכְּחַן טוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה, טׇהֳרָה בְּלוּעָה מְנָלַן?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an encapsulated impure item does not impart impurity. From where do we derive that a pure item that is encapsulated within another body cannot be rendered impure if it comes in contact with an impure item?

קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה כְּלִי חֶרֶס הַמּוּקָּף צָמִיד פָּתִיל, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַצִּיל עַל טוּמְאָה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ מִלְּטַמֵּא, דְּאָמַר מָר: טוּמְאָה רְצוּצָה בּוֹקַעַת וְעוֹלָה עַד לָרָקִיעַ – מַצִּיל עַל טׇהֳרָה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ מִלְּטַמֵּא,

The Gemara explains: It is derived through an a fortiori inference: If an earthenware vessel that is closed with a tightly sealed cover, which does not shield, i.e., prevent, the impure piece of a corpse contained within it from imparting impurity to other items in the same tent as it; the Gemara interrupts the explication of the inference and clarifies: As the Master said: The impure piece of a corpse that is in a tight space; e.g., it is buried in the ground and there is not a handbreadth of hollow space above it, beneath the dirt, breaks through the earth above it and ascends up to the heavens, imparting impurity in that path. The Gemara resumes the explication of the inference: Although the tightly sealed earthenware vessel does not shield the impure item, it does shield a pure item contained within it from being rendered impure (see Numbers 19:15).

אָדָם שֶׁמַּצִּיל עַל טוּמְאָה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ מִלְּטַמֵּא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמַּצִּיל עַל טׇהֳרָה שֶׁבְּתוֹכוֹ מִלִּיטַּמֵּא?

Then with regard to a person, who does shield the impurity of a piece of a corpse contained within him from imparting impurity to other items in the same tent, as the Gemara derived above, is it not logical that he shields a pure item contained within him from being rendered impure?

מָה לִכְלִי חֶרֶס, שֶׁכֵּן אֵין מִטַּמֵּא מִגַּבּוֹ, תֹּאמַר בָּאָדָם שֶׁמִּטַּמֵּא מִגַּבּוֹ?

The Gemara challenges the inference: What is notable about an earthenware vessel? It is notable in that it cannot become impure through a source of impurity coming in contact with its exterior. Can you say, then, that it is comparable to a person, who can become impure through a source of impurity coming in contact with his exterior? Since here the halakhot concerning impurity of a person are more stringent than those concerning an earthenware vessel, one cannot apply to a person a leniency with regard to an earthenware vessel.

אַטּוּ אֲנַן מִגַּבּוֹ קָאָמְרִינַן? מִתּוֹכוֹ קָאָמְרִינַן!

The Gemara responds: Is that to say we are speaking of rendering an item impure through a source of impurity coming in contact with its exterior? We are in fact speaking of where the impurity comes in contact with its interior. For such cases, it is reasonable to compare the case of a person with an earthenware vessel.

אַדְּרַבָּה, כְּלִי חֶרֶס חָמוּר, שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמֵּא מֵאֲוִירוֹ.

The Gemara adds: On the contrary, the contraction of impurity by an earthenware vessel is more stringent than that of a person, as it becomes impure through the presence of a source of impurity in its airspace, even if the source does not touch the vessel itself. By contrast, a person is rendered impure from a source of impurity in his airspace, e.g., in his mouth, only if it actually touches him, and the a fortiori inference remains valid.

אַשְׁכְּחַן בָּלוּעַ דִּלְמַעְלָה, בָּלוּעַ דִּלְמַטָּה מְנָלַן? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה לְמַעְלָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה עִיכּוּל – מַצִּיל, לְמַטָּה שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה עִיכּוּל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמַּצִּיל?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an impure item encapsulated in a body that entered it from above, i.e., through the mouth, does not impart impurity. From where do we derive that an impure item encapsulated in a body that entered it from below, i.e., through the rectum, also does not impart impurity? The Gemara answers: It is derived through an a fortiori inference: And if, when the impure item enters from above, through the mouth, which is a place that does not digest the food, the body nevertheless shields the impure item from imparting impurity, then with regard to a case where the impure item enters from below, which is a place that does digest food, is it not logical that the body should shield it from imparting impurity?

כְּלוּם עוֹשֶׂה עִיכּוּל לְמַטָּה אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי מַעְלָה? אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, עִיכּוּל דִּלְמַטָּה רַב.

The Gemara challenges the basis of the inference: Isn’t digestion performed below only by means of the chewing and digestive functions of the body above? The Gemara explains: Even so, the digestion performed below is greater than that performed above.

אַשְׁכְּחַן בָּלוּעַ דְּאָדָם, בָּלוּעַ דִּבְהֵמָה מְנָלַן? קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אָדָם שֶׁמִּטַּמֵּא מֵחַיִּים מַצִּיל בְּבָלוּעַ, בְּהֵמָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה מֵחַיִּים – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתַּצִּיל בְּבָלוּעַ?

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the halakha that an impure item encapsulated in the body of a person does not impart impurity; from where do we derive that an impure item encapsulated in the body of an animal does not impart impurity? The Gemara answers: It is derived through an a fortiori inference: If the body of a person, who can impart impurity even while he is still alive, e.g., if he is a leper or a zav, nevertheless shields the impure item encapsulated inside him from imparting impurity, then with regard to an animal, which does not impart impurity while it is alive, is it not logical that it should shield an impure item encapsulated inside it from imparting impurity?

מָה לְאָדָם, שֶׁכֵּן צָרִיךְ שְׁהִיָּיה בְּבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע, תֹּאמַר בִּבְהֵמָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה שְׁהִיָּיה בְּבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע?

The Gemara challenges the inference: What is notable about the impurity of a person? It is notable in that if he entered a leprous house, in order for his garment to be rendered impure he needs to remain in the leprous house for a minimal period of time (see Leviticus 14:33–53). Can you say, then, that it is comparable to an animal, which does not need to remain in a leprous house for a minimal period of time? Rather, any utensils placed upon it are rendered impure immediately upon its entry. Since here the halakhot concerning impurity of an animal are more stringent than those concerning a person, one cannot necessarily apply to an animal a leniency with regard to a person.

בְּהֵמָה דְּאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה שְׁהִיָּיה בְּבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? לְכֵלִים שֶׁעַל גַּבָּהּ. אָדָם נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵי!

The Gemara responds: When it is stated about an animal that it does not need to remain in a leprous house for a minimal period of time, with regard to what halakha was that said? A living animal itself cannot be impure. Perforce, the statement is referring to utensils that are placed upon its back, and they are rendered impure immediately upon entry. But in this regard there is no difference between animals and people: A person as well does not need to remain in the leprous house for a minimal period of time in order to render impure any utensils placed on his back. Rather, they are rendered impure immediately upon entry.

דִּתְנַן: הַנִּכְנָס לְבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע וְכֵלָיו עַל כְּתֵפָיו, וְסַנְדָּלָיו וְטַבְּעוֹתָיו בְּיָדָיו – הוּא וְהֵן טְמֵאִין מִיָּד. הָיָה לָבוּשׁ כֵּלָיו וְסַנְדָּלָיו בְּרַגְלָיו וְטַבְּעוֹתָיו בְּאֶצְבָּעוֹ – הוּא טָמֵא מִיָּד, וְהֵן טְהוֹרִין עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁהֶא בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס, פַּת חִטִּים וְלֹא פַּת שְׂעוֹרִים, מֵיסֵב וְאוֹכֵל בְּלִיפְתָּן.

This is as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 13:9): With regard to one who enters a leprous house with his clothes resting on his shoulders but who is not wearing them in the normal manner, and his sandals and his rings are in his hands, both he and they, the clothes, sandals, and rings, are rendered ritually impure immediately. If he was dressed in his clothes, and his sandals were on his feet and his rings were on his fingers, he is rendered impure immediately upon entering the house, but they, the clothes, sandals, and rings, remain pure until he remains in the house for the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. This calculation is made with wheat bread and not with barley bread, which takes more time to eat than wheat bread. In addition, the calculation is made with regard to one who is reclining, and eating the bread together with a relish usually consumed with bread, which hastens the eating.

אָמַר רָבָא: תַּרְוַיְיהוּ תְּנַנְהִי, טוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה תְּנֵינָא, טׇהֳרָה בְּלוּעָה תְּנֵינָא!

§ Rabba stated above that an encapsulated impure item cannot impart impurity and that an item that is ritually pure that is encapsulated within another body cannot be rendered impure. Rava said: Why is this statement necessary? We learn both halakhot in a mishna: We learn about an encapsulated impure item, and we learn about an encapsulated pure item.

טוּמְאָה בְּלוּעָה – דִּתְנַן: בָּלַע טַבַּעַת טְמֵאָה, טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל בִּתְרוּמָתוֹ; הֱקִיאָהּ – טְמֵאָה, וְטִמְּאַתּוּ.

Rava elaborates: With regard to an encapsulated impure item, the halakha is as we learned (Mikvaot 10:8): If someone swallowed a ring that was impure due to having been in contact with a corpse, he is thereby rendered impure. To render himself pure he immerses and then he may partake of his teruma, despite the fact that the impure ring is still inside him. The reason this is permitted is that since the ring is encapsulated inside the person’s body it cannot impart impurity. If he vomited out this ring it remains impure, as it was not purified by his immersion, and therefore it renders him impure upon its exit from his body.

טׇהֳרָה בְּלוּעָה תְּנֵינָא, דִּתְנַן: בָּלַע טַבַּעַת טְהוֹרָה, וְנִכְנַס לְאֹהֶל הַמֵּת, וְהִזָּה וְשָׁנָה וְטָבַל וֶהֱקִיאָהּ – הֲרֵי הִיא כְּמָה שֶׁהָיְתָה.

Likewise, we learn the halakha that an encapsulated pure item cannot be rendered impure, as we learn in the same mishna (Mikvaot 10:8): If one swallowed a ritually pure ring and then entered a tent containing a corpse, thereby contracting impurity, and then in order to render him pure someone sprinkled upon him the water that is mixed with the ashes of the red heifer, once on the third day and again on the seventh day as required, and then he immersed, thereby completing the purification process; and then he vomited out the ring, the ring is pure as it always was, i.e., it was not rendered impure from the corpse.

כִּי קָאָמַר רַבָּה, כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּלַע שְׁתֵּי טַבָּעוֹת, אַחַת טְמֵאָה וְאַחַת טְהוֹרָה, דְּלָא מְטַמְּיָא לַהּ טְמֵאָה לִטְהוֹרָה.

The Gemara answers: The cases in the mishna concern the possibility of imparting impurity from the ring to the body within which it is contained and vice versa. But when Rabba was speaking he was referring to imparting impurity from one item to another where both are contained together inside a body, such as where a person swallowed two rings, one impure and one pure, and they came in direct contact with one another. Rabba taught that even in this case the impure ring does not render the pure ring impure.

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